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
KANT'S ETHICS:

THE CLAVIS TO AN INDEX.

INCLUDING EXTRACTS FROM SEVERAL ORIENTAL SACRED SCRIPTURES, AND
FROM CERTAIN GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS.

26.
2184
BY JAMES EDMUNDS.

Jesus answered him: If I spoke ^{*}evil, bear witness of the
evil; but if well, why dost thou smite me?—John, xviii., 23.
(American Bible Union, second revision.)




LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL PRINT.

B2799
E8E2
1889

A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EXTRACTS,

With reference to the paging of the Clavis.



§ 858.—THE LAWS OF MOSES. 1451 B. C.*

Extracts from Exodus begin at page	67
Extracts from Leviticus begin at page	72
Extracts from Deuteronomy begin at page	78

§ 881.—THE LAW† ACCORDING TO ZOROASTER. —†††

Extracts from the Vendidad begin at page	138
Extracts from the Vispered begin at page	151
Extracts from the Yasna begin at page	153
Extracts from the Gathas, in the Yasna, begin at page	159
Extracts from the Khordah-Avesta begin at page	182

§ 949.—THE TEACHING‡ OF THE AWAKENED (BUDDHA). 543 B. C.¶

Extracts from the Dharmapada begin at page	269
--	-----

§ 871.—THE TEACHINGS** OF CONFUCIUS. 478 B. C.††

Extracts from the Great Learning begin at page	103
Extracts from the Doctrine of the Mean begin at page	109
Extracts from the Confucian Analects begin at page	120

§ 1039.—XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES. 399 B. C.‡‡

Extracts from Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates begin at page	324
--	-----

§ 1040.—ARISTOTLE'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 322 B. C.¶¶

Extracts from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics begin at page	411
--	-----

§ 1043.—CICERO'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 43 B. C.***

Extracts from Cicero de Officiis begin at page	511
--	-----

§ 906.—THE SAYINGS OF JESUS. 33 A. D.†††

Extracts from Matthew begin at page	214
Extracts from Mark begin at page	232
Extracts from Luke begin at page	235
Extracts from John begin at page	247

§ 968.—THE COMMANDMENTS††† OF MOHAMMED. 632 A. D.¶¶¶

Extracts from the Koran begin at page	295
---	-----

* Date of the death of Moses, according to the margin of your reference Bible. † See Yasna, xlvii., 4 (page 175 below); Vispered, xviii., 1, 2 (page 152 below); Vendidad, iii., 140, 141 (page 138 below); Khordah-Avesta, xiv., 5 (page 184 below). ‡ See Dharmapada, 183 (page 282 below). § Cingalese date of the death of Buddha; see Am. Cyclop. (1873, vol. iii., page 394), article BUDDHISM. See also Dr. Thomas' Biographical Dictionary (article GAUTAMA, page 1005: "According to the Ceylonese writers, Gautama was born in 624 and died in 543 B. C.;" and note to same: "Koeppen, after a careful and thorough examination of the subject, comes to the conclusion that the death of Sakya Muni should be placed, in round numbers, about two centuries before Asoka (Agoka), and that he (Sakya) was very probably the contemporary of Darius Hystaspes, or Xerxes."); and Chambers's Encyclop. (Lippincott, 1877, vol. ii., pages 402-409, article BUDDHISM). ** See the Confucian Analects, Book VII., chapter xxiv. (page 127 below), and Doctrine of the Mean, xx., 18-21 (pages 115, 116 below). †† Date of the death of Confucius, according to Dr. Thomas' Dictionary of Biography and Mythology, article CONFUCIUS (Lippincott, 1877, page 653). "Born, according to the best authorities, 551 B. C., in the kingdom or state of Loo (included in the modern province of Shantung):" the same (p. 651). The death of Confucius is also stated (in Am. Cyclop., 1874, vol. v., page 238, article CONFUCIUS) 479 B. C. ††† Date of the death of Socrates. See Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. (ed. Morris, 1873, vol. i., page 83: "At the time of his condemnation he was, according to his own account in Plat., *Apol.*, 17 d, more than seventy years old." "He must, therefore, have been born at the latest in 469, or rather certainly before 469.") See also Anthon's Classical Dictionary (Harper, 1862, page 1245, article SOCRATES: "born at Alopece, a village near Athens, B. C. 469.") ||| Date of the death of Aristotle: see Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. (ed. Morris, 1873, vol. i., page 137: "Born 384 B. C. (Olymp. 93. 1) at Stagira (or Stageiros) in Thrace, and son of the physician Nicomachus, became in his eighteenth year (367) a pupil of Plato, and remained such for twenty years"); and Anthon's Class. Dict., article ARISTOTELIS (pages 201-203): "*Nicomachean Ethics*, addressed to his son Nicomachus" (page 203). *** Date of the death of Cicero: see Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. (ed. Morris, 1873, vol. i., page 218: "January 3d, 106—December 7th, 43 B. C."): the treatise *De Officiis* was written in the preceding year (page 219). See Anthon's Class. Dict., article CICERO (page 344-348), where it is stated that he "was born at Arpinum, the native place of Marius, B. C. 107" (page 344). †††† Date of the crucifixion, according to the margin of your reference Bible. ††††† See Koran, xvii., 24-24, 36-41 (pages 303, 304 below). ||||| Date of the death of Mohammed: see Dr. Thomas' Biog. Dict. article MOHAMMED (page 1599): "Born at Mecca about 570 A. D. The year of his birth is not positively ascertained; the authorities are divided between 571 and 569, but the former date appears to be generally regarded as the more probable one." "He died, according to the Arabian historians, on his birthday, the eleventh year of the Hejrah, (632 A. D.) aged sixty-three, or, according to some authorities, sixty-five years" (the same, page 1602). †††††† "Eudoxe, cité par Plin., fait naître Zoroastre six mille ans avant Platon, et Plutarque cinq mille ans avant la guerre de Troie. Suidas, plus modeste, se contente de cinq cents ans. Plin., après avoir cité Eudoxe, conclut par fixer l'époque de Zoroastre peu de temps avant celle de Xerxès. Justin veut, au contraire, qu'il ait vécu au temps de Ninus, treize siècles avant Sardanapale. Apulée le fait contemporain de Cambyse, et veut qu'il ait donné des leçons à Pythagore. Porphyre et Clément d'Alexandrie lui assignent pour époque le règne de Cyrus. Ctesias, enfin, la place au règne de Darius fils d' Hystaspes."—*Dictionnaire de la Conversation et de la Lecture*, (2d edition, Paris, 1866, vol. xvi., page 1053, article ZOROASTRE). "The dates generally given are as follows: Xanthus of Lydia places him about 600 years before the Trojan war; Aristotle and Eudoxus place him 6000 years before Plato; others, again, 5000 years before the Trojan war. Berosus, a Babylonian historian, makes him a Babylonian king, and the founder of a dynasty which reigned between 2200 and 2000 B. C. over Babylon. The Parsees place him at the time of Hystaspes, Darius's father, whom they identify with a king mentioned in the Shah-Namah (q. v.), from whom, however, Hystaspes is totally distinct. This account would place him at about 550 B. C. Yet there is scarcely a doubt that he must be considered to belong to a much earlier age, not later than 1000 B. C.; possibly, he was a contemporary of Moses."—*Chambers's Encyclopedia*, article Zoroaster (Lippincott, 1877, vol. x., page 360). "Traditionally, several of the Gathas are ascribed to Zoroaster, whose date was anterior to B. C. 2000 according to Berosus, and whom other writers place still earlier. (See Aristot. ap. Diog. Laert. Pref. 6; Plin. H. N., xxx., 1; Hermipp. Fr. 79; Xan. Lyd. Fr. 29, etc.) Their style shows them to be considerably anterior to the first Fargard of the Vendidad" [see a few lines below], "which must have been composed before the great migration of the Medes southward from the Caspian region. Haug is inclined to date the Zoroastrian Gathas as early as the time of Moses. (*Essays*, page 255.)"—*George Rawlinson's Five Great Monarchies* (Scribner, Welford & Co., New York, 1873, vol. ii., page 323, note 5), Media, ch. iv. [Of the first Fargard of the Vendidad, Rawlinson says, in note 1, pp. 332, 333.] "the Iranian settlements enumerated in the document extend westward no further than Rhages, or at the utmost to Media Antropatene, which may be indicated by the Varena of § 18. (See Appendix, A). Thus the Arians, when the document was written, had not yet spread into Media Magna, much less into Persia Proper. It must consequently be anterior to the time of the first Shalmaneser (B. C. 858-823), who found Medes and Persians beyond the Zagros range. (See above, page 101.)" "Zerdusht, the prophet, whose era is given very differently by ancient writers and by modern investigators, placed variously between 500 or 600 B. C. (Roeth) and 1200 B. C. (Haug)."—*Chambers's Encyclop.* (Lippincott, 1877, vol. vii., page 299) article PARSEES. "The age of the different works mentioned is fixed by Haug in the following manner: The Gathas about 900 or 1200 B. C.; the larger portion of the Vendidad at about 900 or 1000 B. C.; the younger Yasna about 700-800 B. C.; the latest part of the Vendidad (the Pazend) being written as late as 500 B. C., when the collection of the different parts also seems to have taken place. This computation would give the Zend, or rather the famed Parsee literature, a range of about 800 years, or from 1200-400 B. C. Cf. Haug's *Essays on the Religion of the Parsees* (Bombay, 1862)."—*Chambers's Encyclop.* (edition cited above, vol. x., article ZEN, ad fin. page 341.) See also Max Mueller's *Chips* (Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York, 1874, vol. 1., pages 79-100: "The Veda and Zend-Avesta." See also other essays in the same volume, pages 115-173).

A TABLE OF LANGUAGES,

IN WHICH THE ORIGINAL TEXTS OF THE EXTRACTS ARE FOUND.

ORDER.	FAMILY.	DIVISION.	CLASS.	LANGUAGE.
Monosyllabic.*	{	Semitic.	{ Arabic, or Southern. Hebraic, or Middle.	CHINESE.
				ARABIC.
Inflectional.†	{	Aryan.	{ Indic. Iranic. Italic. Hellenic.	HEBREW.
				PALI.** ZEND.†† LATIN. GREEK.

* See Chambers's Encyclopedia, article PHONOLOGY (Lippincott, 1877, vol. vii., page 484). † See American Encyclopedia, article CHINA, LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE, (Appleton, 1874, vol. iv., page 465), with reference to the question whether Chinese is a monosyllabic language. See also, in the same encyclopedia, the article LANGUAGE vol. x., pages 151, 152. ‡ See Max Mueller's table (from which I take the classification of inflectional languages), in Chambers's Encyclopedia, at the place cited above or in the Appendix to the First Series of Mueller's Lectures on the Science of Language, to which series reference is given in the Encyclopedia. ¶ The New Testament is written in Greek, one of the Aryan or Indo-European languages. ** The Dharmapala is translated from the Pali, from which language the Parnese and Siamese versions of the Buddhist Scriptures are derived. The Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese translations of the Buddhist Scriptures are taken from the Sanscrit. See, besides the first volume of Max Mueller's Chips, the articles BUDDHISM, in Chambers's Encyclopedia and in the American Encyclopedia. †† Old Baktrian. See, besides the places referred to in note ††† on the preceding page, the article PERSIAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE, in Chambers's Encyclopedia, (Lippincott, 1877, vol. vii., pages 425-428), which speaks of "the Zend (the East Iranian or Baktrian language, in two dialects—the 'Gatha idiom,' and the 'ancient' or 'classical Zend');" and the article IRANIC RACES AND LANGUAGES, in the American Encyclopedia; and Rawlinson's Five Great Monarchies, Media, ch. v. (New York, 1873, vol. ii., p. 356 seqq). [“Mula ignoramus, quæ nobis non lateat si veterum lectio nobis esset familiaris.” — 2 Co. Inst. 168 (quoted by Kent)].

God, far from exacting the full penalty of my want of learning, has given me in my own tongue most excellent translations, from which I have taken the extracts contained in the following pages. Let all the glory be ascribed to the Infinite Holiness of God,

KANT'S ETHICS.

By JAMES EDMUNDS.

The Clavis to an Index.

Est enim lex nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine deorum tracta ratio, imperans honesta, prohibens contraria.—CICERO (Philip. xi, 12.—*Ramage*, Beautiful Thoughts from Latin Authors, 2d ed. p. 32). (Ex Officina Elzeviriana, tom. v (Orat. tom. iii) page 485.

[In searching for explications, during three readings of KANT'S ETHICS and of the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, I noted on the margin such references from one section to another as I found serviceable. The framework upon which these references are here set forth, consists of a series of section heads nearly all selected from the text, and constitutes an extended table of contents.]

PRELIMINARY SCHEMA.

I.—If I am free, what ought I to do? (§§ 1–983 inclusive.)

II.—How can I be free? (§§ 984–3000 inclusive.)

We have now before us two problems of human reason, which may be more precisely stated as follows:

I.—Upon the hypothesis that man's will is free, what are the duties of man?

II.—How can freedom exist in harmony with the universal law of natural necessity? (Cf. §§ 258, 129.)

Supplementary to these problems of the highest importance, there may be added—the plenary consummation of the scheme, crowning it with hope, (§ 948)—the POSTULATES OF PRACTICAL REASON, God and a future life. (See §§ 2548–2558 inclusive, and cf. §§ 2361 and 2567.)

So supplemented, the general scheme becomes threefold:

I.—What ought I to do?

II.—What can I know?

III.—What may I hope?

As to the solution of this third problem, there will remain, after the complete consideration of the former two, no doubt whatever. (See § 2565.) And strictly speaking, freedom itself also must be stated as a postulate of practical reason. (See § 142 and cf. § 131.) Bearing in mind, therefore, that the Kantian system does not undertake to demonstrate either the actuality or the possibility (*simpliciter*) of freedom (see § 2245 and cf. §§ 251, 128, 136, 138, 141, 963, and Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., pp. 116, 290), but therein rests securely upon the common conscience of mankind (see § 2595 and cf. §§ 248 and 125), our general scheme may be briefly exhibited as follows:

I.—The Law of Freedom;

II.—The Harmony of Freedom and Nature.

The first, or ethical division (vols. i., ii.), which has its entire and perfect subsistence by itself, and may be separately propounded, properly precedes the second or logical division (vols. iii., iv., v.), whose interest is created and supported by the absolute and unconditioned validity of the Law itself, but whose practical value (its speculative is very small), as an impregnable defense against idealism, skepticism, materialism, fatalism, atheism, free thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, is inestimable (§§ 1031, 1432, 2527, 2865, 2829, 2658, 2855, 2700, 2810, 1430, 2500, 129, 2964.)

And, finally, our general scheme manifests the inner connection and completeness of the whole system (cf. §§ 274, 246, 278), while at the same time the presupposition of the first division does not add to the argument any element of weakness. (See § 122.) For (be it always remembered) the LAW first enforces itself as the supreme law of man, and is afterward found to be the supreme law of freedom, that law of liberty wherein if a man abide he shall be happy in his doing. (James, i., 21.) And although, if the reality of freedom be first granted, the deduction and formulation of the law thereupon easily follow, the objective validity of the law depends in nowise upon the reality of freedom, nor its deduction and formulation upon the assumption of freedom; but (exactly the reverse) freedom rises upon the inexorable law, and the hypothesis is animated by the law's unconquerable energy. (§§ 173, 174, 178; Romans, iii., 19.) That is to say, THAT WHICH IS IN ANY AND EVERY EVENT WHATSOEVER MAN'S UNCONDITIONED AND INEVASIBLE DUTY, is afterward clearly seen to be precisely that which WOULD BE HIS ABSOLUTE DUTY IF HE WERE A FREEMAN. Whence it happens that our first general problem may be *per se* more accurately described simply thus: "*What ought I to do?*" a description which, however, not only does not show the intimate unity of the system (§ 2551), but gives rise to the mistaken conception that the Kantian philosophy is twofold, having both a negative and a positive side*, whereof the last may be taken and the first left. Undoubtedly, the first may be omitted. But to us, who are first MEN, and not till afterward LOGICIANS, the contest† is against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against the spiritual powers of evil in the heavenly places; wherefore we ought to take on the whole armor of God, that we may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having fully done all, to stand. (Revelations, iii., 12.)

*See Dr. Calderwood's introduction to Kant's Ethics (p. x.) mentioned below.

†Ephesians, vi. 12, 13. [See the revised version published by the American Bible Union].

FIRST GENERAL DIVISION.

If I am Free, What Ought I to Do? (§§ 1–983 inclusive.)

VOLUME I.

THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS.

By IMMANUEL KANT, Professor of Logic and Metaphysic in the University of Königsberg. Translated by J. W. SEMPLE, Advocate. (§§ 1–636 inclusive.)
Paging (in parentheses) of Clark's edition of 1869, with an introduction by the Rev. HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. (Paging [in brackets] of Clark's edition of 1836, with an introduction and appendix by J. W. SEMPLE.)

PRELIMINARY TREATISES. (§§ 1–274 inclusive.)

I—Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics.* (§§ 1–146 inclusive.)

Chapter I.—Transit from the Common Popular Notions of Morality to the Philosophical. (§§ 1–23 inclusive.)

There is nothing in the world which can be termed absolutely and altogether good, a GOOD WILL alone excepted. (§§ 1, 2.)

§ 1.—Good WILL the only absolute good (p. 1.) Cf. CICERO *de Officiis*, book I., ch. ix: “An action which is intrinsically right is only morally good in so far as it is voluntary.” (C. R. Edmonds' tr.)

§ 2.—Good will presupposed by particular virtues. (page 2, line 4.) [page 2, line 11.]

First position.—A good will is esteemed to be so, not by the effects which it produces, nor by its fitness for accomplishing any given end, but by its MERE GOOD VOLITION. (§§ 3–12 inclusive.)

§ 3.—Good will is of unconditioned worth. (page 2, line 18.) [page 2, line 25.]

§ 4.—Good will constituted by the sway of reason. (page 2, line 34.) [page 3, line 10.]

§ 5.—Happiness not the final aim of man's constitution. (page 3, line 8.) [page 3, line 19.]

§ 6.—End of man's existence far higher and nobler than happiness. (page 3, line 33.) [page 4, line 13.]

§ 7.—True end, for which reason is implanted. (page 4, line 25.) [page 5, line 8.]

Analysis of the notion DUTY, in order to explain the conception of a GOOD WILL. (§§ 8–12 inclusive.)

§ 8.—Actions at variance with or in accordance with **duty** are not here investigated (but only whether they have been performed out of duty.) (page 5, line 21.) [page 6, line 8.]

§ 9.—Duty to preserve one's life. (p. 6, l. 14.) [p. 7, l. 4.]

§ 10.—Duty to be beneficent. (p. 6, l. 27.) [p. 7, l. 18.]

§ 11.—Duty to promote one's own health. (page 7, line 27.) [page 8, line 22.]

§ 12.—Duty to love our neighbor. (p. 8, l. 18.) [p. 9, l. 16.]

Second position.—An action done out of duty has its moral worth, not from any purpose it may subserve, but from the maxim according to which it is determined on. (§ 13.)

§ 13.—Moral worth of an action depends not on the effecting any given end, but on the principal of volition singly. (page 8, line 29.) [page 9, line 28.]

The third position results from the two preceding. Duty is the necessity of an act out of reverence felt for law. (§§ 14–16 inclusive.)

§ 14.—Duty has to be done irrespective of all appetite whatsoever; and hence there remains nothing present to the will, except objectively law, and subjectively pure reverence for it. (page 9, line 12.) [page 10, line 14.]

§ 15.—Reverence is no positive feeling, but an active emotion. (page 9, note.) [page 10, note.]

§ 16.—Moral worth of an action consists not in the effect resulting from it, and consequently in no principle of acting taken from such effect. (page 10, line 3.) [page 11, line 4.]

What kind of law is that, the representation of which must alone determine the will, if this last is to be denominated absolutely and altogether good? (§§ 17–23 inclusive.)

§ 17.—Form of law in general.—ACT FROM A MAXIM AT ALL TIMES FIT FOR LAW UNIVERSAL. (page 10, line 16.) [page 12, line 1.]

§ 18.—Maxim of deceit unfit for law universal. (page 11, line 11.) [page 12, line 19.]

§ 19.—Maxims unfit for law universal must be rejected. (page 12, line 16.) [page 13, line 29.]

§ 20.—Principle whereon depend the common ethic notices of mankind. (page 12, line 33.) [page 14, line 15.]

§ 21.—Practical powers more easily exercised than speculative. (page 13, line 16.) [*Errs*—wanders.] [page 15, line 1.]

§ 22.—Innocence is easily seduced. (page 14, line 11.) [page 15, line 32.] [Cf. Romans, vii. 23.]

§ 23.—Hope to attain repose. (page 14, line 34.) [p. 16, l. 24.]

Chapter II.—Transit from Common Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysic of Ethics. (§§ 24–103 inclusive.)

§ 24.—Duty not a mere *a posteriori* notion. (page 16, line 4.) [page 18, line 4.]

§ 25.—Secret springs of the will beyond scrutiny. (page 16, line 24.) [page 19, line 1.]

§ 26.—Actions generally spring from self, not from the stern law. (page 17, line 18.) [page 19, line 21.]

§ 27.—Observation could not even suggest the moral law. (page 18, line 17.) Cf. Luke xvii. 20. [page 20, line 24.]

§ 28.—Imitation has no place in morals. (p. 18, l. 33.) [p. 21, l. 9.]

§ 29.—Moral philosophy philosophical. (p. 19, l. 21.) [p. 21, l. 32.]

§ 30.—Moral philosophy scientific. (p. 19, l. 34.) [p. 22, l. 14.]

§ 31.—Moral philosophy metaphysical. (page 20, line 19.) [page 23, line 1.]

§ 32.—Pure philosophy of morals distinguished from mixed. (page 21, note.) [page 23, note.]

§ 33.—Moral philosophy strengthens virtue. (p. 21, l. 5.) [*Hyper*—beyond; *hypo*—beneath. *Defecated*—separated.] [page 23, line 22.]

§ 34.—Moral philosophy not anthropological. (page 21, line 25.) [*Prelected*—discoursed.] [page 24, line 17.]

§ 35.—Reason must be investigated. (p. 22, l. 31.) [p. 25, l. 21.]

§ 36.—Will is nothing else than practical reason. (p. 23, l. 6.) [*When reason determines the will*—When reason determines itself to act.] [page 25, line 30.]

§ 37.—Imperative expresses a commandment of reason; the representation of an objective principle, so far as it necessitates the will. (page 23, line 27.) [page 26, line 20.]

§ 38.—Interest indicates the dependency of the will on principles of reason. (page 24, note.) Cf. § 139. [page 27, note.]

§ 39.—Imperatives are valid only for defective wills. (page 24, line 10.) [page 27, line 7.]

§ 40.—Imperatives are either hypothetical or categorical. (page 24, line 22.) [page 28, line 1.]

§ 41.—Imperative actions are necessary. (page 25, line 6.) [page 28, line 7.]

§ 42.—Imperative actions are good. (p. 25, l. 16.) [p. 28, l. 17.]

§ 43.—Imperatives are either problematic, assertive, or apodictic. (page 25, line 24.) [page 28, line 25.]

§ 44.—Problematic imperatives; principles of action necessary in order to gain some given purposes. (p. 25, l. 31.) [p. 28, l. 32.]

§ 45.—Assertive imperatives; announcing the practical necessity of an act as a mean toward happiness. (page 26, line 23.) [page 29, line 28.]

§ 46.—Apodictic imperative commands categorically, irrespective of every ulterior end or aim. (p. 27, l. 4.) [p. 30, l. 11.]

§ 47.—Imperatives are either technical, pragmatic, or ethical. (page 27, line 11.) [*Pragmatic*—See § 2550.] [page 30, line 18.]

§ 48.—How technical imperatives are possible. (page 27, line 25.) [page 31, line 1.]

§ 49.—How pragmatic imperatives are possible. (page 28, line 15.) [page 31, line 26.]

§ 50.—Possibility of the ethical imperative can not be shown *a posteriori*. (page 29, line 32.) [page 33, line 17.]

§ 51.—Possibility of the ethical imperative must be investigated *a priori*. (page 30, line 25.) [page 34, line 12.]

§ 52.—Categorical imperative is a synthetic proposition *a priori*. (page 31, line 5.) Cf. §§ 1448, 1470, 1698, 2667. [page 34, line 26.]

§ 53.—Categorical imperative ordains conformity to law. (page 31, line 12.) Cf. Romans xii. 2. [page 35, line 1.]

§ 54.—Categorical imperative formulated. (p. 31, l. 30.) Act from that maxim only which thou canst will law universal. [page 35, line 21.]

§ 55.—All imperatives of duty are derived from the categorical imperative. (page 31, line 33.) [page 35, line 24.]

§ 56.—Categorical imperative is conformed to nature. (page 32, line 5.) [page 35, line 31.]

§ 57.—Duties of determinate and indeterminate obligation. (page 32, line 11.) [page 36, line 6.]

§ 58.—Determinate duty: such a one as admits of no exceptions in favor of appetite. (page 32, note.) [page 36, note.]

§ 59.—Maxims of suicide unfit for law universal. (page 32, line 15.) Cf. § 489. [page 36, line 10.]

§ 60.—Maxims of deceit unfit for law universal. (page 33, line 1.) Cf. §§ 502-509. [page 36, line 25.]

§ 61.—Maxims of mental sluggishness unfit for law universal. (page 33, line 24.) Cf. §§ 542-547. [page 37, line 23.]

§ 62.—Maxims of illiberality unfit for law universal. (page 34, line 6.) Cf. §§ 510-514 and 561-565. [page 38, line 8.]

§ 63.—Maxims of conduct must be fit for universal law. (page 34, line 24.) [page 38, line 27.]

§ 64.—Violation of the law can not be justified. (page 35, line 4.) [page 39, line 10.]

§ 65.—Laws of duty are apodictic. (p. 35, l. 28.) [p. 40, l. 3.]

§ 66.—Laws of duty are not derived from particularities. (page 36, line 6.) [page 40, line 16.]

§ 67.—Philosophy must uphold her laws. (page 36, line 24.) [page 41, line 3.]

§ 68.—*A posteriori* principles are detrimental to morality. (page 37, line 3.) *Virtue*—cf. Cicero's Offices, i. 5. [page 41, line 16.]

§ 69.—Reason's practical law is inseparably connected apriori with the very idea of the will. (page 37, line 15.) [page 41, line 28.]

§ 70.—Distinction between subjective and objective ends. (page 38, line 12.) [page 42, line 29.]

§ 71.—Categorical imperative is grounded on an absolute end. (page 39, line 1.) [page 43, line 22.]

§ 72.—Man is an absolute end (an end in himself, possessing absolute worth). Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada 187. Max Mueller, tr. (Scribner 1872) page 246. (page 39, line 6.) [page 43, line 27.]

§ 73.—Categorical imperative is grounded on humanity. (page 40, line 3.) Cf. §§ 59–62. [page 44, line 29.]

§ 74.—Suicide is inconsistent with the idea of humanity as an absolute end. (page 40, line 23.) Cf. § 59. [page 45, line 18.]

§ 75.—Deceit is inconsistent with the idea of humanity as an absolute end. (page 41, line 3.) Cf. § 60. [page 45, line 30.]

§ 76.—Neglect of self improvement is inconsistent with the idea of humanity as an absolute end. (page 41, line 19.) Cf. § 61. [page 46, line 17.]

§ 77.—Illiberality is inconsistent with the idea of humanity as an absolute end. (page 41, line 29.) Cf. § 62. [page 46, line 27.]

§ 78.—Will of every intelligent as universally legislative. (page 42, line 7.) [page 47, line 8.]

§ 79.—Will of every intelligent self-legislative. (page 42, line 26.) [page 47, line 29.]

§ 80.—Specific difference betwixt a categorical and hypothetical imperative. (page 42, line 32.) [page 48, line 3.]

§ 81.—Will supremely legislative can not be dependent upon any interest. (page 43, line 16.) [page 48, line 22.]

§ 82.—Categorical imperative can only ordain to act according to a maxim fit for universal law. (p. 43, l. 23.) [p. 48, l. 30.]

§ 83.—Principle of the autonomy of the will. (page 43, line 34.) [page 49, line 10.]

§ 84.—Realm of ends. (page 44, line 21.) Analogy to what we call the realm of nature. [page 49, line 32.]

§ 85.—Realm—the systematic conjunction of all intelligent nature under a uniform and common law. (p. 44, l. 30.) [p. 50, l. 9.]

§ 86.—Systematic conjunction of intelligents. (page 45, line 6.) [page 50, line 20.]

§ 87.—Intelligent is a member of the realm of ends. (page 45, line 13.) [page 50, line 28.]

§ 88.—Finite intelligent not sovereign of the realm of ends. (page 45, line 18.) [page 51, line 1.]

§ 89.—Morality refers all action to the realm of ends. (page 45, line 25.) [page 51, line 9.]

§ 90.—Duty rests solely on the relation betwixt intelligents. (page 46, line 4.) [page 51, line 23.]

§ 91.—Price and dignity in the realm of ends. (page 46, line 15.) [page 52, line 3.]

§ 92.—Price is relative; dignity is absolute worth. (page 46, line 20.) [page 52, line 8.]

§ 93.—Morality the only dignity of humanity. (page 46, line 27.) [page 52, line 15.]

§ 94.—Autonomy the ground of the dignity of humanity. (page 47, line 21.) [page 53, line 12.]

§ 95.—Three formulae of one and the same law. (p. 48, l. 5.) (1) form, cf. §§ 53–65; (2) matter, cf. §§ 66–77; (3) aggregate determination, cf. §§ 78–94; (1) unity; (2) plurality; (3) totality. [p. 53, l. 31.]

§ 96.—Conception of an absolutely good will. (page 48, line 34.) [page 54, line 28.]

§ 97.—End of a good will not an end to be effected. (page 49, line 14.) [page 55, line 11.]

§ 98.—World of intelligents (*mundus intelligibilis*) may be cogitated. (page 50, line 6.) [page 56, line 6.]

§ 99.—Formal principle of the maxims of every intelligent. (page 50, line 18.) [page 56, line 18.]

§ 100.—Worth of intelligents judged of only according to their disinterested adherence. (page 51, line 6.) [page 57, line 10.]

§ 101.—Morality the relation betwixt action and the autonomy of the will. (page 51, line 30.) [page 58, line 3.]

§ 102.—Dignity belongs to that intelligent who discharges all his duties. (page 52, line 8.) [page 58, line 15.]

§ 103.—Autonomy of will is the supreme principle of morality. (page 52, line 24.) [page 59, line 2.]

Chapter III.—Transit from the Metaphysic of Ethics to an Inquiry into the Apriori Operations of the Will. (§§ 104–146 inclusive.)

Article I.—The idea freedom explains that of autonomy of will. (§§ 104–108 inclusive.)

§ 104.—Freedom is independence on foreign determining causes. (page 54, line 5.) [page 61, line 5.]

§ 105.—Freedom is not devoid of law. (page 54, line 13.) [page 61, line 13.]

§ 106.—Freedom of will is autonomy. (page 54, line 23.) [page 61, line 23.]

§ 107.—Freedom is subjection to the moral law. (page 55, line 2.) [page 62, line 6.]

§ 108.—Freedom's law is synthetic. (page 55, line 9.) [page 62, line 14.]

Article II.—Freedom must be postulated as a property of the will of every intelligent whatsoever. (§ 109.)

§ 109.—Reason practical must regard herself as free. (page 55, line 27.) [page 63, line 3.]

Article III.—Of the interest indissolubly connected with the idea of morality. (§§ 110–122 inclusive.)

§ 110.—Morality and freedom identical. (page 56, line 28.) [page 64, line 8.]

§ 111.—Objective necessity of freedom. (page 57, line 5.) [page 64, line 18.]

§ 112.—Fixing the true foundation of morality. (page 57, line 26.) [page 65, line 11.]

§ 113.—Mere worthiness to become happy has an interest. (page 58, line 11.) [page 65, line 31.]

§ 114.—Freedom and self-legislation convertible ideas. (page 58, line 27.) [page 66, line 16.]

§ 115.—Only one escape. (page 59, line 7.) [page 66, line 30.]

§ 116.—Knowledge of the appearances of things only. (page 59, line 13.) [page 67, line 4.]

§ 117.—Sensible system distinguished from a cogitable and unseen. (page 59, line 33.) [page 67, line 24.]

§ 118.—Halt on the threshold of discovery. (page 60, line 20.) [page 68, line 14.]

§ 119.—Laws beyond which the understanding can not pass. (page 60, line 29.) [page 68, line 24.]

§ 120.—Two-fold set of laws regulating conduct. (page 61, line 15.) Cf. St. Paul (Romans vii.). [page 69, line 13.]

§ 121.—Groundwork of all moral actions. (page 61, line 25.) [page 69, line 24.]

§ 122.—Freedom not the ground of moral necessitation (but only its form). (page 62, line 1.) [page 70, line 3.]

Article IV.—How is a categorical imperative possible. (§§ 123–125 inclusive.)

§ 123.—Moral necessitation grounded on REASON, which by the idea Freedom gives a law. (page 62, line 17.) [page 70, line 20.]

§ 124.—Analogy between the law of freedom and the laws of nature. Cf. §§ 2719, 2725. (page 63, line 11.) [page 71, line 20.]

§ 125.—Authority of the law recognized even by the uneducated. (page 63, line 31.) [page 72, line 8.] Cf. § 248.

Article V.—Of the extreme verge of all practical philosophy. (§§ 126–144 inclusive.)

§ 126.—Freedom and necessity both *a priori* conceptions. (page 64, line 27.) [page 73, line 7.]

§ 127.—Freedom consequently seems to collide with necessity. (page 65, line 14.) [page 73 line 28.]

§ 128.—Appearance of contradiction must be removed. (page 65, line 29.) [page 74, line 14.]

§ 129.—Speculative philosophy prepares the way for the practical by reconciling freedom and necessity. (page 65, line 34.) [page 74, line 19.] Cf. § 258.

§ 130.—Practical reason secure against all assailants. (page 66, line 24.) [page 75, line 12.]

§ 131.—Reason's legal title to freedom. (page 66, line 30.) [page 75, line 19.] Cf. § 178.

§ 132.—Man conscious of his reason's independency. (page 67, line 1.) [page 75, line 24.]

§ 133.—Origin and seat in the laws of a cogitable world. (page 67, line 20.) [page 76, line 13.]

§ 134.—Cogitable world a mere idea, not an object. (page 68, line 8.) [page 77, line 4.]

§ 135.—Laws of the cogitable world not grounded on an object. (page 68, line 22.) [page 77, line 19.]

§ 136.—Laws of the cogitable world inexplicable. (page 69, line 8.) [page 78, line 7.]

§ 137.—Freedom can be defended. (p. 69, l. 25.) [p. 78, l. 24.]

§ 138.—Interest in the moral law inexplicable. (page 70, line 12.) [page 79, line 15.]

§ 139.—Interest pure or adulterated. (page 70, note.) [page 79, note.]

§ 140.—Interest in the moral law subordinate to obedience. (page 70, line 21.) [page 80, line 3.]

§ 141.—Sole hypothesis on which the categorical imperative is possible. (page 71, line 26.) [page 81, line 1.]

§ 142.—Hypothesis of freedom unconditionally necessary. (page 72, line 1.) [page 81, line 10.]

§ 143.—Nothing known of the cogitable world except the form of its laws. (page 72, line 17.) [page 81, line 28.]

§ 144.—Utmost verge of all ethical inquiry. (page 73, line 5.) [page 82, line 20.]

Article VI.—Conclusion of the groundwork. (§§ 145, 146.)

§ 145.—Absolute necessity of the categorical imperative. (page 73, line 25.) [page 83, line 9.]

§ 146.—Why it is incomprehensible. (p. 74, l. 12.) [p. 84, l. 1.]

II.—Inquiry into the Apriori Operations of the Will. (Three Chapters.) (§§ 147–274.)

Chapter I.—Analytic of Principles. (§§ 147–202.)

Article I.—Exposition of the notions, principle, rule, maxim, law. (§§ 147–152 inclusive.)

§ 147.—Practical principles are propositions containing different rules subordinate to them which may be grounds of determining the will. (page 75, line 4.) [page 85, line 4.]

Remark—Practical laws could not exist if reason were not a practical faculty. (§§ 148–152 inclusive.)

§ 148.—Collision of maxims and laws. (page 75, line 12.) [page 85, line 14.]

§ 149.—Man's law is imperative. (p. 76, l. 9.) [p. 86, l. 17.]

§ 150.—Imperatives objective; maxims subjective. (page 76, line 16.) [page 86, line 25.]

§ 151.—Imperatives divided into laws and practical precepts. (page 76, line 24.) [page 86, line 32.]

§ 152.—Laws take no cognizance of aims, intentions, or effects. (page 77, line 17.) [page 87, line 30.]

Article II.—Every material principle whatsoever is aposteriori, and so can beget no practical law. (§§ 153–155 inclusive.) (Position I.)

§ 153.—All material practical principles are taken from experience and observation. (page 78, line 2.) [page 88, line 15.]

Remarks.— (§§ 154, 155.)

§ 154.—All practical principles determined by desire presuppose pleasure and are aposteriori. (p. 78, l. 7.) [p. 88, l. 21.]

§ 155.—Principles conditioned by pleasure or pain may become maxims but never laws. (page 78, line 23.) [page 89, line 10.]

Article III.—All material practical principles rest on self love. (§§ 156–167 inclusive.) (Position II.)

§ 156.—Happiness the supreme determinator of all material practical principles. (page 79, line 2.) [page 89, line 20.]

§ 157.—Moral law is the sole proof of a supreme power of desire. (page 79, line 26.) (Corollary.) [page 90, line 16.]

Remark I.—Distinction betwixt the higher and lower powers of will. (§§ 158–164 inclusive.)

§ 158.—All feelings of pleasure depend on the sensory. (page 80, line 4.) [page 90, line 23.]

§ 159.—All feelings of pleasure differ merely in degree, not in kind. (page 80, line 19.) [page 91, line 11.]

§ 160.—Faculty of representation of no moment when feeling determines choice. (page 81, line 4.) [page 91, line 31.]

§ 161.—Moral sense would be badly defined as an originary determinator. (page 81, line 18.) Cf. § 198. [page 92, line 13.]

§ 162.—Epicurus consistently regards all pleasures as exactly the same in kind. (page 82, line 4.) [page 93, line 1.]

§ 163.—Reason the supreme power of desire. (page 82, line 21.) [page 93, line 19.] Cf. § 157.

§ 164.—Reason determines the will without the intervention of an emotion. (page 83, line 7.) [page 94, line 8.]

Remark II.—Happiness can not found a practical law. (§§ 165–167 inclusive.)

§ 165.—Happiness a general denomination for all subjective determinators. (page 83, line 13.) [page 94, line 14.]

§ 166.—Laws founded on happiness are subjectively contingent. (page 84, line 3.) [page 95, line 7.]

§ 167.—Subjective principles can not be elevated to the rank of objective laws. (page 84, line 23.) [page 95, line 28.]

Article IV.—Sole condition of all practical laws. (§§ 168–170 inclusive.) (Position III.)

§ 168.—Form of law in general can alone constitute practical laws. (page 85, line 25.) [page 97, line 2.]

Remark.—A posteriori principles never can become the groundwork of any law. (§§ 169, 170.)

§ 169.—Self annihilating, when brought under the form of law. (page 86, line 10.) [page 97, line 21.]

§ 170.—Possible exceptions are innumerable. (page 86, line 32.) [page 98, line 18.]

Article V.—Find the nature of a will whose sole law is the legislative form of its maxims. § 171. (Problem I.)

§ 171.—Concludes upon a free will. (p. 87, l. 28.) [p. 99, l. 15.]

Article VI.—Find the sole law regulating the causality of a free will. (§§ 172–175 inclusive.) (Problem II.)

§ 172.—Concludes upon the legislative form. (page 88, line 16.) [page 100, line 8.]

Remark.—Morality first reveals to man his inward freedom. (§§ 173–175 inclusive.)

§ 173.—Moral necessity not a theoretic deduction from freedom. (page 88, line 29.) [page 100, line 23.] Cf. § 122.

§ 174.—Moral necessity an apodict of practical reason. (p. 89, line 13.) [page 101, line 9.] Galatians iv. 21; Romans iii. 19.

§ 175.—Man judges it possible to do what he ought. (page 90, line 2.) [page 102, line 1.]

Article VII.—Fundamental law of reason. (§§ 176–182 inclusive.) Cf. § 332.

§ 176.—So act that thy maxims of will might become law in a system of universal moral legislation. (p. 90, l. 21.) See §§ 346 and 430 for the legal and moral principles into which this fundamental law is divided. [page 102, line 21.]

Remark.—Reason is immediately legislative. (§§ 177, 178.)

§ 177.—Practical rule is absolute in ethics. (page 90, line 24.) [page 102, line 24.]

§ 178.—Single isolated fact of practical reason. (page 91, line 9.) [page 103, line 14.]

§ 179.—Reason is spontaneously practical. (page 91, line 22.) (Corollary.) [page 103, line 28.]

Remark.—Obligation is the relation of a defective will to the law. (§§ 180–182 inclusive.)

§ 180.—Moral law not confined to man. (page 91, line 24.) [page 104, line 2.]

§ 181.—Conceptions of duty and obligation. (page 92, line 12.) [page 104, line 22.]

§ 182.—Conceptions of virtue and holiness. (page 92, line 20.) [page 104, line 30.]

Article VIII.—Autonomy of will is the sole foundation of the ethical nature of man. (§§ 183–198 inclusive.) (Position IV.)

§ 183.—Moral law expresses nothing but the autonomy of reason. (page 93, line 4.) [page 105, line 19.]

Remark I.—Heteronomy can not satisfy the demands of reason. (§§ 184–187 inclusive.)

§ 184.—Every volition has an end aimed at. (page 94, line 2.) [page 106, line 21.]

§ 185.—Happiness of others may be the object of will. (page 94, line 17.) [page 107, line 9.]

§ 186.—Ends do not condition the will, but are added by the law. (page 94, line 25.) [page 107, line 18.]

§ 187.—Pure will is not determined by desire. (page 95, line 5.) [page 107, line 31.]

Remark II.—Contrariety of heteronomy and autonomy is not logical merely, but practical. (§§ 188–198 inclusive.)

§ 188.—Antipart of autonomy is self love. (page 95, line 17.) [page 108, line 12.]

§ 189.—Self love cunning and deceitful. (page 95, line 27.) [page 108, line 22.]

§ 190.—Self love advises; law commands. (page 96, line 16.) Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. book vi., ch. xii. 9. “Now prudence is not the same as this faculty [DEINOTES—craft cleverness, cunning] nor is

it without this faculty." Browne's tr. (ed. Bohn) page 173. [page 109, line 15.]

§ 191.—Duty undoubted; expediency uncertain. (p. 96, l. 22.) [So Confucius—"The path is not far from man. When men try to pursue a course which is far from the common indications of consciousness, this course can not be considered the path." Doctrine of the Mean, xiii. 1. Dr. Legge's Life and Teachings of Confucius (Truebner 1869) page 290.] [page 109, line 21.]

§ 192.—Obedience to the law always practicable; to self love, not always. (page 97, line 1.) [page 110, line 3.]

§ 193.—Disobedience to the law despicable; to self love, merely vexations. (page 97, line 18.) [page 110, line 21.]

§ 194.—Transgression of law requires punishment; of expediency, not. (page 97, line 30.) [page 111, line 3.]

§ 195.—Utilitarian conception of crime inconsistent. (page 98, line 11.) [page 111, line 18.]

§ 196.—Moral sense presupposes (and consequently can not originate) morality and duty. (p. 98, l. 28.) [p. 112, l. 5.] Cf. § 161.

§ 197.—Moral felicity can not precede obligation, much less found it. (page 99, line 10.) [page 112, line 22.]

§ 198.—Moral sense ought to be cultivated. (page 99, line 21.) [page 113, line 1.]

Appendix.—Tabular view of every possible false system of ethic. (§§ 199-202 inclusive.)

§ 199.—Material principles either subjective or objective, and either external or internal. (page 100, line 1.) [page 113, line 16.]

§ 200.—Material principles either inductive or deductive. (page 100, line 18.) [page 114, line 1.]

§ 201.—Supreme perfection not an ethical determinator. (page 100, line 31.) [page 114, line 14.]

§ 202.—Sole ethical determinator of the will. (page 101, line 13.) [page 114, line 30.]

Chapter II.—On the *Apriori* Spring of the Will' §§ 203-242. Of "the Relation Betwixt Pure Practical Reason and the Sensory, and the Necessary Effect, (Cognizable *Apriori*) Thereon, which Effect we Call the Moral Sense." § 244.

§ 203.—Essence of all moral worth in acting. (page 102, line 3.) [page 116, line 3.]

§ 204.—Moral law the sole ethical spring of the human will. (page 102, line 12.) [page 116, line 12.]

§ 205.—Effect of the ethical law, as spring. (page 102, line 22.) [page 117, line 1.]

§ 206.—Essence of all moral determination of will. (page 103, line 16.) [page 117, line 20.]

§ 207.—Apriori ground of pain. (p. 103, l. 21.) [p. 117, l. 25.]

§ 208.—Self love circumscribed and self conceit overthrown by practical reason. (page 103, line 33.) [page 118, line 6.] Cf. §§ 592–594, Romans xii. 3.

§ 209.—Apriori ground of reverence. (page 104, line 18.) [page 118, line 27.]

§ 210.—Man's will deflected by his aposteriori self. (page 105, line 1.) [page 119, line 14.] Cf. §§ 656, 688.

§ 211.—Moral law therefore inevitably humbles every man. (page 105, line 17.) [page 120, line 3.]

§ 212.—Moral law the subjective ground of reverence. (page 105, line 27.) [page 120, line 15.]

§ 213.—Moral law the ground of the moral sense. (page 106, line 13.) [page 120, line 32.] Cf. §§ 196–198.

§ 214.—Reverence not a pathognomic emotion. (page 106, line 30.) [page 121, line 18.]

§ 215.—Reverence toward the law is not a spring advancing morality. (page 107, line 21.) [page 122, line 13.]

§ 216.—Reverence is a mere spring co-acting the law. (page 107, line 34.) [page 122, line 26.]

§ 217.—Reverence felt toward persons, not things. (page 108, line 8.) [page 123, line 3.]

§ 218.—Reverence entertained unwillingly. (page 109, line 7.) [page 124, line 6.]

§ 219.—Reverent regard for intellectual greatness. (page 109, line 29.) [page 124, line 29.]

§ 220.—Reverence begins with humility. (page 110, line 19.) [page 125, line 22.]

§ 221.—Reverence becomes a spring. (p. 111, l. 4.) [p. 126, l. 10.]

§ 222.—Reverence begets interest and conforms maxims. (page 111, line 28.) *Maxim*: cf. §§ 147, 332. [page 127, line 3.]

§ 223.—Moral sense is precisely the susceptibility to have reverence. (page 112, line 12.) [page 127, line 21.]

§ 224.—Duty involves practical necessitation. (page 112, line 34.) [page 128, line 12.]

§ 225.—Obedience followed by exaltation. (page 113, line 16.) [page 128, line 29.]

§ 226.—Duty is objectively legal, subjectively moral. (page 113, line 31.) [page 129, line 13.]

§ 227.—Moral inclination can not supersede moral necessitation. (page 114, line 9.) [page 129, line 25.]

§ 228.—Reverence the only ethical spring of the will. (page 114, line 28.) [page 130, line 13.]

§ 229.—Love can not supersede duty. (page 115, line 3.) [page 130, line 23.]

§ 230.—Love God means cheerfully to obey his law. (page 115, line 27.) [page 131, line 17.]

§ 231.—Love is the apotheosis of reverence. (page 116, line 22.) [page 132, line 16.]

§ 232.—Virtue (man's incumbent moral state) is militant. (page 117, line 19.) [page 133, line 17.] Cf. § 729.

§ 233.—Virtuous actions are duteous, not meritorious. (page 118, line 1.) [page 134, line 2.] Cf. § 455.

§ 234.—Virtuous actions may very fitly be praised. (page 118, line 23.) [page 134, line 25.]

§ 235.—Ethical fanaticism is transgression. (page 119, line 7.) [page 135, line 13.]

§ 236.—Jesus first taught purity of moral principle. (page 119, line 18.) Cf. §§ 723, 907. [page 135, line 25.] *Self love*: §§ 208–210.

§ 237.—All appetites are dumb before duty. (page 120, line 3.) [page 136, line 13.]

§ 238.—Personality the root of duty. (page 120, line 14.) [page 136, line 24.] Cf. § 671.

§ 239.—Humanity extorts veneration. (page 120, line 31.) [page 137, line 11.] *Used as an end*: mean (Semple's erratum.)

§ 240.—Honest men never prostitute humanity. (page 121, line 15.) [page 137, line 30.] *Emitted*: eschewed (Semple's erratum.)

§ 241.—Peace is the effect of reverence. (page 121, line 30.) [page 138, line 14.]

§ 242.—Hope of happiness, if permitted sway, destroys man's ethical character. (page 122, line 9.) [page 138, line 28.] Cf. § 663.

Chapter III.—Dilucidation of the Foregoing Analytic—On Freedom and Necessity. (§§ 243–274.)

§ 243.—Practical reason and speculative differ in form. (page 123, line 4.) [page 140, line 4.]

§ 244.—Practical reason begins with principles a priori. (page 123, line 13.) [page 140, line 13.]

§ 245.—Analytic of practical reason divided analogously to the theoretical. (page 124, line 9.) [page 141, line 11.]

§ 246.—Division of the analytic of practical reason, like that of a syllogism. (page 124, line 23.) [page 141, line 27.]

§ 247.—Powers of practical reason exhibited by the common use. (page 125, line 10.) [page 142, line 18.] Cf. § 125.

§ 248.—Justification of the moral principles (by an appeal to the judgment of mankind's moral sense). Cf. §§ 2595, 1145. (page 125, line 23.) [page 142, line 32.]

§ 249.—Distinguish betwixt utilitarianism and morality. (page 126, line 21.) [page 144, line 1.]

§ 250.—Distinction betwixt utility and morality is not contrariety. (page 127, line 7.) [page 144, line 22.]

§ 251.—Freedom of an active cause cannot be comprehended, even as to its possibility. (page 127, line 29.) [page 145, line 13.] [Defined: cf. Spinoza (Tennemann Hist. Phil., ed. J. R. Morell, 1870, § 338, page 316): “*Deo parere summa libertas est.*”]

§ 252.—Some who think they can explain freedom as a mere psychological quality. (page 128, line 11.) [page 145, line 30.]

§ 253.—Causality of things in time different from the causality of things in themselves. (page 128, line 27.) [page 146, line 15.]

§ 254.—Attribute to things in time mechanical causality; to things in themselves, freedom. (page 129, line 22.) [page 147, line 14.]

§ 255.—Problem at whose solution centuries have labored. (page 130, line 10.) [page 148, line 3.]

§ 256.—Psychological freedom in nowise to be distinguished from physical necessity. (page 130, line 28.) [page 148, line 21.]

§ 257.—Psychological freedom cannot found moral law. (page 131, line 14.) [page 149, line 10.]

§ 258.—Seeming antagonism between nature and freedom cleared up by the Critique. (page 131, line 32.) [p. 149, l. 28.] Cf. § 129.

§ 259.—Conscience determinable by no law of things in time. (page 132, line 30.) [page 150, line 29.] Cf. § 525.

§ 260.—Contrition for past sin is legitimate. (page 133, line 13.) [page 151, line 14.]

§ 261.—Man's sentient existence is the absolute unity of one phenomenon. (page 133, line 24.) [page 151, line 25.]

§ 262.—Refer the sensitive itself to the cogitable substratum. (page 134, line 5.) [page 152, line 9.]

§ 263.—Man's choice depends on a free causality at bottom. (page 134, line 14.) [page 152, line 19.]

§ 264.—Difficulty of harmonizing freedom and necessity presses upon every other theory as well as upon Kant's. (page 135, line 3.) [Exit: out of the labyrinth § 115.—Main theory: § 258.—That theory: transcendental realism; see § 2952.] [page 153, line 10.]

§ 265.—Freedom is illusory upon the theory that things in time are things in themselves (transcendental realism). (page 135, line 19.) [page 153, line 26.]

§ 266.—Spinozism the only alternative to Kant's theory (transcendental idealism). (page 136, line 7.) [page 154, line 17.]

§ 267.—Freedom, upon the theory of transcendental idealism, does not conflict with God's creative power. (p. 137, l. 8.) [p. 155, l. 20.]

§ 268.—Difficulties advance the groundworks of science. (page 138, line 1.) [page 156, line 15.]

§ 269.—How the idea Freedom procures us so great an extension of moral-practical science. (page 138, line 17.) [page 157, line 1.] *Think*: see § 1649.

§ 270.—Freedom's category contains synthesis of mere existence, not necessarily of the homogeneous, and therefore can refer to an unconditioned in the cogitable world. (page 138, line 31.) Cf. §§ 2203, 2205, 2248. [page 157, line 16.]

§ 271.—Morality, interwoven with the reason of all men, presupposes such an unconditioned causality. (p. 139, l. 32.) [p. 158, l. 20.]

§ 272.—Causality the only category which allows such a transcendent synthesis (although only for a practical behoof). (page 140, line 28.) [page 159, line 19.]

§ 273.—Freedom can be established only for a practical behoof. (p. 141, l. 9.) [p. 160, l. 3.] *Quit*: QUIT NOT.—Semple's erratum.

§ 274.—Every step taken by pure practical reason coincides with the march of the Critique of pure speculative reason. (page 141, line 21.) [page 160, line 16.]

METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS.

(§§ 275--636 inclusive.)

Prolegomena to the Metaphysic of Ethics. (§§ 275--477 inclusive.)

Preface to the Metaphysic of Ethics. (§§ 275--280.)

§ 275.—Metaphysic of Ethics divided into elements of law and of morals. (page 145, line 3.) [page 165, line 3.]

§ 276.—Metaphysical elements of law evolved by pure reason from principles apriori. (page 145, line 9.) [page 165, line 9.]

§ 277.—Scholastic exactness is indispensable. (page 146, line 7.) [page 166, line 14.]

§ 278.—Only one true system of philosophy is possible. (page 147, line 6.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. VI, xiii, 5 and V, i, 12; Confucius Ana. XV, ii, iii; Xen. Mem. I, i, 9; III, ix, 5; and Buddh. Dharm. 38 § 949. Cf. § 819.—Brown (A. D. 1735-1788) into sthenic and asthenic. (Am. Cyclop. ed. 1873, vol. iii, page 337). [page 167, l. 17.]

§ 279.—Kant's doctrine of time and space not borrowed. (page 148, line 10.) [page 168, line 25.]

§ 280.—Kantic terminology cannot be supplied by popular language. (page 149, line 5.) [page 169, line 20.]

Chapter I.—Introduction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. (§§ 281-338 inclusive.)

Article I.—Of the relation subsisting betwixt the powers of the human mind and the moral law. (§§ 281-291 inclusive.)

§ 281.—Power of desire or appetitive faculty is the power man has of becoming, by his representations, the cause of the existence

of the object represented. Cf. Romans viii, 6. Cf. § 676. (page 150, line 6.) [page 171, line 6.]

§ 282.—Desire invariably attended by feeling, which is not always its cause, but sometimes its effect. (page 150, line 11.) [page 171, line 11.]

§ 283.—Feeling is merely subjective and begets no knowledge. (page 150, line 21.) [page 171, line 21.] (Feeling distinguished from sensation and intuition : see §§ 283, 284.)

§ 284.—Feeling is the sensible effect of representation, (no matter whether or not the representation causing it belong to the intellect or the sensory.) (page 151, note.) [page 172, note.]

§ 285.—Pleasure is either practical or contemplative. (page 151, line 10.) [page 172, line 13.]

§ 286.—Practical pleasure, when it causes habitual desire, is an appetitive interest. (page 151, line 20.) [page 173, line 2.]

§ 287.—Practical pleasure, when it is the effect of desire, represents* an interest of reason. (page 152, line 3.) [p. 173, l. 10.]

§ 288.—Concupiscence different from desiring. (page 152, line 20.) [page 174, line 1.]

§ 289.—Choice is appetite in respect of the action ; will is appetite in respect of the ground of the action ; wish is appetite inactive. (page 152, line 24.) [page 174, line 5.]

§ 290.—Freedom of choice is independency on sensitive stimulants. (page 153, line 9.) Cf. § 54. [page 174, line 20.] *By an imperative ordaining or forbidding*: cf. Cicero (page 9) above.

§ 291.—Moral law, governing the external use of choice, founds jurisprudence ; governing the internal use of choice, founds ethics. (page 153, line 26.) [page 175, line 6.] *Time*: cf. § 1503.

Article II.—On the idea and the necessity of having a metaphysic of ethics. (§§ 292–298 inclusive.)

§ 292.—Laws of nature may be accepted on the evidence of experience. (page 154, line 19.) Cf. §§ 2702, 2725 and refer to §§ 2608–2617. [page 176, line 3.]

§ 293.—Laws of morals can only be accepted in so far as they are seen to be founded apriori. (p. 154, l. 33.) [p. 176, l. 18.]

§ 294.—Precepts of eudaimonism cannot be constituted apriori. (page 155, line 8.) [page 176, line 26.]

*Practical reason creates the desire, whereupon the desire may cause practical pleasure. Therefore, notwithstanding that the conjunction of the pleasure with the desire is called interest, still, as it is in this case an interest of reason, it ought not to be said to be constituted by the pleasure, but rather to be represented by it.

§ 295.—Authority of law does not depend upon advantage of obedience. (p 155, l. 27.) Cf. §§ 616, 715, 2366. [p. 177, l. 16.]

§ 296.—Metaphysic of ethics cannot rest on anthropology, but it must apply to it. (page 156, line 14.) [page 178, line 6.]

§ 297.—Moral anthropology is the antipart of the metaphysic of ethics. (page 156, line 32.) [page 178, line 26.]

§ 298.—Philosophy can contain no technical, but singly a moral practical part. (page 157, line 18.) [page 179, line 16.]

Article III.—Of the division of a system of the metaphysic of ethics. (§§ 289–307 inclusive.)

§ 299.—Notion of an act of free choice in general. (page 158, note.) [page 180, note.]

§ 300.—All legislation requires, first, a law; secondly, a spring of action. (page 158, line 2.) [page 180, line 5.]

§ 301.—Legislation divided into ethical and juridical. (page 158, line 13.) Cf. § 291. [page 180, line 16.]

§ 302.—Coincidence of action with the law divided into legality and morality. (page 158, line 25.) [page 181, line 10.]

§ 303.—Duties of forensic obligation are outward only. (page 159, line 5.) [page 181, line 15.]

§ 304.—Ethical legislation cannot be external. (page 159, line 11.) [page 181, line 21.]

§ 305.—All duties are ethical, irrespective of the law giving them birth. (page 159, line 22.) [page 182, line 1.]

§ 306.—Ethical obligation belongs simply to an inward legislation. (page 160, line 9.) [page 182, line 23.]

§ 307.—Duties of juridical obligation come indirectly to be ethical duties. (page 160, line 23.) [page 183, line 5.]

Article IV.—Preliminary ideas entering into the metaphysic of ethics (§§ 308–338 inclusive.)

§ 308.—Idea Freedom not a constitutive but simply regulative principle of speculative reason. (page 160, line 32.) Cf. § 334. [page 183, line 16.]

§ 309.—Reality of freedom evinced by practical reason. (page 161, line 5.) [page 183, line 22.]

§ 310.—Moral laws founded upon the idea of freedom. (page 161, line 11.) [page 183, line 28.] See § 123.

§ 311.—Moral sense not the foundation of the practical laws, but an effect. (page 161, line 18.) [page 184, line 6.] Cf. §§ 196, 213.

§ 312.—Obligation is the necessity of a free action. (page 161, line 31.) [page 184, line 20.]

§ 313.—Imperative is a practical rule making necessary a subjectively contingent action. (page 161, line 33.) [p. 184, l. 22.]

§ 314.—Categorical imperative represents an act as immediately incumbent and makes it objectively necessary. (page 162, line 10.) [page 185, line 1.]

§ 315.—Actions allowed or disallowed. (page 162, line 22.) [page 185, line 14.]

§ 316.—Duty is the matter of obligation. (page 162, line 26.) [page 185, line 18.]

§ 317.—Actions are either commanded or prohibited. (page 162, line 31.) [page 185, line 23.]

§ 318.—Are there any adiaphorons actions? (page 163, line 1.) [page 185, line 28.]

§ 319.—Deeds can be imputed. (page 163, line 12.) [p. 186, l. 6.]

§ 320.—Person is one to whom actions can be imputed. (page 163 line 19.) [page 186, line 13.]

§ 321.—Thing is that to which no event can be imputed as an action. (page 163, line 25.) [page 186, line 20.]

§ 322.—Actions either right or wrong. (page 163, line 28.) [page 186, line 23.]

§ 323.—Transgression is either fault or crime. (page 163, line 32.) [page 186, line 27.]

§ 324.—Actions are externally either just or unjust (page 164, line 1.) [page 186, line 30.]

§ 325.—Collision of duties is perfectly inconceivable. (page 164, line 3.) [page 187, line 1.]

§ 326.—More extensive ground toward obligation takes precedence. (page 164, line 9.) [page 187, line 7.] Cf. § 450.

§ 327.—External laws either natural or statutable. (page 164, line 18.) [page 187, line 17.]

§ 328.—Laws are objective principles; maxims are subjective rules. (page 164, line 29.) [page 187, line 28.] [*Maxims*: rules of conduct deliberately adopted by an agent-intelligent (*regulae quae inter MAXIMAS haberi debent*)—Simple, explanation of terms, p. xv.]

§ 329.—Necessity of adopting such maxims as might serve for common laws. (page 164, line 33.) [page 187, line 32.]

§ 330.—Simplicity of the law exceedingly surprising. (page 165, line 7.) Cf. § 716. [page 188, line 9.]

§ 331.—Legality and morality of actions. (page 165, line 22.) [page 188, line 25.]

§ 332.—Supreme principle of ethics. (page 165, line 28.) Cf. § 176. [page 188, line 32.]

§ 333.—Law proceeds from will; maxims, from choice. (page 165, line 31.) [page 189, line 3.] Cf. § 289.

§ 334.—Liberty of choice can only be explained negatively. (page 166, line 3.) [page 189, line 10.] Cf. §§ 141, 308.

§ 335.—Lawgiver is the author of juridical obligation, but not necessarily the author of the law. (p. 166, l. 23.) [p. 190, l. 3.]

§ 336.—Imputation is either judiciary or adjudicatory. (page 167, line 4.) [page 190, line 14.]

§ 337.—Legal consequence of disobedience is punishment. (page 167, line 13.) [page 190, line 23.] *Meritorious*: Cf. §§ 455, 532, 715, and especially § 891.

§ 338.—Consequences of obedience cannot be imputed to the agent. (page 167, line 23.) [page 191, line 3.]

Chapter II.—Introduction to the Metaphysic of Law. (§§ 339–378 inclusive.)

Article A.—What the science of law is. (§ 339.)

§ 339.—Law (*JUS*) is the aggregate of those laws which may be externally promulgated. (page 169, line 5.) Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. iv. 19. Cf. Cicero de Officiis, Book III, ch. vi. 3 and xvii, 5, 6. [page 192, line 5.]

Article B.—What is law? (§§ 340–342 inclusive.)

§ 340.—Criterion to determine whether laws are just. (page 169, line 20.) [page 192, line 21.]

§ 341.—Law merely respects the formal relationship of choices. (page 170, line 12.) [page 193, line 13.]

§ 342.—Law is the aggregate of those conditions according to which personal choices may harmonize (and not destroy one another) by being subordinated to Freedom's law universal. (page 170, line 24.) [page 193, line 26.]

Article C.—Supreme principle of law. (§§ 343–346 inclusive.)

§ 343.—Every action is right and just whose maxim allows the agent's freedom of choice to harmonize with the freedom of every other, according to a universal law. (page 170, l. 29.) [p. 194, l. 2.]

§ 344.—Wrong to obstruct just actions. (page 170, line 32.) Cf. St. James i., 25. [page 194, line 5.]

§ 345.—No one is legally entitled to demand that justice be my maxim. (page 171, line 5.) [page 194, line 10.]

§ 346.—So act that the use of thy freedom may not circumscribe the freedom of any other. (page 171, line 11.) Cf. §§ 176, 430–434 and 332 and 178. [page 194, line 17.]

Article D.—Law carries with it a title of co-action. (§ 347.)

§ 347.—Co-action preventing misuse of freedom, goes to establish freedom. (page 171, line 23.) Cf. § 221. [page 195, line 2.]

Article E.—Law may likewise be strictly defined as that by which mutual co-action is made consistent with universal freedom. §§ 348–353.

§ 348.—Law is not to be regarded as made up of two parts, the one obligation, the other a title of co-action. (page 172, line 4.) [page 195, line 15.]

§ 349.—Strict law can require no internal, but merely external determinators of choice. (page 172, line 9.) [page 195, line 20.]

§ 350.—Quantum of personal freedom is preserved undiminished by reciprocal action and co-action. (p. 172, l. 24.) [p. 196, l. 6.]

§ 351.—Propositions of law are deduced from that equal and mutual co-action which corresponds to the ordinary moral idea of the law. (page 172, line 33.) [page 196, line 17.]

§ 352.—Law insists on a mathematic precision not exigible in the offices of virtue. (page 173, line 8.) [page 196, line 25.]

§ 353.—Two stumbling blocks must be removed. (page 173, line 22.) [page 197, line 9.]

APPENDIX TO THE INTRODUCTION TO THE METAPHYSIC OF LAW. PARTS I, II, III. (§§ 354--378 inclusive.)

PART I.—OF LAW EQUIVOCAL. (§§ 354--360.)

§ 354.—Two sorts of usurped law: equity and necessity. (page 174, line 3.) [page 197, line 20.]

Article I.—Equity. (§§ 355--357 inclusive.)

§ 355.—Equity represented as legal right, not as ethical. (page 174, line 13.) [page 198, line 5.]

§ 356.—Equity is an absurdity, except so far as it properly belongs to ethics. (page 174, line 30.) [page 198, line 22.]

§ 357.—Equity cannot properly be enforced by law. (page 175, line 8.) [page 199, line 3.]

Article II.—Necessity. (§§ 358--360 inclusive.)

§ 358.—Necessity assumes a right repugnant to law. (page 175, line 14.) [page 199, line 9.]

§ 359.—Necessity outweighs the law's co-action, and is consequently inconsiderately held to outweigh the law's judgment. (page 175, line 22.) [page 199, line 17.]

§ 360.—Necessity cannot outweigh the law's judgment. (page 176, line 5.) [page 200, line 5.]

PART II.—GENERAL DIVISION OF JURISPRUDENCE. (§§ 361--373 inclusive.)

Article A.—Division of juridical offices. (§§ 361--365 inclusive.)

§ 361.—Follow Ulpian [A. D. 215.] in this division. (page 176, line 10.) [page 200, line 10.]

§ 362.—Honeste vive. (page 176, line 14.) [page 200, line 15.]

§ 363.—Neminem laede. (page 176, line 21.) [page 200, line 23.]

§ 364.—Suum cuique tribue. (page 176, line 24.) [p. 200, l. 26.]

§ 365.—Found a division of juridical obligation into internal, external, and composite. (page, 176, line 30.) [page 201, line 7.]

Article B.—Division of rights. (§§ 366–373 inclusive.)

§ 366.—Law is either natural or statutable and positive. (page 177, line 4.) [page 201, line 13.]

§ 367.—Right is the ethical faculty or title of obliging another, and is the legal ground of positive law. (p. 177, l. 8.) [p. 201, l. 17.]

§ 368.—External rights must always be acquired. (page 177, line 14.) [page 201, line 24.]

§ 369.—Freedom is the only birthright of man. (page 177, line 16.) [page 202, line 2.]

§ 370.—Rights subordinate to freedom: (1) equality; (2) innocence; (3) action. (page 177, line 20.) [page 202, line 6.]

§ 371.—Juridical falsehood distinguished out of lying. (page 178 note.) [page 202 note.] Cf. § 505.

§ 372.—Whoso declines the burden of proof, does in fact appeal to his birthright. (page 178, line 1.) [page 202, line 19.]

§ 373.—Subdivisions of natural law restrained to external rights. (page 178, line 13.) [page 203, line 13.]

PART III.—FUNDAMENTAL DIVISION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS.
(§§ 374–378 inclusive.)

§ 374.—All obligations are either juridical or ethical. (page 178, line 20.) [page 203, line 20.] *Compulsion*: cf. § 386, 388, 400.

§ 375.—Division of all moral science founded on the relations betwixt the law and the matter of obligation. (page 179, line 9.) [page 204, line 4.]

§ 376.—Division according to the relation betwixt the obliger and the obliged. (page 180, line 1.) [page 204, line 25.]

§ 377.—Division of ethic as a general system of human offices or duties. (page 180, line 24.) [page 205, line 22.]

§ 378.—Law of nature divided into natural and civil or municipal. (page 181, line 1.) [page 206, line 1.]

Chapter III.—Preliminary Notions. (§§ 379–477 inclusive.)

§ 379.—Ethics comprehends both law and morals. (page 182, line 3.) [page 207, line 4.]

TITLE I.—EXPOSITION OF THE NOTION VIRTUE. (§§ 380–389 inclusive.)

§ 380.—Duty implies necessitation, i. e. co-action exercised by the law upon the choice. (page 182, line 16.) [page 207, line 17.]

§ 381.—Self co-action first reveals to man his moral freedom. (page 183 note.) [page 208 note.]

§ 382.—Duty involves no more than *self* co-action, and consequently comes within the sphere of morals. (page 183, line 5.) [page 208, line 7.]

§ 383.—Mighty opposing forces which he has to go forth and encounter. (page 183, line 13.) Cf. St. John xvi, 33; I John v, 4;

Rev. iii, 12; Ephesians vi, 12; Buddha's Dharmapada 44, 45. Cf. § 736. [page 208, line 16.] § 949.

§ 384.—Resolve to withstand is moral valor, i. e. virtue. (page 183, line 21.) [page 209, line 6.] Cf. § 232.

§ 385.—Ethic objects a matter to man's free choice, an end given by pure reason. (page 184, line 6.) [page 209, line 14.]

§ 386.—No end can be mine unless I make it so. (page 184, line 19.) [page 209, line 27.] See § 388.

§ 387.—Ethics is a doctrine of the ends of reason. (page 185, line 3.) [page 210, line 14.] Cf. §§ 1026, 1027, 2605.

§ 388.—Ethics is a doctrine of the offices of virtue. (page 185, line 13.) [page 210, line 24.]

§ 389.—How is an end which is in itself a ground of duty, possible? (page 185, line 30.) [page 211, line 10.]

TITLE II.—EXPOSITION OF THE NOTION OF AN END WHICH IS AT THE SAME TIME A DUTY. (§§ 390--399 inclusive.)

§ 390.—Relation of an end to duty may be cogitated in a two-fold manner. (page 186, line 3.) [page 211, line 15.]

§ 391.—Jurisprudence, beginning with the end, statutes the duty. (page 186, line 7.) [page 211, line 19.]

§ 392.—Morals, obliged by the duty, ordains the end. [page 186, line 14.] [page 211, line 26.]

§ 393.—Duties regarding ends are moral duties, or offices of virtue. (page 186, line 27.) [page 212, line 11.]

§ 394.—Obligation in general abstracts from all ends, and consequently is not an office of virtue. (page 186, line 32.) Cf. Coke: "Every right is a title; but every title is not such a right for which an action lies." Burrill's Law Diet. article Title. Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. v, page 304. [page 212, line 17.]

§ 395.—Virtuous office can be constituted only where an action is both an end and a duty. (page 187, line 9.) [page 212, line 28.]

§ 396.—Juridical obligations are coercible; moral depend on freedom. (page 187, line 16.) [page 213, line 3.]

§ 397.—Moral science treats not only of the autonomy, but also of the autokraty of the will. (page 187, line 19.) [page 213, l. 6.]

§ 398.—Virtue cannot be explained to be a habit. (page 188, line 1.) [page 213, line 23.]

§ 399.—Virtue=a; non-virtue=0 its logical antipart; vice=—a its real antagonist. (page 188, line 10.) [page 214, line 1.]

TITLE III.—OF THE GROUND UPON WHICH MAN REPRESENTS TO HIMSELF AN END WHICH IS AT THE SAME TIME A DUTY. (§§ 400--402 inclusive.)

§ 400.—Categorical imperative connects the idea Duty with that of an end in general. (page 189, line 3.) Cf. §§ 374, 386, 388. [page 214, line 27.]

§ 401.—Because no action can be aimless—(page 189, line 15.) [page 215, line 10.]

§ 402.—Ethics treats of such ends as man ought to aim at. (page 189, line 25.) [page 215, line 21.]

TITLE IV.—WHAT ENDS THEY ARE, THE VERY ESSENCE WHEREOF IT IS TO BE DUTIES. (§ 403.)

§ 403.—Such ends are: (1) our own perfection; (2) our neighbor's happiness. (page 190, line 6.) Cf. Buddha Dharmapada 166. See §§ 192, 423, 430. [page 216, line 3.] § 949.

TITLE V.—DILUCILATION OF THESE TWO NOTIONS. (§§ 404-410 inclusive.)

Article A.—One's own perfection. (§§ 404-407 inclusive.)

§ 404.—Ethical perfection is formal and qualitative. (page 190, line 28.) [page 216, line 25.]

§ 405.—Perfection the effect of his own activity; not any gift of nature. (page 191, line 9.) [page 217, line 11.]

§ 406.—Ethico-active reason unconditionally ordains self development. (page 191, line 17.) Cf. §§ 238-240. [page 217, line 20.]

§ 407.—Culture of his will to the purest grade of ethic sentiment. (page 191, line 26.) [page 217, line 30.]

Article B.—My neighbor's happiness. (§§ 408-410 inclusive.)

§ 408.—Happiness not an end affording the groundwork of any duty. (page 192, line 7.) [page 218, line 13.] Cf. § 242.

§ 409.—Happiness of others it indirectly becomes my duty to advance, because humanity is by the law constituted my absolute end. (page 192, line 23.) Cf. §§ 72, 73, 77, 94, 97, 186, 239, 240. Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. v, page 297—See § 403. [page 218, line 30.]

§ 410.—Not my happiness, but my morality, which to uphold in its integrity is at once my end and my duty. (page 193, line 5.) [page 219, line 16.]

TITLE VI.—MORALS CONTAIN NO LAW FOR ACTIONS (THAT WERE JURISPRUDENCE), BUT FOR THE INWARD MAXIMS SINGLY WHENCE ACTIONS TAKE THEIR RISE. (§§ 411, 412.)

§ 411.—Notion duty relates immediately to law. (page 193, line 27.) [page 220, line 7.]

§ 412.—Notion of an end in itself a duty founds a law ordaining positive maxims of conduct. (page 194, line 12.) [page 220, l. 25.]

TITLE VII.—MORAL DUTY IS OF INDETERMINATE OBLIGATION, BUT THE JURIDICAL OFFICES ARE STRICT. (§§ 413-417 inclusive.)

§ 413.—Indeterminate obligation constitutes no exception from duty. (page 195, line 3.) [page 221, line 22.]

§ 414.—Duties of indeterminate obligation are the only offices of virtue. Omission is moral unworth; deliberate transgression is vice. (page 195, line 19.) Cf. § 399. [page 222, line 11.]

§ 415.—Juridical obligations ought to be observed as duties. (page 195, line 30.) Cf. §§ 455, 305, 715. [page 222, line 23.]

§ 416.—Ethical complacency meant when it is said that virtue is her own reward. (page 196, line 11.) [page 223, line 8.]

§ 417.—Consciousness of virtue brings forth an ethical delight. (page 196, line 21.) [page 223, line 19.]

TITLE VIII.—EXPOSITION OF THE MORAL DUTIES AS DUTIES OF INDETERMINATE OBLIGATION. (§§ 418-425 inclusive.)

PART I.—MY OWN PERFECTION, AS END AND DUTY. (§§ 418-422 inclusive.)

Article A.—Physical perfection. (§§ 418, 419.)

§ 418.—Culture of all our faculties in general is an imperative duty. (page 197, line 4.) [page 224, line 4.]

§ 419.—Duty of physical culture is of indeterminate obligation. (page 197, line 20.) [page 224, line 21.]

Article B.—Ethical perfection. (§§ 420-422 inclusive.)

§ 420.—Where the law is at once the rule and the mobile of the will. (page 197, line 32.) [page 225, line 5.]

§ 421.—How much ethical content may belong to any action, cannot be explored. (page 198, line 12.) [page 225, line 17.]

§ 422.—Law does not ordain any such inward mental act* but merely that it ought to be our maxim to discharge duty because it is duty. (page 198, line 24.) [page 225, line 30.]

PART II.—MY NEIGHBOR'S HAPPINESS AS END AND DUTY. (§§ 423-425 inclusive.)

Article A.—Physical wellbeing. (§§ 423, 424.)

§ 423.—Happiness of others is an end incumbent on us as a duty (beneficence). (page 198, line 32.) [page 226, line 7.] Cf. § 409.

§ 424.—Duty of beneficence is indeterminate only. (page 199, line 15.) [page 226, line 23.]

Article B.—The moral welfare of our neighbor. (§ 425.)

§ 425.—Ought not to tempt others to violate conscience. (page 199, line 29.) Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 125. Cf. I Cor. viii, 13. [page 227, line 9.] § 949.

TITLE IX.—WHAT A MORAL DUTY (OR VIRTUOUS OFFICE) IS. (§§ 426-431.)

§ 426.—Virtue is the strength of the human will in the execution of duty. (page 200, line 11.) [p. 227, l. 25.] Cf. §§ 232, 436.

§ 427.—Every duty involves the notion of necessitation by law. (page 200, line 21.) [page 228, line 7.]

§ 428.—Duty in general is not a virtuous office. Particular duties springing from ends are offices of virtue. (page 200, line 32.) Cf. §§ 394, 395. [page 228, line 18.]

*As exploring the ethical content of our actions, i. e., quibbling within ourselves about our own moral worth. Self examination may aid us to make the law our motive, but is merely an adminicle to virtue, and may be dispensed with provided we do make the law our motive.

§ 429.—Virtue in general is only one and identic. (page 201, line 13.) [page 228, line 32.] Cf. §§ 278, 456.

§ 430.—Supreme principle of morals: Adopt such ends in thy maxims as may be made imperative on all mankind to design. (page 201, line 22.) See §§ 176, 346. [page 229, line 9.]

§ 431.—Every end a priori is enforced by practical reason as a duty incumbent on all mankind. (p. 201, l. 30.) [p. 229, l. 17.]

TITLE X.—THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF LAW WAS ANALYTIC; THAT OF MORALS IS SYNTHETIC. (§§ 432-436 inclusive.)

§ 432.—Principle of law is evolved analytically out of the idea freedom. (page 202, line 13.) Cf. §§ 122, 346-350. [p. 230, l. 3.]

§ 433.—Principle of morals conjoins with the notion of external freedom that of an end which is in itself a ground of duty. (page 202, line 22.) See § 431. [page 230, line 12.]

§ 434.—Inward freedom put in room of outward co-action. (page 202, line 28.) [page 230, line 18.]

§ 435.—Unconditioned end of practical reason consists in this, that virtue is its own end and its own reward. (page 203, line 5.) [page 230, line 27.] Cf. § 416.

§ 436.—Man is under an obligation to virtue, in its strength a matter of acquisition. (page 203, line 30.) [page 231, line 23.]

TITLE XI.—TABLE OF MORAL DUTIES. (§ 437.)

§ 437.—Form and matter of all internal and external moral duties. (page 204, line 6.) [page 232, line 1.]

TITLE XII.—EMOTIONS PREREQUISITE TOWARD CONSTITUTING MAN A MORAL AGENT. (§§ 438-449 inclusive.)

§ 438.—Predispositions by which man is rendered the subject of ethical obligation. (page 204, line 23.) [page 232, line 20.]

Article A.—The moral sense. (§§ 439-441 inclusive.)

§ 439.—Susceptibility for pleasure or displacency upon the bare consciousness of the harmony or of the discrepancy of our actions with the law. (page 205, line 10.) [page 233, line 10.]

§ 440.—All consciousness of obligation presupposes this feeling. (page 205, line 22.) [page 233, line 23.]

§ 441.—No man is destitute of moral sense. (page 205, line 33.) [page 234, line 3.] Cf. §§ 2595, 248, 125.

Article B.—Of conscience. (§§ 442-444 inclusive.)

§ 442.—Conscience is man's practical reason in the act of holding before him in all circumstances his law of duty, in order to absolve or condemn him. (page 206, line 11.) [page 234, line 16.]

§ 443.—Conscience cannot err. (page 206, line 29.) Cf. § 954. [page 235, line 3.]

§ 444.—Duty to quicken the attention due to conscience. (page 207, line 8.) [page 235, line 17.] Cf. §§ 524, 441.

Article C.—Love of our neighbor. (445–448 inclusive.)

§ 445.—Love is not and never can be a duty. (page 207, line 17.) Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. v, page 307. [page 235, line 28.]

§ 446.—Beneficence is at all times incumbent upon us as a duty. (page 207, line 30.) [page 236, line 10.] Cf. § 608.

§ 447.—Beneficence produces philanthropy, and emerges into love. (page 208, line 7.) [page 236, line 22.] Cf. § 559.

§ 448.—Benevolence is only indirectly a duty. (page 208, line 19.) [page 237, line 3.] Cf. § 558.

Article D.—Of reverence. (§ 449.)

§ 449.—Reverence for himself is no man's duty, but is inevitably extorted from him by the law. (page 208, line 25.) Cf. §§ 239, 240. [page 237, line 10.]

TITLE XIII.—GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS, ON WHICH EVERY SCIENTIFIC TREATISE ON MORALS MUST BE REARED.—POSITIONS (1) § 450, (2) § 451, (3) § 452. (§§ 450–453.)

§ 450.—Different grounds of obligation cannot found one and the same duty.* (page 209, line 10.) [page 238, line 4.]

§ 451.—Difference betwixt virtue and vice not one of degree, but of relation to the law. (page 210, line 6.) [page 239, line 3.]

§ 452.—Duty is not conformable to virtue, but virtue must be adequate to duty. (page 210, line 30.) [page 239, line 28.]

§ 453.—Three old apophthegms objectionable. (page 211, line 3.) [page 240, line 3.]

TITLE XIV.—OF VIRTUE IN GENERALE. (§§ 454–457 inclusive.)

§ 454.—Virtue is the ethic strength (*fortitudo moralis*) of man in the fulfilment of his duty. (p. 211, l. 11.) Cf. § 384. [p. 240, l. 12.]

§ 455.—Virtue, however well deserving of our fellow men, never meritorious in respect of the law. (page 212, line 8.) Cf. §§ 233, 337, 532, 338, 715. [page 241, line 13.] See § 891.

§ 456.—Different virtues are merely practical applications of the one and single principle of virtue. (page 212, line 19.) Cf. § 429. [page 241, line 24.]

§ 457.—Æsthetic of ethics is a subjective exposition of the metaphysic of ethics. (page 212, line 28.) [page 242, line 2.]

TITLE XV.—OF THE PRINCIPLE DISTINGUISHING BETWIXT MORALS AND LAW. (§§ 458–460 inclusive.)

§ 458.—Inward freedom as the condition precedent of all moral duty. (page 213, line 7.) Cf. §§ 442–444. [page 242, line 15.]

*It is duty in general to attend to every particular obligation; but that duty is founded, not on any particular obligation, but on obligation in general, that is, on the law itself. The duty which rises upon a particular obligation is manifestly a particular duty; and the virtue of performing it is a particular virtue. Cf. §§ 394, 395, 428, 429, and especially 326. See also § 456. Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. v., page 304.

Of virtue according to the principles of inward freedom. (§§ 459–467 inclusive.)

§ 459.—Why virtue cannot be defined to be an aptitude of acting conformably to the law. (p. 213, l. 19.) Cf. §§ 398, 188. [p. 242, l. 27.]

§ 460.—Inward freedom demands two things: (1) self command; (2) apathy. (page 214, line 4.) [page 243, line 16.] Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, i, 4. See § 871.

TITLE XVI.—VIRTUE, SO FAR FORTH AS IT IS BASED UPON A PRINCIPLE OF INWARD FREEDOM, DEMANDS, FIRST, (POSITIVELY), MAN'S SELF COMMAND. (§§ 461–463 inclusive.)

§ 461.—Emotions obstruct the exercise of reason. (page 214, line 13.) [page 243, line 25.]

§ 462.—Passions lead on to deliberate sin. (page 214, line 19.) [page 244, line 2.]

§ 463.—Virtue consequently ordains self command. (page 215, line 3.) Cf. Buddha, Dharmapada 103, 105, 160, 321; Confucius, Analects (Dr. Legge §191 above) XII, i, 1. [page 244, line 19.]

TITLE XVII.—VIRTUE AS BASED ON A PRINCIPLE OF INWARD FREEDOM, DEMANDS, SECOND (i. e. NEGATIVELY), APATHY, CONSIDERED AS FORCE OF WILL. (§§ 464–467 inclusive.)

§ 464.—Ethic apathy is freedom from passion. (page 215, line 17.) [page 245, line 4.]

§ 465.—Enthusiasm is but the seeming strength of passion. (page 215, line 27.) [page 245, line 14.] *Sensory*: cf. § 284.

§ 466.—True strength of virtue is the mind at tranquility. (page 216, line 3.) [page 245, line 23.] [Strike out the last half of this section.]

§ 467.—Virtue can never find a truce with appetite and instinct. (page 216, line 18.) [page 246, line 11.]

TITLE XVIII.—PRELIMINARY—OF THE SUBDIVISION OF MORALS. §§ 468–476.

§ 468.—Formally, morals must be completely distinguished from law. (page 217, line 2.) [page 247, line 2.]

§ 469.—Materially, ethics must be represented as the system of the ends and scope of practical reason. (page 217, line 12.) [page 247, line 12.] Cf. §§ 1026, 2605.

§ 470.—Morals regards only moral duties* (offices of virtue). (p. 217, l. 21.) See §§ 394, 395, 428, 429, 450, 456. [p. 247, l. 21.]

§ 471.—Morals because it treats of duties of indeterminate obligation, requires a method.† (page 218, line 5.) [p. 248, l. 9.]

*That is to say, the science of morals excludes not only the science of law, but the science of ethics, which underlies both law and morals. The groundwork of ethics and the inquiry into the apriori operations of the will must precede morals. See § 275.

†META-ODOS—showing the way.

§ 472.—Casuistry is interwoven fragmentarily into morals, under the form of scholia. (page 218, line 21.) [page 248, line 26.]

§ 473.—Didactic of ethics is the exercise of reason in the theory of duty. It is either akroamatic or erotematic. (page 218, line 27.) [page 248, line 32.] Cf. § 1397.

§ 474.—Erotetic method is either catechetic or Socratic. (page 218, line 34.) [page 249, line 7.] Cf. § 614.

§ 475.—Ascetic of ethics is the exercise of reason in the practice of virtue. (page 219, line 9.) [page 249, line 17.] Cf. § 622.

§ 476.—Morals is divided into the elementology and the methodology of ethics. (page 219, line 15.) [p. 249, l. 23.] Cf. § 1471.

TITLE XIX.—TWOFOLD PRINCIPLE OF DIVISION OF THE SYSTEM OF ETHICAL CONCEPTIONS. (§ 477.)

§ 477.—Ground plan of the science of pure practical reason. (page 219, line 23.) [page 249, line 31.]

TOME I.—ELEMENTOLOGY OF ETHICS. (§§ 478--611.)

Book I.—Of the Duties Owed by Man to Himself. (§§ 478--550.)

Introduction. (§§ 478-487 inclusive.)

Article I.—The notion of a duty owed by mankind to himself appears at first sight to involve a contradiction. (§ 478.)

§ 478.—Duty owed to myself imports an absurdity when the obligating I is taken in exactly the same sense with the I obliged. (page 223, line 6.) [page 253, line 6.]

Article II.—There are duties owed by man to himself. (§ 479.)

§ 479.—Duties owed to others would be abolished, if I owed no duty to myself. (page 224, line 4.) [page 254, line 6.]

Article III.—Solution of this apparent antinomy. (§§ 480, 481.)

§ 480.—Man regards himself in a twofold capacity: (1) as a sensible being; (2) as a very reason. (p. 224, l. 14.) [p. 254, l. 17.]

§ 481.—Man, in respect of his personality, stands under obligation to the humanity subsisting in his person. (page 224, line 24.) Cf. §§ 237-239. [page 255, line 1.]

Article IV.—On the principle of subdividing the duties owed by man to himself. (§§ 482-487 inclusive.)

§ 482.—Duties owed by man to himself cannot be divided into those owed to the body and those due to the soul. (page 225, line 8.) [page 255 line 17.] Cf. § 2938.

§ 483.—Duties owed by man to himself are divided objectively into (1) negative (maintain thyself in the original perfection of thy nature) and (2) positive (study to perfect and advance thy being.) (page 225, line 26.) (1) of determinate obligation; (2) of indeterminate obligation. [page 256, line 7.]

§ 484.—Subjective division of the duties owed by man to himself: (1) in respect of his animal part; (2) in respect of his moral being. (page 226, line 18.) [page 257, line 1.]

§ 485.—Vices subversive of man's duty in respect of his animal part: (1) self-murder; (2) self-defilement; (3) self-obstupefaction. (page 226, line 23.) [page 257, line 6.]

§ 486.—Vices subversive of man's duty in respect of his moral being: (1) lying; (2) avarice; (3) spurious humility. (page 226, line 33.) [page 257, line 17.]

§ 487.—Virtue opposed to all these vices is self-reverence. (page 227, line 16.) Cf. § 592. [page 258, line 3.]

APOTOME I.—OF THE DUTIES OF PERFECT AND DETERMINATE OBLIGATION. (§§ 488–541 inclusive.)

Chapter I.—Of the Duty Owed by Mankind to Himself in Respect of his Animal Part. (§§ 488–500 inclusive.)

Article V.—Three vices opposed to this duty. (§ 488.)

§ 488.—Duty of self-conservation in his animal estate. (page 228, line 8.) [page 258, line 17.]

Article VI.—Of self-murder. (§§ 489–492 inclusive.)

§ 489.—Self-destruction is a crime. (page 228, line 21.) [page 259, line 7.] Cf. §§ 59, 74.

§ 490.—Man cannot renounce his personality. (page 229, line 28.) [page 260, line 11.]

§ 491.—Acts of partial self-murder. (p. 230, l. 8.) [p. 260, l. 25.]

§ 492.—Casuistics of self-murder. (p. 230, l. 21.) [p. 261, l. 7.]

Article VII.—Of self defilement. (§§ 493–497 inclusive.)

§ 493.—Sexual appetite is a last end purposed by nature. (page 231, line 17.) [page 262, line 8.]

§ 494.—Attains the humanity inhabiting his person. (page 231, line 31.) [p. 262, l. 22.] St Paul: "Keep thyself pure." I Tim. v, 22.

§ 495.—Sexual appetite is called lust. and gives birth to the vice impurity. Upon this instinct is raised the virtue chastity. (page 232, line 6.) [page 263, line 1.]

§ 496.—Violation in the highest degree of the duty owed to himself. (page 232, line 10.) [p. 263, l. 5.] *Productive*: § 1628.

§ 497.—Man meanly abdicates his personality, when he attempts to employ himself as a bare means to satisfy a brutal lust. (page 232, line 31.) [page 263, line 26.]

Article VIII.—Of self-obstupefaction by excessive indulgence in meats and drinks. (§§ 498–500 inclusive.)

§ 498.—Vice of intemperance is not constituted by its physical results. (page 233, line 21.) [page 264, line 19.]

§ 499.—Drunkenness and gluttony are the two vices falling under this head. (page 233, line 29.) [page 264, line 27.]

§ 500.—Casuistics of intemperance. (p. 234, l. 23.) [p. 265, l. 25.]

Chapter II.—Of the Duty Owed by Man to Himself as a Moral Being Singly
(§§ 501-522 inclusive.)

§ 501.—Opposed to the vices of lying, avarice, and false humility. (page 235, line 21.) [page 266, line 27.]

Article IX.—Of lying. (§§ 502-509 inclusive.)

§ 502.—Highest violation of the duty owed by man to himself. (page 235, line 24.) [page 267, line 2.] Cf. §§ 60, 75, 249.

§ 503.—Subversive of the purpose and design of language, and a renunciation of one's personality. (p. 236, l. 8.) [p. 267, l. 15.]

§ 504.—Candor is veracity in statements; fidelity is veracity in promises; both together make up sincerity. (page 236, line 27.) [page 268, line 4.]

§ 505.—Lying is a crime by its bare form, regardless of its end or consequences. (page 236, line 31.) [page 268, line 7.]

§ 506.—Many an inward lie, the guilt whereof man entails upon himself. (page 237, line 5.)—" *Although he find none such*"—but rather a judge ever present. [page 268, line 16.]

§ 507.—Seems to taint the vitals of humanity. (page 237, line 27.) Cf. § 961. [page 269, line 7.]

§ 508.—Deflective tendency must have preceded man's actual lapse from truth. (page 238, line 8.) Cf. §§ 703, 704. [p. 269, l. 24.]

§ 509.—Casuistics of lying. (page 238, line 18.) [page 270, line 3.]

Article X.—Of avarice. (§§ 510-514 inclusive.)

§ 510.—Avarice of hoarding makes a man a miser, because it narrows and contracts. (page 239, line 4.) [page 270, line 25.]

§ 511.—Aristotle's famous principle, that virtue is the mean betwixt two extreme vices. (page 239, line 12.) The argument in this section is perfectly conclusive. [p. 271, l. 3.] Cf. § 451.

§ 512.—Profusion and hoarding are specifically distinct vices, in respect of the contrary maxims of the miser and prodigal. (page 239, line 26.) [page 271, line 19.]

§ 513.—Betwixt truth and falsehood, there is no mean. To be too virtuous is as much as drawing a right line too straight. (page 240 note.)—" *nay - - commits in so far a fault:*" may commit. See the first (Semple's) edition. [page 272, note.]

§ 514.—Casuistics of avarice. (page 240, line 9.) [p. 272, l. 4.]

Article XI.—Of false and spurious humility. (§§ 515-520 inclusive.)

§ 515.—Man as an animal is of very little moment. (page 241, line 21.) [page 273, line 23.]

§ 516.—Man as the subject of ethico-active reason, is exalted beyond all price. (page 241, line 28.) [page 274, line 1.] Cf. § 91.

§ 517.—Ought to estimate himself by a measure at once great and small. (page 242, line 4.) Cf. Tsze-sze, in the Doctrine of the Mean, ch. xii. (Lagge [see above, § 191] p. 289.) [p. 274, l. 11.]

§ 518.—Ethical humility opposed to self-righteousness and to spiritual hypocrisy. (page 242, line 23.) [p. 274, l. 31.] Cf. § 220.

§ 519.—Humility in view of the law becomes arrogance or hypocrisy when it regards other persons.* (page 242, line 31.) [*Teacher, we know that thou sayest and teachest rightly, and regardest not the person of any, but teachest the way of God truly. Luke xx, 21 (p. 10 † sup.) Therefore do men fear Him; He regards not any of the wise in heart. Job xxxvii, 24 (Conant tr.)] [page 275, line 8.]

§ 520.—True humility results from comparison of a man's self with the moral law. (page 243, line 9.) [page 275, line 21.]

Article XII.—Duty in respect of the dignity of our humanity. (§§ 521, 522.)

§ 521.—Precepts of true dignity. (page 243, l. 21.) [p. 276, l. 2.]

§ 522.—Casuistics of humility. (page 244, line 7.) [p. 276, l. 23.]

Chapter III.—Of the Duty Owed by Man to Himself as his Own Judge.

(§§ 523-536 inclusive)

Article XIII.—Of conscience. (§§ 523-532 inclusive.)

§ 523.—Consciousness of an internal tribunal in man, before which his thoughts accuse or excuse him. (page 244, line 30.) Cf. St. Paul, Romans ii, 15. [page 277, line 16.]

§ 524.—Man may indeed have ceased to heed him, but not to hear him is impossible. (p. 245, l. 15.) Cf. §§ 442-444. [p. 278, l. 5.]

§ 525.—Conscience must represent to itself always some One other than itself as Judge. (p. 245, l. 28.) Cf. § 259. [p. 278, l. 19.]

§ 526.—Twofold personality cogitated only for a practical behoof. (page 246, note.) [page 279, note.]

§ 527.—Conscience must be regarded as a subjective principle implanted in the reason of man, calling for an account of every action before God. (page 246, line 7.) [page 279, line 3.]

§ 528.—Idea of a Supreme Being is given subjectively only, by practical reason obliging itself to act conformably. (page 247, line 4.) [page 280, line 5.] Cf. §§ 2371, 2331.

§ 529.—Religion in genere is a principle of esteeming of all our duties AS IF THEY WERE divine commandments. (page 247, line 10.) Cf. §§ 541, 628, 896, 2296, 2577, and see § 2420. [page 280, line 11.]

§ 530.—Minutest scruple of conscience, when it refers to an idea of duty, is of weight. (page 247, line 20.) [page 280, line 22.]

§ 531.—Conscience decides according to the rigor of the law. (page 247, line 30.) [page 280, line 32.] Cf. § 455.

§ 532.—Effect of absolution by conscience is not positive (joy) but only negative (tranquilization). (p. 248, l. 1.) [p. 281, l. 5.]

Article XIV.—The first commandment of all duties owed by man to himself. (§§ 533–536 inclusive.)

§ 533.—Know thyself. Search thy heart, whether it be good or evil. (page 248, line 13.) [page 281, line 18.] Cf. §§ 422, 706.

§ 534.—Self-examination is the beginning of all human wisdom. (page 248, line 20.) “*Inamissible*”=not to be lost. [p. 281, l. 25.]

Article XV.—Ethical self-knowledge produces impartiality and sincerity. (§§ 535, 536.)

§ 535.—Guards against the detestation of one’s self, and against a disdain of the whole human race in general. (page 248, line 31.) [page 282, line 7.]

§ 536.—Guards against the self-delusion of taking a bare wish, however ardent, for any index of a good heart. (page 249, line 7.) In popular language “the will for the deed.” [page 282, line 16.]

Episode. §§ 537–541 inclusive.

Article XVI.—Of an amphiboly of the reflex moral notions; whereby mankind is led to regard what is only a duty toward himself, as if it were a duty owed by him to others. (§§ 537, 538.)

§ 537.—Man can have no duty toward (but only IN REGARD OF) any being other than his fellow man. (p. 249, l. 21.) [p. 283, l. 5.]

§ 538.—What is man’s duty in regard of other beings, visible or invisible? (page 250, line 11.) [page 283, line 27.]

Article XVII.—Our duty in regard of impersonals. (§§ 539, 540.)

§ 539.—Duty in regard of the beauties of nature. (page 250, line 23.) [page 284, line 11.]

§ 540.—Duty in regard of the animal creation. (page 250, line 33.) [page 284, line 22.]

Article XVIII.—Our duty in regard of God. (§ 541.)

§ 541.—Religion: the duty of recognizing all our duties AS IF THEY WERE divine commandments. (page 251, line 16.) Cf. § 2296. [page 285, line 9.] See § 529.

APOTOME II.—OF THE INDETERMINATE MORAL DUTIES OWED BY MAN TO HIMSELF IN REGARD OF HIS END. (§§ 542–550 inclusive.)

Article XIX.—Of the duty owed by him to himself of advancing his physical perfection. (§§ 542–545 inclusive.)

§ 542.—Culture of all the different resources of mind, soul, and body, is a duty, a commandment of ethico-active reason. (page 252, line 6.) [“*Without* so moderate a share of capacity”: with but.] [page 286, line 6.]

§ 543.—Powers of mind are faculties whose exercise is possible by force of reason singly. (page 252, line 30.) [page 287, line 4.]

§ 544.—Powers of soul are those which stand at the command of the understanding. (page 253, line 10.) [Powers of mind pertain to man; powers of soul must be attained and retained. Powers of mind are prerequisite to personality; powers of soul are prerequisite of effort and industry.] [page 287, line 14.] Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 367 (see § 949 below.)

§ 545.—Culture of our bodily powers (gymnastic, properly so called). (page 253, line 18.) [page 287, line 23.]

Article XX.—Because the law ordains only the maxims of the action. (§§ 546, 547.)

§ 546.—Choice and degree of natural perfections must be left to the private reflection of each individual. (p. 253, l. 25.) [p. 288, l. 2.]

§ 547.—Duty in regard of his physical perfection is only of indeterminate obligation. (page 254, line 6.) [page 288, line 17.]

Article XXI.—Of the duty owed by man to himself of advancing his ethical perfection. (§ 548.)

§ 548.—Consists (1) subjectively, in the purity of his moral sentiments; (2) objectively, in the execution of his whole duty. (page 254, line 14.) [page 288, line 25.]

Article XXII.—Duty of ethical perfection is indeterminate. (§§ 549, 550.)

§ 549.—Determinate in quality (objectively); but (subjectively) in degree, it is indeterminate. (p. 254, l. 28.) [page 289, l. 11.]

§ 550.—Only one virtue objectively in idea; but subjectively in real fact a vast number of virtues. (p. 255, l. 7.) [p. 289, l. 22.]

Book II.—Of the Moral Duties Owed by Mankind Toward his Fellow Men. (§§ 551–599 inclusive.)

Chapter I.—Of the Duty Owed to Others, Considered Simply as Men. (§§ 551–599 inclusive.)

APOTOME I.—OF THE OFFICES OF CHARITY. (§§ 551–584 inclusive.)

INTRODUCTION.—OF LOVE AND REVERENCE. (§§ 551–557 inclusive.)

Art. XXIII.—Principal division of these obligations. (§§ 551, 552.)

§ 551.—Duties (1) such as oblige our fellow men when we discharge them; (2) those which entail no obligation. (page 256, line 10.) Cf. § 455. [page 291, line 9.]

§ 552.—Emotions which go hand in hand with our discharge of these offices. (page 256, line 15.) [State the last sentence negatively: not so to behave etc., as to etc., but to spare etc.] [p. 291, l. 14.]

Article XXIV.—Analogy to the physical system. (§ 553.)

§ 553.—Joint action and reaction of attractive and repellent forces. (page 257, line 12.) [page 292, line 19.]

Article XXV.—Love and reverence are practical, not merely emotional. (§§ 554–557 inclusive.)

§ 554.—Love must be understood as the practical maxim of good will, issuing in beneficence as its result. (page 257, line 24.) [page 293, line 2.]

§ 555.—Reverence must be taken to mean the practical maxim of circumscribing our own self esteem. (p. 257, l. 29.) [p. 293, l. 7.]

§ 556.—Duty of reverence is properly negative only, viz: not to exalt ourselves above others. (p 258, l. 6.) § 363. [p. 293, l. 16.]

§ 557.—Duty of loving my neighbor means making my own the ends and interests of others, in so far as these ends are not immoral. (page 258, line 12.) [page 293, line 23.]

APPENDIX TO THE INTRODUCTION.—OF PHILANTHROPY IN GENERAL.
(§§ 558-560 inclusive.

Article XXVI.—Philanthropy is not merely aesthetic, but practical.

§ 558.—Love of our fellow men not a love of complacency in our species, but a maxim actively to befriend them. (page 258, line 25.) [page 294, line 7.] Cf. § 448.

Article XXVII.—Maxim: Love thy neighbor as thyself. (§ 559.)

§ 559.—Active philanthropy is a duty mutually owed by all men to one another. (page 259, line 6.) [page 294, line 22.]

Article XXVIII.—General philanthropy has no degree. (§ 560.)

§ 560.—Active practical beneficence admits of degrees, because the universal law ordains only the maxim—(Love thy neighbor as thyself). (p. 260.) See §§ 420, 424, 447, and cf. § 549. [p. 295, l. 25.]

Part I.—The Offices of Charity are (A) Benevolence; (B) Gratitude; (C) Sympathy. (§§ 561-576.)

TITLE A.—OF THE DUTY OF BENEFICENCE. (§§ 561-565 inclusive.)

Article XXIX.—Deduction of this obligation from the law not immediately evident. (§§ 561, 562.)

§ 561.—Deprive one's self of the bounties of fortune: (1) servilely; (2) fanatically. (page 261, line 5.) [page 297, line 4.]

§ 562.—Benevolence is the pleasure we take in the happiness of our neighbor; beneficence is the maxim to make that happiness our end. (page 261, line 13.) [page 297, line 13.]

Article XXX.—Principle of selfishness self-contradictory and self-destructive. (§ 563.)

§ 563.—Beneficence a universal duty owed by man to man. (page 261, line 23.) [page 298, line 2.] Cf. §§ 62, 77.

Article XXXI.—Of ethical wealth. (§ 564.)

§ 564.—Beneficence to others, being a duty owed to one's self, is of debt merely, and therefore not meritorious. Consequently it ought to be exercised in private and in silence. (page 262, line 16.) [page 298, line 22.]

§ 565.—Casuistics of beneficence. (p. 263, l. 4.) [p. 299, l. 15.]

TITLE B.—OF THE DUTY OF GRATITUDE. (§§ 566-570 inclusive.)

Article XXXII.—Reverence toward the benefactor. (§§ 566-568.)

§ 566.—Gratitude is the veneration of another on account of a benefit. (page 263, line 27.) [page 300, line 6.]

§ 567.—Gratitude is immediately made necessary by the moral law. (page 264, line 4.) [page 300, line 17.]

§ 568.—No retribution can acquit a person of a conferred benefit. (p. 264, l. 10.) [p. 300, l. 23.] *Sacrosanct*: inviolable.—Webster.

Article XXXIII.—Indecorous not to defend the ancients. (§ 569.)

§ 569.—Gratitude is due to our ancestors. (page 264, line 25.) Cf. § 1074. [page 301, line 9.]

Article XXXIV.—Ethical advantage of gratitude. (§ 570.)

§ 570.—Take good heed not to regard the benefit as a burden. (page 265, line 5.) [page 301, line 23.]

TITLE C.—OF THE DUTY OF SYMPATHY. (§§ 571-576 inclusive.)

An aesthetic susceptibility of pleasure or pain. (§§ 571-574.)

§ 571.—Cultivate and employ these physical springs as means of advancing an effective and rational benevolence. (This duty is called humanity). (page 265, line 21.) [page 302, line 12.]

§ 572.—Humanity depends on practical reason, and is obligatory. (page 265, line 30.) [page 302, line 21.]

§ 573.—Physical sympathy, as in pity, cannot constitute obligation. (page 266, line 7.) [page 303, line 1.]

§ 574.—Mercy is offensive. (page 266, line 19.) [p. 302, l. 13.]

Article XXXV.—Virtue of the sympathetic affections. (§§ 575, 576.)

§ 575.—Instruments enabling us to discharge the offices of a humane mind, upon ethical principles. (p. 266, l. 25.) [p. 303, l. 20.]

§ 576.—Charity the highest ethical decoration of the world. (page 267, line 5.) [page 304, line 4.]

Part II.—Of the Vices Springing from the Hatred of our Fellows, and which are Opposed to the Duties of Philanthropy. (§§ 577-584 inclusive.)

Article XXXVI.—The detestable family of envy, ingratitude, and malice. (§§ 577-584 inclusive.)

§ 577.—Hate is in these vices not open and violent, but veiled and secret. (page 267, line 17.) [page 304, line 16.]

TITLE A.—ENVY IS THE PROPENSITY TO PERCEIVE THE WELFARE OF OUR NEIGHBOR WITH A GRUDGE. EVEN THOUGH OUR OWN HAPPINESS DOES NOT SUFFER BY IT. (§ 578.)

§ 578.—Envy arises from not knowing how to estimate our own advantages by their own intrinsic worth, but singly by comparing them with those enjoyed by others. (p. 267, l. 22.) [p. 304, l. 22.]

TITLE B.—INGRATITUDE: THE WANT OF LOVE IS TRANSMUTED TO A TITLE TO HATE THOSE BY WHOM WE HAVE BEEN FIRST BELOVED. (§ 579.)

§ 579.—Ground of the possibility of ingratitude lies in the duty

(owed to one's self) not to come to need. (page 268, line 10.) [That the duty may be misunderstood, is evident; but I cannot see that any possible misunderstanding of the duty has an essential relation to the duty in so far as the duty is ground of the possibility of the vice.] [page 305, line 16.]

TITLE C.—MALICE IS THE EXACT COUNTERPART OF SYMPATHY. AND DENOTES JOY AT THE SORROW OF ANOTHER. (§§ 580-58; inclusive.)

§ 580.—Malice is an inward hate of mankind, and the veriest antipart of the offices of charity. It eventuates in misanthropy. (page 269, line 1.) [The use of the double negative is English as well as Greek, but scarcely to be considered elegant. See §§ 486, 586, 703, 837.] [page 306, line 10.]

§ 581.—Desire for vengeance seems to rest on some title of justice. (page 269, line 23.) [page 307, line 1.]

§ 582.—Punishment is no act emanating from the private authority of the injured. God alone can say, Vengeance is mine. (page 269, line 29.) "*Decern:*" adjudge. [page 307, line 7.]

§ 583. Placability is a duty owed by man to man. (page 270, line 7.) [page 307, line 20.]

§ 584.—Notions of devilish vices and angelic virtues express only a maximum, used as a standard in estimating the morality of actions. (page 270, line 20.) [page 308, line 1.]

APOTOME II.—OF THE DUTY OF REVERENCE OWED TO OTHERS. (§§ 585--599 inclusive.)

Part I.—Acknowledgment of a Dignity in the Person of Another. (§§ 585-591 inclusive.)

§ 585.—Reverence is opposed to self-love, to self-conceit, to contempt. It is expressed by modesty. (page 271, line 10.) Cf. §§ 449 and 555. [page 308, line 26.]

Article XXVIII.—*Humanity is itself a dignity.* (§ 586.)

§ 586.—Every man is obliged practically to recognize the dignity of every other man's humanity. (page 271, l. 21.) [p. 309, l. 12.]

Article XXIX.—*To despise others is in any event contrary to duty.* (§§ 587-589 inclusive.)

§ 587.—Consequently the vicious is entitled to reverence, notwithstanding his unworth. (page 272, line 13.) [page 310, line 1.]

§ 588.—Hence some punishments are to be reprobated, as dishonoring humanity. (page 272, line 26.) [page 310, line 16.]

§ 589.—Duty of reverence for man, even in the logical use of reason (to uphold for him his reverence for his own understanding.) (page 273, line 3.) Cf. § 1091. [*Inept:* not fit.] [page 310, line 26.]

Article XL.—*Decorum and scandal.* (§ 590.)

§ 590.—Right to be revered cannot be abdicated. (page 273, line 24.) Cf. §§ 439-441. [page 311, line 17.]

Article XLI.—Duty of reverence is expressed indirectly, by forbidding its opposite. (§ 591.)

§ 591.—Neglect of the duties founded on the reverence due to every man, is a vice. (page 274, line 12.) [page 312, line 9.]

Part II.—Of the Vice Subversive of the Reverence Owed by us to Others. (§§ 592-599.)

Article XLII.—These vices are (A) pride; (B) backbiting; (C) sneering.

TITLE A.—PRIDE (SUPERBIA). (§§ 592-594 inclusive.)

§ 592.—Pride imputes to others that they will think meanly of themselves when contrasted with us. (p. 274, l. 26.) [p. 312, l. 25.]

§ 593.—Pride differs entirely from love of honor. (page 274, line 31.) Cf. 590. [page 313, line 4.]

§ 594.—Proud is always at the bottom of his soul, mean and abject. (page 275, line 7.) [page 313, line 12.]

TITLE B.—DETRACTION. (§§ 595-596 inclusive.)

Article XLIII.—Blunts away the moral sense. (§§ 595-596.)

§ 595.—Scandal weakens reverence, on which emotion depends the spring toward the moral good. (p. 275, l. 24.) [p. 314, l. 2.]

§ 596.—Duty to suppress our judgments concerning the faults of others. (page 276, line 1.) [page 314, line 12.]

TITLE C.—SCORN. (§§ 597, 598.)

Article XLIV.—Sneering—a sort of diabolic pleasure. §§ 597, 598.

§ 597.—Wickedness to exhibit, as the object of ridicule, one's real faults. (page 276, line 22.) [page 315, line 4.]

§ 598.—Make no defense against sneering. (page 277, line 1.) [page 315, line 16.]

§ 599.—Reverence toward men is negative; I am not obliged to pay them positive veneration (which is due only toward the law). (page 277, line 14.) [page 315, line 30.]

Chapter II.

Article XLV.—Of the ethical duties owed by mankind toward one another in regard of their state and condition.

This chapter, consisting of a single paragraph, Mr. Semple omits as immaterial. [Cf. Confucian Great Learning, x., 2. (§§ 871 below.)]

Conclusion of the Elementology—Of Friendship. (§§ 600-611.)

Article XLVI.—Of the intimate blending of love with reverence in friendship. (§§ 600-604 inclusive.)

§ 600.—Friendship is an ideal of sympathy. (page 278, line 10.) Cf. §§ 571, 572. [page 317, line 5.]

§ 601.—Friendship is the due equipoise of the attractive sentiment of love and the repellent duty of reverence, and is therefore unattainable. (page 278, line 18.) [page 317, line 14.]

§ 602.—Censure (a duty of friendship) conflicts with the love essential to friendship. (page 279, line 22.) [page 318, line 18.]

§ 603.—Friendship is not a union intended for mutual and reciprocal advantage. (page 279, line 30.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. VIII, iii, 2, 3, and VIII, iv, 4. [page 318, line 26.]

§ 604.—Love in friendship is circumscribed by demands of reverence, and cannot be impassioned. (p. 280, l. 17.) [p. 319, l. 17.]

Article XLVII.—Moral friendship, as contradistinguished from aesthetical. (§§ 605-608 inclusive.)

§ 605.—Moral friendship is the entire confidence of two people, as far as consistent with reverence. (p. 280, l. 33.) [p. 320, l. 2.]

§ 606.—Qualities of moral friendship rarely found together in the same subject. (page 281, line 5.) [page 320, line 7.]

§ 607.—Intermeddling friendship which molests itself with the ends of other men. (page 282, line 5.) [page 321, line 13.] § 958.

§ 608.—Duty to cherish good will to men as their friend, serves as a guard against pride. (p. 282, l. 14.) *Where:* i. e. in the idea. Cf. §§ 799, 800. [page 321, line 22.] Cf. § 447.

APPENDIX. (§§ 609-611 inclusive.)

Article XLVIII.—Of the social virtues. (§§ 609-611 inclusive.)

§ 609.—Duty both to one's self and to others not to isolate himself. (page 283, line 3.) [page 322, line 9.]

§ 610.—Oblige others, and promote the cause of virtue by making it beloved. (page 283, line 15.) [page 322, line 21.]

§ 611.—Frequent the society of the wicked as sparingly as possible. (p. 283, l. 28.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. IX, iii, 3, 4. [p. 323, l. 6.]

TOME II.—METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS. (§§ 612-626 inclusive.)

APOTOME I.—DIDACTIC OF ETHICS. (§§ 612-621 inclusive.)

Article XLIX.—Power of exerting knowledge into act. (§§ 612, 613.)

§ 612.—Virtue must be acquired, and is not innate. (page 287, line 4.) [page 327, line 5.] Cf. §§ 436, 452.

§ 613.—Ethics can and must be taught, but virtue must be cultivated (practiced). (page 287, line 13.) Cf. Xen. Mem. IV, i, 5. Cf. §§ 729, 730. [page 327, line 14.] Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, xxi., (§ 871 below.) Cf. Buddha Dharmapada, 276, (§ 949.)

Article L.—The Socratic master and disciple. (§ 614.)

§ 614.—Virtue's scientific method must be systematic. (The Socratic method explained). (page 288, line 7.) Cf. §§ 471-475. [page 328, line 12.]

Article LI.—The ethical catechism. (§ 615.)

§ 615.—Ground sketch of the moral duties ought to go before the religious catechism. (p. 288, l. 29.) [p. 329, l. 5.] Cf. §§ 1396, 1245.

Article LII.—Only the law is the infallible standard of education.

§ 616.—Examples cannot be used in founding principles of virtue, but only in showing the practicability of our duty. (page 289, line 27.) Cf. § 715. [page 330, line 7.] See § 1661.

Observation.—Fragment of such a moral catechism. (§ 617.)

§ 617.—Fragment of a pure moral catechism. (p. 290.) [p. 331.]

Article LIII.—Be immediately grounded on the pure moral law itself. (§§ 618–621 inclusive.)

§ 618.—Behests of duty must not be based on any advantages or good results. Shame (and not the damage) of disobedience is at all points to be insisted on. (page 293, line 11.) [p. 334, l. 11.]

§ 619.—Fire the soul to unsheath a yet keener energy of reason and prompt her to the more inly hallowing of her law. (page 293, line 28.) [page 335, line 3.]

§ 620.—Questions in casuistry useful to sharpen the judgment. (page 294, line 24.) Cf. § 1661. [page 335, line 32.]

§ 621.—Religious instruction must never precede moral. Bring the understanding to the clearest insight in ethical topics. (page 295, line 1.) [page 336, line 12.]

APOTOME II.—THE ASCETIC EXERCISE OF ETHICS. (§§ 622–626 inclusive.)

Article LIV.—The practice of virtue renders the will robust and makes the heart glad. (§§ 622–626 inclusive.)

§ 622.—Exercise of virtue makes the mind (1) hardy and (2) cheerful in the discharge of duty. (p. 295, l. 14.) [p. 337, l. 4.]

§ 623.—Bear and forbear (1)—(Stoics). Endure the evils of life without complaint; abstain from its superfluous enjoyments. (page 295, l. 26.) Cf. Confucian Analects book I, ch. xiv. [p. 337, l. 16.]

§ 624.—Transplant himself into a serene and joyous frame of mind. (2) (Epicurus). (page 296, line 2.) [page 337, line 23.]

§ 625.—Self-imposed punishment, to make expurgation for sins, is the antipart of the practice of virtue. (page 296, line 14.) Cf. §§ 242 and 663 (the latter referred to by Semple). [page 338, line 7.] Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada 141, (§ 949 below.)

§ 626.—All ethical gymnastic consists in subjugating the instincts and appetites of our physical system. (p. 297, l. 5.) [p. 339, l. 13.]

Conclusion of the Ethics.

Religion, as a doctrine of the duties owed to God, falls beyond the boundary of pure moral philosophy. (§§ 627–636 inclusive.)

§ 627.—Belief in God does not belong to the science of law. Are we to regard it as belonging to morals? (page 298, line 5.) [page 340, line 4.] See §§ 2371, 2832.

§ 628.—Formal of religion belongs to the science of morals, and expresses a subjective obligation only. (page 298, line 16.) Cf. §§ 527–529 and 541. [page 340, line 16.]

§ 629.—Matter of religion (duties toward God) not cognizable a priori; consequently not part of pure moral philosophy. (page 299, line 3.) Cf. § 537. [page 341, line 6.]

§ 630.—Religion, so far as it lies within the bounds of pure reason, belongs to *applied* moral philosophy. (page 299, line 16.) Cf. §§ 144 and 100. [page 341, line 20.]

§ 631.—Principle of the ethic relation betwixt man and God is transcendent. (page 299, line 31.) [page 342, line 5.]

§ 632.—Principle of His divine rights can be no more than that of justice. (page 300, line 9.) [page 342, line 18.]

§ 633.—Reward cannot be expected, on the score of justice, from the Supreme Being. (page 300, line 21.) [page 342, line 31.]

§ 634.—Divine justice hard to be reconciled with the relation of man to God. (page 300, line 27.) [page 343, line 5.]

§ 635.—Justice, cogitated as a transcendent principle, leads to results contrary to the principles of practical reason. (page 301, line 7.) [page 343, line 20.]

§ 636.—Ethics can treat only of the relation betwixt man and man. (p. 302, l. 15.) Cf. § 376. Cf. Job. xxxv, 5–8. [p. 345, l. 1.]

VOLUME II.

RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARY OF PURE REASON

Showing in four books, the necessary harmony and identity of the notices of reason with those of any possible revelation whatsoever. By IMMANUEL KANT, Professor of Logic and Metaphysic in the University of Koenigsberg, Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin, etc. Translated out of the original German by J. W. SEMPLE, Advocate. (§§ 637–983 inclusive.) [Paging of Clark's edition, Edinburgh, 1838.]

Preface. (§§ 637–647.)

§ 637.—Man needs no spring to its execution, other than the law itself. (page 1, line 1.) Cf. § 645.

§ 638.—Ethics, therefore, needs no religion, neither objectively to aid man's will nor subjectively to aid his power. (p. 1, l. 13.)

§ 639.—Transit from ethic to religion, which last contains the representation of an end emerging in consequence of the will's determination by the Law. (page 2, line 13.)

§ 640.—Idea of the SUMMUM BONUM takes its rise from ethic, and is not its groundwork. (page 3, line 4.) Cf. §§ 2566, 877.

§ 641.—Ethical need to figure to himself a final or last end, as the sequent of his duties. (page 3, line 20.)

§ 642.—Ethic issues inevitably in religion. (page 4, line 18.)

§ 643.—Position THERE IS A GOD, is a synthetic apriori proposition which extends beyond the notion duty. (page 4, line 23 [note.])

§ 644.—Superadds to it an effect not involved in the moral law, and which consequently can not be evolved analytically from it. (page 4, line 35.)

§ 645.—Ground of the possibility of the synthetical extension of reason beyond its law. (page 5, line 17.) Cf. §§ 1119, 1120.

§ 646.—Commandment OBEY THE GOVERNMENT is of moral obligation. (page 5, line 1.) Cf. § 804.

§ 647.—Good and evil principles figured as two self-subsisting causes. (page 10, line 19.) Cf. § 771.

Preface to the Second Edition. (§§ 648-650 inclusive.)

§ 648.—Revelation and natural religion may be regarded as orbs concentric, of which the latter (and smaller) is the sphere of the philosopher. (p. 11, l. 3 [or begin with line 8 if thought best.])

§ 649.—Reason and revelation are not only in harmony, but identic. (p. 11, l. 22.) Cf. Cicero (Philip xi. 12, page 9 above.)

§ 650.—No acquaintance with the Kantic Critiques needed for comprehending the substance of this treatise, but only the most ordinary notices of ethic. (page 13, line 7 [or begin with page 14, line 1 if thought best.])

Book I.—Of Indwelling Sin. (On the Radical Evil of Human Nature.) (§§ 651-728 inclusive.)

Exordium. (§§ 651-666 inclusive.)

§ 651.—Ancient complaint that the world lieth in wickedness. (page 17, line 4.) See I. John, v., 19.

§ 652.—Nature ever ready to assist our moral growth. *Sanabilibus aegrotamus malis.* (page 18, line 3.) Xen. Mem. III., v., 18.

§ 653.—Judgment that a person is by nature evil never can with certainty be rested on experience and observation. (p. 18, l. 28.)

§ 654.—Nature of man here means only the subjective ground of the use of his freedom. (page 19, line 23.)

§ 655.—Ground of moral evil can lie only in a maxim self-appointed by choice to its own freedom. (page 19, line 30.)

§ 656.—Subjective ground of adopting good or bad maxims is unsearchable. (page 20, line 7.)

§ 657.—Ground of moral determination is with man congenite. (page 20, line 23.)

Explanatory Scholion. (§§ 658-666 inclusive.)

§ 658.—Man is by nature either morally good or morally evil. (page 21, line 20.)

§ 659.—Ethic admits unwillingly of moral media. (p. 22, l. 1.)

§ 660.—Betwixt a good and an evil moral mindedness no intermediate can be found. (page 22, line 13.)

§ 661.—Mankind never can be neither good nor evil. (page 22, line 11.)

§ 662.—Majesty of the law inspires awe, not dread. (page 22, line 35.)

§ 663.—Virtue's æsthetic character valiant and by consequence joyous. (page 23, line 16.). (Cf. §§ 242, 232, 624.) Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 16, 18 (§ 949 below.)

§ 664.—Neither can man be in some points good and at the same time in others morally evil. (page 24, line 18.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. book V., i., 14. Cf. Buddha Dharm. xiii. 176. (§ 949 below.)

§ 665.—Peremptory and rigoristical precision of the moral philosophers of antiquity. (page 24, line 26.)

§ 666.—Moral mindedness, because its last ground is inexplicable, is said to belong to man "*by nature.*" (page 25, line 1.)

Chapter I.—Of Mankind's Origrinary Predisposition Toward Good. (§§ 667-672 inclusive.)

§ 667.—Man's last ground of moral choice classed according to his (1) animality, (2) humanity, and (3) personality. (p. 26, l. 8.)

§ 668.—Moral law pertains to personality, *not necessarily to humanity.* (page 26, note.)

§ 669.—Predisposition for animality may be called mechanical self-love, needing no exercise of reason. Abuse of this appetite gives rise to beastly vices. (page 27, line 1.)

§ 670.—Man's humanity may be all classed as comparative self-love, for which theoretic reason is required. Abuse of this appetite gives rise to devilish vices. (page 27, line 19.)

§ 671.—Man's predisposition for personality consists in his susceptibility for such reverence as makes the law the spring of his will. (page 28, line 19.) Cf. § 238.

§ 672.—All these predispositions are good and all originary, but the third alone is self-practical. (page 29, line 14.)

Chapter II.—Of the Bias to Evil in Human Nature. (§§ 673-682 inclusive.)

§ 673.—Bias is the susceptibility of so liking that by one taste a permanent appetite is established. (p. 30, l. 9.) Cf. §§ 461-463.

§ 674.—Bias to evil can only consist in the subjective ground of the possibility of an agent-intelligent's maxims swerving from the moral law. (page 31, line 4.)

§ 675.—Three different degrees of this badness of heart: (1) frailty; (2) impurity; (3) depravity. (page 31, line 18.) [As to impurity, I think Semple is wrong in suggesting the word "sup-

posed." The good maxim may cover a subsidiary rule of conduct which has erected into a spring an end which *as end* is right and moral, but *as spring* immoral.]

§ 676.—Frailty finds the moral law weaker than the appetitive springs. (page 31, line 28.) Cf. § 281. Cf. Nic. Eth. I., xiii., 11. Cf. Confucius (Analects II., iv., 6.): "At *seventy*, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right." § 191.

§ 677.—Impurity fails to state (in the maxim) the moral Law as alone the sufficient spring. (page 32, line 4.)

§ 678.—Depravity in its maxims chooses immoral springs instead of the law. (page 32, line 15.) Cf. § 694.

§ 679.—Bias to evil charged upon all men. (page 32, line 26.)

§ 680.—Difference betwixt a man of good morals and a morally good man. (page 32, line 32.)

§ 681.—Indwelling bias toward evil can cleave only to the moral faculty of choice (can not be physical.) (page 33, line 22.)

§ 682.—Indwelling bias toward evil is a DEED COGITABLE (*peccatum originarium*, patent to reason a priori,) and never can be extirpated. (page 33, line 32.) [*Unanswerable*: Strictly philosophically. But it is cogitable that the original bias to evil is implanted by the Lawgiver, in order that the necessity of the principle of good may continuously direct His creatures to Himself. In this view, the two principles may be regarded as connate and essentially co-existent.] Cf. § 692 and § 771.

Chapter III.—Man is by Nature Evil. (§§ 633-697 inclusive.)

Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. (HORACE, quoted by Kant.)

§ 683.—Intent of occasionally swerving from the moral law adopted into his maxim. (page 35, line 12.)

§ 684.—First subjective ground of appointing maxims rooted in the substratum of humanity. (page 35, line 27.)

§ 685.—Reflect on the multitude of crying instances thrown by the observed actions of man into our hands. (page 36, line 11.)

§ 686.—Nations proceed upon principles diametrically contrary to their professed objects. (page 37, line 24.)

§ 687.—Ground of evil can not be placed either (1) in the human sensory, or (2) in a corruption of moral-legislative reason (man being neither [1] merely an animal, nor [2] altogether a devil.) (page 38, line 16.)

§ 688.—Bias to evil can not be explained (but only exhibited) by experience and observation, but must be cognizable a priori and be deduced from the idea evil. (page 40, line 1.)

§ 689.—Cannot depend on the *difference* of the springs adopted

into his maxims (not on their matter), but on their *subordination* (on their FORM), namely, WHICH ONE HE CHOOSES TO MAKE THE CONDITION OF THE OTHERS. (page 40, line 14.)

§ 690.—Mankind is only evil so far forth as he inverts the ethical order of the springs of his will. (page 41, line 10.)

§ 691.—Man's outward and observed character may be good, although his intelligible remain all the while evil. (p. 41, l. 22.)

§ 692.—Natural bias toward evil never can be extirpated by man; nevertheless, it can be OUTWEIGHED. (p. 41, l. 31.) Cf. § 682.

§ 693.—Vitiosity of human nature is not so much wickedness as rather PERVERSITY of heart (whereby the absence of vice is looked upon as virtue.) (page 42, line 12.) Cf. § 678.

§ 694.—Frailty and impurity (§ 675) may be regarded as unintentional (*culpa*); but depravity (§ 678) as forethought crime (*dolus*.) (page 42, line 31.)

§ 695.—Prevents the founding of genuine moral principles within. (page 43, line 25.)

§ 696.—“As it is written, there is none righteous.” (Romans, iii., 10.) (page 44, line 5.)

§ 697.—Mean betwixt good and evil is excluded by reason; nevertheless actions, when spoken of merely as deeds exhibited to sense, may be said to be mixed or indifferent. [Withholding, in view of the phenomenal and frail character of man, the condemnatory sentence of morally judging reason. *Leges silent inter arma*.] (page 44, line 17.) Cf. §§ 658–665 and 232 and 454.

Chapter IV.—Of the Origin of Evil in Human Nature. (§§ 698–704 inclusive.)

§ 698.—Moral evil can not be deduced from any antecedent state. (page 45, line 3.)

§ 699.—Moral evil can not be figured as an inheritance. (In regard of the three academic faculties: [1] hereditary disease; [2] heritable debt; [3] inherited depravity.) (page 45, line 26.)

§ 700.—Every wicked action must be held an originary use of choice. (page 46, line 11.) Cf. § 736.

§ 701.—Sufficient ground of imputing consequences is already extant in the primary free act out of which they rise. (p. 47, l. 7.)

§ 702.—Origin of evil represented by the Scripture as chronologically BEGINNING in the human race. (page 48, line 1.)

§ 703.—When we endeavor to unravel and retrace the chronic origin of evil, we must assume a bias. (page 49, line 7.) Cf. § 508. [*Quite impracticable*. Not so. I figure to myself a concreated contingency as readily as a concreated subsistency, either being incomprehensible by the merely human reason. (Cf. § 682.)]

§ 704.—First beginning of all evil utterly unfathomable. (page 50, line 8.) Cf. § 682. *Amendment*: cf. § 652. *Adiaphora*: cf. § 318.

General Scholion.—Of Reinstating the Predisposition Toward Good into its Original Power. (§§ 705-728 inclusive.)

§ 705.—Man destined for good by his Creator. (page 51, line 18.)

§ 706.—LAY HOLD ON HELP. (page 52, line 11.) See § 729.

§ 707.—Possible that one naturally and radically bad should come to make out of himself a man good. (page 52, line 22.)

§ 708.—Assume that a germ of good still subsists in its entire purity, which can not be self-love (unless we speak of a practical self-love, of unconditioned complacency [§§ 448, 558] in regard of the law. But this is neither more nor less than reverence. Cf. §§ 208, 209, 449.) (p. 53, l. 9.) Cf. Buddha Dharm., 285 (§ 949.)

§ 709.—Original good consists in that sanctity of intent which proposes to itself the execution of all duty. (page 54, line 1.) Cf. Zend Avesta (Bunsen's God in history, vol. i., page 280, or Haug's Essays, pp. 141-144.) "But he who chooses AHURA-MAZDA, the All-Holy and All-True, honors Him in faith by truthful word and holy deed." See § 881 below.

§ 710.—Virtue formally requires no change of heart (morality), but only a change of manners (legality), exhibiting actions outwardly in harmony with the law. (page 55, line 2.)

§ 711.—Virtue materially implies a transvolution of the sentiments of the inner man (whereby he needs no other motive than the representation DUTY. Cf. §§ 452, 459.) (page 55, line 24.)

§ 712.—When by one single inflexible determination mankind retroverts his will's perverted bias (intelligibly an instant transit.) (page 56, line 5.) [Cf. Nic. Eth. VI., viii., 4; VII., viii., 4; VI., v., 5.]

§ 713.—Gradual reform affects the bent of the sensory (sensibly a perpetual progression from bad to better.) (page 56, line 19.) Cf. Buddha Dharm. 40. (§ 949.) Cf. Confucian Analects, IV., v., 3 (§ 191.)

§ 714.—Moral education of man can not begin with correcting his manners, but must take its rise from a transvolving of his cast of thinking. (page 57, line 5.)

§ 715.—Wonder at deeds of virtue is mischievous in its effect (by representing the performance of duty as meritorious and extraordinary. Cf. §§ 233, 455, 616.) (page 57, line 20.)

§ 716.—Whereby REASON mightily commands, though annexing to that behest neither bribe nor threat. (page 58, line 9.) Cf. § 330. Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 354 (see § 949 below.) Cf. (Zoroaster) Avesta: Yagna xxxvii., 13 (Bleek, vol. ii., page 97—see § 881 below); Yagna xxx., 2 (Bleek, ii., 85); Vispered iii., 22 (Bleek ii., 11); Yagna xix., 29, 30 (Bleek, ii., 69); Yagna xliii., 9-11 (Bleek,

ii., 104); Yagna xlviii., 5, 9 (Bleek, ii., 112, 113); Yagna xxxix., 10-13 (Bleek, ii., 98); Vendidad, Fargard v., 66, 67 (Bleek, vol. i., page 42); Fargard xviii., 11-20 (Bleek, i., 127, 128.)

§ 717.—Duty demands that he adhere inviolably faithful to its decrees; hence he rightly infers that he CAN do so. (page 58, line 28.)

§ 718.—No difficulty in combining the idea FREEDOM with that of God as a necessary being. (page 59, line 18.) Cf. § 2799.

§ 719.—Redintegration of character by one's own exertions incomprehensible, nevertheless possible. (page 60, line 7.) Cf. § 682.

§ 720.—Duties imposed by the Law remain the same, whether a bias to evade them be co-extant with the will or not. (p. 60, l. 22.)

§ 721.—Because this bias is ineradicable, begin by unremittingly wrestling and so making stand against it. (page 60, line 28.) Cf. Ephesians, vi., 12, 13 and §§ 672, 687. Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 127, 236 (See § 949 below.)

§ 722.—All religions may be divided into those of mere worship, and the religion of a moral life. (page 61, line 23.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. X., vii., 12. Cf. Confucius, Analects, IX., xxiii (§ 191 above.)

§ 723.—Self-amelioration the unalterable decree, upon the principles of moral religion (which, amid all public ones that have hitherto appeared, the Christian religion alone is. Cf. §§ 236, 864, 906-911.) (page 62, line 11.) Cf. Xenophon's Memorabilia, I., iii., 3; II. Corinthians, viii., 12; Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, X., vii., 11, 12; Philippians ii., 12, 13; Buddha's Dharmapada, 19, 16 (§ 949 below); Confucius, Analects, VI, x., and XII., xxi., 3; and Doctrine of the Mean, xiii., 3 (§ 871.)

§ 724.—Not necessary for every one to know what God does; but all should know WHAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE TO DO in order to render themselves worthy of his aid. (page 62, line 20.) See Buddha, Dharmapada (§ 949 below), 271, 272, (with which compare Isaiah, xxvi., 3); and St. John xvii., 25 (with which compare Ephesians, i., 8, and Colossians, i, 27); and Proverbs ii., 1-5; and Confucius, Analects, XVI, viii; and Doctrine of the Mean, xiv., 5 (§ 871 below.)

Appendix to the General Scholion. (§§ 725-728 inclusive.)

§ 725.—Outworks of a religion within the bounds of naked reason: (1) works of grace; (2) miracles; (3) mysteries; (4) means of grace. (page 63, line 1.) See §§ 777, 872, 962.

§ 726.—Reason impugns neither the possibility nor yet the existence of objects corresponding to those ideas. (page 63, line 11.)

§ 727.—Baneful results following these morally transcendent ideas: (1) fanaticism; (2) superstition; (3) illuminatism; (4) thaumaturgy. (page 63, line 26.) Cf. Jeremiah xxiii., 28.

§ 728.—Works of grace never can afford the groundwork of any maxims, whether regulating the theoretical or practical conduct of the mind. (page 64, line 5.)

Book II.—Of the Combat Betwixt the Good and the Evil Principle, for the Dominion over Man. (§§ 729–787 inclusive.)

Exordium. (§§ 729–737 inclusive.)

§ 729.—Virtue signifies fortitude or valor, and reminds us that there is an enemy to be overcome. (page 67, line 4.) Cf. § 454. Cf. Cicero de Officiis., I., xix., 2. Cf. §§ 613, 706. Buddha's Dharma-pada, 40, 66 (§ 949 below)

§ 730.—Stoics mistook their enemy. They called on wisdom to make a stand against FOLLY, instead of calling upon her to wage war upon WICKEDNESS. (page 67, line 21.) Cf. Dharmapada 315.

§ 731.—Beginning must be made by dislodging evil from possessions it has usurped. (page 68, line 16.)

§ 732.—Appetites not to be extirpated, but kept in subjection. (*Prudence.*) (page 69, line 4.) Cf. I. Cor. ix., 26, 27. Cf. Cicero de Officiis III., iii., 7. Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 321 (§ 949 below); and Doctrine of Mean, i, 4 (§ 871 below)

§ 733.—Only the morally evil is to be eradicated. (*Wisdom.*) (page 69, line 11.) Cf. Proverbs ii., 6–12; iii., 13–18; iv., 5–9; viii., 1–13; ix., 12; and Koran, x., 108, 109; xvii., 16; iv., 81, § 968.

§ 734.—Induce philosophers to mistake the actual enemy of good. (page 69, line 21.)

§ 735.—Ground of moral evil and that of moral good equally incomprehensible. (page 70, line 21.) [*Utterly inexplicable, and can only be regarded.*]

§ 736.—Wrestle not against flesh and blood. (page 70, line 9.) Ephesians vi., 11, 12. [*Were we not already secretly banded: . Eripe me de inimicis meis Deus meus; et ab insurgentibus in me libera me.* Psal. lix., 1.] Cf. §§ 383, 700.

§ 737.—Ethic of Christianity represents moral good as distant from moral evil, not as heaven from earth, but as heaven from hell. (page 71, line 7.)

APOTOME I.—OF THE TITLE OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE TO RULE OVER MAN-KIND. (§§ 738–770 inclusive.)

TITLE A.—IMPERSONATED IDEA OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE. (§§ 738–742.)

§ 738.—Happiness is immediately attached (by the will of the MOST HIGH) to morality as a supreme condition of happiness. (page 72, line 5.)

§ 739.—Idea of the PERFECT MAN emanates from God's very essence. (p. 72, l. 10.) Cf. John, i., 2; Hebrews, i., 3; John, iii., 16.

§ 740.—Self-elevation to this ideal of moral perfection is obviously a duty. (p. 72, l. 22.) [The last sentence may be omitted.]

§ 741.—Representation of a person ready and willing to discharge all the offices of humanity. (page 73, line 25.) *Vis insita*—ingrafted. Cf. §§ 1732, 1733. Cf. I. Cor. xiv., 8.

§ 742.—Adhere unchangeably to the archetype of humanity, so (through such PRACTICAL faith) to enter into everlasting bliss. (page 74, line 9.) St. John, v., 40.

TITLE II.—OBJECTIVE REALITY OF THIS IDEA. (§§ 743-749 inclusive.)

§ 743.—Necessity of unconditional obedience is self-evident and needs no examples from experience and observation. (p. 74, l. 23.)

§ 744.—Want of belief in virtue not to be supplied by any faith grounded on miraculous supports. (page 75, line 17.)

§ 745.—Law would entitle us to expect from every one an ectypal transcript of this idea. (page 75, line 32.) James, iii., 12.

§ 746.—Consequently no person, who, in doctrine, life, and death, had fully set forth the exemplary pattern of a course of life acceptable to God, ought *therefore* to be looked upon as anything else than a naturally begotten man. (page 76, line 17.)

§ 747.—Supernatural person, exemplifying the idea of holiness, could not be represented as a pattern for our imitation. (page 77, line 2.) Cf. § 715.

§ 748.—Analogical schematism is allowable in explaining our conceptions of the supersensible; but when turned into a schematism for determining an object, it becomes anthropomorphism, which is of the most hurtful consequences in religion. (p. 78, l. 16.) Cf. §§ 921, 2827. See §§ 2408-2443, especially §§ 2430-2432.

§ 749.—Figured as extant in an Ideal of Humanity, is valid for all men, at all times, and throughout all worlds. (page 79, line 1.)

TITLE C.—DIFFICULTIES CONTRARY TO THE REALITY OF THIS IDEA, TOGETHER WITH THEIR SOLUTION. (§§ 750-770 inclusive.)

§ 750.—Good conduct, regarded as a constant progression from bad to better *in infinitum*, must always be estimated by us as defective. (First difficulty.) (page 80, line 19.) Cf. Matthew v., 48.

§ 751.—Trust, notwithstanding his perpetual short coming, that he may *on the whole* be well pleasing to God. (p. 81, l. 16.) Cf. § 713.

§ 752.—Never yet steadfastly persevered in good. (Second difficulty.) (page 82, line 1.) Cf. Matt. vi., 33.

§ 753.—Work out your own salvation, with fear and trembling. (page 82, line 16.) Philippians, ii., 12. Cf. Buddha's Dharmapada, 236 (§ 949 below.)

§ 754.—Views into a blessed or cursed eternity. (p. 83, l. 17.)

§ 755.—Whether the pains of hell are finite or eternal, is a childish question. (page 84, line 8.)

§ 756.—Just because reason is free, its sentence over man can not be corrupted or bribed. (page 85, line 15.) Cf. § 770.

§ 757—"All's well that ends well," an adage which can not be applied to morals. (page 85, line 24.) [*Brocard*: a canon, or elementary principle.] Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. I., vii., 12; I., ix., 7.

§ 758.—When we go hence, we have cause to regard our account as closed. (Not a principle constituent of knowledge of the supersensible, but a regulative principle of practical reason.) (page 86, line 18.) Cf. Eccles. xi., 3. *Wisdom*: Dharmapada 411 (§ 949.)

§ 759.—COMFORTER, reassuring us when backslidings make us apprehensive. (page 86, line 1.) [*Trajectory*: curved course (no man's course being straightforward.)]

§ 760.—Still he began from evil, and this prior guilt he never can abolish. (Third difficulty.) (page 87, line 23.) [*Tye*: bound. *Prestable*: payable.] [*Is indifferent*: but OUGHT not to be (unless indeed the creditor have knowledge that the debtor has rendered *quid pro quo* for the surety.)]

§ 761.—Look forward to an illimitable punishment and everlasting extrusion from the Kingdom of God. (page 88, line 18.)

§ 762.—Punishment due to his misdeeds not inflicted prior to repentance. (page 88, line 32.) [*Henceforward*: This should be stated negatively: No longer an object of the divine displacency.]

§ 763.—Punishment takes place IN THE VERY ACT of reintegrating one's character. (page 89, line 19.)

§ 764.—Punishment attending a change of heart belongs properly to "THE OLD MAN" (physically the self-same guilty person as before.) (page 90, line 1.) Cf. Romans vi., 6; Ephesians, iv., 22.

§ 765.—What was due to his "OLD MAN" (as punishment), he joyously goes through for the sake of that good wherewith his "NEW MAN" is invested. (page 91, line 6.) Cf. Ephesians, iv., 24. [*As morally another*: The section may end here, omitting the next thirteen lines, and appending the note to the word *punishment*.]

§ 766.—Already held to be (cogitably) that "NEW MAN" (alive unto righteousness) which he is (physically) never more than about to become. (*Decree of Grace*.) (page 92, line 2.) Cf. Galatians ii., 21. Cf. §§ 712, 713.

§ 767.—Deduction of the idea of justification is no more than the solution of a speculative problem. (Positive use of the above inquiry.) (page 93, line 1.)

§ 768.—No expiations can supply the want of a total change of heart. (Negative use.) (p. 93, l. 21.) Dharmapada, 264, 394 (§ 949.)

§ 769.—What mankind may, at the end of life, have to hope or fear. (page 94, line 4.)

§ 770.—Inexorably rigid sentence is always uttered, for no one can bribe his own reason. (page 95, line 1.) Cf. §§ 756, 757.

APOTOME II.—OF THE TITLE OF THE EVIL PRINCIPLE TO RULE OVER MANKIND, AND OF THE BATTLE OF THE GOOD WITH THE EVIL PRINCIPLE FOR THE SOVEREIGN EMPIRE OVER THE HUMAN RACE. (§§ 771-776 inclusive.)

§ 771.—Sacred Volume represents the two principles in man as persons without. (page 96, line 6.) Cf. §§ 647, 682. Cf. Avesta (§ 881 below): Yaçna, xliii., 5, 15 (Bleek, vol. ii., 103, 105); Yaçna, xxx., 3-6 (Bleek, ii., 85); Yaçna, lvi., (7) 6 (Bleek, ii., 123.)

§ 772.—Kingdom of evil erected by the prince of this world. (page 96, line 14.) Cf. Matthew, viii., 12. [*Imprescriptible*—That can not be impaired by disuse. *Abeyance*: suspension or temporary extinction.]

§ 773.—Appeared a person in whom the prince of this world had nothing. (page 98, line 8.) Cf. John, xiv., 30; xii., 44-50. [*When—rebellion*—omit nine words] [*but yet*, etc.: omit forty-four words.]

§ 774.—Exhibition of mankind's indwelling good principle in its entire moral perfection. (page 99, line 17.) Cf. John, xvii., 4 and i., 14. Psalms, xi., 4 and liii., 2. John, i., 11, 12. Titus, ii., 14.

§ 775.—Kingdom of the evil principle still endures. (page 101, line 15.) Cf. John, xiv., 30, 31; Matthew, x., 17.

§ 776.—Moral suggested by the narrative is that there is absolutely no salvation for mankind apart from genuine moral principles. (page 102, line 1.) [Omit the last nine lines.]

GENERAL SCHOLION.—OF MIRACLES. (§§ 777-787 inclusive.)

§ 777.—Moral religion tends eventually to displace and dispense with all miraculous beliefs. (page 103, line 10.)

§ 778.—Serve no purpose whatever to question the accuracy of narrations of matters incomprehensible (which any one may believe and repeat without being or ever becoming thereby a better man.) (page 104, line 8.) [*Adminicles*: imperfect proofs; helps; supports.]

§ 779.—Object to cultivating any practical belief in the marvelous. (page 105, line 7.)

§ 780.—Miracles are events brought about by causes with the laws of whose efficiency we are and must ever remain totally unacquainted. (page 106, line 9.) Cf. note to § 779.

§ 781.—No more than a general moral notion that whatever God does will be all very good. (Theistical miracles.) (p. 107, l. 1.)

§ 782.—Demonian miracles are the most irreconcilable with the exercise of reason. (page 107, line 22.)

§ 783.—No practical benefit can accrue from such tenets. (page 108, line 10.)

Appendix to the General Scholion. (§§ 784-787 inclusive.)

§ 784.—Knowledge of natural law is enough both for a sure and rational application and for explication *secundum quid* (although not for an explication *simpliciter*.) (page 110, line 1.)

§ 785.—Natural wonders encourage reason; preternatural wonders overwhelm the understanding. (page 110, line 17.)

§ 786.—Necessary maxim on which we must regulate the use of our understanding. (page 111, line 11.) Cf. §§ 2406, 2405.

§ 787.—Must not be mistaken for a positive theoretical assertion. (page 111, line 29.) [*Rash*: i. e., without due deliberation—and *indecorous*: i. e., not befitting the gravity of the topic.] § 2374.

Book III.—The Entire Conquest of the Evil by the Good Principle is only Possible Through the Coming and Founding of a Kingdom of God on Earth. (§§ 788-801 inclusive.)

Exordium. (§§ 788-791 inclusive.)

§ 788.—Continue always armed and ready for a conflict. (page 115, line 6.) Cf. Romans, vi., 18. Dharmapada, 40, 315 (§ 949)

§ 789.—Corrupt themselves mutually and plunge one another into evil. (page 115, line 18.)

§ 790.—Form a general combination for the express purpose of warding off the bad and cultivating what in mankind is good. (page 116, line 23.) St. John, ii., 17.

§ 791.—Combined under its ideal moral laws, may be called an ethical society (and, by analogy, an ETHICAL STATE or kingdom.) (page 117, line 25.)

APOTOME I.—PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF THE VICTORY OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE, BY FOUNDING A KINGDOM OF GOD ON EARTH. (§§ 792-801 inclusive.)

Chapter I.—Of the Ethical State of Nature. (§§ 792-793 inclusive.)

§ 792.—Ethico-civil state distinguished from a political state. (page 119, line 6.)

§ 793.—Ethico-civil state distinguished from the ethical state of nature. (page 119, line 15.)

§ 794.—Every member of a political state is entitled to persist in his ethical state of nature. (page 120, line 1.)

§ 795.—Ethico-civil state can not be ruled (but only limited) by political authority. (page 120, line 25.)

§ 796.—Idea of an ethical commonwealth embraces an ideal aggregate of all mankind. (page 121, line 6.)

Chapter II.—Mankind Ought to Quit His Ethical State of Nature in Order to Become a Member of an Ethical Commonwealth. (§§ 797-800 inclusive.)

§ 797.—Ethical state of nature is tantamount to an open and perpetual invasion of the principles of virtue. (p. 121, l. 26.) § 789.

§ 798.—*Exeundum esse e statu naturali.* (Hobbes.) (page 122, line 22.) [i. e. that from this will follow a departure. etc.]

§ 799.—Duty imposed by the idea of an ethical state differs entirely, both in kind and principle, from all other duties. (page 122, line 19.)

§ 800.—Idea of a Supreme Moral Governor presupposed by that of an ethical state. (page 123, line 20.) Cf. §§ 639, 640, 875, 877.

Chapter III.—The Idea of an Ethical Commonwealth is the Idea of a People of God Combined Under Moral Laws. (§§ 801-806 inclusive.)

§ 801.—Laws of the ethical state must be regarded as commandments issuing from a common Lawgiver. (page 124, line 4.) See §§ 335, 346.

§ 802.—People of an ethical state can not be regarded as themselves legislating. (page 124, line 17.)

§ 803.—Ethical state can only be cogitated as a people of God, standing under ethic laws. (page 124, line 25.) See §§ 523-532 (referred to by Semple) and 442. [*From the will of a Superior, but from every free will which he has created.*]

§ 804.—Whenever anything is acknowledged to be duty, obedience is enjoyed by the Divine Will. (page 125, line 17.)

§ 805.—Theocracy as a juridical commonwealth whereof the legislator is God. (page 126, line 3.) Cf. Titus, ii., 14. Cf. § 859.

§ 806.—Rabble, or mob, whose ringleader is the evil principle. (page 126, line 24.) Cf. § 647.

Chapter IV.—The Idea of a People of God is (by Human Endeavor) only to be Realized by Forming a Church. (§§ 807-816.)

§ 807.—Idea of an ethical commonwealth can never be fully realized by man. (page 127, line 4.)

§ 808.—Mankind ought to proceed as if every thing depended on himself. (page 127, line 11.)

§ 809.—Wish of every honest minded man. (page 127, line 25.) Matthew, vi., 10. Cf. Avesta (Yagna, xix., 35) § 881.

§ 810.—Idea of THE INVISIBLE CHURCH; the archetype. (p. 128, l. 1.) See note to Khordah Avesta, li (Bleeeck, vol. iii., page 179.)

§ 811.—Visible church, representing the moral kingdom of God on earth. (Endeavors to copy the form and feature of the invisible church.) (page 128, line 7.)

§ 812.—Numerical oneness of the church. (Its universality.) (page 128, line 24.)

§ 813.—Purity of the church. (Its quality.) (page 128, line 32.)

§ 814.—Mutual relationship of freedom. (Relativity of the church.) (page 129, line 4.) No room either for HIERARCHY or for ILLUMINATISM.

§ 815.—Can not be founded on arbitrary formulæ. (Modality of the church; an unchangeable constitution.) (page 129, line 14.)

§ 816.—Constitution of the church likened to that of a family under a common, invisible, and moral Father. (page 129 line 24.) Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. viii., p. 346., note (wherein I ought to have given more especial credit to F. DeLanoye's Rameses the Great, "Egypt 3300 years ago," pages 130, 133, 136, 138, from which I derived my information and references.) Cf. Kent (Comm., ii., 190, lect. xxix.): "A father's house is always open to his children."

Chapter V.—The Constitution of every Church Invariably Rests on a Historical Belief (Revealed Faith: this may be called Church Faith, and is best Founded on a Holy Writ. (§§ 817-827.)

§ 817.—Pure religious faith alone can serve as a groundwork for a church universal. (page 130, line 14.)

§ 818.—Idea of divine worship is placed in room of the idea of a pure moral religion. (page 130, line 27.)

§ 819.—Divine Will commands either by merely statutable or by pure moral laws. (page 131, line 32.) Cf. §§ 2566, 905.

§ 820.—Revelation of statutable divine laws would found a historical but never a pure rational belief. (page 132, line 18.)

§ 821.—True worship consists in "DOING the will of God" (Ephesians, vi., 6) by good moral deportment (in obedience to pure moral laws.) (page 133, line 3.) Cf. Matthew, vii., 21; I. John, ii. 17; Zoroaster, Avesta, Vispered, xviii., 1, 2 (Bleek, ii., 22; § 881 below); Buddha, Dharmapada, 86 (§ 949 below); Confucius, Doctrine of the Mean, xx., 19 (§ 871 below); Mohammed, Koran, ii., 172; v., 53; xvi., 92; etc. (§ 968 below); Romans ii., 13.

§ 822.—Church faith distinguished from pure religious belief. (page 133, line 20.)

§ 823.—No insuperable ground for holding the laws forming and instituting any church to have been enacted by divine authority. (page 134, line 20.)

§ 824.—Creed of the church will always be found anterior to the pure ethical belief. (page 135, line 6.)

§ 825.—No ecclesiastical faith bottomed upon a Scripture has ever perished. (page 136, line 12.)

§ 826.—ONE RELIGION, although there may be various kinds of belief. (p. 137, l. 17.) § 944. [I object to Mr. Kant's use of the word FAITH, for the reason that it tends toward the confusion of the conception properly represented by the word: and for the same reason I would avoid the use of the word BELIEF. Reserving these words for the proper uses, we (who borrow from all tongues with apt adaptability) have ready a word CREED, which can be appropriated to the arbitrary statutory beliefs, and indeed is.] Cf. § 278.

§ 827.—Heterodoxy swerves in unessentials; heresy stumbles at essentials; infidelity disbelieves (this or that creed). (p. 138, l. 22.)

Chapter VI.—The Pure Ethical Belief is the Supreme Expounder of all Ecclesiastical Creeds Whatsoever. (§§ 828-837 inclusive.)

§ 828.—Ecclesiastico-historical creeds available to confirm the grounds and ideas of naked reason. (page 140, line 4.) § 832.

§ 829.—Depend mainly on the exegetical mode in which the revealed text is expounded. (page 140, line 20.)

§ 830.—Bible to be tested by the standard of morality. (page 141, note.) Jeremiah, xxiii., 28; John, vii., 17; II. Timothy, iii., 17.

§ 831.—Sacred Scriptures of every variety, in both ancient and modern times, have been forced into moral interpretations. (page 141, line 9.) *One Divine Essence*: Cf § 862.

§ 832.—Moral interpretations possible, because MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON underlies the different revelations. (page 142, line 19.) Cf. James, ii., 17. §§ 858, 871, 881, 906, 949, 968.

§ 833.—Natural religion must supply the supreme canon of all scriptural exegesis. (page 143, line 12.) See II. Timothy, iii., 16, and ii., 16, and John, xvi., 13, and Ephesians, v., 9. Cf. John, v., 39. [*Depravities*: crookedness; want of virtue.]

§ 834.—Learning and biblical criticism are indispensable to support a church rising on a holy writ. (page 143, line 32.)

§ 835.—Divine must not be disturbed by the arm of the magistrate. (page 145, line 12.) Cf. § 795.

§ 836.—No FEELING can be trusted as a touchstone of revealed truth. (page 146, line 5.) Cf. St. John, vii., 17. [*Illapses*: sliding in; sudden entrance.] Cf. §§ 164, 197, 140, 283, 284.

§ 837.—Holy writ can have no expounder save the religion of pure reason working together with scripturary learning. (page 147, line 16.)

Chapter VII.—The Observed Transit of the Church Creed, Whereby it is Seen Gradually to Merge and to Become Eventually Sunk and Lost in the Supremacy and Sovereignty of the Pure Apriori Ethical Belief, is a Certain Index that the Kingdom of God is at Hand. (§§ 838-855 inclusive.)

§ 838.—Historical belief is contingent; pure moral religion alone is necessary. (page 148, line 15.)

§ 839.—Historical belief may attend religion as its concomitant and introductory vehicle. (page 149, line 5.) [Omit the last sentence—the term CHURCH MILITANT ought to be restricted to those who PUT ON THE WHOLE ARMOR OF GOD. (Ephesians, vi., 13.) For if a trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for battle? (I. Corinthians, xiv., 8)]

§ 840.—Saving faith can be but one and PRACTICAL, and must

pervade all diversities of church belief. (page 149, line 19.) *Bursting from the vehicular husk*: Mark, iv., 28. [*Ingenuous*: native; indigenous; free born. (Andrews Latin Lexicon.)]

§ 841.—Saving faith consists of two inseparable parts: (1) belief in righteousness; (2) belief in absolution. (page 150, line 7.) Cf. §§ 766-768. Cf. (1) James, ii., 24, and (2) Galatians, ii., 21.

§ 842.—Emerges a very extraordinary antinomy. (p. 150, l. 28.)

§ 843.—Every sinner would gladly have the benefit of vicarious atonement. (page 151, line 6.) Cf. § 722 [*Utiliter*: duly. *Radicitus*: utterly. *Funditus*: completely.—Andrews.]

§ 844.—Absolution is conditioned by reintegration of character. (Repentance must go before forgiveness.) (page 152, line 3.) Cf. Luke, xiii., 1-9. *Reconciliation*: II. Corinthians, v., 20.

§ 845.—Condition precedent of all exertion toward good works—(*faith*; the required absolute conformity to law not being possible by man. See §§ 750, 751. Cf. Romans, iv., 15, 16.) (page 152, line 19.) Cf. James, ii., 22; II. Peter, i., 5. Cf. §§ 760, 749.

§ 846.—*Practically* we must begin by good works (by henceforward leading an honest and upright life. § 841.) (p. 153, l. 7.) § 724.

§ 847.—Theoretically, the notion of absolution is necessary; *but reformation of life is the supreme condition*. (page 153, line 22.)

§ 848.—Ethic starts with a principle of ACTING; revelation begins with a principle of believing. (page 154, line 7.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. X.; ix., 1.

§ 849.—Good moral conduct A DUTY ABSOLUTELY IMPERATIVE; while absolution is OF GRACE. (page 154, line 18.) Romans, vii., 1.

§ 850.—Solution of the antinomy of faith. (page 155, line 9.) [*To lead a life acceptable to God* (which is your rational service, Romans, xii., 1,) *in order to expect that His benignant care*, that is, "before we can expect." The expectation must not constitute the motive. (Cf. §§ 228, 154. Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. VI., ii., 4.)]

§ 851.—All forms of religion have afforded room for this antagonism of a twofold set of principles of faith. (page 157, line 18.)

§ 852.—Transit to the pure religion of reason a necessary result of our physical and moral nature. (page 159, line 3.)

§ 853.—Kingdom of God has come, whenever the transition principle has taken public root. (page 160, line 20.) Cf. Cicero de Officiis, I., v., 1: *quae, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato* (Phaedrus, c. 65, Anthon says), *excitaret sapientiae*. With this, compare Zoroaster, Avesta, Yaçna. xxxi., 2 (Bleek, ii., 86.)

§ 854.—Aim at this grand end—concord and unity in religious belief. (page 161, line 9.)

§ 855.—Give to the world perpetual peace. (page 162, line 3.)

APOTOME II.—HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE GRADUAL
FOUNDING OF A KINGDOM OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE ON
EARTH. (§§ 856-871.)

§ 856.—No universal history of religion can be written. (page 163, line 4.)

§ 857.—Church history begins with the subordination of ecclesiastical faith to pure ethical belief. (page 163, line 12.) [*Enodation*: solution of difficulty; untying a knot.—*Webster*.]

§ 858.—Judaism an aggregate of statutable laws, whereon rested the political constitution. (page 164, line 24.) [The last fifteen lines may be omitted.] *Judaical belief*: Cf. §§ 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 871, 881, 905, 906, 949, 968, and the following extracts from the Second Book of Moses, called Exodus:

III., 13. And Moses said unto God, Behold, *when* I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, what *is* his name? what shall I say unto them? 14. And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM:† and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.

IV., 10. And Moses said unto the LORD, O my LORD, I *am* not eloquent, neither heretofore, nor since thou hast spoken unto thy servant: but I *am* slow of speech, and of a slow tongue. 11. And the LORD said unto him, Who hath made man's mouth? or who maketh the dumb, or deaf, or the seeing, or the blind? have not I the LORD? 12. Now therefore go, and I will be with thy mouth, and teach thee what thou shalt say.

XIV., 10. And when Pharoh drew nigh, the children of Israel lifted up their eyes, and, behold, the Egyptians marched after them; and they were sore afraid: and the children of Israel cried out to the LORD.

13. And Moses said unto the people, Fear ye not, stand still, and see the salvation of the LORD, which he will show you to-day: for the Egyptians whom ye have seen to-day, ye shall see them

† "LXX. et author Vulgatæ editionis Latinae hæc in præsentī transtulerunt, EGO SUM QUI SUM." [Annotata ad Exodum, cap. iiii. page 47, FAGIUS.—Critici Sacri: sive annotata doctissimorum virorum in Vetus ac Novum Testamentum, etc. Amsterdam, MDCXCVIII., vol. i.] "Verum Hebræi sæpe usurpant futurum loco præsentis. ESSE autem SOLI DEO convenit, qui est illa Essentia quæ nec præterit nec præteribit, h. e. SEMPER EST, qui nunquam coepit, nec unquam desiturus est, sed transcendit omnem temporis rationem, et qui solus dicere potest, SUM" [CLARIUS, id. p. 51.] "Est Deus illa existentia quæ nec præterit nec præteribit: h. e. EST DEUS SEMPER, qui nunquam coepit nec unquam desinet sed transcendit omnem temporis rationem, et qui solus dicere potest, SUM. Est enim ipse omnis essentia atque vitæ fons et plenitudo," etc. [MUNSTERUS, id. p. 46.] EGO EIMI 'O ON. [LXX., ed. Leander van Ess, Lipsiæ 1824, page 57.] Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. viii., page 350.

again no more forever. 14. The LORD shall fight for you, and ye shall hold your peace.

15. And the LORD said unto Moses, WHEREFORE CRIEST THOU UNTO ME? SPEAK UNTO THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL, THAT THEY GO FORWARD :

26. And the LORD said unto Moses, Stretch out thine hand over the sea, that the waters may come again upon the Egyptians, upon their chariots, and upon their horsemen. 27. And Moses stretched forth his hand over the sea, and the sea returned to his strength when the morning appeared; and the Egyptians fled against it; and the LORD overthrew the Egyptians in the midst of the sea.

XV., 1. Then sang Moses and the children of Israel this song unto the LORD, and spake, saying, I will sing unto the LORD, for he hath triumphed gloriously: the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea.

2. The LORD *is* my strength and song, and he is become my salvation: he *is* my God, and I will prepare him an habitation; my father's God, and I will exalt him.

6. Thy right hand, O LORD, is become glorious in power: thy right hand, O LORD, hath dashed in pieces the enemy.

11. Who *is* like unto thee, O LORD, among the gods? who *is* like thee, glorious in holiness, fearful *in* praises, doing wonders?

13. Thou in thy mercy hast led forth the people *which* thou hast redeemed: thou hast guided *them* in thy strength unto thy holy habitation.

17. Thou shalt bring them in, and plant them in the mountain of thine inheritance, *in* the place, O LORD, *which* thou hast made for thee to dwell in; *in* the sanctuary, O LORD, *which* thy hands have established.

18. The LORD shall reign for ever and ever.

XIX., 3. And Moses went up unto God, and the LORD called unto him out of the mountain, saying, Thus shalt thou say to the house of Jacob, and tell the children of Israel: 4. Ye have seen what I did unto the Egyptians, and *how* I bare you on eagles' wings, and brought you unto myself. 5. Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth *is* mine: 6. And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. These *are* the words which thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel.

XX., 1. And God spake all these words, saying, 2. I *am* the

LORD thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage.

3. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 4. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of *anything* that *is* in heaven above, or that *is* in the earth beneath, or that *is* in the water under the earth: 5. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God *am* a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth *generation* of them that hate me; 6. And showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.

7. Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain: for the LORD will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.

8. Remember the sabbath-day, to keep it holy. 9. Six days shalt thou labor, and do all thy work: 10. But the seventh day *is* the sabbath of the LORD thy God: *in it* thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that *is* within thy gates: 11. For *in* six days the LORD made heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them *is*, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the LORD blessed the sabbath-day, and hallowed it.

12. Honor thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee.

13. Thou shalt not kill.

14. Thou shalt not commit adultery.

15. Thou shalt not steal.

16. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.

17. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that *is* thy neighbor's.

22. And the LORD said unto Moses, Thus thou shalt say unto the children of Israel: Ye have seen that I have talked with you from heaven. 23. Ye shall not make with me gods of silver, neither shall ye make unto you gods of gold.

XXI., 12. He that smiteth a man so that he die, shall be surely put to death. 13. And if a man lie not in wait, but God deliver *him* into his hand; then I will appoint thee a place whither he shall flee. 14. But if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbor, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from mine altar, that he may die.

15. And he that smiteth his father, or his mother, shall be surely put to death.

16. And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death.

17. And he that curseth his father or his mother, shall surely be put to death.

18. And if men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with *his* fist, and he die not, but keepeth *his* bed: 19. If he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote *him* be quit; only he shall pay *for* the loss of his time, and shall cause *him* to be thoroughly healed.

26. And if a man smite the eye of his servant, or the eye of his maid, that it perish; he shall let him go free for his eye's sake.

27. And if he smite out his man-servant's tooth, or his maid-servant's tooth; he shall let him go free for his tooth's sake.

28. If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox *shall be* quit. 29. But if the ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to his owner, and he hath not kept him in, but that he hath killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death. 30. If there be laid on him a sum of money, then he shall give for the ransom of his life whatsoever is laid upon him. 31. Whether he have gored a son, or have gored a daughter, according to this judgment shall it be done unto him. 32. If the ox shall push a man-servant, or a maid-servant; he shall give unto their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned. 33. And if a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit, and not cover it, and an ox or an ass fall therein; 34. The owner of the pit shall make *it* good, *and* give money unto the owner of them; and the dead *beast* shall be his. 35. And if one man's ox hurt another's, that he die; then they shall sell the live ox, and divide the money of it; and the dead *ox* also they shall divide. 36. Or if it be known that the ox hath used to push in time past, and his owner hath not kept him in; he shall surely pay ox for ox, and the dead shall be his own.

XXII., 1. If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep. 2. If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that he die, *there shall* no blood *be shed* for him. 3. If the sun be risen upon him, *there shall be* blood *shed* for him: *for* he should make full restitution; if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft. 4. If the theft be certainly found in his hand alive, whether it be ox, or ass, or sheep; he shall restore double.

5. If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall

put in his beast, and shall feed in another man's field; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard shall he make restitution. 6. If fire break out, and catch in thorns, so that the stacks of corn, or the standing corn, or the field, be consumed *therewith*; he that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution.

7. If a man shall deliver unto his neighbor money or stuff to keep, and it be stolen out of the man's house; if the thief be found, let him pay double. 8. If the thief be not found, then the master of the house shall be brought unto the judges, *to see* whether he have put his hand unto his neighbor's goods. 9. For all manner of trespass, *whether it be* for ox, for ass, for sheep, for raiment, *or* for any manner of lost thing, which *another* challengeth to be his, the cause of both parties shall come before the judges; *and* whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbor. 10. If a man deliver unto his neighbor an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast, to keep; and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no man seeing it: 11. *Then* shall an oath of the LORD be between them both, that he hath not put his hand unto his neighbor's goods; and the owner of it shall accept *thereof*, and he shall not make *it* good. 12. And if it be stolen from him, he shall make restitution unto the owner thereof. 13. If it be torn in pieces, *then* let him bring it for witness, *and* he shall not make good that which was torn.

14. And if a man borrow *aught* of his neighbor, and it be hurt, or die, the owner thereof *being* not with it, he shall surely make *it* good. 15. *But* if the owner thereof *be* with it, he shall not make *it* good: if it *be* an hired thing, it came for his hire.

20. He that sacrificeth unto *any* god, save unto the LORD only, he shall be utterly destroyed.

21. Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. 22. Ye shall not afflict any widow, or fatherless child. 23. If thou afflict them in any wise, and they cry at all unto me, I will surely hear their cry; 24. And my wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless.

25. If thou lend money to *any of* my people *that is* poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.

26. If thou at all take thy neighbor's raiment to pledge, thou shalt deliver it unto him by that the sun goeth down: 27. For that *is* his covering only, it *is* his raiment for his skin: wherein shall he sleep? and it shall come to pass, when he crieth unto me, that I will hear; for I *am* gracious.

28. Thou shalt not revile the gods, nor curse the ruler of thy people.

XXIII., 1. Thou shalt not raise a false report: put not thine hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness.

4. If thou meet THINE ENEMY'S OX or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. 5. If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldst forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him.

6. Thou shalt not wrest the judgment of thy poor in his cause. 7. Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous slay thou not: for I will not justify the wicked.

8. And thou shalt take no gift: for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous.

9. Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger: for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.

10. And six years thou shalt sow thy land, and shalt gather in the fruits thereof: 11. But the seventh year thou shalt let it rest and lie still; that the poor of thy people may eat: and what they leave the beasts of the field shall eat. In like manner thou shalt deal with thy vineyard, and with thy oliveyard.

12. Six days thou shalt do thy work, and on the seventh day thou shalt rest: that thine ox and thine ass may rest, and the son of thy handmaid, and the stranger, may be refreshed.

13. And in all things that I have said unto you be circumspect: and make no mention of the name of other gods, neither let it be heard out of thy mouth.

XXXIII., 17. And the LORD said unto Moses, I will do this thing also that thou hast spoken: for thou hast found grace in my sight, and I know thee by name.

18. And he said, I beseech thee, show me thy glory. 19. And he said, I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the LORD before thee; and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. 20. And he said, Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live.

EXTRACTS FROM LEVITICUS.

VI., 1. And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying, 2. If a soul sin, and commit a trespass against the LORD, and lie unto his neighbor in that which was delivered him to keep, or in fellowship, or in a thing taken away by violence, or hath deceived his neighbor; 3. Or have found that which was lost, and lieth concerning it, and sweareth falsely; in any of all these that a man doeth, sinning therein: 4. Then it shall be, because he hath sinned and is guilty, that he shall restore that which he took violently away, or the thing which he hath deceitfully gotten, or that which was deliv-

ered him to keep, or the lost thing which he found, 5. Or all that about which he hath sworn falsely; he shall even restore it in the principal, and shall add the fifth part more thereto, *and* give it unto him to whom it appertaineth, in the day of his trespass-offering.

XVIII., 1. And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying, 2. Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, I am the LORD your God. 3. After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do: and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do: neither shall ye walk in their ordinances. 4. Ye shall do my judgments, and keep mine ordinances, to walk therein: I *am* the LORD your God. 5. Ye shall therefore keep my statutes, and my judgments: which if a man do, he shall live in them: I *am* the LORD.

29. For whosoever shall commit any of these abominations, even the souls that commit *them* shall be cut off from among their people. 30. Therefore shall ye keep mine ordinance, that *ye* commit not *any one* of these abominable customs, which were committed before you, and that ye defile not yourselves therein: I *am* the LORD your God.

XIX., 1. And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying, 2. Speak unto all the congregation of the children of Israel, and say unto them, Ye shall be holy: for I the LORD your God *am* holy. 3. Ye shall fear every man his mother, and his father, and keep my sabbaths: I *am* the LORD your God. 4. Turn ye not unto idols, nor make to yourselves molten gods: I *am* the LORD your God.

9. And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not wholly reap the corners of thy field, neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvest. 10. And thou shalt not glean thy vineyard, neither shalt thou gather *every* grape of thy vineyard; thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger: I *am* the LORD your God.

11. Ye shall not steal, neither deal falsely, neither lie one to another. 12. And ye shall not swear by my name falsely, neither shalt thou profane the name of thy God: I *am* the LORD. 13. Thou shalt not defraud thy neighbor, neither rob *him*: the wages of him that is hired shall not abide with thee all night until the morning. 14. Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling-block before the blind, but shalt fear thy God: I *am* the LORD. 15. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honor the person of the mighty: *but* in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor. 16. Thou shalt not go up and down *as* a tale-bearer among thy people; neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor: I *am*

the LORD. 17. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him. 18. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOR AS THYSELF: I *am* the LORD.

27. Ye shall not round the corners of your heads, neither shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard. 28. Ye shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor print any marks upon you: I *am* the LORD. 29. Do not prostitute thy daughter to cause her to be a whore; lest the land fall to whoredom, and the land become full of wickedness. 30. Ye shall keep my sabbaths, and reverence my sanctuary: I *am* the LORD. 31. Regard not them that have familiar spirits, neither seek after wizards, to be defiled by them: I *am* the LORD your God. 32. Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head, and honor the face of the old man, and fear thy God: I *am* the LORD. 33. And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him. 34. *But* the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt: I *am* the LORD your God. 35. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, in meteyard, in weight, or in measure. 36. Just balances, just weights, a just ephah, and a just hin shall ye have: I *am* the LORD your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt. 37. Therefore shall ye observe all my statutes, and all my judgments, and do them: I *am* the LORD.

XXIV., 15. And thou shalt speak unto the children of Israel, saying, Whosoever curseth his God shall bear his sin. 16. And he that blasphemeth the name of the LORD, he shall surely be put to death, *and* all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the stranger, as he that is born in the land, when he blasphemeth the name of *the LORD*, shall be put to death.

17. And he that killeth any man shall surely be put to death.

18. And he that killeth a beast shall make it good; beast for beast. 19. And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor; as he hath done, so shall it be done unto him: 20. Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him *again*. 21. And he that killeth a beast, he shall restore it: and he that killeth a man, he shall be put to death. 22. Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: for I *am* the LORD your God.

XXV., 1. And the LORD spake unto Moses in Mount Sinai, saying, 10. And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout *all* the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it

shall be a jubilee unto you; and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family. 11. A jubilee shall that fiftieth year be unto you: ye shall not sow, neither reap that which groweth of itself in it, nor gather *the grapes* in it of thy vine undressed. 12. For it *is* the jubilee; it shall be holy unto you: ye shall eat the increase thereof out of the field. 13. In the year of this jubilee ye shall return every man unto his possession.

23. The land shall not be sold for ever: for the land *is* mine; for ye *are* strangers and sojourners with me. 24. And in all the land of your possession ye shall grant a redemption for the land. 25. If thy brother be waxen poor, and hath sold away *some* of his possession, and if any of his kin come to redeem it, then shall he redeem that which his brother sold. 26. And if the man have none to redeem it, and himself be able to redeem it; 27. Then let him count the years of the sale thereof, and restore the overplus unto the man to whom he sold it; that he may return unto his possession. 28. But if he be not able to restore *it* to him, then that which is sold shall remain in the hand of him that hath bought it until the year of jubilee: and in the jubilee it shall go out, and he shall return unto his possession.

29. And if a man sell a dwelling-house in a walled city, then he may redeem it within a whole year after it is sold; *within* a full year may he redeem it. 30. And if it be not redeemed within the space of a full year, then the house that *is* in the walled city shall be established forever to him that bought it, throughout his generations: it shall not go out in the jubilee. 31. But the houses of the villages which have no wall round about them, shall be counted as the fields of the country: they may be redeemed, and they shall go out in the jubilee. 32. Notwithstanding, the cities of the Levites, *and* the houses of the cities of their possession, may the Levites redeem at any time. 33. And if a man purchase of the Levites, then the house that was sold, and the city of his possession, shall go out in *the year of* jubilee; for the houses of the cities of the Levites *are* their possession among the children of Israel. 34. But the field of the suburbs of their cities may not be sold, for it *is* their perpetual possession.

35. And if thy brother be waxen poor, and fallen in decay with thee; then thou shalt relieve him: *yea, though he be* a stranger, or a sojourner; that he may live with thee. 36. Take thou no usury of him, or increase: but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee. 37. Thou shalt not give him thy money upon usury, nor lend him thy victuals for increase. 38. *I am* the LORD your God,

which brought you forth out of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan, *and* to be your God.

39. And if thy brother *that dwelleth* by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee; thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond-servant: 40. *But* as an hired servant, *and* as a sojourner he shall be with thee, *and* shall serve thee unto the year of jubilee: 41. And *then* shall he depart from thee, *both* he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession of his fathers shall he return. 42. For they *are* my servants which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt: they shall not be sold as bondmen. 43. Thou shalt not rule over him with rigor, but shalt fear thy God.

XXVI., 1. Ye shall make you no idols nor graven image, neither rear you up a standing image, neither shall ye set up *any* image of stone in your land, to bow down unto it: for I *am* the LORD your God. 2. Ye shall keep my sabbaths, and reverence my sanctuary: I *am* the LORD.

3. If ye walk in my statutes and keep my commandments, and do them; 4. Then I will give you rain in due season, and the land shall yield her increase, and the trees of the field shall yield their fruit: 5. And your threshing shall reach unto the vintage, and the vintage shall reach unto the sowing-time: and ye shall eat your bread to the full, and dwell in your land safely. 6. And I will give peace in the land, and ye shall lie down, and none shall make *you* afraid: and I will rid evil beasts out of the land, neither shall the sword go through your land. 7. And ye shall chase your enemies, and they shall fall before you by the sword. 8. And five of you shall chase an hundred, and an hundred of you shall put ten thousand to flight: and your enemies shall fall before you by the sword. 9. For I will have respect unto you, and make you fruitful, and multiply you, and establish my covenant with you. 10. And ye shall eat old store, and bring forth the old because of the new. 11. And I will set my tabernacle among you: and my soul shall not abhor you. 12. And I will walk among you, and will be your God, and ye shall be my people. 13. I *am* the LORD your God, which brought you forth out of the land of Egypt, that ye should not be their bondmen; and I have broken the bands of your yoke, and made you go upright.

14. But if ye will not hearken unto me, and will not do all these commandments; 15. And if ye shall despise my statutes, or if your soul abhor my judgments, so that ye will not do all my commandments, *but* that ye break my covenant: 16. I also will do this unto you; I will even appoint over you terror, consumption,

and the burning ague, that shall consume the eyes, and cause sorrow of heart : and ye shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies shall eat it. 17. And I will set my face against you, and ye shall be slain before your enemies : they that hate you shall reign over you, and ye shall flee when none pursueth you. 18. And if ye will not yet for all this hearken unto me, then I will punish you seven times more for your sins. 19. And I will break the pride of your power ; and I will make your heaven as iron, and your earth as brass : 20. And your strength shall be spent in vain : for your land shall not yield her increase, neither shall the trees of the land yield their fruits. 21. And if ye walk contrary unto me, and will not hearken unto me ; I will bring seven times more plagues upon you according to your sins. 22. I will also send wild beasts among you, which shall rob you of your children, and destroy your cattle, and make you few in number ; and your *high-ways* shall be desolate. 23. And if ye will not be reformed by me by these things, but will walk contrary unto me ; 24. Then will I also walk contrary unto you, and will punish you yet seven times for your sins. 25. And I will bring a sword upon you, that shall avenge the quarrel of *my* covenant : and when ye are gathered together within your cities, I will send the pestilence among you ; and ye shall be delivered into the hand of the enemy. 26. *And* when I have broken the staff of your bread, ten women shall bake your bread in one oven, and they shall deliver *you* your bread again by weight : and ye shall eat, and not be satisfied. 27. And if ye will not for all this hearken unto me, but walk contrary unto me ; 28. Then I will walk contrary unto you also in fury ; and I, even I, will chastise you seven times for your sins. 29. And ye shall eat the flesh of your sons, and the flesh of your daughters shall ye eat. 30. And I will destroy your high places, and cut down your images, and cast your carcasses upon the carcasses of your idols, and my soul shall abhor you. 31. And I will make your cities waste, and bring your sanctuaries unto desolation, and I will not smell the savor of your sweet odors. 32. And I will bring the land into desolation : and your enemies which dwell therein shall be astonished at it. 33. And I will scatter you among the heathen, and will draw out a sword after you : and your land shall be desolate, and your cities waste. 34. Then shall the land enjoy her sabbaths, as long as it lieth desolate, and ye *be* in your enemies' land ; *even* then shall the land rest, and enjoy her sabbaths. 35. As long as it lieth desolate it shall rest ; because it did not rest in your sabbaths, when ye dwelt upon it. 36. And upon them that are left *alive* of you I will send a faintness into their hearts in the lands of their enemies ;

and the sound of a shaken leaf shall chase them; and they shall flee, as fleeing from a sword; and they shall fall when none pursueth. 37. And they shall fall one upon another, as it were before a sword, when none pursueth: and ye shall have no power to stand before your enemies. 38. And ye shall perish among the heathen, and the land of your enemies shall eat you up. 39. And they that are left of you shall pine away in their iniquity in your enemies' lands; and also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them.

40. If they shall confess their iniquity, and the iniquity of their fathers, with their trespass which they trespassed against me, and that also they have walked contrary unto me; 41. And *that* I also have walked contrary unto them, and have brought them into the land of their enemies; if then their uncircumcised hearts be humbled, and they then accept of the punishment of their iniquity: 42. Then will I remember my covenant with Jacob, and also my covenant with Isaac, and also my covenant with Abraham will I remember; and I will remember the land. 43. The land also shall be left of them, and shall enjoy her sabbaths, while she lieth desolate without them: and they shall accept of the punishment of their iniquity: because, even because they despised my judgments, and because their soul abhorred my statutes. 44. And yet for all that, when they be in the land of their enemies, I will not cast them away, neither will I abhor them, to destroy them utterly, and to break my covenant with them: for I *am* the LORD their God. 45. But I will for their sakes remember the covenant of their ancestors, whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt in the sight of the heathen, that I might be their God: I *am* the LORD.

46. These *are* the statutes and judgments and laws, which the LORD made between him and the children of Israel in mount Sinai by the hand of Moses.

EXTRACTS FROM DEUTERONOMY.

I., 5. On this side Jordan, in the land of Moab, began Moses to declare this law, saying,

6. The LORD our God spake unto us in Horeb, saying, Ye have dwelt long enough in this mount: 7. Turn you, and take your journey, and go to the mount of the Amorites, and unto all the *places* nigh thereunto, in the plain, in the hills, and in the vale, and in the south, and by the sea-side, to the land of the Canaanites, and unto Lebanon, unto the great river, the river Euphrates. 8. Behold, I have set the land before you: go in and possess the land which the LORD sware unto your fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to give unto them and to their seed after them.

9. And I spake unto you at that time, saying, I am not able to bear you myself alone : 10. The LORD your God hath multiplied you, and behold, ye *are* this day as the stars of heaven for multitude. 11. (The LORD God of your fathers make you a thousand times so many more as ye *are*, and bless you, as he hath promised you!) 12. How can I myself alone bear your cumbrance, and your burden, and your strife? 13. Take ye wise men, and understanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you. 14. And ye answered me, and said, The thing which thou hast spoken *is* good *for us* to do. 15. So I took the chief of your tribes, wise men, and known, and made them heads over you, captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, and captains over fifties, and captains over tens, and officers among your tribes. 16. And I charged your judges at that time, saying, Hear *the causes* between your brethren, and judge righteously between *every* man and his brother, and the stranger *that is* with him. 17. Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; *but* ye shall hear the small as well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man; for the judgment *is* God's: and the cause that is too hard for you, bring *it* unto me, and I will hear it. 18. And I commanded you at that time all the things which ye should do.

IV., 1. Now therefore hearken, O Israel, unto the statutes and unto the judgments, which I teach you, for to do *them*, that ye may live, and go in and possess the land which the LORD God of your fathers giveth you. 2. Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish *ought* from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the LORD your God which I command you. 3. Your eyes have seen what the LORD did because of Baal-peor: for all the men that followed Baal-peor, the LORD thy God hath destroyed them from among you. 4. But ye that did cleave unto the LORD your God are alive every one of you this day. 5. Behold, I have taught you statutes and judgments, even as the LORD my God commanded me, that ye should do so in the land whither ye go to possess it. 6. Keep therefore and do *them*; for this *is* your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this great nation *is* a wise and understanding people. 7. For what nation *is there* so great, who *hath* God so nigh unto them, as the LORD our God *is* in all *things that* we call upon him *for*? 8. And what nation *is there* so great, that hath statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law, which I set before you this day? 9. Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul diligently, lest thou forget the things which thine eyes have seen, and lest they depart from thy heart all

the days of thy life : but teach them thy sons, and thy sons' sons ; 10. *Specially* the day that thou stoodest before the LORD thy God in Horeb, when the LORD said unto me, Gather me the people together, and I will make them hear my words, that they may learn to fear me all the days that they shall live upon the earth, and *that* they may teach their children. 11. And ye came near and stood under the mountain ; and the mountain burned with fire unto the midst of heaven, with darkness, clouds, and thick darkness. 12. And the LORD spake unto you out of the midst of the fire : ye heard the voice of the words, but saw no similitude ; only *ye heard* a voice. 13. And he declared unto you his covenant, which he commanded you to perform, *even* ten commandments ; and he wrote them upon two tablets of stone. 14. And the LORD commanded me at that time to teach you statutes and judgments, that ye might do them in the land whither ye go over to possess it.

15. Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves ; for ye saw no manner of similitude on the day *that* the LORD spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire ; 16. Lest ye corrupt *yourselves* and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the likeness of male or female, 17. The likeness of any beast that *is* on the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl that flieth in the air, 18. The likeness of anything that creepeth on the ground, the likeness of any fish that *is* in the waters beneath the earth : 19. And lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun, and the moon, and the stars, *even* all the host of heaven shouldest be driven to worship them, and serve them, which the LORD thy God had divided unto all nations under the whole heaven. 20. But the LORD hath taken you, and brought you forth out of the iron furnace, *even* out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of inheritance, as *ye are* this day. 21. Furthermore the LORD was angry with me for your sakes, and sware that I should not go over Jordan, and that I should not go in unto that good land which the LORD thy God giveth thee *for* an inheritance : 22. But I must die in this land, I must not go over Jordan : but ye shall go over, and possess that good land. 23. Take heed unto yourselves, lest ye forget the covenant of the LORD your God, which he made with you, and make you a graven image, *or* the likeness of any *thing* which the LORD thy God hath forbidden thee. 24. For the LORD thy God *is* a consuming fire, *even* a jealous God.

25. When thou shalt beget children, and children's children, and ye shall have remained long in the land, and shall corrupt *yourselves*, and make a graven image, *or* the likeness of any *thing*, and shall do evil in the sight of the LORD thy God, to provoke him to anger : 26.

I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that ye shall soon utterly perish from off the land whereunto ye go over Jordan to possess it; ye shall not prolong *your* days upon it, but shall utterly be destroyed. 27. And the LORD shall scatter you among the nations, and ye shall be left few in number among the heathen, whither the LORD shall lead you. 28. And there ye shall serve gods, the work of men's hands, wood and stone, which neither see, nor hear, nor eat, nor smell. 29. But if from thence thou shalt seek the LORD thy God, thou shalt find *him*, if thou seek him with all thy heart and with all thy soul. 30. When thou art in tribulation, and all these things are come upon thee, *even* in the latter days, if thou turn to the LORD thy God, and shalt be obedient unto his voice; 31. (For the LORD thy God *is* a merciful God;) he will not forsake thee, neither destroy thee, nor forget the covenant of thy fathers which he sware unto them.

32. For ask now of the days that are past, which were before thee, since the day that God created man upon the earth, and *ask* from the one side of heaven unto the other, whether there hath been *any such thing* as this great thing *is*, or hath been heard like it? 33. Did *ever* people hear the voice of God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard, and live? 34. Or hath God assayed to go *and* take him a nation from the midst of *another* nation, by temptations, by signs, and by wonders, and by war, and by a mighty hand, and by a stretched out arm, and by great terrors, according to all that the LORD your God did for you in Egypt before your eyes? 35. Unto thee it was showed, that thou mightest know that the LORD he *is* God: *there is* none else beside him. 36. Out of heaven he made thee to hear his voice, that he might instruct thee: and upon earth he showed thee his great fire; and thou heardest his words out of the midst of the fire. 37. And because he loved thy fathers, therefore he chose their seed after them, and brought thee out in his sight with his mighty power out of Egypt; 38. To drive out nations from before thee greater and mightier than thou *art*, to bring thee in, to give thee their land *for* an inheritance, as *it is* this day. 39. Know therefore this day, and consider *it* in thine heart, that the LORD he *is* God in heaven above, and upon the earth beneath: *there is* none else. 40. Thou shalt keep therefore his statutes, and his commandments, which I command thee this day, that it may go well with thee, and with thy children after thee, and that thou mayest prolong *thy* days upon the earth which the LORD thy God giveth thee, for ever.

V., 1. And Moses called all Israel, and said unto them, Hear. O Israel, the statutes and judgments which I speak in your ears this

day, that ye may learn them, and keep, and do them. 2. The LORD our God made a covenant with us in Horeb. 3 The LORD made not this covenant with our fathers, but with us, *even us*, who *are* all of us here alive this day. 4. The LORD talked with you face to face in the mount, out of the midst of the fire, 5. (I stood between the LORD and you at that time, to show you the word of the LORD : for ye were afraid by reason of the fire, and went not up to the mount;) saying,

6. I *am* the LORD thy God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt from the house of bondage. 7. Thou shalt have none other gods before me.

8. Thou shalt not make thee *any* graven image, or any likeness of *anything* that *is* in heaven above, or that *is* in the earth beneath, or that *is* in the waters beneath the earth : 9. Thou shalt not bow down thyself unto them, nor serve them : for I the LORD thy God *am* a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth *generation* of them that hate me, 10. And showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments.

11. Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain : for the LORD will not hold *him* guiltless that taketh his name in vain.

12. Keep the sabbath-day to sanctify it, as the LORD thy God hath commanded thee. 13. Six days thou shalt labor, and do all thy work : 14. But the seventh day *is* the sabbath of the LORD thy God : *in it* thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger that *is* within thy gates ; that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou. 15. And remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and *that* the LORD thy God brought thee out thence through a mighty hand and by a stretched out arm : therefore the LORD thy God commanded thee to keep the sabbath-day.

16. Honor thy father and thy mother, as the LORD thy God hath commanded thee ; that thy days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with thee, in the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee.

17. Thou shalt not kill.

18. Neither shalt thou commit adultery.

19. Neither shalt thou steal.

20. Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbor.

21. Neither shalt thou desire thy neighbor's wife, neither shalt

thou covet thy neighbor's house, his field, or his manservant, or his maidservant, his ox, or his ass, or any *thing* that *is* thy neighbor's.

22. These words the LORD spake unto all your assembly in the mount out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud, and of the thick darkness, with a great voice: and he added no more. And he wrote them in two tablets of stone, and delivered them unto me. 23. And it came to pass, when ye heard the voice out of the midst of the darkness, (for the mountain did burn with fire,) that ye came near unto me, *even* all the heads of your tribes, and your elders; 24. And ye said, Behold, the LORD our God hath showed us his glory and his greatness, and we have heard his voice out of the midst of the fire: we have seen this day that God doth talk with man, and he liveth. 25. Now therefore why should we die? for this great fire will consume us: if we hear the voice of the LORD our God any more, then we shall die. 26. For who *is there of* all flesh that hath heard the voice of the living God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as we *have*, and lived? 27. Go thou near, and hear all that the LORD our God shall say: and speak thou unto us all that the LORD our God shall speak unto thee; and we will hear *it*, and do *it*. 28. And the LORD heard the voice of your words, when ye spake unto me; and the LORD said unto me, I have heard the voice of the words of this people, which they have spoken unto thee: they have well said all that they have spoken. 29. O that there were such an heart in them, that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments always, that it might be well with them, and with their children for ever! 30. Go say to them, Get you into your tents again. 31. But as for thee, stand thou here by me, and I will speak unto thee all the commandments, and the statutes, and the judgments, which thou shalt teach them, that they may do *them* in the land which I give them to possess it. 32. Ye shall observe to do therefore as the LORD your God hath commanded you: ye shall not turn aside to the right hand or to the left. 33. Ye shall walk in all the ways which the LORD your God hath commanded you, that ye may live, and *that it may be* well with you, and *that ye* may prolong *your* days in the land which ye shall possess.

VI, 1. Now these *are* the commandments, the statutes, and the judgments, which the LORD your God commanded to teach you, that ye might do *them* in the land whither ye go to possess it: 2. That thou mightest fear the LORD thy God, to keep all his statutes and his commandments which I command thee, thou, and thy son, and thy son's son, all the days of thy life; and that thy days may be prolonged.

3. Hear therefore, O Israel, and observe to do *it*; that it may be well with thee, and that ye may increase mightily, as the LORD God of thy fathers hath promised thee, in the land that floweth with milk and honey.

4. Hear, O Israel: THE LORD our God *is* ONE LORD: 5. AND THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD THY GOD WITH ALL THINE HEART, AND WITH ALL THY SOUL, AND WITH ALL THY MIGHT. 6. And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart: 7. And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up. 8. And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thine hand, and they shall be as frontlets between thine eyes. 9. And thou shalt write them upon the posts of thy house, and on thy gates.

10. And it shall be, when the LORD thy God shall have brought thee into the land which he sware unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give the great and goodly cities, which thou buildedst not, 11. And houses full of all good *things*, which thou filledst not, and wells digged, which thou diggedst not, vineyards and olive-trees, which thou plantedst not; when thou shalt have eaten and be full; 12. *Then* beware lest thou forget the LORD, which brought thee forth out of the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage. 13. Thou shalt fear the LORD thy God, and serve him, and shalt swear by his name. 14. Ye shall not go after other gods, o the gods of the people which *are* round about you; 15. (For the LORD thy God *is* a jealous God among you) lest the anger of the LORD thy God be kindled against thee, and destroy thee from off the face of the earth. 16. Ye shall not tempt the LORD your God, as ye tempted *him* in Massah. 17. Ye shall diligently keep the commandments of the LORD your God, and his testimonies, and his statutes, which he hath commanded thee. 18. AND THOU SHALT do *that which is* RIGHT AND GOOD in the sight of the LORD: that it may be well with thee, and that thou mayst go in and possess the good land which the LORD sware unto thy fathers, 19. To cast out all thine enemies from before thee, as the LORD hath spoken.

20. *And* when thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying, What *mean* the testimonies, and the statutes, and the judgments, which the LORD our God hath commanded you? 21. Then thou shalt say unto thy son, We were Pharaoh's bondmen in Egypt; and the LORD brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand: 22. And the LORD showed signs and wonders, great and sore, upon Egypt, upon Pharaoh, and upon all his household, before our eyes: 23. And he brought us out from thence, that he might bring us in, to give

us the land which he sware unto our fathers. 24. And the LORD commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the LORD our God, for our good always, that he might preserve us alive, as *it is* at this day. 25. And it shall be our righteousness, if we observe to do all these commandments before the LORD our God, as he hath commanded us.

VII., 6. For thou *art* an holy people unto the LORD thy God: the LORD thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all people that *are* upon the face of the earth. 7. The LORD did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number than any people; for ye *were* the fewest of all people: 8. But because the LORD loved you, and because he would keep the oath which he had sworn unto your fathers, hath the LORD brought you out with a mighty hand, and redeemed you out of the house of bondmen, from the hand of Pharaoh king of Egypt.

9. Know therefore that the LORD thy God, he *is* God, the faithful God, which keepeth covenant and mercy with them that love him and keep his commandments to a thousand generations; 10. And repayeth them that hate him to their face, to destroy them: he will not be slack to him that hateth him, he will repay him to his face. 11. Thou shalt therefore keep the commandments, and the statutes, and the judgments, which I command thee this day, to do them.

12. Wherefore it shall come to pass, if ye hearken to these judgments, and keep, and do them, that the LORD thy God shall keep unto thee covenant and the mercy which he sware unto thy fathers: 13. And he will love thee, and bless thee, and multiply thee: he will also bless the fruit of thy womb, and the fruit of thy land, thy corn, and thy wine, and thine oil, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep, in the land which he sware unto thy fathers to give thee. 14. Thou shalt be blessed above all people: there shall not be male or female barren among you, or among your cattle. 15. And the LORD will take away from thee all sickness, and will put none of the evil diseases of Egypt, which thou knowest, upon thee; but will lay them upon all *them* that hate thee.

X., 12. And now, Israel, what doth the LORD thy God require of thee, but to fear the LORD thy God, to walk in all his ways, and to love him, and to serve the LORD thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul, 13. To keep the commandments of the LORD, and his statutes, which I command thee this day for thy good? 14. Behold, the heaven and the heaven of heavens *is* the LORD's thy God, the earth *also*, with all that therein *is*. 15. Only the LORD had a delight in thy fathers to love them, and he

chose their seed after them, *even* you above all people, as *it is* this day. 16. Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart, and be no more stiff-necked. 17. For the LORD your God *is* God of gods, and LORD of lords, a great God, a mighty, and a terrible, which regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward: 18. He doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow, and loveth the stranger, in giving him food and raiment. 19. LOVE YE THEREFORE THE STRANGER: for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. 20. Thou shalt fear the LORD thy God; him shalt thou serve, and to him shalt thou cleave, and swear by his name. 21. He *is* thy praise, and he *is* thy God, that hath done for thee these great and terrible things, which thine eyes have seen. 22. Thy fathers went down into Egypt with three-score and ten persons; and now the LORD thy God hath made thee as the stars of heaven for multitude.

XI., 1. Therefore thou shalt love the LORD thy God, and keep his charge, and his statutes, and his judgments, and his commandments, alway.

18. Therefore shall ye lay up these my words in your heart and in your soul, and bind them for a sign upon your hand, that they may be as frontlets between your eyes. 19. And ye shall teach them your children, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down, and when thou risest up. 20. And thou shalt write them upon the door posts of thine house, and upon thy gates: 21. That your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children, in the land which the LORD sware unto your fathers to give them, as the days of heaven upon the earth.

26. Behold, I set before you this day a blessing and a curse; 27. A blessing, if ye obey the commandments of the LORD your God, which I command you this day; ; 28. And a curse, if ye will not obey the commandments of the LORD your God, but turn aside out of the way which I command you this day, to go after other gods, which ye have not known.

XIV., 22. Thou shalt truly tithe all the increase of thy seed, that the field bringeth forth year by year.

23. And thou shalt eat before the LORD thy God, in the place which he shall choose to place his name there, the tithe of thy corn, of thy wine, and of thine oil, and the firstlings of thy herds and of thy flocks; that thou mayst learn to fear the LORD thy God always.

24. And if the way be too long for thee, so that thou art not able to carry it; *or* if the place be too far from thee, which the LORD

thy God shall choose to set his name there, when the LORD thy God hath blessed thee : 25. Then shalt thou turn *it* into money, and bind up the money in thine hand, and shalt go unto the place which the LORD thy God shall choose : 26. And thou shalt bestow that money for whatsoever thy soul lusteth after, for oxen, or for sheep, or for wine, or for strong drink, or for whatsoever thy soul desireth : and thou shalt eat there before the LORD thy God, and thou shalt rejoice, thou, and thine household. 27. And the Levite that *is* within thy gates ; thou shalt not forsake him : for he hath no part nor inheritance with thee.

28. At the end of three years thou shalt bring forth all the tithe of thine increase the same year, and shalt lay *it* up within thy gates : 29. And the Levite, (because he hath no part nor inheritance with thee,) and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, which *are* within thy gates, shall come, and shall eat and be satisfied ; that the LORD thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine hand which thou doest.

XV., 1. At the end of *every* seven years thou shalt make a release. 2. And *this is* the manner of the release : Every creditor that lendeth *ought* unto his neighbor, shall release *it* ; he shall not exact *it* of his neighbor, or of his brother ; because it is called the LORD's release. 3. Of a foreigner thou mayst exact *it again* : but *that* which is thine with thy brother thine hand shall release ; 4. Save when there shall be no poor among you ; for the LORD shall greatly bless thee in the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee *for* an inheritance to possess it : 5. Only if thou carefully hearken unto the voice of the LORD thy God, to observe to do all these commandments which I command thee this day. 6. For the LORD thy God blesseth thee, as he promised thee : and thou shalt lend unto many nations, but thou shalt not borrow ; and thou shalt reign over many nations, but they shall not reign over thee.

7. If there be among you a poor man of one of thy brethren within any of thy gates in thy land which the LORD thy God giveth thee, thou shalt not harden thine heart, nor shut thine hand from thy poor brother : 8. But thou shalt open thine hand wide unto him, and shalt surely lend him sufficient for his need, *in that* which he wanteth. 9. Beware that there be not a thought in thy wicked heart, saying, The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand ; and thine eye be evil against thy poor brother, and thou givest him naught ; and he cry unto the LORD against thee, and it be sin unto thee. 10. Thou shalt surely give him, and thine heart shall not be grieved when thou givest unto him : because that for this thing the LORD thy God shall bless thee in all thy works, and in all that

thou puttest thine hand unto. 11. For the poor shall never cease out of the land : therefore I command thee, saying, THOU SHALT OPEN THINE HAND WIDE UNTO THY BROTHER, TO THY POOR, AND TO THY NEEDY, IN THY LAND.

12. And if thy brother, an Hebrew man, or an Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years ; then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free from thee. 13. And when thou sendest him out free from thee, thou shalt not let him go away empty : 14. Thou shalt furnish him liberally out of thy flock, and out of thy floor, and out of thy wine-press : *of that* wherewith the LORD thy God hath blessed thee thou shalt give unto him. 15. And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt, and the LORD thy God redeemed thee : therefore I command thee this thing to-day. 16. And it shall be, if he say unto thee, I will not go away from thee ; because he loveth thee and thine house, because he is well with thee ; 17. Then thou shalt take an awl, and thrust *it* through his ear unto the door, and he shall be thy servant forever. And also unto thy maidservant thou shalt do likewise. 18. It shall not seem hard unto thee, when thou sendest him away free from thee : for he hath been worth a double hired servant *to thee*, in serving thee six years : and the LORD thy God shall bless thee in all that thou doest.

XVI., 16. Three times in a year shall all thy males appear before the LORD thy God in the place which he shall choose ; in the feast of unleavened bread, and in the feast of weeks, and in the feast of tabernacles : and they shall not appear before the LORD empty : 17. Every man *shall give* as he is able, according to the blessing of the LORD thy God which he hath given thee.

18. Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the LORD thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes : and they SHALL JUDGE THE PEOPLE WITH JUST JUDGMENT. 19. Thou shalt not wrest judgment ; thou shalt not respect persons, neither take a gift : for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous. 20. THAT WHICH IS ALTOGETHER JUST SHALT THOU FOLLOW, that thou mayst live, and inherit the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee.

21. Thou shalt not plant thee a grove of any trees near unto the altar of the LORD thy God, which thou shalt make thee. 22. Neither shalt thou set thee up *any* image ; which the LORD thy God hateth.

XVII., 8. If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, *being* matters of controversy within thy gates : then

shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the LORD thy God shall choose; 9. And thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire; and they shall show thee the sentence of judgment: 10. And thou shalt do according to the sentence, which they of that place which the LORD shall choose shall show thee; and thou shalt observe to do according to all that they inform thee: 11. According to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do: thou shalt not decline from the sentence which they shall show thee, *to the right hand nor to the left.* 12. And the man that will do presumptuously, and will not hearken unto the priest that standeth to minister there before the LORD thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die: and thou shalt put away the evil from Israel. 13. And all the people shall hear, and fear, and do no more presumptuously.

XVIII., 9. When thou art come into the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee, thou shalt not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. 10. There shall not be found among you *any one* that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, *or that useth divination, or an observer of times, or an enchanter, or a witch,* 11. Or a charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer. 12. For all that do these things *are* an abomination unto the LORD: and because of these abominations the LORD thy God doth drive them out from before thee. 13. Thou shalt be perfect with the LORD thy God. 14. For these nations, which thou shalt possess, hearkened unto observers of times, and unto diviners: but as for thee, the LORD thy God hath not suffered thee so *to do.*

XIX., 1. When the LORD thy God hath cut off the nations, whose land the LORD thy God giveth thee, and thou succeedest them, and dwellest in their cities, and in their houses; 2. Thou shalt separate three cities for thee in the midst of thy land, which the LORD thy God giveth thee to possess it. 3. Thou shalt prepare thee a way, and divide the coasts of thy land, which the LORD thy God giveth thee to inherit, into three parts, that every slayer may flee thither.

4. And this *is* the case of the slayer, which shall flee thither, that he may live: Whoso killeth his neighbor ignorantly, whom he hated not in time past; 5. As when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbor to hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the ax to cut down the tree, and the head slippeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbor, that he die; he shall flee unto one of those

cities, and live : 6. Lest the avenger of blood pursue the slayer, while his heart is hot, and overtake him, because the way is long, and slay him ; whereas he *was* not worthy of death, inasmuch as he hated him not in time past. 7. Wherefore I command thee, saying, Thou shalt separate three cities for thee. 8. And if the LORD thy God enlarge thy coast, as he hath sworn unto thy fathers, and give thee all the land which he promised to give unto thy fathers ; 9. If thou shalt keep all these commandments to do them, which I command thee this day, to love the LORD thy God, and to walk ever in his ways ; then shalt thou add three cities more for thee, beside these three : 10. That innocent blood be not shed in thy land, which the LORD thy God giveth thee *for* an inheritance, and *so* blood be upon thee.

11. But if any man hate his neighbor, and lie in wait for him, and rise up against him, and smite him mortally that he die, and fleeth into one of these cities : 12. Then the elders of his city shall send and fetch him thence, and deliver him into the hand of the avenger of blood, that he may die. 13. Thine eye shall not pity him, but thou shalt put away *the guilt of* innocent blood from Israel, that it may go well with thee.

14. Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's land-mark, which they of old time have set in thine inheritance, which thou shalt inherit in the land that the LORD thy God giveth thee to possess it.

15. One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth : at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be established.

16. If a false witness rise up against any man to testify against him *that which is* wrong ; 17. Then both the men, between whom the controversy *is*, shall stand before the LORD, before the priests, and the judges, which shall be in those days ; 18. And the judges shall make diligent inquisition : and behold, *if* the witness *be* a false witness, *and* hath testified falsely against his brother ; 19. Then shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to have done unto his brother : so shalt thou put the evil away from among you. 20. And those which remain shall hear, and fear, and shall henceforth commit no more any such evil among you. 21. And thine eye shall not pity ; *but* life *shall go* for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.

XXI., 15. If a man have two wives, one beloved, and another hated, and they have borne him children, *both* the beloved and the hated ; and *if* the first-born son be hers that was hated : 16. Then it shall be, when he maketh his sons to inherit *that* which he hath,

that he may not make the son of the beloved first-born, before the son of the hated, *which is indeed* the first-born: 17. But he shall acknowledge the son of the hated *for* the first-born, by giving him a double portion of all that he hath: for he *is* the beginning of his strength; the right of the first-born *is* his.

18. If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and *that*, when they have chastened him, will not hearken unto them: 19. Then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his place; 20. And they shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son *is* stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice; *he is* a glutton, and a drunkard. 21. And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die: so shalt thou put evil away from among you; and all Israel shall hear, and fear.

XXII., 1. Thou shalt not see thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, and hide thyself from them: thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy brother. 2. And if thy brother *be* not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it unto thine own house, and it shall be with thee until thy brother seek after it, and thou shalt restore it to him again. 3. In like manner shalt thou do with his ass; and so shalt thou do with his raiment; and with all lost things of thy brother's, which he hath lost, and thou hast found, shalt thou do likewise: thou mayest not hide thyself. 4. Thou shalt not see thy brother's ass or his ox fall down by the way, and hide thyself from them: thou shalt surely help him to lift *them* up again.

6. If a bird's nest chance to be before thee in the way in any tree, or on the ground, *whether they be* young ones, or eggs, and the dam sitting upon the young, or upon the eggs, thou shalt not take the dam with the young: 7. *But* thou shalt in any wise let the dam go, and take the young to thee; that it may be well with thee, and *that* thou mayest prolong *thy* days.

8. When thou buildest a new house, then thou shalt make a battlement for thy roof, that thou bring not blood upon thine house, if any man fall from thence.

XXIII., 15. Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee: 16. He shall dwell with thee, *even* among you, in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best: thou shalt not oppress him.

19. Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon

usury: 20. Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury: that the LORD thy God may bless thee in all that thou settest thine hand to in the land whither thou goest to possess it.

24. When thou comest into thy neighbor's vineyard, then thou mayest eat grapes thy fill, at thine own pleasure; but thou shalt not put *any* in thy vessel. 25. When thou comest into the standing-corn of thy neighbor, then thou mayest pluck the ears with thine hand; but thou shalt not move a sickle unto thy neighbor's standing-corn.

XXIV., 6. No man shall take the nether or the upper millstone to pledge: for he taketh *a man's* life to pledge.

7. If a man be found stealing any of his brethren of the children of Israel, and maketh merchandise of him, or selleth him; then that thief shall die; and thou shalt put evil away from among you.

10. When thou dost lend thy brother anything, thou shalt not go into his house to fetch his pledge. 11. Thou shalt stand abroad, and the man to whom thou dost lend shall bring out the pledge abroad unto thee. 12. And if the man *be* poor, thou shalt not sleep with his pledge: 13. In any case thou shalt deliver him the pledge again when the sun goeth down, that he may sleep in his own raiment, and bless thee: and it shall be righteousness unto thee before the LORD thy God.

14. Thou shalt not oppress an hired servant *that is* poor and needy, *whether he be* of thy brethren, or of thy strangers *that are* in thy land within thy gates: 15. At his day thou shalt give *him* his hire, neither shall the sun go down upon it; for he *is* poor, and setteth his heart upon it: lest he cry against thee unto the LORD, and it be sin unto thee.

16. The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin.

17. Thou shalt not pervert the judgment of the stranger, *nor* of the fatherless; nor take a widow's raiment to pledge: 18. But thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in Egypt, and the LORD thy God redeemed thee thence: therefore I command thee to do this thing.

19. When thou cuttest down thine harvest in thy field, and hast forgot a sheaf in the field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it: it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow: that the LORD thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine hands. 20. When thou beatest thine olive-tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again: it shall be for the stranger, for the father-

less, and for the widow. 21. When thou gatherest the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean *it* afterward : it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow. 22. And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bondman in the land of Egypt : therefore I command thee to do this thing.

XXV., 1. If there be a controversy between men, and they come unto judgment, that *the judges* may judge them ; then they shall justify the righteous, and condemn the wicked. 2. And it shall be, if the wicked man *be* worthy to be beaten, that the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face, according to his fault, by a certain number. 3. Forty stripes he may give him, *and* not exceed : lest, *if* he should exceed, and beat him above these with many stripes, then thy brother should seem vile unto thee.

4. Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out *the corn*.

13. Thou shalt not have in thy bag divers weights, a great and a small. 14 Thou shalt not have in thine house divers measures, a great and a small. 15. *But* thou shalt have a perfect and just weight, a perfect and just measure shalt thou have : that thy days may be lengthened in the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee. 16. For all that do such things, *and* all that do unrighteously, *are* an abomination unto the LORD thy God.

XXVI., 1. And it shall be, when thou *art* come in unto the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee *for* an inheritance, and possessest it, and dwellest therein ; 2. That thou shalt take of the first of all the fruit of the earth, which thou shalt bring of thy land that the LORD thy God giveth thee, and shalt put *it* in a basket, and shalt go unto the place which the LORD thy God shall choose to place his name there. 3. And thou shalt go unto the priest that shall be in those days, and say unto him, I profess this day unto the LORD thy God, that I am come unto the country which the LORD sware unto our fathers for to give us. 4. And the priest shall take the basket out of thine hand, and set it down before the altar of the LORD thy God. 5. And thou shalt speak and say before the LORD thy God, A Syrian ready to perish *was* my father, and he went down into Egypt, and sojourned there with a few, and became there a nation, great, mighty, and populous : 6. And the Egyptians evil-entreated us, and afflicted us, and laid upon us hard bondage : 7. And when we cried unto the LORD God of our fathers, the LORD heard our voice, and looked on our affliction, and our labor, and our oppression : 8. And the LORD brought us forth out of Egypt with a mighty hand, and with an out-stretched arm, and with great terribleness, and with signs, and with wonders : 9. And he hath

brought us into this place, and hath given us this land, *even* a land that floweth with milk and honey. 10. And now, behold, I have brought the first fruits of the land, which thou, O LORD, hast given me. And thou shalt set it before the LORD thy God, and worship before the LORD thy God: 11. And thou shalt rejoice in every good *thing* which the LORD thy God hath given unto thee, and unto thine house, thou, and the Levite, and the stranger that is among you.

12. When thou hast made an end of tithing all the tithes of thine increase the third year, *which is* the year of tithing, and hast given *it* unto the Levite, the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow, that they may eat within thy gates, and be filled; 13. Then thou shalt say before the LORD thy God, I have brought away the hallowed things out of *mine* house, and also have given them unto the Levite, and unto the stranger, to the fatherless, and to the widow, according to all thy commandments which thou hast commanded me: I have not transgressed thy commandments, neither have I forgotten *them*: 14. I have not eaten thereof in my mourning, neither have I taken away *ought* thereof for *any* unclean *use*, nor given *ought* thereof for the dead: *but* I have hearkened to the voice of the LORD my God, *and* have done according to all that thou hast commanded me. 15. Look down from thy holy habitation, from heaven, and bless thy people Israel, and the land which thou hast given us, as thou swarest unto our fathers, a land that floweth with milk and honey.

16. This day the LORD thy God hath commanded thee to do these statutes and judgments: thou shalt therefore keep and do them with all thine heart and with all thy soul. 17. Thou hast avouched the LORD this day to be thy God, and to walk in his ways, and to keep his statutes, and his commandments, and his judgments, and to hearken unto his voice: 18. And the LORD hath avouched thee this day to be his peculiar people, as he hath promised thee, and that *thou* shouldst keep all his commandments; 19. And to make thee high above all nations which he hath made, in praise, and in name, and in honor; and that thou mayest be an holy people unto the LORD thy God, as he hath spoken.

XXVII., 11. And Moses charged the people the same day, saying, 12. These shall stand upon mount Gerizin to bless the people, when ye are come over Jordan; Simeon, and Levi, and Judah, and Issachar, and Joseph, and Benjamin: 13. And these shall stand upon mount Ebal to curse; Reuben, Gad, and Asher, and Zebulun, Dan, and Naphtali.

14. And the Levites shall speak, and say unto all the men of Israel with a loud voice,

15. Cursed *be* the man that maketh *any* graven or molten image, an abomination unto the LORD, the work of the hands of the craftsman, and putteth *it* in *a* secret place. And all the people shall answer and say, Amen.

16. Cursed *be* he that setteth light by his father or his mother. And all the people shall say, Amen.

17. Cursed *be* he that removeth his neighbor's land-mark. And all the people shall say, Amen.

18. Cursed *be* he that maketh the blind to wander out of the way. And all the people shall say, Amen.

19. Cursed *be* he that perverteth the judgment of the stranger, fatherless, and widow. And all the people shall say, Amen.

20. Cursed *be* he that lieth with his father's wife; because he uncovereth his father's skirt. And all the people shall say, Amen.

21. Cursed *be* he that lieth with any manner of beast. And all the people shall say, Amen.

22. Cursed *be* he that lieth with his sister, the daughter of his father, or the daughter of his mother. And all the people shall say, Amen.

23. Cursed *be* he that lieth with his mother-in-law. And all the people shall say, Amen.

24. Cursed *be* he that smiteth his neighbor secretly. And all the people shall say, Amen.

25. Cursed *be* he that taketh reward to slay an innocent person. And all the people shall say, Amen.

26. Cursed *be* he that confirmeth not *all* the words of this law to do them. And all the people shall say, Amen.

XXVIII., 1. And it shall come to pass, if thou shalt hearken diligently unto the voice of the LORD thy God, to observe *and* to do all his commandments which I command thee this day, that the LORD thy God will set thee on high above all nations of the earth:
2. And all these blessings shall come on thee, and overtake thee, if thou shalt hearken unto the voice of the LORD thy God.

3. Blessed *shalt* thou *be* in the city, and blessed *shalt* thou *be* in the field.

4. Blessed *shall be* the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy ground, and the fruit of thy cattle, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep.

5. Blessed *shall be* thy basket and thy store.

6. Blessed *shalt* thou *be* when thou comest in, and blessed *shalt* thou *be* when thou goest out.

7. The LORD shall cause thine enemies that rise up against thee to be smitten before thy face: they shall come out against thee one

way, and flee before thee seven ways. 8. The LORD shall command the blessing upon thee in thy store-houses, and in all that thou settest thine hand unto; and he shall bless thee in the land which the LORD thy God giveth thee. 9. The LORD shall establish thee an holy people unto himself, as he hath sworn unto thee, if thou shalt keep the commandments of the LORD thy God, and walk in his ways. 10. And all people of the earth shall see that thou art called by the name of the LORD; and they shall be afraid of thee. 11. And the LORD shall make thee plenteous in goods, in the fruit of thy body, and in the fruit of thy cattle, and in the fruit of thy ground, in the land which the LORD sware unto thy fathers to give thee. 12. The LORD shall open unto thee his good treasure, the heaven to give thee rain unto thy land in his season, and to bless all the work of thine hand: and thou shalt lend unto many nations, and thou shalt not borrow. 13. And the LORD shall make thee the head, and not the tail; and thou shalt be above only, and thou shalt not be beneath; if that thou hearken unto the commandments of the LORD thy God, which I command thee this day, to observe and to do *them*: 14. And thou shalt not go aside from any of the words which I command thee this day, *to the right hand or to the left*, to go after other gods to serve them.

15. But it shall come to pass, if thou wilt not hearken unto the voice of the LORD thy God, to observe to do all his commandments and his statutes which I command thee this day; that all these curses shall come upon thee, and overtake thee:

16. Cursed *shalt thou be* in the city, and cursed *shalt thou be* in the field.

17. Cursed *shall be* thy basket and thy store.

18. Cursed *shall be* the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy land, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep.

19. Cursed *shalt thou be* when thou comest in, and cursed *shalt thou be* when thou goest out.

20. The LORD shall send upon thee cursing, vexation, and rebuke, in all that thou settest thine hand unto for to do, until thou be destroyed, and until thou perish quickly; because of the wickedness of thy doings, whereby thou hast forsaken me. 21. The LORD shall make the pestilence cleave unto thee, until he have consumed thee from off the land, whither thou goest to possess it. 22. The LORD shall smite thee with a consumption, and with a fever, and with an inflammation, and with an extreme burning, and with the sword, and with blasting, and with mildew; and they shall pursue thee until thou perish. 23. And thy heaven that *is* over thy head shall be brass, and the earth that *is* under thee *shall be* iron. 24.

The LORD shall make the rain of thy land powder and dust : from heaven shall it come down upon thee, until thou be destroyed. 25. The LORD shall cause thee to be smitten before thine enemies : thou shalt go out one way against them, and flee seven ways before them ; and shalt be removed into all the kingdoms of the earth. 26. And thy carcass shall be meat unto all fowls of the air, and unto the beasts of the earth, and no man shall fray *them* away. 27. The LORD will smite thee with the botch of Egypt, and with the emerods, and with the scab, and with the itch, whereof thou canst not be healed. 28. The LORD shall smite thee with madness, and blindness, and astonishment of heart : 29. And thou shalt grope at noonday, as the blind gropeth in darkness, and thou shalt not prosper in thy ways : and thou shalt be only oppressed and spoiled evermore, and no man shall save *thee*. 30. Thou shalt betroth a wife, and another man shall lie with her : thou shalt build an house, and thou shalt not dwell therein : thou shalt plant a vineyard, and shalt not gather the grapes thereof. 31. Thine ox *shall be* slain before thine eyes, and thou shalt not eat thereof : thine ass *shall be* violently taken away from before thy face, and shall not be restored to thee : thy sheep *shall be* given unto thine enemies, and thou shalt have none to rescue *them*. 32. Thy sons and thy daughters *shall be* given unto another people, and thine eyes shall look, and fail *with longing* for them all the day long : and *there shall be* no might in thine hand. 33. The fruit of thy land, and all thy labors, shall a nation which thou knowest not eat up ; and thou shalt be only oppressed and crushed alway : 34. So that thou shalt be mad for the sight of thine eyes which thou shalt see. 35. The LORD shall smite thee in the knees, and in the legs, with a sore botch that cannot be healed, from the sole of thy foot unto the top of thy head. 36. The LORD shall bring thee, and thy king which thou shalt set over thee, unto a nation which neither thou nor thy fathers have known ; and there shalt thou serve other gods, wood and stone. 37. And thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb and a by-word, among all nations whither the LORD shall lead thee. 38. Thou shalt carry much seed out into the field, and shalt gather *but* little in ; for the locust shall consume it. 39. Thou shalt plant vineyards and dress *them*, but shalt neither drink *of* the wine, nor gather *the grapes* ; for the worms shall eat them. 40. Thou shalt have olive-trees throughout all thy coasts, but thou shalt not anoint *thyself* with the oil ; for thine olive shall cast *his fruit*. 41. Thou shalt beget sons and daughters, but thou shalt not enjoy them ; for they shall go into captivity. 42. All thy trees and fruit of thy land shall the locust consume. 43. The stranger that *is* within

thee shall get up above thee very high ; and thou shalt come down very low. 44. He shall lend to thee, and thou shalt not lend to him : he shall be the head, and thou shalt be the tail. 45. Moreover, all these curses shall come upon thee, and shall pursue thee, and overtake thee, till thou be destroyed ; because thou hearken-
edst not unto the voice of the LORD thy God, to keep his commandments and his statutes which he commanded thee: 46. And they shall be upon thee for a sign and for a wonder, and upon thy seed forever. 47. Because thou servedst not the LORD thy God with joyfulness and with gladness of heart, for the abundance of all *things* ; 48. Therefore shalt thou serve thine enemies which the LORD shall send against thee, in hunger, and in thirst, and in nakedness, and in want of all *things*: and he shall put a yoke of iron upon thy neck, until he have destroyed thee. 49. The LORD shall bring a nation against thee from far, from the end of the earth, *as swift* as the eagle flieth; a nation whose tongue thou shalt not understand ; 50. A nation of fierce countenance, which shall not regard the person of the old, nor show favor to the young: 51. And he shall eat the fruit of thy cattle, and the fruit of thy land, until thou be destroyed : which *also* shall not leave thee *either* corn, wine, or oil, *or* the increase of thy kine, or flocks of thy sheep, until he have destroyed thee. 52. And he shall besiege thee in all thy gates, until thy high and fenced walls come down, wherein thou trustedst, throughout all thy land : and he shall besiege thee in all thy gates throughout all thy land, which the LORD thy God hath given thee. 53. And thou shalt eat the fruit of thine own body, the flesh of thy sons and of thy daughters, which the LORD thy God hath given thee, in the siege, and in the straitness, wherewith thine enemies shall distress thee: 54. *So that* the man *that is* tender among you, and very delicate, his eye shall be evil toward his brother, and toward the wife of his bosom, and toward the remnant of his children which he shall leave : 55. *So that* he will not give to any of them of the flesh of his children whom he shall eat : because he hath nothing left him in the siege, and in the straitness, wherewith thine enemies shall distress thee in all thy gates. 56. The tender and delicate woman among you, which would not adventure to set the sole of her foot upon the ground for delicateness and tenderness, her eye shall be evil toward the husband of her bosom, and toward her son, and toward her daughter, 57. And toward her young one that cometh out from between her feet, and toward her children which she shall bear : for she shall eat them for want of all *things* secretly in the siege and straitness, wherewith
no enemy shall distress thee in thy gates. 58. If thou wilt not.

observe to do all the words of this law that are written in this book, that thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name, THE LORD THY GOD; 59. Then the LORD will make thy plagues wonderful, and the plagues of thy seed, *even* great plagues, and of long continuance, and sore sicknesses, and of long continuance. 60. Moreover he will bring upon thee all the diseases of Egypt, which thou wast afraid of; and they shall cleave unto thee. 61. Also every sickness and every plague which *is* not written in the book of this law, them will the LORD bring upon thee, until thou be destroyed. 62. And ye shall be left few in number, whereas ye were as the stars of heaven for multitude; because thou wouldest not obey the voice of the LORD thy God. 63. And it shall come to pass, *that* as the LORD rejoiced over you to do you good, and to multiply you; so the LORD will rejoice over you to destroy you, and to bring you to nought; and ye shall be plucked from off the land whither thou goest to possess it. 64. And the LORD shall scatter thee among all people, from the one end of the earth even unto the other; and there thou shalt serve other gods, which neither thou nor thy fathers have known. *even* wood and stone. 65. And among these nations shalt thou find no ease, neither shall the sole of thy foot have rest: but the LORD shall give thee there a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind. 66. And thy life shall hang in doubt before thee: and thou shalt fear day and night, and shalt have none assurance of thy life: 67. In the morning thou shalt say, Would God it were even! and at even thou shalt say, Would God it were morning! for the fear of thine heart wherewith thou shalt fear, and for the sight of thine eyes which thou shalt see. 68. And the LORD shall bring thee into Egypt again with ships, by the way whereof I spake unto thee, Thou shalt see it no more again: and there ye shall be sold unto your enemies for bondmen and bondwomen, and no man shall buy *you*.

XXX., 1. And it shall come to pass, when all these things are come upon thee, the blessing and the curse, which I have set before thee, and thou shalt call *them* to mind among all the nations whither the LORD thy God hath driven thee, 2. And shalt return unto the LORD thy God, and shalt obey his voice according to all that I command thee this day, thou and thy children, with all thine heart, and with all thy soul: 3. That then the LORD thy God will turn thy captivity, and have compassion upon thee, and will return and gather thee from all the nations whither the LORD thy God hath scattered thee. 4. If *any* of thine be driven out unto the outmost *parts* of heaven, from thence will the LORD thy God gather thee, and from thence will he fetch thee: 5. And the LORD thy

God will bring thee into the land which thy fathers possessed, and thou shalt possess it ; and he will do thee good, and multiply thee above thy fathers. 6. And the LORD thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the LORD thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live. 7. And the LORD thy God will put all these curses upon thine enemies, and on them that hate thee, which persecuted thee. 8. And thou shalt return and obey the voice of the LORD, and do all his commandments which I command thee this day. 9. And the LORD thy God will make thee plenteous in every work of thine hand, in the fruit of thy body, and in the fruit of thy cattle, and in the fruit of thy land, for good : for the LORD will again rejoice over thee for good, as he rejoiced over thy fathers : 10. If thou shalt hearken unto the voice of the LORD thy God, to keep his commandments and his statutes which are written in this book of the law, *and* if thou turn unto the LORD thy God with all thine heart and with all thy soul.

11. For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither *is* it far off. 12. It *is* not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? 13. Neither *is* it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? 14. But the word *is* very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it.

15. See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil ; 16. In that I command thee this day to love the LORD thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments and his statutes and his judgments, that thou mayest live and multiply : and the LORD thy God shall bless thee in the land whither thou goest to possess it. 17. But if thine heart turn away, so that thou wilt not hear, but shalt be drawn away, and worship other gods, and serve them ; 18. I denounce unto you this day, that ye shall surely perish, *and that* ye shall not prolong *your* days upon the land, whither thou passest over Jordan to go to possess it. 19. I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, *that* I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing : therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live : 20. That thou mayest love the LORD thy God, *and* that thou mayest obey his voice, and that thou mayest cleave unto him : for he *is* thy life, and the length of thy days : that thou mayest dwell in the land which the LORD sware unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them.

XXXI., 9. And Moses wrote this law, and delivered it unto the priests the sons of Levi, which bare the ark of the covenant of the LORD, and unto all the elders of Israel. 10. And Moses commanded them, saying, At the end of *every* seven years, in the solemnity of the year of release, in the feast of tabernacles, 11. When all Israel is come to appear before the LORD thy God in the place which he shall choose, thou shalt read this law before all Israel in their hearing. 12. Gather the people together, men, and women, and children, and thy stranger that *is* within thy gates, that they may hear, and that they may learn, and fear the LORD your God, and observe to do all the words of this law: 13. And *that* their children, which have not known *anything*, may hear, and learn to fear the LORD your God, as long as ye live in the land whither ye go over Jordan to possess it.

XXXII., 4. *He* is the Rock, his work *is* perfect: for all his ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he.

XXXIII., 26. *There* is none like unto the God of Jeshurun, *who* rideth upon the heaven in thy help, and in his excellency on the sky. 27. The eternal God *is* thy refuge, and underneath *are* the everlasting arms: and he shall thrust out the enemy from before thee; and shall say, Destroy *them*. 28. Israel then shall dwell in safety alone: the fountain of Jacob *shall be* upon a land of corn and wine; also his heavens shall drop down dew. 29. Happy *art* thou, O Israel: *who is* like unto thee, O people saved by the LORD, the shield of thy help, and *who is* the sword of thy excellency! and thine enemies shall be found liars unto thee; and thou shalt tread upon their high places.

§ 859.—Judaism insists only on outward conformity, and takes no note whatever of MORAL INFORMEDNESS OF INTENT in observance, in which latter point alone Christianity afterward placed the very spirit and genius of morality. (page 165, line 24.) See §§ 858, 805.

§ 860.—Every sequent arising from fulfilling or transgressing the edicts of the Pentateuch is limited to this life. (page 166, line 3.) [*Sequacity*: a disposition to follow, or logical consistency.] [Omit all but the first eleven lines.] Cf. § 858.

§ 861.—Mosaic economy rather excluded the rest of mankind from its communion. (page 168, line 1.) [Omit the last half of the section.] Cf. § 858.

§ 862.—Only one unseen God, of whom no sensible likeness was to be made. (page 168, line 8.) Cf. Xen. Mem. IV., iii., 13; I., iv., 17; Cicero *de Natura Deorum*, Book II., cap. ii.; Lao Tse, ch. 25 (Max Mueller's fourth lecture on the science of religion, ed. Scrib-

ner, Armstrong & Co., New York, 1872, page 114); Aristotle *de Mundo* 5 (in Ramage, *Beautiful Thoughts from Greek Authors*, second ed., 1873, page 102); Plato *Theaet.* 85, ed. Bohn, vol. i., page 411 (in Ramage, page 378); Rig-Veda (X., cxxi., 8: "He who alone is God above all gods."—Mueller's *Chips*, vol. i., page 29, ed. Scribner, 1874, and also in Bunsen's *God in History*, vol. i.); Zoroaster, Avesta (§ 881 below); Yagna, lxix., 2, 3 (Bleek, vol. ii., page 137); Yagna, xliii., 7 (Bleek, ii., 104); Yagna, xxviii., 11 (Bleek, ii., 82); Khordah-Avesta, xvii., 37 (Bleek, vol. iii., 24); Khordah-Avesta, xiv., (Bleek, iii., 14, 15.)

§ 863.—General church history must consequently commence with the origin of Christianity, which, as an entire abandonment of that Judaism whence it sprang, was grounded on a quite new principle, and effected a thorough revolution in points of faith. (page 168, line 26.) Cf. § 859, above.

§ 864.—Suddenly burst forth the new Christian faith. Jesus taught that a moral faith alone, which proved its reality by good deportment, could sanctify and save. (page 169, line 17.) Cf. §§ 236, 723, 908.

§ 865.—Although his moral, soul-amending tenets can dispense with all such adminicles of their truth, still the sacred volume has accompanied and interwoven them with miracles and mysteries. (page 170, line 5.) Cf. § 778. [*Nuncupative*: oral.—See Webster.] [The section may begin with the word *although*, omitting what precedes.] [JUST people of the ordinary run: The earliest testimony I have seen is contained in a quotation by EUSEBIUS (book iv., ch. 17) from the *Apology* of JUSTIN MARTYR, (born probably between A. D. 89 and 118, and killed at Rome 165) addressed to the emperor ANTONINUS PIUS (reigned 138–161,) ed. Bohn, page 140.]

§ 866.—Root of multiform turmoil flourishes in the soil of despotically commanding church faith. (page 173, line 1.) [Omit the last six lines.]

§ 867.—Principle of an equitable reserve in speaking of all matters that concern revelation. (page 174, line 25.)

§ 868.—Every interpretation of the Scripture must be entirely moral. (page 175, line 23.) Cf. § 724.

§ 869.—Government bound not to oppose ethical principles by test acts or any other legislation. (page 176, line 10.) Cf. § 795.

§ 870.—BEHOLD, THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU. (page 178, line 8.) [*Again*, etc.: page 179 may be omitted.] [*Finally dashed*.—Webster, quotes Psalm ii., 9, to show the meaning of dash.] *God becomes all in all*: Cf. I. Corinthians, xii., 6; xv., 28; Ephesians, i., 23; John Scotus Erigena (Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. i., pp. 359, 361, 362); Proclus (Ueberweg, vol. i., pp. 257, 258). § 2920.

§ 871.—Kingdom of God on earth not a MESSIANIC but a MORAL kingdom. (page 181, line 3.) [*The Hindus*: The rest of the section may be omitted.] [*Has perished*: i. e. the creed of such of them as are supposed to be Gypsies. The American Cyclopaedia says that “Buettner, Ruediger, Bacmeister, Pallas, and Grellmann, consider them to have come from India, whence they were driven by the ravages of Tamerlane (1398), and where they belonged to the Soodra caste, or to the Pariahs.” Also that “Vigne holds that modern Gypsies are descendants of Cashmere Hindoos, who fled from persecution toward the end of the fourteenth century. Arab Shah, who lived at Samarkand in 1422, says (in his life of Timour) that the Gypsies were probably descendants of Buddhists, who emigrated about 300 B. C., when persecuted by Nara.”—Article “Gypsies,” ed. 1874, vol. viii., page 356. (The objection to the latter supposition is that the Buddhists have taken with them their sacred writings into other countries.) See § 949.] [*Religion of Zoroaster*: see § 881.] [*Christianity*: see §§ 906–911.] [*Mohammedanism*: see § 963] [*Judaical belief*: see § 858.] *Chinese creed*: cf. the following extracts from the Great Learning.†

1. What the Great Learning teaches, is—to illustrate illustrious virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence. 2. The point where to rest being known, the object of pursuit is then determined; and, that being determined, a calm unperturbedness may be attained. To that calmness there will succeed a tranquil repose. In that repose there may be careful deliberation, and that deliberation will be followed by the attainment of the desired end. 3. Things have their root and their completion. Affairs have their end and their beginning. To know what is first

† “The Life and Teachings of Confucius, with explanatory notes, by James Legge, D. D.” London, Trubner & Co., 1869. I omit the valuable notes appended by Choo He and by Dr. Legge, which the reader will easily find, the work being readily accessible. I have added many references to the paging, which will facilitate search, and have noted at least some of the verses and chapters omitted (retaining the numbers of omitted portions); though it seems scarcely possible that the reader can be seriously annoyed by any want in this respect, inasmuch as the numbering of the extracts here presented will probably be a sufficient clue and guide.

“Though we cannot positively assign the authorship of The Great Learning,” says Dr. Legge (Preliminary Essays, page 27), “there can be no hesitation in receiving it as a genuine monument of the Confucian school. There are not many words in it from the sage himself; but it is a faithful reflection of his teachings, written by some of his followers, not far removed from him by lapse of time. It must synchronize pretty nearly with the Analects, and may be safely referred to the fourth century before our era.” And again (page 27), “An ancient tradition attributes it to K’ung Keih, the grandson of Confucius.”

and what is last will lead near to what is taught in *the Great Learning*. [pages 264, 265.]

4. The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire, first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. 5. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their States were rightly governed. Their States being rightly governed, the whole empire was made tranquil and happy. [page 266.]

6. From the emperor down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of *everything besides*. 7. It cannot be, when the root is neglected, that what should spring from it will be well ordered. It never has been the case that what was of great importance has been slightly cared for, and, at the same time, that what was of slight importance has been greatly cared for. [Chapter I. of the commentary which immediately follows the above seven paragraphs of text, I here omit, and also other portions, retaining in some instances merely the numbers of omitted sections (hereinafter marked*).]

CHAPTER II. 1. On the bathing-tub of T'ang, the following words were engraved:—"If you can one day renovate yourself, do so from day to day. Yea, let there be daily renovation." 4. Therefore the superior man in everything uses his utmost endeavors. [ch. iii,* iv*, I omit.]

V. 1. This is called knowing the root. 2. This is called the perfecting of knowledge.†

† The above fifth chapter of commentary explained the meaning of "investigating things and carrying knowledge to the utmost extent," but it is now lost. I have ventured to take the views of the scholar Ch'ing to supply it, as follows:—The meaning of the expression, "*The perfecting of knowledge depends on the investigation of things*," is this:—If we wish to carry our knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the principles of all things we come into contact with, FOR THE INTELLIGENT MIND OF MAN IS CERTAINLY FORMED TO KNOW, AND THERE IS NOT A SINGLE THING IN WHICH ITS PRINCIPLES DO NOT INHERE. But so long as all principles are not investigated, man's

VI. 1. What is meant by “making the thoughts sincere,” is the allowing no self-deception, as *when* we hate a bad smell, and as *when* we love what is beautiful. This is called self-enjoyment. Therefore, the superior man must be watchful over himself when he is alone.

2. There is no evil to which the mean man, dwelling retired, will not proceed; but when he sees a superior man, he instantly tries to disguise himself, concealing his evil, and displaying what is good. The other beholds him, as if he saw his heart and reins;—of what use *is his disguise?* This is an instance of the saying—“What truly is within will be manifested without.” Therefore, the superior man must be watchful over himself when he is alone.

4. Riches adorn a house, and virtue adorns the person. The mind is expanded, and the body is at ease. Therefore, the superior man must make his thoughts sincere. [page 272.]

VII. 1. What is meant by “The cultivation of the person depends on rectifying the mind,” *may be thus illustrated*:—If a man be under the influence of passion, he will be incorrect in his conduct. He will be the same, if he is under the influence of terror, or under the influence of fond regard, or under that of sorrow and distress. 2. When the mind is not present, we look and do not see; we hear and do not understand; we eat and do not know the taste of what we eat. 3. This is what is meant by saying that the cultivation of the person depends on the rectifying of the mind.

VIII. 1. What is meant by “The regulation of one’s family depends on the cultivation of his person,” is this:—Men are partial where they feel affection and love; partial where they despise and dislike; partial where they stand in awe and reverence; partial where they feel sorrow and compassion; partial where they are arrogant and rude. Thus it is that there are few men in the world who love, and at the same time know the bad qualities of *the object of their love*, or who hate, and yet know the excellences of *the object of their hatred*. 2. Hence it is said, in the common adage, “A man does not know the wickedness of his son; he does not know

knowledge is incomplete. On this account, the Learning for Adults, at the outset of its lessons, instructs the learner, IN REGARD TO ALL THINGS IN THE WORLD, TO PROCEED FROM WHAT KNOWLEDGE HE HAS OF THEIR PRINCIPLES, AND PURSUE HIS INVESTIGATION of them, till he reaches the extreme point. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he will suddenly find himself possessed of a wide and far-reaching penetration. Then, the qualities of all things, whether external or internal, the subtle or the coarse, will all be apprehended; and the mind, in its entire substance and its relations to things, will be perfectly intelligent. This is called the investigation of things. This is called the perfection of knowledge.—*Choo He’s note.* [page 271.] Cf. § 1419.

the richness of his growing corn." 3. This is what is meant by saying that if the person be not cultivated, a man cannot regulate his family. [page 273.]

IX. 1. What is meant by "In order rightly to govern his State, it is necessary first to regulate his family," is this:—It is not possible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the ruler, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the State. There is filial piety:—therewith the sovereign should be served. There is fraternal submission:—therewith elders and superiors should be served. There is kindness:—therewith the multitude should be treated. [2.*] 3. From the loving *example* of one family, a whole State becomes loving, and from its courtesies, the whole State becomes courteous; while, from the ambition and perverseness of the one man, the whole State may be led to rebellious disorder;—such is the nature of the influence. This verifies the saying, "Affairs may be ruined by a single sentence; a kingdom may be settled by its one man." 4. Yaou and Shun led on the empire with benevolence, and the people followed them. Kee and Chow led on the empire with violence, and the people followed them. The orders which these issued were contrary to the practices which they loved, and so the people did not follow them. On this account, the ruler must himself be possessed of the *good* qualities, and then he may require them in the people. He must not have the *bad* qualities in himself, and then he may require that they shall not be in the people. Never has there been a man, who, not having reference to his own character and wishes in dealing with others, was able effectually to instruct them. 5. Thus we see how the government of the State depends on the regulation of the family. [6,* 7,* 8,* 9.*]

X. 1. What is meant by "The making the whole empire peaceful and happy depends on the government of his State," is this:—When the sovereign behaves to his aged, as the aged should be behaved to, the people become filial; when the sovereign behaves to his elders, as elders should be behaved to, the people learn brotherly submission; when the sovereign treats compassionately the young and helpless, the people do the same. Thus the ruler has a principle with which, as with a measuring square, he may regulate his conduct. [pages 275, 276.]

2. What a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not display in the treatment of his inferiors; what he dislikes in inferiors, let him not display in the service of his superiors; what he hates in those who are before him, let him not therewith precede those who are behind him; what he hates in those who are behind him,

let him not therewith follow those who are before him; what he hates to receive on the right, let him not bestow on the left; what he hates to receive on the left, let him not bestow on the right:—this is what is called “The principle, with which, as with a measuring square, to regulate one’s conduct.” [page 277.]

3. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, “How much to be rejoiced in are these princes, the parents of the people!” When a *prince* loves what the people love, and hates what the people hate, then is he what is called the parent of the people. [page 277.]

4. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, “Lofty is that southern hill, with its rugged masses of rocks! Full of majesty are you, O *grand-teacher* Yin, the people all look up to you.” Rulers of kingdoms may not neglect to be careful. If they deviate to a *mean selfishness*, they will be a disgrace in the empire. [page 277.]

5. In the Book of Poetry, it is said, “Before the sovereigns of the Yin *dynasty* had lost the *hearts of the* people, they were the mates of God. Take warning from *the house of* Yin. The great decree is not easily *preserved*.” This shows that, by gaining the people, the kingdom is gained, and, by losing the people, the kingdom is lost.

6. On this account, the ruler will first take pains about *his own* virtue. Possessing virtue will give him the people. Possessing the people will give him the territory. Possessing the territory will give him its wealth. Possessing the wealth, he will have resources for expenditure.

7. Virtue is the root; wealth is the result. 8. If he make the root his secondary object, and the result his primary, he will *only* wrangle with his people, and teach them rapine. 9. Hence, the accumulation of wealth is the way to scatter the people; and the letting it be scattered among them is the way to collect the people. 10. And hence, the ruler’s words going forth contrary to right, will come back to him in the same way; and wealth, gotten by improper ways, will take its departure by the same. [page 278.]

11. In the Announcement to K’ang, it is said, “The decree indeed may not always rest on *us*;” that is, goodness obtains the decree, and the want of goodness loses it.

12. In the Book of Ts’oo, it is said, “The kingdom of Ts’oo does not consider that to be valuable. It values, *instead*, its good men.”

13. Duke Wan’s uncle, Fan, said, “Our fugitive does not account that to be precious. What he considers precious, is the affection due to his parent. [page 278.]

14. In the Declaration of the duke of Ts’in, it is said, “Let me have but one minister, plain and sincere, not *pretending to other* abilities, but with a simple, upright mind; and possessed of gener-

osity, regarding the talents of others as though he himself possessed them, and, where he finds accomplished and perspicacious men, loving them in his heart more than his mouth expresses, and really showing himself able to bear *and employ them*:—such a minister will be able to preserve my sons and grandsons, and black-haired people, and benefits likewise to the kingdom may well be looked for from him. But *if it be his character*, when he finds men of ability, to be jealous and hate them; and, when he finds accomplished and perspicacious men, to oppose them and not allow their advancement, showing himself really not able to bear them:—such a minister will not be able to protect my sons and grandsons, and black-haired people; and may he not also be pronounced dangerous to the State?" [pages 278, 279.]

15. It is only the truly virtuous man who can send away such a man and banish him, driving him out among the barbarous tribes around, determined not to dwell along with him in the Middle kingdom. This is in accordance with the saying, "It is only the truly virtuous man who can love or who can hate others." 16. To see men of worth and not be able to raise them to office; to raise them to office, but not to do so quickly:—this is disrespectful. To see bad men and not be able to remove them; to remove them, but not to do so to a distance:—this is weakness. 17. To love those whom men hate, and to hate those whom men love; this is to outrage the natural feeling of men. Calamities cannot fail to come down on him who does so. [page 279.]

18. Thus we see that the sovereign has a great course to pursue. He must show entire self-devotion and sincerity to attain it, and by pride and extravagance he will fail of it.

19. There is a great course also for the production of wealth. Let the producers be many and the consumers few. Let there be activity in the production, and economy in the expenditure. Then the wealth will always be sufficient. 20. The virtuous ruler, by means of his wealth, makes himself more distinguished. The vicious ruler accumulates wealth, at the expense of his life. [page 280.]

21. Never has there been a case of the sovereign loving benevolence, and the people not loving righteousness. Never has there been a case where the people have loved righteousness, and the affairs of the sovereign have not been carried to completion. And never has there been a case where the wealth in such a State, collected in the treasuries and arsenals, did not continue in the sovereign's possession.

22. The officer Mang Heen said, "He who keeps horses and a carriage does not look after fowls and pigs. The family which

keeps its stores of ice does not rear cattle or sheep. So, the house which possesses a hundred chariots should not keep a minister to look out for imposts that he may lay them on the people. Than to have such a minister, it were better for that house to have one who should rob it of *its revenues*." This is in accordance with the saying:—"In a State, *pecuniary* gain is not to be considered to be prosperity, but its prosperity *will* be found in righteousness."

23. When he who presides over a State or a family makes his revenues his chief business, he must be under the influence of some small, mean man. He may consider this man to be good; but when such a person is employed in the administration of a State or family, calamities *from Heaven*, and injuries *from men*, will befall it together; and, though a good man may take his place, he will not be able to remedy the evil. This illustrates *again* the saying, "In a State, gain is not to be considered prosperity, but its prosperity will be found in righteousness." [page 281.]

EXTRACTS FROM THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN.

CHAPTER I. 1. What Heaven has conferred is called THE NATURE; an accordance with this nature is called THE PATH *of duty*; the regulation of this path is called INSTRUCTION. [page 283.]

2. The path may not be left for an instant. If it could be left, it would not be the path. On this account, the superior man does not wait till he sees things, to be cautious, nor till he hears things, to be apprehensive. [page 283.]

3. There is nothing more visible than what is secret, and nothing more manifest than what is minute. Therefore, the superior man is watchful over himself, when he is alone. [page 283.]

4. While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of EQUILIBRIUM. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of HARMONY. This EQUILIBRIUM is the great root *from which grow all the human actings* in the world, and this HARMONY is the universal path *which they all should pursue*. [Cf. § 446. (page 38 above).]

5. Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish. [ii,* iii,* iv,* v,* vi,* vii,* viii,* ix,* (chapters which I here omit).]

X. 1. Tsze-loo asked about forcefulness. [page 287.]

2. The Master said, "Do you mean the forcefulness of the South, the forcefulness of the North, or the forcefulness which you should cultivate yourself? 3. To show forbearance and gentleness in teaching others; and not to revenge unreasonable conduct:—this

is the forcefulness of Southern regions, and the good man makes it his study. 4. To lie under arms; and meet death without regret:—this is the forcefulness of Northern regions, and the forceful make it their study. 5. Therefore, the superior man cultivates *a friendly harmony*, without being weak. How firm is he in his forcefulness! He stands erect in the middle, without inclining to either side.—How firm is he in his forcefulness! When good principles prevail in the government of his country, he does not change from what he was in retirement.—How firm is he in his forcefulness! When bad principles prevail in the country, he maintains his course to death without changing.—How firm is he in his forcefulness!”

XI. 1. The Master said, “To live in obscurity, and yet practice wonders, in order to be mentioned with honor in future ages;—this is what I do not do. 3. The superior man accords with the course of the Mean. Though he may be all unknown, unregarded by the world, he feels no regret. It is only the sage who is able for this.” [page 288.]

XII. 1. The way which the superior man pursues, reaches wide and far, and yet is secret. 2. Common men and women, however ignorant, may intermeddle with the knowledge of it; yet in its utmost reaches, there is that which even the sage does not know. Common men and women, however much below the ordinary standard of character, can carry it into practice; yet in its utmost reaches, there is that which even the sage is not able to carry into practice. Great as heaven and earth are, men still find some things in them with which to be dissatisfied. Thus it is, that were the superior man to speak of his way in all its greatness, nothing in the world would be found able to embrace it; and were he to speak of it in its minuteness, nothing in the world would be found able to split it. [page 289.]

3. It is said in the Book of Poetry. “The hawk flies up to heaven; the fishes leap in the deep.” This expresses how this *way* is seen above and below. 4. The way of the superior man may be found, in its simple elements, in the intercourse of common men and women; but in its utmost reaches, it shines brightly through heaven and earth. [page 289.]

XIII. 1. The Master said, “The path is not far from man. When men try to pursue a course which is far from the common indications of consciousness, this course cannot be considered THE PATH. [2.*] 3. When one cultivates to the utmost the principles of his nature, and exercises them on the principle of reciprocity, he is not far from the path. What you do not like, when done to yourself, do not do to others. [page 290.]

4. "In the way of the superior man there are four things, to not one of which have I as yet attained.—To serve my father as I would require my son to serve me: to this I have not attained; to serve my prince as I would require my minister to serve me: to this I have not attained; to serve my elder brother as I would require my younger brother to serve me: to this I have not attained; to set the example in behaving to a friend as I would require him to behave to me: to this I have not attained. Earnest in practicing the ordinary virtues, and careful in speaking about them, if, in his practice, he has anything defective, the superior man dares not but exert himself; and if, in his words, he has any excess, he dares not allow himself such license. Thus his words have respect to his actions, and his actions have respect to his words; is it not just an entire sincerity which marks the superior man?"

XIV. 1. The superior man does what is proper to the station in which he is: he does not desire to go beyond this. 2. In a position of wealth and honor, he does what is proper to a position of wealth and honor. In a poor and low position, he does what is proper to a poor and low position. Situated among barbarous tribes, he does what is proper to a situation among barbarous tribes. In a position of sorrow and difficulty, he does what is proper to a position of sorrow and difficulty. The superior man can find himself in no situation in which he is not himself. 3. In a high situation, he does not treat with contempt his inferiors. In a low situation, he does not court the favor of his superiors. He rectifies himself, and seeks for nothing from others, so that he has no dissatisfactions. He does not murmur against heaven, nor grumble against men. 4. Thus it is that the superior man is quiet and calm, waiting for the appointments of *Heaven*, while the mean man walks in dangerous paths, looking for lucky occurrences. [page 291.]

5. The Master said, "In archery we have something like the way of the superior man. When the archer misses the center of the target, he turns round and seeks for the cause of his failure in himself." [page 291.]

XV. 1. The way of the superior man may be compared to what takes place in traveling, when to go to a distance we must first traverse the space that is near, and in ascending a height, when we must begin from the lower ground. [pages 291, 292.]

2. It is said in the Book of Poetry, "Happy union with wife and children is like the music of lutes and harps. When there is concord among brethren, the harmony is delightful and enduring. Thus may you regulate your family, and enjoy the pleasure of your wife and children." 3. The Master said, "In such a state of things, parents have entire complacency!" [page 292.]

XVI. 1. The Master said, "How abundantly do spiritual beings display the powers that belong to them! 2. We look for them, but do not see them; we listen to, but do not hear them; yet they enter into all things, and there is nothing without them." [3,* 4,* 5.*]

XVII. 1. The Master said, "How greatly filial was Shun! His virtue was that of a sage; his dignity was the imperial throne; his riches were all within the four seas. He offered his sacrifices in his ancestral temple, and his descendants preserved the sacrifices to himself. 2. Therefore, having such great virtue, it could not but be that he should obtain the throne, that he should obtain those riches, that he should obtain his fame, that he should attain to his long life. 3. Thus it is that Heaven, in the production of things, is surely bountiful to them, according to their qualities. Hence the tree that is flourishing, it nourishes, while that which is ready to fall, it overthrows. [page 294.] [Cf. Matthew xxv., 29 (§ 906).]

4. "In the Book of Poetry, it is said, 'The admirable, amiable, prince, Displayed conspicuously his excelling virtue, Adjusting his people, and Adjusting his officers. Therefore, he received from Heaven the emoluments of dignity. It protected him, assisted him, decreed him the throne; Sending from heaven these favors, as it were repeatedly.' 5. We may say therefore that he who is greatly virtuous will be sure to receive the appointment of Heaven." [pages 294, 295.] [xviii,* xix.*]

XX. 1. The Duke Gae asked about government. [page 298.]

2. The Master said, "The government of Wan and Woo is displayed in the *records*,—the tablets of wood and bamboo. Let there be the men, and the government will flourish; but without the men, the government decays and ceases. 3. With the *right* men the growth of government is rapid, just as vegetation is rapid in the earth; and moreover *their* government *might be called* an easily-growing rush. 4. Therefore the administration of government lies in *getting proper* men. Such men are to be got by means of the *ruler's own* character. That character is to be cultivated by his treading in the ways of *duty*. And the treading those ways of duty is to be cultivated by the cherishing of benevolence. 5. Benevolence is *the characteristic element* of humanity, and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives. Righteousness is *the accordance of actions with what is right*, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the steps in the honor due to the worthy, are produced by *the principle of propriety*. 6. When those in inferior situations do not possess the confidence of their superiors, they cannot retain the government of the people. 7. Hence the sovereign may

not neglect the cultivation of his own character. Wishing to cultivate his character, he may not neglect to serve his parents. In order to serve his parents, he may not neglect to acquire a knowledge of men. In order to know men, he may not dispense with a knowledge of Heaven. [pages 298, 299.]

8. "The duties of universal obligation are five, and the virtues wherewith they are practiced are three. The duties are those between sovereign and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those belonging to the intercourse of friends. Those five are the duties of universal obligation. Knowledge, magnanimity, and energy, these three, are the virtues universally binding. And the means by which they carry *the duties* into practice is singleness.† 9. Some are born with the knowledge of *those duties*; some know them by study; and some acquire the knowledge after a painful feeling of their ignorance. But the knowledge being possessed, it comes to the same thing. Some practice them with a natural ease; some from a desire for their advantages; and some by strenuous effort, but the achievement being made, it comes to the same thing."

10. The Master said. "To be fond of learning is to be near to knowledge. To practice with vigor is to be near to magnanimity. To possess the feeling of shame is to be near to energy. 11. He who knows these three things knows how to cultivate his own character; knowing how to cultivate his own character, he knows how to govern other men. Knowing how to govern other men, he knows how to govern the empire with all its States and families.

12. "All who have the government of the empire with its States and families have nine standard rules to follow;—viz.: the cultiva-

† "The duties of universal obligation" is, literally, "the paths proper to be trodden by all under heaven" = the path of the Mean. Of the three virtues, the first is the *knowledge* necessary to choose the detailed course of duty; the second is "benevolence," "the unselfishness of the heart" = *magnanimity* (so I style it for want of a better term), to pursue it; the third is the *valiant energy*, which maintains the permanence of the choice and the practice. The last clause is, literally, "Whereby they are practiced is one," and this, according to Ying-ta, means—"From the various kings downward, in the practicing of these five duties and three virtues, there has been but one method. There has been no change in modern times and ancient." This, however, is not satisfactory. We want a substantive meaning for "one." This Choo He gives us. He says:—"The *one* is simply sincerity;" the sincerity, that is, on which the rest of the work dwells with such strange predication. I translate, therefore, the term here by *singleness*. There seems a reference in the term to the being *alone* in ch. i., p. 3. [page 109 above.] The singleness is that of the soul in the apprehension and practice of the duties of the Mean, which is attained to by watchfulness over one's self, when *alone*.—Extract from Dr. Legge's note, page 300.

tion of their own characters; the honoring of men of virtue and talents; affection toward their relatives; respect toward the great ministers; kind and considerate treatment of the whole body of officers; dealing with the mass of the people as children; encouraging the resort of all classes of artisans; indulgent treatment of men from a distance; and the kindly cherishing of the princes of the States. 13. By the ruler's cultivation of his own character, the duties of *universal obligation* are set up. By honoring men of virtue and talents, he is preserved from errors of judgment. By showing affection to his relatives, there is no grumbling nor resentment among his uncles and brethren. By respecting the great ministers, he is kept from errors in the practice of government. By kind and considerate treatment of the whole body of officers, they are led to make the most grateful return for his courtesies. By dealing with the mass of the people as his children, they are led to exhort one another to what is good. By encouraging the resort of all classes of artisans, his resources for expenditure are rendered ample. By indulgent treatment of men from a distance, they are brought to resort to him from all quarters. And by kindly cherishing the princes of the States, the whole empire is brought to revere him. 14. Self-adjustment and purification, with careful regulation of his dress, and the not making a movement contrary to the rules of propriety:—this is the way for the ruler to cultivate his person. Discarding slanderers, and keeping himself from *the seductions of beauty*; making light of riches, and giving honor to virtue:—this is the way for him to encourage men of worth and talents. Giving them places of *honor* and emolument, and sharing with them in their likes and dislikes:—this is the way for him to encourage his relatives to love him. Giving them numerous offices to discharge their orders and commissions:—this is the way for him to encourage the great ministers. According to them a generous confidence, and making their emoluments large:—this is the way to encourage the body of officers. Employing them only at the proper times, and making the imposts light:—this is the way to encourage the people. By daily examinations and monthly trials, and by making their rations in accordance with their labors:—this is the way to encourage the classes of artisans. To escort them on their departure and meet them on their coming; to commend the good among them, and show compassion to the incompetent:—this is the way to treat indulgently men from a distance. To restore families whose line of succession has been broken, and to revive States that have been extinguished; to reduce to order States that are in confusion, and support those which are in peril; to have fixed times

for their own reception at court, and the reception of their envoys; to send them away after liberal treatment, and welcome their coming with small contributions:—this is the way to cherish the princes of the States. 15. All who have the government of the empire with its States and families have the above nine standard rules. And the means by which they are carried into practice is singleness.

16. “In all things success depends on previous preparation, and without such previous preparation there is sure to be failure. If what is to be spoken be previously determined, there will be no stumbling. If affairs be previously determined, there will be no difficulty with them. If one’s actions have been previously determined, there will be no sorrow in connection with them. If principles of conduct have been previously determined, the practice of them will be inexhaustible. 17. When those in inferior situations do not obtain the confidence of the sovereign, they cannot succeed in governing the people. There is a way to obtain the confidence of the sovereign;—if one is not trusted by his friends, he will not get the confidence of his sovereign. There is a way to being trusted by one’s friends;—if one is not obedient to his parents, he will not be true to friends. There is a way to being obedient to one’s parents; if one, on turning his thoughts in upon himself, finds a want of sincerity, he will not be obedient to his parents. There is a way to the attainment of sincerity in one’s self;—if a man do not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself.

18. “Sincerity is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the way of men. He who possesses sincerity, is he who, without an effort, hits what is right, and apprehends, without the exercise of thought;—he is the sage who naturally and easily embodies the *right* way. He who attains to sincerity, is he who chooses what is good, and firmly holds it fast. 19. To this attainment there are requisite the extensive study of what is good, accurate inquiry about it, careful reflection on it, the clear discrimination of it, and the earnest practice of it. 20. The superior man, while there is anything he has not studied, or while in what he has studied there is anything he cannot understand, will not intermit his labor. While there is anything he has not inquired about, or anything in what he has inquired about which he does not know, he will not intermit his labor. While there is anything which he has not reflected on, or anything in what he has reflected on which he does not apprehend, he will not intermit his labor. While there is anything which he has not discriminated, or while his discrimination is not clear, he will not intermit his labor. If there be anything which he has not practiced, or if his practice fails in earnest-

ness, he will not intermit his labor. If another man succeed by one effort, he will use a hundred efforts. If another man succeed by ten efforts, he will use a thousand. 21. Let a man proceed in this way, and, though dull, he will surely become intelligent; though weak, he will surely become strong." [pages 304, 305.]

XXI. 1. When we have intelligence resulting from sincerity, this condition is to be ascribed to nature; when we have sincerity resulting from intelligence, this condition is to be ascribed to instruction. But given the sincerity, and there shall be the intelligence, given the intelligence, and there shall be the sincerity. [page 305.] [Cf. Socrates (Xen. Mem. IV., i., 5); Zoroaster (Khordah-Avesta xiii); Psalm cxix., 73: *Da mihi intellectum, ET DISCAM mandata tua*, in the Vulgate, with which reading agrees the Septuagint: *SUNETISON ME, KAI MATHESOMAI ENTOLAS SOU.*] § 881.

XXII. It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can exist under heaven, who can give its full development to his nature. Able to give its full development to his own nature, he can do the same to the nature of other men. [page 306.] [I omit the remainder of this chapter.]

XXIII. Next to the above is he who cultivates to the utmost the shoots of *goodness* in him. From those he can attain to the possession of sincerity. This sincerity becomes apparent. From being apparent, it becomes manifest. From being manifest, it becomes brilliant. Brilliant, it affects others. Affecting others, they are changed by it. Changed by it, they are transformed. It is only he who is possessed of the most complete sincerity that can exist under heaven, who can transform. [page 307.] [xxiv.*]

XXV. 1. Sincerity is that whereby self-completion is effected, and *its* way is that by which man must direct himself. 2. Sincerity is the end and beginning of things; without sincerity there would be nothing. On this account, the superior man regards the attainment of sincerity as the most excellent thing. 3. The possessor of sincerity does not merely accomplish the self-completion of himself. With this quality he completes *other men and things also*. The completing himself *shows his* perfect virtue. The completing *other men and things shows his* knowledge. *Both these are* virtues belonging to the nature, and *this is* the way by which a union is effected of the external and internal. Therefore, whenever he—the *entirely sincere man*—employs them,—that is, these virtues,—*their action will be right*. [pages 308, 309.]

XXVI. 1. Hence to entire sincerity there belongs ceaselessness. 2. Not ceasing it, it continues long. Continuing long, it evidences itself. 3. Evidencing itself, it reaches far. Reaching far, it be-

comes large and substantial. Large and substantial, it becomes high and brilliant. 4. Large and substantial;—this is how it contains *all* things. High and brilliant;—this is how it overspreads *all* things. Reaching far and continuing long;—this is how it perfects *all* things. [page 309.] [5,* 6.*]

7. The way of Heaven and Earth may be completely declared in one sentence. They are without any doubleness, and so they produce things in a manner that is unfathomable. 8. The way of Heaven and Earth is large and substantial, high and brilliant, far-reaching and long-enduring, [page 310.] [9.*]

10. It is said in the Book of Poetry, “The ordinances of Heaven, how profound are they and unceasing!” The meaning is, that it is thus that Heaven is Heaven. *And again*, “How illustrious was it, the singleness of the virtue of King Wan!” indicating that it was thus that King Wan was what he was. Singleness likewise is unceasing. [page 311.]

XXVII. 1. How great is the path proper to the sage! 2. Like overflowing water, it sends forth and nourishes all things, and rises up to the height of heaven. [page 311.] [3.*]

4. It waits for the proper man, and then it is trodden. 5. Hence it is said, “Only by perfect virtue can the perfect path, in all its courses, be made a fact.” 6. Therefore, the superior man honors his virtuous nature, and maintains constant inquiry and study, seeking to carry it out to its breadth and greatness, so as to omit none of the more exquisite and minute points which it embraces, and to raise it to its greatest height and brilliancy, so as to pursue the course of the Mean. He cherishes his old knowledge, and is continually acquiring new. He exerts an honest, generous earnestness, in the esteem and practice of all propriety. 7. Thus, when occupying a high situation, he is not proud, and in a low situation, he is not insubordinate. When the kingdom is well-governed, he is sure by his words to rise; and when it is ill-governed, he is sure by his silence to command forbearance to himself. Is not this what we find in the Book of Poetry,—“Intelligent is he and prudent, and so preserves his person?” [pages 311, 312.]

XXVIII. 1. The Master said, “Let a man who is ignorant be fond of using his own judgment; let a man without rank be fond of assuming a directing power to himself; let a man who is living in the present age go back to the ways of antiquity;—on the persons of all who act thus calamities will be sure to come.” [2,* 3,* 4,* 5.*]

XXIX. 1. He who attains to the sovereignty of the empire, having *those* three important things, shall be able to effect that there shall be few errors *under his government*. 2. However excellent may

have been the regulations of those of former times, they cannot be attested. Not being attested, they cannot command credence, and not being credited, the people would not follow them. However excellent might be the regulations made by one in an inferior situation, he is not in a position to be honored. Unhonored, he cannot command credence, and not being credited, the people would not follow his rules. 3. Therefore the institutions of the Ruler are rooted in his own character and conduct, and sufficient attestation of them is given by the masses of the people. He examines them *by comparison* with those of the three kings, and finds them without mistake. He sets them up before heaven and earth, and finds nothing in them contrary to their mode of operation. He presents himself with them before spiritual beings, and no doubts about them arise. He is prepared to wait for the rise of a sage, a hundred ages after, and has no misgivings. 4. His presenting himself *with his institutions* before spiritual beings, without any doubts about them arising, shows that he knows Heaven. His being prepared, without any misgivings, to wait for the rise of a sage, a hundred ages after, shows that he knows men. [pages 313, 314.]

5. Such being the case, the movements of such a ruler, *illustrating his institutions*, constitute an example to the empire for ages. His acts are for ages a law to the empire. His words are for ages a lesson to the empire. Those who are far from him, look longingly for him; and those who are near him; are never wearied with him. 6. It is said in the Book of Poetry,—“Not disliked there, not tired of here, from day to day, and night to night, will they perpetuate their praise.” Never has there been a ruler, who did not realize this description, that obtained an early renown throughout the empire. [pages 314, 315.]

XXX. 1. Chung-ne† handed down the doctrines of Yaou and Shun, as if they had been his ancestors, and elegantly displayed the regulations of Wan and Woo, taking them as his model. Above, he harmonized with the times of heaven, and below, he was conformed to the water and land. 2. He may be compared to heaven and earth, in their supporting and containing, their overshadowing and curtaining, all things. He may be compared to the four seasons in their alternating progress, and to the sun and moon in their successive shining. 3. All things are nourished together without

†Tsze-sze here refers to his grandfather Confucius by his marriage-name Chung-ne, instead of the usual designation “The Master.” The reader may consult Dr. Legge’s note to chapter ii. (Life and Teachings of Confucius, page 285.) See also the article *Confucius* in Dr. Thomas’ Biographical Dictionary. (Lippincott, 1873, page 651.)

their injuring one another. The courses of *the seasons, and of the sun and moon*, are pursued without any collision among them. The smaller energies are like river currents; the greater are seen in mighty transformations. It is this which makes heaven and earth so great. [page 315.]

XXXI. 1. It is only he, possessed of all sagely qualities that can exist under heaven, who shows himself quick in apprehension, clear in discernment, of far-reaching intelligence and all-embracing knowledge, fitted to exercise rule; magnanimous, generous, benign, and mild, fitted to exercise forbearance; impulsive, energetic, firm, and enduring, fitted to maintain a firm hold; self-adjusted, grave, never swerving from the Mean, and correct, fitted to command reverence; accomplished, distinctive, concentrative, and searching, fitted to exercise discrimination. 2. All-embracing is he and vast, deep and active as a fountain, sending forth in their due seasons his virtues. 3. All-embracing and vast, he is like heaven. Deep and active as a fountain, he is like the abyss. He is seen, and the people all reverence him; he speaks, and the people all believe him; he acts, and the people are all pleased with him. 4. Therefore, his fame overspreads the Middle kingdom, and extends to all barbarous tribes. Wherever ships and carriages reach; wherever the strength of man penetrates; wherever the heavens overshadow and the earth sustains; wherever the sun and moon shine; wherever frosts and dews fall:—all who have blood and breath unfeignedly honor and love him. Hence it is said,—“He is the equal of Heaven.” [pages 315–317.]

XXXII. 1. It is only the individual possessed of the most entire sincerity that can exist under heaven, who can adjust the great invariable relations of mankind, establish the great fundamental virtues of humanity, and know the transforming and nurturing operations of Heaven and Earth;—shall this individual have any being or anything beyond himself on which he depends? 2. Call him man in his ideal, how earnest is he! Call him an abyss, how deep is he! Call him Heaven, how vast is he! 3. Who can know him, but he who is indeed quick in apprehension, clear in discernment, of far-reaching intelligence, and all-embracing knowledge, possessing all heavenly virtue? [pages 317, 318.]

XXXIII. 1. It is said in the Book of Poetry, “Over her embroidered robe she puts a plain, single garment,” intimating a dislike to the display of the elegance of the former. Just so, it is the way of the superior man to prefer the concealment of *his virtue*, while it daily becomes more illustrious; and it is the way of the mean man to seek notoriety, while he daily goes more and more to

ruin. It is characteristic of the superior man, appearing insipid, yet never to produce satiety; while showing a simple negligence, yet to have his accomplishments recognized; while seemingly plain, yet to be discriminating. He knows how what is distant lies in what is near. He knows where the wind proceeds from. He knows how what is minute becomes manifested. Such an one, we may be sure, will enter into virtue. [page 318.]

2. It is said in the Book of Poetry, "Although *the fish* sinks and lies at the bottom, it is still quite clearly seen." Therefore, the superior man examines his heart, that there may be nothing wrong there, and that he may have no cause for dissatisfaction with himself. That wherein the superior man cannot be equalled is simply this,—his *work* which other men cannot see. [pages 318, 319.]

3. It is said in the Book of Poetry, "Looked at in your apartment, be there free from shame, where you are exposed to the light of heaven." Therefore, the superior man, even when he is not moving, has a *feeling of reverence*, and while he speaks not, he has *the feeling of truthfulness*. [page 319.]

4. It is said in the Book of Poetry, "In silence is the offering presented, and *the spirit* approached to; there is not the slightest contention." Therefore the superior man does not use rewards, and the people are stimulated *to virtue*. He does not show anger, and the people are awed more than by hatchets and battle-axes.

5. It is said in the Book of Poetry, "What needs no display is virtue. All the princes imitate it." Therefore, the superior man being sincere and reverential, the whole world is conducted to a state of happy tranquility. [page 319.]

6. It is said in the Book of Poetry, "I regard with pleasure your brilliant virtue, making no great display of itself in sounds and appearances." The Master said, "Among the appliances to transform the people, sounds and appearances are but trivial influences. It is said in another ode, 'Virtue is light as a hair.' Still, a hair will admit of comparison *as to its size*. 'The doings of the supreme Heaven have neither sound or smell.'—That is perfect virtue."

EXTRACTS FROM THE CONFUCIAN ANALECTS.

BOOK I, CHAPTER I. 1. The Master said, "Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and application? 2. Is it not delightful to have friends coming from distant quarters? 3. Is he not a man of complete virtue, who feels no discomposure though men may take no note of him?" [page 116.]

III. The Master said, "Fine words and an insinuating appearance are seldom associated with true virtue." [page 117.]

V. The Master said, "To rule a country of a thousand chariots, there must be reverent attention to business, and sincerity; economy in expenditure, and love for the people; and the employment of them at the proper seasons." [page 118.]

VI. The Master said, "A youth, when at home, should be filial, and, abroad, respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and cultivate the friendship of the good. When he has time and opportunity, after the performance of these things, he should employ them in polite studies." [page 118.]

VIII. 1. The Master said, "If the scholar be not grave, he will not call forth any veneration, and his learning will not be solid. 2. Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles. 3. Have no friends not equal to yourself. 4. When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them." [page 119.]

XIV. The Master said, "He who aims to be a man of complete virtue, in his food does not seek to gratify his appetite, nor in his dwelling-place does he seek the appliances of ease: he is earnest in what he is doing, and careful in his speech; he frequents the company of men of principle that he may be rectified:—such a person may be said indeed to love to learn." [page 120.]

XVI. The Master said, "I will not be afflicted at men's not knowing me; I will be afflicted that I do not know men." [page 121.]

BOOK II, CHAPTER I. The Master said, "He who exercises government by means of his virtue, may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn toward it."

II. The Master said, "In the Book of Poetry are three hundred pieces, but the design of them all may be embraced in *that* one sentence—'Have no depraved thoughts.'" [page 121.]

III. 1. The Master said, "If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid *the punishment*, but have no sense of shame. 2. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good." [page 122.]

IV. 1. The Master said, "At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. 2. At thirty, I stood firm. 3. At forty, I had no doubts. 4. At fifty, I knew the decrees of heaven. 5. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ *for the reception of truth*. 6. At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right." [page 122.]

VII. Tsze-yew asked what filial piety was. The Master said, "The filial piety of now-a-days means the support of one's parents. But

dogs and horses likewise are able to do something in the way of support ;—without reverence, what is there to distinguish the one support given from the other ? ” [page 123.]

VIII. Tsze-hea asked what filial piety was. The Master said, “The difficulty is with the countenance. If, when *their elders* have any *troublesome* affairs, the young take the toil of them, and if, when *the young* have wine and food, they set them before their elders, is *this* to be considered filial piety ? ” [page 123.]

IX. The Master said, “I have talked with Hwuy for a whole day, and he has not made any objection to *anything I said*;—as if he were stupid. He has retired, and I have examined his conduct when away from me, and found him able to illustrate *my teachings*. Hwuy ! He is not stupid.” [page 124.]

X. 1. The Master said, “See what a man does. 2. Mark his motives. 3. Examine in what things he rests. 4. How can a man conceal his character ! ” [page 124.]

XI. The Master said, “If a man keeps cherishing his old knowledge so as continually to be acquiring new, he may be a teacher of others.” [page 124.]

XIII. Tsze-kung asked what constituted the superior man. The Master said, “He acts before he speaks, and afterward speaks according to his actions.” [page 124.]

XIV. The Master said, “The superior man is catholic and no partizan. The mean man is a partizan and not catholic.”

XV. The Master said, “Learning without thought is labor lost ; thought without learning is perilous.” [page 124.]

XVIII. The Master said, “Yew, shall I teach you what knowledge is ? When you know a thing, to hold that you know it ; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it ;—this is knowledge.” [page 125.]

XX. Ke K'ang asked how to cause the people to reverence *their ruler*, to be faithful to him, and to urge themselves to virtue. The Master said, “Let him preside over them with gravity ;—then they will reverence him. Let him be filial and kind to all ;—then they will be faithful to him. Let him advance the good and teach the incompetent ;—then they will eagerly seek to be virtuous.”

XXII. The Master said, “I do not know how a man without truthfulness is to get on. How can a large carriage be made to go without the cross bar for yoking the oxen to, or a small carriage without the arrangement for yoking the horses ? ” [Cf. XV., v.]

XXIV. 1. The Master said, “For a man to sacrifice to a spirit which does not belong to him is flattery. 2. To see what is right and not to do it, is want of courage.” [page 127.]

BOOK III., CHAPTER, XIII. 1. Wang-sun Kea asked, saying, "What is the meaning of the saying, 'It is better to pay court to the furnace than to the south-west corner'?" 2. The Master said, "Not so. He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray." [page 130.]

XXVI. The Master said, "High station filled without indulgent generosity; ceremonies performed without reverence; mourning conducted without sorrow;—wherewith should I contemplate such ways?" [page 134.]

BOOK IV., CHAPTER I. The Master said, "It is virtuous manners which constitute the excellence of a neighborhood. If a man in selecting a residence do not fix on one where such prevail, how can he be wise?" [page 134.]

II. The Master said, "Those who are without virtue cannot abide long either in a condition of poverty and hardship, or in a condition of enjoyment. The virtuous rest in virtue; the wise desire virtue." [page 134.]

IV. The Master said, "If the will be set on virtue, there will be no practice of wickedness." [page 134.]

V. 1. The Master said, "Riches and honors are what men desire. If it cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be held. Poverty and meanness are what men dislike. If it cannot be obtained in the proper way, they should not be avoided. 2. If a superior man abandon virtue, how can he fulfil the requirements of that name? 3. The superior man does not, even for the space of a single meal, act contrary to virtue. In moments of haste, he cleaves to it. In seasons of danger, he cleaves to it."

VI. 1. The Master said, "I have not seen a person who loved virtue, or one who hated what was not virtuous. He who loved virtue would esteem nothing above it. He who hated what was not virtuous, would practice virtue in such a way that he would not allow anything that is not virtuous to approach his person. 2. Is any one able for one day to apply his strength to virtue? I have not seen the case in which his strength would be insufficient. 3. Should there possibly be any such case, I have not seen it."

IX. The Master said, "A scholar, whose mind is set on truth, and who is ashamed of bad clothes and bad food, is not fit to be discoursed with." [pages 135, 136.]

X. The Master said, "The superior man in the world does not set his mind either for anything, or against anything; what is right he will follow." [page 136.]

XI. The Master said, "The superior man thinks of virtue; the small man thinks of comfort. The superior man thinks of the

sanctions of law; the small man thinks of favors *which he may receive*." [page 136.]

XIV. The Master said, "*A man should say, I am not concerned that I have no place,—I am concerned how I may fit myself for one. I am not concerned, that I am not known,—I seek to be worthy to be known.*"

XV. 1. The Master said, "Sin, [Tsang Sin, a disciple of Confucius] my doctrine is that of an all-pervading unity." Tsang the philosopher, replied, "Yes." [Cf. Bk. XV., ii, 3.] 2. The Master went out, and the *other* disciples asked, saying, "What do his words mean?" Tsang said, "The doctrine of our Master is to be true to the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to others,—this and nothing more." [pages 136, 137.]

XVI. The Master said, "The mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain." [page 137.]

XVII. The Master said, "When we see men of worth, we should think of equaling them; when we see men of a contrary character, we should turn inward and examine ourselves." [page 137.]

XVIII. The Master said, "In serving his parents, *a son* may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow *his advice*, he shows an increased degree of reverence, but does not abandon *his purpose*; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur." [page 137.]

XXIV. The Master said, "The superior man wishes to be slow in his words and earnest in his conduct." [page 138.]

XXV. The Master said, "Virtue is not left to stand alone. *He who practices it* will have neighbors." [page 138.] [xxvi.*]

BOOK V., CHAPTER IV. 1. Some one said, "Yung is truly virtuous, but he is not ready with his tongue." 2. The Master said, "What is the good of being ready with the tongue? They who meet men with smartnesses of speech, for the most part procure themselves hatred. I know not whether he be truly virtuous, but why should he show readiness of the tongue?" [page 139.]

IX. 1. Tsae Yu being asleep during the day time, the Master said, "Rotten wood cannot be carved; a wall of dirty earth will not receive the trowel. This Yu!—what is the use of my reproving him?" 2. The Master said, "At first, my way with men was to hear their words, and give them credit for their conduct. Now my way is to hear their words, and look at their conduct. It is from Yu that I have learned to make this change."

X. The Master said, I have not seen a firm and unbending man." Some one replied, "There is Shin Ch'ang." "Ch'ang," said the

Master, "is under the influence of his lusts; how can he be firm and unbending?" [page 141.]

XXVII. The Master said, "In a hamlet of ten families, there may be found one honorable and sincere as I am, but not so fond of learning." [page 145.]

BOOK VI., CHAPTER II. The Duke Gae asked which of the disciples loved to learn. Confucius replied to him, "There was Yen Hwuy; HE loved to learn. He did not transfer his anger; he did not repeat a fault. Unfortunately, his appointed time was short and he died; and now there is not *such another*. I have not yet heard of any one who loves to learn *as he did*." [page 146.]

V. The Master said, "Such was Hwuy that for three months there would be nothing in his mind contrary to perfect virtue. The others may attain to this once a day or once a month, but nothing more." [page 147.]

IX. The Master said, "Admirable indeed was the virtue of Hwuy! With a single bamboo dish of rice, a single gourd dish of drink, and living in his mean narrow lane, while others could not have endured the distress, he did not allow his joy to be affected by it. Admirable indeed was the virtue of Hwuy!" [page 148.]

X. Yen K'ew said, "It is not that I do not delight in your doctrines, but my strength is insufficient." The Master said, "Those whose strength is insufficient give over in the middle of the way, but now you limit yourself." [page 149.]

XVII. The Master said, "Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness, and yet live, his escape *from death* is the effect of mere good fortune." [page 150.]

XVIII. The Master said, "They who know *the truth* are not equal to those who love it, and they who love it are not equal to those who find delight in it." [Cf. Dharmapada 79, 354, 364 (§ 949).]

XX. Fan Ch'è asked what constituted wisdom. The Master said, "To give one's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom." He asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, "The man of virtue makes the difficulty *to be overcome* his first business, and success only a subsequent consideration;—this may be called perfect virtue." [pages 150, 151.]

XXVIII. 1. Tsze-kung said, "Suppose the case of a man extensively conferring benefits on the people, and able to assist all: what would you say of him? Might he be called perfectly virtuous?" The Master said, "Why speak only of virtue in connection with him? Must he not have the qualities of a sage? Even Yaou and Shun were still solicitous about this. 2. Now the man of per-

fect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. 3. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves;—this may be called the art of virtue.” [page 152.]

BOOK VII., CHAPTER I. The Master said, “A transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients, I venture to compare myself with our old P’ang.” [page 153.]

II. The Master said, “The silent treasuring up of knowledge; learning without satiety; and instructing others without being wearied:—what one of these things belongs to me?” [page 153.]

III. The Master said, “The leaving virtue without proper cultivation; the not thoroughly discussing what is learned; not being able to move toward righteousness of which a knowledge is gained; and not being able to change what is not good:—these are the things which occasion me solicitude.” [page 153.]

VI. 1. The Master said, “Let the will be set on the path of duty. 2. Let every attainment in what is good be firmly grasped. 3. Let perfect virtue be accorded with. 4. Let relaxation and enjoyment be found in the polite arts.” [page 154.]

VII. The Master said, “From the man bringing his bundle of dried flesh for my teaching upward, I have never refused instruction to any one.” [page 154.]

XVIII. 1. The duke of She asked Tsze-loo about Confucius, and Tsze-loo did not answer him. 2. The Master said, “Why did you not say to him,—He is simply a man, who in his eager pursuit of knowledge forgets his food, who in the joy of its attainment forgets his sorrows, and who does not perceive that old age is coming on?”

XIX. The Master said, “I am not one who was born in the possession of knowledge; I am one who is fond of antiquity, and earnest in seeking it there.” [pages 157, 158.]

XX. The subjects on which the Master did not talk, were,—prodigious things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings.

XXI. The Master said, “When I walk along with two others, they may serve me as my teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, their bad qualities and avoid them.”

XXII. The Master said, “Heaven produced the virtue that is in me. Hwan T’uy—what can he do to me?”†

†CONFUCIUS CALM IN DANGER, THROUGH THE ASSURANCE OF HAVING A DIVINE MISSION. According to the historical accounts, Confucius was passing through Sung on his way from Wei to Ch’in, and was practicing ceremonies with his disciples under a large tree, when they were set upon by emissaries of Hwan T’uy, a high officer of Sung. These pulled down the tree, and wanted to kill the sage. His disciples urged him to make haste and escape, when he calmed their fears by these words. At the same time, he disguised himself till he got past Sung. This story may be apocryphal, but the saying remains,—a remarkable one.—*Dr. Legge’s note.* [Cf. Book IX., ch. v., and Book XIV., ch. xxxviii.]

XXIII. The Master said, "Do you think, my disciples, that I have any concealments? I conceal nothing from you. There is nothing which I do that is not shown to you, my disciples;—that is my way." [page 158.]

XXIV. There were four things which the Master taught,—letters, ethics, devotion of soul, and truthfulness. [page 158.]

XXVII. The Master said, "There may be those who act without knowing why. I do not do so. Hearing much and selecting what is good and following it, seeing much and keeping it in memory:—this is the second style of knowledge." [page 159.]

XXIX. The Master said, "Is virtue a thing remote? I wish to be virtuous, and lo! virtue is at hand." [page 159.]

XXXIII. The Master said, "The sage and the man of perfect virtue;—how dare I *rank myself with them*? It may simply be said of me, that I strive to become such without satiety, and teach others without weariness." Kung-se Hwa said, "This is just what we, the disciples, cannot imitate you in." [page 160.]

XXXIV. The Master being very sick, Tsze-loo asked leave to pray for him. He said, "May such a thing be done?" Tsze-loo replied, "It may. In the Prayers it is said, 'Prayer has been made to you, the spirits of the upper and lower worlds.'" The Master said, "My praying has been for a long time." [page 161.] [xxxv,* xxxvi,* xxxvii.*] [Cf. Psalms, lxxxviii., 1; cxxxviii., 3.]

BOOK VIII., CHAPTER VII. 1. Tsang the philosopher said, "The scholar may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous endurance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. 2. Perfect virtue is the burden which he considers it is his to sustain; is it not heavy? Only with death does his course stop; is it not long?" [page 164.] [See Book IV., ch. xv. above.]

XII. The Master said, "It is not easy to find a man who has learned for three years without coming to be good." [page 164.]

XIII. 1. The Master said, "With sincere faith he unites the love of learning; holding firm to death, he is perfecting the excellence of his course. 2. *Such an one* will not enter a tottering state, nor dwell in a disorganized one. When right principles of government prevail in the empire, he will show himself; when they are prostrated, he will keep concealed. 3. When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honor are things to be ashamed of." [page 165.]

XVII. The Master said, "Learn as if you could not reach your object, and were *always* fearing also lest you should lose it." [page 165.] [xviii,* xix,* xx,* xxi.*]

BOOK IX., CHAPTER IV. There were four things from which the Master was entirely free. He had no forgone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism.

V. 1. The Master was put in fear in K'wang. 2. He said, "After the death of king Wan, was not the cause of truth lodged here *in me*? 3. If heaven had wished to let this cause of truth perish, then I, a future mortal, should not have got such a relation to that cause. While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of K'wang do to me?" Cf. Book VII., ch. xxii.

XI. 1. The Master being very ill, Tsze-loo wished the disciples to act as ministers to him. 2. During the remission of his illness, he said, "Long has the conduct of Yew been deceitful! By pretending to have ministers when I have them not, whom should I impose upon? Should I impose upon Heaven? 3. Moreover, than that I should die in the hands of ministers, is it not better that I should die in the hands of you, my disciples? And though I may not get a great burial, shall I die upon the road?" [page 170.]

XVIII. The Master said, "*The prosecution of learning* may be compared to what may happen in raising a mound. If there want but one basket of earth to complete the work, and I stop, the stopping is my own work. It may be compared to *throwing down the earth* on the level ground. Though *but* one basketful is thrown at a time, the advancing with it is my own going forward."

XXIII. The Master said, "Can men refuse to assent to the words of strict admonition? But it is reforming the conduct because of them which is valuable. Can men refuse to be pleased with words of gentle advice? But it is unfolding their aim which is valuable. If a man be pleased with these words, but does not unfold their aim, and assents to those, but does not reform his conduct, I can really do nothing with him." [pages 172, 173.]

XXIV. The Master said, "Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles. Have no friends not equal to yourself. When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them." [page 173.]

XXV. The Master said, "The commander of the forces of a large State may be carried off, but the will of even a common man cannot be taken from him. [xxvi,* xxvii,* xxviii,* xxix,* xxx*]

BOOK X., CHAPTER XII. The stable being burned down, when he was at court, on his return he said, "Has any man been hurt?" He did not ask about the horses. [page 180.]

XV. 1. When any of his friends died, if he had no relations who could be depended on for the necessary offices, he would say, "I will bury him." [page 181.] [2.*] [xvi,* xvii,* xviii.*]

BOOK XI., CHAPTER XI. Ke Loo asked about serving the spirits.

of the dead. The Master said, "While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve *their* spirits?" *Ke Loo* added, "I venture to ask about death?" He was answered, "While you do not know life, how can you know about death?" [page 185.] [Cf. Zoroaster, Avesta, Yagna, xxvi, 21, 35. (§ 881 below.)]

XXIII. 1. *Ke Tsze-jen* asked whether *Chung-yew* and *Yen K'ew* could be called great ministers. 2. The Master said, "I thought you would ask about some extraordinary individuals, and you only ask about *Yew* and *K'ew*!" 3. What is called a great minister, is one who serves his prince according to what is right, and when he finds he cannot do so, retires. 4. Now, as to *Yew* and *K'ew*, they may be called ordinary ministers." 5. *Tsze-jen* said, "Then they will always follow their chief;—will they?" 6. The Master said, "In an act of parricide or regicide, they would not follow him." [page 188.] [xxiv,* xxv.*]

BOOK XII., CHAPTER I. 1. *Yen Yuen* asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, "To subdue one's self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him. Is the practice of perfect virtue from a man himself, or is it from others?" 2. *Yen Yuen* said, "I beg to ask the steps of that process." The Master replied, "Look not at what is contrary to propriety; listen not to what is contrary to propriety; speak not what is contrary to propriety; make no movement which is contrary to propriety." *Yen Yuen* then said, "Though I am deficient in intelligence and vigor, I will make it my business to practice this lesson." [page 191.] [Cf. Buddha's *Dharmapada* 160. (§ 949.)]

II. *Chung-kung* asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, "*It is*, when you go abroad, *to behave to every one* as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family." *Chung-kung* said, "Though I am deficient in intelligence and vigor, I will make it my business to practice this lesson." [pages 191, 192.]

III. 1. *Sze-ma New* asked about perfect virtue. 2. The Master said, "The man of perfect virtue is cautious and slow in his speech." 3. "Cautious and slow in his speech!" said *New*;—"is this what is meant by perfect virtue?" The Master said, "When a man feels the difficulty of *DOING*, can he be other than cautious and slow in speaking?" [page 192.]

IV. 1. *Sze-ma New* asked about the superior man. The Master said, "The superior man has neither anxiety nor fear." 2. "Being:

without anxiety or fear!" said *New*;—"does this constitute what we call a superior man?" 3. The Master said, "When internal examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be anxious about, what is there to fear?" [page 192.]

V. 1. Sze-ma New, full of anxiety, said, "Other men all have their brothers, I only have not." 2. Tsze-hea [a disciple of Confucius] said to him, "There is the following saying which I have heard: 3. 'Death and life have their determined appointment; riches and honors depend upon Heaven.' 4. Let the superior man never fail reverentially to order his own conduct, and let him be respectful to others and observant of propriety:—then all within the four seas will be his brothers. What has the superior man to do with being distressed because he has no brothers?"

VII. 1. Tsze-kung asked about government. The Master said, "*The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler.*" 2. Tsze-kung said, "If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be foregone first?" "The military equipment," said the Master. 3. Tsze-kung *again* asked, "If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be foregone?" The Master answered, "Part with the food. From of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the State."

X. 1. Tsze-chang having asked how virtue was to be exalted, and delusions to be discovered, the Master said, "Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles, and be moving continually to what is right;—this is the way to exalt one's virtue." [page 195.] [2,*3.*]

XVI. The Master said, "The superior man *seeks* to perfect the admirable qualities of men, and does not *seek* to perfect their bad qualities. The mean man does the opposite of this." [page 196.]

XVII. Ke K'ang asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, "To govern means to rectify. If you lead on *the people* with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?" [page 196.]

XVIII. Ke K'ang distressed about the number of thieves in the State, inquired of Confucius *about how to do away with them*. Confucius said, "If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal." [page 197.]

XIX. Ke K'ang asked Confucius about government, saying, "What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?" Confucius replied, "Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your *evinced* desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The rela-

tion between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend when the wind blows across it." [page 197.]

XX. 1. Tsze-chang asked, "What must the officer be, who may be said to be distinguished?" 2. The Master said, "What is it you call being distinguished?" 3. Tsze-chang replied, "It is to be heard of through the State, to be heard of through the Family." 4. The Master said, "That is notoriety, not distinction. 5. Now, the man of distinction is solid and straightforward, and loves righteousness. He examines people's words, and looks at their countenances. He is anxious to humble himself to others. Such a man will be distinguished in the country; he will be distinguished in the family. 6. As to the man of notoriety, he assumes the appearance of virtue, but his actions are opposed to it, and he rests in this character without any doubts *about himself*. Such a man will be heard of in the country; he will be heard of in the family."

XXI. 1. Fan-ch'e rambling with the Master under *the trees* about the rain-altars, said, "I venture to ask how to exalt virtue, to correct cherished evil, and to discover delusions." 2. The Master said, "Truly a good question! 3. If doing what is to be done be made the first business, and success a secondary consideration;—is not this the way to exalt virtue? To assail one's own wickedness and not assail that of others;—is not this the way to correct cherished evil? For a morning's anger, to disregard one's own life, and involve that of one's parents;—is not this a case of delusion?"

XXII. 1. Fan Ch'e asked about benevolence. The Master said, "It is to love *all men*." He asked about knowledge. The Master said, "It is to know *all men*." 2. Fan Ch'e did not immediately understand *these answers*. 3. The Master said, "Employ the upright and put aside all the crooked;—in this way, the crooked can be made to be upright." 4. Fan Ch'e retired, and seeing Tsze-hea, he said to him. "A little ago, I had an interview with our Master, and asked him about knowledge. He said, 'Employ the upright, and put aside all the crooked;—in this way, the crooked can be made to be upright.' What did he mean?" 5. Tsze-hea said, "Truly rich is his saying! 6. Shun, being in possession of the empire, selected from among all the people, and employed Kaou-yaou, on which all who were devoid of virtue disappeared. T'ang being in possession of the empire, selected from among all the people, and employed E-Yin, and all who were devoid of virtue disappeared." [page 198.]

XXIII. Tsze-kung asked about friendship. The Master said: "Faithfully admonish *your friend*, and kindly try to lead him. If

you find him impracticable, stop. Do not disgrace yourself." [pages 198, 199.] [xxiv.*]

BOOK XIII., CHAPTER IX. 1. When the Master went to Wei, Yen Yew acted as driver of his carriage. 2. The Master observed, "How numerous are the people!" 3. Yew said, "Since they are thus numerous, what more shall be done for them?" "Enrich them," was the reply. 4. "And when they have been enriched, what more shall be done?" The Master said, "Teach them."

XIII. The Master said, "If a minister make his own conduct correct, what difficulty will he have in assisting in government? If he cannot rectify himself, what has he to do with rectifying others?"

XXIV. Tsze-kung asked saying, "What do you say of a man who is loved by all the people of his village?" The Master replied, "We may not for that accord our approval of him." "And what do you say of him who is hated by all the people of his village?" The Master said, "We may not for that conclude that he is bad. It is better than either of these cases that the good in the village love him, and the bad hate him." [page 206.]

XXV. The Master said, "The superior man is easy to serve and difficult to please. If you try to please him in any way which is not accordant with right, he will not be pleased. But in his employment of men, he uses them according to their capacity. The mean man is difficult to serve, and easy to please. If you try to please him, though it be in a way which is not accordant with right, he may be pleased. But in his employment of men, he wishes them to be equal to everything." [pages 206, 207.]

XXVII. The Master said, "The firm, the enduring, the simple, and the modest, are near to virtue." [page 207.]

XXX. The Master said, "To lead an uninstructed people to war is to throw them away." [page 207.]

BOOK XIV., CHAPTER II. 1. "When the love of superiority, boasting, resentments, and covetousness are repressed, may this be deemed perfect virtue?" 2. The Master said, "This may be regarded as the achievement of what is difficult. But I do not know that it is to be deemed perfect virtue." [page 208.]

III. The Master said, "The scholar who cherishes the love of comfort, is not fit to be deemed a scholar." [page 208.]

XI. The Master said, "To be poor without murmuring is difficult. To be rich without being proud is easy." [page 210.]

XIII. 1. Tsze-loo asked what constituted a COMPLETE man. The Master said, "Suppose a man with the knowledge of Tsang Woo-chung, the freedom from covetousness of Kung-ch'o, the bravery of Chwang of Peen, and the varied talents of Yen K'ew; add to these

the accomplishments of the rules of propriety and music :—such an one might be reckoned a COMPLETE man.” 2. *He then added*, “But what is the necessity for a complete man of the present day to have all these things? The man, who in the view of gain thinks of righteousness; who in the view of danger is prepared to give up his life; and who does not forget an old agreement, however far back it extends :—such a man may be reckoned a COMPLETE man.”

XXIX. The Master said, “The superior man is modest in his speech, but exceeds in his actions.” [page 216.]

XXX. 1. The Master said, “The way of the superior man is threefold, but I am not equal to it. Virtuous, he is free from anxieties; wise, he is free from perplexities; bold, he is free from fear.” 2. Tsze-kung said, “Master, that is what you yourself say.”

XXXI. Tsze-kung was *in the habit of* comparing men together. The Master said, “Ts’ze must have reached a high pitch of excellence! Now, I have not leisure *for this*.” [page 216.]

XXXII. The Master said, “I will not be concerned at men’s not knowing me; I will be concerned at my own want of ability.”

XXXVI. 1. Some one said, “What do you say concerning the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness?” 2. The Master said, “With what then will you recompense kindness? 3. Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness.” [page 217.]

XXXVII. 1. The Master said, “Alas! there is no one that knows me.” 2. Tsze-kung said, “What do you mean by thus saying—that no one knows you?” The Master replied, “I do not murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble against men. My studies lie low, and my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven;—that knows me!” [pages 217, 218.] [Cf. Psalms lxix., 3; cxxiii., 1.]

XXXVIII. 1. The Kung-pih, Leaou, having slandered Tsze-loo to Ke-sun, Tsze-fuh King-pih informed Confucius of it, saying, “Our Master is certainly being led astray by the Kung-pih, Leaou, but I have still power enough left to cut *Leaou* off, and expose his corpse in the market and in the court.” 2. The Master said, “If *my* principles are to advance, it is so ordered. If they are to fall to the ground, it is so ordered. What can the Kung-pih, Leaou, do, where such ordering is concerned?” [page 218.] [Cf. VII., xxii., page 126 above.] [xxxix* to xlvii* I omit.]

BOOK XV., CHAPTER II. 1. The Master said, “Ts’ze, you think, I suppose, that I am one who learns many things and keeps them in memory?” 2. Tsze-kung replied, “Yes,—but perhaps it is not so?” 3. “No,” was the answer; “I *seek* a unity all-pervading.”

V. 1. Tsze-chang asked how a man might conduct himself, *so as to be everywhere appreciated*. 2. The Master said, “Let his words

be sincere and truthful, and his actions honorable and careful;—such conduct may be practiced among the rude tribes of the South or the North. If his words be not sincere and truthful, and his actions not honorable and careful, will he, with such conduct, be appreciated, even in his neighborhood? 3. When he is standing, let him see those two things, as it were fronting him. When he is in a carriage, let him see them attached to the yoke. Then may he subsequently carry them into practice.” 4. Tsze-chang wrote these counsels on the end of his sash. [pages 222, 223.]

VIII. The Master said, “The determined scholar and the man of virtue will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their virtue. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue complete.” [pages 223, 224.]

IX. Tsze-kung asked about the practice of virtue. The Master said, “The mechanic, who wishes to do his work well, must first sharpen his tools. [Cf. Doctrine of the Mean, xxi., page 116 above.] When you are living in any state, take service with the most worthy among its great officers, and make friends of the most virtuous among its scholars.” [page 224.]

XV. The Master said, “When a man is not *in the habit of* saying—‘What shall I think of this? What shall I think of this?’ I can indeed do nothing with him!” [page 225.]

XVI. The Master said, “When a number of people are together for a whole day, without their conversation turning on righteousness, and when they are fond of carrying out *the suggestions of* a small shrewdness; theirs is indeed a hard case.” [page 225.]

XVII. The Master said, “The superior man in *everything* considers righteousness to be essential. He performs it according to the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in humility. He completes it with sincerity. This is indeed a superior man.”

XVIII. The Master said, “The superior man is distressed by his want of ability. He is not distressed by men’s not knowing him.”

XX. The Master said, “What the superior man seeks, is in himself. What the mean man seeks, is in others.” [page 226.]

XXIII. Tsze-kung asked, saying, “Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one’s life?” The Master said, “Is not RECIPROCITY such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.” [page 226.]

XXIX. The Master said, to have faults and not to reform them,—this, indeed, should be pronounced having faults.” [page 228.]

XXX. The Master said, “I have been the whole day without eating, and the whole night without sleeping:—occupied with thinking. It was of no use. The better plan is to learn.”

XXXI. The Master said, "The object of the superior man is truth. Food is not his object. There is ploughing;—even in that there is *sometimes* want. So with learning;—emolument may be found in it. The superior man is anxious lest he should not get truth; he is not anxious lest poverty should come upon him."

XXXIV. The Master said, "Virtue is more to man than either water or fire. I have seen men die from treading on water and fire, but I have never seen a man die from treading the course of virtue."

XXXV. The Master said, "Let every man consider virtue as what devolves on himself. He may not yield the performance of it *even* to his teacher." [page 229.]

XXXVI. The Master said, "The superior man is correctly firm, and not firm merely." [page 229.]

XXXVII. The Master said, "A *minister*, in serving his prince, reverently discharges his duties, and makes his emolument a secondary consideration." [page 229.]

XXXVIII. The Master said, "There being instruction, there will be no distinction of classes." [page 230.] [xxxix,* xl,* xli.*]

BOOK XVI., CHAPTER VII. Confucius said, "There are three things which the superior man guards against. In youth, when the physical powers are not yet settled, he guards against lust. When he is strong, and the physical powers are full of vigor, he guards against quarrelsomeness. When he is old, and the animal powers are decayed, he guards against covetousness." [page 235.]

VIII. 1. Confucius said, "There are three things of which the superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the ordinances of Heaven. He stands in awe of great men. He stands in awe of the words of sages. 2. The mean man does not know the ordinances of Heaven, and *consequently* does not stand in awe of them. He is disrespectful to great men. . He makes sport of the words of sages." [page 235.]

X. Confucius said, "The superior man has nine things which are subjects with him of thoughtful consideration. In regard to the use of his eyes, he is anxious to see clearly. In regard to the use of his ears, he is anxious to hear distinctly. In regard to his countenance, he is anxious that it should be benign. In regard to his demeanor, he is anxious that it should be respectful. In regard to his speech, he is anxious that it should be sincere. In regard to his doing of business, he is anxious that it should be reverently careful. In regard to what he doubts about, he is anxious to question others. When he is angry, he thinks of the difficulties his anger may involve him in. When he sees gain to be got, he thinks of righteousness." [page 236.]

XI. 1. Confucius said, "Contemplating good, *and pursuing it*, as if they could not reach it; contemplating evil, *and shrinking from it*, as they would from thrusting the hand into boiling water:—I have seen such men, as I have heard such words. 2. Living in retirement to study their aims, and practicing righteousness to carry out their principles:—I have heard these words, but I have not seen such men." [page 236.] [xii,* xiii,* xiv.*]

BOOK XVII., CHAPTER VI. Tsze-chang asked Confucius about perfect virtue. Confucius said, "To be able to practice five things everywhere under heaven constitutes perfect virtue." He begged to ask what they were, and was told, "Gravity, generosity of soul, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness. If you are grave, you will not be treated with disrespect. If you are generous, you will win all. If you are sincere, people will repose trust in you. If you are earnest, you will accomplish much. If you are kind, this will enable you to employ the services of others." [page 240.]

XIX. 1. The Master said, "I would prefer not speaking." 2. Tsze-kung said, "If you, Master, do not speak, what shall we, your disciples, have to record?" 3. The Master said, "Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are *continually* being produced, *but* does Heaven say anything?"

XXII. The Master said, "Hard is the case of him, who will stuff himself with food the whole day, without applying his mind to anything *good*! Are there not [incorrupt] gamblers and chess players? To be one of these would still be better than doing nothing at all."

XXIII. Tsze-loó said, "Does the superior man esteem valor?" The Master said, "The superior man holds righteousness to be of highest importance. A man in a superior situation, having valor without righteousness, will be guilty of insubordination; one of the lower people, having valor without righteousness, will commit robbery." [page 246.]

XXIV. 1. Tsze-kung said, "Has the superior man his hatreds also?" The Master said, "He has his hatreds. He hates those who proclaim the evil of others. He hates the man who, being in low station, slanders his superiors. He hates those who have valor *merely*, and are unobservant of propriety. He hates those who are forward and determined, and, *at the same time*, of contracted understanding." 2. *The Master then inquired*, "Ts'ze, have you also your hatreds?" *Tsze-kung replied*, "I hate those who pry out matters, and ascribe the knowledge to their wisdom. I hate those who are *only* not modest, and think that they are valorous. I hate those who make known secrets, and think that they are straightforward." [pages 246, 247.] [xxv,* xxvi.*]

BOOK XX., CHAPTER III. 1. The Master said, "Without recognizing the ordinances of *Heaven*, it is impossible to be a superior man. 2. Without an acquaintance with the rules of Propriety, it is impossible for the character to be established. 3. Without knowing *the force of words*, it is impossible to know men."

GENERAL SCHOLION.—OF MYSTERIES. (§§ 872-891 inclusive.)

§ 872.—Holy mysteries found in all religious forms of faith. (page 183, line 10.)

§ 873.—Feelings are not knowledge, and consequently teach no mystery. (page 183, line 24.) See §§ 283, 284, 836.

§ 874.—Ethic is publicly communicable, and therefore not mysterious. (page 184, line 6.)

§ 875.—Freedom is no mystery whatever; but when transferred to the last object of practical reason (viz. the realizing the idea of our chief moral end), it issues inevitably in holy mysteries. (page 184, line 18.) Cf. §§ 469, 1026, 2605.

§ 876.—Touching that which it is everyone's duty to know, no secret or mystery obtains; but only touching that which God alone can do. (page 184, line 29.) Cf. § 784. [*There are in nature arcana*: omit the sentence.] See § 724.

§ 877.—Seeing that mankind cannot by himself alone realize that idea of the sovereign and supreme good. (page 185, line 1.) Cf. §§ 799, 800, 639, 640, 1120, 706. [§ 878 begins with page 186, line 3.]

§ 878.—Concerned about knowing, not what the nature of God may be in itself, but what he is in reference to us as moral agents.

§ 879.—Belief in God as (1) Omnipotent Creator, (2) Benignant Governor, (3) Righteous Judge. (page 186, line 15.)

§ 880.—Same threefold notion occurs in constitutional law: (1) legislative; (2) executive; (3) judicial. (page 186, line 28.)

§ 881.—Many nations of antiquity have concurred in holding this opinion. (page 187, line 20.) [Omit the last sentence.] [*Phta*: see the American Cyclopedic, (ed. 1874, vol. vi., page 464,) article *Egypt*.] *Zoroaster's creed*: cf. § 871, and the following extracts from the Avesta.*

*"Avesta: the Religious Books of the Parsees; from Professor Spiegel's German translation of the Original Manuscripts. By Arthur Henry Bleek, author of a Persian Grammar, etc. In three volumes [in one]. Hertford: printed for Muncherjee Hormusjee Cama, by Stephen Austin, 1864." Mr. Bleek states in the preface (page viii.) that "this edition has been printed by Mr. Cama for the purpose of distributing it gratuitously to his Parsee brethren in India; but the translator having expressed a wish that a few copies might be sold in this country, to introduce the ancient religion of Zarathustra to the English public, Mr. Cama has kindly acceded to the translator's request." I have inserted many references to the paging of Bleek's volumes, and have also noted some of the

VENDIDAD, III. 75. Creator of the corporeal world, Pure One! 76. Who fourthly rejoices this earth with the greatest joy? 77. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: He who most cultivates the fruits of the field, grass and trees, which yield food, O holy Zarathustra. 78. Or, he who provides waterless land with water, or gives water to the waterless (land). 79. For the earth is not glad which lies long uncultivated. 80. If it can be cultivated; 81. Then is it good for a habitation for these (men). 84. He who cultivates this earth with the left arm and the right, with the right arm and the left, O holy Zarathustra, 85. To him it brings wealth. 87. He who cultivates this earth, O holy Zarathustra, with the left arm and the right, with the right arm and the left. 88. Then this earth speaks to him: Man! thou who cultivatest me with the left arm and the right, with the right arm and the left, 89. Always will I come hither and bear. 90. All food will I bear, together with the fruits of the field. 91. He who does not cultivate this earth, O holy Zarathustra, with the left arm and the right, with the right arm and the left, 92. Then this earth speaks to him: Man! thou who dost not cultivate me with the left arm and the right, with the right arm and the left, 93. Always thou standest there, going to the doors of others to beg for food.

96. Creator of the corporeal world, Pure One! 97. What is the increase of the Mazdayasnian law? 98. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: When one diligently cultivates corn, O holy Zarathustra. 99. He who cultivates the fruits of the field cultivates purity. 100. He promotes the Mazdayasnian law. [vol. i., page 24.]

138. (It is asked) Whether any one praises and hears the Mazdayasnian law. 139. Or whether any one does not praise and hear the Mazdayasnian law; 140. Since it (the law) will take away these (sins) from those who praise the Mazdayasnian law, 141. IF AFTERWARD THEY DO NOT AGAIN COMMIT WICKED DEEDS.

149. In this wise, O holy Zarathustra, does the Mazdayasnian law take away all the evil thoughts, words and deeds, of a pure man, even as the strong swift wind clears the sky from the right side. 150. Well is it here, O Zarathustra, WHEN ONE HAS PERFORMED

verses and sections which I have here omitted (appending the numbering of omitted verses [in brackets] at the end of extracts presented); but I have judged it not necessary to attempt completeness in either respect, inasmuch as the numbering of the extracts will be in general a sufficient guide for the reader. I have retained many of the notes, more perhaps than my present purpose requires. Double parentheses ((thus)) enclose hereinafter matter which in Bleek's text is enclosed in brackets [thus.] I have substituted *s* (italic) for *g* (cedilla), and have disregarded other diacritical marks.

GOOD WORKS. 151. The good Mazdayasnian law cuts completely away all punishment. [vol. i., page 26.]

IV. 1. Who to a lending man does not pay back the debt; 2. Is a thief of the loan, a robber of what is lent to him; 3. For him (the debtor) one must preserve night and day as well as (his own property). [vol. i., page 30.] [Cf. Khordah-Avesta, xxvi. below.]

54. He who prepares to strike a man that is to him Agerepta; 55. If he knocks him down it is to him Avaairista; 56. If revenge sits in his mind it is to him Aredus. 57. At the fifth of the sins Aredus (the man) fills up his body ((i. e. with sin.))

130. With regard to the married, I call them, O holy Zarathustra, before him 131. Who is not married; 132. Him who has a household before him who has none; the father of a family before the childless; 133. The rich before the poor. 134. For he seeks most among other men to protect the Vohu-mano who furthers the increase of cattle, before him who does it not. [vol. i., page 36.] [I omit verses 135-158.]

V. 23. Creator! Does the water destroy a man? 24. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: The water does not destroy a man. 25. Asto-Vidhotus* binds him, the birds carry the bound one away;

*For the convenience of the reader, I have thought it worth while to collect here some of the more frequently recurring Zend terms, with reference to the pages of Bleek where explanation may be sought:

Aeshma—"The Daeva Aeshma, the very evil." (Vendidad x., 23.) (vol. i., page 93.) "Aeshma (wrath)." (Yasna xxix., 1.) (vol. ii., page 83.)

Ahriman—The same as Anra-mainyus.

AHURA-MAZDA—[See Khordah-Avesta xiv. below.] "Praise be to the name of ORMAZD, the God with the name 'Who always was, always is, and always will be.'" (vol. iii., page 14.) See MAZDA.

Airyana-vaeja—"This country must be placed in the furthest east of the Iranian highlands, at the sources of the Oxus and Jaxartes." "In later times, Airyana-vaeja becomes a purely fabulous country." (vol. i., page 6.)

Ameretat—The lord of the trees; one of the Amesha-spentas. (vol. ii., page 29.) Amerdat (the same as Ameretat.) (vol. iii., pages 156, 160, 166. (See vol. ii., page 91.))

Amesha-spentas—[Archangels: see at the head of the first Gatha below. (Yasna xxviii.)] Seven in number: (1) Vohumano; (2) Asha-vahista; (3) Khshathra-vairya; (4) Spenta-armaiti; (5 and 6) Haurvat and Ameretat; (7) "AHURA-MAZDA being counted as the seventh [see Yasna lvii., 13, 14, below]; but in the later mythology AHURA-MAZDA is no longer reckoned among the Amesha-spentas, and Sraosha (Srosh) completes the number." (vol. ii., 29.) See Khordah-Avesta xxxv., 16 below. (vol. iii., page 127.)

Amshaspands—The same as Amesha-spentas.

Andervai—"The space between heaven and earth." (vol. iii., page 15.)

Anra-mainyus—"The most wicked spirit." (See Yasna xxx., 3-6.) (vol. ii., page 85.) "While AHURA-MAZDA works with perfect foresight of the re-

26. The water carries him up, the water carries him down, the water washes him; 27. Afterward the birds eat him up. 28. There (in the other world) he goes up and down by destiny. 29. Creator! Does the fire destroy a man? 30. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: Fire destroys no man. 31. Asto-Vidhotus binds him, the birds carry away the bound one. 32. The fire burns his bones and

sult, Anra-mainyus always works without forethought, and only becomes aware of his mistakes when too late to rectify them." (vol. ii., page 86.) [Cf.

Yasna lvi., (7), 6 (vol. ii., page 123).] See Yasna xxvii., 2. (vol. ii., page 80.) Ardebihiirst—The same as Asha-vahista.

Ardvi-sura—"The personification of water." (vol. ii., page 10.) See Yasna lxiv. (vol. ii., page 131.)

Armaiti—"Is sometimes the genius of the earth and sometimes wisdom personified." (vol. ii., page 82.) See Spenta-armaiti.

Asto-vidhotu—"The destroyer of the bones." (vol. i., page 47.)

Asha-vahista—"The genius of Fire, and the most powerful of the Amesha-spentas. Light and fire terrify all evil beings." (vol. iii., page 28.) (Cf. vol. ii., pages 83 and 29.) (vol. iii., pages 156, 165.)

"Ashis-vanuhi and Parendi are the genii of domestic prosperity and wealth." (vol. iii., page 51.)

Aspandarmat—The same as Spenta-armaiti. (Khordah-Avesta xlvi., 7.) (vol. iii., page 165.)

Bahman—The same as Vohu-mano.

Bahram—The same as Verethraghna.

Baodho-varsta—"Sins committed wilfully." (vol. i., page 66.)

Baresma—A "bundle of twigs." (vol. ii., page 10.) Barsom. (vol. ii., page 122.)

Chinvat—"Is the bridge to which all the souls must arrive. The good pass over it easily; the wicked fall off into hell." (vol. ii., page 14.) See Yasna xlvii., 2, below (vol. ii., page 111); Khordah-Avesta xiv., 4, below (vol. iii., page 15); Vendidad xix., 96 (vol. i., page 141.)

Draona—"Usually signifies a little round cake, eaten on certain ceremonial occasions." (vol. ii., page 60.) (vol. ii., page 3.)

Drujas—"The *Drujas* are considered by the Parsees as evil spirits which take up their abode inside of men and rule them. They can be expelled, or at least rendered powerless, by prayer and good works." (vol. ii., page 86.)

Fravashis—[The angels who inhabit the soul.] "Signifies both the souls of the departed and the souls of those yet unborn." (vol. ii., page 14); "usually applied to the power which holds body and soul together." (vol. ii., page 79.) [Cf. St. Paul, I. Cor., vi., 19; iii, 16; Buddha Dharmapada, 62 (§ 949 below); Confucius, Doctrine of the Mean, xvi., 2 (§ 871 page 112 above); and see the Khordah-Avesta, xxix., 157, below. (vol. iii., page 103).]

Garō-nmana—(See vol. i., page 144.) "Garō-nmanem is the dwelling of AHURA-MAZDA, the highest in the heavens." (vol. ii., page 14.) Garothman (Khordah-Avesta xlvii., 22.) (vol. iii., page 170.)

Gayo-marathan—" (= mortal life) is the Primeval Man, created with the Bull." (vol. ii., page 64.)

"Haoma—or Hom, which was the juice of a certain mountain plant, and held in the highest veneration as being the emblem of immortality." (vol. ii., p. 3.)

his vital principle. 33. There (in the other world) he goes up and down by destiny. [vol. i., page 41.]

54. The water bring I away, I who am AHURA-MAZDA, from the sea Vouru-kasha with wind and clouds; 55. I bring it to the corpses, I who am AHURA-MAZDA; I bring it to the Dakhma, I who am AHURA-MAZDA; I bring it to uncleanness, I who am

Haurvat—The lord of the waters. (vol. ii., page 29.) (Cf. vol. ii., page 91.)

Khordat. (vol. iii., pages 156, 160, 166.) One of the Amesha-spentas.

Isat-vastra—"Is the eldest son of Zarathustra. According to the Bundehesh, he died a hundred years after the promulgation of the law. He is regarded as the head of the priests." (vol. ii., page 79.)

Ized—See Yazata.

Kareshvares—"The seven parts which came into existence when the earth became softened by the water," etc. (vol. i., page 144.)

Khordah-Avesta—"Little Avesta," (vol. iii., page 2.)

Khshathra-vairya—"Is the lord and protector of metals;" one of the Amesha-spentas. (vol. ii., page 29.) Shahrevan. (vol. iii., page 165.) Khordah-Avesta xlvii., 6 below.

Khshnaothra—Signifies "the making contented," or "satisfying." (vol. ii., page 18.) "The technical expression for a particular kind of prayers." (vol. ii., page 43.) Translated *passim* "satisfaction" or "contentment." (vol. ii., page 43.)

Kingdom to AHURA—(vol. ii., pages 71 and 69.) See the Khordah-Avesta ii. (vol. iii., page 3.) Yasna xxviii., 3. (vol. ii., page 81) and Yasna xix., 35.

Kusti—"The religious girdle of the Parsees." (vol. iii., page 4.) Kosti: See the Khordah-Avesta, xlv., 19 below. (vol. iii., page 157.)

Manthra-spenta—The Holy Word. (vol. i., page 150); Vendidad, xix. 54, below (vol. i., page 139); Vispered, x., 29. (vol. ii., page 16); cf. Khordah-Avesta, xxix., 91 (vol. iii., page 91) etc.

MAZDA—"My name is Great Wise One (MAZDA)." (Khordah-Avesta, xvii, 14, below.) (vol. iii., page 23.) See AHURA-MAZDA, above.

Mazdayasnian law—[The meaning of Yasna being "offering with prayers." (vol. ii., page 2.) I infer that the phrase which occurs so frequently may be rendered "the law of those who worship God." For a brief statement of the law see Yasna, xlvii., 4, below, and cf. Yasna, xlv., 3. (vol. ii., pages 106 and 111.) (Khordah-Avesta, xlvii., 1.)]

Mithra—"The lord of light," (vol. ii., page 30.) "typified as the first sunbeams which illumine the mountain tops" (vol. iii., page 58); "the divinity who presides over contracts" (vol. i., page 31), "so that 'to lie to Mithra' and 'to break a contract or promise' are identical." (vol. i., page 31.) Vendidad, iv. (vol. i., page 30) and Khordah-Avesta, xxvi., below (vol. iii., page 57) Mithra-druja. breach of contract. (vol. i., page 30.) [Honesty the best policy: see the Khordah-Avesta, xxvi., 106, 116, below (vol. iii., pages 69, 70.) In the Mihr-Yasht (xxvi., 100,) (vol. iii., page 68), it is said: "On his right side marches the good Sraosha, the holy; on his left side marches Rashnus, the great, powerful." "Rashnu-razista is the genius of justice" (vol. ii., page 14), and Sraosha is Obedience, hearing (Yasna, lxx., below) (vol. ii., page 121); "In the older period Sraosha was sometimes held to be an invisible warning voice" (vol. ii., page 31); consequently we may see

AHURA-MAZDA; I pour it over the bones, I who am AHURA-MAZDA; I bring it away secretly, I who am AHURA-MAZDA. 56. I bring these things to the sea Puitika: they are seething in the midst of the sea. 57. Purified do the waters flow from out the sea Puitika to the sea Vouru-kasha. 58. To the Tree Hvapa. 59. There grow my trees, all, of all kinds. 60. These I cause to be rained down

here a picture of Fidelity supported by Justice and Conscience.] "Mithra, Sraosha, and Rashnu, are the three judges who are to judge the souls at the Bridge Chinvat." (vol. iii., page 155.) [The Mithra-liar (Khordah-Avesta, xxvi., 19, 38, below) (vol. iii., pages 59, 61), abhorred by every nation, may well feel doubt of heavenly protection.]

Myazda—"In the Avesta it is particularly employed of the flesh offered to AHURA-MAZDA and the genii" (vol. ii., page 39) [but it is expressly stated (vol. ii., page 2) that "the Parsees have no 'sacrifice' in the Jewish sense of that term."]

ORMAZD—The same as AHURA-MAZDA.

Parendi—"The goddess who presides over hidden treasures." (vol. ii., pages 14, 15.) See Ashis-vanuhi, above.

Saoshyans—See note to Vendidad, xix., 18, page 148 below (vol. i., page 143.)

Spendarmat—The same as Spenta-armaiti. (Khordah-Avesta, xlv., 14) (vol. iii., page 156.)

"Spenta-armaiti is 'perfect wisdom,' as well as the genius of the earth." (vol. ii., page 10.) One of the Amesha-spentas. "In the older writings, she is especially the goddess of wisdom." (vol. ii., page 29.) [The increase of goodness. (See in note ††, vol. i., page 138.)]

Spenta-Mainyu—[Holy Spirit], MAZDA-AHURA, see Yasna, xlvi., below (vol. ii., page 110); "as Spenta-mainyu upholds the heaven," etc. (Khordah-Avesta, xxix., 28) (vol. iii., page 84.) See Vendidad, xix., 33 (vol. i., page 138) and Yasna, xxvii., 7 (vol. ii., page 80.)

Sraosha—Obedience (Yasna, lix., 8) (vol. ii., page 128); hearing (Yasna, lv., i.) (vol. ii., page 121.) See *Amesha-spentas* and *Mithra* above.

Shahrevar—The same as Khshathra-vairya.

Verethraghna—Victory. (vol. ii., page 7.)

Vohu-mano—"Usually signifies one of the Amesha-spentas (Bahman)" (vol. i., page 143), "the protector of all living creatures." (vol. ii., page 29). "In this, [Haoima], as well as in many other cases in the Avesta, the same word is at once a *genius*, and the thing which is under the especial protection of the genius. Thus Vohu-mano may stand for either an Amesha-spenta or the living creation." (vol. ii., page 54.) "Although Vohu-mano is the highest of the creatures of AHURA-MAZDA, it is nowhere said that he himself has the power of creating." (vol. ii., page 18.) See the Khordah-Avesta, xvii., 37: "Here is Vohu-mano. MY CREATURE, O Zarathustra." (vol. iii., page 24.) MAN: (Vendidad, xix., 82) (vol. i., page 140.) "'The understanding of Vohu-maho' signifies 'goodmindedness,' that is, a disposition to perform good actions" (vol. ii., page 82) (Yasna, xxviii., 1). "the way of Vohu-mano" (Yasna, xxxiv., 13, below) (vol. ii., page 94.) "Destroy with evil deeds, from ignorance of Vohu-mano" (Yasna, xxxiv., 9) "Through Vohu-mano," etc. (Yasna, xlii., 13, below, an important passage) (vol. ii.,

from thence, I who am AHURA-MAZDA; 61. As food for the pure man, as fodder for the cow created by the good ((principle, AHURA-MAZDA)). 62. The corn may men eat, the pastures are for the cow created by the good ((principle)). 63. This is the Good, this is the Beautiful, as Thou who art pure sayest. [vol. i., page 42.]

64. By these words the pure AHURA-MAZDA rejoiced him, the pure Zarathustra. 65. Purity is the best thing for men after birth.* 66. This is purity, O Zarathustra! the Mazdayasnian law. 67. He who keeps himself pure by good thoughts, words, and deeds.

168. For AHURA-MAZDA does not throw away even things of the smallest value; 169. Not of the value of a thread; not even so

page 102.) "That desire I from Thee, through Vohu-mano." (Yasna, xlv., 9, below) (vol. ii., page 108.) Cf Yasna, xlv., 12. [WISDOM comes to men THROUGH GOOD WILL.—Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, xxi. (§ 871, page 116 above).] "Thou, the Holy, knowest also the hidden teachings, and he who resembles Thee, MAZDA, through the understanding of Vohu-mano. WHOSO MAKES THE MIND BETTER, and PERFORMS GOOD WORKS, he ACTS ACCORDING TO THE LAW with word and deed." (Yasna xlvii., 3, 4) (vol. ii., page 111.) "Who possesses the law THROUGH GOODMINDEDNESS," (Yasna, xlviii., 5) (vol. ii., page 112) "take to themselves contentment through Vohu-mano," (Yasna, xlvii., 12) (vol. ii., page 112.) "He is the holy man of wisdom, according to knowledge, words, and deeds, (to whom) according to the law, HOLY PURITY THROUGH VOHU-MANO, the kingdom AHURA-MAZDA has given," etc. (Yasna, l., 21) (vol. ii., page 117) [That is to say, in Kantic terminology; "GOOD WILL (by which is not meant a wish" (Ethics § 3 above: Semple, page 2) ("natio gratis anhelans, multa agendo, NIHIL AGENS"—Phaedrus, quoted by Kant in § 926)), GOOD WILL, the way of the Law, the door of the Kingdom, the Life everlasting.] "I believe in the pure law; by EVERY GOOD WORK seek I forgiveness for all sins." (Khordah-Avesta, xiv., 5, below) (vol. iii., page 15.) "The knowledge which concerns the Manthra-Spenta praise we. The Heavenly Understanding, created by MAZDA, praise we. The Understanding gifted with ears, created by MAZDA, praise we." (Khordah-Avesta, xlv., (ii.), 29, below) (vol. iii., page 152.)

Yasna—"Offering with prayers." (vol. ii., page 2.)

Yazata—"Worthy of honor," is the modern Persian Ized." (vol. i., page 19.)

"Yima was so pure that he could look at the sun, which blinds other men who are less pure" (vol. ii., page 55)—"became a sinner on account of pride and selfexultation [exaltation?], whereupon AHURA-MAZDA abandoned him," etc. (vol. ii., page 55.)

Zaota—Priest. (vol. ii., page 35.)

Zaothra—"Holy water" (vol. ii., page 3), "over which certain prayers have been recited at a particular time" (vol. ii., page 10)—"with the Zaothras of good-mindedness," etc., "of good speech," etc., "of good works" (Yasna, lxvii., 6-8) "seems here to be used for offering in general." (vol. ii., page 134.)

*Verse 65 is evidently an interpolation, and is written in the dialect of the second part of the Yasna. [vol. i., page 48.]

much in value: 170. As a single reel throws off in quantity. 171. If the Mazdayasnians throw on a dead* body 172. As much as a reel yields in quantity, 173. Then are they not pure in life, and after death they take no share in Paradise. 174. They fill up the place which is appointed for the wicked, 175. The dark, which comes from darkness. 176. Darkness. 177. This place ye make, ye who are wicked, THROUGH YOUR OWN DEEDS and your own law, the worst of places. [vol. i., page 47.]

VI., 54. Creator! If the Mazdayasnians, ((whilst)) going a-foot, running, riding, or driving, come to a dead body floating in the water: 55. How shall the Mazdayasnians act? 56. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: Laying aside their shoes, pulling off their clothes, 57. They shall remain there, O Zarathustra: 58. They shall go in, they shall drag the dead out of the water, O Zarathustra. [vol. i., page 53.]

92. Creator! Where shall we carry the bodies of the dead, O AHURA-MAZDA! where shall we lay them down? 93. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: On the highest place, O holy Zarathustra! 94. Where they are most perceived by carnivorous dogs and birds. 95. The Mazdayasnians shall fasten these dead bodies by their own feet and hair, 96. With iron, stone, or lead. 97. If not, then will the carnivorous dogs and birds carry away ((some)) of the bones to the water and to the trees. 98. Creator! if they do not fasten them, and the carnivorous dogs and birds take some of the bones to the water and the trees; 99. What is the punishment for this? 100. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: Strike their sinful bodies two hundred strokes with the horse-goad, two hundred with the Sraosho-charana. 101. Creator! Where shall we bring the carcasses of the dead, O AHURA-MAZDA! where shall we lay them down? 102. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: They shall turn them upward ((or, place them up high)), 103. Above the dogs, above the panthers, above the wolves, 104. So that they cannot be rained upon from above by the rain. 105. If the Mazdayasnians can, they shall lay them on stone, mortar, or carpet: 106. If they cannot, then they shall lay them down on the earth, on their own bed, and their own mat, exposed to the light, looking toward the Sun. [vol. i., pages 54, 55.]

VIII., 74. Creator! When any one emits his seed unwillingly, 75. What is the punishment for this? 76. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: Let them strike eight hundred strokes with the horse-goad, eight hundred with the Sraosho-charana. 77. Creator! If

*[Cf. Deuteronomy, xxvi., 14 (page 94 above).]

he willingly emits his seed, 78. What is the punishment for this? 79. What is the atonement for this? 80. What is the purification for this? 81. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA; For this there is no punishment, for this there is no atonement, for this there is no purification; 82. For these deeds which are inexpiable forever.

98. Creator! Who is a Daeva? who a Daeva-worshiper? 99. Who a companion of the Daevas? who a vessel of the Daevas? 100. Who a concubine of the Daevas? who a Daeva himself? 101. Who ((is)) wholly a Daeva? who is already before death a Daeva? who is after death a spiritual Daeva? 102. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: He who practices forbidden intercourse with men, or allows the same from them, O holy Zarathustra: 103. Such a one is a Daeva, such a one is a worshiper of the Daevas, such a one is a companion of the Daevas, such a one is a vessel of the Daevas, 104. Such a one is a paramour of the Daevas, such a one is a Daeva himself, such a one is wholly a Daeva, 105. Such a one is already before death a Daeva, he becomes after death a spiritual Daeva; 106. He who lies with man as man, or takes away seed from a man. [vol. i., page 73.] [I omit verses 107-310.]

IX., 161. For unwillingly, O holy Zarathustra, shines the sun upon the unclean, unwillingly the moon, unwillingly these stars. 162. For he who purifies makes content, he who removes the Nasus from the unclean, O holy Zarathustra; 163. He makes the fire content, he makes the water content, he makes the earth content, he makes the cattle content, he makes the trees content, he makes the pure man content, he makes the pure woman content. [vol. i., page 88.] [I omit verses 164-196.]

X., 35. Purity is the best thing for men after birth. 36. This is purity, O Zarathustra, the Mazdayasnian law. 37. He who keeps himself pure by good thoughts, words, and works. 38. As to the right purity of one's own body, that is the purification of every one in this corporeal world for his own state. 39. When he keeps himself pure by good thoughts, words, and works. [vol. i., page 93.]

XIII., 97. Creator! If a dog in a Mazdayasnian dwelling is not in his right senses and right understanding, 98. How shall the Mazdayasnians behave themselves? 99. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: They shall seek remedies for him just as for any pure man. 100. Creator! If he will not take it willingly, 101. How shall the Mazdayasnians act? 102. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: They shall put a piece of hewn wood on his head, they shall muzzle his mouth with it; the size of a bone of hard wood, double the size of soft; they shall bind him fast thereto, they shall chain him up; otherwise if this dog who is not in his right senses falls into a

cistern, a well, a pitfall, a stream, or running water, 103. And receives injury thereby; 104. If he injures himself thereby; 105. Then are they (the Mazdayasnians) sinners and Peshotanus thereby. 106. The dog have I made, O Zarathustra, with his own clothing and his own shoes; 107. With keen scent and sharp teeth. 108. Faithful to men, as a protection to the folds. 109. For I have made the dog, I who am AHURA-MAZDA. [vol. i., page 107.] [I omit verses 110-174.]

XV., 36. He who goes with a maiden (who is still with her parents or who is no longer with her parents, who is betrothed or not betrothed, and makes the same pregnant); 37. Then this maiden must not from shame of men inflict an injury herself upon the fruit of her body. 38. If this maiden from shame of men inflicts an injury on the fruit of her body. 39. Then she commits a sin for the parents, she wounds for the parents, for the parents shall they atone for the wound of the wounded with the punishment of the Baodho-varsta. 40. He who goes with a maiden, 41. (Who is still with her parents or no longer with her parents, who is betrothed or not betrothed, and makes her pregnant); If the maiden says: "The child is begotten by this man." 42. If then this man says: "Seek to make thyself friends with an old woman and ask her." 43. If then this maiden makes friends with an old woman and asks her; 44. And this old woman brings Bana or Shaeta, 45. Or Ghnana or Fraspata, or any one of the trees which make loose (the embryo); 46. (Saying): "Seek to kill this child." 47. If then this maiden seeks to kill the child, 48. Then the maiden, the man, and the old woman are alike guilty. [vol. i., page 116.] [I omit verses 49-137.]

XVIII., 11. He who lies the whole night without praising or without hearing; 12. Without reciting, without working, without learning, without teaching, desiring to win the soul; 13. He calls himself falsely an Athrava; do not call such a man an Athrava—thus spake AHURA-MAZDA—O pure Zarathustra. 14. Call him an Athrava—thus spake AHURA-MAZDA—O pure Zarathustra; 15. Who the whole night through asks the pure understanding; 16. (The understanding) which purifies from sins, which makes (the heart) large, and affords rewards at the bridge Chinvat; 17. Which makes us to reach the place, the purity, and the goodness of Paradise. 18. Ask Me, O pure! 19. Me, the Creator, the Holiest, Wisest, who willingly gives an answer when he is asked. 20. So will it be well with thee, so wilt thou attain to purity if thou askest Me.

51. Then this holy Sraosha wakes up the bird which bears the name of Parodars, O holy Zarathustra; 52. Whom evil-speaking

men call Kahrkatas. Then lifts up this bird his voice at every divine dawn: "Stand up, ye men, praise the best purity, destroy the Daevas, there runs up to you the Daeva Bushyansta with long hands, this sends to sleep again the whole corporeal world when it is awakened. Long sleep, O man, becomes thee not. Turn yourselves not away from the three best things, good thought, word, and work; turn yourselves away from the three evil things, evil thought, word, and work." 53. Then speaks he: "Friend, arise," to those who lie on the bed. 54. "Arise, it is day." (?) 55. Whoso first arises, he comes to Paradise. 56. Whoso first brings pure fire-wood to the fire (the son) of AHURA-MAZDA, with washed hands, 57. Him will the fire bless, contented without hate, and satisfied. [vol. i., page 129.]

70. The holy Sraosha asked the Drukhs, 71. With club uplifted (*i. e.* threatening her with his club): 72. "Drukhs, thou who eatest not and workest not," 73 "Art thou it alone in the corporeal world, which becomes pregnant without cohabitation?" 74. To him answered this Drukhs: Sraosha, Holy, Beautiful! 75. I do not in the whole corporeal world become pregnant without cohabitation. 76. There are four men like me; 77. These cover me as other men cover women by lying with (them). 78. The holy Sraosha asked the Drukhs, with club uplifted: Drukhs, thou who eatest not and laborest not, who is the first of these men? 79. Then answered him the Daevi Drukhs: Sraosha, Holy, Beautiful! 80. This is the first of these men: 81. If a man does not give the worthless garments, when he is begged for them,* to a pure man in purity and goodness. [vol. i., page 130.]

113. The holy Sraosha asked the Drukhs, with club uplifted: Drukhs, thou who eatest not and laborest not, who is the fourth of these men? 114. Then answered him the Daevi Drukhs: Sraosha, Holy, Beautiful! this is the fourth of these men. 115. If a man who is above fifteen years practices unchastity without Kosti and band: Immediately after the fourth pace we occupy him, his tongue and his feet.† 116. (Such men) are afterward able to go along in the world of purity as sorcerers, and to kill the corporeal world of purity. 117. The holy Sraosha asked the Drukhs, with club uplifted: Drukhs, thou who eatest not and laborest not, what is the atonement for him? 118. Hereupon answered him the Daevi Drukhs: Sraosha, Holy, Beautiful! 119. There is not an atone-

* If a man having means to give and does not give.—*Gujerati Translation.*

†The *Sad-der*; *Porta* lxix., says: "It is enjoined that thou beware of having intercourse with a harlot. Whoever has lain once with a harlot, intellect and knowledge will depart from him during forty days," etc. [vol. i., page 136.]

ment for him. 120. If a man after his fifteenth year rushes forward as a paramour without Kosti and band : when he has made four steps immediately we do occupy him, his tongue and his feet ; 121. He is afterward able to go along in the corporeal world as a slayer and a sorcerer, he slays the corporeal world of purity. [vol. i., page 132.] [I omit verses 122-152.]

XIX., 16. Zarathustra informed Anra-mainyus : " Evil-witting Anra-mainyus ! 17. I will smite the creation which was created by the Daevas, I will smite the Nasus which the Daevas have created. 18. I will smite the Pari whom one prays to (?)* until Saoshyans† (*i. e.* the Profiting) is born, the victorious, out of the water Kansaoya. 19. From the east region, from the eastern regions." 20. Him answered Anra-mainyus, who has created the wicked creatures : 21. " Do not slay my creatures, O pure Zarathustra ! 22. Thou art the son of Pourushaspa, and hast life from a (mortal) mother. 23. Curse‡ the good Mazdayasnian law. obtain happiness as Vadhaghna, the lord of the regions, has obtained it." 24. Him answered the holy Zarathustra : 25. " I will not curse the good Mazdayasnian law ; 26. Not if bones, soul, and vital-power, were to separate themselves asunder." 27. Him answered Anra-mainyus who has created the evil creatures : 28. By whose word wilt thou smite, by whose word wilt thou annihilate, by what well-made arms (smite) my creatures, Anra-mainyus ? " 29. Him answered the holy Zarathustra : 30. " Mortar, cup, Haoma, and the words which AHURA-MAZDA has spoken : 31. These are my best weapons ; 32. By this word will I smite, by this word will I annihilate, by these well-formed weapons (smite) O evil Anra-mainyus. 33. Which SPENTA-MAINYUS (*i. e.* AHURA-MAZDA) created ; he created in the infinite time." [vol. i., pages 137, 138.]

36. The pure Zarathustra spake : This, I ask thee : tell me the right, O LORD ! 39. How shall I protect them from this Drukhs, from the evil Anra-mainyus ! || 40. How shall I take away the uncleanness, that of ((a man's)) self, how the uncleanness through others. how the Nasus from this Mazdayasnian dwelling-place ? 41. How shall I purify the pure man, how shall I bring purification to the pure woman ? [vol. i., page 138.]

42. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA : " Praise thou, O Zarathustra, the good Mazdayasnian law. 43. Praise thou, O Zarathustra, these

*Idol worship.—*Guj. Tr.* †Saoshyans is the future part. of *su* = " to profit," and denotes the King, the Savior, who is expected by the Parsees to come at the end of all things and accomplish the resurrection, after which he will establish a kingdom full of untroubled happiness. [vol. i., page 143.] ‡Forsake.—*Guj. Tr.* || Evil understanding.—*Guj. Tr.*

Amesha-spentas (which rule) over the earth, consisting of seven Keshvars [Kareshvares]. 44. Praise thou, O Zarathustra, the self-created firmament, the infinite time, the air, which works on high. 45. Praise thou, O Zarathustra, the swift wind created by AHURA-MAZDA; Spenta-armaiti, the fair daughter of AHURA-MAZDA. 46. Praise thou, O Zarathustra, my Fravashis (Ferver) AHURA-MAZDA's; 47. The greatest, best fairest, strongest, most understanding, best formed, highest in holiness; 48. Whose soul is the holy word. 49. Of thyself, praise thou, O Zarathustra, this creation of AHURA-MAZDA's. [vol. i., pages 138, 139.]

50. Zarathustra gave me for answer: 51. I praise AHURA-MAZDA, the Creator of the pure creation. 52. I praise Mithra who has a great territory, the victorious, the most brilliant of the victorious, the most victorious of the victorious. 53. I praise Sraosha, the holy, beautiful, who holds a weapon in his hands against the head of the Daevas. 54. I praise the holy word,* the very brilliant. 55. I praise the heaven, the self-created, the never-ending time, the air which works above. 56. I praise the wind, the swift, which AHURA-MAZDA has created, and Spenta (Armaiti), the fair daughter of AHURA-MAZDA. 57. I praise the good Mazdayasnian law, the law against the Daevas from Zarathustra. [vol. i., page 139.]

67. Zarathustra asked AHURA-MAZDA: All-wise AHURA-MAZDA! 68. Thou art without sleep, Thou art without drunkenness, Thou who art AHURA-MAZDA! 69. Vohu-mano (man) defiles (himself) directly. Vohu-mano defiles (himself) indirectly, by the body which the Daevas have slain, by the Daeva he defiles (himself) ((how)) is Vohu-mano (man) clean?† [vol. i., page 140.] [The formal directions for purification, verses 70-80, I omit.]

81. Let Vohu-mano (the man) fumigate it (the garment.) 82. Purified is Vohu-mano, purified is the man. 83. Let Vohu-mano lift up (the garment) with the left arm on the right, with the right arm on the left. 84. Let Vohu-mano say: Praise to AHURA-MAZDA, praise to the Amesha-spentas, praise to the rest of the pure.

85. Zarathustra asked AHURA-MAZDA: All-wise AHURA-MAZDA! 86. Shall I invite‡ the holy man, shall I invite the holy woman, shall I invite the sinful of the evil-Daeva-worshipping men? 87. Shall they spread abroad over the earth running water, growing fruits of the field, and other goods?|| 88. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA! Invite,¶ O pure Zarathustra. [vol. i., pages 140-141]

*The Manthra Spenta.—*Guj. Tr.* †The chief difficulty of this verse lies in the word Vohu-mano, which usually signifies one of the Amesha-spentas (Bahman). The *Huz. Tr.* explains it by "man," but the word should be translated here "the good-minded." [page 144.] ‡Will they rise? (An allusion to the resurrection).—*Guj. Tr.* ¶And him who spreads, etc., running water, him who grows fruit, etc.—*Guj. Tr.* ¶They shall rise.—*Guj. Tr.*

89. Creator ! Where are those tribunes, where do they assemble, where do they come together, at which a man of the corporeal world gives account for his soul ?* 90. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA : After the man is dead, after the man is departed, after his going, the wicked evil-knowing Daevas do work (?). 91. In the third night, after the coming and lighting of the dawn. 92. And when the victorious Mithra places himself on the mountains with pure splendor ; 93. And the brilliant sun arises ; 94. Then the Daeva Vizaresho by name, O holy Zarathustra, leads the souls bound, the sinful-living, of the wicked Daeva-worshiping men. 95. To the ways which were created by Time, comes he who is godless and he who is holy. 96. To the bridge Chinvat (comes he) the created by AHURA-MAZDA, where they interrogate the consciousness and the soul regarding the conduct 97. Practiced in the corporeal world. 102. Vohu-mano arises from his golden throne. 103. Vohu-mano speaks : How hast thou, O Pure ! come hither ? 104. From the perishable world to the imperishable world ? 105. The pure souls go contented, 106. To the golden thrones of AHURA-MAZDA, of the Amesha-spentas ; 107. To Garo-nemana, the dwelling of AHURA-MAZDA, the dwelling of the Amesha-spentas, the dwelling of the other pure. 108. The smell of the soul of the pure man, who has purified himself, does so affright the bad evil-witting Daevas, 109. As sheep enclosed by wolves do dread these wolves. 110. The pure men are together with him ; 111. Nairyosanha is together with him. 112. A messenger of AHURA-MAZDA is Nairyosanha. 113. Of thyself praise, O Zarathustra, the Creation of AHURA-MAZDA.

114. Zarathustra gave me for answer : 115. I praise AHURA-MAZDA, who has made the pure creation. 116. I praise the earth which AHURA has created, the water which AHURA has created, and the pure trees : 117. I praise the sea, Vouru-kasha ; 118. I praise the shining heaven ; 119. I praise the lights without a beginning,† the self-created ; 120. I praise the best place of the pure (Paradise), the shining, adorned with all brightness. 121. I praise Garo-nemana, the abode of AHURA-MAZDA, the abode of the Amesha-spentas, the abode of the other pure. 122. I praise the mid-world, the self-created, and the bridge Chinvat created by AHURA-MAZDA. [vol. i., page 142.] [I omit verses 123-147, and the whole of Fargards xx.-xxii.]

*This passage is an important one, and, taken in conjunction with verse 26, is a proof that at the time the Vendidad was composed the resurrection of the body was not recognized by the Parsees. The souls of the pious go direct to Paradise, and the souls of the wicked to hell. In the Khordah-Avesta, xxxviii., there is a similar account of the future state, but with many amplifications. [page 144.]

†Innumerable.—*Guj. Tr.*

EXTRACTS FROM THE VISPERED.

II., 8. Here by means of the Zaothra and Baresma I wish hither with praise: him who thinks on the lord,* the pure man who holds fast (in remembrance), 9. The well thinking in thoughts, the well-speaking in speech, the well-doing in works. 10. He who holds fast (in remembrance) Spenta-armaiti,† namely, the Manthra of the profiting.‡ 11. Through whose deeds the worlds of the pure increase. 18. Here by means of the Zaothra and Baresma I wish hither with praise: the pure lord of purity, provided with overseers and lords, for this is the LORD and MASTER, AHURA-MAZDA. [vol. ii., page 9.] [Omit verses 19-34].

III., 18. The young man who thinks well, speaks well, acts well, who is devoted to the law, I desire. I desire the youth who utters the words.|| Those who have married amongst kindred I desire. 19. I invite the furtherers of the region, I desire the willing worshippers. I desire the mistresses of the house. 20. I desire the woman who especially thinks good, speaks good, does good, lets herself be commanded well, who obeys her lord, the pure. 22. I desire the pure man, who especially thinks, speaks and does good. 23. Who knows the faith, does not know sins. 24. Through whose deeds the worlds increase in purity. [vol. ii., page 11.] [Omit verses 25-31.]

V., 1. We praise that which is thought in the soul, 2. And the good knowledge, the good holiness, the good wisdom, the good STEADFASTNESS. [vol. ii., page 12.] [I omit verses 3-6.]

X., 28. For the helpful purity, the helpful prayer at the right time. 29. For the Manthra-spenta, for the Mazdayasnian law, for the prayer of praise belonging to the Yasna. 30. For all times, for all prayers at the right time. 31. For the whole world of purity, for offering, prayer, pacification and praise. May the hearing be here as in the beginning so in the end. [vol. ii., page 16.]

XIV., 5. We teach the well-arranged adorations. 6. Of the Ahuna-vairya [Khordah-Avesta, ii., below] which is now recited with purity, which will be recited in future. 8. The right-spoken discourses, the Zarathustrian prayers, the well-performed ACTIONS, the Baresmas which are bound together in purity, the Haomas prepared with purity, the prayers which are employed in the Yasna,

*That is, he who has the holy writings in his memory, and hence keeps them before his eyes. There is no single equivalent word in any European language. †Spenta-armaiti is "perfect wisdom," as well as the genius of the earth. In both capacities she is *feminine*. In this verse the former meaning of the word must be adopted. ‡By "the profitable" (Saoshyanto) is meant a kind of prophets, or persons who have devoted themselves particularly to the Zarathustrian doctrines. [vol. ii., page 10.] ||That is, prayers.

the thoughts, words, AND DEEDS of the Mazdayasnian law, 9. May they now be salutary to us; we give these salutary (things) to the creatures, we announce these salutary (things), we think on these salutary (things), which AHURA-MAZDA, the Pure, has created. [vol. ii., page 20.] [I omit verses 10-17.]

XV., 1. As pure we praise AHURA-MAZDA, as pure we praise the Amesha-spentas, as pure we praise the true discourse; 2. As pure we praise all Manthras, (as pure) we praise Zarathustra, who is provided with Manthras. [vol. ii., page 21.] [I omit verses 3-7.]

XVI., 1. With the efficacious prayers, with the texts, with the commentaries, 2. With questions, with counter questions, with measured texts, 3. The well-spoken, 4. Those which shall be well spoken, 5. The well-praised, 6. Those which shall be well praised, 7. According to the own wisdom, 8. According to the own publishing, 9. According to the own will, 10. According to the own rule, 11. According to the own supremacy, 12. According to the own wish, 13. Of AHURA-MAZDA, let one speak, (I praise) for increase for the believing mind, from the memory.*

XVII., 1. Ahuna-vairya, the pure lord of purity, we praise. 2. Him who possesses rulers and lords we praise, the pure LORD of purity, for he is the LORD AND MASTER, AHURA-MAZDA. [vol. ii., page 21.] [I omit verses 3, 4.]

XVIII., 1. Keep ready feet, hands, and understanding, O Mazdayasnians, Zarathustrians, 2. For the PERFORMANCE OF GOOD WORKS according to the law† and the commandment, 3. For the avoidance of unlawful, forbidden, wicked works. 4. Accomplish here good deeds. 5. Afford help to the helpless. [vol. ii., page 22.] [I omit verses 6-16.] [See Yasna, xlvii., 4, below.]

XXI., 3. Happiness for the pure man praise we. 4. The entire prosperity praise we, the coming to nought‡ is for wicked men. [vol. ii., page 23.] [I omit verse 5.]

XXIII., 2. The right-spoken discourse praise we, the victorious (words) which smite the Daevas praise we. 3. This reward praise we, this health praise we, 4. This remedy we praise. 5. This advancement we praise, this spreading abroad we praise, this victory we praise, 6. Which is in (the Gatha) Vohu-khshathra and Vahistoisti. 7. In order, through the utterance of good thoughts,

*Not clear; in fact, the whole chapter is full of difficulties. †[See Yasna, xlvii., 4, below.] ‡[Cf. Deuteronomy, xxxiii., 26, 27. (Douay ed.): "There is no other God like the God of the rightest: he that is mounted upon the heaven is thy helper. By his magnificence the clouds run hither and thither. His dwelling is above, and underneath are the everlasting arms: he shall cast out the enemy from before thee, and shall say: Be thou brought to nought." Cf. page 101 above.]

words and works, 8. To withstand evil thoughts, words, and works, 9. For an atonement for my false thoughts, words, and works. [Omit verse 10, and all of Vispered, xxiv.-xxvii.]

EXTRACTS FROM THE YASNA.

I., 1. I invite and announce *to: the Creator AHURA-MAZDA, the Brilliant, Majestic, Greatest, Best, Most Beautiful, 2. The Strongest, Most Intellectual, of the best body, the highest through holiness; 3. Who is very wise, who rejoices afar, 4. Who created us, who formed us, who keeps us, the Holiest among the heavenly.

47. I invite and announce to: the Fravashis of the pure, the strong, very mighty, the Fravashis of those who had the first belief, the Fravashis of the nearest relations, the Fravashi of (my) own soul. 48. I invite and announce to: all lords of purity. 49. I invite and announce to: all those who have good wisdom, the genii of heaven, and the world worthy of adoration, who are to be worshiped and praised on account of the best purity.

56. If I have pained thee, 57. Be it with thoughts, be it with words, be it with works, 58. Be it willingly, be it against (my) will, 59. I praise thee (now) there-for; I invite thee, if I have neglected thee in praise and prayer. 60. All ye lords. greatest, pure, lords of purity. 61. If I have pained you, 62. Be it with thoughts, be it with words, be it with works, 63. Be it willingly, be it unwillingly, 64. I praise you (now) there-for, I invoke you, if I have neglected you in praise and prayer. 65. I profess (myself) as a Mazdayasnian, a follower of Zarathustra, an adversary of the Daevas, a worshiper of AHURA. [vol. ii., pages 28, 29.] [I omit verses 66-68.]

III., 16. The well-thought, well-spoken, and well-performed† words, I wish hither with praise. 17. The singing of the Gathas,

*The sense appears to be this: "I invite the spiritual presence of AHURA-MAZDA and all the good Genii, and I announce to them that I am about to perform the proper religious rites." The first word of the Vispered, *Nivaedhayemi* (or *nivedhyemi*) has been variously translated, "I invite," and "I invoke." The second word, *Hankarayemi* (or *hankaryemi*), is rendered by Professor Spiegel, "Ich thue es kund," "Ich verkuendige es," and "Ich verkuende es," which are almost synonymous phrases, signifying, "I make known to," "I announce to," "I proclaim to," etc. Neriösengh has, "I accomplish," or "I make perfect;" and the Sanskrit gloss explains this of the accomplishment of the sacrifice, or the celebration of the Yasna in honor of Hormazd. Wilson (*The Parsi Religion*, etc.) translates, "I celebrate," but this is certainly erroneous. [Note to Vispered, i., 1 (vol. ii., page 5), which is referred to at this place.] †See note to Vispered, xxii., 6, [where it will be seen that "well-performed Manthras" (vol. ii., page 24) is equivalent to "ACTIONS agreeing with the Manthras and their precepts."]

I wish hither with praise.* 18. The well-made Manthras, I wish hither with praise. 19. The lordship, holiness, righteousness, and the prayer at the right time, I wish hither with praise. 20. For contentment of the pure Yazatas, heavenly and earthly, for the satisfaction of (my) own soul. [page 36.] [I omit verses 21-71.]

VI., 37. AHURA-MAZDA, the brilliant, majestic, praise we. 38. The good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise we. 39. Thee, the fire, the son of AHURA-MAZDA, the pure, lord of purity, praise we; together with all fires. 40. The good waters, the best, created by MAZDA, pure, praise we. All waters created by MAZDA, pure, praise we; all trees created by MAZDA, pure, praise we. 41. The Manthra-spenta, the very shining, praise we. 42. The law, that given against the Daevas, praise we. 43. The Zarathustrian law praise we. 44. The long precept praise we, the good Mazdayasnian law praise we. [vol. ii., pages 44, 45.] [I omit verses 45-56.]

VII., 9. With purity I offer: well-thought, well-spoken, well-performed words. 10. With purity I offer: the recitation of the Gathas. 11. With purity I offer: the well-made Manthra. 12. With purity I offer: this lordship, holiness, punctuality, the right prayer, for the satisfaction of the heavenly and earthly, pure Yazatas, for the satisfaction of our own soul. [vol. ii., page 46.] [Omit verses 13-69.]

VIII., 10. According to desire, and with happiness, mayest Thou rule over Thy creatures, AHURA-MAZDA. 11. Over the water, as Thou wilt over the trees, as Thou wilt over all good that has a pure origin. 12. Make that the pure may rule, the impure may not rule. 13. May the pure rule as he will, may the godless not rule as they will. 14. May the foe disappear, driven away by the creatures of SPENTA-MAINYUS, conquered, not ruling as he would. 15. I urge, I who am Zarathustra, the first of the families, clans, societies, regions,† 16. To thinking, speaking, and acting, according to this law which originates from AHURA and Zarathustra. 17. The wide extent and brightness of the whole creation of purity, I bless. 18. The narrowness and trouble of the whole evil creation, I bless. [vol. ii., pages 49-50.]

IX., 86. What man in this house, this clan, this society, this region, is revengeful? 87. From his feet take away strength, 88. Cast a shadow on his spirit, 89. Inflict a blow on his spirit.

*The words, "I wish hither with praise," run in the translations, "I wish hither for this offering, or in this offering." Amongst the Parsees, "offering" and "worship" are so closely connected that it is difficult to find a suitable expression in another language. [Extract from the note (vol. ii., page 35) to Yasna, ii., 1-10.] †Although these words are placed in the mouth of Zarathustra, it is more than doubtful whether they belong to him.

97. Against the head of the wicked, profligate, hindering men,
 98. Come hither with a weapon for the pure, to protect the body,
 O golden Haoma. 99. Against the very wicked, impure destroyer
 of the world, who certainly has in remembrance the words of this
 law, BUT DOES NOT PERFORM, 100. Come hither with a weapon for
 the pure, to protect the body, O golden Haoma. [vol. ii., page 54.]
 [I omit verses 101-103.]

X., 45. To five I belong, to five I belong not. 46. I belong to
 those who think good; to those who think evil I belong not. 47.
 I belong to those who speak good; to those who speak evil I be-
 long not. 48. I belong to those who do good; to those who do evil
 I belong not. 49. I belong to those who hear, not to those who
 hear not. 50. I belong to the pure, not to the bad. [vol. ii., page
 58. [I omit verses 51-65.]

XI., 1. Three beings, manifestly pure, which bring words of
 blessing with them, curse: 2. The cow, the horse, and Haoma. 3.
 The cow curses him who keeps her: 4. Mayest thou remain with-
 out posterity, ever continuing of evil report, 5. Thou who dost not
 distribute to me food, 6. And yet causest me to labor for thy wife,
 thy children, and thine own belly. [vol. ii., page 60.] [I omit
 verses 7-27.]

XII., 1. I praise the well-thought, well-spoken, well-performed
 thoughts, words, and works. 2. I lay hold on all good thoughts,
 words, and works. 3. I abandon all evil thoughts, words, and
 works. 4. I bring to you, O Amesha-spentas, 5. Praise and
 adoration, 6. With thoughts, words, and works, with heavenly
 mind, the vital strength of my own body. [vol. ii., page 62.] [Cf.
 Romans, xii., 1, 2.]

XIII., 3. To AHURA-MAZDA, the good, indued with good wisdom,
 I offer all good. 4. To the Pure, Rich, Majestic: 5. Whatever are
 the best goods to Him, to whom the cow, to whom purity belongs,
 from whom arises the light, the brightness which is inseparable
 from the lights. 6. Spenta-armaiti, the good, choose I, may she
 belong to me. 7. By my praise will I save the cattle from theft
 and robbery, 8. (To keep far off) hurt and affliction from the
 Mazdayasnian clans. 9. I promise to the heavenly free course,
 dwelling according to their desire. 10. That they may dwell on
 this earth with the cattle. 12. May I not hereafter bring harm and
 affliction on the Mazdayasnian clans. 13. Not on account of love
 for the body, not for the love of life. 16. I deny to the Daevas, to
 those possessed with Daevas, to the sorcerers, the possessed by
 sorcerers, to all evil beings: 17. I deny with thoughts, words,
 works, and tokens, rule to those that are bad and fearful. 18. Thus

has AHURA-MAZDA commanded Zarathustra, 19. In all questionings, in all meetings in which AHURA-MAZDA and Zarathustra conversed with one another. 20. So also has Zarathustra renounced the rule of the Daevas, 21. In all questionings, in all meetings in which AHURA-MAZDA and Zarathustra conversed with one another. 22. Thus I also, as a Mazdayasnian, a follower of Zarathustra, renounce the rule of the Daevas, as the pure Zarathustra has renounced them. 27. I praise the well-thought sentiment, the well-spoken speech, the well-performed action. I praise the good Mazdayasnian law, the free from doubt, removing strife. 29. To AHURA-MAZDA I offer every good. Let this be the land of the Mazdayasnian law. [vol. ii., pages 62, 63.]

XIV., 1. I invoke AHURA-MAZDA, the LORD of the head of the house, the LORD of the lord of the clan, the LORD of the chief of the confederacy, the LORD over the lord of the regions. 12. Thus thinks the heavenly, so he speaks, so he acts, 13. As Thou, O AHURA-MAZDA, hast thought, spoken, created, and made what is good; 14. So we also give to Thee, offer, and praise, drawing nigh; 15. So we adore Thee, so we pray to Thee, O AHURA-MAZDA. 16. Through the existence of the good self, the good holiness, come we to Thee. [vol. ii., pages 63, 64.] [I omit verses 17-19.]

XVII., 9. The law of Zarathustra praise we. 10. The faith and the forthcoming* of Zarathustra we praise. 11. The pure-wishing, the fore-created,† pure creatures in both worlds, we praise. 12. The Creator AHURA-MAZDA, the Bright, Majestic, we praise. 34. The Creator, AHURA-MAZDA, praise we. 35. The good Mazdayasnian law praise we. 38. The heavens praise we. 39. The earth, the well-created, praise we. 40. The Manthra-spenta praise we. 41. The beginningless lights, the illimitable, praise we.‡ 42. The brilliant deeds of purity praise we, 43. At which the souls of the deceased rejoice, the Fravashis of the pure. 44. We praise the best place of the pure, the illumining, wholly brilliant. 50. We praise all waters, we praise all trees, 51. We praise all good men, we praise all good women. 52. We praise all heavenly Yazatas and all earthly, the well-created, pure. 53. We praise thee (our) dwelling-place, Spenta-armaiti (earth). 54. We praise Thee, LORD of the dwell-

*The two words rendered "faith" and "forthcoming" are almost synonymous. Perhaps the former refers to spiritual belief, and the latter to the practice of religion. †That is, those who taught prior to the coming of Zarathustra. ‡Besides all the good lights of the creation of AHURA-MAZDA, the Mazdayasnians honor the "Primeval Light," from which all the others are derived, and in which, according to the Bundehesh, AHURA-MAZDA himself dwells. Opposed to this was "Primeval Darkness," the abode of Anra-mainyus. The Aryan race appear to have devoted themselves especially to the worship of light.

ling-place, Pure AHURA-MAZDA. [vol. ii., pages 66, 67.] [I omit verses 55-74.]

XIX., 27. This speech* was taught for us, for every being, to learn and to meditate, on account of the best purity. 28. He who utters this, 29. He who recognizes Him as LORD and MASTER, who teaches Him, AHURA-MAZDA, to the creatures, who are the first in understanding. 30. He who resigns himself to Him, the Greatest of all, he teaches also His creatures to know Him as the Greatest. 35. He brings "the kingdom of AHURA,"—it is thy kingdom. O MAZDA, he prays consequently "food for the poor." [vol. ii., page 69.]

37. All the words which are uttered, every word springs from AHURA-MAZDA. 38. The Best AHURA-MAZDA has spoken the Ahuna-vairya, the Best has made it perfect. 39. Swiftly went the bad away, when it was spoken against the bad. 40. On account of this utterance against them. 41. May they (the bad spirits) neither to our souls, nor teaching, nor to our understanding, 42. Nor to our faith, nor to our prayers, nor to actions, 43. Nor to our law, nor to our souls, adhere. [vol. ii., pages 69, 70.]

44. This speech which AHURA-MAZDA has spoken contains three heads, four professions, five rulers, it is brought to the end through the offering.† 45. Which are the heads? To think, speak, and do good.‡ 46. Which the professions? Priests, warriors, husbandmen, and artizans.|| 47. All renown unites itself with the pure man through true thinking, speaking, and acting; 48. As it is taught by the lord according to the teaching of the law. 49. Through his deeds the worlds increase in purity. [vol. ii., page 70.]

53. What is well thought? Purity, by the beings first in understanding. 54. What well-spoken? The Manthra-spenta. 55. What well done? (What is done) with hymns by the beings first in purity. 56. AHURA-MAZDA has spoken (the Ahuna-vairya), to whom has he spoken? To the pure in heaven and in the world. 57. In what capacity has he spoken the speech? As best king. 58. To whom? To the best pure, not ruling at will.

XXV., 17. The most righteous wisdom, created by MAZDA, pure, praise we, the good Mazdayasnian law praise we. 18. The Manthra-spenta, the very brilliant, praise we, the law against the Daevas praise we, the Zarathustrian law praise we, the long pre-

*[The prayer Ahuna-vairya. (Khordah-Avesta, ii., below).] † Perhaps the meaning is that the Ahuna-vairya contains all the fundamental regulations of the Zarathustrian state, and at the end of the prayer charity is inculcated. ‡ [That is, I suppose, these are "the works in the world for MAZDA," stated generally.] || [That is, I suppose, the prayer Ahuna-vairya, which (like the Law itself) knows no distinction of persons, is to be spoken by all professions and by all rulers. (Cf. St. Luke, xx., 21: Deuteronomy, x. 17; § 519).]

cept praise we, the good Mazdayasnian law praise we, the spreading abroad of the Manthra-spenta praise we, the keeping in mind the good Mazdayasnian law praise we, the knowledge of the Manthra-spenta praise we, the heavenly wisdom created by MAZDA praise we, the wisdom heard with the ears, created by MAZDA, praise we. [vol. ii., pages 77, 78.] [I omit verses 19-24.]

XXVI., 1. The good, mighty, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise I, 2. Invoke I, make I my own;—I praise (the Fravashis) of the dwellings, clans, confederacies, regions, those of the priests. 3. All the earlier Fravashis praise we here: the Fravashi of AHURAMAZDA, 4. The Greatest, Best, Fairest, 5. The Strongest, Most Intelligent, Best Formed. 6. The Highest on account of His purity. 7. The good, mighty, holy Fravashis of the pure praise we. 8. Of the Amesha-Spentas, the kings, beholding at will, 9. The great, mighty, strong, proceeding from AHURA, 10. Who are imperishable, the pure of the first faith, the first disciples. 11. We praise the place, the law, the consciousness, the souls, the Fravashis of the pure men and women here,* 12. Who were protectors of purity. 21. We praise the souls of the pure deceased here, which are† Fravashis of the pure. 22. We praise the Fravashis of all the pure relations, the Aethrapaitis,‡ deceased in this dwelling, of the disciples, of the men and women, the pure here. 23. The Fravashis of all pure Aethrapaitis praise we. 24. The Fravashis of all pure disciples praise we. 25. The Fravashis of all pure men praise we. 26. The Fravashis of all pure women praise we. 27. The Fravashis of all youths,|| the pious, pure, praise we. 28. The Fravashis of all the pure who belong to the region, praise we. 29. The Fravashis of all the pure beyond the region, praise we. 30. The Fravashis of the pure men praise we. 31. The Fravashis of the pure women praise we. 32. All the good, mighty, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise we, 33. From Gayo-marathan unto Saoshyans, the

*"The pure men and women *here*," signifies "those who were pure during their lives in this world." In this verse we find a three-fold division of the soul. *Baodho* is "spiritual activity;" *Urean* (= "the soul") is the Will, or the ability to choose between good and bad; *Fravashi*, which is usually applied to the power which holds body and soul together, seems here to be equivalent to "the conscience." In the later systems the soul was made to consist of *five* parts. †[Cf. Confucius, Analects, XI., xi.; Doctrine of the Mean, xvi., 2 (§ 871, pages 112, 129 above).] ‡Aethrapaiti (= Herbed) signifies properly "the lord of the precept," and the phrase is applied to one who has given proofs of his acquaintance with the truths of the Zarathustrian religion. || By "the pious youths," are meant those who, though not of sufficient age to understand all the duties of a Mazdayasnian, are nevertheless learning and practicing them to the best of their ability.

victorious. 34. All Fravashis of the pure praise we. 35. The souls of the deceased praise we, which are the Fravashis of the pure. [See verse 21 above.] [vol. ii., pages 78, 79.]

Extracts from the Gathas.—I. Gatha Ahunavaiti.*

YASNA, XXVIII. (Good is the thought, good the speech, good the work of the pure Zarathustra.—May the Amesha-spentas accept the Gathas,—Praise be to you, pure songs.)†

1. I desire by my prayer with uplifted hands this joy :

First the entirely pure works of the Holy Spirit, MAZDA,

(Then) the understanding of VOHU-MANO,‡ (and that) which rejoices the soul of the Bull.||

2. I draw near to You,§ O AHURA-MAZDA, WITH GOOD-MINDED-NESS,

Give me for both these (worlds), the corporeal as well as the spiritual,

Gifts arising out of purity, which make joyful in brightness.¶

3. I praise you first, O Asha and Vohu-mano,

And AHURA-MAZDA, to whom belongs an imperishable kingdom,

* We now commence what is termed the *second* part of the Yasna, which is written in a dialect older than the language of the rest of the Avesta. It has already been mentioned [vol. ii., page 2] that the *Gathas* are a species of religious Hymns, bearing more or less resemblance to the Vedic Hymns. They are, however, extremely difficult and obscure; and the translator regrets that many passages are quite unintelligible, and more very nearly so. Still further obscurity arises from the necessity of translating each line separately, so as to make it correspond exactly with the original Zend. In Professor Spiegel's translation this difficulty is less felt, because the German case-system enables the reader to perceive at a glance which are nominatives and which accusatives, etc., and which are the adjectives belonging to their respective nouns; whereas in English the slightest inversion, or transposition, leads to inevitable confusion. The translator wishes to state that he has made this part of the translation as strictly *literal* as possible, not presuming to hazard conjectures of his own. He hopes however, that Professor Spiegel's "Commentary" will render the Gathas at least tolerably intelligible, which is more than can be said of them at present. [vol. ii., page 81.] † ["The Revealed Thought, the Revealed Word, the Revealed Deed of Zarathustra the Holy; the Archangels first sang the Gathas." Heading of the first Gatha, a translation which I find in Chambers' Encyclopedia (vol. x., page 343, ed., 1874) art. Zendavesta.] [In a note here (Bleek, vol. ii., page 82) it is stated that] the words in parentheses do not belong to the Gathas; they appear to be a liturgical addition. ‡ "The understanding of Vohu-mano," signifies "goodmindedness," that is, a disposition to perform good actions. || According to the Gloss, the soul of the Bull is desired to be rejoiced, that it may protect the herds. § The plural of "You" is employed because AHURA-MAZDA is reckoned amongst the Amesha-spentas, of whom he is Supreme Lord. ¶ That is, gifts which will rejoice us in the other world.

- May Armaiti, to grant gifts, come hither at my call.
4. I who have entrusted the soul to heaven with good disposition,
 Acquainted with the reward for the actions of AHURA-MAZDA,
 So long as I can and am able will I teach according to the wish
 of the pure. [vol. ii., page 81.]
5. Asha!* when shall I behold thee and Vohu-mano with knowl-
 edge?
 (When shall I see) the place which belongs to AHURA-MAZDA,
 the Most Profitable, which is shown by Sraosha?
 These Manthras are the greatest thing, we teach them to those
 of evil tongue. [vol. ii., page 82.]
11. I keep for ever purity AND GOOD-MINDEDNESS.
 Teach Thou me, MAZDA-AHURA, from out Thyself,
 From heaven through Thy mouth whereby the world first
 arose.
- XXIX., 4. MAZDA is it, who remembers best the words which
 He has made before,
 Ere Daevas and men were, and which He will make again
 hereafter.
 AHURA has the determination, may it happen with us as He
 will.
5. Now call I with uplifted hands zealously to AHURA-MAZDA :
 For my soul and that of the three-year-old bull: for wisdom
 in doubtful questions.
 May he not perish who leads a pure life, not the active with-
 out the wicked.
6. Then spake AHURA-MAZDA, who knows the impure through
 His wisdom :
 "Not can a lord be found, nor a master who proceeds from
 purity,
 I, the Creator, have created thee for the industrious and for
 the active." [vol. ii., pages 83, 84.] [Stanzas 7-11 I omit.]
- XXX., 1. I announce this for those who desire after what MAZDA
 created for the prudent :
 The praises for AHURA which are to be sounded by man,
 Those to be well thought with purity, the beautiful through
 their brightness, the friendly.
2. Let him hear the best with the ears, let him see the clear with
 the soul,
 To determine the desirable, man by man, for himself,
 Ere the great deed† (occurs) must those teach us who know it.

*Asha seems to stand here for Asha-vahista, though the word may also be taken as an adjective (O Pure!) referring to AHURA-MAZDA. †The tradition understands by "the great deed," the resurrection.

9. May we belong to Thee, we who seek to further this world.
May the wise lords bring help through Asha.
Whoso is obedient here, he will there* unite himself with
wisdom.
11. Teach both the Perfections† which MAZDA has given to men,
Of themselves as many as there are who long time wound the
wicked.
They are profit to the pure, through them will hereafter come
(to them) happiness. [vol. ii., page 86.]
- XXXI., 1. Reciting to you these Perfections, which have not yet
been heard, we teach the words
Against those who destroy the world of purity with the teach-
ing of the Drujas,
Thus the best for those who give their heart to MAZDA.
2. If the good holds fast without doubt to that which cannot be
perceived with the eyes, [Cf. § 853, above.]
Then comes he to you all, since he desires AHURA-MAZDA,
The Lord of these good things, from purity, through which
we live.
3. What Thou in heavenly way, through the fire, and Asha,
givest as wisdom for the warriors:‡
As perfection for the intelligent, that announce to us, O
MAZDA, that we may know it,
With the tongue of Thy mouth, that I may teach it to all
living.
7. He came as the first fashioner, (when) brightness mingled
itself with the lights;
He (fashioned) the pure creation, He upholds the best soul
with His understanding;
Thou causest both|| to increase in heavenly way, O MAZDA-
AHURA, Thou who art also now the LORD.
8. Thee have I thought, O MAZDA, as the first to praise with the
soul,
As the Father of Vohu-mano, since I saw Thee with eyes,
The active Creator of purity, the LORD of the world IN DEEDS.
9. To Thee belonged Armaiti, with Thee was the understanding
which fashioned the Cow,
When Thou, MAZDA-AHURA, the Heavenly, createdst ways for
Her,

*Here—there = “the present and future worlds.” †“The two perfections,”
are perhaps the “Avesta” and the “Zend,” *i. e.* the holy Scriptures and the oral
Tradition. ‡Perhaps “the warriors” are the spiritual adversaries of Anra-main-
yus. ¶By “both” is meant the heavenly as well as the earthly creation.

From the active proceeds also he who himself is not active.

10. Of them hast Thou chosen for it (the earth) the active working,
As the pure lord over the good things of Vohu-mano.
The inactive did not, O MAZDA, impart the precept to the bad.
11. When Thon, MAZDA, first createdst the world for us, and the laws,
And the understanding, through Thy spirit, when Thou clothedst the vital powers with bodies,
And createdst deeds and teaching to satisfy the wish for the world to come.
12. Thither turns his voice the liar as the truth speaker,
The wise as the unwise, in his heart and his soul:
He who holds fast to wisdom asks after the heavenly abodes.
13. What questions (he) asks as manifest, O MAZDA, what as furtive,
Who commits great sins in order to cover little ones,
All that seest Thou, O LORD, Pure with thine eyes.
14. Both these I ask Thee, O LORD, what there is and what will yet come:
What debt* do they pay for judgment to the pure,
What to the godless, when these (judgments) shall be concluded?
15. Concerning this I ask Thee, what may be the punishment (for him) who prepares the kingdom for the wicked?
(For him) who THROUGH EVIL DEEDS does not increase life even a little,
For the tormentors of the active, and those who do not torment men and cattle.
16. I ask Thee of this: The wise, who the dominion of the dwelling,
Or of the confederacy, or of the region, strove to increase with purity,
Is HE LIKE THEE, O MAZDA-AHURA, IF HE (RESEMBLES THEE) IN DEEDS?
17. Which is greater, what the pure or what the impure believes?
May the wise say it to the wise,—may there be no more hereafter one who knows it not.
Teach us, MAZDA-AHURA, the tokens of GOOD-MINDEDNESS.
18. May no one of you hear the Manthras of the evil and their teaching,
For to the dwelling, to the clan, to the confederacy, or to the region, brings he down

*Perhaps by "debt" is implied that Paradise is due to pure men who have earned a right to it by their good deeds.

Wickedness which (conducts) to death. Drive them away then with strokes.

19. He will be heard who has ascribed purity to both worlds; the Wise AHURA,

Who rules with true spoken words, who has power in his tongue,*

Through thee, the red fire, MAZDA gives the decision of the battle.

20. Whoso then brings about that the pure is defrauded, he has afterward the dwelling

Of darkness a long time, bad food, unbecoming speech.†

To this place, ye wicked, the LAW conducts you BY REASON OF YOUR OWN DEEDS.

21. MAZDA-AHURA created fullness and immortality,

Unto the perfection of the pure, He, the Head of His kingdom, The FULLNESS OF VOHU-MANO for him who through heavenly DEEDS is His friend.

22. Manifestly are both of these to the wise, namely, to him who knows through his soul.

He is the good king (who) promotes purity with word AND DEED.

Such a one is to Thee, MAZDA-AHURA, the most helpful assistant. [vol. ii., page 89.]

- XXXII., 1. May the allied‡ desire Him, His deeds, with obedience.

According to His mind are we, ye Daevas, the rejoicers of AHURA,

May we be thy messengers, the restraining, who torment you.

2. To them answered MAZDA-AHURA, ruling THROUGH VOHU-MANO,

From his kingdom, the very friendly with the shining Asha, The perfect Armaiti teach we to you to know. May she be ours.

4. What ever is good that evil men pervert,

They are called friends of the Daevas, REVOLTED FROM VOHU-MANO,

*That is, perhaps, he has only to speak and it is done. †It is stated in the Mkh. that when the souls of the wicked arrive at the abode of darkness, the Daevas give them bad or poisonous food, and receive them with mocking speech. See also Yasna, xlviil., 11, and Khordah-Avesta, xxxviii. ‡ Of all the difficult chapters in the second part of the Yasna this is the most difficult, and much of it can only be translated at all by the help of tradition. The phrase, "the allied," refers perhaps to one who is, as it were, intimately in communion with AHURA-MAZDA.

Removing themselves from the understanding of AHURA-MAZDA and of purity.

5. Of both does he defraud men: of fullness and immortality,
When to you, Daevas, Aka-mainyu, through evil mind,
Teaches evil deeds and words,—dominion for the wicked.
6. Much punishment does man obtain, if thus as He has announced,
AHURA should reckon openly. He who is aware through the
best spirit.

In thy kingdom, O MAZDA, is the Precept of Asha known.*

9. The false prayers, they slay through their teaching the soul
of life.

They take away my good that is hotly desired by Vohu-mano.
With these prayers of my soul entreat I you, MAZDA and Asha.

10. He slays my words, who there utters what is evil to see
For the Cow with the eyes, and for the Sun, whoso gives gifts
to the wicked,
Who changes the pastures into deserts, and who openly injures
the pure.

11. He slays me, who thinks the life of the bad as the greatest,
(So that) cheerful possession is taken away from the masters
of houses and the mistresses of houses,
He who, O MAZDA, wishes to wound the best pure soul.

12. The men who by their teaching hinder from GOOD DEEDS,
To these has MAZDA announced evil, to them who slay the Soul
of the Cow with friendly speech.†
To whom morsels are dearer than purity,‡ the Karapas
among those who wish dominion in evil way.

13. Whoso wishes the rending of the kingdom, he belongs to the
abode of the most wicked spirit,
As the destroyer of this world, and he who wishes, O MAZDA,
weeping,

He who wishes to keep the messengers of Thy Manthras far
from beholding purity.

16. All that comes from the best, which teaches good to the soul,
AHURA-MAZDA rules over that which is manifest to me, and
what is hidden,

What is presented as punishment for the wicked ||

*Gloss, "When thy rule shall be perfect then will each know justice." Perhaps this has a reference to the time of the last things. †"MAZDA has announced evil," i. e. punishment to those who maintain that, by slaying the cow, good will be produced. ‡"To whom pieces," etc. Gloss, "they prefer riches to good works." The *Karapas* seem to be the deaf who cannot hear the words of AHURA-MAZDA. The remainder of the chapter is all but unintelligible. ¶ The rest is unintelligible.

XXXIII., 1. As is right, so DOES HE who created the first place,
The MASTER, the most righteous deeds for the evil as for the
good,

What is false, that mixes itself with that which he possesses.
of good.

5. I to thy Sraosha, as the greatest of all, call for help :
Give us long life in the kingdom of Vohu-mano,
Unto the pure paths of purity, in which AHURA-MAZDA dwells.

6. What Zaota (walks) in the pure (paths) of purity he desires
after the heavenly Paradise,
From him has he help through the Spirit, who thinks the
works which are to be done,
These are desired by Thee, AHURA-MAZDA, for seeing and
conversation, [vol. ii., page 92.]

9. May the dominion greatly increase to Thee, MAZDA, (and) to
this heavenly (Vohu-mano);
May there come brightness, enduring, wisdom through the
best spirit,
Accomplishment of that whereby the souls cohere.

10. All the enjoyments of life, which were and still are,
And which will be, these distribute according to Thy will ;
May I increase THROUGH VOHU-MANO, Khshathra and Asha in
happiness for the body.

11. AHURA-MAZDA, Thou who art the Most Profitable, and
Armaiti
And Asha who furthers the world, and Khshathra and Vohu-
mano ;
Hear me and pardon me all whatever it may be.

12. Purify me, O LORD, through Armaiti give me strength.
Holiest, Heavenly MAZDA, give me at my supplication in
goodness,
Through Asha strong power, THROUGH VOHU-MANO fullness of
good.

13. To teach afar for (Thy) rejoicing give me certainty,
That from the kingdom, O AHURA, which belongs to the
blessings of Vohu-mano.
Teach us, O Spenta-armaiti, the law with purity.

14. Zarathustra gives as a gift the soul from his body,
(Give to him) the PRECEDENCE OF GOOD MIND, O MAZDA,
Purity IN DEED and in word, obedience and dominion.

XXXIV., 2. And so to Thee, by means of the soul, are also given
all good things of Vohu-mano,

As also through the actions of the pure man, whose soul is bound with purity,

I come to your adoration, O MAZDA, with full prayers.

3. So offer we Myazda to Thee with prayer, O AHURA, and to Asha,

May all good things which are nourished by Vohu-mano, be in Thy kingdom,

For he is wholly wise who ever brings profit to such as You.

9. Those who the holy wisdom, which is desired by them that know Thee,

Destroy with evil deeds, FROM IGNORANCE OF VOHU-MANO,

From them purity flies far away, so long as they are thereby wicked and corrupt.

10. Let the wise announce THE LAYING HOLD ON VOHU-MANO WITH THE DEED, [Cf. §§ 706, 723, 846, 821, above.]

(Let) him who knows (announce) the holy Wisdom, the skilful, the abode of purity,

But all that,* O MAZDA, may they drive out from Thy kingdom.

12. What is Thine ordination, what Thy wish, be it praise, be it offering?

Let it be announced, O MAZDA, say who fulfils Your command the purest.

Teach us, Asha, the paths which belong there to Vohu-mano.

13. The WAY OF VOHU-MANO of which Thou hast spoken to me, The law of the Profitable, in which HE WHO DOES RIGHT from purity, FINDS IT IS WELL with him.

Where the reward which Thou hast promised to the wise is given to Thine.

14. This wish, O MAZDA, grant to the soul endowed with body:

WORKS OF VOHU-MANO, for those who labor with the walking cow,

Your wisdom, O AHURA, efficacy of the soul which furthers purity.

15. MAZDA! announce to me the best words and deeds,

These are to Thee, together with Vohu-mano and Asha, the debt of praise,

Through Thy realm makest Thou, AHURA, increasing at will, the place mani est. [vol. ii., page 95.]

II. Yasna Haptanhaiti.

XXXVI. (2)., 9. O fire, son of AHURA-MAZDA, we draw near to thee 10. With good mind, with good purity, 11. With deeds and

*The words, "all that," refer to Anra-mainyus and his companions.

words of good wisdom draw we near to thee. 12. We praise Thee, we acknowledge ourselves as Thy debtors, MAZDA-AHURA. 13. With all good thoughts, with all good words, with all good works, we draw nigh unto Thee. [vol. ii., page 96.] [I omit verses 14-16, and all of Yasna, xxxv., (1).]

XXXVII. (3)., 1. Here praise I now AHURA-MAZDA, who has created the cattle, who has created purity, the water and the good trees. 2. Who created the splendor of light, the earth, and all good. 3. To Him belongs the kingdom, the might, the power. 6. Him praise we with AHURIAN name, MAZDA, 7. With our own bodies and life praise we Him. 10. What is fairest, what pure, what immortal, 11. What brilliant, all that is good: 12. The good spirit we honor, the good kingdom we honor, 13. And the good law, and the good rule, and the good wisdom.

XXXIX. (5)., 5. Then we praise the souls of the pure, who have ever been born, men and women, 6. Whose good laws one honors, will honor, and has honored. [vol. ii., p. 98.] [I omit verses 7-14.]

XL. (6)., 1. From place to place, MAZDA-AHURA, will I bring forth wisdom and fullness, 2. As gifts for Thee, LORD of the understanding, on account of that which is above.* 3. What reward Thou hast given to those of the same law as myself, MAZDA-AHURA, 4. That give also to us for this world, and that beyond. 5. May we thus attain to that which is so, 6. To union with Thy purity to all eternity. 7. Let the pure men, MAZDA-AHURA, who desire after purity, 8. Warriors as well as husbandmen, be long mighty, long rejoiced. 9. For us to our joy. 10. So may relationship, worship, and friendship be, 11. That we may lift ourselves up and be Yours, MAZDA-AHURA, as pure and truthful, with sacrifice and offering. [vol. ii., pages 98, 99.]

XLI. (7)., 1. Hymns, reverential adoration, to AHURA-MAZDA and Asha-Vahista, 2. We give, we spread abroad, and we make known. 3. May we attain Thy good kingdom, MAZDA-AHURA, for ever. 4. Thou art our Ruler, possessed of the good kingdom, for men as well as for women, 5. The Wisest among beings in both worlds. 6. The good increase we bestow on Thee, the worthy of adoration, the Friend of purity. 7. Mayest Thou be to us life and body, 8. Thou, the Wisest among the creatures in both worlds.— 9. May we show ourselves worthy, may we live, AHURA-MAZDA, 10. In joy in Thee a long life, may we desire after Thee and be mighty. 11. Rejoice us long and well, O Wisest among beings. 12. As Thy praisers and psalmists, O AHURA-MAZDA, 13. We come, we desire, and we obey. 14. What reward Thou hast given to my

*That is, according to the Gloss, the law.

equal according to the law, O AHURA, 15. That give to me also for earth as well as for heaven. 16. May we thus come. 17. Under Thy rule, Pure, for all eternity. [I omit verses 18-36.]

III. Gatha Ustavaiti.

XLII. (Praise to you, the Pure Gathas.)

1. Hail to him who suffices for happiness to each!
 May AHURA create, ruling after his own wish!
 May power and strength (come to me) according to Thy will:
 That I may be able to maintain purity, give me that, O
 Armaiti:
 (Namely) kingdom, blessing, AND THE LIFE OF VOHU-MANO.
2. To the man full of brightness may the brightness
 Which is the best of all, be given!
 Manifest Thyself, O Holiest, Heavenly MAZDA,
 Thou who createdst, O Pure, the good things of Vohu-mano,
 Day by day from love for long life,*
3. May every man attain the best,
 Who teaches us to know the right paths for profit,
 For this corporeal world as well as for the spiritual.
 The manifest toward the worlds in which AHURA dwells,
 (And) the offerer, who is like Thee, wise, holy, O MAZDA!
4. Thee thought I as the Strong as well as the Holy, O MAZDA,
 As Thou with thine own hand protectest
 The blessing, which thou hast created for the good as well as
 for the wicked:
 The warmth of Thy fire, indued with pure strength.
 When there came to me a robber of Vohu-mano.
5. For the Holy one held I Thee, MAZDA-AHURA,
 When I first saw Thee at the origin of the world,
 As Thou effectest that deeds and prayers find their reward.
 Evil for the evil, good blessings for the good,
 At the last dissolution of the Creation through Thy virtue.
6. At this dissolution there will come to Thy kingdom,
 O Holy, Heavenly MAZDA, THROUGH GOOD-MINDEDNESS,
 He through whose deeds the world increases in purity.
 Armaiti teaches them, the leaders
 Of Thy spirit, whom no one deceives.†
7. For the Holy one held I Thee, MAZDA-AHURA,

*That is, from love for the long life of the pure man, since AHURA must desire the pure man to remain long in life. †Here the singular changes abruptly to the plural, which, however, is easily understood, since the singular is used collectively. The construction is, Armaiti . . . the leader, etc.

As it came to me THROUGH VOHU-MANO,
And asked me, "Who art thou, to whom dost thou belong?"
How shall I at the question teach to know the signs of the day,
In reference to Thy worlds and the bodies?*

8. Then spake Zarathustra to Him first:
Since manifest torments are desirable for the wicked,
So may I suffice for strong joy to the pure,
Since I will bring knowledge in the power of the Ruler,
So will I, as long as I exist, laud and praise Thee, MAZDA.
 10. Give Thou to me perfect purity, since I desire it for myself,
Thou who art bound with wisdom.
Ask us the questions which thou hast for us,
For thy questions are those of the mighty,†
Since to thee the Ruler gives strength at will.
 11. As the Holy One thought I Thee, MAZDA,
When it came to me THROUGH VOHU-MANO.
When it was first taught me through Your prayer,
That the spreading abroad of the Law through me among men
was something difficult.
That will I do which was said to me as the best.
 13. As the Holy One thought, I Thee, MAZDA,
When it came to me THROUGH VOHU-MANO,
(That) I should teach THE RIGHT GUIDANCE OF THE WILL. Give
me the (reward)
Of a long life, as no one obtains from you,
Among the desirable of creation, who are named in Thy king-
dom. [vol. ii., page 102.] [I omit stanzas 14-16.]
- XLIII., 1. That ask I Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA,
Unto the praise of Your praise mayest Thou,
O MAZDA, teach me, the friend.
Through purity may friendly helpers be our portion
Until he shall come to us THROUGH VOHU-MANO.
2. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA,
How is the beginning of the best place (Paradise),
How is it to profit (him) who desires after both?‡
For Thou art through purity—the Holy over the wicked—
The Ruler over all, the Heavenly, the Friend for both worlds,
MAZDA!

*This latter question must be ascribed to Zarathustra, not to AHURA-MAZDA.

† Gloss, "thou becomest mighty when thou utterest the law." It is difficult to say what is the meaning of this strophe, since we do not know to whom it is addressed. ‡ "Both" = "The Avesta and Zend."

3. That ask I Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!
 Who was the father of the pure creatures at the beginning?
 Who has created the way of the Sun, of the Stars?
 Who (other than) Thou (causest) that the Moon waxes and
 wanes?
 That, MAZDA, and other ((things)) I desire to know.
4. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!
 Who upholds the earth, and the unsupported?*
- So that they fall not,—who the waters and trees?
 Who has united swiftmess with the winds and the clouds?
 Who, O MAZDA, is the creator of Vohu-mano (mankind)?
5. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!
 Who, working good, has made light as well as darkness?
 Who, working good, sleep and waking?
 Who the morning dawns, the noons, the nights?
 Who (him) who considers the measures of the law?
6. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!
 These sayings—are they also clear?
 Does Armaiti increase purity THROUGH DEEDS?
 Does the kingdom belong to Thine ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR GOOD-
 MINDEDNESS?
 For whom hast thou made the going cow, as a gracious
 gift?
7. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!
 Who has created the desired wisdom, together with the king-
 dom?
 Who created through His purity the love of father to son?
 For these things turn I myself most to Thee.
 Heavenly, Holy, Creator of all things.
9. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!
 How shall I maintain pure for myself the pure Law,
 Which the LORD of the wise realm teaches?
 Truthful kingdoms (possessest Thou): swiftmess, O MAZDA,
 Thou who rejoicest the dwelling with Asha and Vohu-mano.
10. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!
 About the Law which is the best for beings,
 Which furthers me continually the worlds in purity,
 Makes right with the words AND DEEDS of perfect wisdom—
 For my wisdom I desire Thy gifts of fortune, O MAZDA!
11. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O MAZDA!
 How does a share in wisdom come to those
 To whom, O MAZDA, Thy law is announced?

*The "unsupported" means probably the heavenly bodies.

I desire to know Thee first of them,
All the others will I watch from hate of the (evil) spirit.

13. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!

How shall we drive away the Drujas from here?
Away to those who are the champions of disobedience;
Who do not unite themselves to the pure when they mark him,
Do not desire after that for which the pure spirit asks.

14. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!

How shall I through purity get the Drujas into my power?
In order to slay them with the Manthras of Thy precept,
Bring forth a mighty overthrow among the wicked,
(Bring it) to the deceivers and godless that they may not
come again.

15. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!

Whether Thou rulest openly in that time with purity
When both the imperishable hosts come together? *
According to those laws which Thou, O MAZDA, teachest.
Where, and to which of both, givest Thou the victory?

16. That will I ask Thee, tell me the right, O AHURA!

Who is the victoriously smiting, through (Thy) powerful
word, (those) who are? †
Make manifest to me a wise lord for the creatures in both worlds.
May obedience come, through the good spirit,
To that one whomsoever Thou wilt, O MAZDA! ‡

XLIV., 2. Now will I announce: the two Heavenly Ones at the
beginning of the world,—

Of these Two thus spake the Holy to the Evil:

"Not do our souls, not our doctrines, not our understanding,
Not our wishes, not our sayings, not our works,
Not the laws, not the souls unite themselves." ||

*The tradition refers this to the time of the Resurrection, when the hosts of AHURA-MAZDA and those of Anra-mainyus will encounter each other, and the former prove victorious. †"Those who are," according to the Glosses, are the evil-doers. ‡[I omit stanzas 17-20. (vol. ii., pages 105, 106).] ||["The contrast between good and evil is strongly and sharply marked in the Gathas; the writers continually harp upon it; their minds are evidently struck with this sad antithesis, which colors the whole moral world to them; they see everywhere a struggle between right and wrong, truth and falsehood, purity and impurity apparently they are blind to the evidence of harmony and agreement in the universe, discerning nothing anywhere but strife, conflict, antagonism."—(But see Yasna, xliii., 5, and xxxi., 7, pages 170 and 161 above.)—"Nor is this all. They go a step further, and personify the two parties to the struggle. One is a 'white' or holy 'Spirit' (Spento-mainyus), and the other a 'dark spirit' (angro-mainyus). But this personification is merely poetical or metaphorical, not real. The 'white spirit' is not AHURA-MAZDA, and the 'dark spirit' is not a hostile intelligence. Both resolve themselves, on examination, into mere figures of speech—phantoms of poetic imagery—abstract notions, clothed by language with an apparent, not a real, personality."—George Rawlinson's *Ancient Monarchies* (Media, ch. iv.), vol. ii., pages 331, 332 (ed. Scribner, 1871).]

3. Now will I say to you what as the first in the world
The Wise AHURA-MAZDA has said to me :
" He among you who will not act according to this Manthra,
Namely, ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT AS WELL AS THE WORD,
To him will the end of the world turn to downfall."
 6. Now will I say to you, the greatest thing of all :
Praise with purity (of him), the wise there, (of those) who are.
May Holiest, Heavenly AHURA-MAZDA, hear it,
He to Whom praise is asked BY GOOD MIND,
May He through His understanding teach me the best.
 7. He for whose profit desire all the offerers,
Who were ever living or are so still.
Immortality is the wish of the soul of the pure,
(And) strength, which is a weapon against the wicked,
(And) the kingdom, (whose) Creator is AHURA-MAZDA.
 8. Him will we serve with praiseworthy prayers,
For now is it evident to the eyes,
He who IN WORKS and words of the good Spirit
Knows purity, he (knows) AHURA-MAZDA.
His praise also will we lay down in Garo-nemana.
 9. Him will we content with good-mindedness,
Who made the rejoicing and the unjoyful serviceable to us.
May MAZDA-AHURA make kingdoms serviceable to us,
Our cattle, our men, so that they may increase
Through the purity of Vohu-mano, unto the good birth.
 10. To Him desire I to draw near with the offering of Armaiti,
Who is called with name as the WISE LORD.*
He who announces Him with purity and good-mindedness,
To him will Haurvat and Ameretat in the kingdom
Continually give power and strength.
 11. May there come to the Daevas,† then to men,
Scorn, if they scorn Him,
The contrary if they highly esteem Him :
To the serviceable wise is through the Holy Spirit,
Friend, Brother, Father, AHURA-MAZDA.
- XLV., 1. What land shall I praise, whither shall I go praying,
After that I have imparted individuality and obedience.
Those do not make me contented who act after their own
pleasure,

*[At the risk of misleading the reader here, I venture to say that George Rawlinson (*Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii., page 324, ed Scribner), quotes from Dr. Haug's essays (page 33) the following definition of the Name AHURA-MAZDA :— "*the Living Wise.*"] †["Devas—'fiends' or 'devils.' " Rawlinson's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii., page 330 (ed. Scribner, 1873).]

Nor again the evil oppressors of the region.
How shall I satisfy Thee, MAZDA-AHURA?

5. Whoso as Ruler gives not to him who brings hurt—
Skilled from the law, or from the covenant,
Whoso as a right liver, ((and)) pure (does not give) to the
wicked,
He is intelligent, he shall speak forth for himself.
He is raised, MAZDA-AHURA, above oppression.
6. What man does not willingly approach him,
He goes openly over to the creation of the Drujas,
For he is a wicked one who is the best for the wicked.
The pure, to whom the pure is friendly,
So long as the first law endures, O AHURA!
7. Whom has MAZDA appointed as protector for my fellows,
If the wicked chooses me for vengeance? [Cf. page 128 above.]
What other than thee, the fire and the spirit,
Through both of whose deeds purity is increased,
This help for the law tell me.
8. He who commits these earthly goods to the foe,
My punishment will not strike him for these shameful deeds,*
Through tormenting there comes to him that
To ((his)) body which drives him away from the good life,
(But) not ever from the wicked, through hatred against
MAZDA.† [vol. ii., page 108.]
9. Who is the offerer, who first teaches me
How I may exalt Thee according to wish,
In (my) doing, (Thee) the Holy, Pure AHURA?
What thou (possessest) pure, what the Maker of the Cow said
pure,
That desire I from Thee, THROUGH VOHU-MANO.
10. What man or what woman, O MAZDA-AHURA,
Gives me in this world the best that thou knowest:
Blessing for purity, the kingdom THROUGH VOHU-MANO,
And (for those) whom I exhort to Your praise,
With all these go I forward to the bridge Chinvat.
11. To empire have the Karapas and Kavis‡ united themselves
In order through wicked deeds to destroy the world for men,

*Extremely obscure. †The meaning is: It is not AHURA-MAZDA who punishes the wicked, but his (the wicked man's) own hatred toward a good life which drives him to a bad life, and so occasions his punishment. [vol. ii., page 108.] [Cf. Yasna, xxxiii., 1 (page 165 above). This is the most ancient theodicy I know of.] ‡The translations make the *Karapas* and *Kavis* to signify "the deaf" and "the blind;" that is, metaphorically, those who will not hear or regard the law of AHURA-MAZDA.

Whose own souls, whose own state, becomes hard.*
 If they come thither where the bridge Chinvat is,
 So will they for ever place themselves in the abode of the
 Drujas.

12. When purity in the families and races
 Of the relations arises at the speech of the kinsmen,†
 Which increases the world through the activity of Armaiti,
 Then dwells with them together THROUGH VOHU-MANO,
 To them for joy commands AHURA-MAZDA.
18. Whoso for my sake here continually does the best
 To him grant I of my goods through Vohu-mano (reward),
 Oppressing him who oppresses us.
 MAZDA and Asha, in your desire I find contentment,
 That is the decision of my understanding and soul.
19. He who to me from holiness thus works openly
 That which according to his will is the first to Zarathustra,
 To him they grant as reward the world beyond,
 Together with all good things known to me ‡
 That hast thou said to me, MAZDA, Thou who knowest it best.

IV. Gatha Spenta-mainyu.

XLVI. (Praise be to you, pure Gathas.)

1. Through the holiest Spirit, and THROUGH THE BEST-MINDED-
 NESS,
 Which springs from purity with words AND WORKS,
 'To us has given fullness and immortality,
 'Good things and understanding, MAZDA-AHURA.
2. Of this holiest Spirit best does he,
 The best through the loud prayers by means of the mouth of
 Vohu-mano,
 With the hands of Armaiti performs he pure deeds,
 Through His own wisdom is MAZDA the Father of purity.
3. Thou who art also the Holy in Heaven,
 Thou who has created the cow as a helpful gift,
 Thou who givest her fodder and delight according to Thy
 wisdom,
 When thou, MAZDA, hast consulted with Vohu-mano.
4. Hurt arises from this Spirit, the wicked,
 Not so from the Pure Holy MAZDA.
 Even in a small thing man desires for the pure,||

*Precisely as we speak of hardness of heart. Cf. Vendidad v. 13. †That is, perhaps, if, through the conversation of believers, the faith is spread abroad amongst the tribe. ‡Quite unintelligible. ||Gloss, "Even in small things he performs good works."

In a great one, if he is able, the bad for the evil.

5. That, SPENTA-MAINYU, MAZDA-AHURA,
Mayest Thou give to the pure, what is best.
Without Thy will the wicked takes a share
In his* works; he whosprings from the dwelling of Ako-mano.†
6. That hast Thou created, SPENTA-MAINYU, MAZDA-AHURA,
Through the fire gives He decision for the combatants,‡
Through the greatness of Armaiti and Asha,
For this teaches perfectly him who wishes it.

XLVII., 1. When the coming Asha shall smite the Drukhs,||

When there comes what was announced as delusive:

Immortality for men and Daevas,

Then shall Thy profitable laud increase, O AHURA!§

2. Tell me, For Thou knowest it, O AHURA!

Before that (the man) reaches to the double¶ bridge,

How shall the pure, O MAZDA, smite the wicked?

For that is acknowledged in the world as a good accomplishment.

3. To know as the best of teachings are
(Those) which the wise AHURA teaches with purity.
Thou, the Holy, knowest (also) the hidden teachings,
(AND) HE WHO RESEMBLES THEE, MAZDA, THROUGH THE UNDERSTANDING OF VOHU-MANO. [vol. ii., page 111.]
4. WHOSO MAKES THE MIND BETTER, AND PERFORMS GOOD WORKS,
HE (ACTS) ACCORDING TO THE LAW** with word and deed,
Wealth unites itself with him according to ((his)) desire and will,
According to Thy mind is at last everyone.
7. DRIVE AWAY WRATH, DRIVE AWAY HATRED,
(Ye) who are created for the bringing-up of Vohu-mano,
For that pure, pleasant thing that the holy man should know,
So becomes this creation Thy creation, O MAZDA.††
9. How shall I know whether Ye rule over something,
MAZDA and Asha, whereof a doubt comes to me? ‡‡

*That is, the pure man's. †[“Ako-mano stands in direct antithesis to Vohu-mano, as ‘the bad mind,’ or. more literally, ‘the naught mind’—for the Zoroastrians, like Plato, regarded good and evil as identical with reality and unreality.”—Rawlinson's Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii., page 335 (ed. Scribner, 1873).]

‡ Perhaps by “the combatants,” the good and the bad are meant. || [“Drukhs—‘Destruction.’” Rawlinson's Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii., page 337 (ed. Scribner, 1873).]

§ The Gloss refers this to the Resurrection. ¶ The bridge (Chinvat) may be regarded as “double,” because it conducts to both heaven and hell.

**[Cf. Buddha, Dharmapada, 183 (§ 949 below) cf. § 821 (page 64 above).]

†† This verse is extremely difficult and obscure. ‡‡ According to this tradition: “When shall I know when the time arrives when You rule.” (An allusion, apparently, to the Resurrection.)

The weightiest life is the destruction of Vohu-mano,*
Let the profitable know how he may attain to purity.

12. They are the Profitable of the regions,
Who take to themselves contentment THROUGH VOHU-MANO,
With the works of Thy teaching, O pure MAZDA,
These are created as adversaries against the will . . . †
XLVIII., 1. Protect me so long as the perishable world endures
as the greatest,
I who teach holiness to the wickedly brought up, O MAZDA,
From goodness come hither to those displeasing to me,
May I work their destruction THROUGH VOHU-MANO.
2. To this perishableness fetters me
The bad according to the law,‡ the deceitful, who is wounded
by the Holy,
He does not hold upright perfect wisdom for this world,
He does not ask, O MAZDA, WITH GOOD MIND,
4. They who with evil mind increase Aeshma, the wrathful,||
With their tongues,—inactive among the active,
They desire not after good deeds, but after evil,
They give themselves to the wicked Daevas through their law.
5. May he, O MAZDA, possess sweetness and fatness
Who possesses the law THROUGH GOOD-MINDEDNESS.
Every one is wise through the purity of Armaiti,
Ail that ((is)) in Thy kingdom. AHURA!§
6. I pray from You, MAZDA and Asha, let it be said :
What through the spirit which comes from Your understanding
Shall be rightly determined, that we may announce it,
The law, (namely), Yours, O AHURA!
9. May the active, created for profit, hear the precepts.
Mayest Thou not give the true words as dominion to the
wicked,
For with the law is bound the best reward
(What) with purity the warlike Jamaspa bound.¶||

*If the translation is correct, these words must signify that the true life will only commence at the time of the Resurrection, when this present world is annihilated. †The last word is unintelligible. ‡The tradition explains "the bad according to the law," to signify the unjust judge. The Gloss adds that such will be wounded (*i. e.* punished) when righteous judgment is passed. ||Or, Aeshma and Rama, the second word being taken as a noun, signifying the demon of envy. ["Aeshemo—'rapine.'"—Rawlinson's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii., page 337 (ed. Scribner, 1873).] §According to the tradition: "Through perfect wisdom every one possesses the knowledge of purity; all these make thy kingdom, O AHURA!" ¶ [I omit stanzas 10-12. (vol. ii., page 113).]

XLIX., 6. Whoso, O MAZDA, spreads abroad the words of the Manthra :

- The friend Zarathustra with pure prayer,
 Let him make his tongue to the way of understanding,
 May he teach me the secrets THROUGH VOHU-MANO.
8. With hymns which are spoken on account of fullness*
 Come I to You MAZDA, with uplifted hands,
 To You, with the pure prayer of the offering,†
 To You, WITH THE VIRTUES OF VOHU-MANO.
11. Thy praise will I announce, O MAZDA, with the mouth
 So long as I, O Asha,‡ can and am able,
 Let the Creator of the world bestow THROUGH VOHU-MANO,
 What is best for the wish of those working openly.

V. Gatha Vohu-Khshathra.

L., (Praise to you, pure Gathas.)

1. The best kingdom, the unbounded, the portion which must be given.||
 To the distributor of gifts (which) he distributes with righteousness,
 The best through deeds, that (give) us now to cultivate.
3. To You come listening they who rule through Your deeds,
 AHURA and Asha, WITH THE PRAYERS OF VOHU-MANO,
 WHICH THOU, MAZDA, HAST FIRST TAUGHT.
4. Where is the Lord of fullness, where is pardon found?
 Where does one attain to Asha, where is Spenta-armaiti?
 WHERE IS VOHU-MANO, where are Thy realms, O MAZDA?
5. After all this asks, to support the Cow, from Asha,
 The active, the pure, WITH DEEDS, the wise with prayers,
 Who is mighty and holy, and announces to the created the right guide,
6. Who gives better than the good, who grants to him according to wish,
 To AHURA-MAZDA the kingdom, but him who (arises) from the bad as Holy,
 Does not requite (until) the final dissolution of the world.§

*That is, perhaps, on account of the fullness of good things which I have obtained. †That is, probably, with prayers accompanied with sacrifices and offerings. ‡[See the note to Yasna, xxviii., 5, page 160 above.] § Or, "which was given (at the commencement of the world)." The sense of the whole verse appears to be, that dominion in the world belongs properly to him only who distributes the good things of the world with justice. ¶ That is, the wicked will not be fully punished until the Day of Judgment.

7. Give me, Thou who hast created the Cow and the water, and the trees,
Immortality and fullness, Holiest, Heavenly MAZDA,
Power and strength, instruction through the Best Spirit.
8. Thy sayings, O MAZDA, may the man announce for knowledge
As something hurtful for the wicked, for health (to him) who maintains purity,
For he rejoices the Manthra, who utters it for knowledge.
9. The wisdom which Thou givest to the warriors through Thy red fire,
Through the metal, that give as a token in both worlds,
To wound the wicked, to profit the pure.
13. The law thinks openly of the wicked as well as the good,
Whose soul trembles on the bridge Chinvat, the notorious,
Wishing to attain through their deeds and tongue the path of purity.* [vol. ii., page 116.]
21. He is the holy man of wisdom, according to knowledge, words, and deeds.

(To whom) according to the law, HOLY PURITY THROUGH VOHU-MANO, the kingdom

AHURA-MAZDA has given, to this pray we for his good blessing.†

VII. AIRYAMA ISHYO. (YASNA LIIL.), 1. May the desirable obedience come hither, for joy to the men and women of Zarathustra, 2. For joy to Vohu-mano, may he grant the reward to be desired according to the law. 3. I wish the good purity of the pure. Great be AHURA-MAZDA! [vol. ii., page 119.]

LIV., 6. These Gathas are for our soul both: food and raiment. 7. May they bring us good reward, much reward, pure reward, 8. For the next world, after the separation of the vital powers and consciousness. 9. May they to us as strength, as victory, 10. As health, as remedy, 11. As advancement, as enlargement, 12. As help, as defense, 13. As wise, as very pure. 14. As offering; may they for those who know 15. Come to light, the praiseworthy prayers, as AHURA-MAZDA has created them, 16. The Most Profitable, Victorious, the Furtherer of the world, 17. For the protection of purity in the world, for ruling over purity in the world. for those who profit and will profit, 18. And for the whole world of purity. Give to every pure one who comes hither with this distinguished sheltering prayer, good thoughts, words, and actions. [vol. ii., page 120.] [I omit verses 19–24.]

*The meaning appears to be: The Law remembers the deeds of men in this world, when they arrive at the Bridge Chinvat, and endeavor to reach Paradise.

†[I omit stanza 22 (vol. ii., page 117).]

LV,* 1. May hearing here have place, for praise to AHURA-MAZDA, the Most Profitable, Pure, Who is desired by us from the beginning even to the end. [vol. ii., page 121.] [I omit verses 2-8.]

LVII., 1. This profit, this victory give we: namely, the prayer which has a good seed. 2. Which is united with purity, united with wisdom, 3. Whose seeds are good thoughts, words, and works. 4. May this prayer protect against torment from the Daevas and the (bad) men. [vol. ii., page 126.]

10. O Father over the cattle, and over those who belong to the Holy One: the pure, and those wishing purity in the world. 11. Thou open Giver of good! Whose greatness, goodness, and beauty amongst you we desire. 12. May he shelter us, the rich in goods, control us with purity, with activity, with liberality, with knowledge, with gentleness, with the fire of AHURA-MAZDA. 13. As you created us, O AMESHA-SPENTA, so support us. 14. Support us; good men, support us: good women, support us, AMESHA-SPENTA, good Ruler, wise. 15. I know no one save you, ye pure; therefore support us. 16. Thoughts, words, and works, cattle and men, commit we to SPENTA-MAINYU. [vol. ii., p. 126.] [I omit verses 17-24.]

LIX., 1. May that man obtain the best,

Who teaches us to know the right path to profit

For this world, the bodily as well as for the spiritual

The manifest away to the worlds where AHURA is enthroned,
And the offerer, like Thee, a wise, holy one, O MAZDA!

2. May there now come to this dwelling, contentment, blessing, guilelessness, and wisdom of the pure. May there appear for this clan: Purity, dominion, profit, majesty, and brightness, 3. Long dominion of the law, the AHURIAN, Zarathustrian. 4. Quickly may cattle arise out of this clan, 5. Quickly purity, quickly the strength of the pure man, 6. Quickly AHURIAN Custom. 7. May there come hither the good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure, bound with the remedies of purity, according to the breadth of the earth, the length of a river, the height of the Sun, with desire after good things, for withstanding against the foes, for increase for riches and brightness. 8. May Sraosha (obedience) in this dwelling smite disobedience, peace dissension, liberality avarice, wisdom slighting, truthful speech the lie, which hates purity. 16. According to wish mayest Thou AHURA-MAZDA, etc. (Cf. Yasna viii., 10.) [page 154 above.] 17. That joyful may be our mind,

*This chapter seems to be an introduction to the following *Srosh-Yasht* [Yasna, lvi.] It is worthy of notice that the traditions here expressly translate the word *Sraosha* by "hearing" (or "obedience"), thus supplying another example of the mode in which abstract ideas and persons are interchanged.

happy our souls 18. Indued with brilliant bodies for Paradise, 19. So may there openly come hither, O AHURA-MAZDA, the best purity, the fairest purity. 20. May we see Thee, attain to Thee, to Thy perfect friendship. [vol. ii., page 128.]

LXI., 7. Mayest thou burn in this dwelling, ever mayest thou burn in this dwelling, mayest thou be in brightness in this dwelling, mayest thou be in increase in this dwelling: 8. Throughout the long time, until the perfect resurrection, the perfect good resurrection included. 9. Give me, O fire, son of AHURA-MAZDA, 10. Swift brightness, swift nourishment, swift blessings of life, 11. Greatness in holiness, fluency for the tongue, but for the soul sense and understanding, which afterward increases, not diminishes,—then manly courage, 12. Activity, sleeplessness the third part of the night, easy going, watchfulness, 13. Well-nourished, heavenly posterity, which makes a circle, collects itself together, 14. Which grows up, is enduring, pure from crime, and manly, 15. Which can help me in the house, in the clan, in the confederacy, in the region, in the district. 16. Give me, O fire, son of AHURA-MAZDA, what instructs me now and for all time concerning the best place of the pure, the shining, wholly brilliant. 17. May I attain good reward, good renown, good sanctification, for the soul. [vol. ii., page 130.] [I omit verses 18–30.]

LXIV., 24. May our water not appertain to him who thinks, speaks, or does evil, or to the unbelievers, 25. Not to him who torments the friend, torments the companion, torments the neighbor, torments the relation. 26. May our good, best water, created by MAZDA, pure, not be helpful to him 27. Who seeks to injure our uninjured goods. 28. May our good, best water, created by MAZDA, pure, not be helpful to him 29. Who seeks to harm our unharmed bodies, who is a thief, a robber, a criminal, a murderer of a pure man, 30. Who is a wizard, or one who buries the dead, a foe, a miser, or a wicked sinner. [vol. ii., page 132.] [I omit verses 31–61.]

LXIX., 2. I lay hold on this God, this LORD we praise: AHURA-MAZDA, 3. The Creator, the Rejoicer, the Maker of all good things. 13. That we may employ fruitful speech, that we as profitable to the regions 14. May employ profitable speech, that we may be profitable, victorious; be friends of AHURA-MAZDA; may have vigorous bodies, 15. As pure men, who think good, speak good, do good, 16. That we may attain THROUGH VOHU-MANO (good-mindedness) to rejoice in good things, to obtain them.

20. For the praise, adoration, satisfaction, and laud of the whole world of purity, may hearing find place. 21. Sraosha, the holy,

praise we. The great LORD praise we, namely AHURA-MAZDA, 22. Who is the Highest of purity, the most Helpful of purity. 23. All sayings of Zarathustra praise we. All well-done actions praise we, as well those already done as those which will yet be done.

LXX., 4. Zarathustra the pure, lord of purity, praise we. 5. The Fravashi of the pure Zarathustra praise we. 6. The Amesha-spentas, the pure, praise we. 7. The good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise we. 8. The earthly and the heavenly, 9. The highest of the lords praise we. The most helpful of the Yazatas, the most worthy, most desirable of the lords of purity, the most helpful prayer at the right time, for the pure lords of purity, praise we. 10. AHURA-MAZDA, the Pure, Lord of purity, praise we. 13. All lords of purity praise we. 14. The whole Mazdayasnian law praise we. 15. All efficacious prayers praise we. 16. The whole Manthra-spentas praise we. 17. The whole law, which is created against the Daevas, praise we. 18. The collected long precept praise we. 19. All pure, the Yazatas, heavenly and earthly, praise we. 20. All good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise we. 21. All creatures, created by MAZDA, pure, praise we. 22. Which are purely created, purely formed, 23. Have pure conduct, pure offering, 24. Which are pure before the pure, which are manifest among the pure. 25. All five Gathas, the pure, praise we. 26. The whole Yasna praise we, the going forward, going backward, and arriving (of the same). 27. All the Staota-yasnyas praise we. All words spoken by MAZDA praise we, 28. Which best smite the wicked thoughts, 29. Which best smite the wicked sayings, 30. Which best smite the wicked actions, 31. Which mark the wicked thoughts, 32. Which mark the wicked sayings, 33. Which mark the wicked actions, 34. Which exterminate all wicked thoughts, 35. Which exterminate all wicked sayings. 36. Like as the fire, dry, pure, sought out wood 37. Destroys, devours and burns up. 38. The strength, victoriousness, majesty and might of all these sayings praise we. 39. All waters, the fountains as well as those flowing down in streams, praise we. 40. All trees, the growing, adorned with tops, praise we. 41. The whole earth praise we. 42. The whole heaven praise we. 43. All Stars, the Moon and Sun, praise we. 44. All lights, without beginning, praise we. 45. All cattle, that which lives under the water, under the heaven, the birds, the wide-stepping, the beasts with claws, praise we. 46. All the good pure creatures, working well for AHURA-MAZDA, praise we, 47. Through which He created fullness and blessings, 48. Which are to be praised and adored on account of the best purity.

60. This pure Zarathustra—(him) let one wish for a friend (and) protector, 61. Thee call I pure, as the pure, to distribute blessing, as a friend who is better than (every) friend, for that is the best. 62. For he is a wicked one who is the best for the wicked, 63. But he is a pure one to whom the pure is dear. 73. The acting and the good-mindedness praise we. The good-mindedness and the acting praise we. 93. The souls of the departed praise we, which are the Fravashis of the pure. 94. The great LORD praise we, namely, AHURA-MAZDA. 95. Who is the Highest of purity, the Most Helpful of purity. 96. All sayings of Zarathustra praise we. All well-done actions praise we. [vol. ii., pages 140, 141.] [I omit Yasna lxxi.]

EXTRACTS FROM THE KHORDAH-AVESTA.*

I. ASHEM-VOHU.,† 1. Purity is the best good. 2. Happiness, happiness is to him: 3. Namely, to the best pure in purity. [vol. iii., page 3.] [See the Khordah-Avesta, xxxvii., below (vol. iii., page 135).]

II. YATHA AHU VAIRYO.,‡ 1. As is the will of the LORD, so (is He) the Ruler out of purity. 2. From Vohu-mano (will one receive) gifts for the works (which one does) in the world for MAZDA. 3. And the kingdom (we give) to AHURA when we afford succor to the poor. [vol. iii., page 3.] [Cf. Yasna xix., 27, and xxviii., 3 (pages 157, 159 above).]

*As the Yasna, etc., was to be recited principally by the priests, so the Khordah-Avesta was intended for the use of the laity, and all the daily prayers are contained in it. Of these prayers the greater part are in the same language as the rest of the Avesta—not unfrequently, indeed, consisting of extracts from different chapters of the Yasna—but a considerable number, including the *Patets*, or confessional prayers, are written in *Parsi*, and hence belong, in their present shape at least, to a comparatively modern period. In order that the reader may perceive at a glance to which language the several prayers, or portions of prayers, belong, everything written in *Parsi* is printed in *italics* [in Bleeck's edition; but hereinafter, everything written in *Parsi* is printed in the ordinary roman type enclosed within triple parentheses, (((thus)))].—*Extract from Bleeck's introduction.* † This well-known prayer, sometimes called also *Asha-vahista* in the Avesta, has been translated into Huzvareh and Sanskrit as well as into Gujarati. The two first-named versions agree essentially with that in our text; but the Gujarati translation differs somewhat from all the above, particularly in the third line, which it renders, "Whoso is an announcer of justice, he is also very pure and good." It does not seem possible to find such a meaning in the original words. ((In line 2 the word *usta* = "Happiness," "Prosperity," "Felicity," or "Hail!") ‡ This is the second of the three most celebrated Zarathustrian prayers, and is generally called *Ahuna-vairya*. Like the Ashem-vohu, it has been translated into Huzvareh, Sanskrit, and Gujarati; the two former translations agreeing with our own and the latter differing from it completely.

VII. QARSET NYAYIS. (((In the name of God. I praise and exalt (Thee) the Creator ORMAZD, the Brilliant, Majestic, Omniscient, the Perfecter of deeds, the LORD of Lords, the Prince over all princes, the Protector, the Creator of the created, the Giver of daily food, the Powerful, Good, Strong, Old, Forgiving, Granter of forgiveness, Rich in Love, Mighty and Wise, the pure Supporter. May Thy right rule be without ceasing.—ORMAZD King! Increaser! May there attain to great Majesty: the Sun, the immortal, shining, with excellent steeds, may he come hither. Of all my sins repent I with Patet. For all evil thoughts, words, and works which I have thought, spoken and done in the world, which I have committed, which cleave to my nature, for all sinful thoughts, words, works, bodily or mental, earthly or heavenly, I pray, O LORD, for forgiveness, and repent of them with the three words.))) [vol. iii., page 6.] [I omit the remainder of the prayer.]

XI. ATAS-BEHRAM-NYAYIS., 1. (((In the name of God, ORMAZD, the Ruler, the Increaser of great majesty. May the Fire Behram increase (the Fire) Adarfra. Of all my sins, etc.)))

2. Purify me, O GOD, give me strength through Armaiti.

Holiest, Heavenly MAZDA, give me at my prayer in goodness, Strong power through Asha, fullness of blessings THROUGH VOHU-MANO.

To teach afar for (Thy) joy give me certainty,

That from the kingdom, O AHURA, which belongs to the blessings of Vohu-mano.

Teach, O Spenta-armaiti, the law with purity.

Zarathustra* gives as a gift the soul from his body.

(Give to him) THE PRECEDENCE OF A GOOD MIND, O MAZDA,

Purity in deed and word, obedience and rule.†

XIII. VISPA HUMATA., 1. All good thoughts, words, and works, are done with knowledge. 2. All evil thoughts, words, and works are not done with knowledge. 3. All good thoughts, words, and works lead to Paradise. 4. All evil thoughts, words, and works lead to hell. 5. To all good thoughts, words, and works (belongs) Paradise—so (is it) manifest to the pure.—Ashem-vohu. [vol. iii., page 14.] [Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, xxi. (§ 871, page 116 above.) Cf. Xen. Mem. IV., i., 5.]

XIV. NANM-STAISNI.,‡ 1. (((In the name of God, the Giver, Forgiver, Rich in Love. Praise be to the name of ORMAZD, the God with the name, "Who always was, always is, and always will

* [Psalm xci., 14.] † Cf. Yasna, xxxiii., 12-14 [page 165 above]. [I omit verses 3-10 (vol. iii., pages 12, 13).] ‡ *Nanm-staisni* = "Praise to the Name (of ORMAZD).

be." SPENTA-MAINYUS, the Heavenly amongst the Heavenly,* with the name, "From whom alone is derived rule." ORMAZD is the Greatest Ruler, Mighty, Wise, Creator, Supporter, Refuge, Defender, Completer of good works, Overseer, Pure, Good and Just. 2. With all strength (bring I) thanks: to the Great among beings, who created and destroyed,† and through His own determination of time,‡ strength, wisdom, is higher than the six Amshaspands, and the many Yazatas, the shining Paradise Garothman, the circumference of Heaven, the shining Sun, the brilliant Moon, the numerous Stars, the wind, the Andervai,|| the water, the fire, the earth, the trees, the cattle, the metals, mankind. 3. Offering and praise to that LORD, the Completer of good works, who made men greater than all earthly beings, and through the gift (?) of speech created them to rule and appoint for the creatures, as warriors against the Daevas. 4. Praise to the Omniscience of God, who hath sent through the holy Zarathustra, with pure Frohar, peace for the creatures, the wisdom of the law—the enlightening derived from the heavenly understanding, and heard with the ears—wisdom and guidance for all beings who are, were, and will be, (and) the wisdom of wisdoms, the Manthra-spenta, who effects freedom from hell for the soul at the bridge (Chinvat), and leads it over to that Paradise the brilliant, sweet-smelling of the pure. 5. All good do I accept at Thy command, O God, and think, speak, and do it. I BELIEVE IN THE PURE LAW, BY EVERY GOOD WORD SEEK I FORGIVENESS FOR ALL SINS.§ I keep pure for myself the serviceable work and abstinence (from the unprofitable). (I keep) pure the six powers: thought, speech, work, memory, mind and understanding. According to Thy will am I able to accomplish, O Accomplisher of good, Thy honor with good thoughts, good words, good works. 6. I enter on the shining way (to Paradise); may the fearful terror of hell not overcome me! May I step over the bridge Chinvat, may I attain Paradise with much perfume, and all enjoyments, and all brightness. 7. Praise to the Overseer, the LORD, who rewards those who accomplish good deeds according to (His own) wish, purifies at last the obedient, and, (at last) purifies (even) the wicked out of hell.—All praise be to the Creator ORMAZD, the All-wise, Mighty, Rich in might, to the seven Amshaspands, to Ized Bahram, the victorious annihilator of foes.)) [vol. iii., pages 14, 15.]

*According to the Guj. Tr., "Invisible amongst the invisible." The Parsees believe that AHURA-MAZDA can make himself invisible when He will, even to the Amesha-spentas. † This passage is doubtful. The term "destroyed" must refer to the production of Ahriman. ‡ The word rendered "determination of time" is very obscure. || *Andervai* is the space between heaven and earth. § [See *Yasna* xlvii., 4 (page 175 above).]

XVII. (1) ORMAZD-YASHT. (((In the name of God, ORMAZD, the LORD of Increasing. May the Creator ORMAZD increase in great brilliancy; the Bright, the Majestic, Heavenly of the Heavenly, may He the Highest come (to our help). Of all sins I repent, etc.))) [vol. iii., page 21.]

6. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: My Name is: The to be questioned, O pure Zarathustra; the second: the Gatherer; the third: the Spreader abroad; the fourth: Best Purity; the fifth: All good things created by MAZDA which have a pure origin; the sixth: I am the Understanding; the seventh: I am Endowed with understanding; the eighth: I am Wisdom; the ninth: I am Endowed with Wisdom; the tenth: I am the Increaser; the eleventh: I am Endowed with Increase; the twelfth: the LORD; the thirteenth: the Most Profitable; the fourteenth: He who is without harm; the fifteenth: the Steadfast; the sixteenth: the Reckoner of service; the seventeenth: the All-observing; the eighteenth: the Healing; the nineteenth: that I am the Creator; the twentieth: that I bear the Name MAZDA. 7. Praise me, Zarathustra, day and night with gifts which are brought hither midst prayers. 8. I will come to thee for protection and joy, I who am AHURA-MAZDA; there shall come to thee for protection and joy: the good Sraosha, the holy; there shall come to thee for protection and joy: Water, trees, and the Fravashis of the pure. [vol. iii., page 22.]

12. These Names preserve, (and) utter them day and night. 13. I am the Protector, I am the Creator, I am the Nourisher, I am the Knowing, I am the Holiest Heavenly One. 14. My name is: The Healing; my name is: The Most Healing; my name is: The Priest; my name is: The Most Priestly; my name is: GOD (AHURA); my name is: Great Wise One (MAZDA); 15. My name is: The Pure; my name is: The Purest; I am called, The Majestic; I am called The Most Majestic; 16. I am called, The Much-seeing; I am called, The Most Much-seeing; I am called, The Far-seeing; I am called, The Most Far-seeing; 17. I am called, The Watcher; I am called, The Desirer; I am called, The Creator; I am called, The Protector; I am called, The Nourisher; I am called, The Knower; I am called, The Most Knowing; 18. I am called, The Augmenter; I am called, Possessing increasing Manthras; I am called, The Ruler at Will; I am called, The Most Ruling at Will; 19. I am called, The Ruling with Name; I am called, The Most Ruling with Name; I am called, The Not to be Deceived; I am called, The Undeceived; 20. I am called, The Protecting; I am called, The Tormentor of Torment; I am called, The Smiting here; I am called, The All-smiting; I am called, The All-creating; 21.

I am called, The All-Majestic; I am called, Indued with much Majesty; I am called, The Very Majestic; I am called, Indued with Very Great Majesty; I am called, The Effecting-profit; I am called, The Working-gain; I am called, The Profitable; 22. I am called, The Strong; I am called, The Most Profitable; I am called The Pure; I am called, The Great; 23. I am called, The Kingly; I am called, The Most Kingly; I am called, The Well-wise; I am called, The Well-wisest; I am called, The Far-seeing. 24. These my names—he who in the corporeal world, O holy Zarathustra, maintains and speaks these my names: 25. By day and night, standing or sitting, sitting or standing, girt with the Aiwyaonhana (i. e. Kosti), or drawing off the Aiwyaonhana, 26. Going forward out of the house, going forward out of the confederacy, going forward out of the region, coming into a region, 27. Such a man the points of the Drukhs-souled, proceeding from Aeshma, will not injure in that day or that night, not the slings, not the arrows, not knives, not clubs, the missiles will not penetrate, (and) he be injured. 28. And on account of accepting (it) the same take upon themselves with names to be a support and wall against the invisible Drukhs, the Varenian, wicked. 29. Against the striving to hurt, greedy of revenge, all slaying, wholly evil Anra-mainyus. 30. Like as a thousand men can control one single man.

31. Who is the victoriously smiting? etc. (Yasna xliii, 16.) [page 171 above.] 32. Praise to the kingly majesty, praise to Airyana-vaeja, praise to the profit created by AHURA-MAZDA, praise to the water Daitya, praise to the water Ardvi-sura the pure, praise to the whole world of purity. 33. Yatha ahu vairyo (10). Ashem-vohu (10). The Ahuna-vairya praise we. Asha-vahista, the fairest Amesha-spenta, praise we. Strength, might, power, victoriousness, and strength, praise we. AHURA-MAZDA, the Shining, Majestic, praise we. [vol. iii., page 24.]

34. Protect the kinsmen evermore, O Zarathustra, from the hostile evil-minded. 35. Do not abandon the friend to the stroke, not to the enduring of evil, not to the touching of harm. 36. Do not wish a gift for the man who, instead of the greatest offering, offers us the least; of that which is to be offered, complete praise for us, the Amesha-spentas.* 37. Here is Vohu-mano, MY CREATURE, O Zarathustra; Asha-vahista, MY CREATURE, O Zarathustra; Khshathra-vairya, MY CREATURE, O Zarathustra; Spenta-armaiti, MY CREATURE, O Zarathustra; here are Haurvat and Ameretat, MY CREATURES, O

* The meaning seems to be, that a man must expect no gifts who, in return for the blessings bestowed upon him, endeavors to acquit himself of his duties in the easiest and least costly manner.

Zarathustra, which are a reward for the pure who attain to incorporeality. 38. Know also how it (is), O pure Zarathustra : through My wisdom, through which was the beginning of the world, so also its end shall be. [vol. iii., pages 24, 25.]

39. A thousand remedies, ten thousand remedies (3). Come to my help, O MAZDA.—To strength, the well-created, beautiful, and the victory created by MAZDA. and the smiting which comes from above, and Spenta-armaiti. 40. O Spenta-armaiti! smite their torments, surround their understanding, bind their hands, summer and winter smite, restrain the hinderers. 41. When, O MAZDA, will the pure smite the wicked, when the pure the Drukhs, when the pure the evil? 42. The understanding of AHURA-MAZDA we praise, to lay hold of the Manthra-spenta. The understanding of AHURA-MAZDA we praise, to maintain the Manthra-spenta in remembrance. The tongue of AHURA-MAZDA we praise, to be able to utter the Manthra-spenta. This mountain praise we, Ushi-darena, bestowing understanding, day and night, with gifts brought amidst prayers. [vol. iii., page 25.] [I omit the remainder of this Yasht.]

XVIII. (2)., YASHT OF THE SEVEN AMSHASPANDS. (((In the name of God, the LORD ORMAZD, the Increaser. May the seven Amshaspands increase to great brilliancy, may they come.—Of all my sins, etc.))) [vol. iii., page 25.]

6. AHURA-MAZDA. the Shining, Majestic, praise we. The Amesha-spentas, the good, wise kings praise we. The Amesha-spenta Vohu-mano, praise we. Peace, the victoriously smiting, praise we, which is set above other creatures. The heavenly understanding, created by MAZDA, praise we. The understanding which is heard with the ears, created by MAZDA, praise we. 7. Asha-vahista, the fairest Amesha-spenta, praise we. The Airyama-ishya,* praise we; the Strong, created by MAZDA, praise we. Saoka, the good, gifted with far-seeing eyes, created by MAZDA, pure, we praise. Khshathra-vairya. the Amesha-spenta, praise we. Metal praise we. CHARITY, WHICH FEEDS THE POOR, PRAISE WE. [vol. iii., page 26.] [I omit the remainder of this Yasht.]

XIX. (3)., YASHT ARDIBIHIST. 3. I will praise Asha-vahista : if I praise Asha-vahista, then praise I him as the helper of the other Amesha-spentas, whom MAZDA protects through good thoughts, whom MAZDA protects through good works, whom MAZDA protects through good words. 4. To the pure man belongs Garo-nemana, none of the wicked can approach to Garo-nemana, to

* *Airyama-ishya* is the prayer in Yasna liii., which commences with those words. [page 178 above.]

the dwelling pure in joy, manifest, AHURA-MAZDA. [vol. iii., page 28.] [I omit verses 5-17.]

XXVI. (10) MIHR-YASHT. (((In the name of God, the LORD ORMAZD, the Increaser. May there increase to great brightness: Mihr, who possesses wide pastures; may the righteous judge come. Of all sins, etc.)))

(1.*) Khshnaothra for AHURA-MAZDA, etc. Praise to Mithra, who possesses wide pastures, who has a thousand ears, ten thousand eyes, the Yazata with named name, and Rama-gastra. Khshnaothra, etc.

1. AHURA-MAZDA spake to the holy Zarathustra: When I created Mithra, who possesses wide pastures, O holy, I created him as worthy of honor, as praiseworthy, as I Myself, AHURA-MAZDA. 2. The destroying defrauder of Mithra slays the whole region: he slays as many pure ones as a hundred evil doers. Slay not the Mithra, O holy, which thou desirest from the evil, not from the good, devoted to his own teaching. For the Mithra is for both, for the wicked as well as for the pure.† [vol. iii., page 57.]

17. Mithra, etc., who lies for no one, not for the lord of the house, not for the lord of the clan, not for the lord of the confederacy, not for the lord of the region. 18. But if one lies to him, be it the lord of the house, the lord of the clan, the lord of the confederacy, the lord of the region, then Mithra, the wrathful, offended, destroys the dwelling, the clan, the confederacy, the region, and the lords of the dwelling, the lords of the clan, the lords of the confederacy, the lords of the region, or the chiefs of the regions. 19. To that side comes Mithra, wrathful and offended, on which side is the Mithra-liar; he does not make them sure with heavenly protection.

22. Mithra, etc., who when he is not lied to, takes men out of trouble, takes them away from destruction. 23. Away from trouble, away from the troublers, bring us, O Mithra, thou who art not lied to. Thou bringest thereby fear to the own bodies of Mithra-lying men; from their arms thou, O Mithra, who art grim and strong, takest away might, strength from their feet, sight from their eyes, hearing from their ears. 24. Never does a well-hurled lance, or a flying arrow penetrate his limbs, to whom Mithra comes as protection, as increase to his limbs, he who spies with ten thousand (eyes), the strong, all-knowing, not to be lied to. For his brightness, etc.

* [i. e. section 1.—The verses of the Mihr-Yasht are divided into sections; but as the verses are numbered consecutively, I call no further attention to the sections—and this remark applies to the Srosh-Yasht, Farvardin-Yasht, Din-Yasht, and Zamyad-Yasht below.] † That is, contracts are to be observed faithfully, even when they are made with a wicked and godless man. Respecting the *Mithra-Druja*, see Vendidad iv.

25. Mithra, etc., the lord, the profiting, strong, bestower of profit, the gatherer, who receives adoration, the strong, gifted with the virtues of purity, whose body is the Manthra, the strong-armed warrior. 26. The smiter of the skulls of the Daevas, the worst for the culpable, (?) the adversary of the Mithra-lying men, the foe of the Pairikas, who, if he is not lied to, affords the highest strength to the region, who if he is not lied to, affords the highest victory to the region. 27. Who takes away from a godless region the straightest (ways), turns away brightness, takes away victory, does not protect purposely, delivers up the slayers of ten thousand, he who sees with ten thousand eyes, the strong, all-knowing, not to be lied to. For his brightness, etc. [vol. iii., page 60.]

32. Hear, O Mithra, our offering, be content, O Mithra, with our offering, come to our offering, accept our alms, accept the offered gifts, carry them together to the gathering place* (Chinvat), lay them down in the place of praise (Garō-nemana). 33. Give us the favors we pray thee for, O Hero, in accordance with the given prayers: Kingdom, strength, victoriousness, fullness, and sanctification, good fame, and purity of soul, greatness, and knowledge of holiness, victory created by AHURA, the blow which springs from above, from the best purity, instruction in the holy word.

35. Mithra, etc., the debt-paying, host-desiring, gifted with a thousand strengths, ruling, mighty, all-wise. 36. Who leads forward in the fight, stands in the fight, who, placing himself in the fight, breaks the lines of battle. They fight at all ends of the line of battle which is led to battle; but he confounds the middle of the hostile hosts. 37. To them brings he, the mighty, punishment and fear; he sweeps away the heads of the Mithra-lying men, he carries away the heads of the Mithra-lying men. 38. Horrible are the dwellings, the abodes not blessed with offspring, in which dwell the Mithra-liars, the wicked who openly slay the pure. In a horrible manner goes the cow, walking on hoofs on the wrong way, who has crawled into the narrow passes of the Mithra-lying men. In their chariots stand teams pouring out tears, which run down into their mouths. [vol. iii., page 61.]

102. Mithra, etc., with shining steeds, sharp lance, long hilt, arrows gliding-home,† the far-seeing, bold warrior. 103. Whom AHURA-MAZDA created as ruler and overseer of all living nature, he is ruler and overseer of all living nature, he who without sleeping protects through his watchfulness the creatures of AHURA-MAZDA, who without sleeping guards through his watching the creatures of AHURA-MAZDA. For his brightness, etc. [vol. iii., page 68.]

* Instead of "to the gathering-place," the word may also be rendered "for joy."

† That is, attaining their mark.

104. Mithra, etc., whose long arms grasp forward here with Mithra-strength: that which is in Eastern India he seizes, and that which in the Western he smites, and what is on the Steppes of Ranha, and what is at the ends of this earth.* 105. Thou, O Mithra, seizing together, far out with the arms. The unrighteous destroyed through the just, is gloomy in soul. Thus thinks the unrighteous: Mithra, the artless, does not see all these evil deeds, all these lies. 106. But I think in my soul: No earthly man with a hundred-fold strength thinks so much evil as Mithra with heavenly strength thinks good. No earthly man with a hundred-fold strength speaks so much evil as Mithra with heavenly strength speaks good. No earthly man with a hundred-fold strength does so much evil as Mithra with heavenly strength does good. 107. With no earthly man is the hundred-fold greater heavenly understanding allied as the heavenly understanding allies itself to the heavenly Mithra, the heavenly. No earthly man with a hundred-fold strength hears with the ears as the heavenly Mithra who hears with the ears, possesses a hundred strengths, sees every liar. Mightily goes forward Mithra, powerful in rule marches he onward, fair visual power, shining from afar, gives he to the eyes.

115. Mithra, etc. O Mithra, with many pastures, Lord over the dwellings, clans, confederacies, regions, High-priest! 116. Twenty-fold is Mithra among friends through firmness, thirty-fold among the laboring, forty-fold amongst those who sit on hurdles,† fifty-fold amongst the good offerers, sixty-fold among the disciples, seventy-fold amongst teachers and disciples, eighty-fold among children-in-law and parents-in-law, ninety-fold among brethren. 117. A hundred-fold among father and son, a thousand-fold among the regions, ten-thousand-fold is Mithra with him who holds fast to the Mazdayasnian law. then here by day arms himself for victory(?)‡ [vol. iii., page 70.] [I omit verses 118-145.]

XXVII. (11) SROSH-YASHT-HADOKHT. (((In the name of God, ORMAZD, the Ruler, Increaser. May there increase in great majesty: Srosh the pure, the swift, whose body is the Manthra, whose weapons are terrible, who is gifted with mighty weapons, the ruler of the creatures of ORMAZD, may he come.—Of all sins, etc.)))

* *Eastern* India is no doubt the country which we call by the same name. *Western* India may perhaps be Babylonia. The *Steppes* (plains) of Ranha, *i. e.* the Jaxartes, [see note to Khordah-Avesta xxviii., 19 (vol. iii., page 78)] seem to be regarded as the boundary toward the North,—the Southern boundary is, naturally, the sea. † That is, sheep-folds or cattle-pens. ‡ These words are obscure. It is worthy of note that Mithra's connection with the region, *i. e.* the political district, is placed higher than his relation to families.

Khshnaothra to AHURA-MAZDA, etc. Satisfaction for the holy Sraosha, the firm, whose body is the Manthra, whose weapons are terrible, praise for the Ahurian, etc. [vol. iii., page 74.]

1. Sraosha the holy, beautiful, victorious, promoting the world, pure, lord of purity, praise we. Good adoration, best adoration, O Zarathustra, (be) for the worlds. 2. This holds back the friend of the wicked among the wicked, this surrounds completely the eyes and understanding, ears, hands, feet of the evil man, as well as the evil woman, and their mouth with bands :—the good prayer, the unerring, not tormented, the shield for man, a cuirass against the Drujas, an averter. 3. Sraosha the holy is he who most nourishes the poor, he is the victorious, who most slays the Drujas. Also the pure man who most utters blessings is, through victory, the most victorious, (for) the Manthra-spenta most drives away the invisible Drujas. The Ahuna-vairya [see page 182 above] is the most victorious among prayers. The right-spoken speech is the most victorious in congregations. The Mazdayasnian law is in all disputations, in all good things, in all those which spring from pure seed, manifestly the most legal, and so appointed by Zarathustra.

20. All dwellings protected by Sraosha we praise, where Sraosha, beloved as a friend, receives, where the pure man especially thinks purity, especially speaks purity, especially does purity. [vol. iii., page 76.] [I omit verses 21, 22.]

XXIX. (13) FARVARDIN-YASHT. (((In the name of God, the LORD ORMAZD, the Increaser. May they increase in great brightness, the high Frohars; may they come.—Of all my sins, etc.))) [vol. iii., page 80.]

Khshnaothra for AHURA-MAZDA, etc. Khshnaothra for the Fravashis of the pure, the strong, storming, the Fravashis of the former Custom, the Fravashis of the nearest relations, for praise, etc.

1. AHURA-MAZDA spake to the holy Zarathustra: I declare thus to thee, the might, strength, majesty, help, and joy of the Fravashis of the pure, O pure, holy (Zarathustra), the mighty, storming, how they bring help to me, how they secure assistance to me, the strong Fravashis of the pure. 2. Through their brightness and majesty I uphold the heaven, O Zarathustra, which shines above and is fair, which goes round about this earth. 3. It is likened to a bird which stands fast, heavenly-made, having far boundaries, with a body of shining ore, shining on the third (of the earth), which AHURA-MAZDA clothes with a star-sown garment, one made in heavenly guise; in company with him is Mithra, together with Rashnu and Armaiti-spenta, whose (heaven's) boundaries can be seen on no side. 4. Through their brightness and majesty, O Zarathustra, I

maintain Ardvi-sura the Spotless, the full-flowing, healing, averse to the Daevas, attached to the law of AHURA, the praiseworthy for the corporeal world, the pure for those who promote life, the pure for those who advance the cattle, the pure for those who advance the kingdom, the pure for the advancers of the region. 9. Through their brightness and majesty, O Zarathustra, I support the broad earth created by AHURA, great, wide, the mother of the fair abundance, which bears the whole corporeal world, the living and dead, and the high mountains with many pastures, abounding in water. 10. On which flowing waters hasten, going in many streams, on which trees of many kinds spring out of the earth, for the nourishment of cattle and men, for the nourishment of the Arian region, for the nourishment of the cattle that is harnessed on the ways, for the protection of the pure men. 17. They are an assistance in fierce combats, the wisest Fravashis of the pure. The Fravashis of the pure are the strongest, O holy; those of the former law or those of the yet unborn men, the forward-stepping, profitable. Then of the others, O Zarathustra, the Fravashis of living men are stronger than those of the dead. 18. What man treats them well, the Fravashis of the pure, while he lives: the ruler of a region, alike in kingdom, he lives long, is mighty,—(just so) every man who treats Mithra with wide pastures well, Arstat who furthers the world and increases the world. 19. Thus I announce to thee the strength, might, majesty, protection and joy of the Fravashis of the pure, O pure Zarathustra, the strong, storming; they come to my help, they bring me assistance, the strong Fravashis of the pure.

20. AHURA-MAZDA spake to the holy Zarathustra: If, O holy Zarathustra, there come before thee on the ways in this corporeal world, fearful terrors, fearful events, if they (come) for the frightening of bodies, then shalt thou recite these words, utter these prayers, the victorious, O Zarathustra: 21. The good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure, I praise, I invoke, I make ((them)) my own, I offer to them; the Fravashis of the dwellings, of the clans, of the confederacies, of the regions, the Zarathustrian; those which are amongst those now living, which are amongst the former living, which are among those about to live hereafter, of the pure, all (Fravashis) of all regions, the friendly, the kindred regions. 23. Which endure much, which are above all strong, high of themselves, high on chariots, above all mighty, above all powerful, which are strong in blessings, strong in victory, strong in fight. 24. The givers of victory to the implorers, the givers of favor to the marksmen (?), the givers of health to the working (?), the givers of much

brightness to those offering to them, who pray to them, contenting them, bringing gifts, the pure. 25. Who here go most thither where pure men are, who most keep purity in mind where they are most honored, where the pure is contented, where the pure is not plagued. [vol. iii., page 83.]

42. Who if well-invoked are the best of the heavenly, if well-invoked, SENT FROM HEAVEN, THEY GO FORWARD TO THE HEIGHT OF THAT HEAVEN, HEAPING UP STRENGTH, the well-created, and victory created by AHURA, and the blow that comes from on high, and brings profit to the kingdoms, brings the pure favor and the praiseworthy fullness, worthy of honor, which springs from the best purity. [vol. iii., pages 85, 86.]

82. The good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure praise we, those of the Amesha-spentas, the shining, with efficacious eyes, great, helpful, mighty, AHURIAN, imperishable, pure. 83. Who are all seven of like mind, all seven of like speech, all seven like-acting. Like is their mind, like their word, like their actions, like is their Father and Ruler, namely, the Creator AHURA-MAZDA. 84. Of whom one sees the soul of another: how it thinks on good thoughts, how it thinks on good words, how it thinks on good works, how it thinks on Garo-nemana. Their ways are shining when they fly hither to the offering-gifts. [vol. iii., page 90.]

88. The Fravashi and the holiness of the holy Zarathustra, the pure here, praise we. Who first thought the good, spoke the good, performed the good, to the first priest, to the first warrior, to the first husbandman, to the first announcer to whom it was first announced, to the first vouchsafed, who has first vouchsafed: Cow, purity, word, hearing the word, rule, and all good things created by MAZDA, which have a pure-origin. 91. In whom the whole Manthra, the pure Word was announced, the lord and master of the worlds, the praiser of purity, the greatest, best, fairest, the asker for the law, which is the best for beings. 92. Whom the Amesha-spentas desired, who have all like wills with the Sun,—for increase of the soul from believing heart,—as lord and master for the worlds, as questioner concerning the law which is best for beings. 93. At whose birth and growth the waters and trees increased, at whose birth and growth the waters and trees augmented, at whose birth and growth all the creatures created by the HOLY ONE announced to themselves Hail!* 94. (Saying): “Hail to us! the priest is born, the holy Zarathustra: He will offer for us with gifts.—Zarathustra is provided with Baresma spread abroad: hereafter will the Mazdayasnian law

* Or. happiness.

spread itself abroad over the seven Kareshvares. 95. Here will in future Mithra, who possesses broad pastures, bring forth everything which is chiefest for the regions, and rejoice those* who unite themselves. Here will in future the Navel of the Waters, the strong, promote all that is chiefest for the regions, and those who keep themselves allied."—The holiness and the Fravashi of Maidhyo-mao, the son of Arasta, praise we, who first heard from Zarathustra the Manthra and his teaching. [vol. iii., pages 91, 92.]

145. All the good, strong, holy Fravashis of the pure, praise we, from Gayo-marathan to the victorious Saoshyans. May the Fravashis of the pure soon desire for us here, may they come to us for protection. 146. They support us, who are in misfortune, with provident help, protected by AHURA-MAZDA, and by the holy, strong Sraosha, and by the Manthra-spenta, the wise, which is the greatest adversary of the Daevas amongst the adversaries of the Daevas, a friend of AHURA-MAZDA, which Zarathustra praised as like himself for the corporeal world. 147. Rejoice yourselves here below, ye blessings: Waters, Trees, and the Fravashis of the pure! Be contented, accepting here in this house. Here are the Athravas of the regions, honored with good, with purity. Lift up your hands for our protection, ye Strong; at your offering, ye most Profitable. 148. The Fravashis of all pure men and women praise we here, whose souls are worthy-of-offering, (?) whose Fravashis are mighty. The Fravashis of all pure men and women praise we here, from whom AHURA-MAZDA announced to us good in offering. Of all these have we heard, Zarathustra is the first and best lord as to what concerns the Ahurian faith. 149. We praise the lord, the law, the consciousness, the soul, and the Fravashi of the pure men and women here amongst the Paoiryotkaeshas† who first heard the precepts, who have done battle for purity. We praise the lord, the law, the consciousness, the souls and the Fravashis of the pure men and women here amongst the Nabanazdistas‡ who have warred for purity. [vol. iii., page 102.]

153. This earth praise we. That heaven praise we. Those good things praise we which stand between (both), the praise-worthy, worthy of adoration, worthy of offering, for the pure man. 154. The souls of the goers a-foot and of the riders praise we. The souls of the pure praise we. The souls of the pure men and women born anywhere praise we, who (possess) very good law,

* That is, the regions. This is an exhortation to the various Mazdayasnian tribes to dwell harmoniously together. † Probably, "those of the former faith," or "the Patriarchs." Cf. Weber's *Ind. Stud.* iii., 448. ‡ ((Professor Spiegel elsewhere translates this word "nearest relations."))

(who) war, or shall war, or have warred. 155. The lord, the law, the consciousness, the soul, the Fravashi of the pure men and women here,—of the warring, of those who will war, or have warred, praise we. 156. The Fravashis of the pure Fravashis, the strong, storming-up, the bold, victorious, of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas, of the Nabanzdistas, shall come hither contented to this dwelling, go about in this dwelling. 157. Contented may they, blessing, wish hither in this dwelling Ashi-vanuhi, the steadfast; may they go away contented from this dwelling, may they take away with them praise and adoration for the Creator AHURA-MAZDA and the Amesha-spentas. May they never go away from this dwelling weeping over any one of us Mazdayasnians. Offering, praise, etc.

XXXII. (16) DIN-YASHT. (((In the name of GOD, ORMAZD the LORD, the Increaser. May the good Mazdayasnian law increase in great majesty, may it come.—Of all sins, etc.))) Satisfaction to AHURA-MAZDA. Ashem-Vohu.—I confess (myself), etc. Satisfaction to the rightest Wisdom created by MAZDAS pure, the good Mazdayasnian Law for praise, adoration, satisfaction, and laud.—Yatha ahu vairyo. [vol. iii., page 116.]

1. The rightest Wisdom created by MAZDA, pure, praise we; (the good Mazdayasnian law praise we); the good provision for the way,* the swift hastening, very pardoning, gift bringing, pure, virtuous, renowned, swift working, soon working, averting of itself, pure of itself, the good Mazdayasnian Law. 2. To which Zarathustra offered (saying), “Lift up thyself from the throne, come forth from (thy) dwelling Rightest Wisdom, created by MAZDA, pure. If thou art before, then wait for me; if thou art behind, then come to me. 3. Then shall there be peace, that the ways may be protected of themselves, the mountains to be visited of themselves, the woods to be run through of themselves, the flowing waters easy to step over on account of this protection; for announcing the speech, the further to be thought of. 4. For Its brightness, for Its majesty, will I praise It with audible praise, the Rightest Wisdom created by MAZDA, pure, with offerings. We praise the Rightest Wisdom created by MAZDA, pure. With Haoma, etc. [vol. iii., pages 116, 117.] [I omit verses 5-20.]

XXXV. (19) ZAMYAD-YASHT., 9. The strong Kingly Majesty created by MAZDA, praise we, the much-obtaining, working on high, salutary, shining, possessing strength, which is placed over other creatures, 10. Which belongs to AHURA-MAZDA. AHURA-

* The Mazdayasnian Law is called “the good provision for the way” (*hupath-mainyo*) because it is most fitted to strengthen men on their way to Paradise. [Cf. Buddha, Dharmapada, 235 (§949 below.)]

MAZDA created the creatures very good, very fair, very high, very furthering, very lofty. 11. That they might make the world progressive, not growing old, not dying, not becoming corrupt and stinking, but ever-living, ever-profitting,—a kingdom as one wishes it; that the dead may arise, and there may come Immortality for the living, which furthurs the world at will. 12. The worlds which teach purity will be immortal, the Drukhs will disappear at the time. As soon as it comes to the pure to slay him and his hundred-fold seed, then is it (ripe) for dying and fleeing away. Yatha ahu vairyo. 13. For its brightness, etc. [vol. iii., page 126.]

14. The strong Kingly Majesty, etc. 15. Which belongs to the Amesha-spentas, the shining, having efficacious eyes, great, helpful, strong, AHURIAN,—who are imperishable and pure. 16. Which are all seven of like mind, like speech, all seven doing alike, like is their mind, like their word, like is their action, like their Father and Ruler, namely, the Creator AHURA-MAZDA. 17. Of whom one sees the soul of the other, how it thinks on good thoughts, how it thinks on good words, how it thinks on good deeds, thinking on Garo-nemana. Their ways are shining when they come hither to the offering-gifts. 18. Which are there the creators and the destroyers of the creatures of AHURA-MAZDA, their creators and overseers, their protectors and rulers. 19. They it is who further the world at will so that it does not grow old and die, does not become corrupt and stinking, but ever-living, ever-profitting, a kingdom as one wishes it, that the dead may arise, and Immortality for the living may come, which gives according to wish furtherance for the world. 20. The worlds which teach purity will be immortal, the Drukhs will disappear at the time. So soon as it comes to the pure to slay him and his hundred-fold seed, then is it (ripe) for dying and fleeing away. Yatha ahu vairyo. For its brightness, etc.

30. The strong Kingly Majesty, etc. 31. Which united itself with Yima, the shining, possessing a good congregation, for a long time when he ruled over the seven-portioned earth, over men and Daevas, over sorcerers and Pairikas, over Sathras, Kaoyas, and Karapanas. 32. He took away from the Daevas both blessings and profits, both fatness and herds, both food and praise, in whose rule were poured out for the body imperishable foods, immortal were men and beasts, the water and trees not dried up. 33. In his rule was no cold, no heat, no old age, no death, no envy created by the Daevas, on account of the absence of the Lie, formerly before he (himself) untrue, began to love lying speech. 34. Then when he, untrue, began to love lying speech, then flew away visibly from him the Majesty, with the body of a bird. When the

ruler Yima, the shining, with good congregation, no longer saw the Majesty, then Yima displeased, staggered away to evil thoughts, he fell affrighted down on the earth. [vol. iii., page 128.]

78. The strong Kingly Majesty, etc. 79. Which attached itself to the pure Zarathustra for thinking the law, speaking the law, fulfilling the law, because he was of the whole corporeal world, in purity the purest; in rule the best ruling; in brightness the most shining; in majesty the most majestic; in victory the most victorious. 80. Visibly flew before him the Daevas, visibly furthered he the sciences, surely then hunted these the Jainis away from men, then they did violence to them tearful, weeping, to the Daevas.

83. The strong Kingly Majesty. 84. Which attached itself to Kavi Vistaspa for thinking the law, speaking the law, for fulfilling the law, when he praised this law, driving away the evil-minded, the Daevas, the impure. 85. Who with the much-penetrating weapon of purity made a broad way, who with the much-penetrating weapon of purity announced a broad way, who threw himself beneath as arm and protection of this AHURIAN, Mazdayasnian law.

91. The strong, Kingly Majesty, etc. 92. When Astvat-ereto* uplifts himself from the water Kansuya, a messenger of AHURAMAZDA, son of Vispa-taurvi, who purifies the victorious wisdom. Which the strong Thraetaono bore (possessed) when Azhis-dahaka was slain. 93. Which the Turanian Franrace bore when the wicked was slain, the Cow was slain,—which Kava Husrava bore when the Turanian Franrace was slain,—which Kava Vistaspa bore when he set purity before the wicked hosts, drove these away to the Druja out of the worlds of purity. This (Astvat-ereto) will see with the eyes of understanding, he will view all creatures, the images of the wicked seed. He will see the whole corporeal world with the eyes of fullness, beholding he will make the whole corporeal world immortal. 95. The companions of this Astvat-ereto go forward victorious, thinking good, speaking good, perfecting good deeds, attached to the good law, speaking no lie. They have their own tongue, before them Aeshma, with terrible weapon, with evil brightness, bows himself. He (Astvat-ereto) will smite the very wicked Drukhs, which proceeds from wicked seed out of darkness. 96. Vohu-mano will smite Ako-mano, the truth smites the lie. Haurvatat, and Ameretat subdue hunger and thirst; the evil-doer Anra-mainyu bows himself robbed of the rule. Yatha ahu vairyo. [I omit the remainder of this verse.] [vol. iii. page 134.]

* The future savior.

XXXVII. (21) FRAGMENT., 1. Zarathustra asked AHURA-MAZDA: AHURA-MAZDA, Heavenly, Holiest, Creator of the corporeal world, Pure! Wherein alone (is contained) Thy word, which expresses all good, all that springs from purity? 2. Him answered AHURA-MAZDA: The prayer Ashem, [see page 182 above] O Zarathustra. 3. Whoso utters the prayer Ashem with believing mind, from the memory, he praises Me, AHURA-MAZDA; he praises the water, he praises the earth, he praises the Cow, he praises the trees, he praises all good things created by MAZDA, which have a pure origin. 4. For this speech, the right spoken, O Zarathustra, when it is spoken, (reaches to) the prayer Ahunavairyā, the out-spoken, one furthers (?) strength and victoriousness for the pure soul and the law. 5. For it is worth, O holy Zarathustra, the mere prayer Ashem, as a Khshnaothra of the pure, a hundred sleep-(prayers), a thousand flesh meals, ten thousand head of small cattle, all that is come from bodies to incorporeality.

6. What is that prayer Ashem-vohu which in greatness, goodness, and beauty is worth as much as ten other prayers, Ashem-vohu? 7. Him answered AHURA-MAZDA: That, O pure Zarathustra, which a man eating prays with purity for Haurvat and Ameretat, praising good thoughts, words, and works, putting away all evil thoughts, words, and works.

8. Which is that one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, goodness, and beauty is worth a hundred other prayers Ashem-vohu? 9. Him answered AHURA-MAZDA: That, O pure Zarathustra, which a man after having eaten of the prepared Haoma, prays with purity, praising good thoughts, words, and works; putting away evil thoughts, words and works.

10. Which is the one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, goodness, and beauty, is worth a thousand other prayers Ashem-vohu? 11. Him answered AHURA-MAZDA: That one, O pure Zarathustra, which a man stretched out for sleep, speaks waking with purity, praising the good thoughts, words and works; removing evil thoughts, words, and works.

12. Which is the one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, goodness, and beauty, is worth ten thousand other prayers Ashem-vohu? 13. Him answered AHURA-MAZDA: That one, O pure Zarathustra, which a man waking from sleep, prays with purity, lifting himself up, praising good thoughts, words, and works; putting away evil thoughts, words, and works.

14. Which is the one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, goodness, and beauty, is worth as much as the whole Karashvare Qaniratha, with cattle, with chariots, with men? 15. Him answered

AHURA-MAZDA: That one, O pure Zarathustra, which a man at the latter end of his life prays with purity, praising all good thoughts, words, and works; putting away all evil thoughts, words, and works.

16. Which is the one prayer Ashem-vohu, which in greatness, goodness, and beauty, is worth all that is between heaven and earth, and this earth, those Lights, and all good things created by MAZDA which have a pure origin? 17. Him answered AHURA-MAZDA: That one, O pure Zarathustra, when one renounces all evil thoughts, words, and works. [vol iii., pages 135, 136.]

XXXVIII. (22) FRAGMENT., 1. Zarathustra asked AHURA-MAZDA: AHURA-MAZDA, Heavenly, Holiest, Creator of the corporeal world, Pure! When a pure man dies, where does his soul dwell during this night? 2. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: Near its head it sits itself down, reciting the Gatha Ustavaiti, praying happiness for itself: "Happiness be to the man who conduces to the happiness of each. May AHURA-MAZDA create, ruling after his wish." On this night the soul sees as much joyfulness as the whole living world possesses. [see page 168, above.]

5. Where does his soul stay throughout the third night? 6. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: Near its head it sits itself, etc (as in verse 2). Also in this night this soul sees as much joyfulness as the whole living world (possesses). 7. When the lapse of the third night turns itself to light, then the soul of the pure man goes forward, recollecting itself at the perfume of plants. A wind blows to meet it from the mid-day region, from the mid-day regions, a sweet-scented one, more sweet-scented than the other winds. 8. Then it goes forward, the soul of the pure man, receiving the wind in the nose (saying): Whence blows this wind, the sweetest-scented which I ever have smelt with the nose? 9. In that wind (?) there comes to meet him his own law* in the figure of a maiden, one beautiful, shining, with shining arms; one powerful, well-grown, slender, with large breasts, praiseworthy body; one noble, with brilliant face, one of fifteen years, as fair in her growth as the fairest creatures. 10. Then to her (the maiden) speaks the soul of the pure man, asking: What maiden art thou whom I have seen here as the fairest of maidens in body? 11. Then replies to him his own law: I am, O youth, thy good thoughts, words, and works, thy good law, the own law of thine own body. Which would be in reference to thee (like) in greatness, goodness, and beauty, sweet-smelling, victorious, harmless, as thou appearest to me. 12. Thou art like me, O well-speaking, well-thinking, well-acting youth, de-

* That is. the rule of life to which he has conformed.

voted to the good law, so in greatness, goodness, and beauty as I appear to thee. 13. If thou hast seen one there practice witchcraft, practice unlawfulness and bribery, fell trees, then thou didst set thyself down whilst thou recitedst the Gathas, offeredst to the good waters and to the fire of AHURA-MAZDA, whilst thou didst seek to satisfy the pure man who came near and from far. 14. Thou hast (made) the pleasant yet more pleasant to me, the fair yet fairer, the desirable yet more desirable, that sitting^e in a high place, sitting in a yet higher place, in these (Paradises) Humata, Hukta, Hvarsta. Afterward men praise me, and ask AHURA-MAZDA, praised long ago.

15. The soul of the pure man goes the first step and arrives in (the Paradise) Humata; the soul of the pure man takes the second step and arrives at (the Paradise) Hukhta; it goes the third step and arrives at (the Paradise) Hvarsta; the soul of the pure man takes the fourth step and arrives at the Eternal Lights. 16. To it speaks a pure one deceased before, asking it: How art thou, O pure deceased, come away from the fleshly dwellings, from the earthly possessions (?), from the corporeal world, hither, to the invisible, from the perishable world hither to the imperishable, has it happened to thee—to whom (be) Hail!—long? 17. Then speaks AHURA-MAZDA: Ask not him whom thou askest, (for) he is come on the fearful, terrible, trembling way, the separation of body and soul. 18. Bring him hither of the food, of the full fatness, that is the food for a youth who thinks, speaks, and does good, who is devoted to the good law after death, that is the food for the woman who especially thinks good, speaks good, does good, the following, obedient, pure, after death.

19. Zarathustra asked AHURA-MAZDA: AHURA-MAZDA, Heavenly, Holiest, Creator of the corporeal world, Pure! when a wicked one dies where does the soul dwell throughout this night? 20. Then answered AHURA-MAZDA: There, O pure Zarathustra, near the head it runs about whilst it utters the prayer *Ke manm*, etc. (*Yasna* xlv.,) [page 172 above]. “Which land shall I praise, whither shall I go praying, O AHURA-MAZDA?” In this night the soul sees as much displeasing as the whole living world.

23. Where does this soul keep itself the third night? 24. Throughout the third night it runs, etc. (as in verse 20). 25. When the lapse of the third night approaches toward light, O pure Zarathustra, then goes the soul of the wicked man to the impure place, recollecting itself continually by the stench. To it comes a wind blowing from the North region, from the North Region, an evil-smelling one, more evil-smelling than other winds. 26. When

the soul of the wicked man receives this wind into the nose it goes (saying) Whence comes this wind which I smell with the nose as the most evil-smelling wind? 33. The fourth step takes the soul of the wicked man and arrives at the darknesses without beginning. 34. To it speaks a formerly deceased wicked one, asking it: How, O deceased wicked one, art thou come away from the Drukhs, from the fleshly abode, from the earthly possessions, from the corporeal world to the spiritual, from the perishable world to the imperishable, how long—woe to thee!—was it? 35. Then speaks Anra-mainyu: Ask it nothing, it whom thou askest which has wandered on the fearful, terrible, trembling way, the separation of body and soul. 36. Bring hither food, poison, and mixed with poison, for that is the food for a youth who thinks, speaks, and does evil, belongs to the wicked law, after his death. This is the food for a harlot who most thinks, speaks, and does evil, is indocile and disobedient, the wicked, after her death.

38. The understanding of AHURA-MAZDA praise we, to inculcate the Manthra-spenta; the understanding of AHURA-MAZDA praise we, to maintain the Manthra-spenta; the tongue of AHURA-MAZDA praise we, to be able to utter the Manthra-spenta; the mountain, Ushi-darena, which bestows understanding, praise we, by day and by night, with gifts offered amidst prayers. [vol. iii., pp. 136–139.]

XLI. AFRIGAN GAHANBAR., 3. Offer, ye Mazdayasnians, at this time Myazda, to Maidhyo-zaremaya: the young of a cow, a sound one, milk-giving, if it can be done. 4. But if it cannot, then give so much Hura, and honor this on account of Sraosha (saying): O wisest, most truth-speaking, purest in purity, mightiest in rule, most sinless (?), most far-rejoicing, most merciful, most supporting the poor, most learned in purity, bringing the treasures which are bound with women,—if this can be done. 5. If not, then shall they bring well-cleaved, selected wood in loads, or more than this, into the house of the lord, if it can be done. But if not, then they shall bring into the house of the lord selected, well-split wood, as much as reaches to the ears, as much as goes on the arms (?), as much as they can carry in the hands,—if they can. 6. But if they cannot, then shall they impart the kingdom to the best Ruler, to AHURA-MAZDA (saying): “Let the kingdom belong to the best Ruler, wherefore we give it to Him, impart, offer ((it)) to AHURA-MAZDA, to Asha-vahista.” Then is the Myazda given to him which satisfies him at the right time. [I omit verses 7–19.]*

* [Cf. Hosea vi., 6: “For I desired mercy, and not sacrifice: and the knowledge of God more than holocausts.”—(*Douay version.*) Cf. Deuteronomy xxvi., 2 (page 93 above).] [In a note (vol. iii., page 140) there is a reference to the

XLIV. SIROZAH, II., 1. *Ormazd*. AHURA-MAZDA, the Shining, Majestic, praise we. The Amesha-spentas, the good rulers, the wise, praise we. 8. *Dai-pa-Adar*. The Creator AHURA-MAZDA, the Shining, Majestic, praise we. The Amesha-spentas, the good kings, the wise, praise we. 15. *Dai-pa-Mihr*. The Creator AHURA-MAZDA, the Shining, Majestic, praise we. The Amesha-spentas, the good kings, the wise, praise we. 23. *Dai-pa-din*. The Creator AHURA-MAZDA, the Shining, Majestic, praise we. The Amesha-spentas, the good kings, the wise, praise we. 24. *Din*. The Rightest Wisdom created by MAZDA, pure, praise we. The good Mazdayasnian law praise we. 29. *Manserspant*. The Manthra-spenta, with much brightness, praise we. The law given against the Daevas praise we. The Zarathustrian law praise we. The long-teaching praise we. The good Mazdayasnian law praise we. The maintaining in heart the Manthra-spenta praise we. The keeping the Mazdayasnian law in mind praise we. The knowledge which concerns the Manthra-spenta praise we. The Heavenly Understanding, created by MAZDA, praise we. The Understanding gifted with ears, created by MAZDA, praise we. [vol. iii., pages 148–152.] [I omit verse 30.]

XLV. PATET ADERBAT.* Yatha ahu vairyo (5). (((I repent of all sins. All wicked thoughts, words, and works which I have meditated in the world,—thoughts, words, and works, corporeal, spiritual, earthly, and heavenly, I repent of, in your presence, ye believers. O LORD, pardon through the three words.†))) Yatha ahu vairyo (5). Ashem-vohu (3). I confess myself a Mazdayasnian, a Zarathustrian, an opponent of the Daevas, devoted to belief in AHURA, for praise, adoration, satisfaction, and laud. To Sraosha the holy, strong, whose body is the Manthra, with strong weapons, Ahurian,—Khshnaothra, for praise, adoration, satisfaction, and laud. As it is the will of God, let the Zaota say to me, thus announces the LORD, the Pure out of Holiness. Let the wise speak: (Yatha ahu vairyo). [vol. iii., page 153.]

1. (((I praise all good thoughts, words, and works through thought, word, and deed. I curse all evil thoughts, words, and

note to Vispered, i., 2-7 (vol. ii., page 7), where it is stated that "the Gahanbars, or great annual festivals, are described in the Sad-der Bundesh, which says that God created the world in the space of a year, and hence men ought to keep six festivals yearly, and bestow alms to the poor. The festivals are as follows: 1. Maidhyo-zaremaya, in commemoration of the creation of heaven, in the month Ardibehist," etc.] [In a note here (vol. iii., page 141) it is said that "the foregoing verses appear to refer to the reward which was to be given to the priest on the occasions of the Gahanbars."]

* The *Patets* are formularies of confession. They are written in *Parsi* with occasional passages inserted in Zend. † That is, Thoughts, words, and works.

works away from thought, word, and deed. I lay hold on all good thoughts, words, and works, with thoughts, words, and works, *i. e.* I perform good actions. I dismiss all evil thoughts, words, and works, from thoughts, words, and works, *i. e.* I commit no sins. *)))

3. (((I praise the best purity, I hunt away the Devs, I am thankful for the good of the Creator ORMAZD, with the opposition and unrighteousness which come from Gana-mainyo, am I contented† and agreed in hope of the resurrection. The Zarathustrian law created by ORMAZD, uprightness and righteousness, the actions of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas I take as a plummet. For the sake of this way‡ I repent of all sins.))) [vol. iii., pages 153, 154.]

4. (((I repent of the sins which can lay hold of the character of men, or which have laid hold of my character,|| small and great (?), which are committed amongst men, the three Sraosho-charananm ganah§ the meanest sin, to a thousand times a thousand Margerzan,¶ as much as is (and) can be. yet more than this, namely: all evil thoughts, words and works which (I have committed) for the sake of others, or others for my sake, or if the hard (?) sin has seized the character of an evil doer on my account,—such sins, thoughts, words, and works, corporeal, mental, earthly, heavenly, I repent of with the three words: pardon, O LORD, I repent of the sins with Patet.))) [vol. iii., page 154.]

6. (((The sins against father, mother, sister, brother, wife, child, against spouses, against the superiors, against my own relations, against those living with me, against those who possess equal property, against the neighbors, against the inhabitants of the same town, against servants, every unrighteousness through which I have become amongst sinners; of these sins repent I with thoughts, words, and works, corporeal as spiritual, earthly as heavenly, with the three words: Pardon, O LORD, I repent of sins.)))

8. (((That which was the wish of ORMAZD the Creator, and I ought to have thought and have not thought, what I ought to have spoken and have not spoken, what I ought to have done and have not done; of these sins repent I with thoughts, words, and works, corporeal as well as spiritual, earthly as well as heavenly, with the three words: Pardon, O LORD, I repent of sin. 9. That which

* The words "*i. e.* I perform good actions," and "*i. e.* I commit no sins," may also be rendered, "that I may perform good actions," and "that I may commit no sin." Cf. Yasna xii. [page 153 above] with verses 1 and 2 † See note to verse 22. ‡ That is, if I have deviated from the right way. || The Guj. Tr. has "sins from my birth," etc., which would signify hereditary sins. § That is, sins which are to be punished with three strokes of the Sraosho-charana. ¶ "Margerzan" signifies "sins worthy of death;" but these, however, can always be atoned for in other ways.

was the wish of Ahriman, and I ought not to have thought and yet have thought, what I ought not to have spoken and yet have spoken, what I ought not to have done and yet have done; of these sins repent I with thoughts, words, and works, corporeal as well as spiritual, earthly as well as heavenly, with the three words: Pardon, O LORD, I repent of sin. 10. Of all and every kind of sin, of all kinds of crimes worthy of death, of all kinds of deeds not yet atoned for, of all kinds of repeated sins, all sins which are upon sins,* which I have committed against ORMAZD, men, and the kinds of men, I repent.)) [vol. iii., page 156.]

19. (((Of pride, haughtiness, covetousness, slandering the dead, anger, envy, the evil eye, shamelessness, looking at with evil intent, looking at with evil concupiscence,† stiffneckedness, discontent with the godly arrangements,‡ selfwilledness, sloth, despising others, mixing in strange matters, unbelief, opposing the Divine powers,|| false witness, false judgment, idol-worship, running without Kosti, running naked, running with one shoe, the breaking of the low (midday) prayer, the omission of the (midday) prayer, theft, robbery, whoredom, witchcraft, worshiping with sorcerers, unchastity, unchastity with boys, allowing unchastity with myself, tearing the hair,§ as well as all other kinds of sin which are enumerated in this Patet, or not enumerated, which I am aware of, or not aware of, which are appointed or not appointed, which I should have bewailed with obedience before the LORD and the Destur of the law, and have not bewailed,—of these sins repent I with thoughts, words, and works, corporeal as spiritual, earthly as heavenly. O LORD, pardon, I repent with the three words, with Patet.)))

21. (((I remain standing fast in the statutes of the law which ORMAZD gave to Zarathustra, Zarathustra to Gustasp, that in the family (of these two) then came to Ader-bat, son of Mahrespand who (again) made it right and purified it. I desire much after purity from love to my soul. As long as the life of my vital powers endures will I stand fast in good thoughts in my soul, in good words in my speech, in good deeds in my actions; I remain standing in the good Mazdayasnian law. 22. With all good deeds am I in agreement, with all sins am I not in agreement, for the good am I thankful, with iniquity am I contented.¶ With the punishment.

* That is, which are greater than other sins. † That is, coveting the wife or property of another. ‡ Or murmuring over one's own condition as compared with that of others. || This sin, in the original *Asmoi*, consists in speaking evil of ORMAZD to his Genii, creating strife, and designedly perverting the meaning of the Avesta. § That is, on the occasion of the loss of a relative. Excessive lamentation is prohibited in the Mazdayasnian religion. Cf. Vendidad iii., 36-7. ¶ Because suffering is necessary in the order of the world, in order that finally the resurrection may take place.

at the bridge, with the bonds and tormentings and chastisements of the mighty of the law, with the punishment of the three nights* (after) the fifty-seven years am I contented and satisfied. 23. This Patet have I made in my soul from great hope of the pure deed,† from vehement fear of hell, from love for purity of soul. The good works which I have hitherto done, which I shall do hereafter (are done) for the continual subsistence of good works, for the passing by of sins, for the purification of the soul. If anything still remains over, so that my sins are not yet atoned, then am I contented and agreeing with the punishment of the three nights for it.)) [vol. iii., page 158.] [I omit verse 24.]

XLVI. PATET QOD., 1. (((I praise the good thoughts, words, and works, with thoughts, words, and works. I curse wicked thoughts, words, and works, away from thoughts, words, and works. I lay hold on all good thoughts, words, and works. I renounce all evil thoughts, words, and works. I give to you, ye Amshaspands, offering and praise, with thoughts, words, and works, with my life and my vital powers. My property possess I in dependence upon the Yazatas, if one of the things come that I must give this body for the sake of the soul, then I give it to them. I praise the best purity, I hunt away the Devs, I confess myself a Mazdayasnian, a follower of Zarathustra, an opponent of the Devs, devoted to the faith in ORMAZD. Of all kinds of sins, all evil thoughts, all evil speech, all evil actions, all Margerzans, especially all bad withholding‡ which the wicked Ahriman produced in opposition to the creatures of ORMAZD; ORMAZD has declared as sins, whereby men become sinners and may come to hell; if I have thereby become a sinner, in what kind soever I have sinned, against whomsoever I have sinned, however I have sinned, I repent of it with thoughts, words, and works: pardon! 2. Before the Creator ORMAZD and the Amshaspands, the face of the right-believing Mazdayasnians, before Mihr, Sros, and Rasn,|| before the heavenly Yazatas, before the earthly Yazatas, before the lord and Destur of the law, before the Frohar of the immortal soul of Zartusht, before my own believing soul, before the faithful am I here come, and repent with thoughts, words, and works: pardon!)))

16. (((My sins which I have committed against those in authority, the lords, the Desturs, and Mobeds, etc. 17. My sins which

* According to the Parsees, on the Day of Judgment the souls which have not atoned for their sins will be sent back to hell, and tormented during three days and nights with torments surpassing the usual torments of hell itself. Cf. *Tradit. Lit. der Parsen*, ii., 117. † That is, in the hope that my good works will conduct me to Paradise. ‡ That is, the withholding debts which are due. || [Mithra, Sraosha, and Rashnu. See page 142, line 8 above.]

I have committed against father, mother, sister, brother, wife, child, relations, descendants, family, friends, and other near relations, etc. 18. If I have broken the whispered prayer, eaten without the whispered prayer, etc. 19a. If I have gone without Kosti, I repent it. 19b. If I have defiled my feet, I repent it. 20. Deceit, contempt, idol-worship, lies, I repent of. 21. I repent of paederastism, going with menstruous women, whoredom, unnatural intercourse with beasts. 22. Of all wicked deeds I repent. 23. Pride, despite, scoffing, revenge, and lust, I repent of. 24. All that I ought to have thought and have not thought, all that I ought to have spoken and have not spoken, all that I ought to have done and have not done; pardon, I repent with Patet. 25. All that I ought not to have thought and yet have thought, all that I ought not to have spoken and yet have spoken, all that I ought not to have done, and yet have done; pardon, I repent with Patet. 26. All and every kind of sin which men have committed because of me, or which I have committed because of men; pardon, I, etc. 27. All kinds of sins which the evil Ahriman produced amongst the creatures of ORMAZD in opposition ((and)) ORMAZD has declared as sins, through which men become sinners and may come to hell, if they have at all laid hold of my character; I repent of them. 28. I believe in the existence, the purity, and unboughtness of the good Mazdayasnian faith, and in the Creator ORMAZD, and the Amshaspands, the furthering of righteousness, and in the resurrection and the new body. In this faith I remain and recognize the undoubtedness of the same, as ORMAZD has imparted it to Zertusht, Zertusht to Frashaostra and Jamasp, as Aderbat the son of Mahrespand rectified and purified it, how the righteous Paoiryotkaeshas and the Desturs in succession have brought it to us, and I am wise therein. Of all kinds of sins of which mention is made in this law, and which I have committed, from the least to three Sraosho-charanas, to countless sins, which have been thought, spoken, done by me, I repent with thoughts, words, and works.)) [vol. iii., pages 161, 162.] [I omit the 29th verse.]

XLVII. PATET ERANI, 1. ((I praise all good thoughts, words, and works, with thoughts, words, and works. I curse all evil thoughts, words, and works, away from thoughts, words, and works, I lay hold on all good thoughts, words, and works, that is, I do good works, I renounce all evil thoughts, words, and works; that is, I commit no sins. I am constant in right-doing, in pure actions, I remain in the pure Mazdayasnian law, in that law remain I which the Ruler ORMAZD and the Amshaspands have taught to Zertusht with praised Frohar, the descendant of Spitama,

and Zertusht has taught the king Vistaspa, the king Vistaspa to Frashaostra and Jamasp and Asfendiyar, and these have taught to all the believers in the world, which came in succession to Aderbat, the son of Mahrespand, the restorer of purity, who restored it and purified it, and stood before (?) it. I am steadfast in this faith and turn myself not away from it for the sake of a good life, or for the sake of a longer life, nor for rule, nor for kingdom, out of love for purity.—If I perhaps must give up my body for the sake of my soul, I give it with contentment. I turn myself not away from this law and have laid hold of all good thoughts, words, and works, the good law and all uprightness. I renounce all evil thoughts, words, and works, the evil law, and all wickedness; that is, I am with knowledge believing in the law of ORMAZD, and in Zertusht the newer. I am wholly without doubt in the existence of the good Mazdayasnian faith, in the coming of the resurrection and the later body, in the stepping over the bridge Chinvat, in an invariable recompense of good deeds and their reward, and of bad deeds and their punishment, as well as in the continuance of Paradise, in the annihilation of Hell and Ahriman and the Devs, that the GOD ORMAZD will at last be victorious and Ahriman will perish, together with the Devs and the off-shoots of darkness.))

2. (((All that I ought to have thought and have not thought, all that I ought to have said and have not said, all that I ought to have done and have not done, all that I ought to have ordered and have not ordered; (further) all that I ought not to have thought and yet have thought, all that I ought not to have spoken and yet have spoken, all that I ought not to have done and yet have done, all that I ought not to have ordered and yet have ordered; for thoughts, words and works, bodily and spiritual, earthly and heavenly, pray I for forgiveness, and repent of it with Patet.)))

3. (((All kinds of sins which I have committed in reference to Heaven against the Creator ORMAZD, in reference to the World against men and all kinds of Men; if I have smitten Men, injured, hurt them with words, if I have harmed the pure, the lords, the Mobeds, the Desturs and Herbads, and withheld from them the gifts which it was incumbent on me to give them, if I have granted no place to a stranger who came into the town, if I have not taken heed for men before the fire, the cold, and the heat, have done evil to men; if I have requited the men who stand under my dominion with evil, have not bestowed on them affection and good things, so that at like time the good things and the Creator ORMAZD have been injured through me, and were not contented with me; I repent with thoughts, words, and works, etc. 6. Of all

kinds of sins which I have committed in reference to Heaven against the Metals and the various kinds of Metals, if I have not kept the Metal pure and clean, if I have laid it in a damp place so that rust has laid hold of it, if I have taken it out of the protection of the good, if I have not purified in the lawful manner, metal out of which a woman has eaten anything during menstruation, if I have given gold, silver, ore, copper, iron, brass, and bronze, to sinners, so that they commit sin therewith and great profit might accrue to them there-from, and whereby I myself have become an evil-doer, so that alike the good things and the Amshaspand Shahrevar have been thereby injured and displeased, I repent, etc. 7. Of all kinds of sins which I have committed in reference to Heaven against the Amshaspand Aspendarmat, and in reference to the world against the Earth, and the various kinds of Earth; if I have not kept the earth pure and cultivated, if I have not removed the holes of the Kharfesters, if I have made fruitful land waste, or have not made waste land fruitful, if I have gone on the earth afoot with only one shoe on, if I have buried corpses in the Earth, if I have not dug up what was buried, if I as a menstruous woman have gone on the Earth without shoes, if I have thrown seed upon the Earth, if I have treated ill the land which was under my protection, so that alike all good things and Aspendarmat have been injured by me and not contented with me, I repent, etc. 9. Of all kinds of sins which I have committed in reference to Heaven against the Amshaspand Amerdat, in reference to the world against the Trees and the kinds of Trees; if I have cut round young Trees, if I have collected unripe fruits, if I have kept back medicine and healing-remedies from the worthy and given them to the unworthy, if I have given food to eat to sinners and taken it away from the pure, so that alike all good things and the Amshaspand Amerdat, etc. 11. Of all kinds of sins; the sins against towns, lands, against souls, the sins Kaidhyozat, Kaidhyo-hvarest, Vaidhyozat, Magh, Bagh, Astars, Asvartuann, sins which draw after them the high punishment, the utterance of incantations, the striking with terror, the desire to requite wound with wound, the frequent sins, the separating from the pure, Navid-nasast, Adut-as-aosma, the sins which bear the name of three Craosho-charanas, generally, of all kinds of sins, repent I, with thoughts, words, and works, etc. 12. Of wrong thought, wrong speech, wrong action, unrighteous questioning, speaking before or after without grounds,* theft, lie, false witness,† violent judgment, shamelessness, pride, thanklessness, mocking,

* Anquetil: "to question and answer without reason." † *Lit.*, "violence-witness," that is, perhaps, witness extorted from another by oppression.

insatiability, self-exaltation, disobedience against the law, contentiousness, hard-heartedness, wrathfulness, revenge, envy, excessive lamentation, approbation of sins, disapprobation of a good deed, friendship with sinners, self-will, witchcraft, honoring sorcerers, teaching sorcery, enmity toward the Yazatas, hostility toward the law, hostility toward the Desturs, the calling the names of the Yazatas together with those of the Devs, or the names of the Devs with those of the Yazatas, unnatural sins with women, boys, or cattle, unchastity, pæderasty, going with menstruous women, adultery with the wives of others, going with one shoe, going without Kosti, interrupting the low prayer (at eating), the omission of the low prayer at eating, the satisfying natural wants without prayer, if I have made water standing upright, if I have honored the Devs, thought on them, brought them offering, have broken the adoption, I repent, etc.))) [vol. iii., pages 164–167.]

15. (((If I have not helped the poor, have not observed the manner and custom of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas, the feast of blessings, the Nauroz, the Mihir-jan, if I have not displayed friendship to mankind, so repent I with thoughts, etc. 18. Every Avesta that I have not spoken, read, learned,—the Avesta-i-jamas, the Khorda-Avesta, —if I have not rightly learned or recited the Avesta, or if I have forgotten again what was learned, so repent I with thoughts, etc. 20. On account of a crime worthy of death—if, perhaps, evil Ahri-man and the Devs should have prevailed over me—am I contented, if it is fitting, to atone for it by death, (I am contented) that the Destur should take away from me what lies upon me and free me from sin, namely, from the Margerzans from one to ten, from ten to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, from a thousand to ten thousand, from ten thousand to countless (?) Margerzans. Of all evil thoughts, words, and works whereby men may become sinners, whereby I have become a sinner, repent I with thoughts, etc. 21. Of all kinds of sins which the Creator ORMAZD has declared as sins in the good Mazdayasnian law, at which, if one commits them, the Yazatas feel pain, the Devs joy; of that which I have thought, committed, spoken, done, whereby I have become a sinner. what has been enumerated by me and not enumerated, what was known to me by name and what was not known to me, what I do not yet know, what I have committed on account of others, what others have committed on my account, everything whereby I am a sinner, in reference to everything whereby I have become a sinner, for every sin, for everything kept back, repent I a thousand times and ten thousand times before the ruler ORMAZD, the Accomplisher of good deeds, the Shining, Majestic, the First of

the Heavenly and earthly (Genii), before the Amshaspands, and before every other heavenly good being, before Mihr, Sros, and Rasn-rast, before Adar-qara, Adar-Gusasp, Adar-burzin-mihr, before the Frohar of Zartusht the descendant of Spitama, before the Law and mine own soul, before every good thing before which I come, with thoughts, etc.))) [vol. iii., pages 168-170.]

22. (((With three words, with a hundred words, with a thousand words, with ten thousand words am I a right-believing good Mazdayasnian, I am in that faith which the LORD ORMAZD and the Amshaspands have given to Zartusht with holy Frohar, the son of Spitama, Zartusht to the king Vistasp, Vistasp to Frashaostra and Jamasp and Aspendyar, and these have taught to the good in the world, until in succession of descent it came to the restorer of purity, Aderbat, the son of Mahrespand, who made it right and purified it. I stand in the faith and will not be unbelieving, not for good life, nor for longer life, nor for dominion, nor possessions. From love toward purity do I not depart, and if thereby my head is cut off so depart I not from this belief, for I am affrighted before the terror of the punishment, and the requital of hell. I am full of hope for that attaining to Paradise and the shining Garothman, which possesses all majesty. I accomplish this Patet in the thought that as I hereafter may become more zealous to accomplish good works, I may also keep myself more from sin and that my good deeds may serve for the lessening of sin, for the increase of good works,* until the resurrection and the last body comes to me. I cherish hope in the coming of the last body to behold ORMAZD and the Amshaspands. I have wrought and still work for this, that when that time arrives. and my mouth is in bonds through the smiting of the wicked Gana-mainyo, Asto-vahat, and the bad Bird, ye may declare my thoughts, and if I with my own tongue can no longer speak the Patet, the Amshaspands, in friendship to my soul, may cause this Patet to arrive and bestow it on my soul that my soul may attain to the light place and not arrive at the dark place, and the wicked Ahriman and the diminishers may not torment my soul and not cause sorrow to it. On account of every sin which has remained in the world without atonement, am I contented and agreeing to give retribution and atonement with thrice cutting off the head, only (?) I pray from the Highest Creator, ORMAZD, the Supporter, Forgiver, and Pardoner, that the Yazatas

* We see in this Patet that good deeds are not regarded merely from an individual point of view, but as tending to the result that ultimately the total of good deeds will outweigh the total of bad ones, and the superiority of ORMAZD over Ahriman be manifest. [Cf. § 751.]

may throw to us and give us an equipment. If any one after my departure, out of love to my soul, or if my son performs the Patet before one of those set over who is at the place, so am I agreed thereto. May ORMAZD and the Amshaspands and the other Heavenly come to my soul for good help and companionship, and loose it from anguish and fear and affliction, from Ahriman and the Devs and from the coming to the terrors of Hell. In these thoughts have I laid hold on all good thoughts, words, and works; in this mind have I renounced all evil thoughts, words, and works from thoughts, words, and works.)))] [vol. iii., pages 170, 171.] [I omit verse 23.]

XLIX. NIKAH OR MARRIAGE-PRAYER., 4. (((Do ye both accept the contract for life with honorable mind, that pleasure may increase to you twain?)))

5. (((In the name and friendship of ORMAZD. Be ever shining, be very enlarged! Be increasing! Be victorious! Learn purity! Be worthy of good praise! May the mind think good thoughts, the words speak good, the works do good! May all wicked thoughts hasten away, all wicked words be diminished, all wicked works be burnt up. Let them praise purity and thrust away sorcery. (Let them read :) Be a Mazdayasnian, accomplish works according to thy mind.* Win for thyself property by right-dealing. Speak truth with the rulers and be obedient. Be modest with friends, clever, and well-wishing. Be not cruel. Be not wrathful-minded. Commit no sin through shame. Be not covetous. Torment not. Cherish not wicked envy, be not haughty, treat no one despitefully, cherish no lust. Rob not the property of others, keep thyself from the wives of others. Do good works with good activity. Impart to the Yazatas and the faithful (of thine own). Enter into no strife with a revengeful man. Be no companion to a covetous one. Go not on the same way with a cruel one. Enter into no agreement with one of ill-fame. Enter not into work in common with an unskilful one. Combat the adversaries with right. Go with friends as is agreeable to friends. Enter into no strife with those of evil repute. Before an assembly speak only pure words. Before kings speak with moderation. From ancestors inherit (good) names. In no wise displease thy mother. Keep thine own body pure in justice.))) [vol. iii., page 174.] [I omit verses 6-12.]

L. AFERIN OF THE SEVEN AMSHASPANDS., 10. (((May the praiseworthy souls possess all might, who believing to the last in righteousness and well-doing, have spread abroad law and equity.

* These words are not clear in the original. Anquetil translates, "*Being a Mazdayasnian, think and do good.*"

11. May there possess all might: the LORD, the King of Kings. May the Great Commander possess all might. 16. May each from the midst (of us) suffer harm from idol-worship, be it in body, or in property, or in soul. He who must have more (than he has) let him have more; he who must have good things, let him have good things; he who must have a wife, let him have a wife; he who must have a son, let him have a son. May the earthly be so as the body desires it in righteousness; may the heavenly be as the soul desires it in purity. 18. May good deeds increase through prayers and words; may sins become utterly annihilated. May the world be good, the Heaven be good, at last may the good purity increase, the souls come to Garothman. Be pure, live long!))) So may it come as I wish. Good thoughts, etc. Yatha ahu vairyo (21). To Him belongs brightness, etc. [vol. iii., pages 177-179.]

LI. AFERIN GAHANBAR., 1. (((Be wholly strength, be wholly pure. May all strength, all blessings be present. May the Creator ORMAZD possess all strength, the Shining ORMAZD, the Majestic ORMAZD, and the Amshaspands. May the Aderan's and Ateshans possess all strength. May the Fravashis of the pure possess all strength. May the good Mazdayasnian Law possess all strength. May the good in the seven Keshvars of the cattle possess all strength, who are believing according to the law, according to the kind of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas,* and who are constant in the pure good Mazdayasnian law, that with us, that with us.†))) [vol. iii., page 179.] [I omit verses 2-21.]

LII. PRAYER AT EATING. (((In the Name of God, the Forgiver, Pardoning, Loving,—the Ruler AHURA-MAZDA. Here praise I now AHURA-MAZDA who has created the cattle, has created purity, the water and the good trees, who created the splendor of light, the earth, and all good. Ashem-vohu (3). (Hereupon the person eats and after eating prays as follows:))) Yatha ahu vairyo (2). Ashem-vohu (1). To him belongs brightness, etc. A thousand, etc. Come, etc. For reward, etc.‡ Ashem-vohu (1).

LXVI. CONFESSION OF FAITH. (((The good, righteous, right Religion which the LORD has sent to the creatures is that

* [See note †, page 194 above.] † The author of this passage understands by the *Seven Keshvars* the often-named seven divisions, each of which is a world in itself, and separated from the rest. All the known land belongs to *Qaniras*, and hence comprises only *one seventh* of the world. As Zartusht and his Law were only sent to *Qaniras*, the faithful in the rest of the world cannot be disciples of Zartusht, but are only believers *after the way of the Paoiryo-tkaeshas*: that is, they were created pure by ORMAZD, and continue to preserve this purity. Hence they live according to the Law, but without knowing it. They form therefore, as it were, an invisible community with the true Parsees. [Cf. § 810.] ‡ [Cf. Khordah-Avesta, v., and xvii., 39 (page 187 above).]

which Zartusht has brought. The religion is the religion of Zartusht, the religion of ORMAZD, given to Zartusht.))) Ashem-vohu.

§ 882.—Embodied* in the Christian creed. (page 188, line 1.)

§ 883.—Symbol may fitly suggest to us the whole of pure moral religion. (page 188, line 11.)

§ 884.—While in a theoretical respect surpassing all our notions. (page 189, line 15.)

§ 885.—Mystery of our calling. (page 190, line 4.) Cf. § 2361. Cf. I. Thessalonians, ii., 12.

§ 886.—Mystery of redemption. (page 190, line 29.)

§ 887.—Mystery of election. (page 191, line 14.) Cf. II. Thessalonians, ii., 13.

§ 888.—Arcanum that must ever remain hidden. (p. 191, l. 30.)

§ 889.—God's will amply revealed to us by the moral law. (page 192, line 7.)

§ 890.—GOD IS LOVE,—a principle of religious faith, rising out of the love of the law. (p. 193, l. 16.) *Loved by God himself*: cf. § 2441.

§ 891.—Notion of a Benignant Judge issues out of love combined with reverence. (page 194, line 12.) Cf. Matthew xxv., 31, 32; Acts x., 42; II. Cor., v., 10; II. Timothy, iv., 1; John xvi., 8. [*Opinions*: cf. § 2524.]

Book IV.—Of the True and False Worship of God under the Sway of the Good Principle Victress; or of Religion and Ecclesiastical Despotism (§§ 892-983 inclusive.)

Exordium. (§§ 892-895 inclusive.)

§ 892.—Advent of the kingdom of God. (page 199, line 4.) [*Intellectual*: Milton is quoted by Webster as authority for the use of this word.] *Duty of its own kind*: see § 799.

§ 893.—Idea of His kingdom must serve as the pattern of our combination ecclesiastical. (page 200, line 12.)

§ 894.—True service of the church must be such as perpetually to approach the belief taught by pure reason. (page 201, line 12.)

§ 895.—Spurious service, wherein a church faith frustrates the pure worship of God. (page 202, line 11.)

APOTOME I.—OF THE RELIGIOUS WORSHIP OF THE DEITY. (§§ 896-918 inclusive.)

§ 896.—Religion, subjectively considered, is the acknowledgment and recognition of all our duties AS IF THEY WERE divine commandments. (page 203, line 3.) Cf. §§ 627-631, 529.

§ 897.—Religion does not assert the existence of God; the possibility that there may be a God is enough. (page 203, line 6.) Cf. §§ 2595, 1428, 1178.

* [That is, the belief in God as (1) Omnipotent Creator, (2) Benignant Governor, (3) Righteous Judge. See § 879 (page 137 above), and cf. § 3064.]

§ 898.—Religion does not mean an aggregate of certain fixed duties to be rendered toward God (offices of divine worship.) (page 203, line 23.) Cf. §§ 537, 541, 449.

§ 899.—Conflicting positions of the pure rationalists and supernaturalists. (page 204, line 8.)

§ 900.—Religion, abstract from its first origin and inward ground, is either natural or else a learned religion. (page 205, line 13.)

§ 901.—Although a religion be natural, it may notwithstanding have moreover been revealed. (page 205, line 30.) Cf. § 1017.

§ 902.—Every, even a revealed religion, must present the lineaments of a natural religion. (page 206, line 26.)

§ 903.—Revelation and philosophy having but one common end (viz., forwarding the culture of the moral good), let us scrutinize the principles of Christianity. (page 207, line 5.) *Intromit*: in Scottish law, to intermeddle with the effects of another.—(Webster.)

Chapter I.—Christianity as Natural Religion. (§§ 904-911 inclusive.)

§ 904.—Natural religion possesses the first requisite of a true church (universal validity § 812). (page 208, line 9.)

§ 905.—Must be superadded sundry statutable authoritative edicts, to bring about a permanent and abiding union of mankind in a visible church universal. (page 209, line 1.)

§ 906.—Jesus the founder of the true catholic church. (page 210, line 4.) Cf. §§ 864, 773. [*Irregressible*: from which there is no return.—*Andrews' Latin Lexicon*. "And Jesus said unto him, No man, having put his hand to the plough, AND LOOKING BACK, is fit for the kingdom of God." *St. Luke ix.*, 62.] *His sayings*: cf. the following extracts from the Gospel according to St. Matthew :*

V., 1. And seeing the multitudes, he went up into the mountain ; and he having sat down, his disciples came to him. 2. And he opened his mouth, and taught them, saying :

3. Happy the poor in spirit ; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

4. Happy they that mourn ; for they shall be comforted.

5. Happy the meek ; for they shall inherit the earth.

6. Happy they that hunger and thirst after righteousness ; for they shall be filled.

7. Happy the merciful ; for they shall obtain mercy.

8. Happy the pure in heart ; for they shall see God.

9. Happy the peacemakers ; for they shall be called sons of God.

10. Happy they who are persecuted for righteousness' sake ; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

11. Happy are ye, when they shall revile and persecute you, and shall say all evil against you falsely, for my sake. 12. Rejoice, and

* American Bible Union, second revision: New York, 1869.

exult ; because great is your reward in heaven, for so they persecuted the prophets that were before you.

13. Ye are the salt of the earth ; but if the salt become tasteless, wherewith shall it be salted ? It is thenceforth good for nothing, but to be cast out, and to be trodden under foot by men.

14. Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill can not be hid. 15. Nor do they light a lamp and put it under the bushel, but on the lamp-stand ; and it shines to all that are in the house. 16. Thus let your light shine before men, that they may see YOUR GOOD WORKS, and glorify your Father who is in heaven.

17. Think not that I came to destroy the law, or the prophets ; I came not to destroy, but to fulfil. 18. For verily I say to you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall not pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. 19. Whoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven ; but whoever shall do and teach them, he shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.

20. For I say to you, that except your RIGHTEOUSNESS shall exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.

21. Ye heard that it was said to those of old : Thou shalt not kill ; and whoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment. 22. But I say to you, that every one who is angry with his brother, without cause, shall be in danger of the judgment ; and whoever shall say to his brother, Raca ! shall be in danger of the council ; and whoever shall say, Thou fool ! shall be in danger of hell-fire. 23. Therefore if thou bringest thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother has aught against thee ; 24. leave there thy gift before the altar, and go, first be reconciled to thy brother and then come and offer thy gift.

25. Agree with thine adversary quickly, while thou art in the way with him ; lest haply the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. 26. Verily I say to thee, thou shalt not come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.

27. Ye heard that it was said : Thou shalt not commit adultery : 28. But I say to you, that every one who looks on a woman, to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart. 29. And if thy right eye causes thee to offend, pluck it out and cast it from thee ; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members perish, and not thy whole body be cast into hell. 30. And if thy right hand causes thee to offend, cut it off and cast it from thee ; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members perish, and not thy whole body be cast into hell.

31. And it was said : Whoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement. 32. But I say to you, that whoever shall put away his wife, save for the cause of fornication, makes her commit adultery ; and whoever shall marry her when put away, commits adultery.

33. Again ye heard, that it was said to those of old : Thou shalt not swear falsely, but shalt perform to the Lord thine oaths. 34. But I say to you, SWEAR NOT AT ALL ; neither by heaven, for it is God's throne ; 35. nor by the earth, for it is his footstool ; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. 36. Nor shalt thou swear by thy head ; because thou canst not make one hair white or black. 37. But let your word be, Yea, yea, Nay, nay ; for that which is more than these comes of evil.

38. Ye heard that it was said : An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. 39. But I say to you, that ye resist not evil ; but whoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. 40. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. 41. And whoever shall compel thee to go one mile, go with him two. 42. Give to him that asks of thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not away.

43. Ye heard that it was said : Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and shalt hate thine enemy. 44. But I say to you, love your enemies, and pray for those who persecute you ; 45. that ye may be sons of your Father who is in heaven ; FOR HE CAUSES HIS SUN TO RISE ON THE EVIL AND THE GOOD, AND SENDS RAIN ON THE JUST AND THE UNJUST. 46. For if ye love those who love you, what reward have ye ? Do not also the publicans the same ? 47. And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye that excels ? Do not also the heathen thus ? 48. Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father who is in heaven is perfect.

VI., 1. Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men, to be seen by them ; otherwise ye have no reward with your Father who is in heaven. 2. Therefore when thou doest alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may have glory of men. Verily I say to you, they have in full their reward. 3. But when thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand does ; 4. that thine alms may be in secret ; and thy Father who sees in secret will himself reward thee.

5. And when ye pray, ye shall not be as the hypocrites ; for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen by men. Verily I say to you, they have in full their reward. 6. But thou, when thou prayest,

enter into thy closet, and having shut thy door, pray to thy Father who is in secret; and thy Father who sees in secret will reward thee.

7. But when ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the heathen do; for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking. 8. Be not ye therefore like to them; for your Father knows what things ye have need of, before ye ask him. 9. Do ye, therefore, pray after this manner:

Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name.

10. Thy kingdom come; thy will be done, as in heaven, so also on the earth.

11. Give us this day our daily bread.

12. And forgive us our debts, as also we forgave our debtors.

13. And bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.

14. For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; 15. but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.

16. And when ye fast, be not as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance; for they disfigure their faces, that they may appear to men to fast. Verily I say to you, they have in full their reward.

17. But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head, and wash thy face; 18. that thou appear not to men to fast, but to thy Father who is in secret; and thy Father who sees in secret will reward thee.

19. Lay not up for yourselves treasures on the earth, where moth and rust consume, and where thieves break through and steal. 20. But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consumes, and where thieves do not break through nor steal. 21. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

22. The lamp of the body is the eye. If therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body will be light; 23. but if thine eye be evil, thy whole body will be dark. If therefore the light that is in thee is darkness, how great the darkness! 24. No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one, and love the other, or he will hold to one and despise the other. Ye can not serve God and Mammon.

25. For this cause I say to you, take not thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than food, and the body than raiment? 26. Behold the birds of the air, that they sow not, nor reap, nor gather into barns; and your heavenly Father feeds them. Are ye not much better than they? 27. And which of you by

taking thought can add one cubit to his stature? 28. And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow. They toil not, nor spin; 29. and I say to you, that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. 30. And if God so clothes the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, will he not much more you, ye of little faith? 31. Take not thought therefore, saying; What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewith shall we be clothed? 32. For after all these do the Gentiles seek. For your heavenly Father knows that ye have need of all these. 33. But SEEK FIRST THE KINGDOM OF GOD, AND HIS RIGHTEOUSNESS; and all these shall be added to you. 34. Take not thought, therefore, for the morrow; for the morrow will take thought for itself. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.

VII., 1. Judge not, that ye be not judged. 2. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged; and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you. 3. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye? 4. Or how wilt thou say to thy brother: Let me cast out the mote from thine eye; and behold, the beam is in thine own eye? 5. Hypocrite! first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.

6. Give not that which is holy to the dogs, nor cast your pearls before the swine; lest they trample them with their feet, and turn and rend you.

7. Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you. 8. For every one that asks receives; and he that seeks finds; and to him that knocks it shall be opened. 9. Or what man is there of you, of whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone? 10. And if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent? 11. If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who ask him? 12. Therefore ALL THINGS WHATEVER YE WOULD THAT MEN SHOULD DO TO YOU, SO ALSO DO YE TO THEM; for this is the law and the prophets.

13. Enter in through the strait gate; because wide is the gate, and broad the way, that leads to destruction, and many are they who go in thereat. 14. Because strait is the gate, and narrow the way, that leads to life, and few are they who find it.

15. Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves.

16. Ye shall know them from their fruits. Do men gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles? 17. So every good tree brings forth good fruit; but the corrupt tree brings forth evil fruit. 18. A good tree can not bring forth evil fruit, nor a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. 19. Every tree that brings not forth good fruit is cut down, and cast into the fire. 20. So then, from their fruits ye shall know them.

21. Not every one that says to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but he that DOES the will of my Father who is in heaven. 22. Many will say to me in that day: Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in thy name, and in thy name cast out demons, and in thy name do many miracles? 23. And then will I profess to them, I never knew you; depart from me, ye who work iniquity.

24. Every one, therefore, who hears these sayings of mine, AND DOES THEM, I will liken him to a wise man, who built his house on the rock. 25. And the rain descended, and the streams came, and the winds blew, and fell upon that house; and it did not fall, for it had been founded on the rock. 26. And every one who hears these sayings of mine, and does them not, shall be likened to a foolish man, who built his house on the sand. 27. And the rain descended, and the streams came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house, and it fell; and great was the fall of it.

IX., 9. And Jesus, passing on from thence, saw a man named Matthew, sitting at the place of receiving custom; and he says to him: Follow me. And he rose up and followed him. 10. And it came to pass that, as he reclined at table in the house, behold, many publicans and sinners came and reclined at table with Jesus and his disciples. 11. And the Pharisees, seeing it, said to his disciples: Why does your teacher eat with the publicans and the sinners? 12. And Jesus hearing it, said: They who are well need not a physician, but they who are sick. 13. But go, and learn what this means: I desire mercy and not sacrifice; for I came not to call righteous men, but sinners.

35. And Jesus went about all the cities and villages, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the good news of the kingdom, and healing every sickness and every infirmity. 36. And seeing the multitudes, he was moved with compassion for them, because they were harassed, and scattered, as sheep having no shepherd. 37. Then he says to his disciples: The harvest indeed is great, but the laborers are few. 38. Pray therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he will send forth laborers into his harvest.

X., 1. And calling to him his twelve disciples, he gave them authority over unclean spirits, so as to cast them out, and to heal every sickness and every infirmity.

2. And the names of the twelve apostles are these: first Simon, who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother; James the son of Zebedee, and John his brother; 3. Philip, and Bartholomew; Thomas, and Matthew the publican; James the son of Alpheus, and Lebbeus surnamed Thaddeus; 4. Simon the Cananite, and Judas Iscariot, who also betrayed him.

5. These twelve Jesus sent forth, and charged them, saying: Go not into the way to the Gentiles, and into a city of Samaritans enter not. 6. But go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. 7. And as ye go, preach, saying: THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN IS AT HAND. 8. Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out demons. Freely ye received, freely give. 9. Provide not gold, nor silver, nor brass in your girdles; 10. nor bag for the journey, nor two coats, nor sandals, nor staff; for the laborer is worthy of his living. 11. And into whatever city or village ye shall enter, inquire who in it is worthy; and there abide till ye go thence. 12. But when ye come into the house, salute it. 13. And if the house be worthy, let your peace come upon it; but if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you. 14. And whoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye go out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet. 15. Verily I say to you, it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for that city.

16. Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be therefore wise as serpents, and simple as doves. 17. But beware of men; for they will deliver you up to councils, and will scourge you in their synagogues; 18. and before governors also and kings will ye be brought for my sake, for a testimony to them and to the Gentiles.

19. But when they deliver you up, take not thought how or what ye shall speak; for it shall be given you in that hour what ye shall speak. 20. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaks in you.

21. And the brother will deliver up the brother to death, and the father the child; and children will rise up against parents, and cause them to be put to death. 22. And ye will be hated by all for my name's sake; but he that has endured to the end, the same shall be saved.

23. But when they persecute you in this city, flee into the other; for verily I say to you, ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel, till the Son of man come.

24. A disciple is not above the teacher, nor the servant above his lord. 25. It is enough for the disciple that he be as his teacher, and the servant as his lord. If they called the master of the house Beelzebul, how much more those of his household!

26. Fear them not therefore; for there is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, and hid that shall not be known. 27. What I say to you in the darkness, that speak ye in the light; and what ye hear in the ear, that proclaim upon the house-tops. 28. And be not afraid of those who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.

29. Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? And one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. 30. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. 31. Fear not therefore; ye are of more value than many sparrows.

XII., 1. At that time Jesus went on the sabbath through the grain-fields; and his disciples were hungry, and began to pluck ears of grain, and to eat. 2. And the Pharisees seeing it said to him: Behold, thy disciples are doing that which it is not lawful to do on the sabbath. 3. And he said to them: Have ye not read what David did, when he hungered, himself and those with him; 4. how he entered into the house of God, and ate the show-bread, which it was not lawful for him to eat, nor for those with him, but for the priests alone? 5. Or have ye not read in the law, that on the sabbath the priests in the temple profane the sabbath, and are blameless? 6. But I say to you, that a greater than the temple is here. 7. But if ye had known what this means, I desire mercy and not sacrifice, ye would not have condemned the blameless. 8. For the Son of man is Lord of the sabbath.

XIII., 1. And on that day Jesus went out of the house, and sat by the sea-side. 2. And great multitudes were gathered together to him, so that he went into the ship and sat down; and all the multitude stood on the beach. 3. And he spoke many things to them in parables, saying:

4. Behold, the sower went forth to sow. And as he sowed, some fell by the way-side, and the birds came and devoured them. 5. And others fell on the rocky places, where they had not much earth; and forthwith they sprang up, because they had not depth of earth. 6. And when the sun was up, they were scorched; and because they had not root, they withered away. 7. And others fell upon the thorns; and the thorns came up, and choked them. 8. And others fell on the good ground, and yielded fruit, some a hundredfold, some sixty, some thirty. 9. He that has ears to hear, let him hear.

10. And the disciples came and said to him: Why dost thou speak to them in parables? 11. And he answering said to them: To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven but to them it is not given.

18. Hear therefore the parable of the sower. 19. When any one hears the word of the kingdom, and understands not, then comes the evil one and snatches away what was sown in his heart. This is that which was sown by the way-side.

20. And that sown on the rocky places, this is he that hears the word, and immediately with joy receives it; 21. and has not root in himself, but is only for a time; and when tribulation or persecution arises because of the word, immediately he is offended.

22. And that sown among the thorns, this is he that hears the word, and the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choke the word, and it becomes unfruitful. 23. And that sown on the good ground, this is he that hears the word and understands; who bears fruit, and produces, some a hundredfold, some sixty, some thirty.

24. Another parable he put forth to them, saying: The kingdom of heaven is likened to a man that sowed good seed in his field. 25. But while men slept, his enemy came and sowed darnel among the wheat, and went away. 26. And when the blade sprang up and produced fruit, then appeared the darnel also. 27. And the servants of the householder came and said to him: Sir, didst thou not sow good seed in thy field? From whence then has it darnel? 28. He said to them: An enemy did this. The servants said to him: Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up? 29. He said: Nay, lest while ye gather up the darnel, ye root up the wheat with them. 30. Let both grow together until the harvest. And in time of harvest I will say to the reapers: Gather up first the darnel, and bind them in bundles to burn them; but gather the wheat into my barn.

31. Another parable he put forth to them, saying: The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard, which a man took and sowed in his field. 32. Which is the least indeed of all seeds; but when it is grown, it is greater than the herbs, and becomes a tree, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in its branches.

33. Another parable he spoke to them: The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened.

36. Then having sent away the multitudes, he went into the house. And his disciples came to him, saying: Explain to us the parable of the darnel of the field. 37. And answering he said to them:

He that sows the good seed is the Son of man. 38. The field is the world. The good seed, these are the sons of the kingdom; but the darnel are the sons of the evil one. 39. and the enemy that sowed them is the Devil. The harvest is the end of the world; and the reapers are angels. 40. As therefore the darnel are gathered up and are burned with fire, so shall it be in the end of the world. 41. The Son of man will send forth his angels, and they will gather out of his kingdom all the causes of offense, and those who do iniquity, 42. and will cast them into the furnace of fire; there will be the wailing, and the gnashing of teeth! 43. Then will the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. He that has ears to hear, let him hear.

44. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like to a treasure hidden in the field, which a man found and concealed; and for joy thereof, he goes and sells all that he has, and buys that field.

45. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like to a merchant seeking goodly pearls; 46. and having found one pearl of great price, he went and sold all that he had, and bought it.

47. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like to a net, cast into the sea, and gathering together of every kind. 48. Which, when it was filled, they drew up upon the beach, and sat down and gathered the good into vessels, but cast the bad away. 49. So will it be in the end of the world. The angels will go forth, and will separate the wicked from among the just, 50. and will cast them into the furnace of fire; there will be the wailing, and the gnashing of teeth!

XV., 10. And calling to him the multitude, he said to them: Hear, and understand. 11. Not that which enters into the mouth defiles the man; but that which comes out of the mouth, this defiles the man.

12. Then came to him his disciples, and said to him: Knowest thou that the Pharisees, when they heard the saying, were offended? 13. And he answering said: Every plant, which my heavenly Father planted not, shall be rooted up. 14. Let them alone; they are blind leaders of the blind; and if the blind lead the blind, both will fall into the ditch.

15. And Peter answering said to him: Explain to us this parable. 16. And he said: Are ye also even yet without understanding? 17. Do ye not yet understand, that whatever enters into the mouth goes into the belly, and is cast out into the drain? 18. But the things that proceed out of the mouth come forth out of the heart; and they defile the man. 19. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false-witnessings, blasphemies. 20. These are the things that defile the man; but to eat with unwashed hands defiles not the man.

XVIII., 1. At that time came the disciples to Jesus, saying : Who then is greatest in the kingdom of heaven?

2. And Jesus calling a little child to him, placed it in the midst of them, 3. and said: Verily I say to you, if ye do not turn and become as the little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. 4. Whoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, he is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. 5. And whoever shall receive one such little child, in my name, receives me. 6. But whoever shall cause one of these little ones that believe on me to offend, it were better for him that an upper millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were plunged in the depth of the sea.

7. Woe to the world, for causes of offense ! For it must needs be that causes of offense come ; but woe to that man, through whom the cause of offense comes ! 8. But if thy hand or thy foot causes thee to offend, cut it off, and cast it from thee. It is better for thee to enter into life lame or maimed, than having two hands or two feet to be cast into the everlasting fire. 9. And if thine eye causes thee to offend, pluck it out and cast it from thee. It is better for thee to enter into life with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell-fire.

10. Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones ; for I say to you, that their angels in heaven always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven. 11. For the Son of man came to save that which was lost.

12. What think ye ? If a man has a hundred sheep, and one of them is gone astray, does he not leave the ninety and nine upon the mountains, and go and seek that which is gone astray ? 13. And if it be that he find it, verily I say to you, he rejoices over it more than over the ninety and nine that went not astray. 14. So it is not the will of your Father who is in heaven, that one of these little ones perish.

15. But if thy brother shall sin against thee, go show him his fault between thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. 16. But if he hear not, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. 17. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it to the church ; and if he neglect to hear the church also, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican. 18. Verily I say to you : whatever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven ; and whatever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

19. Again I say to you, that if two of you shall agree on earth, concerning any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them by my Father who is in heaven. 20. For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.

21. Then Peter came to him, and said : Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him ? Until seven times ?

22. Jesus says to him : I say not to thee, until seven times, but until seventy times seven.

23. Therefore is the kingdom of heaven likened to a certain king, who desired to make a reckoning with his servants. 24. And when he had begun to reckon, there was brought to him one, who owed ten thousand talents. 25. But as he was not able to pay, his lord commanded him to be sold, and his wife, and children, and all that he had, and payment to be made. 26. The servant therefore, falling, prostrated himself before him, saying : Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all. 27. And the lord of that servant, moved with compassion, released him, and forgave him the debt. 28. But that servant went out, and found one of his fellow-servants, who owed him a hundred denaries ; and laying hold of him he took him by the throat, saying : Pay me that thou owest. 29. Therefore his fellow-servant fell down and besought him, saying : Have patience with me, and I will pay thee. 30. And he would not ; but went and cast him into prison, till he should pay the debt. 31. And his fellow-servants, seeing what was done, were very sorry, and came and disclosed to their lord all that was done. 32. Then having called him, his lord says to him : Thou wicked servant ; I forgave thee all that debt, because thou besoughtest me. 33. Shouldest not thou also have had pity on thy fellow-servant, as I too had pity on thee ? 34. And his lord was angry, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due to him. 35. So also will my heavenly Father do to you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother.

XIX., 1. And it came to pass, when Jesus finished these sayings, that he departed from Galilee, and came into the borders of Judæa beyond the Jordan. 2. And great multitudes followed him, and he healed them there.

3. And the Pharisees came to him, tempting him and saying : Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause ?

4. And he answering said to them : Have ye not read, that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female, 5. and said : For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh. 6. So that they are no longer two, but one flesh. What therefore God joined together, let not man put asunder.

7. They say to him : Why then did Moses command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away ? 8. He says to them : Moses, for your hardness of heart, suffered you to put away

your wives; but from the beginning it was not so. 9. And I say to you, that whoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery; and whoever marries her when put away, commits adultery.

16. And, behold, one came to him and said: Teacher, what good shall I do, that I may have eternal life? 17. And he said to him: Why dost thou ask me concerning good? One is the Good. But if thou desirest to enter into life, keep the commandments. 18. He says to him, Which? Jesus said: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not bear false-witness; 19. Honor thy father and thy mother; and, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. 20. The young man says to him: All these I kept; what do I yet lack? 21. Jesus said to him: If thou desirest to be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me. 22. But when the young man heard this saying, he went away sorrowful; for he had great possessions.

23. And Jesus said to his disciples: Verily I say to you, that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven. 24. And again I say to you: It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. 25. And the disciples, hearing it, were exceedingly amazed, saying: Who then can be saved? 26. But Jesus, looking on them, said to them: With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible.

XX., 1. For the kingdom of heaven is like to a householder, who went out early in the morning to hire laborers into his vineyard. 2. And having agreed with the laborers for a denary a day, he sent them into his vineyard.

3. And he went out about the third hour, and saw others standing idle in the market-place. 4. And to them he said: Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatever is right I will give you. And they went their way.

5. Again he went out about the sixth and ninth hour, and did likewise.

6. And about the eleventh he went out, and found others standing, and says to them: Why stand ye here all the day idle? 7. They say to him: Because no one hired us. He says to them: Go ye also into the vineyard.

8. And when evening was come, the lord of the vineyard says to his steward: Call the laborers, and pay them the hire, beginning from the last, unto the first. 9. And they of the eleventh hour came, and received every man a denary. 10. But when the

first came, they supposed that they should receive more ; and they also received each one a denary. 11. And on receiving it, they murmured against the householder, 12. saying : These last labored one hour, and thou madest them equal to us, who bore the burden of the day, and the burning heat.

13. But he answering said to one of them : Friend, I do thee no wrong. Didst thou not agree with me for a denary ? 14. Take what is thine, and go. But I will give to this last, even as to thee. 15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with my own ? Is thine eye evil, because I am good ?

16. So will the last be first, and the first last ; for many are called, but few are chosen.

17. And Jesus, going up to Jerusalem, took the twelve disciples apart ; and in the way he said to them : 18. Behold, we are going up to Jerusalem ; and the Son of man will be delivered to the chief priests and scribes, and they will condemn him to death, 19. and will deliver him to the Gentiles to mock and scourge and crucify ; and on the third day he will rise again.

20. Then came to him the mother of the sons of Zebedee, with her sons, bowing down and asking a certain thing of him. 21. And he said to her : What wilt thou ? She says to him : Command that these my two sons shall sit, one on thy right hand, and one on thy left, in thy kingdom. 22. But Jesus answering said : Ye know not what ye ask. Are ye able to drink of the cup that I shall drink of ? They say to him : We are able. 23. And he says to them : Ye shall drink indeed of my cup ; but to sit on my right hand, and on my left, is not mine to give, but is for them for whom it has been prepared by my Father. 24. And the ten, hearing it, were much displeased with the two brothers. 25. But Jesus, having called them to him, said : Ye know that the rulers of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them, and they that are great exercise authority over them. 26. Not so shall it be among you ; 27. but whoever would become great among you, let him be your minister ; and whoever would be first among you, let him be your servant ; 28. even as the Son of man came not to be ministered to, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.

XXI., 23. And when he had come into the temple, the chief priests and the elders of the people came to him as he was teaching, and said : By what authority doest thou these things ; and who gave thee this authority ? 24. And Jesus answering said to them : I also will ask you one thing, which if ye tell me, I too will tell you by what authority I do these things. 25. John's immersion, whence was it ? From heaven, or from men ? And they reasoned

among themselves, saying : If we say, From heaven, he will say to us : Why then did ye not believe him? 25. But if we say, From men, we fear the multitude; for all hold John as a prophet. 27. And they answered Jesus, saying : We do not know. And he said to them: Neither do I say to you, by what authority I do these things.

28. But what think ye? A man had two sons; and he came to the first, and said: Son, go work to-day in the vineyard. 29. And he answering said: I will not; but afterward he repented, and went. 30. And he came to the other, and said likewise. And he answering said: I will, sir; and went not. 31. Which of the two did the father's will? They say to him: The first. Jesus says to them: Verily I say to you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you. 32. For John came to you in the way of righteousness, and ye did not believe him; but the publicans and the harlots believed him; and ye, when ye had seen it, repented not afterward, that ye might believe him.

33. Hear another parable. There was a householder, who planted a vineyard, and put a hedge around it, and dug a winepress in it, and built a tower, and let it out to husbandmen, and went abroad. 34. And when the season of fruits drew near, he sent his servants to the husbandmen, to receive his fruits. 35. And the husbandmen taking his servants, beat one, and killed another, and stoned another. 36. Again he sent other servants, more than the first; and they did to them likewise. 37. And afterward he sent to them his son, saying: They will reverence my son. 38. But the husbandmen, seeing the son, said among themselves: This is the heir; come, let us kill him, and have his inheritance. 39. And taking him, they cast him out of the vineyard, and killed him. 40. When therefore the lord of the vineyard comes, what will he do to those husbandmen? 41. They say to him: He will miserably destroy those wicked men, and will let out the vineyard to other husbandmen, who will deliver over to him the fruits in their seasons. 42. Jesus says to them: Did ye never read in the Scriptures:

The stone which the builders disallowed,
The same is become the head of the corner;
This is from the Lord,

And is wonderful in our eyes. [Ps. cxviii., 22. Is. xxviii., 16.]

43. Therefore I say to you, that the kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof. 44. And he that falls upon this stone will be broken; but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder.

45. And the chief priests and Pharisees, hearing his parables, knew that he spoke of them. 46. And they sought to lay hold of him, but feared the multitudes, since they held him as a prophet.

XXIII., 1. Then Jesus spoke to the multitudes, and to his disciples, 2. saying: The scribes and the Pharisees sat down in Moses' seat. 3. All, therefore, whatever they bid you, do and observe; but do not according to their works, for they say and do not. 4. For they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men's shoulders, but will not move them with their finger. 5. But all their works they do to be seen by men; they make broad their phylacteries, and enlarge the fringes; 6. and love the first place at feasts, and the first seats in the synagogues, 7. and the greetings in the markets, and to be called by men, Rabbi, Rabbi. 8. But be not ye called Rabbi; for one is your Teacher, and all ye are brethren. 9. And call not any your father on the earth; for one is your Father, he who is in heaven. 10. Neither be called leaders; for one is your leader, the Christ. 11. But the greatest of you shall be your servant. 12. And whoever shall exalt himself shall be humbled; and he that shall humble himself, shall be exalted.

13. But woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men; for ye go not in, nor suffer those who are entering to go in.

15. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye traverse sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him twofold more a child of hell than yourselves.

16. Woe to you, blind guides, who say: Whoever shall swear by the temple, it is nothing; but whoever shall swear by the gold of the temple, he is bound. 17. Fools and blind; for which is greater, the gold, or the temple that sanctifies the gold? 18. And, Whoever shall swear by the altar, it is nothing; but whoever shall swear by the gift that is upon it, he is bound. 19. Fools and blind; for which is greater, the gift, or the altar that sanctifies the gift?

20. He therefore who swears by the altar, swears by it, and by all things thereon. 21. And he that swears by the temple, swears by it, and by him who dwells therein. 22. And he that swears by heaven, swears by the throne of God, and by him who sits thereon.

23. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye pay tithe of the mint and the dill and the cumin, and omitted the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith; these ought ye to have done, and not leave those undone.

24. Blind guides! that strain out the gnat, and swallow the camel.

25. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye cleanse the outside of the cup and the platter, but within they are full of rapacity and excess. 26. Blind Pharisee! Cleanse first the inside of the cup and the platter, that its outside also may become clean.

27. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye are like to whited sepulchres, which outwardly indeed appear beautiful, but within are full of bones of the dead, and of all uncleanness. 28. So also ye outwardly indeed appear righteous to men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity.

29. Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the sepulchres of the prophets, and adorn the tombs of the righteous, and say: 30. If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets. 31. So that ye witness to yourselves, that ye are sons of those who killed the prophets; 32. and fill ye up the measure of your fathers!

33. Serpents! Brood of vipers! How can ye escape the judgment of hell?

34. Therefore, behold, I send forth to you prophets, and wise men, and scribes; and some of them ye will kill and crucify, and some of them ye will scourge in your synagogues, and persecute from city to city; 35. that on you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel to the blood of Zechariah, son of Barachiah, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar. 36. Verily I say to you, all these things shall come upon this generation.

37. Jerusalem! Jerusalem! that killest the prophets, and stonest those sent to her; how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! 38. Behold, your house is left to you desolate. 39. For I say to you, ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say: Blessed is he that comes in the name of the Lord.

XXV., 1. Then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened to ten virgins, who took their lamps, and went out to meet the bridegroom. 2. And five of them were wise, and five foolish. 3. The foolish, taking their lamps, took no oil with them; 4. but the wise took oil in their vessels with their lamps. 5. While the bridegroom tarried, they all slumbered and slept. 6. And at midnight a cry was made: Behold, the bridegroom! Go out to meet him. 7. Then all those virgins arose, and trimmed their lamps. 8. And the

foolish said to the wise: Give us of your oil, for our lamps are going out. 9. But the wise answered, saying: Not so; there will not be enough for us and you. Go rather to those who sell, and buy for yourselves. 10. And while they went to buy, the bridegroom came; and they who were ready went in with him to the marriage; and the door was shut. 11. And afterward come also the rest of the virgins, saying: Lord, Lord, open to us. 12. But he answering said: Verily I say to you, I know you not.

13. Watch, therefore; because ye know not the day, nor the hour!

14. For as a man going abroad called his own servants, and delivered to them his goods; 15. and to one gave five talents, to another two, and to another one, to each according to his own ability; and straightway went abroad. 16. And he that received the five talents went and traded with them, and gained other five talents. 17. Likewise also he that received the two gained other two. 18. But he that received the one went away and digged in the earth, and hid his lord's money. 19. After a long time the lord of those servants comes, and reckons with them. 20. And he that received the five talents came and brought other five talents, saying: Lord, thou deliveredst to me five talents: behold, I gained other five talents beside them. 21. His lord said to him: Well done, good and faithful servant; thou wast faithful over a little, I will set thee over much. Enter thou into the joy of thy lord. 22. And he also that received the two talents came and said: Lord, thou deliveredst to me two talents; behold, I gained other two talents beside them. 23. His lord said to him: Well done, good and faithful servant; thou wast faithful over a little, I will set thee over much. Enter thou into the joy of thy lord. 24. And he also that received the one talent came and said: Lord, I knew thee that thou art a hard man, reaping where thou didst not sow, and gathering where thou strewedst not. 25. And fearing, I went and hid thy talent in the earth. Lo, thou hast thine own. 26. And his lord answering said to him: Wicked and slothful servant! Thou knewest that I reap where I did not sow, and gather where I strewed not? 27. Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers; and when I came, I should have received my own with interest. 28. Take therefore the talent from him, and give to him that has the ten talents. 29. For to every one that has shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that has not, even what he has shall be taken away. 30. And cast forth the unprofitable servant into the outer darkness. There will be the weeping, and the gnashing of teeth!

31. And when the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the angels with him, then will he sit on his throne of glory. 32. And before him shall be gathered all the nations; and he will divide them one from another, as the shepherd divides the sheep from the goats. 33. And he will set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left.

34. Then will the King say to those on his right hand: Come, blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. 35. For I was hungry, and ye gave me to eat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink; I was a stranger and ye took me in, 36. naked and ye clothed me; I was sick, and ye visited me; I was in prison, and ye came to me.

37. Then will the righteous answer him, saying: Lord, when saw we thee hungering and fed thee, or thirsting and gave thee drink? 38. And when saw we thee a stranger and took thee in, or naked and clothed thee? 39. And when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came to thee? 40. And the King will answer and say to them: Verily I say to you, inasmuch as ye did it to one of the least of these my brethren, ye did it to me.

41. Then will he say also to those on the left hand: Depart from me, accursed, into the everlasting fire, prepared for the Devil and his angels. 42. For I was hungry, and ye did not give me to eat; I was thirsty, and ye did not give me drink; 43. I was a stranger, and ye did not take me in; naked, and ye did not clothe me; sick, and in prison, and ye did not visit me.

44. Then will they also answer, saying: Lord, when saw we thee hungering, or thirsting, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister to thee? 45. Then will he answer them, saying: Verily I say to you, inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not to me.

46. And these shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into everlasting life.

EXTRACTS FROM MARK.

II., 23. And it came to pass, that he went through the grain-fields on the sabbath; and his disciples began to go forward, plucking the ears of grain. 24. And the Pharisees said to him: Behold, why do they on the sabbath that which is not lawful? 25. And he said to them: Did ye never read what David did, when he had need and hungered, himself and they who were with him; 26. how he went into the house of God, in the days of Abiathar the high priest, and ate the show-bread, which it is not lawful to eat but for the priests, and gave also to those who were with him? 27.

And he said to them : The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath. 28. So that the Son of man is Lord also of the sabbath.

IV., 26. And he said : So is the kingdom of God, as when a man has cast the seed upon the earth, 27. and sleeps and rises night and day, and the seed sprouts and grows up. he knows not how. 28. For the earth brings forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear. 29. But when the fruit permits, immediately he puts forth the sickle because the harvest is come.

VII., 1. And there come together to him the Pharisees and certain of the scribes, who came from Jerusalem. 2. And seeing some of his disciples eating bread with defiled (that is, unwashed) hands, they found fault. 3. For the Pharisees, and all the Jews, except they carefully wash their hands, do not eat, holding the tradition of the elders. 4. And coming from the market, except they immerse themselves, they do not eat. And there are many other things which they received to hold, immersions of cups, and pots, and brazen vessels, and couches. 5. And the Pharisees and the scribes ask him : Why do not thy disciples walk according to the tradition of the elders, but eat bread with defiled hands? 6. And he said to them : Well did Isaiah prophesy concerning you hypocrites ; as it is written :

This people honor me with their lips,

But their heart is far from me.

7. But in vain they worship me,

Teaching as doctrines commandments of men.

8. For laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men, immersions of pots and cups ; and many other such things ye do. 9. And he said to them : Well do ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition ! 10. For Moses said : Honor thy father and thy mother ; and he that curses father or mother, let him surely die. 11. But ye say : If a man say to his father or his mother, It is Corban (that is, a gift) whatever thou mightest be profited with from me—;* 12. and ye suffer him no more to do aught for his father or his mother, 13. annulling the word of God by your tradition, which ye handed down. And many such things ye do.

14. And again calling to him the multitude, he said to them : Harken to me every one, and understand. 15. There is nothing

* The conclusion, "He is bound" (by his vow), and so freed from the duty to his parents, is left to be inferred from the speaker's silence; compare the similar use of this figure of speech in Exodus, xxxii., 32; Luke, xiii., 9; Acts, xxiii., 9.

from without a man, that entering into him can defile him; but the things that come out of him, these are they that defile the man. 16. If any one has ears to hear, let him hear.

X., 13. And they brought little children to him, that he might touch them; and the disciples rebuked those who brought them. 14. But Jesus seeing it, was much displeased, and said to them: Suffer the little children to come to me; forbid them not, for to such belongs the kingdom of God. 15. Verily I say to you, whoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, shall not enter therein. 16. And he folded them in his arms, put his hands on them, and blessed them.

17. And as he was going forth into the way, there came one running, and kneeling to him, and asked him: Good Teacher, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life? 18. And Jesus said to him: Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, God. 19. Thou knowest the commandments: Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Defraud not, Honor thy father and mother. 20. And he answering said to him: Teacher, all these I kept from my youth. 21. And Jesus beholding him loved him, and said to him: One thing thou lackest; go, sell whatever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, take up the cross, and follow me. 22. And he became sad at that saying, and went away sorrowful; for he had great possessions.

23. And looking around, Jesus says to his disciples: How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God! 24. And the disciples were astonished at his words. But Jesus answering again says to them: Children, how hard it is for those who trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God! 25. It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. 26. And they were exceedingly amazed, saying among themselves: Who then can be saved? 27. And Jesus, looking on them, says: With men it is impossible, but not with God; for with God all things are possible.

XII., 28. And one of the scribes came to him, and having heard them reasoning together, and perceiving that he answered them well, asked him: Which commandment is first of all? 29. And Jesus answered him: First is, Hear, O Israel; the Lord is our God, the Lord is one; 30. and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. This is the first commandment. 31. Second is this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. There is no other commandment greater than these. 32. And the scribe said

to him : Well, Teacher ; thou saidst truly that he is one, and there is no other beside him : 33. and to love him with all the heart, and with all the understanding, and with all the soul, and with all the strength, and to love his neighbor as himself, is more than all the whole-burnt-offerings and sacrifices. 34. And Jesus, seeing that he answered intelligently, said to him : Thou art not far from the kingdom of God. And no one dared any longer to question him.

38. And he said to them in his teaching : Beware of the scribes, who love to go about in long robes, and love greetings in the markets. 39. and the first seats in the synagogues, and the first places at the feasts ; 40. who devour widows' houses, and for a pretense make long prayers ; these shall receive greater condemnation.

41. And sitting over against the treasury, he beheld how the people cast money into the treasury ; and many that were rich cast in much. 42. And one poor widow came, and cast in two mites, which are a farthing. 43. And calling to him his disciples, he said to them : Verily I say to you, that this poor widow cast in more than all who are casting into the treasury. 44. For all cast in out of their abundance ; but she, out of her want, cast in all that she had, her whole living.

XIII., 31. Heaven and earth shall pass away ; but my words shall not pass away.

32. But of that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father. 33. Take heed, watch ; for ye know not when the time is. 34. As a man who is abroad, having left his house, and given authority to his servants, to each one his work, also commanded the porter that he should watch ; 35. watch therefore, for ye know not when the master of the house comes, at evening, or at midnight, or at the cock-crowing, or in the morning ; 36. lest coming suddenly he find you sleeping. 37. And what I say to you, I say to all, Watch.

EXTRACTS FROM LUKE.

VI., 20. And he, lifting up his eyes on his disciples, said : Happy are ye poor ; for yours is the kingdom of God. 21. Happy are ye that hunger now ; for ye shall be filled. Happy are ye that weep now ; for ye shall laugh.

22. Happy are ye, when men shall hate you, and when they shall separate you from them, and shall reproach you, and cast out your name as evil, for the sake of the Son of man. 23. Rejoice in that day, and leap for joy ; for, behold, your reward is great in heaven ; for in the same manner did their fathers to the prophets.

24. But woe to you that are rich ; for ye have received your consolation. 25. Woe to you that are full ; for ye shall hunger.

Woe to you that laugh now; for ye shall mourn and weep. 26. Woe! when all men shall speak well of you; for in the same manner did their fathers to the false prophets.

27. But I say to you who hear: Love your enemies, DO GOOD TO THOSE WHO HATE YOU, 28. bless those who curse you, pray for those who abuse you. 29. To him who smites thee on the cheek offer also the other; and him who takes away thy cloak forbid not to take thy coat also.

30. Give to every one that asks of thee; and of him who takes away thy goods demand them not again. 31. And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also in like manner to them.

32. For if ye love those who love you, what thanks have ye? For even the sinners love those who love them. 33. And if ye do good to those who do good to you, what thanks have ye? For even the sinners do the same. 34. And if ye lend to those of whom ye hope to receive, what thanks have ye? And sinners lend to sinners, that they may receive as much in return.

35. But love your enemies, and DO GOOD, AND LEND, HOPING FOR NOTHING IN RETURN; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be sons of the Highest; for he is kind to the unthankful and evil. 36. Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful.

37. And judge not, and ye shall not be judged; condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned; acquit, and ye shall be acquitted.

38. Give, and it shall be given to you; good measure, pressed down, shaken together, running over, shall they give into your bosom. For with the same measure with which ye mete it shall be measured to you again.

39. And he spoke also a parable to them: Can the blind lead the blind? Shall they not both fall into the ditch? 40. A disciple is not above the teacher; but every one shall be perfected as his teacher.

41. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye? 42. How canst thou say to thy brother: Brother, let me cast out the mote that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Hypocrite! cast out first the beam out of thine eye, and then thou shalt see clearly to cast out the mote that is in thy brother's eye.

43. For there is no good tree that bears corrupt fruit, nor corrupt tree that bears good fruit. 44. For every tree is known from its own fruit. For from thorns they do not gather figs, nor from a bramble bush do they harvest grapes. 45. The good man out of the good treasure of his heart brings forth that which is good;

and the evil, out of the evil, brings forth that which is evil; for out of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaks.

46. And why call ye me, Lord, Lord, AND DO NOT THE THINGS WHICH I SAY? 47. Every one that comes to me, and hears my sayings, AND DOES THEM, I will show you to whom he is like. 48. He is like a man building a house, who digged deep, and laid a foundation on the rock. And when a flood arose, the stream burst upon that house, and could not shake it; because it was well builded. 49. But he that hears, and DOES NOT, is like a man that built a house upon the earth without a foundation; on which the stream burst, and immediately it fell; and the ruin of that house was great.

VIII., 4. And a great multitude coming together, of those also who came to him out of every city, he spoke by a parable: 5. The sower went forth to sow his seed. And as he sowed, one fell by the wayside; and it was trodden down, and the fowls of the air devoured it. 6. And another fell upon the rock; and springing up, it withered away, because it had no moisture. 7. And another fell among the thorns; and the thorns sprang up with it, and choked it. 8. And another fell into the good ground, and sprang up, and bore fruit a hundredfold.

And saying these things, he cried: He that has ears to hear, let him hear.

9. And his disciples asked him, what this parable was. 10. And he said: To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God; but to the rest in parables, that seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand.

11. Now the parable is this: The seed is the word of God. 12. Those by the wayside are they that hear; after that comes the Devil, and takes away the word from their heart, that they may not believe and be saved. 13. Those on the rock are they who, when they hear, with joy receive the word; and these have no root, who for a while believe, and in time of temptation fall away. 14. And that which fell among the thorns, these are they who have heard, and going forth are choked with the cares and riches and pleasures of life, and bring no fruit to perfection. 15. But that in the good ground, these are they who, in an honest and good heart, having heard, HOLD FAST THE WORD, AND BRING FORTH FRUIT with patience.

16. No one, having lighted a lamp, covers it with a vessel, or puts it under a bed; but puts it on a lamp-stand, that they who enter in may behold the light. 17. For nothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest, nor hidden, that shall not be known and come

abroad. 18. Take heed therefore how ye hear. For whoever has, to him shall be given; and whoever has not, even what he seems to have shall be taken from him.

19. And his mother and his brothers came to him; and they could not come near him on account of the multitude. 20. And it was told him, saying: Thy mother and thy brothers are standing without, desiring to see thee. 21. And he answering, said to them: My mother and my brothers are these, who hear AND DO the word of God.

IX., 57. And as they were going in the way, a certain one said to him: I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest. 58. And Jesus said to him: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man has not where to lay his head.

59. And he said to another: Follow me. But he said: Lord, permit me first to go and bury my father. 60. And he said to him: Let the dead bury their own dead; but do thou go and announce the kingdom of God.

61. And another also said: I will follow thee, Lord; but first permit me to bid farewell to those in my house. 62. And Jesus said to him: No one, having put his hand to the plow, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.

X., 1. After these things the Lord appointed also seventy others, and sent them two and two before his face, into every city and place, whither he himself was about to come. 2. And he said to them: The harvest indeed is great, but the laborers are few. Pray therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he will send forth laborers into his harvest. 3. Go your ways; behold, I send you forth as lambs among wolves. 4. Carry neither purse, nor bag, nor sandals; and salute no one by the way. 5. And into whatever house ye enter, first say: Peace be to this house. 6. And if a son of peace be there, your peace shall rest upon it; and if not, it shall return to you. 7. And in that house remain, eating and drinking such things as they give; for the laborer is worthy of his hire. Go not from house to house. 8. And into whatever city ye enter and they receive you, eat what is set before you; 9. and heal the sick that are therein, and say to them: The kingdom of God has come nigh unto you.

16. He that hears you, hears me; and he that rejects you, rejects me; and he that rejects me, rejects him who sent me.

25. And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, tempting him, saying: Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? 26. He said to him: What is written in the law? How readeest thou? 27. And he answering said: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy

heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself. 28. And he said to him: Thou answeredst rightly. This do, and thou shalt live. 29. But he, desiring to justify himself, said to Jesus: Who then is my neighbor?

30. And Jesus answering said: A certain man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among robbers, who stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead. 31. And by chance a certain priest was going down that way; and seeing him, he passed by on the other side. 32. And in like manner also a Levite, arriving at the place, came and saw, and passed by on the other side.

33. And a certain Samaritan, as he was journeying, came where he was, and seeing him had compassion; 34. and coming to him, bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine; and setting him on his own beast, he brought him to an inn, and took care of him. 35. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two denaries and gave to the host, and said: Take care of him; and whatever thou spendest more, when I come again I will repay thee.

36. Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbor to him that fell among the robbers? 37. And he said: He that had mercy on him. And Jesus said to him: Go, and do thou likewise.

XI., 33. No one, having lighted a lamp, puts it in a secret place, or under the bushel, but on the lamp-stand, that they who come in may see the light. 34. The lamp of the body is thine eye. When thine eye is single, thy whole body also is light; but when it is evil, thy body also is dark. 35. Take heed therefore, lest the light that is in thee is darkness. 36. If therefore thy whole body is light, having no part dark, it shall be all light as when the lamp, with its bright shining, gives thee light.

37. And as he was speaking, a Pharisee asked him to dine with him; and he went in, and reclined at table, 38. And the Pharisee, seeing it, wondered that he did not first immerse himself before dinner. 39. And the Lord said to him: Now ye Pharisees cleanse the outside of the cup and the platter; but your inward part is full of rapacity and wickedness. 40. Fools! Did not he, who made the outside, make the inside also? 41. But give that which ye have in alms; and, behold, all things are clean to you.

XII., 13. And a certain one of the multitude said to him: Teacher, speak to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me. 14. And he said to him: Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you? 15. And he said to them: take heed, and beware of all covetousness; because a man's life consists not in the abundance of his possessions.

16. And he spoke a parable to them, saying: The ground of a certain rich man brought forth plentifully. 17. And he thought within himself, saying: What shall I do, because I have not where to store my fruits? 18. And he said: This will I do; I will pull down my barns, and will build greater; and there I will store all my fruits and my goods. 19. And I will say to my soul: Soul, thou hast many goods laid up for many years; take thine ease, eat, drink, be merry. 20. But God said to him: Fool! this night thy soul shall be required of thee; and whose shall those things be, which thou didst provide? 21. So is he that lays up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God.

22. And he said to his disciples: Therefore I say to you, take not thought for the life, what ye shall eat, nor for the body, what ye shall put on. 23. The life is more than food, and the body than raiment. 24. Consider the ravens, that they sow not nor reap; which have neither storehouse nor barn; and God feeds them. How much better are ye than the birds! 25. And which of you by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature? 26. If therefore ye can not do even that which is least, why take ye thought for the rest?

27. Consider the lilies, how they grow; they toil not, nor spin; and I say to you, that even Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these. 28. And if God so clothes the grass, which to-day is in the field, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more you, ye of little faith? 29. And ye, seek not what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, and be not of a doubtful mind. 30. For all these things do the nations of the world seek after; and your Father knows that ye have need of these. 31. But seek his kingdom, and these things shall be added to you.

32. Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom. 33. Sell what ye have, and give alms; provide yourselves purses that wax not old, a treasure unfailing in the heavens, where a thief approaches not, nor moth corrupts. 34. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

35. Let your loins be girded about, and your lamps burning: 36. and ye like men waiting for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding; that, when he comes and knocks, they may open to him immediately. 37. Happy those servants, whom their lord when he comes shall find watching! . Verily I say to you, that he will gird himself, and make them recline at table, and will come forth and serve them. 38. And if he shall come in the second watch, or in the third watch, and find it so, happy are those servants. 39. And this know, that if the master of the house had

known at what hour the thief is coming, he would have watched, and not have suffered his house to be broken through. 40. Be ye also ready; for at an hour when ye think not, the Son of man comes.

41. And Peter said to him: Lord, speakest thou this parable to us, or also to all? 42. And the Lord said: Who then is the faithful, the wise steward, whom his lord will set over his household, to give the portion of food in due season? 43. Happy that servant, whom his lord when he comes shall find so doing! 44. Of a truth I say to you, that he will make him ruler over all his goods.

45. But if that servant say in his heart: My lord delays his coming; and shall begin to beat the men-servants and maid-servants, and to eat and drink, and to be drunken; 46. the lord of that servant will come in a day when he looks not for it, and in an hour when he is not aware, and will cut him asunder, and appoint his portion with the faithless.

47. And that servant, who knew his lord's will, and prepared not, nor did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; 48. but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few. For to whomsoever much was given, of him much will be required; and to whom they committed much, of him they will require the more.

XIV., 1. And it came to pass, as he went into the house of one of the chief of the Pharisees to eat bread on the sabbath, that they watched him. 2. And, behold, there was a certain man before him who had the dropsy. 3. And Jesus answering spoke to the lawyers and Pharisees, saying: Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath, or not? And they were silent. 4. And taking hold of him, he healed him, and let him go. 5. And to them he said: Who is there of you, whose ox or ass shall fall into a pit, and he will not straightway draw him up on the sabbath day? 6. And they could not answer him again to these things.

7. And he spoke a parable to those who were bidden, when he marked how they chose out the first places; saying to them: 8. When thou art bidden by any one to a wedding, recline not in the first place at table, lest one more honorable than thou may have been bidden by him; 9. and he that bade thee and him shall come and say to thee, Give place to this man; and then thou shalt begin with shame to take the lowest place. 10. But when thou art bidden, go and recline in the lowest place; that when he that bade thee comes, he may say to thee, Friend, go up higher. Then shalt thou have honor in the presence of those who recline at table with thee. 11. For every one that exalts himself shall be humbled; and he that humbles himself shall be exalted.

12. And he said also to him who bade him : When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brothers; nor thy kinsmen, nor rich neighbors; lest they also bid thee again, and a recompense be made thee. 13. But when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind. 14. And happy shalt thou be, because they can not recompense thee; for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the righteous.

15. And a certain one of those who reclined at table with him, hearing these things, said to him : Happy is he, who shall eat bread in the kingdom of God! 16. And he said to him : A certain man made a great supper, and bade many. 17. And he sent his servant, at the hour of the supper, to say to those who were bidden : Come, for all things are now ready. 18. And they all, with one mind, began to excuse themselves. The first said to him : I bought a piece of ground, and I must needs go out and see it; I pray thee let me be excused. 19. And another said : I bought five yoke of oxen, and I am going to make trial of them; I pray thee let me be excused. 20. And another said : I married a wife; and therefore I can not come.

21. And the servant came, and reported these things to his lord. Then the master of the house, being angry, said to his servant : Go out quickly into the streets and lanes of the city, and bring in hither the poor, and maimed, and lame, and blind. 22. And the servant said : Lord, it is done as thou didst command, and yet there is room. 23. And the Lord said to the servant : Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled; 24. for I say to you, that none of those men who were bidden shall taste of my supper.

XV., 1. And there were drawing near to him all the publicans and the sinners to hear him. 2. And the Pharisees and the scribes murmured, saying : This man receives sinners, and eats with them.

3. And he spoke this parable to them, saying : 4. What man of you having a hundred sheep, and having lost one of them, does not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he finds it? 5. And having found it, he lays it on his shoulders, rejoicing. 6. And coming home, he calls together his friends and neighbors, saying to them : Rejoice with me; because I found my sheep which was lost. 7. I say to you, that so there will be joy in heaven over one sinner that repents, more than over ninety and nine just persons, who have no need of repentance.

8. Or what woman having ten pieces of silver, if she lose one piece, does not light a lamp, and sweep the house, and seek carefully till she finds it? 9. And having found it, she calls her friends

and neighbors together, saying: Rejoice with me; because I found the piece which I lost! 10. So, I say to you, there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repents.

11. And he said: A certain man had two sons. 12. And the younger of them said to his father: Father, give me the portion of the property that falls to me. And he divided to them his living. 13. And not many days after, the younger son gathered all together, and went abroad into a far country, and there wasted his substance in riotous living. 14. And when he had spent all, there arose a grievous famine in that country; and he began to be in want. 15. And he went and joined himself to one of the citizens of that country; and he sent him into his fields to feed swine. 16. And he would fain have filled his belly with the husks which the swine ate; and no one gave to him. 17. And coming to himself, he said: How many hired servants of my father have bread enough and to spare, and I perish here with hunger! 18. I will arise and go to my father, and will say to him: Father, I sinned against heaven, and before thee. 19. I am no longer worthy to be called thy son; make me as one of thy hired servants.

20. And he arose, and came to his father. But when he was yet a great way off, his father saw him and had compassion, and ran and fell on his neck, and kissed him. 21. And the son said to him: Father, I sinned against heaven, and before thee; I am no longer worthy to be called thy son. 22. But the father said to his servants: Bring forth a robe, the best, and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand, and sandals on his feet; 23. and bring the fatted calf, and kill it; and let us eat and be merry. 24. Because this my son was dead and is alive again, was lost and is found. And they began to be merry.

25. Now his elder son was in the field. And as he came, and drew near to the house, he heard music and dancing. 26. And calling to him one of the servants, he inquired what these things meant. 27. And he said to him: Thy brother is come; and thy father killed the fatted calf, because he received him back, safe and sound. 28. And he was angry, and would not go in; and his father came out and entreated him. 29. And he answering said to his father: Lo, so many years do I serve thee, and never transgressed thy command; and to me thou never gavest a kid, that I might make merry with my friends. 30. But when this thy son came, who devoured thy living with harlots, thou didst kill for him the fatted calf. 31. And he said to him: Child, thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine. 32. It was meet that we should make merry, and be glad; because this thy brother was dead and is alive again; and was lost, and is found.

XVI., 19. There was a certain rich man, who was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day. 20. And there was a certain beggar named Lazarus, who was laid at his gate, full of sores, 21. and desiring to be fed with the crumbs that fell from the rich man's table. Moreover the dogs came and licked his sores. 22. And it came to pass, that the beggar died; and he was borne away by the angels into Abraham's bosom. The rich man also died, and was buried; 23. and in the under-world, lifting up his eyes, being in torments, he sees Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom. 24. And he cried and said: Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this flame. 25. But Abraham said: Child, remember that in thy lifetime thou receivedst thy good things in full, and Lazarus in like manner his evil things; but now here, he is comforted and thou art tormented. 26. And besides all this, between us and you a great gulf is fixed; that they who would pass from hence to you may not be able, nor those from thence pass over to us. 27. And he said: I pray thee therefore, father, that thou wouldst send him to my father's house. 28. For I have five brothers; that he may testify to them, that they may not also come into this place of torment. 29. Abraham says to him: They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them. 30. And he said: Nay, father Abraham; but if one should go to them from the dead, they will repent. 31. And he said to him: If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one should rise from the dead.

XVII., 7. And who of you, having a servant plowing, or feeding cattle, will say to him immediately, when he has come in from the field, Come and recline at table; 8. and will not rather say to him, Make ready wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself and serve me, till I have eaten and drunken, and afterward thou shalt eat and drink? 9. Does he thank that servant, because he did the things that were commanded? I think not. 10. So also ye, WHEN YE SHALL HAVE DONE ALL THE THINGS THAT WERE COMMANDED you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done THAT WHICH WAS OUR DUTY to do.

20. And being asked by the Pharisees, when the kingdom of God would come, he answered them and said: THE KINGDOM OF GOD COMES NOT WITH OBSERVATION; 21. nor shall they say, Lo here! or, Lo there! for, BEHOLD, THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU.

XVIII., 9. And he spoke this parable to some who trust in themselves that they are righteous, and despise others. 10. Two

men went up into the temple to pray; one a Pharisee, and the other a publican. 11. The Pharisee stood, and prayed thus with himself: God, I thank thee, that I am not as other men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican. 12. I fast twice in the week; I give tithes of all that I possess. 13. And the publican, standing afar off, would not even lift up his eyes to heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying: God be merciful to me, the sinner. 14. I say to you, this man went down to his house justified, rather than the other. For every one that exalts himself shall be humbled; and he that humbles himself shall be exalted.

XIX., 47. And he was teaching daily in the temple; and the chief priests and the scribes and the chief of the people were seeking to destroy him, 48. and could not find what they might do; for all the people hung, listening, upon him.

XX., 20. And watching him, they sent forth spies, feigning themselves to be just men, that they might take hold of his words, in order to deliver him up to the magistracy, and to the authority of the governor. 21. And they asked him, saying: Teacher, we know that thou sayest and teachest rightly, and regardest not the person of any, but teachest the way of God truly. 22. Is it lawful that we should give tribute to Cæsar, or not? 23. And perceiving their craftiness, he said to them: 24. Show me a denary. Whose image and inscription has it? And answering they said: Cæsar's. 25. And he said to them: **RENDER THEREFORE TO CÆSAR THE THINGS THAT ARE CÆSAR'S, AND TO GOD THE THINGS THAT ARE GOD'S.** 26. And they could not take hold of his words before the people; and they marveled at his answer, and held their peace.

27. And some of the Sadduces, who deny that there is a resurrection, coming to him, asked him, 28. saying: Teacher, Moses wrote to us, if a man's brother die, having a wife, and he die childless, that his brother should take his wife, and raise up seed to his brother.

29. There were therefore seven brothers; and the first took a wife, and died childless; 30. and the second and the third took her; 31. and in like manner also the seven left no children, and died. 32. At last the woman also died. 33. In the resurrection, therefore, of which of them is she wife? For the seven had her for a wife.

34. And Jesus answering said to them: The sons of this world marry, and are given in marriage. 35. But they who are accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage; 36. for neither can they die any more; for they are equal to the angels and are sons of God, being sons of the resurrection.

37. Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed, at The Bush, when he calls the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. 38. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for to him all live.

39. And some of the scribes answering said: Teacher, thou saidst well. 40. For they no longer dared to ask him any question.

XXII., 1. Now the feast of unleavened bread was drawing near, which is called the Passover; 2. and the chief priests and the scribes were seeking how they might kill him; for they feared the people.

14. And when the hour came, he reclined at table, and the apostles with him. 15. And he said to them: I earnestly desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer. 16. For I say to you, I shall eat of it no more, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.

24. And there arose also a contention among them, which of them should be accounted the greatest. 25. And he said to them: The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and they who exercise authority over them are called benefactors. 26. But ye are not so; but let the greatest among you become as the younger, and he that is chief as he that serves. 27. For which is greater, he that reclines at table, or he that serves? Is not he that reclines at table? But I am in the midst of you as he that serves.

XXIII., 1. And the whole multitude of them arose, and led him unto Pilate. 2. And they began to accuse him, saying: We found this man perverting our nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar, saying that he himself is Christ, a king. 3. And Pilate asked him, saying: Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answering said to him: Thou sayest it. 4. And Pilate said to the chief priests and the multitudes: I find no fault in this man. 5. And they were the more violent, saying: He stirs up the people, teaching, throughout all Judæa, beginning from Galilee, unto this place.

20. Again, therefore, Pilate spoke to them, desiring to release Jesus. 21. But they cried, saying: Crucify, crucify him. 22. And a third time he said to them: What evil then has this man done? I found no cause of death in him. I will therefore chastise, and release him. 23. And they were urgent with loud voices, requiring that he should be crucified. And their voices and those of the chief priests prevailed. 24. And Pilate gave sentence, that what they required should be done.

32. And there were also two others, malefactors, led with him to be put to death. 33. And when they had gone away to the place which is called A Skull, there they crucified him, and the malefac-

tors, one on the right hand, and the other on the left. 34. And Jesus said: FATHER, FORGIVE THEM; FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO.

EXTRACTS FROM JOHN.

III., 1. There was a man of the Pharisees, named Nicodemus, a ruler of the Jews. 2. The same came to him by night, and said to him: Rabbi, we know that thou hast come a teacher from God; for no one can do these signs which thou doest, except God be with him.

3. Jesus answered and said to him: Verily, verily, I say to thee, except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God. 4. Nicodemus says to him: How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born?

5. Jesus answered: Verily, verily, I say to thee, except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God. 6. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. 7. Marvel not that I said to thee: Ye must be born again.

8. The wind blows where it will, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but knowest not whence it comes, and whither it goes. So is every one that is born of the Spirit.

9. Nicodemus answered and said to him: How can these things be? 10. Jesus answered and said to him: Art thou the teacher of Israel, and knowest not these things? 11. Verily, verily, I say to thee, we speak that which we know, and testify that which we have seen; and ye receive not our testimony. 12. If I told you the earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell you the heavenly things? 13. And no one has ascended up into heaven, but he who came down out of heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven. 14. And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of man be lifted up; 15. that every one who believes on him may have everlasting life. 16. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whoever believes on him should not perish, but may have everlasting life. 17. For God sent not his Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world through him might be saved. 18. He that believes on him is not judged; but he that believes not has already been judged, because he has not believed on the name of the only-begotten Son of God. 19. And this is the judgment, that light has come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light; for their deeds were evil. 20. For every one that does evil hates the light, and comes not to the light, lest his deeds should be

reproved. 21. But he that does the truth comes to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God.

IV., 1. When therefore the Lord knew that the Pharisees heard, that Jesus made and immersed more disciples than John (2. though Jesus himself immersed not, but his disciples), 3. he left Judæa, and departed again into Galilee. 4. And he must go through Samaria. 5. He comes therefore to a city of Samaria, called Sychar, near to the parcel of ground that Jacob gave to his son Joseph. 6. And Jacob's well was there. Jesus therefore, being wearied with the journey, sat down thus on the well. It was about the sixth hour.

7. There comes a woman of Samaria to draw water. Jesus says to her : Give me to drink. 8. For his disciples had gone away into the city to buy food. 9. The Samaritan woman therefore says to him : How is it that thou, being a Jew, askest drink of me, being a Samaritan woman? For Jews do not associate with Samaritans. 10. Jesus answered and said to her : If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that says to thee, Give me to drink, thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water. 11. The woman says to him : Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep. From whence then hast thou the living water. 12. Art thou greater than our father Jacob, who gave us the well, and drank thereof himself, and his children, and his cattle? 13. Jesus answered and said to her : Every one that drinks of this water shall thirst again. 14. But whoever drinks of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall become in him a well of water, springing up into everlasting life. 15. The woman says to him : Sir, give me this water, that I may not thirst, nor come hither to draw.

16. Jesus says to her : Go, call thy husband, and come hither. 17. The woman answered and said : I have no husband. Jesus says to her : Thou saidst well, I have no husband. 18. For thou hast had five husbands; and he whom thou now hast is not thy husband. That thou hast spoken truly.

19. The woman says to him : Sir, I perceive that thou art a prophet. 20. Our fathers worshiped in this mountain; and ye say, that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship. 21. Jesus says to her : Woman, believe me, an hour is coming, when ye shall neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem worship the Father. 22. Ye worship that which ye know not; we worship that which we know; because salvation is of the Jews. 23. But an hour is coming, and now is, when the true worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for such the Father

seeks to worship him. 24. God is spirit; and that they worship him, must worship in spirit and in truth. tr

31. In the meanwhile the disciples prayed him, saying: Master, eat. 32. But he said to them: I have food to eat that ye know not of. 33. Therefore said the disciples one to another: Has any one brought him aught to eat? 34. Jesus says to them: My food is to do the will of him who sent me, and to finish his work. 35. Do ye not say, that there are yet four months, and then comes the harvest? Behold, I say to you, lift up your eyes and look on the fields, that they are already white for harvest. 36. And he that reaps receives wages, and gathers fruit unto life eternal; that both he that sows and he that reaps may rejoice together.

V., 1. After these things there was a feast of the Jews; and Jesus went up to Jerusalem. 2. And there is in Jerusalem by the sheep-gate a pool, which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having five porches. 5. And a certain man was there, who had an infirmity thirty and eight years. 6. Jesus seeing this man lying, and knowing that he had been already a long time thus, says to him: Dost thou desire to be made whole? 7. The infirm man answered him: Sir, I have no man, when the water is troubled, to put me into the pool; but while I am coming, another goes down before me. 8. Jesus says to him: Rise, take up thy bed, and walk. 9. And immediately the man was made whole, and took up his bed and walked.

And on that day was the sabbath. 10. The Jews therefore said to him that was cured: It is the sabbath; it is not lawful for thee to carry the bed. 11. He answered them: He who made me whole, the same said to me: Take up thy bed, and walk. 12. They asked him therefore: Who is the man that said to thee: Take up thy bed and walk? 13. And he who was healed knew not who it was; for Jesus conveyed himself away, there being a multitude in the place.

14. Afterward Jesus finds him in the temple. And he said to him: Behold, thou hast been made whole; sin no more, lest something worse befall thee. 15. The man departed, and told the Jews that it was Jesus who made him whole. 16. And for this the Jews persecuted Jesus, because he did these things on the sabbath. 17. But Jesus answered them: My Father works hitherto, and I work. 18. For this therefore the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he not only broke the sabbath, but also called God his Father, making himself equal with God.

19. Jesus therefore, answered and said to them: Verily, verily, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father do; for what things soever he does, these also does the

Son in like manner. 20. For the Father loves the Son, and shows him all things that he himself does ; and greater works than these will he show him, that ye may marvel.

24. Verily, verily, I say to you, he that hears my word, and believes him who sent me, has everlasting life, and comes not into judgment, but has passed out of death into life. 25. Verily, verily, I say to you, an hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God ; and they that hear shall live. 26. For as the Father has life in himself, so he gave also to the Son to have life in himself. 27. And he gave him authority to execute judgment also, because he is a son of man. 28. Marvel not at this ; for an hour is coming, in which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, 29. and shall come forth ; they that did good, to the resurrection of life, and they that did evil, to the resurrection of judgment.

30. I can of myself do nothing. As I hear, I judge ; and my judgment is just ; because I seek not my own will, but the will of him who sent me.

VII., 14. But when it was already the midst of the feast, Jesus went up into the temple and taught. 15. And the Jews wondered, saying : How knows this man letters, having never learned ? 16. Jesus therefore answered them, and said : My teaching is not mine, but his who sent me. 17. If any one desires to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it is of God, or whether I speak from myself. 18. He that speaks from himself seeks his own glory ; but he that seeks the glory of him who sent him, the same is true, and there is no unrighteousness in him.

VIII., 2. And early in the morning he came again into the temple, and all the people came to him ; and having sat down, he was teaching them. 3. And the scribes and the Pharisees bring to him a woman taken in adultery ; and having placed her in the midst, 4. they say to him : Teacher, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act. 5. Now in the law Moses commanded us, that such should be stoned ; what then dost thou say ? 6. This they said, tempting him, that they might have whereof to accuse him. But Jesus, having stooped down, was writing with his finger in the ground. 7. And as they continued asking him, raising himself up, he said to them : He that is without sin among you, let him first cast the stone at her. 8. And again stooping down, he wrote in the ground. 9. And they hearing it, and being convicted by their conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, unto the last ; and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst. 10. And Jesus raising himself up, and seeing none but the

woman, said to her: Woman, where are they, thine accusers? Did no one condemn thee? 11. She said: No one, Lord. And Jesus said to her: Neither do I condemn thee; go, and sin no more.

12. Again therefore Jesus spoke to them, saying: I am the light of the world; he that follows me shall not walk in the darkness, but shall have the light of life. 13. The Pharisees therefore said to him: Thou bearest witness of thyself; thy witness is not true. 14. Jesus answered and said to them: Though I bear witness of myself, my witness is true; because I know whence I came, and whither I go; but ye know not whence I come, or whither I go. 15. Ye judge according to the flesh; I judge no one. 16. And even if I judge, my judgment is true; because I am not alone, but I and the Father who sent me. 17. It is written also in your law, that the witness of two men is true. 18. I am one that bear witness of myself, and the Father who sent me bears witness of me. 19. They said therefore to him: Where is thy Father? Jesus answered: Ye know neither me, nor my Father. If ye knew me, ye would know my Father also.

20. These words he spoke in the treasury, while teaching in the temple; and no one laid hands on him, because his hour had not yet come.

21. Again therefore he said to them: I go away, and ye will seek me, and shall die in your sin. Whither I go, ye can not come. 22. The Jews therefore said: Will he kill himself? because he says: Whither I go, ye can not come. 23. And he said to them: Ye are from beneath; I am from above. Ye are of this world; I am not of this world. 24. I said therefore to you, that ye shall die in your sins; for if ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins. 25. Therefore they said to him: Who art thou? And Jesus said to them: That which I also say to you from the beginning. 26. I have many things to say, and to judge concerning you. But he who sent me is true; and the things which I heard from him, these I speak to the world. 27. They understood not that he spoke to them of the Father.

28. Therefore Jesus said to them: When ye shall have lifted up the Son of man, then ye shall know that I am he; and of myself I do nothing, but as the Father taught me, those things I speak. 29. And he who sent me is with me. He has not left me alone; because I do always the things that please him. 30. As he spoke these words many believed on him.

31. Jesus therefore said to those Jews who have believed him: If ye continue in my word, ye are truly my disciples; 32. and ye shall know the truth, and the truth will make you free. 33. They

answered him : We are Abraham's seed, and have never been in bondage to any one. How sayest thou : Ye shall be made free ? 34. Jesus answered them : Verily, verily, I say to you, every one who commits sin is a servant of sin. 35. And the servant abides not in the house forever. 36. The Son abides forever ; if therefore the Son shall make you free, ye will be free indeed. 37. I know that ye are Abraham's seed ; but ye seek to kill me, because my word has no place in you. 38. I speak what I have seen with my Father ; and ye therefore do what ye have heard from your father.

39. They answered and said to him : Our father is Abraham. Jesus says to them : If you were children of Abraham, ye would do the works of Abraham. 40. But now ye seek to kill me, a man who has spoken to you the truth, which I heard from God. This Abraham did not. 41. Ye do the works of your father. They said to him : We were not born of fornication ; we have one father, God. 42. Jesus said to them : If God were your father, ye would love me ; for from God I came forth, and am come ; neither have I come of myself, but he sent me. 43. Why do ye not understand my speech ? Because ye can not hear my word. 44. Ye are of your father the Devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abides not in the truth, because truth is not in him. When he speaks a lie, he speaks of his own ; because he is a liar, and the father of it. 45. And because I speak the truth, ye believe me not.

46. Which of you convicts me of sin ? If I speak truth, why do ye not believe me ? 47. He that is of God hears God's words ; ye therefore hear not, because ye are not of God.

48. The Jews answered and said to him : Say we not well, that thou art a Samaritan, and hast a demon ? 49. Jesus answered : I have not a demon ; but I honor my Father, and ye dishonor me. 50. And I seek not my own glory ; there is one that seeks, and judges. 51. Verily, verily, I say to you, if any one keep my saying, he shall not see death, forever. 52. The Jews said to him : Now we know that thou hast a demon. Abraham is dead, and the prophets ; and thou sayest : If a man keep my saying, he shall not taste of death, forever. 53. Art thou greater than our father Abraham, who is dead ? And the prophets are dead. Whom makest thou thyself ? 54. Jesus answered : If I honor myself, my honor is nothing. It is my Father that honors me, of whom ye say, that he is your God. 55. And ye know him not ; but I know him. And if I say, I know him not, I shall be a liar like to you. But I know him, and I keep his word.

IX, 1. And passing along, he saw a man blind from his birth. 2. And his disciples asked him, saying: Master, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he should be born blind? 3. Jesus answered: Neither this man sinned, nor his parents, but that the works of God should be made manifest in him. 4. I must work the works of him who sent me, while it is day. Night is coming, when none can work. 5. As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world.

6. Having thus spoken, he spit on the ground, and made clay of the spittle, and anointed the eyes of the blind man with the clay, 7. and said to him: Go, wash in the pool of Siloam (which is interpreted, Sent). He went away therefore, and washed, and came seeing.

8. The neighbors therefore, and they who before had seen him that he was a beggar, said: Is not this he that sits and begs? 9. Some said: This is he; and others: He is like him; he said: I am he. 10. Therefore they said to him: How were thine eyes opened? 11. He answered: A man called Jesus made clay, and anointed mine eyes, and said to me: Go to the pool of Siloam, and wash. And I went away and washed, and received sight. 12. They said to him: Where is he? He said: I know not.

13. They bring to the Pharisees him who before was blind. 14. And it was the sabbath when Jesus made the clay, and opened his eyes. 15. Again therefore the Pharisees also asked him, how he received sight. He said to them: He put clay upon mine eyes, and I washed, and do see. 16. Therefore some of the Pharisees said: This man is not from God, because he keeps not the sabbath. Others said: How can a man that is a sinner do such signs? And there was a division among them. 17. They say to the blind man again: What sayest thou of him, seeing that he opened thine eyes? He said: He is a Prophet.

18. The Jews therefore did not believe concerning him, that he was blind and received sight, until they called the parents of him that received sight. 19. And they asked them, saying: Is this your son, who ye say was born blind? How then does he now see? 20. His parents answered them and said: We know that this is our son, and that he was born blind. 21. But by what means he now sees, we know not; or who opened his eyes, we know not. He is of age; ask him. He shall speak for himself. 22. These words spoke his parents, because they feared the Jews; for the Jews had agreed already, that if any one acknowledged him as Christ, he should be put out of the synagogue. 23. Therefore his parents said: He is of age; ask him.

24. They therefore called a second time the man that was blind, and said to him : Give glory to God ; we know that this man is a sinner. 25. He answered therefore : Whether he is a sinner, I know not ; one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see. 26. They therefore said to him : What did he to thee ? How opened he thine eyes ? 27. He answered them : I told you already, and ye did not hear. Wherefore would ye hear again ? Will ye also become his disciples ? 28. They reviled him, and said : Thou art his disciple ; but we are Moses' disciples. 29. We know that God has spoken to Moses ; but this man we know not, whence he is. 30. The man answered and said to them : Why herein is a marvelous thing, that ye know not whence he is, and he opened mine eyes. 31. Now we know that God hears not sinners. But if any one is a worshiper of God, and does his will, him he hears. 32. Since the world began, it was not heard that any one opened the eyes of one born blind. 33. If this man were not from God, he could do nothing. 34. They answered and said to him : Thou wast altogether born in sins, and dost thou teach us ? And they cast him out.

39. And Jesus said : For judgment came I into this world ; that they who see not may see, and that they who see may become blind. 40. And some of the Pharisees who were with him heard these words, and said to him : Are we also blind ? 41. Jesus said to them : If ye were blind, ye would not have sin. But now ye say : We see. Your sin remains !

X., 11. I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. 12. But he that is a hireling, and not a shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, sees the wolf coming, and leaves the sheep, and flees ; and the wolf catches them, and scatters the sheep. 13. The hireling flees, because he is a hireling, and cares not for the sheep. 14. I am the good shepherd ; and I know mine, and am known by mine, 15. as the Father knows me, and I know the Father ; and I lay down my life for the sheep. 16. And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold. Them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice ; and there shall be one flock, one shepherd. 17. For this the Father loves me, because I lay down my life, that I may take it again. 18. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have authority to lay it down, and I have authority to take it again. This commandment I received from my Father.

19. Again there arose a division among the Jews because of these words. 20. And many of them said : He has a demon, and is mad : why do ye hear him ? 21. Others said : These are not the words of one that has a demon. Can a demon open the eyes of the blind ?

22. And there came the feast of the dedication, in Jerusalem; and it was winter. 23. And Jesus was walking in the temple, in the porch of Solomon. 24. The Jews therefore came around him, and said to him: How long dost thou hold us in doubt? If thou art the Christ, tell us plainly.

25. Jesus answered them: I told you, and ye do not believe. The works that I do in my Father's name, these bear witness of me. 26. But ye do not believe; for ye are not of my sheep, as I said to you. 27. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me; 28. and I give to them eternal life; and they shall never perish, nor shall any one pluck them out of my hand. 29. My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all; and no one is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand. 30. I and the Father are one.

31. The Jews therefore took up stones again to stone him. 32. Jesus answered them: Many good works have I showed you from my Father; for which of those works do ye stone me? 33. The Jews answered him: For a good work we stone thee not, but for blasphemy, and because thou, being man, makest thyself God. 34. Jesus answered them: Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? 35. If he called them gods to whom the word of God came, and the Scripture can not be broken, 36. say ye of him, whom the Father sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God? 37. If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. 38. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works; that ye may learn and know, that the Father is in me, and I in the Father. 39. Therefore they sought again to seize him, and he went forth, out of their hand.

XII., 44. And Jesus cried and said: He that believes on me, believes not on me but on him who sent me. 45. And he that beholds me beholds him who sent me. 46. I have come a light into the world, that whoever believes on me may not abide in the darkness. 47. And if any one hear my words, and keep them not, I do not judge him; for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. 48. He that rejects me, and receives not my words, has one that judges him. The word that I spoke, that shall judge him in the last day. 49. Because I spoke not from myself; but the Father who sent me, he has given me a commandment, what I should say, and what I should speak. 50. And I know that his commandment is everlasting life. What things I speak therefore, as the Father has said to me, so I speak.

XIII., 1. And before the feast of the passover, Jesus knowing that his hour has come that he should depart out of this world to

the Father, having loved his own who were in the world, loved them to the end. 2. And supper being served, the Devil having already put into the heart of Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, to betray him; 3. knowing that the Father has given all things into his hands, and that he came out from God, and is going to God, 4. he rises from the supper, and lays aside his garments, and taking a towel he girded himself. 5. After that he pours water into the basin, and began to wash the feet of his disciples, and to wipe them with the towel with which he was girded.

12. When therefore he had washed their feet, he took his garments, and reclining again at table, said to them: Know ye what I have done to you? 13. Ye call me the Teacher, and the Master; and ye say well, for so I am. 14. If I then, the Master and the Teacher, washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet. 15. For I gave you an example, that as I did to you, ye also should do. 16. Verily, verily, I say to you, a servant is not greater than his lord, nor one that is sent greater than he who sent him. 17. If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them.

33. Children, yet a little while I am with you. Ye will seek me; and as I said to the Jews, whither I go ye can not come, so now I say to you. 34. A new commandment I give to you, that ye love one another; as I loved you, that ye also love one another. 35. By this shall all know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one toward another.

XIV., 1. Let not your heart be troubled. Believe on God, and believe on me. 2. In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you; because I go to prepare a place for you. 3. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and will receive you to myself; that where I am ye may be also. 4. And ye know the way whither I go.

5. Thomas says to him: Lord, we know not whither thou goest; and how do we know the way? 6. Jesus says to him: I am the way, the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father, but by me. 7. If ye knew me, ye would know my Father also; and from henceforth ye know him, and have seen him.

8. Philip says to him: Lord, show us the Father, and it suffices us. 9. Jesus says to him: Am I so long time with you, and dost thou not know me, Philip? He that has seen me has seen the Father; and how sayest thou: Show us the Father? 10. Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak to you I speak not of myself; but the Father who dwells in me, he does the works. 11. Believe me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me; or else believe for the very works' sake.

12. Verily, verily, I say to you, he that believes on me, the works that I do he shall do also, and greater than these shall he do, because I go to the Father. 13. And whatever ye shall ask in my name, that I will do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. 14. If ye shall ask anything in my name, I will do it.

15. If ye love me, keep my commandments. 16. And I will ask of the Father, and he will give you another Comforter, that he may be with you forever; 17. the Spirit of truth, whom the world can not receive, because it sees him not, neither knows him; but ye know him, because he abides with you, and shall be in you. 18. I will not leave you bereaved; I will come to you.

19. Yet a little while, and the world sees me no more; but ye see me; because I live, ye shall live also. 20. In that day ye shall know that I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you. 21. He that has my commandments, and keeps them, he it is that loves me; and he that loves me shall be loved by my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him.

22. Judas says to him (not Iscariot): Lord, how is it that thou wilt manifest thyself to us, and not to the world? 23. Jesus answered and said to him: If any one loves me, he will keep my word; and my Father will love him, and we will come to him, and make our abode with him. 24. He that loves me not, keeps not my words; and the word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father's who sent me.

25. These things have I spoken to you, while abiding with you. 26. But the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all things which I said to you.

27. Peace I leave with you, my peace I give to you; not as the world gives, give I to you. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid. 28. Ye heard how I said to you: I go away; and I come to you. If ye loved me, ye would have rejoiced that I go to the Father; because the Father is greater than I. 29. And now I have told you before it comes to pass, that when it is come to pass, ye may believe.

30. I will no longer talk much with you; for the prince of the world comes, and in me he has nothing. 31. But that the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father gave me commandment, so I do. Arise, let us go hence.

XV., 1. I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman. 2. Every branch in me that bears not fruit, he takes it away; and every one that bears fruit, he cleanses it, that it may bear more fruit. 3. Ye are already clean, through the word which I have spoken to you.

4. Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch can not bear fruit of itself, if it abide not in the vine, so neither can ye, if ye abide not in me. 5. I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abides in me and I in him, the same bears much fruit; because without me ye can do nothing. 6. If any one abide not in me, he is cast forth as the branch, and is withered; and they gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned. 7. If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ask whatever ye will, and it shall be done to you.

8. Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; and ye shall become my disciples. 9. As the Father loved me, I also loved you; abide in my love. 10. If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love; as I have kept my Father's commandments, and abide in his love.

11. These things I have spoken to you, that my joy may be in you, and your joy be made full. 12. This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I loved you. 13. Greater love has no one than this, that one lay down his life for his friends. 14. Ye are my friends, if ye do whatever I command you.

15. No longer do I call you servants; because the servant knows not what his lord does. But I have called you friends; because all things that I heard from my Father I made known to you. 16. Ye did not choose me, but I chose you, and appointed you that ye may go and bear fruit, and that your fruit may remain; that whatever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, he may give it you.

17. These things I command you, that ye love one another. 18. If the world hates you, ye know that it has hated me before it hated you. 19. If ye were of the world, the world would love its own; but because ye are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, for this the world hates you. 20. Remember the word that I said to you: A servant is not greater than his lord. If they persecuted me, they will also persecute you; if they kept my saying, they will keep yours also. 21. But all these things they will do to you for my name's sake, because they know not him who sent me.

22. If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin. 23. He that hates me hates my Father also. 24. If I had not done among them the works which no other one has done, they would not have sin; but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father. 25. But this comes to pass, that the word might be fulfilled that is written in their law: They hated me without a cause.

26. But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, which proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness of me. 27. And ye also shall bear witness, because ye are with me from the beginning.

XVI, 1. These things I have spoken to you, that ye should not be offended. 2. They will put you out of the synagogues; yea, a time is coming, that every one who kills you will think he makes an offering to God. 3. And these things they will do to you, because they have not known the Father, nor me. 4. But these things I have spoken to you, that when the time shall come, ye may remember that I told you. And these things I told you not from the beginning, because I was with you.

5. And now I go to him who sent me; and none of you asks me: Whither goest thou? 6. But because I have spoken these things to you, sorrow has filled your heart. 7. But I tell you the truth, it is expedient for you that I depart; for if I depart not, the Comforter will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you. 8. And when he is come, he will convict the world, in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment; 9. of sin, in that they believe not on me; 10. of righteousness, in that I go to my Father, and ye behold me no more; 11. of judgement, in that the prince of this world has been judged.

12. I have yet many things to say to you, but ye can not bear them now. 13. But when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak from himself, but whatever he shall hear, that will he speak, and he will tell you the things to come. 14. He will glorify me; because he will receive of mine, and will tell it to you.

25. These things I have spoken to you in parables. A time is coming, when I will no more speak to you in parables, but I will tell you plainly of the Father. 26. In that day ye shall ask in my name. And I say not to you, that I will pray the Father for you; 27. for the Father himself loves you, because ye have loved me, and have believed that I came forth from God. 28. I came forth from the Father, and have come into the world; again, I leave the world, and go to the Father.

29. His disciples say to him: Lo, now thou speakest plainly, and speakest no parable. 30. Now we know that thou knowest all things, and needest not that any one should ask thee. By this we believe that thou camest forth from God.

31. Jesus answered them: Do ye now believe? 32. Behold, an hour is coming, and has come, that ye will be scattered, each one to his own, and will leave me alone; and I am not alone, because the Father is with me.

33. These things I have spoken to you, that in me ye may have peace. In the world ye have tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world.

XVII., 1. These words spoke Jesus, and lifted up his eyes to heaven, and said: Father, the hour has come; glorify thy Son, that thy Son may glorify thee; 2. as thou gavest him authority over all flesh, that as many as thou hast given to him, to them he should give eternal life. 3. And this is the eternal life, that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou didst send. 4. I glorified thee on the earth; I finished the work which thou hast given me to do. 5. And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was. 6. I manifested thy name to the men whom thou hast given me out of the world. Thine they were, and thou hast given them to me; and they have kept thy word. 7. Now they know that all things whatever thou hast given me are from thee; 8. because the words which thou gavest me I have given to them, and they received them, and knew in truth that I came forth from thee, and believed that thou didst send me. 9. I pray for them; I pray not for the world, but for those whom thou hast given me; because they are thine. 10. And all things that are mine are thine, and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them.

11. And I am no longer in the world; and these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep those in thy name whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are. 12. While I was with them, I kept them in thy name. Those whom thou hast given me I watched over and none of them perished, except the son of perdition, that the scripture might be fulfilled. 13. And now I come to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they may have my joy made full in them. 14. I have given them thy word; and the world hated them, because they are not of the world, as I am not of the world. 15. I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil. 16. They are not of the world, as I am not of the world. 17. Sanctify them in the truth; thy word is truth. 18. As thou didst send me into the world, I also sent them into the world. 19. And for their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also may be sanctified in the truth. 20. And I pray not for these only, but also for those who believe on me through their word; 21. that all may be one; as thou, Father, in me and I in thee, that they also may be in us; that the world may believe that thou didst send me. 22. And the glory which thou hast given to me I have given to them, that they may be one, as we are one; 23. I in them, and thou in.

me, that they may be perfected into one ; that the world may know that thou didst send me, and lovedst them as thou lovedst me

24. Father, those whom thou hast given me, I will that where I am they also be with me ; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me ; because thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world. 25. Righteous Father ! And the world knew thee not ! But I knew thee, and these knew that thou didst send me ; 26. and I made known to them thy name, and will make it known ; that the love wherewith thou lovedst me may be in them, and I in them.

XVIII., 1. Having spoken these words, Jesus went out with his disciples beyond the brook Kedron, where was a garden, into which he entered and his disciples. 2. And Judas also, his betrayer knew the place ; because Jesus oftentimes resorted thither with his disciples.

3. Judas therefore, having received the band and officers from the chief priests and Pharisees, comes thither with torches and lamps and weapons. 4. Jesus therefore, knowing all the things that were coming upon him, went forth and said to them : Whom do ye seek ? 5. They answered him : Jesus the Nazarene. Jesus says to them : I am he. And Judas also, his betrayer, was standing with them.

6. When therefore he said to them, I am he, they went backward, and fell to the ground.

7. Again therefore he asked them : Whom do ye seek ? And they said : Jesus the Nazarene. 8. Jesus answered : I told you that I am he ; if therefore ye seek me, let these go their way ; 9. that the saying might be fulfilled, which he spoke : Of those whom thou hast given me, I lost none.

10. Then Simon Peter, having a sword, drew it and smote the servant of the high priest, and cut off his right ear. The servant's name was Malchus. 11. Jesus therefore said to Peter : Put up thy sword into the sheath. The cup which my Father has given me, shall I not drink it ?

12. So the band, and the captain, and the officers of the Jews, took Jesus and bound him, 13. and led him away to Annas first ; for he was father-in-law of Caiaphas, who was high priest that year. 14. And it was Caiaphas who counseled the Jews, that it is expedient that one man should die for the people.

19. The high priest therefore asked Jesus concerning his disciples, and concerning his teaching. 20. Jesus answered him : I have spoken openly to the world ; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple, where all the Jews assemble ; and I spoke nothing in secret. 21. Why askest thou me ? Ask those who have heard, what I spoke to them. Behold, these know what things I said.

22. And when he had said this, one of the officers who was standing by gave Jesus a blow on the face, saying: Answerest thou the high priest so? 23. Jesus answered him: If I spoke evil, bear witness of the evil; but if well, why dost thou smite me?

28. Then they lead Jesus from Caiaphas into the Governor's palace; and it was early; and they themselves went not into the palace, that they might not be defiled, but might eat the passover. 29. Pilate therefore went out to them, and said: What accusation do ye bring against this man? 30. They answered and said to him: If this man were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him up to thee. 31. Pilate therefore said to them: Do ye take him, and judge him according to your law. The Jews therefore said to him: It is not lawful for us to put any one to death; 32. that the saying of Jesus might be fulfilled, which he spoke, signifying by what manner of death he should die.

33. Pilate therefore entered into the palace again, and called Jesus, and said to him: Art thou the King of the Jews? 34. Jesus answered: Dost thou say this of thyself, or did others tell thee concerning me? 35. Pilate answered: Am I a Jew? Thine own nation, and the chief priests, delivered thee up to me. What didst thou? 36. Jesus answered: My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would fight, that I might not be delivered up to the Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence. 37. Pilate therefore said to him: Art thou a king then? Jesus answered: Thou sayest it; because I am a king. To this end have I been born, and to this end have I come into the world, that I may bear witness to the truth. Every one that is of the truth hears my voice.

38. Pilate says to him: What is truth? And having said this, he went out again to the Jews, and says to them: I find no fault in him. 39. But ye have a custom, that I should release to you one at the passover. Do ye desire therefore that I release to you the King of the Jews? 40. They all therefore cried out again, saying: Not this one, but Barabbas. Now Barabbas was a robber.

XIX., 1. Then therefore Pilate took Jesus, and scourged him. 2. And the soldiers platted a crown of thorns, and put it on his head, and put on him a purple robe; and they came to him, 3. and said: Hail, King of the Jews! And they gave him blows on the face.

4. Pilate went forth again, and says to them: Behold, I bring him forth to you, that ye may know that I find no fault in him. 5. Jesus therefore came forth, wearing the crown of thorns, and the purple robe. And he says to them: Behold the man!

6. When therefore the chief priests and the officers saw him, they cried out, saying: Crucify him, crucify him. Pilate says to them: Do ye take him, and crucify him: for I find no fault in him. 7. The Jews answered him: We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God.

8. When therefore Pilate heard this saying, he was the more afraid. 9. And he went again into the palace, and says to Jesus: Whence art thou? But Jesus gave him no answer. 10. Then says Pilate to him: Dost thou not speak to me? Knowest thou not that I have power to release thee, and have power to crucify thee? 11. Jesus answered: Thou wouldst have no power against me, except it were given thee from above. Therefore he that delivers me to thee has the greater sin. 12. Thenceforth Pilate sought to release him. But the Jews cried out, saying: If thou let this man go, thou art not a friend of Cæsar. Whoever makes himself a king speaks against Cæsar.

13. When therefore Pilate heard these words, he brought Jesus forth, and sat down on the judgment seat in a place called the Pavement, and in Hebrew, Gabbatha. 14. And it was the preparation of the passover, and about the sixth hour. And he says to the Jews: Behold your king! 15. But they cried out: Away with him, away with him, crucify him. Pilate says to them: Shall I crucify your king? The chief priests answered: We have no king but Cæsar. 16. Then therefore he delivered him to them to be crucified. And they took Jesus, and led him away.

17. And bearing his cross he went forth into the place called Place of a skull, which in Hebrew is called Golgotha; 18. where they crucified him, and two others with him, on either side one, and Jesus in the midst. 19. And Pilate wrote also a title, and put it on the cross. And the writing was: JESUS THE NAZARENE THE KING OF THE JEWS.

20. This title therefore many of the Jews read; because the place where Jesus was crucified was nigh to the city, and it was written in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin. 21. Therefore said the chief priests of the Jews to Pilate: Write not, The King of the Jews; but that he said, I am King of the Jews. 22. Pilate answered: What I have written, I have written.

25. And there were standing by the cross of Jesus his mother, and his mother's sister, Mary the wife of Clopas, and Mary the Magdalene. 26. Jesus therefore seeing his mother, and the disciple whom he loved standing by, says to his mother: Woman, behold thy son! 27. Then he says to the disciple: Behold thy mother! And from that hour the disciple took her to his own home.

28. After this, Jesus knowing that all things were now finished, that the scripture might be accomplished, says: I thirst. 29. Now there was set a vessel full of vinegar; and they, having filled a sponge with vinegar, and put it on a hyssop-stalk, bore it to his mouth. 30. When Jesus therefore received the vinegar, he said: It is finished; and he bowed his head, and gave up his spirit.

§ 907.—Jesus taught pure honest moral mindedness, veracity, placability, and beneficence. (page 211, line 21.) [*Assume of a witness that he is*, etc: that he is NOT.—(Semple's erratum.)]

§ 908.—Jesus taught that good works are the only admissible proof of pure morality within, and that the want of good deeds can not be compensated by a diligent observance of church duty. (page 212, line 13.) Cf. §§ 821, 330, 3053, 3054, 3056.

§ 909.—Jesus taught not merely laws of virtue, but behests of holiness (indicating the unattainable ideal). (page 213, line 22.) Cf. Matthew, v., 44, 48; John. xii., 44-50; and Mark, xii., 28-34.

§ 910.—Jesus, when speaking of rewards in a world to come, did not intend THEM to incline the will to action. (page 214, line 23.) [*Outwardly conformable to the Law*: not the act of the steward, but the selfish charity which it figuratively illustrates.] Cf. § 3055.

§ 911.—Outline of a religion that can be brought home to the convictions and conceptions of every one. (page 216, line 11.)

Chapter II.—Christianity as a Learned Religion. (§§ 912-918 inclusive.)

§ 912.—Sacred goods, intrusted to the guardianship of the learned. (page 217, line 8.)

§ 913.—Christian faith partly rational (*fides elicitā*), and partly revealed (*fides imperatā*). (page 217, line 25.) Cf. § 3096.

§ 914.—Christian worship consequently presents a twofold aspect: (1) historical; (2) ethical. (page 218, line 14.)

§ 915.—Christianity, if imperatively binding upon every one, would be a blind and servile faith (*fides servilis*). (p. 218, l. 28.)

§ 916.—Christianity must at all times be taught and propounded as *fides historice elicitā*. (page 219, line 18.) [So also Clement of Alexandria (strom. i., 6, quoted by Blunt): "As we assert that a man may be a believer without learning, so also we assert that it is impossible for a man without learning to comprehend the things which are declared in the faith."]

§ 917.—When revelation is placed before religion, then is the church service a false and spurious worship. (page 220, line 13.)

§ 918.—Church creed fabricated; now hermeneutically treated, either by learning, or by this last's antagonist, the inward light. (page 221, line 17.) [*Wisely suggested*: strike out wisely. Wisdom justifies no stratagem.] [*The sacred books of this race*: omit the

paragraph, six lines.] [*Probably prudent, or even necessary in their day: strike it out.*] [*Hermeneutically: according to the acknowledged principles of just interpretation. Here used probably to signify an art.*] [*Not within: the inward light being only relatively internal, and not proper.*]

APOTOME II.—OF THE SUPERSTITIOUS WORSHIP OF GOD IN A STATUTABLE RELIGION. (§§ 919-961 inclusive.)

§ 919.—Delusion of deeming a statutable faith essential to the worship of God. (page 224, line 4.)

§ 920.—Delusion is that deception whereby a man regards the representation of a thing as equivalent to the thing itself. (page 224, line 16.)

Chapter I.—Of the Subjective Ground of a Delusion in Religion. (§§ 921-923.)

§ 921.—Anthropomorphism, theoretically harmless, practically dangerous to our morality. (page 225, line 6.) Cf. § 748.

§ 922.—Every person must, according to his moral notions, figure to himself a Supreme Illimitable Moral Agent. (p. 225, l. 18.)

§ 923.—Devotion made to stand in room of godliness.—(A fixed maxim to ascribe to the means the worth of the end.) (p. 226, l. 4.)

Chapter II.—Of the Moral Principle which Reason Opposes to all Delusions in Religion. (§§ 924-932 inclusive.)

§ 924.—*Everything mankind fancies he can do, over and above good moral conduct, in order to make himself acceptable to God, is mere false worship of the Deity.* (page 228, line 4.)

§ 925.—HOPE that what lies beyond his power will be supplied by the Supreme Wisdom. (page 229, line 3.) Cf. §§ 706, 723, 759.

§ 926.—Ancient boundary and landmarks of pure reason disappear. (page 230, line 6.)

§ 927.—Whatever the surrogatum of the ethic worship of God be, is quite immaterial, and rested on the same groundless flams. (page 230, line 24.) [*Crass: gross, dense, uncultivated. Flams: illusory pretexts. See Webster.*]

§ 928.—No delusion to attach supreme worth to virtue. (page 231, line 18.)

§ 929.—Nature and grace not unfrequently opposed to one another [by churchmen]. (page 232, line 7.) Cf. §§ 651, 687; II. Corinthians, xii., 9.

§ 930.—Imagination that a man can detect or beget within himself effects of grace, is fanaticism. (page 232, line 17.) John, iii., 8.

§ 931.—Imagination that justification can be achieved by establishing a hidden intercourse and communion with God, constitutes religious fanaticism (the death of moral reason). (page 233, line 7.) Cf. § 235.

§ 932.—Principle preventing and eventually extirpating all delusions in religion. (page 234, line 6.)

Chapter III.—Of Priestdom (i. e. Sacerdotal Despotism): An Order of Things Based upon the False Worship of the Good Principle. (§§ 933-950.)

§ 933.—PRIESTDOM, denoting the authority of a spiritual father, suggests the still further idea of spiritual tyranny. (p. 234, l. 21.)

§ 934.—Worship of mighty invisible beings first arose. (page 234, line 19.)

§ 935.—Belong to the class of those who place the worship of the Deity in those outward rites that can not morally amend our species. (page 235, line 14.)

§ 936.—Design that all spurious worshipers aim at accomplishing. (page 236, line 14.)

§ 937.—Actions that in themselves are void of moral worth, can only be admitted into religion with this proviso, *that they are found means of forwarding that which in other actions is immediately and unconditionally good.* (page 236, line 31.)

§ 938.—Whoever imagines that he can employ actions devoid in themselves of moral worth, as a mean fitted for procuring the Divine favor, converts the worship of God into FETICISM. (page 238, line 4.)

§ 939.—Fancies he can work upon the preternatural by using formulas of invocation, confessions of church creeds, and observing rites ecclesiastical. (page 238, line 24.)

§ 940.—Yoke of a statutable law substituted in room of the freedom of the children of God. (page 239, line 32.) Cf. James i., 25; Galatians v., 1; Matthew xi., 30; Acts xv., 10.

§ 941.—Whenever the free homage due to the moral law is not first and supreme, then a servile worship, based on a fetich creed, prevails. (page 241, line 9.)

§ 942.—NOT MERELY THE WISE, or the disputer of this world, is CALLED to be illuminated touching the nature of his true bliss. (page 242, line 31.) [*Not absolutely necessary*: I can not see the necessity for such remarks. Omit the whole sentence.]

§ 943.—Practical knowledge, based entirely upon reason, needing no historic authentication, lying so near everyone, EVEN THE MOST SIMPLE, that it looks as had it been written in detail on the tablets of his heart.* (page 244, line 8.) Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the

* The entire text of §§ 943-948 appears in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. x., pages 428-430. Section 943 begins with page 428, line 13; § 944, with line 45; § 945, with page 429, line 3; § 946, in line 25; § 947, page 430, in line 11; § 948, in line 33. Page 430, in line 13, *for* of *read* by; in line 25, *for* to the appropriation, *read* to appropriation; page 429, line 42, *for* exculpted, *read* exculpted; line 5, *for* moods, *read* mental moods; page 425, the quotation

Mean, xiii., 1 (page 110, above): "The path is not far from man." Cf. Deuteronomy xxx., 14. (page 100, above.)

§ 944.—Whether the lectures publicly delivered in a church ought mainly to set forth doctrines of GODLINESS or those of pure VIRTUE. (page 245, line 12.) [This climax (§§ 943-948 inclusive) deserves the closest attention.]

which ends in line 25, should begin with the word *be*, at the end of line 23; page 426, the quotation which begins in line 32, should end with the word *things*, in line 36; page 427, the quotation which ends in line 6, should begin with the word *the*, in line 5; page 416, the quotation in Journal § 101, is from Acts xvii., 28; the quotation in Journal § 102, is from Clavis § 952, and is an instance of the want of conscientiousness which I so frequently exhibit, the statement by Kant being not assertorical, but hypothetical, a fact which I should have caused to appear; with Journal § 103, cf. §§ 642, 877; with Journal § 104, page 417, cf. §§ 748, 921, 2828; with Journal § 106, cf. §§ 656, 698, 671, 678, 661; page 418, line 27, *for* (§§ 56, 58) *read* (§§ 56-58); the quotation at the bottom of page 418 is from Romans vii., 21-23; the quotation at the bottom of page 419, is from II. Cor., iv., 7; with Journal § 108, cf. §§ 673, 674, 672, 684; with Journal § 109, cf. Clavis §§ 5, 7, 704; with Journal § 110, page 420, cf. §§ 671, 672, 682; with Journal § 111, cf. §§ 697, 701; the quotation in note † is from § 664; with Journal § 112, cf. §§ 680, 691, 682; with Journal § 113, page 421, cf. §§ 687, 731; page 422, line 17, *for* *maxims*, which, *read* *maxims*), (which; with Journal § 114, cf. § 689; with Journal § 115, cf. §§ 707, 711, 613, 701, 709, 714, 712, 692, 682; with Journal § 116, cf. § 713, and Romans xii., 1, 2, and James i., 22-25; with Journal § 117, c. § 722, 700, 701; page 423, line 38, *for* *ordinary*, *read* *originary*; with Journal § 118, page 424, cf. §§ 721, 719, 715, 217, 616; with Journal § 119, cf. §§ 925, 706, 724, Matthew, ch. v., verse 18; page 424, last line, *for* *possible*, *read* *possessed*; page 425, note *, see Romans ii., 12; with Journal § 120, cf. Romans viii., 37-39, I. Cor. xiii., 13, xiv., 1, Romans xiii., 10, and iii., 23, and §§ 230, 726, 925, 963, 913 et seqq.; with Journal § 121, page 426, cf. §§ 721, 930, 964, 728, 783, Romans, iii., 28, 31; with Journal § 122, cf. §§ 819, 877, 878, et seqq., 896, Mark, xii., 32-34; with Journal § 123, page 427, cf. §§ 924, 966; page 427, line 39, *for* *only*, *read* *both*; with Journal § 124, cf. I Cor. xiv., 8, Ephesians, vi., 13.

In Jour. Sp. Phil. vol. viii., page 339, with Journal § 85, cf. §§ 249, 140, 467, 183, 232, 533, 47 (Clavis numbers); with Journal § 86, page 340, cf. §§ 454, 384, 612, 470, 429, 456, 278, 550; with Journal § 87, cf. §§ 435, 225, 241, 197, 532, 416, 417, 467, 232, 227, 451, 511, 182; page 341, note *, see § 1896; with Journal § 88, cf. §§ 560, 549, 424, 420, 444, 413, 331, 343, 328, 547; with Journal § 89, page 342, cf. §§ 735, 3102, 421, 442, 954, 234, 435; page 343, line 2, before the word *We*, *insert* The motive of the act thus establishes the fact of the lie, and; line 4, *for* *map*, *read* *maps*; with Journal § 91, cf. §§ 422, 191; with Journal § 93, page 344, cf. §§ 386, 433, 401, 412, 72 (Clavis numbers); with Journal § 94, cf. §§ 186, 178; with Journal § 95, page 345, cf. § 184; page 345, line 39, *for* *cannot only*, *read* *can not only*; with Journal § 96, cf. §§ 174, 431; page 348, line 4, see Schwegler's Hist. Phil., ed. Seelye, page 155; page 348, line 37, *for* *its*, *read* *it is*; page 349, line 8, *after* *humiliation*, *insert* § 11; page 349, line 13, *for* *could*, *read* *would*; page 349, note †, see Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. iv., pages 293 and 297, "the Finite and the Infinite," by Francis A. Henry; page 350, line, 9, see Dr. Henry Calder-

§ 945.—Godliness may be figured as containing under it two different mental moods: (1) FEAR OF GOD; (2) LOVE OF GOD. (page 245, line 18.) [*Anthropomorphously*: cf. §§ 748, 2439, 2573.]

§ 946.—Godliness can not by itself be the end and aim of morality, but can only serve as a mean. (page 246, line 10.)

§ 947.—Godliness exposed to the risk of sliding into an abject, servile, and adulatory submission to the will of a despot. (page 247, line 17.)

wood's introduction to Semple's translation of Kant's Ethics, ed. 1869, page x; with Journal § 97, page 346, cf. §§ 526, 194, 524; page 347, line 37, *for* "who all rose to their feet" *read* "who all rose to their feet"; page 347, last line, *add* "Egypt 3300 Years Ago," pages 130, 133, 136, 138, where I obtained my facts and references; page 347, line 2, see Schwegler's Hist. Phil., ed. Seelye, 1864, pages 157, 155; page 350 line 24, *for* Siniatic, *read* Sinaitic; line 33, cf. Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, article SOPHOS; line 26, see § 280; line 19, cf. § 25. (Clavis number); page 351, line 9, Psalm lxxxvi., 8–10, Dr. Conant's translation, American Bible Union, New York, 1871.

In Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 27, with Journal § 1, cf. §§ 1516, 1521, 1896, 2920, 1645, 1856, and Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. viii., page 341, note *; in Journal § 1 (page 27, lines 16 and 18) *for* noumena, *read* things in themselves (for the reason explained in the Clavis at § 2920); with Journal § 2, cf. §§ 337, 291, 203, 220, 226; at Journal § 3, refer to §§ 337, 338; with Journal § 4, page 29, cf. §§ 237, 223, 455, 532, 715, 891, and Arist. Nic. Eth. VI., ii., 4 (§ 1040 below); at Journal § 5, refer to Journal §§ 57, 58, 94, 96, 47; with Journal § 7, cf. §§ 891, 645, 234; with Journal § 8 (page 30), cf. Semple's translation of the Ethics, page viii.; with Journal § 10, page 31, cf. §§ 611, 219, 100 (Clavis numbers); with Journal § 11, cf. § 225; at Journal § 12, refer to Dr. Calderwood's introduction (page xv.) to Semple's translation of the Ethics (ed. 1869); with the last part of Journal § 12, page 32, cf. §§ 2141, 2435; with Journal § 14, cf. §§ 31 (Clavis number), 199, 1734, 177, and Habakkuk, ii., 2; with Journal § 15, page 33, cf. § 1603; with Journal § 16, cf. §§ 1599–1615, 952, 1608, 2026, 2782, 1634, 1605, 2137; with Journal § 17, page 34, cf. §§ 2527, 141, 142, 2472; page 34, line 26, *for* Mr. SEMPLE, *read* Dr. CALDERWOOD (and at page 31, line 33, as to which see Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. x., pages 430, 431); page 34, line 27, *for* the common, *read* a; in Journal § 18, omit the first word, (Such) and *read* Students of the progressive development of the human mind (page 35, line 1) will readily admit, etc., (page 35, line 8) omitting seven lines; with Journal § 19 (page 35) cf. Fischer's Commentary on Kant's Critique (tr. Mahaffy, ed. 1866, Longmans) page 24; with Journal § 20, cf. §§ 2560, 174, 64 (Clavis numbers), 180, 191, 2242, 2201, 2086, 2083, 1716, 1735; with Journal § 22 (ad fin., page 37) cf. §§ 178, 174.

In Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 108, with Journal § 25, cf. §§ 132, 133, 134, 480, 117 (Clavis numbers); with Journal § 27, cf. (Clavis numbers) §§ 98, 125, 143, 210; with Journal § 30, page 109, cf. (Clavis numbers) §§ 104, 106, 107, 123, 105; with Journal § 32, page 110, cf. §§ 164, 177, 333, 3036; with Journal § 33, cf. §§ 291, 299, 275, 468, 470; with Journal § 34, cf. § 127; with Journal § 36, page 111, cf. § 2944, and see Monck (Introduction to the Critical Philosophy, Dublin, 1874) page 60; with Journal § 39, cf. §§ 1676, 1681; with Journal § 41, cf. §§ 119 (Clavis number), 1627, 1609, 2901, 1729; with Journal § 42, page 113, cf. §§ 1631, 1628.

§ 948.—Godliness the plenary consummation of virtue, crowning it with hope. (page 248, line 10.)

§ 949.—False and abject humility, placing the whole of religion in a principle of passive resignation, where all moral good is expected from above. (page 248, line 26.) [*Judaism*: see § 858.] [*Mohammedanism*: see § 968.] [*Christianity*: see § 906.] *The Hindu persuasions*: Cf. the following extracts from Buddha's Dharmapada :†

CHAPTER I.—THE TWIN VERSES. 1. All that we are is the result of what we have thought: it is founded on our thoughts, it is

2902, 2904, 2906, 1639, 1598. (I do not doubt that I was wrong); with Journal § 43, cf. § 243; with Journal § 44, cf. §§ 443, 444, 953, 954; with Journal § 49, page 116, cf. §§ 543, 248, 243, and Prof. Fischer (see above) page 8; with Journal § 51, page 117, cf. §§ 2212 et seqq., 291, 244, 251; with Journal § 52, cf. §§ 140, 247, 248; with Journal § 28, page 109, cf. § 132; with Journal § 29, cf. § 687.

In Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 289, with Journal § 54, cf. §§ 174, 172, 171; with Journal § 55, cf. §§ 163, 157, 142, 109 (Clavis numbers), 2245, 247, 248, 152, 717; with Journal § 56, cf. §§ 2560, 123, 1084 (Clavis numbers); with Journal § 58, page 290, cf. §§ 173, 177, 197, 198, 1583, 244, 431; with Journal § 59 (p. 291), cf. §§ 1665, 1666, 1668, 1673, 1674; with Journal § 60, cf. §§ 1686, 210, 1669, Psal. xxxvii., 37; with Journal § 61, page 292, cf. § 125 (Clavis number); with Journal § 62, cf. §§ 147, 176, 54 (Clavis numbers); with Journal § 63, page 293, cf. §§ 152, 153, 1583, 2683, 2684, 2451, 430, 330; with Journal § 64, page 294, cf. §§ 168, 332, 430; with Journal § 65, cf. §§ 350, 347, 221, 3113, 586, 517, 362, 73 (Clavis numbers), and St. Paul (Titus ii., 15: "Let no one despise thee"); with Journal § 66, cf. §§ 386, 388, 400, 374, 303, 345, 391, 396; with Journal § 67, page 296, cf. §§ 306, 305, 301, 291, 428, and *for* judicial, *read* juridical; with Journal § 68, cf. §§ 304, 342, 343, 391, 346; with Journal § 69, page 297, cf. § 411; with Journal § 70, cf. §§ 409, 73, 97 (Clavis numbers); with Journal § 71, cf. §§ 494, 496, 497, 242, 483, 420, 418, 73, 86 (Clavis numbers), and St. Paul (I. Tim., v., 22: "Keep thyself pure"); at Journal § 72, see § 183; with Journal § 73, page 299, cf. §§ 2465, 2466, 1583, 1674, 2456, 1661, 2464, 1074, 277, 30, 31 (Clavis numbers); with Journal § 76, cf. (with I.) § 147, (with II.) § 153, (with III.) § 156, (with IV.) § 157, (VIII.) § 168, (with IX.) § 171, (with X.) § 172; page 302, no. V., the apodict, like the axiom, must be pointed out, whereupon it is immediately accepted by every rational agent (the apodict is the logical correlate of the mathematical axiom; see § 1245); with Journal § 77, page 304, cf. §§ 312, 316; with Journal § 79, cf. §§ 380, 427; with Journal § 81, page 306, cf. § 381; with Journal § 82, cf. § 426; with Journal § 84, page 307, cf. §§ 445, 523.

† "Lectures on the Science of Religion; with a paper on Buddhist Nihilism, and a translation of the Dhammapada, or 'Path of Virtue,' by Max Mueller, M. A." New York, Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1872. See page 193, et seqq., for the Dharmapada, with notes, by Mueller. The verses being numbered consecutively, I have not deemed it necessary to insert references to the paging, or, except in one or two instances, to call attention to portions which I have omitted. The reader will not have the slightest difficulty in finding any desired place, by observing the numbering of the verses.

made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of him who draws the carriage. 2. All that we are is the result of what we have thought: it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him.

3. "He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me,"—hatred in those who harbor such thoughts will never cease. 4. "He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me,"—hatred in those who do not harbor such thoughts will cease. 5. For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time: *HATRED CEASES BY LOVE*; this is an old rule. 6. And some do not know that we must all come to an end here; but others know it, and hence their quarrels cease.

7. He who lives looking for pleasures only, his senses uncontrolled, immoderate in his enjoyments, idle, and weak, Mara (the tempter) will certainly overcome him, as the wind throws down a weak tree. 8. He who lives without looking for pleasures, his senses well controlled, in his enjoyments moderate, faithful and strong, Mara will certainly not overcome him, any more than the wind throws down a rocky mountain. 9. He who wishes to put on the sacred orange-colored dress* without having cleansed himself from sin, who disregards also temperance and truth, is unworthy of the orange-colored dress. 10. But he who has cleansed himself from sin, is well grounded in all virtues, and regards also *TEMPERANCE* and *TRUTH*, is indeed worthy of the orange-colored dress.

15. The evil-doer mourns in this world, and he mourns in the next; he mourns in both. He mourns, he suffers when he sees the evil of *HIS OWN* work. 16. The virtuous man delights in this world, and he delights in the next; he delights in both. He delights, he rejoices, when he sees the purity of his own work. 17. The evil-doer suffers in this world, and he suffers in the next; he suffers in both. He suffers when he thinks of the evil he has done; he suffers more when going on the evil path. 18. The virtuous man is happy in this world, and he is happy in the next; he is happy in both. He is happy when he thinks of the good he has done; he is still more happy when going on the good path.

19. The thoughtless man, even if he can recite a large portion (of the law), but is not a *DOER* of it, has no share in the priesthood, but is like a cowherd counting the cows of others. 20. The fol-

* The saffron dress, of a reddish-yellow or orange color, the *Kasava* or *Kashaya*, is the distinctive garment of the Buddhist priests.—*Extract from Mueller's note.*

lower of the law, even if he can recite only a small portion (of the law), but, having forsaken passion and hatred and foolishness, possesses true knowledge and serenity of mind, he, caring for nothing in this world, or that* to come, has indeed a share in the priesthood.

CHAPTER II.—ON REFLECTION. 21. Reflection is the path of immortality, thoughtlessness the path of death. Those who reflect do not die†, those who are thoughtless are as if dead already. 22. Having understood this clearly, those who are advanced in reflection, delight in reflection, and rejoice in the knowledge of the Ariyas (the Elect). 23. These wise people, meditative, steady, always possessed of strong powers, attain to Nirvana, the highest happiness. 24. If a reflecting person has aroused himself, if he is not forgetful, if his DEEDS are pure, if he ACTS with consideration, if he restrains himself, and lives according to law,—then his glory will increase. 25. By rousing himself, by reflection, by restraint and control, the wise man may make FOR HIMSELF an island which no flood can overwhelm.

26. Fools follow after vanity, men of evil wisdom. The wise man possesses reflection as his best jewel. 27. Follow not after vanity, nor after the enjoyment of love and lust! He who reflects and meditates, obtains ample joy. 29. Reflecting among the thoughtless, awake‡ among the sleepers, the wise man advances like a racer leaving behind the hack. 30. By EARNESTNESS did Maghavan (Indra) rise to the lordship of the gods. People praise earnestness; thoughtlessness is always blamed. 31. A Bhikshu (mendicant) who delights in reflection, who looks with fear on thoughtlessness, moves about like fire, burning all his fetters, small or large. 32. A Bhikshu (mendicant) who delights in reflection, who looks with fear on thoughtlessness, will not go to destruction—he is near to Nirvana.||

*[Every *a posteriori* motive, be it ever so refined and psychical, is material and not moral. See verse 417 below, and cf. §§ 155, 256 (pages 19, 25 above).]

†[Cf. St. Paul (Romans, viii., 6) § 281.] ‡[Cf. Confucius (Analects, V., ix., 1, page 124 above), and Zoroaster (Vendidad, xviii., 11, page 146 above).]

|| No person who reads with attention the metaphysical speculations on the Nirvana contained in the third part of the Buddhist Canon, can arrive at any other conviction than that expressed by Burnouf, namely, that Nirvana, the highest aim; the *summum bonum* of Buddhism, is the absolute nothing.

Burnouf adds, however, that this doctrine appears in its crude form in the third part only of the canon, the so-called Abhidharma, but not in the first and second parts, in the Sūtras, the sermons, and the Vinaya, the ethics, which together bear the name of Dharma, or Law. He next points out that, according to some ancient authorities, this entire part of the canon was designated as not “pronounced by Buddha.”—(Max Mueller's *Chips*, 2d ed., vol. i., p. 285, note.)

CHAPTER III.—THOUGHT. 33. As a fletcher makes straight his arrow, a wise man makes straight his trembling and unsteady thought, which is difficult to keep, difficult to turn. 34. As a fish taken from his watery home and thrown on the dry ground, our thought trembles all over in order to escape the dominion of Mara (the tempter). 35. It is good to tame the mind, which is difficult to hold in and flighty, rushing wherever it listeth; a tamed mind brings happiness. 36. Let the wise man guard his thoughts, for they are difficult to perceive, very artful, and they rush wherever

These are, at once, two important limitations. I add a third, and maintain that sayings of Buddha occur in the *Dhammapada*, which are in open contradiction to this metaphysical nihilism.

Now, first, as regards the soul, or the self, the existence of which, according to the orthodox metaphysics, is purely phenomenal,** a sentence attributed to the Buddha (*Dhammapada*, verse 160) says, "Self is the Lord of Self, who else could be the Lord?" And again, (*Dhammapada*, v. 323) "A man who controls himself enters the untrodden land through his own self-controlled self." But this untrodden land is the *Nirvana*.

Nirvana certainly means extinction, whatever its later arbitrary interpretations may have been, and seems therefore to imply, even etymologically, a real blowing out or passing away. But *Nirvana* occurs also in the Brahmanic writings as synonymous with *Moksha*, *Nirvritti*, (see *Dhammapada*, v. 89, 92) and other words, all designating the highest stage of spiritual liberty and bliss, but not annihilation. *Nirvana* may mean the extinction of many things,—of selfishness, desire, and sin, without going so far as the extinction of subjective consciousness. Further, if we consider that Buddha himself, after he had already seen *Nirvana*, still remains on earth until his body falls a prey to death; that in the legends Buddha appears to his disciples even after his death, it seems to me that all these circumstances are hardly reconcilable with the orthodox metaphysical doctrine of *Nirvana*.

But I go even further and maintain that, if we look in the *Dhammapada* at every passage where *Nirvana* is mentioned, there is not one which would require that its meaning should be annihilation, while most, if not all, would become perfectly unintelligible if we assigned to the word *Nirvana* the meaning which it has in the *Abhidharma* or the metaphysical portions of the canon.

What does it mean, when Buddha (verse 21), calls reflection the path to immortality, thoughtlessness the path of death? Buddhaghosha does not hesitate to explain immortality by *Nirvana*, and that the same idea was connected with it in the mind of Buddha is clearly proved by a passage immediately following (verse 23): "These wise people, meditative, steady, always possessed of strong powers, attain to *Nirvana*, the highest happiness." In the last verse, too, of the same chapter we read, "A Bhikshu who delights in reflection, who looks with fear on thoughtlessness, will not go to destruction—he is near to *Nirvana*." If the goal at which the followers of Buddha have to aim had been in the mind of Buddha perfect annihilation, "*amata*," i. e. immortality, would have been the very last word he could have chosen as its name.

** See Wassiljew, *Der Buddhismus*, p. 296, (269); and Bigandet's *Life of Gaudama*, p. 479. "The things that I see and know, are not myself, nor from myself, nor to myself. What seems to be myself is in reality neither myself nor belongs to myself."

they list; thoughts well guarded bring happiness. 37. Those who bridle their mind which travels far, moves about alone, is without a body, and hides in the chamber (of the heart), will be free from the bonds of Mara (the tempter).

38. If a man's thoughts are unsteady, if he does not know the true law, if his peace of mind is troubled, his knowledge will never be perfect. 40. Knowing that this body is (fragile) like a jar, and making this thought firm like a fortress, one should attack Mara (the tempter) with the weapon of knowledge, one should watch

In several passages of the Dhammapada, Nirvana occurs in the purely ethical sense of rest, quietness, absence of passion; *e. g.* (verse 134), "If, like a trumpet trampled under foot, thou utter not, then thou hast reached Nirvana; anger is not known in thee." In verse 184 long-suffering (titiksha) is called the highest Nirvana. While in verse 202 we read that there is no happiness like rest (*santi*) or quietness, we read in the next verse that the highest happiness is Nirvana. In verse 285, too, "*santi*" seems to be synonymous with Nirvana, for the way that leads to "*santi*," or peace, leads also to Nirvana, as shown by Buddha. In verse 369 it is said, "When thou hast cut off passion and hatred, thou wilt go to Nirvana;" and in verse 225 the same thought is expressed, only that instead of Nirvana we have the expression of unchangeable place: "The sages who injure nobody, and who always control their body, they will go to the unchangeable place, where, if they have gone, they will suffer no more."

In other passages Nirvana is described as the result of right knowledge. Thus we read (verse 203), "Hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the greatest of pains; if one knows this truly, that is Nirvana, the highest happiness."

A similar thought seems contained in verse 374: "As soon as a man has perceived the origin and destruction of the elements of the body (*khandha*), he finds happiness and joy, which belong to those who know the immortal (Nirvana); or which is the immortality of those who know it, namely, the transitory character of the body." In verse 372 it is said that he who has knowledge and meditation is near unto Nirvana.

Nirvana is certainly more than heaven or heavenly joy. "Some people are born again" (on earth) says Buddha, verse 126, "evil doers go to hell; righteous people go to heaven; those who are free from all worldly desires enter Nirvana." The idea that those who had reached the haven of the gods were still liable to birth and death, and that there is a higher state in which the power of birth and death is broken, existed clearly at the time when the verses of the Dhammapada were composed. Thus we read (verse 238), "When thy impurities are blown away, and thou art free from guilt, thou wilt not enter again into birth and decay." And in the last verse (423) the highest state that a Brahmana can reach is called "the end of births," *gatikshaya*.

There are many passages in the Dhammapada where we expect Nirvana, but where, instead of it, other words are used. Here, no doubt, it might be said that something different from Nirvana is intended, and that we have no right to use such words as throwing light on the original meaning of Nirvana. But, on the other hand, these words, and the passages where they occur, must mean something definite; they can not mean heaven or the world of the gods, for

him when conquered, AND SHOULD NEVER CEASE (from the fight). 42. Whatever a hater may do to a hater, or an enemy to an enemy, a wrongly-directed mind will do us greater mischief. 43. Not a mother, not a father will do so much, nor any other relative; a well-directed mind will do us greater service.

CHAPTER IV.—FLOWERS. 44. Who shall overcome this earth, and the world of Yama (the lord of the departed), and the world of the gods? Who shall find out the plainly shown path of virtue, as a clever man finds out the (right) flower? 45. THE DISCIPLE

reasons stated above; and if they do not mean Nirvana, they would have no meaning at all. There may be some doubt whether "para," the shore, and particularly the other shore, stands always for Nirvana, and whether those who are said to have reached the other shore are to be supposed to have entered Nirvana. It may possibly not have that meaning in verses 384 and 385, but it can hardly have another in places such as verses 85, 86, 347, 348, 355, 414. There is less doubt, however, that other words are used distinctly as synonyms of Nirvana. Such words are, the quiet place (*santam padam*, verses 368, 381); the changeless place (*akyutam sthanam*, verse 225, compared with verse 226); the immortal place (*amatam padam*, verse 114); also simply that which is immortal (verse 374). In verse 411 the expression occurs that the wise dives into the immortal.

Though, according to Buddha, everything that has been made, everything that was put together, resolves itself again into its component parts and passes away (verse 277, *sarve samskara anityah*), he speaks nevertheless of that which is not made, *i. e.*, the uncreated and eternal, and uses it, as it would seem, synonymously with Nirvana (verse 97). Nay, he says (verse 383), "When you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which was not made." This surely shows that even for Buddha a something existed which is not made, and which, therefore, is imperishable and eternal.

On considering such sayings, to which many more might be added, one recognizes in them a conception of Nirvana, altogether irreconcilable with the nihilism of the third part of the Buddhist Canon. It is not a question of more or less, but of *aut—aut*. Nirvana can not, in the mind of one and the same person, mean black and white, nothing and something. If these sayings, as recorded in the Dhammapada, have maintained themselves, in spite of their being in open contradiction to orthodox metaphysics, the only explanation, in my opinion, is, that they were too firmly fixed in the tradition which went back to Buddha and his disciples. What Bishop Bigandet and others represent as the popular view of Nirvana, in contradistinction to that of the Buddhist divines, was, in my opinion, the conception of Buddha and his disciples. It represented the entrance of the soul into rest, a subduing of all wishes and desires, indifference to joy and pain, to good and evil, an absorption of the soul in itself, and a freedom from the circle of existences from birth to death, and from death to a new birth. This is still the meaning which educated people attach to it, whilst to the minds of the larger masses (Bigandet, *The Life of Gaudama*, p. 320 note; Bastian, *Die Voelger des oestlichen Asien*, vol. iii., p. 353) Nirvana suggests rather the idea of a Mohammedan paradise or of blissful Elysian fields.

Only in the hands of the philosophers, to whom Buddhism owes its metaphysics, the Nirvana, through constant negations carried to an indefinite degree,

will overcome the earth, and the world of Yama, and the world of the gods. THE DISCIPLE will find out the plainly shown path of virtue, as a clever man finds out the (right) flower. 46. He who knows that this body is like froth, and has learnt that it is as unsubstantial as a mirage, will break the flower-pointed arrow of Mara, and never see the King of Death. 47. Death carries off a man who is gathering flowers and whose mind is distracted, as a flood carries off a sleeping village. 48. Death subdues a man who is gathering flowers, and whose mind is distracted, before he is satiated in his pleasures.

49. As the bee collects nectar and departs without injuring the flower, or its color and scent, so let the sage dwell on earth. 50. Not the failures of others, not their sins of commission or omission, but

through the excluding and abstracting of all that is not Nirvana, at last became an empty Nothing, a philosophical myth. There is no lack of such philosophical myths either in the East or in the West. What has been fabled by philosophers of a Nothing, and of the terrors of a Nothing, is as much a myth as the myth of Eos and Tithonus. There is no more a Nothing, than there is an Eos or a Chaos. All these are sickly, dying or dead words, which, like shadows and ghosts, continue to haunt language, and succeed in deceiving for a while even the healthiest intellect.

Even modern philosophy is not afraid to say that there is a Nothing. We find passages in the German mystics, such as Eckhart and Tauler, where the abyss of the Nothing is spoken of quite in a Buddhist style. If Buddha had said, like St. Paul, 'that what no eye hath seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man,' was prepared in the Nirvana for those who had advanced to the highest degree of spiritual perfection, such expressions would have been quite sufficient to serve as a proof to the philosophers by profession that this Nirvana, which could not become an object of perception by the senses, nor of conception by the categories of the understanding,—the *anakkhata*, the ineffable, as Buddha calls it (verse 218),—could be nothing more nor less than the Nothing. Could we dare with Hegel to distinguish between a Nothing (*Nichts*) and a Not (*Nicht*), we might say that the Nirvana had, through a false dialectical process, been driven from a relative Nothing to an absolute Not. This was the work of the theologians and of the orthodox philosophers. But a religion has never been founded by such teaching, and a man like Buddha, who knew mankind, must have known that he could not, with such weapons, overturn the tyranny of the Brahmins. Either we must bring ourselves to believe that Buddha taught his disciples two diametrically opposed doctrines on Nirvana, say an exoteric and esoteric one, or we must allow that view of Nirvana to have been the original view of the founder of this marvelous religion, which we find recorded in the verses of the Dhammapada, and which corresponds best with the simple, clear, and practical character of Buddha.—[Extract from Max Mueller's preface to Capt. Rogers' translation of Buddhaghosha's Parables (it appears from the publishers' remark; see page 151 of Scribner's edition of the Dhammapada, referred to above, page 269). This extract is taken from pages 179–186 of Scribner.]

HIS OWN MISDEEDS and negligences should the sage take notice of. 51. Like a beautiful flower, full of color, but without scent, are the fine but fruitless words of him who does not ACT accordingly. 52. But like a beautiful flower, full of color and full of scent, are the fine and fruitful words of him who acts accordingly. 53. As many kinds of wreaths can be made from a heap of flowers, so many good things may be achieved by a mortal if once he is born.

54. The scent of flowers does not travel against the wind, nor (that of) sandal-wood, or of a bottle of Tagara oil; but the odor of good people travels even against the wind; a good man pervades every place. 57. Of the people who possess these excellencies, who live without thoughtlessness, and who are emancipated through true knowledge, Mara, the tempter, never finds the way. 58, 59. As on a heap of rubbish cast upon the highway the lily will grow full of sweet perfume and delightful, thus the disciple of the truly enlightened BUDDHA shines forth by his knowledge among those who are like rubbish, among the people that walk in darkness.

CHAPTER V.—THE FOOL. 60. Long is the night to him who is awake; long is a mile to him who is tired; long is life to the foolish who do not know the true law. 62. "These sons belong to me, and this wealth belongs to me;" with such thoughts a fool is tormented. He himself does not belong to himself; how much less sons and wealth?

66. Fools of little understanding have themselves for their greatest enemies, for they do evil deeds which must bear bitter fruits. 67. THAT DEED IS NOT WELL DONE OF WHICH A MAN MUST REPENT, and the reward of which he receives crying and with a tearful face. 68. No, that deed is well done of which a man does not repent, and the reward of which he receives gladly and cheerfully. 69. As long as the evil deed done does not bear fruit, the fool thinks it is like honey; but when it ripens, then the fool suffers grief. 70. Let a fool month after month eat his food (like an ascetic) with the tip of a blade of Kusa grass, yet is he not worth the sixteenth particle of those who have well weighed the law.

71. An evil deed does not turn suddenly, like milk; smouldering it follows the fool, like fire covered by ashes. 72. And when the evil deed, after it has become known, brings sorrow to the fool, then it destroys his bright lot, nay it cleaves his head. 73. Let the fool wish for a false reputation, for precedence among the Bhikshus, for lordship in the convents, for worship among other people! 74. "May both the layman and he who has left the world think that this is done by me; may they be subject to me in every-

thing which is to be done or is not to be done ;” thus is the mind of the fool, and his desire and pride increase.

75. “ One is the road that leads to wealth, another the road that leads to Nirvana ;” if the Bhikshu, the disciple of Buddha, has learnt this, he will not yearn for honor, he will strive after separation from the world.

CHAPTER VI.—THE WISE MAN. 76. If you see an intelligent man, who tells you where true treasures are to be found, who shows what is to be avoided, and who administers reproofs, follow that wise man ; it will be better, not worse, for those who follow him. 77. Let him admonish, let him command, let him hold back from what is improper !—he will be beloved of the good, by the bad he will be hated. 78. Do not have EVIL-DOERS for friends, do not have low people : have virtuous people for friends, have for friends the best of men. 79. He who drinks in the Law lives happily with a serene mind : the sage rejoices always in the Law, as preached by the elect.

80. Well-makers lead the water (wherever they like) ; fletchers bend the arrow ; carpenters bend a log of wood ; wise people fashion themselves.* 81. As a solid rock is not shaken by the wind, wise people falter not amidst blame and praise. 82. Wise people, after they have listened to the laws, become serene, like a deep, smooth, and still lake. 83. Good people walk on, whatever befall, the good do not murmur, longing for pleasure ; whether touched by happiness or sorrow, wise people never appear elated or depressed. 84. If, whether for his own sake, or for the sake of others, a man wishes neither for a son, nor for wealth, nor for lordship, and if he does not wish for his own success BY UNFAIR MEANS, then he is good, wise, and virtuous. .

85. Few are there among men who arrive at the other shore ; the other people here run up and down the shore. 86. But those who, when the Law† has been well preached to them, follow the Law, will pass across the dominion of death, however difficult to overcome. 89. Those whose mind is well grounded in the elements of knowledge, who have given up all attachments, and rejoice without clinging to anything, those whose frailties have been conquered, and who are full of light, are free (even) in this world.

CHAPTER VII.—THE VENERABLE. [90,‡ 91‡]. 92. They who have no riches, who live on authorized food,|| who have perceived the Void, the Unconditioned, the Absolute, their way is difficult to understand, like that of birds in the ether. 93. He whose passions

* [Philippians, ii., 12.] † [See verse 183 below, without delay.] ‡ [I omit verses 90, 91.] || [Deuteronomy, viii., 3 ; Matthew, iv., 4.]

are stilled, who is not absorbed in enjoyment, who has perceived the Void, the Unconditioned, the Absolute, his path is difficult to understand, like that of the birds in the ether. 94. The gods even envy him whose senses have been subdued, like horses well broken in by the driver, who is free from pride, and free from frailty. 95. Such a one who DOES HIS DUTY is tolerant like the earth, like Indra's bolt; he is like a lake without mud; no new births are in store for him. 96. His thought is quiet, quiet are his word and deed, when he has obtained freedom by true knowledge, when he has thus become a quiet man. 97. The man who is free from credulity, but knows the Uncreated, who has cut all ties, removed all temptations, renounced all desires, he is the greatest of men.

CHAPTER VIII.—THE THOUSANDS. 100. Even though a speech be a thousand (of words), but made up of senseless words, one word of sense is better, which if a man hears, he becomes quiet. 101. Even though a Gatha (poem) be a thousand (of words), but made up of senseless words, one word of a Gatha is better, which if a man hears, he becomes quiet. 102. Though a man recite a hundred Gathas made up of senseless words, one word of the Law is better, which if a man hears, he becomes quiet.

103. If one man conquer in battle a thousand times thousand men, and if another CONQUER HIMSELF, he is the greatest of conquerors. 104, 105. One's own self conquered is better than all other people; not even a god, a Gandharva, not Mara with Brahman could change into defeat the victory of a man who has vanquished himself, and always lives under restraint. 106. If a man for a hundred years sacrifice month after month with a thousand, and if he but for one moment pay homage to a man whose soul is grounded (in true knowledge), better is that homage than a sacrifice for a hundred years. 107. If a man for a hundred years worship Agni (fire) in the forest, and if he but for one moment pay homage to a man whose soul is grounded (in true knowledge), better is that homage than sacrifice for a hundred years. 108. Whatever a man sacrifice in this world as an offering or as an oblation for a whole year in order to gain merit, the whole of it is not worth a quarter; reverence shown to the righteous is better.

109. He who always greets and constantly reveres the aged, four things will increase to him, namely life, beauty, happiness, power.

110. But he who lives a hundred years, vicious, and unrestrained, a life of one day is better if a man is virtuous and reflecting. 111. And he who lives a hundred years, ignorant and unrestrained, a life of one day is better, if a man is wise and reflecting. 112. And he who lives a hundred years, idle and weak, a life of one day is better,

if a man has attained firm strength. 113. And he who lives a hundred years, not seeing beginning and end, a life of one day is better if a man sees beginning and end. 114. And he who lives a hundred years, not seeing the immortal place, a life of one day is better if a man sees the immortal place. 115. And he who lives a hundred years, not seeing the highest law, a life of one day is better if a man sees the highest law.

CHAPTER IX.—EVIL. 116. If a man would hasten toward the good, he SHOULD KEEP HIS THOUGHTS AWAY FROM EVIL; if a man does what is good SLOTHFULLY, his mind delights in evil. 117. If a man commits a sin, let him not do it again; let him not delight in sin: pain is the outcome of evil. 118. If a man does what is good, let him do it again; let him delight in it: happiness is the outcome of good. 119. Even an evil-doer sees happiness as long as his evil deed has not ripened; but when his evil deed has ripened, then does the evil-doer see evil. 120. Even a good man sees evil days, as long as his good deed has not ripened; but when his good deed has ripened, then does the good man see happy days.

121. Let no man think lightly of evil, saying in his heart, It will not come near unto me. Even by the falling of water-drops a water-pot is filled; the fool becomes full of evil, even if he gathers it little by little. 122. Let no man think lightly of good, saying in his heart, It will not benefit me. Even by the falling of water-drops a water-pot is filled; the wise man becomes full of good, even if he gather it little by little. 123. Let a man avoid evil deeds, as a merchant if he has few companions and carries much wealth avoids a dangerous road; as a man who loves life avoids poison. 124. He who has no wound on his hand, may touch poison with his hand; poison does not affect one who has no wound; NOR IS THERE EVIL FOR ONE WHO DOES NOT COMMIT EVIL.

125. If a man offend* a harmless, pure, and innocent person, the evil falls back upon that fool, like light dust thrown up against the wind. 126. Some people are born again; evil-doers go to hell; righteous people go to heaven; those who are free from all worldly desires enter Nirvana. 127. Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, not if we enter into the clefts of the mountains, is there known a spot in the whole world where a man might be freed from an evil deed.

CHAPTER X.—PUNISHMENT. 129. All men tremble at punishment, all men fear death; remember that you are like unto them, and DO NOT KILL nor cause slaughter. 130. All men tremble at punishment, all men love life; remember that thou art like unto

* [I. Corinthians, viii., 13.]

them, and do not kill, nor cause slaughter. 131. He who for his own sake punishes or kills beings longing for happiness, will not find happiness after death. 132. He who for his own sake does not punish or kill beings longing for happiness, will find happiness after death.

133. DO NOT SPEAK HARSHLY to anybody ; those who are spoken to will answer thee in the same way. Angry speech is painful, blows for blows will touch thee. 134. If, like a trumpet trampled under foot, thou utter not, then thou hast reached Nirvana ; anger is not known in thee.

136. A fool does not know when he commits his evil deeds : but the wicked man burns BY HIS OWN DEEDS, as if burnt by fire. 137. He who inflicts pain on innocent and harmless persons, will soon come to one of these ten states : 138. He will have cruel suffering, loss, injury of the body, heavy affliction, or loss of mind, 139. Or a misfortune of the king, or a fearful accusation, or loss of relations, or destruction of treasures, 140. Or lightning-fire will burn his houses ; and when his body is destroyed, the fool will go to hell.

141. Not nakedness, not platted hair, not dirt, not fasting, or lying on the earth, not rubbing with dust, not sitting motionless, can purify a mortal who has not overcome desires. 142. He who, though dressed in fine apparel, exercises tranquility, is quiet, subdued, restrained, chaste, and has ceased to find fault with all other beings, he indeed is a Brahmana, an ascetic (*Sramana*), a friar (*bhikshu*). 143. Is there in this world any man so restrained by humility that he does not mind reproof, as a well-trained horse the whip ? 144. Like a well-trained horse when touched by the whip, be ye active and lively, and by faith, by virtue, by energy, by meditation, by discernment of the law you will overcome this great pain (of reproof), perfect in knowledge and in behavior, and never forgetful.

CHAPTER XI.—OLD AGE. 146. How is there laughter, how is there joy, as this world is always burning ? Why do you not seek a light, ye who are surrounded by darkness ? 151. The brilliant chariots of kings are destroyed, the body also approaches destruction, but the virtues of good people never approach destruction, thus do the good say to the good. 152. A man who has learnt little, grows old like an ox ; his flesh grows, but his knowledge does not grow.

CHAPTER XII.—SELF. 157. If a man hold himself dear, let him watch himself carefully ; during one at least out of the three watches a wise man should be watchful. 158. Let each man first

direct himself to what is proper, then let him teach others ; thus a wise man will not suffer. 159. Let each man make himself as he teaches others to be ; he who is well subdued may subdue (others) ; one's own self* is difficult to subdue. 160. Self is the lord of self, who else could be the lord ? With self well-subdued, a man finds a lord such as few can find.

161. THE EVIL DONE BY ONE'S SELF, self-begotten, self-bred, crushes the wicked, as a diamond breaks a precious stone. 162. He whose wickedness is very great brings himself down to that state where his enemy wishes him to be, as a creeper does with the tree which it surrounds. 163. Bad deeds, and deeds hurtful to ourselves, are easy to do ; what is beneficial and good, that is very difficult to do. 164. The wicked man who scorns the rule of the venerable (Arahat), of the elect (Ariya), of the virtuous, and follows false doctrine, he bears fruit to his own destruction, like the fruits of the *Katthaka* reed. 165. BY ONE'S SELF the evil is done, BY ONE'S SELF one suffers ; BY ONE'S SELF evil is left undone, BY ONE'S SELF one is purified. Purity and impurity belong to ONE'S SELF, no one can purify another.

166. Let no one forget his own duty for the sake of another's, however great ; let a man, after he has discerned his own duty, be always attentive to his duty.

CHAPTER XIII.—THE WORLD. 167. Do not follow the evil law ! Do not live on in thoughtlessness ! Do not follow false doctrine ! Be not a friend of the world.

168. Rouse thyself ! DO NOT BE IDLE ! Follow the law of virtue ! The virtuous lives happily in this world and in the next. 169. Follow the law of virtue ; do not follow that of sin. The virtuous lives happily in this world and in the next. 170. Look upon the world as a bubble, look upon it as a mirage : the king of death does not see him who thus looks down upon the world.

171. Come, look at this glittering world, like unto a royal chariot ; the foolish are immersed in it, but the wise do not cling to it. 172. He who formerly was reckless and afterward became sober, brightens up this world, like the moon when freed from clouds. 173. He whose evil deeds are covered by good deeds, brightens up this world, like the moon when freed from clouds. 174. This world is dark, few only can see here ; a few only go to heaven, like birds escaped from the net. 175. The swans go on the path of the sun, they go through the ether by means of their miraculous power ; the wise are led out of this world, when they have conquered Mara and his train.

* [Cf. Confucius, *Analects*, XII., i., 1 (page 129 above).]

176. If a man has transgressed one law, AND SPEAKS LIES, and scoffs at another world, there is no evil he will not do.

177. The uncharitable do not go to the world of the gods; fools only do not praise liberality; a wise man rejoices in liberality, and through it becomes blessed in the other world.

178. Better than sovereignty over the earth, better than going to* heaven, better than lordship over all worlds, is the reward of the first step in holiness.

CHAPTER XIV.—THE AWAKENED (BUDDHA). 179. He whose conquest is not conquered again, whose conquest no one in this world escapes, by what path can you lead him, the Awakened, the Omniscient, into a wrong path? 180. He whom no desire with its snares and poisons can lead astray, by what path can you lead him, the Awakened, the Omniscient, into a wrong path? 182. Hard is the conception of men, hard is the life of mortals, hard is the hearing of the True Law, hard is the birth of the Awakened (the attainment of Buddhahood).

183. NOT TO COMMIT ANY SIN, TO DO GOOD, AND TO PURIFY ONE'S MIND, that is the teaching of the Awakened.† 184. The Awakened call patience the highest penance, long-suffering the highest Nirvana; for he is not an anchorite (Pravragita) who strikes others, he is not an ascetic (Sramana) who insults others. 185. Not to blame, not to strike, to live restrained under the law, to be moderate in eating, to sleep and eat alone, and to dwell on the highest thoughts,—this is the teaching of the Awakened. 186. There is no satisfying lusts, even by a shower of gold pieces; he who knows that lusts have a short taste and cause pain, he is wise. 187. Even in heavenly pleasures he finds no satisfaction, the disciple who is fully awakened delights only in the destruction of all desires.

188. Men, driven by fear, go to many a refuge, to mountains and forests, to groves and sacred trees. 189. But that is not a safe refuge, that is not the best refuge; a man is not delivered from all pains after having gone to that refuge. 194. Happy is the arising of the Awakened, happy is the teaching of the True Law, happy is peace in the church, happy is the devotion of those who are at peace.

CHAPTER XV.—HAPPINESS. 197. Let us live happily, then, not hating those who hate us! let us dwell free from hatred among men who hate! 198. Let us live happily then, free from ailments among the ailing! let us dwell free from ailments among men who

*[See verse 20 (page 271 above).] †[Cf. § 821 (page 64 above); cf. Confucius, *Analects*, Book IX., ch. xxiii., (page 128 above); cf. Zoroaster, *Avesta*, *Yasna*, xlvi., 4 (page 175 above).]

are ailing! 199. Let us live happily, then, free from greed among the greedy! let us dwell free from greed among men who are greedy! 200. Let us live happily, then, though we call nothing our own! We shall be like the bright gods, feeding on happiness!

201. Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy. He who has given up both victory and defeat, he, the contented, is happy. 202. There is no fire like passion: there is no unlucky die like hatred; there is no pain like this body; there is no happiness like rest. 203. Hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the greatest of pains; if one knows this truly, that is Nirvana, the highest happiness. 204. Health is the greatest of gifts, contentedness the best riches; trust is the best of relatives, Nirvana, the highest happiness. 205. He who has tasted the sweetness of solitude and tranquility, is free from fear and free from sin, while he tastes the sweetness of drinking in the Law.

206. The sight of the elect (Arya) is good, to live with them is always happiness; if a man does not see fools, he will be truly happy. 207. He who walks in the company of fools suffers a long way; company with fools, as with an enemy, is always painful; company with the wise is pleasure, like meeting with kinsfolk. 208. Therefore, one ought to follow the wise, the intelligent, the learned, the much enduring, the DUTIFUL, the elect; one ought to follow a GOOD and wise man, as the moon follows the path of the stars.

CHAPTER XVI.—PLEASURE. 209. He who gives himself to vanity, and does not give himself to meditation, forgetting the real aim (of life) and grasping at pleasure, will in time envy him who has exerted himself in meditation. 217. He who possesses virtue and intelligence, who is JUST, speaks the TRUTH, and does what is HIS OWN business, him the world will hold dear. 218. He in whom a desire for the Ineffable (Nirvana) has sprung up, who is satisfied in his mind, and whose thoughts are not bewildered by love, he is called Urdhvamsrotas (carried upward by the stream). 219. Kinsfolk, friends and lovers salute a man who has been long away, and returns safe from afar. 220. In like manner HIS GOOD WORKS receive him who has done good, and has gone from this world to the other; as kinsmen receive a friend on his return.

CHAPTER XVII.—ANGER. 221. Let a man leave anger, let him forsake pride, let him overcome all bondage! No sufferings befall the man who is not attached to either body or soul, and who calls nothing his own. 222. He who holds back rising anger like a rolling chariot, him I call a real driver; other people are but

holding the reins. 223. Let a man overcome anger by love, LET HIM OVERCOME EVIL BY GOOD; let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth!

224. SPEAK THE TRUTH, DO NOT YIELD TO ANGER; GIVE, IF THOU ART ASKED, from the little thou hast; by those steps thou wilt go near the gods. 225. The sages who injure nobody, and who always control their body, they will go to the unchangeable place (*Nirvana*), where if they have gone, they will suffer no more. 226. Those who are always watchful who study day and night, and who strive after *Nirvana*, their passions will come to an end.

228. There never was, there never will be, nor is there now, a man who is always blamed, or a man who is always praised. 229, 230. But he whom those who discriminate praise continually day after day, as without blemish, wise, rich in knowledge and virtue, who would dare to blame him, like a coin made of gold from the *Gambu* river? Even the gods praise him, he is praised even by *Brahman*.

231. Beware of bodily anger, and control thy body! Leave the sins of the body, and with thy body practice virtue! 232. Beware of the anger of the tongue, and control thy tongue! Leave the sins of the tongue, and practice virtue with thy tongue! 233. Beware of the anger of the mind, and control thy mind! Leave the sins of the mind, and practice virtue with thy mind! 234. The wise who control their body, who control their tongue, the wise who control their mind, are indeed well controlled.

CHAPTER XVIII.—IMPURITY. 235. Thou art now like a sear leaf, the messengers of Death (*Yama*) have come near to thee; thou standest at the door of thy departure, and thou hast no provision* for thy journey. 236. Make thyself an island, WORK HARD, be wise! When thy impurities are blown away, and thou art free from guilt, thou wilt enter into the heavenly world of the Elect (*Ariya*).

237. Thy life has come to an end, thou art come near to Death (*Yama*), there is no resting-place for thee on the road, and thou hast no provision for thy journey. 238. Make thyself an island, WORK HARD, be wise! When thy impurities are blown away, and thou art free from guilt, thou wilt not enter again into birth and decay. 239. Let a wise man blow off the impurities of his soul, as a smith blows off the impurities of silver, one by one, little by little, and from time to time. 240. Impurity arises from the iron, and, having arisen from it, it destroys it; thus do a transgressor's OWN WORKS lead him to the evil path.

* [Cf. *Zoroaster, Khordah-Avesta*, xxxii., 1 (§ 881, page 195 above).]

241. The taint of prayers is non-repetition; the taint of houses, non-repair; the taint of the body is sloth, the taint of a watchman thoughtlessness. 242. Bad conduct is the taint of woman, greediness the taint of a benefactor; tainted are all evil ways, in this world and in the next. 243. But there is a taint worse than all taints, ignorance is the greatest taint. O mendicants! throw off that taint, and become taintless!

246. He who destroys life, who speaks untruth, who takes in this world what is not given him, who takes another man's wife; 247. And the man who gives himself to drinking intoxicating liquors, he, even in this world, digs up his own root.

248. O man, know this, that the unrestrained are in a bad state; take care that greediness and vice do not bring thee to grief, for a long time! 249. The world gives according to their faith or according to their pleasure: if a man frets about the food and the drink given to others, he will find no rest either by day or by night. 250. He in whom that feeling is destroyed, and taken out with the very root, finds rest by day and by night. 251. There is no fire like passion, there is no shark like hatred, there is no snare like folly, there is no torrent like greed.

252. The fault of others is easily perceived, but that of one's self is difficult to perceive; the faults of others one lays open as much as possible, but one's own fault one hides as a cheat hides the bad die from the gambler. 253. If a man looks after the faults of others, and is always inclined to detract, his own weaknesses will grow, and he is far from the destruction of weakness. 254. There is no path through the air, a man is not a Sramana by outward acts. The world delights in vanity, the Tathagatas (the Buddhas) are free from vanity. 255. There is no path through the air, a man is not a Sramana by outward acts. No creatures are eternal; but the Awakened (Buddha) are never shaken.

CHAPTER XIX.—THE JUST. 256, 257. A man is not a just judge if he carries a matter by violence; no, he who distinguishes both right and wrong, who is learned and leads others, not by violence, but by law and equity, he who is a guardian of the law and intelligent, he is called Just. 258. A man is not learned because he talks much; he who is patient, free from hatred and fear, he is called learned. 259. A man is not a supporter of the law because he talks much; even if a man has learned little, but SEES THE LAW BODILY, he is a supporter of the law, a man who never neglects the law. 260. A man is not an elder because his head is gray; his age may be ripe, but he is called "Old in-vain." 261. He in whom there is truth, virtue, love, restraint, moderation, he who is free

from impurity and is wise, he is called an "Elder." 262. An envious, greedy, dishonest man does not become respectable by means of much talking only, or by the beauty of his complexion. 263. He in whom all this is destroyed, taken out with the very root, he, freed from hatred and wise, is called "Respectable."

264. Not by tonsure does an undisciplined man who speaks falsehood, become a *Sramana*; can a man be a *Sramana* who is still held captive by desire and greediness? 265. He who always quiets the evil, whether small or large, he is called a *Sramana* (a quiet man), because he has quieted all evil. 266. A man is not a medicant (*Bhikshu*), simply because he asks others for alms; he who adopts THE WHOLE LAW is a *Bhikshu*, not he who only begs. 268, 269. A man is not a *Muni* because he observes silence (*mona*, *i. e.* *mauna*), if he is foolish and ignorant; but the wise who, taking the balance, chooses the good and avoids evil, he is a "Muni," and is a "Muni" thereby; he who in this world weighs both sides is called a "Muni." 270. A man is not a *Elect* (*Ariya*) because he injures living creatures; because he has pity on all living creatures, therefore is a man called "Ariya." 271, 272. Not only by discipline and vows, not only by much learning, not by entering into a trance,* not by sleeping alone, do I learn † the happiness ‡ of release which no worldling can know.|| A *Bhikshu* receives confidence§ when he has reached the complete destruction of all desires!

CHAPTER XX.—THE WAY. [273,¶ 274, 275.] 276. YOU YOURSELF MUST MAKE AN EFFORT. The Tathagatas (*Buddhas*) are only preachers. The thoughtful who enter the way are freed from the bondage of *Mara*. 277. "All created things perish," he who knows and sees this becomes passive in pain; this is the way to purity. 280. He who does not rise when it is time to rise, who, though young and strong, is full of sloth, whose will and thought are weak, that lazy and idle man will never find the way to knowledge.

281. Watching his speech, well restrained in mind, let a man never commit any wrong with his body! Let a man but keep these three roads of action clear, and he will achieve the way which is taught by the wise. 282. Through zeal knowledge is gotten,, through lack of zeal knowledge is lost; let a man who knows this double path of gain and loss thus place himself that knowledge may grow. 283. Cut down the whole forest of lust, not the tree! From lust springs fear. When you have cut down every tree and

* [Jeremiah, xxiii., 28. † Colossians, i., 27. ‡ Isaiah, xxvi, 3.] || [St. John., xvii., 25.] ¶ [Proverbs, ii., 1-5.] ¶ [I have omitted verses 273-275.]

every shrub, then, Bhikshus, you will be free! 285. Cut out the love of self, like an autumn lotus, with thy hand! Cherish the road of peace. Nirvana has been shown by Sugata (Buddha).

286. "Here I shall dwell in the rain, here in winter and summer," thus meditates the fool, and does not think of his death. 287. Death comes and carries off that man, surrounded by children and flocks, his mind distracted, as a flood carries off a sleeping village. 288. Sons are no help, nor a father, nor relations; there is no help from kinsfolk for one whom Death has seized. 289. A wise and good man who knows the meaning of this, should quickly clear the way that leads to Nirvana.

CHAPTER XXI.—290. If by leaving a small pleasure one sees a great pleasure, let a wise man leave the small pleasure, and look to the great. 291. He who, by causing pain to others, wishes to obtain pleasure himself, he, entangled in the bonds of hatred, will never be free from hatred. 292. What ought to be done is neglected, what ought not to be done is done; the sins of unruly, thoughtless people are always increasing. 293. But they whose whole watchfulness is always directed to their body, who do not follow what ought not to be done, and who steadfastly do what ought to be done, the sins of such watchful and wise people will come to an end.

297. The disciples of Gotama are always well awake, and their thoughts day and night are always set on the Law. 298. The disciples of Gotama are always well awake, and their thoughts day and night are always set on the Church. 300. The disciples of Gotama are always well awake, and their mind day and night always delights in compassion.

CHAPTER XXII.—THE DOWNWARD COURSE. 306.* HE WHO SAYS WHAT IS NOT, GOES TO HELL; he also who, having done a thing, says I have not done it. After death both are equal, THEY ARE MEN WITH EVIL DEEDS IN THE NEXT WORLD. 307. Many men whose shoulders are covered with the orange gown are ill-conditioned and unrestrained; such evil-doers by their evil deeds go to hell.

311. As a grass blade, if badly grasped, cuts the arm, badly-practiced asceticism leads to hell. 312. An act carelessly performed, a broken vow, and hesitating obedience to discipline, all this brings no great reward. 313. If anything is to be done, let a man do it, let him attack it VIGOROUSLY! A careless pilgrim only

* I translate "niraya," the exit, the downward course, the evil path, by "hell," because the meaning assigned to that ancient mythological name by Christian writers comes so near to the Buddhist idea of "niraya," that it is difficult not to believe in some actual contact between these two streams of thought. See also *Mahabh.* xii., 7176—*Mueller's note.*

scatters the dust of his passions more widely. 314. An evil deed is better left undone, for a man repents of it afterward; a good deed is better done, for having done it, one does not repent. 315. Like a well-guarded frontier fort, with defenses within and without, so let a man guard himself. Not a moment should escape, for they who allow the right moment to pass, suffer pain when they are in hell.

316. They who are ashamed of what they ought not to be ashamed of, and are not ashamed of what they ought to be ashamed of, such men, embracing false doctrines, enter the evil path. 317. They who fear when they ought not to fear, and fear not when they ought to fear, such men, embracing false doctrines, enter the evil path. 318. They who forbid when there is nothing to be forbidden, and forbid not when there is something to be forbidden, such men, embracing false doctrines, enter the evil path. 319. They who know what is forbidden as forbidden, and what is not forbidden as not forbidden, such men, embracing the true doctrine, enter the good path.

CHAPTER XXIII.—THE ELEPHANT. 320. Silently shall I endure abuse as the elephant in battle endures the arrow sent from the bow: for the world is ill-natured. 321. A tamed elephant they lead to battle, THE KING* MOUNTS A TAMED ELEPHANT; the tamed is the best among men, he who silently endures abuse. 322. Mules are good, if tamed, and noble Sindhu horses, and elephants with large tusks; but he who tames himself is better still. 323. For with these animals does no man reach the untrodden country (Nirvana), where a tamed man goes on a tamed animal, namely on his own well-tamed self.

325. If a man becomes fat and a great eater, if he is sleepy and rolls himself about, that fool, like a hog fed on wash, is born again and again. 326. This mind of mine went formerly wandering about as it liked, as it listed, as it pleased; but I shall now hold it in thoroughly, as the rider who holds the hook holds in the furious elephant. 327. Be not thoughtless, watch your thoughts! Draw yourself out of the evil way, like an elephant sunk in mud.

328. If a man find a prudent companion who walks with him, is wise, and lives soberly, he may walk with him, overcoming all dangers, happy, but considerate. 329. If a man find no prudent companion who walks with him, is wise, and lives soberly, let him walk alone, like a king who has left his conquered country behind, —like a lonely elephant. 330. It is better to live alone, there is

*[I. Corinthians, iii., 16; St. John, xiv., 2.]

no companionship with a fool; let a man walk alone, let him commit no sin, with few wishes, like the lonely elephant.

331. If an occasion arises, friends are pleasant; enjoyment is pleasant if it is mutual; a good work is pleasant in the hour of death; the giving up of all grief is pleasant. 333. Pleasant is virtue lasting to old age, pleasant is a faith firmly rooted; pleasant is attainment of intelligence, pleasant is avoiding of sins.

CHAPTER XXIV.—THIRST. 334. The thirst of a thoughtless man grows like a creeper; he runs hither and thither, like a monkey seeking fruit in the forest. 335. Whom this fierce thirst overcomes, full of poison, in this world, his sufferings increase like the abounding Birana grass. 336. He who overcomes this fierce thirst, difficult to be conquered in this world, sufferings fall off from him, like water-drops from a lotus leaf. 337. This salutary word I tell you, as many as are here come together: "Dig up the root of thirst, as he who wants the sweet-scented Usira root must dig up the Birana grass, that Mara (the tempter) may not crush you again and again, as the stream crushes the reeds."

344. He who in a country without forests (*i. e.* after having reached Nirvāṇa) gives himself over to forest-life (*i. e.* to lust), and who, when removed from the forest (*i. e.* from lust), runs to the forest (*i. e.* to lust), look at that man! though free, he runs into bondage.* 345. Wise people do not call that a strong fetter which is made of iron, wood or hemp; far stronger is the care for precious stones and rings, for sons and a wife. 346. That fetter do wise people call strong which drags down, yields, but is difficult to undo: after having cut this at last, people enter upon their pilgrimage, free from cares, and leaving desires and pleasures behind. 347. Those who are slaves to passions, run up and down the stream (of desires) as a spider runs up and down the web which he has made himself; when they have cut this, people enter upon their pilgrimage,† free from cares, leaving desires and pleasures behind. 348. Give up what is before, give up what is behind, give up what is in the middle, when thou goest to the other shore of existence; if thy mind is altogether free, thou wilt not again enter into birth and decay.

354. The gift of the law exceeds all gifts; the sweetness of the law exceeds all sweetness; the delight in the law exceeds all de-

* This verse seems again full of puns, all connected with the twofold meaning of "vana," forest and lust. By replacing "forest" by "lust," we may translate: "He who, when free from lust, gives himself up to lust, who, when removed from lust runs into lust, look at that man," etc. "Nibbana," though with a short a, may be intended to remind the hearer of Nibbana.—*Mueller's note.* †[Hebrews, xi, 14.]

lights; the extinction of thirst overcomes all pain. 355. Pleasures destroy the foolish, if they look not for the other shore; the foolish by his thirst for pleasures destroys himself, as if he were his own enemy.

CHAPTER XXV.—THE BHIKSHU (MENDICANT). 360. Restraint in the eye is good, good is restraint in the ear, in the nose restraint is good, good is restraint in the tongue. 361. In the body restraint is good, good is restraint in speech, in thought restraint is good, good is restraint in all things. A Bhikshu, restrained in all things, is freed from all pain. 362. He who controls his hand, he who controls his feet, he who controls his speech, he who is well controlled, he who delights inwardly, who is collected, who is solitary and content, him they call Bhikshu. 363. The Bhikshu who controls his mouth, who speaks wisely and calmly, who teaches the meaning and the Law, his word is sweet.

364. He who dwells in the Law, delights in the Law, meditates on the Law, follows the Law, that Bhikshu will never fall away from the true Law. 365. Let him not despise what he has received, nor ever envy others: a mendicant who envies others does not obtain peace of mind. 366. A Bhikshu who, though he receives little, does not despise what he has received, even the gods will praise him, IF HIS LIFE IS PURE, AND IF HE IS NOT SLOTHFUL.

367. He who never identifies himself with his body and soul, and does not grieve over what is no more, he indeed is called a Bhikshu. 368. The Bhikshu who acts with kindness, who is calm in the doctrine of Buddha, will reach the quiet place (Nirvana), cessation of natural desires, and happiness. 369. O Bhikshu, empty this boat! if emptied, it will go quickly; having cut off passion and hatred, thou wilt go to Nirvana. 370. Cut off the five (senses), leave the five, rise above the five? A Bhikshu, who has escaped from the five fetters, he is called *Oghatinna*, "Saved from the flood."

371. Meditate, O Bhikshu, and be not heedless! Do not direct thy thought to what gives pleasure! that thou mayest not for thy heedlessness have to swallow the iron ball (in hell), and that thou mayest not cry out when burning, "This is pain." 372. Without knowledge there is no meditation, without meditation there is no knowledge: he who has knowledge and meditation is near unto Nirvana. 373. A Bhikshu who has entered his empty house, and whose mind is tranquil,* feels a more than human delight when he

* [Cf. § 466 (page 38 above).]

sees the law clearly. 374. As soon as he has considered the origin and destruction of the elements (*khandha*) of the body, he finds happiness and joy which belong to those who know the immortal (*Nirvana*).

375. And this is the beginning here for a wise *Bhikshu*: watchfulness over the senses, contentedness, restraint under the Law; keep noble friends whose life is pure, and who are not slothful. 376. Let him live in charity, let him be perfect in his duties; then in the fullness of delight he will make an end of suffering.

377. As the *Vassika*-plant sheds its withered flowers, men should shed passion and hatred, O ye *Bhikshus*! 379. Rouse thyself by thyself, examine thyself by thyself, thus self-protected and attentive wilt thou live happily, O *Bhikshu*! 380. For self is the lord of self, self is the refuge of self, therefore curb thyself as the merchant curbs a good horse. 381. The *Bhikshu*, full of delight, who is calm in the doctrine of *Buddha* will reach the quiet place (*Nirvana*), cessation of natural desires and happiness. 382. He who, even as a young *Bhikshu*, applies himself to the doctrine of *Buddha*, brightens up this world, like the moon when free from clouds.

CHAPTER XXVI.—THE *BRAHMANA*. 383. Stop the stream valiantly, drive away the desires, O *Brahmana*! When you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which was not made.* 384. If the *Brahmana* has reached the other shore in both laws (in restraint and contemplation), all bonds vanish from him who has obtained knowledge. 385. He for whom there is neither this nor that shore, nor both, him, the fearless and unshackled, I call indeed a *Brahmana*. 386. He who is thoughtful, blameless, settled, dutiful, without passions, and who has attained the highest end, him I call indeed a *Brahmana*. 387. The sun is bright by day, the moon shines by night, the warrior is bright in his armor, the *Brahmana* is bright in his meditation; but *Buddha*, the Awakened, is bright with splendor day and night.

388. Because a man is rid of evil, therefore he is called *Brahmana*; because he walks quietly, therefore he is called *Sramana*; because he has sent away his own impurities, therefore he is called *Pravragita* (a pilgrim). 389. No one should attack a *Brahmana*, but no *Brahmana* (if attacked) should let himself fly at his aggressor! Woe to him who strikes a *Brahmana*, more woe to him who flies at his aggressor! 390. It advantages a *Brahmana* not a little

* [Romans, i., 20.]

if he holds his mind back from the pleasures of life; when all wish to injure has vanished, pain will cease. 391. Him I call indeed a Brahmana who does not offend by body, word, or thought, and is controlled on these three points.*

392. After a man has once understood the Law as taught by the Well-awakened. (Buddha), let him worship it carefully, as the Brahmana worships the sacrificial fire. 393. A man does not become a Brahmana by his platted hair, by his family, or by both; in whom there is truth and righteousness, he is blessed, he is a Brahmana. 394. What is the use of platted hair, O fool! what of the raiment of goatskins? Within thee there is ravening, but the outside thou makest clean.†

399. He who, though he has committed no offense, endures reproach, bonds, and stripes, him, strong in endurance and powerful, I call indeed a Brahmana. 400. He who is free from anger, dutiful, virtuous, without weakness, and subdued, who has received his last body, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 401. He who does not cling to pleasures, like water on a lotus-leaf, like a mustard seed on the point of an awl, him I call indeed a Brahmana.

403. He whose knowledge is deep, who possesses wisdom, who knows the right way and the wrong, who has attained the highest end, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 404. He who keeps aloof both from laymen and from mendicants, goes to no house to beg, and whose desires are small, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 405. He who finds no fault with other beings, whether weak or strong, who does not kill nor cause slaughter, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 406. He who is tolerant with the intolerant, mild with fault-finders, free from passion among the passionate, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 407. He from whom anger and hatred, pride and envy have dropt like a mustard seed from the point of an awl, him I call indeed a Brahmana.

408. He who utters true speech, instructive and free from harshness, so that he offend no one, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 410. He who fosters no desires for this world or for the next, has no inclinations, and is unshackled, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 411. He who has no interests, and when he has understood (the truth), does not say How, how?‡—he who can dive into the Immortal, him

* [Cf. Zoroaster, Avesta, Vispered, ii., 9 (page 151 above).] † I have not copied the language of the Bible more than I was justified in. The words are "ab-bhantaran te gahanam, bahiram parimaggasi," interna est abyssus, externum mundas.—*Mueller's note*. ‡ [He who understands the Law, abides thereby, and follows no path but the path of virtue. He who foolishly asks how or why God established the Law, has not completely comprehended his own reason; else would he know that no answer is possible. It is the self-restrained "DOER OF WORK" (James, i., 25)—not the idle speculator—who has truly dived into the immortal.]

I call indeed a Brahmana. 414. He who has traversed this mazy, impervious world and its vanity, who is through, and has reached the other shore, is thoughtful, guileless, free from doubts, free from attachment, and content, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 415. He who, leaving all desires, travels about without a home, in whom ALL CONCUPISCENCE is extinct, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 416. He who, leaving all longings, travels about without a home, in whom ALL COVETOUSNESS is extinct, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 417. He who, after leaving all bondage to men, has risen above all bondage to the gods,* who is free from every bondage, him I call indeed a Brahmana. 423. He who knows his former abodes, who sees heaven and hell, has reached the end of births, is perfect in knowledge and a sage, he whose perfections are all perfect, him I call indeed a Brahmana.

§ 950.—Virtue, together with its main constituent VALOR (§ 729) has thus been forced to yield place to false devotion. (page 249, line 30.) *Mohammed*: see § 968.

Chapter IV.—Of the clue whereby Conscience can thread every Possible Labyrinth of Faith Ecclesiastical. (§§ 951-961 inclusive.)

§ 951.—Conscience is its own general and leader. (p. 250, l. 28.)

§ 952.—Conscientiousness is a state of consciousness which to possess is at all times our incumbent duty. (page 251, line 4.) Cf. §§ 2782, 2026, 2013. [Cf. Confucius, in the Doctrine of the Mean, xx., 18, (page 115 above); cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. x., pages 416, 420.]

§ 953.—Consciousness that any action I am about to perform is right, is in itself a most immediate and imperative duty. (page 251 line 13.) Cf. §§ 443, 444.

§ 954.—Conscience does not sit in judgment on actions, so as to decide whether they are cases falling under the moral law or beyond it; *that* is determined by reason. (page 251, line 29.) Cf. § 442. [Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 114.]

§ 955.—Want of conscientiousness exemplified by the inquisition. (page 252, line 14.) [*Bewray*: “Thy speech bewrayeth thee.” See Matthew (to whom Webster refers) xxvi., 73; Isaiah, xvi., 3.]

§ 956.—Want of consciousness exhibited by clerical superiors. (page 254, line 7.) [*Sciolist*: a pretender to science; “a smatterer,” Webster calls him.]

§ 957.—Begun to awake to freedom of cogitation. (p. 255, l. 14.)

§ 958.—PERIL arising out of the improbity of his profession—THE LESION OF CONSCIENCE. (page 256, line 6.) [*Molested*: heavily loaded or burdened.] *Lesion*: hurt, or injury. *Improbity*: want of rectitude of principle.—*Webster*.

* [Neither the hope of heaven nor the fear of hell is a moral motive. See § 228 (page 23 above).]

§ 959.—Real moral safety, viz.: that conscience be not violated. (page 256, line 28.)

§ 960.—Boldest preacher of belief must tremble. (p. 257, l. 18.)

§ 961.—Let us throw back an eye on the education given us in youth. (page 258, line 19.) [Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean., xx., 18, xxi., xxv. (pages 115, 116 above.)] [*Astræa*: The goddess of justice; lived on the earth during the golden age, and was the last of the immortals to leave the earth. See Anthon's Classical Dictionary; (ed. Harper, 1862, page 219).] Cf. § 504.

GENERAL SCHOLION.—MEANS OF GRACE. (§§ 962-983 inclusive.)

§ 962.—NATURE, in contradistinction from that good which (springing from preternatural aid) may be called GRACE. (page 259, line 2.) [*Gnomon*: (*gnonai*, i. e. to know) a brief reflection, or maxim; knowledge personified; an imaginary guardian, Webster has it of *gnome*.]

§ 963.—Impossibility of such superadded aid can not be evinced. (page 259, line 18.)

§ 964.—Touching the laws of any preternatural assistance, we are left altogether in the dark. (page 260, line 14.)

§ 965.—Arises the notion of means of grace. (page 261, line 9.)

§ 966.—Ceremonials that symbolically suggest to us our offices as servants of the Most HIGH, become confounded with those offices themselves. (page 261, line 30.)

§ 967.—Rites which have been found serviceable to rouse and sustain our attention to what is the true worship of God: (1) private prayer (§ 970); (2) assembling together in church (§ 977); (3) baptism (§ 978); (4) communion (§ 979). (page 262, line 17.)

§ 968.—Mankind have, in every variety of public faith, excogitated sundry usages as means of grace, although these last are not always (as has been the case with Christianity) related to the ideas of pure practical reason. (page 263, line 18.) *Mohammedan commandments*: cf. the following extracts from the Koran.*

* The text of the following extracts from the Koran is taken out of the English version of GEORGE SALE (Lippincott's edition, Philadelphia, 1871, of which the paging is hereinafter indicated by the letter S.), except in two places (xxxiii., 35; xl., 41-45) where I have preferred the translation of the Rev. J. M. RODWELL (Williams and Norgate's edition, London and Edinburgh, 1861, of which the paging is hereinafter marked by the letter R.), although I do not know Arabic. I have appended in seventeen instances a part (at least once the whole) of Rodwell's rendering, for which credit is in each case expressly given, and in one instance a reading (by Sale's editors) from Savary's French version. I am also under obligation to Rodwell for a parenthesis, with which I have punctuated Sale's translation of xxv., 68-71. The numbering of the chapters is according to Sale, and that of the verses according to Rodwell. The use of *italics* to distinguish (I suppose) Sale's amplifications, is retained, and also the SMALL CAPITALS which set forth the names of the Deity (GOD, the LORD).

XLVII.—IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 1. *God* will render of none effect the works of those who believe not, and *who* turn away *men* from the way of God: 2. but as to those who believe, AND WORK RIGHTEOUSNESS, and believe *the revelation* which hath been sent down unto Mohammed (for it is the truth from their LORD), he will expiate their evil deeds from them, and will dispose their heart aright. (The beginning of the xlvii. chapter, including the whole of the first two verses; S. 410; R. 489, 490.)

V., 18.*—Now is light and a perspicuous book of *revelations* come unto you from God. Thereby will God direct him who shall follow His good pleasure, into the paths of peace; and shall lead them out of darkness into light, by His will, and shall direct them in the right way. (v., last part of verse 18; S. 83, 84; R. 635.)

XL., 60.—The blind and the seeing shall not be held equal; nor they who believe AND WORK RIGHTEOUSNESS, and the evil doer: how few revolve *these things* in their mind! (xl., 60, S. 387; R. 300.)

XVII., 9.—Verily this Koran directeth unto *the way* which is most right, and declareth unto the faithful, 10. who do GOOD WORKS, that they shall receive a great reward; 11. and that for those who believe not in the life to come, we have prepared a grievous punishment. (xvii., 9–11 inclusive; S. 228; R. 191.)

V., 52.†—Unto every of you have we given a law, and an open path; 53. and if God had pleased, he had surely made you one people; but *he hath thought fit to give you different laws*, that he might try you in that which he hath given you *respectively*. Therefore STRIVE TO EXCEL each other IN GOOD WORKS: unto God shall ye all return, and *then* will he declare unto you that concerning which ye have disagreed. (v., last part of verse 52 and all of 53; S. 88; R. 640.)

X., 26.—God inviteth unto the dwelling of peace, and directeth whom he pleaseth into the right way. 27. They who DO RIGHT shall *receive* a most excellent *reward*, and a superabundant addition; neither blackness nor shame shall cover their faces. These *shall* be the inhabitants of paradise; they shall continue therein *forever*. 28. But they who commit evil *shall* receive the reward of evil, equal thereunto, and they shall be covered with shame, (*for* they shall have no protector against God); as though their faces were covered with the profound darkness of the night. These shall be the inhabitants of *hell* fire; they shall remain therein *forever*. (x., 26–28 inclusive; S. 168; R. 345, 346.)

* [I omit the first part of verse 18.] † [I omit the first part of verse 52.]

X., 9.—But as to those who believe, AND WORK RIGHTEOUSNESS, their LORD will direct them because of their faith; they shall have rivers flowing through gardens of pleasure. 10. Their prayer therein *shall be*, PRAISE BE UNTO THEE, O GOD! and their salutation therein *shall be* PEACE! 11. and the end of their prayer *shall be*, PRAISE BE UNTO GOD, THE LORD OF ALL CREATURES! (x., 9–11 inclusive; S. 166, 167; R. 343.)

IV., 33.—O true believers, consume not your wealth among yourselves in vanity; unless there be merchandizing among you by mutual consent: neither slay yourselves; for God is merciful toward you: 34. and whoever doth this maliciously and wickedly, he will surely cast him to be broiled in *hell* fire; and this is easy with God. (iv., 33, 34; S. 64; R. 534. R. has, “O believers! devour not each other’s substance in mutual frivolities; unless there be a trafficking among you by your own consent: and commit not suicide.”)

IV., 40.—Serve God, and associate no creature with him; and *show* kindness unto parents, and relations, and orphans, and the poor, and *your* neighbor who is of kin to you, and also *your* neighbor who is a stranger, and to *your* familiar companion, and the traveler, and *the captives* whom your right hands shall possess; for GOD LOVETH NOT THE PROUD or vain-glorious. 41. who are covetous, and recommend covetousness unto men, and conceal that which God of his bounty hath given them; (we have prepared a shameful punishment for the unbelievers;) 42. and who bestow their wealth *in charity* to be observed of men, and believe not in God, nor in the last day; and whoever hath Satan for a companion, an evil companion *hath he!* (iv., 40–42 inclusive; S. 65; R. 535.)

XIX., 94.—Verily there is none in heaven or on earth but shall approach the MERCIFUL *as his* servant. He encompasseth them *by his knowledge and power*, and numbereth them with an *exact* computation: 95. and they shall all come unto him on the day of resurrection, destitute *both of helpers and followers*. 96. But as for those who believe AND DO GOOD WORKS, the MERCIFUL will bestow on them love. (xix., 94–96 inclusive; S. 255; R. 135.)

II., 224.—MAKE NOT GOD THE OBJECT OF YOUR OATHS, that ye will deal justly, and be devout, and make peace among men; for God is he who heareth and knoweth. 225. God will not punish you for an inconsiderate word in your oaths; but he will punish you for that which your hearts have assented unto: God is merciful and gracious. (ii., 224, 225; S. 26; R. 462. R. reads as follows: Swear not by God, when ye make oath, that ye will be virtuous and fear God, and promote peace among men; for God is He who Heareth,

Knoweth. God will not punish you for a mistake in your oaths: but He will punish you for that which your hearts have done. God is Gracious, Merciful.)

VII., 53.—Call upon your LORD humbly and in secret; for he loveth not those who transgress. 54. And act not corruptly in the earth, after its reformation; and call upon him with fear and desire: for the mercy of God is near unto the righteous. (vii., 53, 54; S. 121; R. 374.)

XXII., 35.*—Your God is one God: wherefore resign yourselves *wholly* unto him. And do thou bear good tidings unto THOSE WHO HUMBLE THEMSELVES; 36. whose hearts, when mention is made of God, are struck with fear; and unto those WHO PATIENTLY ENDURE that which befalleth them; and who duly perform their prayers, and give alms out of what we have bestowed on them. (xxii., last part of verse 35 and all of verse 36; S. 277; R. 591.)

XIV., 36.—Speak unto my servants who have believed, that they be assiduous at prayer, and GIVE ALMS out of that which we have bestowed on them, *both* privately and in public; before the day cometh, wherein there shall be no buying nor selling, neither any friendship. (xiv., 36; S. 207; R. 278.)

IX., 60.—Alms *are to be distributed* only unto the poor, and the needy, and those who are employed in *collecting and distributing* the same, and unto those whose hearts *are* reconciled, and for the *redemption of captives*, and unto those who are in debt *and insolvent*, and for the advancement of God's religion, and unto the traveler. *This is an ordinance from God: and God is knowing and wise.* (ix., 60; S. 156; R. 620.)

III., 86.—Ye will never attain unto righteousness until ye give in alms of that which ye love: and whatever ye give, God knoweth it. (iii., 86; S. 47; R. 507.)

XVI., 92.—Verily GOD COMMANDETH JUSTICE, AND THE DOING OF GOOD, and the giving unto kindred *what shall be necessary*; AND HE FORBIDDETH WICKEDNESS, AND INIQUITY, AND OPPRESSION: he admonisheth you that ye may remember. (xvi., 92; S. 221; R. 248.)

VII., 28.—Say, My LORD hath commanded me *to observe* justice; therefore set your faces *to pray* at every place of worship, and call upon him, approving unto him the sincerity of *your* religion. As he produced you at first, *so unto him* shall ye return. A part of *mankind* hath he directed; and a part hath been justly led into error, because they have taken the devils for *their* patrons besides God, and imagine they are *rightly* directed. 29. O children of Adam, take your decent apparel at every place of worship, and eat and

* [I omit the first part of verse 35.]

drink, but be not guilty of excess; for he loveth not those who are guilty of excess. (vii., 28, 29; S. 118; R. 370.)

II., 172.—It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces *in prayer* toward the east and the west, but righteousness is of him who believeth in God and the last day, and the angels, and the scriptures, and the prophets; who giveth money for God's sake unto his kindred, and unto orphans, AND THE NEEDY, AND THE STRANGER, and those who ask, and for redemption of captives; who is constant at prayer, and giveth alms; AND OF THOSE WHO PERFORM THEIR COVENANT, when they have covenanted, AND WHO BEHAVE THEMSELVES PATIENTLY IN ADVERSITY, and hardships, and in time of violence: these are they who are true, and these are they who fear God. (ii., 172; S. 20, 21; R. 453, 454. R. reads, near the end of the verse, "these are they who are just.")

V., 11.—O true believers, OBSERVE JUSTICE when ye appear as witnesses before God, and let not hatred toward any induce you to do wrong: *but* act justly; this will approach nearer unto piety; and fear God, for God is fully acquainted with what ye do. 12. God hath promised unto those who believe, AND DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, that they shall receive pardon and a great reward. (v., 11, 12; S. 82; R. 633. R. reads, "O Believers! stand up as witnesses for God by righteousness: and let not ill-will at any, induce you not to act uprightly. Act uprightly. Next will this be to the fear of God. And fear ye God: verily, God is apprized of what ye do." v., verse 11.)

IV., 134.—O true believers, OBSERVE JUSTICE WHEN YE BEAR WITNESS before God, although *it be* against yourselves, or *your* parents, or relations, whether *the party* be rich, or *whether he be* poor; for God is more worthy than them both: therefore follow not *your own* lust *in bearing testimony* so that ye swerve *from justice*. And whether ye wrest *your evidence*, or decline *giving it*, God is well acquainted with that which ye do. (iv., 134; S. 76; R. 548, 549.)

XXXI., 13.—We have commanded man concerning his parents (his mother carrieth him *in her womb* with weakness and faintness, and he is weaned in two years), *saying*, Be grateful unto me, and to thy parents. Unto me shall all come *to be judged*. 14. But if *thy parents* endeavor to prevail on thee to associate with me that concerning which thou hast no knowledge, obey them not: bear them company in this world in what shall be reasonable; but follow the way of him who sincerely turneth unto me. Hereafter unto me shall ye return, and then will I declare unto you that which ye have done. (xxxi., 13, 14; S. 336; R. 332, 333.)

II., 184.—Consume not your wealth among yourselves in vain; nor present it unto judges, that ye may devour part of men's sub-

stance UNJUSTLY, against your own consciences. (ii., 184; S. 22; R. 456. R. has "among yourselves in vain things.")

II., 264.—They who lay out their substance for the religion of God, and afterward follow not what they have *so* laid out by reproaches or mischief, they shall have their reward with their LORD; upon them shall no fear come, neither shall they be grieved. 265. A fair speech and to forgive, is better than alms followed by mischief. God is rich and merciful. (ii., 264, 265; S. 32; R. 470.)

V.—IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 1. O true believers, perform your contracts.* (The opening words of the fifth chapter; S. 81; R. 631.)

IV., 61.—Moreover God commandeth you to RESTORE WHAT YE ARE TRUSTED WITH, to the owners: and when ye judge between men, that ye judge according to equity: and surely an excellent *virtue it is* to which God exhorteth you; for God *both* heareth and seeth. (iv., 61; S. 67, 68; R. 538.)

V., 42.—If a man or a woman STEAL, cut off their hands, in retribution for that which they have committed; *this is* an exemplary punishment *appointed* by God; and God is mighty *and* wise. 43. But whoever shall repent after his iniquity, AND AMEND, verily God will be turned unto him, for God *is* inclined to forgive, *and* merciful. (v. 42, 43; S. 86; R. 638.)

II., 277.—God shall take his blessing from usury, and shall increase alms: for God loveth no infidel, or ungodly person. But they who believe AND DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, and observe the stated times of prayer, and pay their legal alms, they shall have their reward with their LORD: there shall come no fear on them, neither shall they be grieved. 278. O true believers, fear God, and remit that which remaineth of usury, if ye *really* believe; 279. but if ye do it not, hearken unto war. *which is declared against you* from God and his apostle: yet if ye repent, ye shall have the capital of your money. Deal not unjustly *with others*, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly. 280. If there be any *debtor* under a difficulty of *paying his debt*, let *his creditor* wait till it be easy for *him to do it*; but if ye remit it as alms, it will be better for you, if ye knew it. 281. And fear the day wherein ye shall return unto God; then shall every soul be paid what it hath gained, and they shall not be treated unjustly. (ii., 277–281; S. 34; R. 472, 473.)

XXX., 37.—Give unto him who is of kin *to thee* his reasonable due; and also to the poor, and the stranger: this is better for those who seek the face of God; and they shall prosper. 38. Whatever

* [I omit the remainder of the first verse.]

ye shall give in usury,* to be an increase of men's substance, shall not be increased by *the blessing of God*: but whatever ye shall give in alms, for God's sake, they shall receive a two-fold *reward*." (xxx., 37, 38: S. 333; R. 257. R. reads the last words, "shall be doubled to you.")

IV., 122.†—Whoso doth evil shall be rewarded for it; and shall not find any patron or helper, beside God; 123. but whoso DOETH GOOD WORKS, whether he be male or female, and is a true believer; they shall be admitted into paradise, and shall not in the least be unjustly dealt with. (iv., last part of verse 122, and all of 123; S. 75; R. 547.)

IV., 172.—Unto those who believe, AND DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, he shall give their rewards, and shall *superabundantly* add unto them of his liberality: but those who are disdainful and proud, he will punish with a grievous punishment; 173. and they shall not find any to protect or to help them, besides God. 174. O men, now is an evident proof come unto you from your LORD, and we have sent down unto you manifest light. They who believe in God and firmly adhere to him, he will lead them into mercy from him, and abundance; and he will direct them in the right way to himself. (iv., 172–174 inclusive; S. 80; R. 553, 554.)

V., 92.—O true believers, surely wine, and lots, and images, and divining arrows, *are* an abomination of the work of Satan; therefore avoid them that ye may prosper. 93. Satan seeketh to sow dissension and hatred among you, by means of wine and lots, and to divert you from remembering God, and from prayer: will ye not therefore abstain *from them*? Obey God, and obey the apostle, and take heed *to yourselves*: but if ye turn back, know that the duty of our apostle is only to preach publicly. 94. In those who believe AND DO GOOD WORKS, it is no sin that they have tasted *wine or gaming before they were forbidden*; if they fear *God*, and believe, AND DO GOOD WORKS, and *shall for the future fear God*, and believe, and *shall persevere to fear him*, and *to do good*; for God loveth those who do good. (v., 92–94 inclusive; S. 93, 94; R. 647. R. reads verse 94 as follows: "No blame shall attach to those who believe and do good works, in regard to any food they have taken, in case they fear God and believe, and do the things that are right, and shall still fear God and believe, and shall still fear him, and do good; for God loveth those who do good.")

VI., 67.—When thou seest those who are engaged in *caviling at, or ridiculing* our signs, depart from them, until they be engaged in some other discourse: and if Satan cause thee to forget *this precept*,

* Or by way of bribe. The word may include any sort of extortion or illicit ain.—*Salé's note*. † [I omit the first part of verse 122.]

do not sit with the ungodly people after recollection. 68. They who fear *God* are not at all accountable for them, but *their duty is* to remember that they may take heed to themselves. 69. Abandon those who make their religion a sport and a jest; and whom the present life hath deceived: and admonish *them by the Koran*, that A SOUL BECOMETH LIABLE TO DESTRUCTION FOR THAT WHICH IT COMMITTETH: it shall have no patron nor intercessor besides God; and if it could pay the utmost price of redemption, it would not be accepted from it.* (vi., 67, 68, and the first part of verse 69; S. 104; R. 407. 408.) R. reads verse 68 as follows: "Not that they who fear God are to pass any judgment upon them, but the *object of* recollection is that they may *continue to* fear Him.")

IV., 107.—Dispute not for those who deceive one another, for God loveth not him who is a deceiver or unjust. 108. *Such* conceal themselves from men, but they conceal not themselves from God; for he is with them when they imagine by night a saying which pleaseth *him* not, and God comprehendeth what they do. 109. Behold, ye are they who have disputed for them in this present life; but who shall dispute with God for them on the day of resurrection, or who will become their patron? 110. yet he who doth evil, or injureth his own soul, and afterward asketh pardon of God, shall find God gracious and merciful. 111. Whoso committeth wickedness, committeth it against his own soul: God is knowing and wise. 112. And whoso committeth a sin or iniquity, and afterward layeth it on the innocent, he shall surely bear *the guilt of* calumny and manifest injustice. (iv., 107–112 inclusive; S. 73, 74; R. 545, 546. R. reads the first clause of verse 107, "And plead not with us for those who are self-deceivers." R. reads verse 112 as follows: "And whoever committeth an *involuntary* fault or a crime, and then layeth it on the innocent, shall surely bear *the guilt of* calumny and of a manifest crime.")

VI., 152.—Say, Come; I will rehearse that which your LORD hath forbidden you; *that is to say*, that ye be not guilty of idolatry, and *that ye show* kindness to *your* parents, and that ye murder not your children *for fear* lest ye be reduced to poverty: we will provide for you and them; and DRAW NOT NEAR UNTO HEINOUS CRIMES, neither openly nor in secret; and SLAY NOT the soul which God hath forbidden *you to slay*, unless for a just cause. This hath he enjoined you that ye may understand. 153. And MEDDLE NOT WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ORPHAN, otherwise than for the improving *thereof*, until he attain his age of strength: and USE A FULL MEASURE, AND A JUST BALANCE. We will not impose a task on

* [I omit the last part of verse 69.]

any soul beyond its ability. And when ye pronounce *judgment* OBSERVE JUSTICE, although it be *for or against* one who is near of kin, and fulfil the covenant of GOD. This hath *God* commanded you, that ye may be admonished; 154. and *that ye may know* that this is my RIGHT WAY: therefore follow it, and follow not the path of *others*, lest ye be scattered from the path of *God*. This hath he commanded you that ye may take heed. (vi., 152–154 inclusive; S. 114, 115; R. 419, 420. Instead of “heinous crimes” etc., in verse 152, R. reads, “and that ye come not near to pollutions, outward or inward.” S. says that “the original word signifies peculiarly fornication and avarice.”)

VII., 31.—Say, Verily MY LORD HATH FORBIDDEN FILTHY ACTIONS, both that which is discovered thereof, and that which is concealed, and also iniquity, and unjust violence; and *hath forbidden you* to associate with GOD that concerning which he hath sent you down no authority, or to speak of GOD that which ye know not. (vii., 31; S. 118, 119; R. 371.)

XVIII., 23—Say not of any matter, I WILL SURELY DO THIS TOMORROW; unless *thou add*, IF GOD PLEASE. And remember thy LORD, when thou forgettest, and say, My LORD is able to direct me with ease, that I may draw near unto *the truth of this matter* rightly. (xviii., 23; S. 240; R. 214, 215.)

XVII., 16.—He who shall be *rightly* directed, shall be directed to *the advantage* only of his own soul; and he who shall err shall err only against the same: neither shall any laden *soul* be charged with the burden of another.* (xvii., part of the 16th verse; S. 228, 229; R. 192.)

IV., 88.—When ye are saluted with a salutation, salute *the person* with a better salutation, or *at least* return the same; for GOD taketh an account of all things. (iv., 88; S. 71; R. 541.)

IV., 147.—GOD LOVETH NOT THE SPEAKING ILL of *any one* in public, unless he who is injured *call for assistance*; and GOD heareth and knoweth: 148. whether ye publish a good *action*, or conceal it. or forgive evil, verily GOD is gracious *and* powerful. (iv., 147, 148; S. 78; R. 550.)

VII., 198.—Use indulgence, and command that which is just, and withdraw far from the ignorant. 199. And if an evil suggestion from Satan be suggested unto thee, *to divert thee from thy duty*, have recourse unto GOD: for he heareth *and* knoweth. (vii., 198, 199; S. 137, 138; R. 393.)

IX., 72.—And the faithful men, and the faithful women, are friends one to another: THEY COMMAND THAT WHICH IS JUST, AND

* [I omit the last part of verse 16.]

THEY FORBID THAT WHICH IS EVIL; and they are constant at prayer, and pay their appointed alms; and they obey God and his apostle: unto these will God be merciful; for he *is* mighty and wise. 73. God promiseth unto the true believers, both men and women, gardens through which rivers flow, wherein they shall remain for ever; and delicious dwellings in the gardens of perpetual abode: but good will from God *shall be their* most excellent reward. This *will be* great felicity. (ix., 72, 73; S. 157; R. 622. R. reads at the close of the 73d verse, "But best of all will be God's good pleasure in them. This will be the great bliss.")

XI., 113.—But unto everyone of them will thy LORD render *the reward of* their works; for he well knoweth that which they do. 114. Be thou steadfast, therefore, as thou hast been commanded; and *let him also be steadfast* who shall be converted with thee; and transgress not; for he seeth that which ye do. 115. And incline not unto those who act unjustly, lest the fire of *hell* touch you: for ye have no protectors, except God; neither shall ye be assisted *against him*. 116. Pray regularly morning and evening; and in the former part of the night, for good *works* drive away evils. This is an admonition unto those who consider: 117. wherefore persevere with patience; for God suffereth not the reward of the righteous to perish. (xi., 113–117 inclusive; S. 186; R. 273.)

XIII., 19.*—The prudent only will consider; 20. who fulfil the covenant of GOD, and break not *their* contract; 21. and who join that which GOD hath commanded to be joined,† and *who* fear their LORD, and dread an ill account; 22. and who persevere out of a *sincere* desire to please their LORD, and observe the stated times of prayer, and give alms out of what we have bestowed on them, in secret and openly, AND WHO TURN AWAY EVIL WITH GOOD: the reward of these *shall be* paradise, 23. gardens of eternal abode, which they shall enter, and *also* WHOEVER SHALL HAVE ACTED UPRIGHTLY, of their fathers, and their wives, and their posterity: and the angels shall go in unto them by every gate, 24. *saying*, PEACE BE UPON YOU, BECAUSE YE HAVE ENDURED WITH PATIENCE; how excellent a reward is paradise! (xiii., last clause of the 19th verse, and verses 20–24 inclusive; S. 202; R. 425.)

XVII., 24.—Thy LORD hath commanded that ye WORSHIP NONE BESIDES HIM; and *that ye show* kindness unto *your* parents, whether the one of them, or both of them attain to old age with thee. Wherefore, say not unto them, Fie on you! neither reproach

*[I omit the first part of verse 19.] † By believing in all the prophets without exception, AND JOINING THERETO THE CONTINUAL PRACTICE OF THEIR DUTY, both toward God and man.—Sale's note.

them, but speak respectfully unto them; 25. and submit to behave humbly toward them, out of tender affection, and say, O LORD, have mercy on them both, as they nursed me *when I was little*. 26. Your LORD well knoweth that which is in your souls; whether ye be men of integrity: 27. and he will be gracious unto those who sincerely return *unto him*. 28. AND GIVE unto him who is of kin *to you* his due, and *also* unto the poor, and the traveler. AND WASTE NOT *thy substance* profusely: 29. for the profuse are brethren of the devils: and the devil was ungrateful unto his LORD. 30. But if thou turn from them, in expectation of the mercy which thou hopest from thy LORD; *at least*, speak kindly unto them. 31. And let not thy hand be tied up to thy neck; neither open it with an unbounded expansion,* lest thou become worthy of reprehension, and be reduced to poverty. 32. Verily thy LORD will enlarge the store of whom he pleaseth, and will be sparing *unto whom he pleaseth*; for he knoweth and regardeth his servants. 33. KILL NOT YOUR CHILDREN for fear of being brought to want; we will provide for them and for you: verily the killing them is a great sin. 34. DRAW NOT NEAR UNTO FORNICATION; for it is wickedness, and an evil way. (xvii., 24-34 inclusive; S. 229, 230; R. 193, 194.)

XVII., 36.—AND MEDDLE NOT WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ORPHAN, unless it be to improve it, until he attain his age of strength: and perform *your covenant*; for the *performance of your covenant* shall be inquired into *hereafter*. 37. AND GIVE FULL MEASURE, when you measure *ought*; AND WEIGH WITH A JUST BALANCE. This will be better, and more easy for determining *every man's due*. 38. And follow not that whereof thou hast no knowledge; for the hearing, and the sight, and the heart, every of these shall be examined *at the last day*. 39. WALK NOT PROUDLY in the land, for thou canst not cleave the earth, neither shalt thou equal the mountains in stature. 40. All this is evil, *and* abominable in the sight of thy LORD. 41. These *precepts are a part* of the wisdom which thy LORD hath revealed unto thee. Set up not any other god *as equal* unto God, lest thou be cast into hell, reprov'd *and* rejected. (xvii., 36-41 inclusive; S. 230; R. 194.)

XVIII., 29.—As to those who believe, AND DO GOOD WORKS, we will not suffer the reward of him who shall work righteousness to perish. (xviii., 29; S. 241; R. 216.)

XVIII., 107.—But *as for* those who believe AND DO GOOD WORKS, they shall have the gardens of paradise for their abode; 108. they

* That is, Be neither niggardly nor profuse, but observe the mean between the two extremes, wherein consists true liberality.—Sale's note.

shall remain therein forever; they shall wish for no change therein. 109. Say, If the sea were ink to *write* the words of my LORD, verily the sea would fail, before the words of my LORD would fail; although we added *another sea* like unto it as a further supply. 110. Say, Verily I am only a man as ye are. It is revealed unto me that your God is one only God: let him therefore who hopeth to meet his LORD work a righteous work; and let him not make any other to partake in the worship of his LORD. (xviii., 107-110; S. 248; R. 224.)

XIX., 59.*—When the signs of the MERCIFUL were read unto them, they fell down, worshipping, and wept: 60. but a succeeding generation have come after them, who neglect prayer, and follow *their* lusts; and they shall surely fall into evil: 61. except him who repenteth, and believeth, AND DOETH THAT WHICH IS RIGHT; these shall enter paradise, and they shall not in the least be wronged: 62. gardens of perpetual abode *shall be their reward*, which the MERCIFUL hath promised unto his servants, as an object of faith; for his promise will surely come *to be fulfilled*. 63. Therein shall they hear no vain discourse, but peace; and their provision shall be prepared for them therein morning and evening. (xix., last part of verse 59, and verses 60-63; S. 252, 253; R. 132, 133.)

XXV., 64.—The servants of the MERCIFUL are THOSE WHO WALK MEEKLY on the earth, and when the ignorant speak unto them, *answer*, Peace:† 65. and who pass the night adoring their LORD, and standing up *to pray unto him*; 66. and who say, O LORD, avert from us the torment of hell, for the torment thereof *is* perpetual; verily the same is a miserable abode and *a wretched* station: 67. and who, when they bestow, are neither profuse nor niggardly; but *observe* a just medium between these; 68. and who invoke not another god together with *the true* God; neither slay the soul which God hath forbidden *to be slain*, unless for a just cause: and who are not guilty of fornication. (But he who shall do this shall meet the reward of *his* wickedness: 69. *his* punishment shall be doubled unto him on the day of resurrection; and he shall remain therein, covered with ignominy, *for ever*: 70. except him who shall repent and believe, AND SHALL WORK A RIGHTEOUS WORK; unto them will God change their *former* evils into good; for God is ready to forgive, *and* merciful. 71. And whoever repenteth, AND DOETH THAT WHICH IS RIGHT; verily HE turneth unto God with an *acceptable* conversion.). 72. AND THEY WHO DO NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS; and

* [I omit the first part of verse 59.] † This is intended here, not as a salutation, but as a waiving all further discourse and communication with the idolators.—*Sale's note*.

when they pass by vain discourse, pass by the same with decency; 73. and who, when they are admonished by the signs of their LORD, fall not down *as if they were* deaf and blind, *but stand up and are attentive* thereto: 74. and who say, O LORD, grant us of our wives and our offspring such as may be the satisfaction of *our* eyes; and make us patterns unto those who fear *thee*. 75. These shall be rewarded with the highest apartments *in paradise*, BECAUSE THEY HAVE PRESEVERED WITH CONSTANCY; and they shall meet therein with greeting and salutation; 76. they shall remain in the same for ever: it shall be an excellent abode, and a *delightful* station. (xxv., 64–76 inclusive; S. 300, 301; R. 188–190. I am indebted to Rodwell for the parenthesis in which I have enclosed the last clause of verse 68 and the whole of verses 69–71 inclusive.)

XXIII., 53.—O apostles, eat of those things which are good; AND WORK RIGHTEOUSNESS: for I well know that which ye do. 54. This your religion is one religion; and I am your LORD: wherefore fear me. (xxiii., 53, 54; S. 283; R. 166, 167.)

XXVIII., 51.—And now have we caused *our* word to come unto them, that they may be admonished. 52. They unto whom we have given the scriptures *which were revealed* before it, believe in the same; 53. and when it is read unto them, say, We believe therein; it is certainly the truth from our LORD: verily we were Moslems before this. 54. These shall receive their reward twice, because they have persevered, AND REPEL EVIL BY GOOD, and distribute *alms* out of that which we have bestowed on them; 55. and when they hear vain discourse, avoid the same, saying, We have our works, and ye have your works; peace be on you; we covet not the acquaintance of the ignorant. (xxviii., 51–55 inclusive; S. 321; R. 309. R. reads the 52d verse, “They to whom we gave the scriptures before IT, do in IT believe.”)

XXVIII., 83.—*As to* this future mansion *of paradise*, we will give it unto them who seek not to exalt themselves in the earth, or to do wrong; for the *happy* issue shall attend the pious. 84. Whoso DOETH GOOD shall receive a reward which shall exceed the merit thereof: but *as to him* who doth evil, they who work evil shall be rewarded *according to the merit* only of that which they shall have wrought. (xxviii., 83, 84; S. 324; R. 313.)

XXIX., 44.—Rehearse that which hath been revealed unto thee of the book *of the Koran*: and be constant at prayer; for prayer preserveth *a man* from filthy crimes, and *from* that which is blamable; and the remembering of God is surely a most important *duty*. God knoweth that which ye do. 45. Dispute not against those who have received the scriptures, unless in the mildest manner:

except against such of them as behave injuriously *toward you*: and say, We believe in the *revelation* which hath been sent down unto us, and *also in that which* hath been sent down unto you; our God and your God is one, and unto him are we resigned. (xxix., 44, 45; S. 328; R. 327, 328. R. reads in the middle of the 45th verse, "We believe in what hath been sent down to us and hath been sent down to you.")

XXIX., 57.—Every soul shall taste death: afterward shall ye return unto us; 58. and *as for* those who shall have believed, AND WROUGHT RIGHTEOUSNESS, we will surely lodge them in the higher apartments of paradise; rivers shall flow beneath them, *and* they shall continue therein for ever. How excellent *will be* the reward of the WORKERS of *righteousness*; 59. who persevere with patience, and put their trust in their LORD! (xxix., 57–59; S. 329; R. 329.)

XXXI, 15.—Oh my son, verily *every matter, whether good or bad*, though it be of the weight of a grain of mustard-seed, and be *hidden* in a rock, or in the heavens, or in the earth, God will bring the same *to light*; for God *is* clear-sighted *and* knowing. 16. Oh my son, be constant at prayer, and command that which is just, and forbid that which is evil: and be patient under the *afflictions* which shall befall thee; for this *is* a duty absolutely incumbent *on all men*. 17. Distort not thy face *out of contempt* to men, neither walk in the earth with insolence; for God loveth no arrogant, vain-glorious person. (xxxi., 15–17 inclusive; S. 336, 337; R. 333.)

XXXIII., 35.—Truly the men who resign themselves to God (Muslims), and the women who resign themselves, and the believing men and the believing women, and the devout men and the devout women, and the men of truth, and the women of truth, and the patient men and the patient women, and the humble men and the humble women, and the men who give alms and the women who give alms, and the men who fast and the women who fast, and the chaste men and the chaste women, and the men and the women who oft remember God: for them hath God prepared forgiveness and a rich recompense. (xxxiii., 35; R. 566, the above is Rodwell's version; S. 346.)

XXXIX., 9.—If ye be ungrateful, verily God hath no¹ need of you; yet he liketh not ingratitude in his servants: but if ye be thankful, he will be well pleased with you. A burdened *soul* shall not bear the burden of another: hereafter shall ye return unto your LORD, and he shall declare unto you that which ye have wrought, *and will reward you accordingly*; 10. for he knoweth the innermost parts of *your* breasts. (xxxix., 9, 10; S. 377; R. 315.)

XL., 41.—And he who believed said, "O my¹ people! follow me: into the right way will I guide you. 42. O my people! this pres-

ent life is only a passing joy, but the life to come is the mansion that abideth. 43. Whoso shall have wrought evil shall not be recompensed but with its like; but WHOSO SHALL HAVE DONE THE THINGS THAT ARE RIGHT, whether male or female, and is a believer—these shall enter paradise: good things unreckoned shall they enjoy therein. 44. And, O my people! how is it that I bid you to salvation, but that ye bid me to the fire? 45. Ye invite me to deny God, and to join with him gods of whom I know nothing; but I invite you to the Mighty, the Forgiving. (xl., 41–45 inclusive; R. 298, the version above is Rodwell's; S. 386.)

L XL., 30.—*As for those who say, Our LORD is God, and who BEHAVE UPRIGHTLY; the angels shall descend unto them, and shall say, Fear not, neither be ye grieved; but rejoice in the hopes of paradise which ye have been promised. 31. We are your friends in this life, and in that which is to come: therein shall ye have that which your souls shall desire, and therein shall ye obtain whatever ye shall ask for; 32. as a gift from a gracious and merciful God. 33. Who speaketh better than he who inviteth unto God, AND WORKETH RIGHTEOUSNESS, and saith, I am a Moslem? 34. Good and evil shall not be held equal. Turn away evil WITH THAT WHICH IS BETTER; and behold, the man between whom and thyself there was enmity shall become, as it were, thy warmest friend: 35. but none shall attain to this perfection, except they who are patient; nor shall any attain thereto, except he who is indued with a great happiness of temper. 36. And if a malicious suggestion be offered unto thee from Satan, have recourse unto God; for it is he who heareth and knoweth.* (xli., 30–36 inclusive; S. 391; R. 231.)

XLi., 46.—HE WHO DOETH RIGHT, *doth it to the advantage of his own soul; and he who doth evil, doth it against the same: for thy LORD is not unjust toward his servants.* (xli., 46; S. 392; R. 233.)

XLII., 23.*—If God pleaseth, he will seal up thy heart: and God will absolutely abolish vanity, and will establish the truth in his words; for he knoweth the innermost part of *men's* breasts. 24. *It is he who accepteth repentance from his servants, and forgiveth sins, and knoweth THAT WHICH YE DO.* 25. He will incline his ear unto those who believe AND WORK RIGHTEOUSNESS, and will add unto them *above what they shall ask or deserve*, of his bounty: but the unbelievers shall suffer a severe punishment. (xlii., last part of the 23d verse, and the whole of verses 24, 25; S. 395; R. 338, 339.)

XLII., 34.—Whatever things are given you, *they are* the provision of this present life: but the *reward* which is with God is better, and more durable, for those who believe, and put their trust

* [I omit the first part of verse 23.]

in their LORD; 35. AND WHO AVOID HEINOUS AND FILTHY CRIMES, AND WHEN THEY ARE ANGRY, FORGIVE; 36. and who hearken unto their LORD, and are constant at prayer, and whose affairs *are directed by consultation among themselves*, and who give *alms* out of what we have bestowed on them; (xlii., 34–36; S. 396; R. 339, 340.)

XLII., 39.—And whoso shall avenge himself, after he hath been injured; as to these, it is not lawful to punish them *for it*: 40. but it is only lawful to punish those who wrong men, and act insolently in the earth, against justice; these shall suffer a grievous punishment. 41. AND WHOSO BEARETH *injuries* PATIENTLY, AND FORGIVETH; verily this is a necessary work. (xlii., 39–41; S. 396; R. 340.)

XLIX., 9.—If two parties of the believers contend with one another, do ye *endeavor to compose* the matter between them: and if the one of them offer an insult unto the other, fight against that *party* which offered the insult, until they return unto the judgment of God; and if they do return, MAKE PEACE between them with equity: and act with justice; for God loveth those who act justly. 10. Verily the true believers are brethren; wherefore reconcile your brethren; and fear God, that ye may obtain mercy. (xlix, 9, 10; S. 418; R. 609. R. reads at the beginning of verse 10, “Only the faithful are brethren; wherefore make peace between your brethren;” etc.)

XLIX., 11.—O true believers, let not men laugh *other* men to scorn; who peradventure may be better than themselves: neither let women laugh *other* women to scorn; who may possibly be better than themselves. Neither defame one another; nor call one another by *opprobrious* appellations. An ill name *it is to be charged with* wickedness, after *having embraced* the faith: and whoso repenteth not, they will be the unjust doers. 12. O true believers, carefully avoid *entertaining* a suspicion of *another*: for some suspicions *are* a crime. Inquire not too curiously *into other men's failings*: neither let the one of you speak ill of another in his absence. Would any of you desire to eat the flesh of his dead brother? Surely ye would abhor it. And fear God; for God *is* easy to be reconciled, and merciful. (xlix., 11, 12; S. 418, 419; R. 609; 610.)

LVIII., 10.—O true believers, when ye discourse privily together, DISCOURSE NOT OF WICKEDNESS, and enmity, and disobedience toward the apostle; but discourse of justice and piety: and fear God, before whom ye shall be assembled. 11. Verily the clandestine discourse *of the infidels proceedeth* from Satan, that he may grieve the true believers: but there shall be none to hurt them in the least, unless by the permission of God; wherefore, in God let the faithful trust. (lviii., 10, 11; S. 442; R. 585. In this

place is a note appended to Sale's version by the editors, giving Savary's reading of the opening of the 11th verse, as follows, "The clandestine assemblies are prompted by Satan." Rodwell reads, "Only of Satan is this clandestine talk.")

LXXXIX., 14.—Moreover man, when his LORD trieth him *by prosperity*, and honoreth him, and is bounteous unto him, 15. saith, My LORD honoreth me; 16. but when he proveth him *by afflictions*, and withholdeth his provisions from him, 17. he saith, My LORD despiseth me, 18. By no means:* but YE honor not the orphan, 19. neither do ye excite *one another* to FEED THE POOR; 20. and ye devour the inheritance *of the weak*, with undistinguishing greediness, 21. and ye love riches with much affection. (lxxxix., 14–21 inclusive; S. 489; R. 45, 46.)

LXXV., 20.—But ye love that which hasteneth away, 21. and neglect the life to come. 22. *Some* countenances on that day *shall be* bright, 23. looking toward their LORD: 24. and *some* countenances, ON THAT DAY, *shall be* dismal: 25. they shall think that a crushing calamity shall be brought upon them. (lxxv., 20–25 inclusive; S. 473; R. 47.)

XCIII., 3.—Thy LORD hath not forsaken thee, neither doth he hate thee. 4. Verily the life to come *shall be* better for thee than this present life: 5. and thy LORD shall give thee *a reward* where-with thou shalt be well pleased. 6. Did he not find thee an orphan, and hath he not taken care *of thee*? 7. And did he not find thee wandering in error, and hath he not guided *thee into the truth*? 8. And did he not find thee needy, and hath he not enriched *thee*? 9. Wherefore, oppress not the orphan: 10. neither repulse the beggar: 11. but declare the goodness of thy LORD. (xciii., 3–11, being the whole chapter except the first two verses; S. 492; R. 9, 10.)

II., 89.†—GOD knoweth the WICKED DOERS; 90. and thou shalt surely find them of all men the most covetous of life, even *more* than the idolaters: one of them would desire his life to be prolonged a thousand years, but none shall reprieve himself from punishment, that his life may be prolonged: GOD seeth that which they do. (ii., last clause of the 89th verse and the whole of the 90th; S. 13; R. 442.)

III., 109.—Yet they are not *all* alike: there are of those who have received the scriptures, upright people; they meditate on the signs of God in the night season, and worship; 110. they believe in God, and the last day; AND COMMAND THAT WHICH IS JUST, AND FORBID

* For worldly prosperity or adversity is not a certain mark either of the favor or disfavor of God.—Sale's note. †[I omit the first part of the 89th verse.]

THAT WHICH IS UNJUST, and zealously strive to *excel* in good works; these are of the righteous. 111. And ye shall not be denied *the reward* of the good which ye do; for God knoweth the pious. (iii., 109–111 inclusive; S. 49; R. 509, 510.)

XXIX.—IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 1.* Do men imagine that it shall be sufficient for them to say, We believe; WILL THEY NOT BE PROVED? 2. We heretofore proved those who *were* before them; for God will surely know them who are sincere, and he will surely know the liars. 3. Do THEY WHO WORK EVIL think that they shall prevent us *from taking vengeance on them*? An ill judgment do they make. 4. Whoso hopeth to meet God, verily God's appointed time will certainly come; and he *both* heareth *and* knoweth. 5. Whoever striveth to *promote the true religion*, striveth for *the advantage of* his own soul; for God needeth not any of *his* creatures: 6. and *as to those* who believe AND WORK RIGHTEOUSNESS, we will expiate their evil deeds from them; and we will give them a reward according to the utmost merit of their actions. 7. We have commanded man to *show* kindness toward his parents: but if they endeavor to prevail with thee to associate with me that concerning which thou hast no knowledge, obey them not. Unto me shall ye return; and I will declare unto you WHAT YE HAVE DONE. 8. Those who shall believe, AND SHALL WORK RIGHTEOUSNESS, we will surely introduce *into paradise*, among the upright. (xxix., verse 1, except the introductory letters, and all of verses 2–8 inclusive; S. 325; R. 322, 323.)

II., 75.—Verily whoso doth evil, and is encompassed by his iniquity, they *shall be* the companions of *hell* fire, they shall remain therein for ever: 76. but they who believe AND DO GOOD WORKS, they shall be the companions of *paradise*, they shall continue therein for ever. (ii., 75, 76; S. 11; R. 439.)

LXXXIII.—IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 1. Woe be unto THOSE WHO GIVE SHORT MEASURE OR WEIGHT: 2. who, when they receive by measure from *other* men, take the full; 3. but when they measure unto them, or weigh unto them, defraud! 4. Do not these think they shall be raised again, 5. at the great day, 6. the day whereon mankind shall stand before the LORD of all creatures? (lxxxiii., 1–6 inclusive; S. 482; R. 48, 49.)

III., 20.—And unto those who believe not in the signs of God, and slay the prophets without a cause, and put those men to death who teach JUSTICE; denounce unto them a painful punishment. 21. These are they whose works perish in this world, and in that which is to come; and they shall have none to help them. (iii., 20, 21; S. 37; R. 497.)

* [I omit the introductory letters.]

XLIII., 35.—Whoever shall withdraw from the admonition of the MERCIFUL, we will chain a devil unto him; and he shall be his inseparable companion. (xliii., 35; S. 398, 399; R. 152.)

IV., 21.—Verily repentance *will be accepted* with God, from those who do EVIL ignorantly, and then repent speedily; unto them will God be turned: for God is knowing and wise. 22. But no repentance *shall be accepted* from those who do evil until *the time* when death presenteth itself unto one of them, *and he saith*, Verily I repent now; nor unto those who die unbelievers; for them have we prepared a grievous punishment. (iv., 21, 22; S. 62; R. 531, 532.)

XVIII., 44.—Wealth and children *are* the ornament of this present life: but good *works*, which are permanent, *are* better in the sight of thy LORD, with respect to the reward, and better with respect to hope. 45. On a *certain* day we will cause the mountains to pass away, and thou shalt see the earth appearing plain *and even*; and we will gather *mankind* together, and we will not leave any one of them behind. 46. And they shall be set before thy LORD in *distinct* order, *and he shall say unto them*, Now are ye come unto us *naked*, as we created you the first time: but ye thought that we should not perform *our* promise unto you. 47. And the book *wherein every one's actions are recorded* shall be put *into his hand*; and thou shalt see THE WICKED in great terror, because of that which *is written* therein, and they shall say, Alas for us! what *meaneth* this book? it omitteth neither a small *action* nor a great *one*, but it compriseth the same; and they shall find THAT WHICH THEY HAVE WROUGHT, present *before their eyes*: and thy LORD will not deal unjustly with any one. (xviii., 44–47 inclusive; S. 242, 243; R. 217, 218.)

XX., 107.—ON THAT DAY *mankind* shall follow *the angel* who will call *them to judgment*, none shall *have power* to turn aside from him; and *their voices* shall be low before the MERCIFUL, neither shalt thou hear any more than the hollow sound of *their feet*. 108. On that day, the intercession of *none* shall be of advantage *unto another*, except *the intercession* of him to whom the MERCIFUL shall grant permission, and who shall be acceptable unto him in what he saith. 109. *God* knoweth that which is before them, and that which is behind them; but they comprehend not the same by *their knowledge*: 110. and their faces shall be HUMBLED BEFORE THE LIVING, THE SELF-SUBSISTING *God*; and he shall be wretched who shall bear *his iniquity*. 111. BUT WHOSOEVER SHALL DO GOOD WORKS, being a true believer, shall not fear any injustice, or any diminution of *his reward from God*. 112. And thus have we sent down *this book*, *oeing* a Koran in the Arabic tongue; and we

have inserted various threats and promises therein, that *men* may fear *God*, or that it may awaken some consideration in them: 113. wherefore, let *God* be highly exalted, the King, the Truth!* (xx., 107–112 inclusive, and the first part of verse 113; S. 262, 263; R. 106. R. reads the 109th and 110th verses as follows: “He knoweth their future and their past; but in their own knowledge they comprehend it not:—And humble shall be their faces before Him that Liveth, the Self-subsisting: and undone be, who shall bear the burden of iniquity;”)

LXXVI., 4.—Verily we have prepared for the unbelievers chains, and collars, and burning fire. 5. But the JUST shall drink of a cup of wine, mixed with the water of Cafur, 6. a fountain whereof the servants of *God* shall drink; they shall convey the same by channels whithersoever they please. 7. These fulfil their vow, and dread THE DAY, the evil whereof will disperse itself far abroad; 8. and give food unto the poor, and the orphan, and the bondman, for his sake, 9. saying, We feed you for *God’s* sake only: we desire no recompense from you, nor any thanks: 10. verily we dread, from our LORD, a dismal and calamitous day. 11. Wherefore, *GOD SHALL DELIVER THEM FROM THE EVIL OF THAT DAY*, and shall cast on them brightness of countenance, and joy; (lxxvi., 4–11 inclusive; S. 474, 475; R. 87, 88.)

XXVIII., 65.—On that day, *God* shall call unto them and shall say, What answer did ye return to our messengers? 66. But they shall not be able to give an account thereof on that day; neither shall they ask one another for information. 67. Howbeit whoso shall repent and believe, AND SHALL DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, may expect to be happy. (xxviii., 65–67 inclusive; S. 322; R. 311.)

LXVII., 22.—Is he, therefore, who goeth groveling upon his face, better directed than he who walketh UPRIGHT IN A STRAIGHT WAY? 23. Say, *It is* he who hath given you being, and indued you with hearing, and sight, and understanding; yet how little gratitude have ye! 24. Say, *It is* he who hath sown you in the earth, and unto him shall ye be gathered together. 25. They say, When shall this menace be put in execution, if ye speak truth? 26. Answer, The knowledge of this matter is with *God* alone: for I am only a public warner. (lxvii., 22–26 inclusive; S. 459; R. 162.)

LXXVI., 24.—Wherefore, patiently wait the judgment of thy LORD; and obey not any wicked person or unbeliever among them. 25. And commemorate the name of thy LORD, in the morning, and in the evening: 26. and during some part of the night worship him, and praise him a long part of the night. 27. Verily these

*[I omit the remainder of verse 113.]

men love the transitory *life*, and leave behind them the heavy day of *judgment*. 28. We have created them, and have strengthened their joints; and when we please, we will substitute *others* like unto them, in their stead. 29. Verily this is an admonition: and who-so willeth, taketh the way unto his LORD: 30. but ye shall not will, unless God willeth; for God is knowing and wise. 31. He leadeth whom he pleaseth into his mercy; but FOR THE UNJUST hath he prepared a grievous punishment. (lxxvi, 24-31; S. 475; R. 89.)

XXXV., 5.—O men, verily the promise of God is true: let not therefore the present life deceive you, neither let the deceiver deceive you concerning God: 6. for Satan *is* an enemy unto you; wherefore, hold him for an enemy: he only inviteth his confederates to be the inhabitants of hell. 7. For those who believe not *there is prepared* a severe torment: 8. but for those who shall believe AND DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, *is prepared* mercy and a great reward. (xxxv., 5-8 inclusive; S. 357, 358; R. 362.)

XXXIX., 47.—Say, O God, the creator of heaven and earth, who knowest that which is secret, and that which is manifest; thou shalt judge between thy servants concerning that wherein they disagree. 48. If those who ACT UNJUSTLY were masters of whatever is in the earth, and as much more therewith, verily they would give it to ransom themselves from the evil of the punishment, on the day of resurrection: and there shall appear unto them, from God, *terrors* which they never imagined; 49. and there shall appear unto them the evils of that which they shall have gained; and that which they mocked at shall encompass them. (xxxix., 47-49 inclusive; S. 380, 381; R. 319.)

XLV., 13.—Speak unto the true believers, that they forgive those who hope not for the days of God, that he may reward people ACCORDING TO WHAT THEY SHALL HAVE WROUGHT. 14. Whoso doeth that which is right *doth it to the advantage of* his own soul; and whoso doeth evil *doth it* against the same: hereafter shall ye return unto your LORD. (xlv., 13, 14; S. 405; R. 235, 236.)

XLV., 19.—This *Koran* delivereth evident *precepts* unto mankind; and *is* a direction, and a mercy, unto people who judge aright. 20. Do the workers of iniquity imagine that we will deal with them as with those who believe AND DO GOOD WORKS; *so that* their life and their death *shall be* equal? An ill judgment do they make. 21. God hath created the heavens and the earth IN TRUTH; that he may recompense every soul ACCORDING TO THAT WHICH IT SHALL HAVE WROUGHT: and they shall not be treated unjustly. 22. What thinkest thou? He who taketh his own lust for his God, and whom God causeth knowingly to err, and whose ears and

whose heart he hath sealed up, and over whose eyes he hath cast a veil; who shall direct him, after God *shall have forsaken him?* Will ye therefore not be admonished? (xlv., 19–22 inclusive; S. 405; R. 236, 237. R. reads in the 22d verse, “He who hath made a God of his passions, and whom God causeth willfully to err;”)

XLVI., 18.—For every one *is prepared* a certain degree of *happiness or misery*, ACCORDING TO THAT WHICH THEY SHALL HAVE WROUGHT: that *God* may recompense them FOR THEIR WORKS: and they shall not be treated unjustly. 19. On a certain day, the unbelievers shall be exposed before the fire of *hell*; and it shall be said unto them, Ye received your good things in your lifetime, while ye were in the world; and ye enjoyed yourselves therein: wherefore this day ye shall be rewarded with the punishment of ignominy; FOR THAT YE BEHAVED INSOLENTLY IN THE EARTH, WITHOUT JUSTICE, and for that ye transgressed. (xlvi., 18, 19; S. 408; R. 396, 397.)

LIII., 30.—Wherefore, withdraw from him who turneth away from our admonition, and seeketh only the present life. 31. This *is* their highest pitch of knowledge. Verily thy LORD well knoweth him who erreth from his way; and he well knoweth him who is *rightly* directed. 32. Unto GOD *belongeth* whatever *is* in heaven and earth: that he may reward those who do evil, ACCORDING TO THAT WHICH THEY SHALL HAVE WROUGHT; and may reward those who do well, with the most excellent *reward*. 33. *As to* those who avoid great crimes, and heinous sins, *and are guilty only of* lighter faults; verily thy LORD *will be* extensive in mercy toward them. He well knew you when he produced you out of the earth, and when ye were embryos in your mothers’ wombs: wherefore, justify not yourselves: he best knoweth *the man* who feareth him. (liii., 30–33; S. 428; R. 66, 67.)

LXIV., 9.*—And whoso shall believe in GOD, AND SHALL DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, from him will he expiate his evil deeds, and he will lead him into gardens beneath which rivers flow, to remain therein for ever. This *will be* great felicity. 10. But they who shall not believe, and shall accuse our signs of falsehood, those *shall be* the inhabitants of *hell* fire, wherein they shall remain *for ever*; and a wretched journey *shall it be thither!* 11. No misfortune happeneth but by the permission of GOD; and whoso believeth in GOD, he will direct his heart: and GOD knoweth all things. 12. Wherefore, obey GOD, and obey the apostle: but if ye turn back, verily *the duty incumbent* on our apostle *is* only public preaching. 13. GOD! THERE IS NO GOD BUT HE: wherefore, in GOD let the

* [I omit the first part of verse 9.]

faithful put their trust. (lxiv., last part of the 9th verse, and verses 10-13 inclusive; S. 453; R. 477.)

XIV.—IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 1.*—*This* book have we sent down unto thee, that thou mayest lead men forth from darkness into light, by the permission of their LORD, into the glorious and laudable way. (xiv., the first verse, omitting the introductory letters; S. 204, 205; R. 274.)

X., 108.—Say, O men, now hath the truth come unto you from your LORD. He therefore who shall be directed, will be directed to *the advantage* of his own soul: but he who shall err, will err only against the same. I am no guardian over you. 109. Do thou, *O prophet*, follow that which is revealed unto thee: AND PERSEVERE WITH PATIENCE, UNTIL GOD SHALL JUDGE; for he is the best judge. (x., 108, 109; S. 174; R. 354.)

IV., 81.—Whatever good befalleth thee, *O man*, it is from God; and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from thyself. We have sent thee an apostle unto men, and God is a sufficient witness *thereof*. (iv., 81; S. 70; R. 540, 541. R. omits *O man*.)

XIII., 27.—The infidels say, Unless a sign be sent down unto him from his LORD, *we will not believe*. Answer, Verily God will lead into error whom he pleaseth, and will direct unto himself HIM WHO REPENTETH, 28. *and* those who believe, and whose hearts rest securely in the meditation of God; shall not *men's* hearts rest securely in the meditation of God? They who believe AND DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT *shall enjoy* blessedness, and *partake of* a happy resurrection. (xiii., 27, 28; S. 202, 203; R. 426.)

XIII., 43.—The unbelievers will say, Thou art not sent *of God*. Answer, God is a sufficient witness between me and you, and he who understandeth the scriptures. (xiii., 43; S. 204; R. 428.)

VII., 186.—They will ask thee concerning the *last* hour; at what time its coming is fixed? Answer, Verily the knowledge thereof is with my LORD; none shall declare the fixed time thereof, except he. *The expectation thereof* is grievous in heaven and on earth: it shall come upon you no otherwise than suddenly. 187. They will ask thee, as though thou wast well acquainted therewith. Answer, Verily the knowledge thereof is with God alone: but the greater part of men know it not. 188. Say, I am able neither to procure advantage unto myself, nor to avert mischief *from me*, but as God pleaseth. If I knew the secrets *of God*, I should surely enjoy abundance of good, neither should evil befall me. Verily I am no other than a denouncer of threats, and a messenger of good tidings unto people who believe. (vii., 186-188; S. 136, 137; R. 391, 392.)

*[I omit the introductory letters.]

III., 73.—It is not *fit* for a man that GOD should give him a book *of revelations*, and wisdom, and prophecy; and then he should say unto men, Be ye worshipers of me, besides GOD; but *he ought to say*, BE YE PERFECT IN KNOWLEDGE AND IN WORKS, since ye know the scriptures, and exercise yourselves therein. (iii., 73; S. 46; R. 505.)

XLl., 5.—Say, Verily I am only a man like you. It is revealed unto me, that YOUR GOD IS ONE GOD: wherefore, direct your way straight unto him; and ask pardon of him *for what is past*. And woe *be* to the idolators: 6. who give not the appointed alms, and believe not in the life to come! 7. But *as to* those who believe AND WORK RIGHTEOUSNESS, they shall receive an everlasting reward (xli., 5–7 inclusive; S. 389; R. 228, 229.)

II., 105.—They say, Verily none shall enter paradise, except they who are Jews or Christians: this is their wish. Say, Produce your proof *of this*, if ye speak truth. 106. Nay, but he who resigneth himself to GOD, AND DOTH THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, he shall have his reward with his LORD: there shall *come* no fear on them, neither shall they be grieved. (ii., 105, 106; S. 14, 15; R. 444.)

XXIII., 98.—TURN ASIDE EVIL WITH THAT WHICH IS BETTER: we well know *the calumnies* which they utter *against thee*. 99. And say, O LORD, I fly unto thee for refuge, against the suggestions of the devils: 100. and I have recourse unto thee, O LORD, *to drive them away*, that they be not present with me. (xxiii., 98–100 inclusive; S. 285; R. 170.)

XX., 130.—Wherefore, do thou, O Mohammed, patiently bear that which they say; and celebrate the praise of thy LORD before the rising of the sun, and before the setting thereof, and praise *him* in the hours of the night, and in the extremities of the day, that thou mayest be well-pleased *with the prospect of receiving favor from God*. 131. And cast not thine eyes on that which we have granted divers of the *unbelievers* to enjoy, *namely*, the splendor of this present life, that we may prove them thereby; for the provision of thy LORD *is* better, and more permanent. 132. Command thy family *to observe* prayer; and do thou persevere therein.* (xx., 130, 131, and the first part of verse 132; S. 264; R. 108.)

XXV., 58.—We have sent thee *to be* no other than a bearer of good tidings, and a denouncer of threats. 59. Say, I ask not of you any reward for this *my preaching*; besides *the conversion of him* who shall desire to take the way unto his LORD. 60. And do thou TRUST IN HIM WHO LIVETH, AND DIETH NOT; and celebrate his praise: (he is sufficiently acquainted with the faults of his servants):† (xxv., 58, 59, and the first part of verse 60; S. 300; R. 188.)

*[I omit the remainder of verse 132.] †[I omit the remainder of verse 60.]

LI., 50.—Fly, therefore, unto God; verily I *am* a public warner unto you, from him. 51. And set not up another god with *the true* God: verily I *am* a public warner unto you, from him. (li., 50, 51; S. 424; R. 56.)

XXXIX., 54.—Say, O my servants who have transgressed against your own souls, despair not of the mercy of God: seeing that God forgiveth all sins, for he is gracious *and* merciful. 55. And be turned unto your LORD, and resign yourselves unto him, before the *threatened* punishment overtake you; for then ye shall not be helped. 56. And follow the most excellent *instructions* which have been sent down unto you from your LORD, before the punishment come suddenly upon you, and ye perceive not *the approach thereof*; (xxxix., 54–56 inclusive; S. 381; R. 320.)

XLII., 14.—Wherefore, invite *them to receive the sure faith*, and be urgent *with them*, as thou hast been commanded; and follow not their *vain* desires: and say, I believe in *all* the scriptures which God hath sent down; and I AM COMMANDED TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE among you: GOD is our LORD and your LORD: UNTO US *will* OUR WORKS *be imputed*, AND UNTO YOU *will* YOUR WORKS *be imputed*: *let there be* no wrangling between us and you; for GOD will assemble us *all at the last day*, and unto him shall we return. (xlii., 14; S. 394; R. 337.)

LXVII.—IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD. 1. BLESSED BE HE in whose hand *is* the kingdom, for he *is* almighty! 2. Who hath created death and life, that he might prove you, which of you is most RIGHTEOUS IN *his* ACTIONS: and he *is* mighty, *and* ready to forgive. (lxvii., 1, 2; S. 458; R. 160.)

XXIII., 117.*—Wherefore, let God be exalted, the King, the Truth! There is no God besides him, the LORD of the honorable throne. Whoever together with *the true* God shall invoke another god, concerning whom he hath no demonstrative proof, shall surely be brought to an account for the same before his LORD. Verily the infidels shall not prosper. 118. Say, O LORD, pardon, and show mercy; for thou art the best of those who show mercy. (The close of the twenty-third chapter, last part of the 117th verse, and the whole of verse 118; S. 286; R. 171.)

L, 44.—We well know what *the unbelievers* say; and thou *art* not sent to compel them forcibly *to the faith*. 45. Wherefore, warn, by the Koran, him who feareth my threatening. (The close of the fiftieth chapter, including all of verses 44, 45; S. 422; R. 97.)

§ 969.—Kinds of elusory belief are threefold: (1) miracles; (2) mysteries; (3) means of grace. (page 264, line 26.) Cf. § 725.

* [I omit the first part of verse 117.]

[Also see as to (1) §§ 777-787; (2) §§ 872-891; and as to the OPERATIONS OF GRACE §§ 705-728]

§ 970.—PRAYER is a mean awakening and quickening our moral mindedness or intent—not a mean of grace (page 265, line 19.)

§ 971.—Sincerity in a verbally pronounced prayer not so unquestionable as in one which confines itself to prayer's spirit. (page 266, line 6.)

§ 972.—Jesus expressed the spirit of prayer most admirably. (page 266, line 31.) See Luke, xi., 2-4; Matthew, vi., 8-15 (page 217, above). Cf. Job, xxxiv., 31, 32 :

31. "Surely, to God it should be said:
I have borne it; I will not be perverse.
32. Beyond what I see do Thou teach me;
If I have done evil, I will do it no more."*

§ 973.—No prayer (unless when directed toward a moral object) will certainly be heard. (page 267, line 13.)

§ 974.—Miraculous faith, said to be able to move mountains. (page 267, line 36.)

§ 975.—Public prayer rests upon a deeper ground of reason than private supplications. (page 268, line 22.)

§ 976.—Prayer rather weakens than strengthens the sensitive effect of the ethical idea. (page 269, line 4.)

§ 977.—ASSEMBLING TOGETHER IN CHURCH is a mean of edification, not a mean of celestial grace. (Edification is the ethical purchase that devotion takes upon the actual amendment and BUILDING UP of the moral character.) (page 270, line 21.) [Webster (article Purchase) says: "*pourchasser* is to pursue to the end or object, and hence to obtain."] [Exodus, xx., 4.] [*Moral maxims*: see § 328 (page 29 above).]

§ 978.—BAPTISM is no mean of grace. (page 272, line 1.) [*A pillar in the Divine state*: cf. Revelations, iii., 12.]

§ 979.—COMMUNION is a good mean, well fitted for carrying forward the congregation in the culture of that moral and brotherly love which is thereby so prominently represented; but it is not a mean of grace. (page 272, line 19.)

§ 980.—Sacerdotal despotism under the sway of a cleriarchy. (page 273, line 7.)

§ 981.—Mankind, instead of becoming conformable to the sacrosanct requirements of the Divine Holiness, address themselves to the Divine Benignity. (page 273, line 15.)

* "The Book of Job. From the original Hebrew, on the basis of the common and earlier English versions. New York: American Bible Union," etc. (Dr. Conant's translation.)

§ 982.—Instead of VIRTUE, presses after PIETY (passive veneration instead of active obedience.) (page 274, line 15.)

§ 983.—Commencing with virtue, thence rise to the condonation of divine grace. (page 275, line 15.)

I desire to add one suggestion further. After completing the logical division (I do not mean of this clavis, but of the text itself), the ethical—at least the groundwork—should be immediately carefully reviewed. The difference (in respect of the first reading) will be like that between the twilight of the Gothic cathedral which Schwegler sees in Boehme's writings, "where the light falls through variegated windows," (Schwegler's *Hist. Phil.*, J. H. Seelye tr., Appleton, New York, 1864, page 170), and the resplendence of the same sacred edifice full of ten thousand lights and resounding with the march of the church militant up the nave on the way toward the altar of God.

"Send out Thy light and Thy truth;
They shall guide me;
They shall bring me to Thy holy mount,
And to Thy tabernacles.
And I shall come to the altar of God,
To God, my exceeding joy."—*Psal. xliii.**

SECOND GENERAL DIVISION.

How can I be Free? (§§ 984–3000.)

VOLUME III.—LOGIC.

Translated from the German of IMMANUEL KANT, M. A., Doctor and late Regius Professor of Pure Philosophy in the University of Königsberg, and Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin. By JOHN RICHARDSON. (§§ 984–1398 inclusive.) Paging of the edition of Simpkin and Marshall, London, 1819. Mr. RICHARDSON has annexed to his translation of the *Logic* a sketch of KANT's life and writings, from which sketch an extract will be found in Appendix vii., below. [It appears from a note to RICHARDSON's preface (page iii.), that the *Logic* was edited by Dr. G. B. FESCHE; but UEBERWEG (*Hist. Phil.*, ed. Morris, vol. ii., page 153) says that the *Logik* was edited by J. B. JAESCHE. Perhaps the disagreement is due to a typographical error.]

INTRODUCTION. (§§ 984–1168.)

Chapter I.—Conception of Logic. (§§ 984–1001 inclusive.)

§ 984.—Everything in nature happens according to rules. (page 9, line 4.)

* "The Psalms." The Common Version revised for the American Bible Union, with an Introduction and Occasional Notes, by Thomas J. Conant." New York, 1871.

§ 985.—Exercise of our powers takes place according to rules. (page 9, line 16.)

§ 986.—Understanding is bound in its operations to rules. (page 10, line 4.)

§ 987.—Rules of the understanding can be investigated. (page 10, line 17.)

§ 988.—Rules of the understanding are either necessary or contingent. (page 10, line 23.)

§ 989.—Necessary rules of the understanding can be known apriori, and are merely formal. (page 11, line 11.)

§ 990.—Logic is the science of the necessary laws of the understanding and of reason in general. (page 12, line 4.)

§ 991.—Logic (1) is the foundation of all the other sciences. (page 12, line 8.)

§ 992.—Logic (2) can not be an organon of the sciences. (page 12, line 13.) [Logic is not an organon of science, but its canon. But logic is an organon of wisdom, whose only canon is the LAW. That is to say, the whole of logic, and along with it the whole of language, words and the uses of words, must be subordinated to the total end of the whole use of reason. For the behoof of the true life, all (theoretic) science must be subordinated to logic as its supreme canon, but also at the same time all of science, and with it logic itself as the organon of wisdom, to philosophy as the supreme science. If logic proclaims itself the canon of life and erects itself into a philosophy, it is mere logomachy, inevitably transcendent, and practically worthless, and worse than worthless, positively evil in practical tendency. Instances are the systems of Fichte and Hegel, both thoroughly and radically unkantian. The moment you depart from practical ground, you depart from Kant. See § 1031, and cf. §§ 1530, 1543.]

§ 993.—Logic (3) is a canon, and comprehends nothing but laws apriori. (page 13, line 9.)

§ 994.—Logic can not presuppose psychological principles. (page 13, line 21.)

§ 995.—Logic (4) is a science of reason as to the matter, not merely as to the form. (page 14, line 11.) [Cf. Campanella (Tennemann, Hist. Phil., ed. Morell; § 318, Bohn's page 289).]

§ 996.—Logic (5) is, as to both the matter and the form, a doctrine, or demonstrated theory. (page 14, line 27.)

§ 997.—Logic (as a canon) is essentially distinguished from æsthetic (as mere criticism of taste). (page 15, line 7.) Cf. § 1529.

§ 998.—Æsthetic takes its rules aposteriori. (page 15, line 25.)

§ 999.—Logic is more than mere criticism; it is a canon, which afterward serves for a criticism. (page 16, line 7.)

§ 1000.—Universal logic distinguished from transcendental. (page 16, line 13.) Cf. § 1535, 1536.

§ 1001.—Logic is a science of the right use of the understanding and of reason in general. (page 16, line 19.) [Cf. Abelard (Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., tr. Morris, § 94, vol. i., page 391, line 41).]

Chapter II.—Principal Divisions of Logic—Propounding—Use of this Science—Sketch of a History of it. (§§ 1002-1015 inclusive.)

§ 1002.—Logic is divided into the analytic and the dialectic. (page 17, line 5.)

§ 1003.—Dialectic arises from a mere abuse of the analytic. (page 17, line 17.) Cf. § 1542.

§ 1004.—Dialectic, as an art of disputation, unworthy of a philosopher. (page 17, line 26.) Cf. § 1543.

§ 1005.—Dialectic of great use as a cathartic of the understanding. (page 18, line 17.)

§ 1006.—Division of logic into natural and artificial (*logica scholastica*) is improper. (page 18, line 24.)

§ 1007.—Division of logic into theoretical and practical is wrong. (page 19, line 10.)

§ 1008.—Logic has a dogmatical and a technical part: (1) doctrine of elements; (2) doctrine of method. (page 19, line 22.)

§ 1009.—Logic (subjectively) may be divided into pure and applied. But applied logic is a psychology. (page 20, line 2.) Cf. §§ 1531-1534.

§ 1010.—Technic must be propounded in every science, not in applied logic only. (page 20, line 25.)

§ 1011.—Logic can not be divided into that of the common and that of the speculative understanding. (page 21, line 1.)

§ 1012.—Propounding of logic may be either scholastic or popular. (page 21, line 21.)

§ 1013.—Propounding distinguished from method. (p. 22, l. 8.)

§ 1014.—Value of the science of logic and the use of its study. (page 22, line 18.)

§ 1015.—History of logic. (Aristotle, Leibnitz, Wolf, etc.) (page 23, line 3.)

Chapter III.—Conception of Philosophy in General—Philosophy considered according to both the scholastic and the mundane conception—Essential requisites and ends of philosophizing—The most general and the chief problems of this science. (§§ 1016-1032 inclusive.)

§ 1016.—Philosophical cognitions belong to the cognitions of reason. (page 25, line 8.)

§ 1017.—Cognition may arise from reason (objectively), and yet (subjectively) be historical. (page 25, line 20.) Cf. §§ 2602, 2603.

§ 1018.—Pernicious to know some rational cognitions merely historically. (page 26, line 13.)

§ 1019.—One may learn philosophy in a certain respect without being able to philosophize. (page 26, line 20.)

§ 1020.—Specific distinction between philosophy and mathematics. (page 26, line 28) Cf. § 2452, *et seqq.*

§ 1021.—Philosophy is the cognition of reason from mere conceptions. (page 27, line 15.)

§ 1022.—Cognitions of mathematics are intuitive; those of philosophy discursive. (page 27, line 29.)

§ 1023.—Philosophy is the science of the ultimate ends of human reason. (p. 23, l. 6.) Cf. §§ 1024, 2604. (The cosmical conception.)

§ 1024.—Philosophy in the scholastic sense is a doctrine of ad-dress; in the cosmic sense, it is a doctrine of wisdom. (page 28, line 15.) See § 1023.

§ 1025.—Philosophy in the scholastic sense is the science of the systematic conjunction of the cognitions of reason in the idea of a whole. (page 29, line 8.) Cf. § 2604.

§ 1026.—Philosophy in the cosmic sense is the science of the reference of all cognition and of all use of reason to the scope of human reason. (page 29, line 18.) Cf. § 2605.

§ 1027.—Questions which the philosopher must be able to determine. (page 29, line 29.) [It will be seen that the especial province of philosophy is to answer the question "WHAT OUGHT WE to do?"] Cf. § 2557.

§ 1028.—Two things requisite to a philosopher: (1) culture; (2) USE. (page 30, line 20.) Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth., II., i., 4. § 1040.

§ 1029.—Mathematics may be learned; philosophy, on the contrary, must be PRACTISED. (page 31, line 5.) [You may learn surveying (theoretically) without going into the field with the chain and compass; but you can not learn WISDOM without actually laying upon the field of your daily LIFE the chain of the LAW, aligned by the compass of reason.] Cf. § 2604. See § 298.

§ 1030.—True philosopher must make a free (not an imitative) use of his reason, but not a dialectical use. (page 31, line 23.)

§ 1031.—Science is of an intrinsic value as an organon of wisdom only. (page 32, line 1.)

§ 1032.—Consider more the method of our use of reason, than the propositions themselves at which we arrive by it. (p. 32, l. 18.)

Chapter IV.—Light Sketch of a History of Philosophy. (§§ 1033-1049.)

§ 1033.—Philosophical cognition commences when the common use of reason begins to make essays in the knowledge of the universal in the abstract. (page 32, line 25.)

§ 1034.—Greeks began the first to philosophize. (page 33, line 7.) With regard to the mathematics, too, the Greeks are the first that cultivated this part of the cognition of reason after a speculative scientific method. [*Chinese*: cf. § 871.] [*Indians*: cf. § 949.] [*Zoroaster's Zend-Avesta*: cf. § 881.]

§ 1035.—Thales and the Ionians. (page 34, line 8.)

§ 1036.—Eleatic philosophy. (page 34, line 26.)

§ 1037.—Dialectic; and the Sophists. (page 35, line 5)

§ 1038.—Pythagoras. (page 35, line 22.)

§ 1039.—Socrates gave the philosophic spirit and all the speculative heads quite a new PRACTICAL direction. (page 37, line 1.) [Cf. §§ 614, 1397, 1430.] *He is almost the only one among mankind, whose conduct approaches nearly to the idea of that of a sage*: cf. the following extracts from Xenophon's MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES:*

BOOK I, CHAPTER I, § 1. I have often wondered by what arguments the accusers of Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he deserved death from the state; for the indictment against him was to this effect: SOCRATES OFFENDS AGAINST THE LAWS IN NOT PAYING RESPECT TO THOSE GODS WHOM THE CITY RESPECTS, AND INTRODUCING OTHER NEW DEITIES; HE ALSO OFFENDS AGAINST THE LAWS IN CORRUPTING THE YOUTH.

2. In the first place, *that he did not respect the gods whom the city respects*, what proof did they bring? For he was seen frequently sacrificing at home, and frequently on the public altars of the city; nor was it unknown that he used divination; as it was a common subject of talk that "Socrates used to say that the divinity instructed him;" and it was from this circumstance, indeed, that they seem chiefly to have derived the charge of introducing new deities. 3. He however introduced nothing newer than those who, practicing divination, consult auguries, voices, omens, and sacrifices; for they do not imagine that birds, or people who meet them, know what is advantageous for those seeking presages, but that the gods, by their means, signify what will be so; and such was the opinion that Socrates entertained. 4. Most people say that they are diverted from an object, or prompted to it, by birds, or by

* "The Anabasis, or Expedition of Cyrus, and the Memorabilia of Socrates. Literally translated from the Greek of Xenophon. By the Rev. J. S. Watson, M. A., M. R. S. L. With a Geographical Commentary, by W. F. Ainsworth, Esq., F. S. A., F. R. G. S., F. G. S." (In Harper's Classical Library. See page 349 *et seqq.* for the Memorabilia of Socrates, with notes.) I have not inserted references to the paging, inasmuch as the numbering of the books and chapters will enable the reader to find quickly any place sought. Except in III., ix., 4, I have substituted double parentheses ((thus)) for brackets which I found in the text [thus]. I have retained many of the notes.

the people who meet them; but Socrates spoke as he thought, for he said it was the divinity that was his monitor. He also told many of his friends to do certain things, and not to do others, intimating that the divinity had forwarned him; and advantage attended those who obeyed his suggestions, but repentance, those who disregarded them.

5. Yet who would not acknowledge that Socrates wished to appear to his friends neither a fool nor a boaster? But he would have seemed to be both, if, after saying that intimations were given him by a god, he had then been proved guilty of falsehood. It is manifest, therefore, that he would have uttered no predictions, if he had not trusted that they would prove true. But who, in such matters, would trust to any one but a god? And how could he, who trusted the gods, think that there were no gods?

6. He also acted toward his friends according to his convictions, for he recommended them to perform affairs of necessary consequence* in such a manner as he thought that they would be best managed; but concerning those of which it was doubtful how they would terminate, he sent them to take auguries whether they should be done or not. 7. Those who would govern families or cities well, he said, had need of divination; for to become skillful in architecture, or working in brass, or agriculture, or in commanding men, or to become a critic in any such arts, or a good reasoner, or a skillful regulator of a household, or a well-qualified general, he considered as wholly matters of learning, and left to the choice of the human understanding; 8. but he said that the gods reserved to themselves the most important particulars attending such matters, of which nothing was apparent to men; for neither was it certain to him who had sown his field well, who should reap the fruit of it; nor certain to him who had built a house well, who should inhabit it; nor certain to him who was skilled in generalship, whether it would be for his advantage to act as a general; nor certain to him who was versed in political affairs, whether it would be for his profit to be at the head of the state; nor certain to him who had married a beautiful wife in hopes of happiness, whether he should not incur misery by her means; nor certain to him who had acquired powerful connections in the state, whether he might not be banished by them: 9. and those who thought

* Things of which the event is certain, because necessary, as Ernesti interprets.—*Schneider*. [Anthon (Harper, 1868, page 146) says, “the things that were necessary to be done,’ i. e. whatever might be their issue. The reference is to things that must be done, as a matter of course, and which are required either by duty, or sound reason, or necessity.”]

that none of these things depended on the gods, but that all were dependent on the human understanding, he pronounced to be insane; as he also pronounced those to be insane who had recourse to omens respecting matters which the gods had granted to men to discover by the exercise of their faculties; as if, for instance, a man should inquire whether it would be better to take for the driver of his chariot one who knows how to drive, or one who does not know; or whether it would be better to place over his ship one who knows how to steer it, or one who does not know; or if men should ask respecting matters which they may learn by counting, or measuring, or weighing; for those who inquired of the gods concerning such matters he thought guilty of impiety, and said that it was the DUTY of men TO LEARN whatever the gods had enabled them to do by learning, and to try to ascertain from the gods by augury whatever was obscure to men; as the gods always afford information to those to whom they are rendered propitious.

10. He was constantly in public, for he went in the morning to the places for walking and the gymnasia; at the time when the market was full he was to be seen there; and the rest of the day he was where he was likely to meet the greatest number of people; he was generally engaged in discourse, and all who pleased were at liberty to hear him; 11. yet no one ever either saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything impious or profane; for he did not dispute about the nature of things as most other philosophers disputed, speculating how that which is called by sophists *the world* was produced, and by what necessary laws every thing in the heavens is effected, but endeavored to show that those who chose such subjects of contemplation were foolish; 12. and used in the first place to inquire of them whether they thought that they already knew sufficient of human affairs, and therefore proceeded to such subjects of meditation, or whether, when they neglected human affairs entirely, and speculated on celestial matters, they thought that they were doing what became them. 13. He wondered, too, that it was not apparent to them that it is impossible for man to satisfy himself on such points, since even those who pride themselves most on discussing them, do not hold the same opinions one with another, but are, compared with each other, like madmen; 14. for of madmen some have no fear of what is to be feared, and others fear what is not to be feared; some think it no shame to say or do any thing whatever before men, and others think that they ought not to go among men at all: some pay no respect to temple, or altar, or any thing dedicated to the gods, and others worship stones, and common stocks, and beasts:

so of those who speculate on the nature of the universe, some imagine that all that exists is one, others that there are worlds infinite in number; some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing is ever moved; some that all things are generated and decay, and others that nothing is either generated or decays.

15. He would ask, also, concerning such philosophers, whether, as those who have learned arts practiced by men, expect that they will be able to carry into effect what they have learned, either for themselves, or for any one else whom they may wish, so those who inquire into celestial things, imagine that, when they have discovered by what laws every thing is effected, they will be able to produce, whenever they please, wind, rain, changes of the seasons, and whatever else of that sort they may desire, or whether they have no such expectation, but are content merely to know how every thing of that nature is generated. 16. Such were the observations which he made about those who busied themselves in such speculations; but for himself, he would hold discourse, from time to time, on what concerned MANKIND, considering what was pious, what impious; what was becoming, what unbecoming; what was just, what unjust; what was sanity, what insanity; what was fortitude, what cowardice; what a state was, and what the character of a statesman; what was the nature of government over men, and the qualities of one skilled in governing them; and touching on other subjects, with which he thought that those who were acquainted were men of worth and estimation, but that those who were ignorant of them might justly be deemed no better than slaves.

17. As to those matters, then, on which Socrates gave no intimation what his sentiments were, it is not at all wonderful that his judges should have decided erroneously concerning him; but is it not wonderful that they should have taken no account of such things as all men knew? 18. For when he was a member of the senate, and had taken the senator's oath, in which it was expressed that *he would vote in accordance with the laws*, he, being president in the assembly of the people when they were eager to put to death Thrasyllus, Erasinides, and all the nine generals, by a single vote contrary to the law, refused, though the multitude were enraged at him, and many of those in power uttered threats against him, to put the question to the vote, but considered it of more importance to observe his oath than to gratify the people contrary to what was right, or to seek safety against those who menaced him; 19. for he thought that the gods paid regard to men, not in the way in which some people suppose, who imagine that the gods know some.

things and do not know others, but he considered that the gods know ALL THINGS, both what is said, what is done, and what is meditated in silence, and are present every where, and give admonitions to men concerning every thing human.

20. I wonder, therefore, how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates had not right sentiments concerning the gods; a man who never said or did anything impious toward the gods, but spoke and acted in such a manner with respect to them, that any other who had spoken and acted in the same manner, would have been, and have been considered, eminently pious.

I., ii., 1. It also seems wonderful to me, that any should have been persuaded that Socrates corrupted the youth; Socrates, who, in addition to what has been said of him, was not only the most rigid of all men in the government of his passions and appetites, but also most able to withstand cold, heat, and every kind of labor; and, besides, so inured to frugality, that, though he possessed very little, he very easily made it a sufficiency. 2. How, then, being of such a character himself, could he have rendered others impious, or lawless, or luxurious, or incontinent, or too effeminate to endure labor? On the contrary, he restrained many of them from such vices, leading them to love virtue, and giving them hopes, that if they would take care of themselves, they would become honorable and worthy characters. 3. Not indeed that he ever professed to be an instructor in that way, but, by showing that he was himself such a character, he made those in his society hope that, by imitating him, they would become such as he was.

4. Of the body he was not neglectful, nor did he commend those who were. He did not approve that a person should eat to excess, and then use immoderate exercise, but recommended that he should work off, by a proper degree of exercise, as much as the appetite received with pleasure; for such a habit, he said, was peculiarly conducive to health, and did not prevent attention to the mind. 5. He was not, however, fine or ostentatious in his clothes or sandals, or in any of his habits of life; yet he did not make those about him lovers of money,* for he checked them in this as well as other passions, and asked no remuneration from those who desired his company. 6. By refraining from such demand, he thought that he consulted his liberty, and called those who took money for their discourses their own enslavers, since they must of necessity hold discussions with those from whom they received pay. 7. He expressed wonder, too, that any one who professed to teach virtue,

* Though he was not extravagant, he was not avaricious; nor had his conversation a tendency to make others avaricious.

should demand money, and not think that he gained the greatest profit in securing a good friend, but fear that he whom he had made an honorable and worthy character would not retain the greatest gratitude toward his greatest benefactor.*

9. "But assuredly," said the accuser, "he caused those who conversed with him to despise the established laws, by saying how foolish it was to elect the magistrates of a state by beans,† when nobody would be willing to take a pilot elected by beans, or an architect, or a flute-player, or a person in any other profession, which, if erroneously exercised, would cause far less harm than errors in the administration of a state;" and declared that "such remarks excited the young to condemn the established form of government, and disposed them to acts of violence." 10. But I think that young men who exercise their understanding, and expect to become capable of teaching their fellow-citizens what is for their interest, grow by no means addicted to violence, knowing that on violence attend enmity and danger, but that, by persuasion, the same results are attained without peril, and with good will; for those who are compelled by us, hate us as if despoiled of something, while those who are persuaded by us, love us as if they had received a favor. It is not the part, therefore, of those who cultivate the intellect to use violence; for to adopt such a course belongs to those who possess brute force without intellect. 11. Besides, he who would venture to use force, had need of no small number of allies, but he who can succeed with persuasion, has need of none, for, though left alone, he would think himself still able to persuade; and it by no means belongs to such men to shed blood, for who would wish to put another man to death rather than to have him as a living subject persuaded to obey?

12. "But," said the accuser, "Critias and Alcibiades, after having been associates of Socrates, inflicted a great number of evils on the state; for Critias was the most avaricious and violent of all that composed the oligarchy, and Alcibiades was the most intemperate, insolent, and turbulent of all those in the democracy." 13. For whatever evil they did the state, I shall make no apology; but as to their intimacy with Socrates, I will state how it took place. 14. These two men were by nature the most ambitious of all the Athenians, and wished that everything should be done by their means, and that they themselves should become the most celebrated of all men. But they knew that Socrates lived with the utmost contentment on very small means, that he was most abstin-

* [I omit section 8.] † Black and white beans were used in voting for the magistrates at Athens.

ent from every kind of pleasure, and that he swayed those with whom he conversed just as he pleased by his arguments; 15. and, seeing such to be the case, and being such characters as they have just been stated to be, whether will any one say that they sought his society from a desire to lead such a life as Socrates led, and to practice such temperance as he practiced, or from an expectation that, if they associated with him, they would become eminently able to speak and act?*

17. Perhaps some one may observe on this point, that Socrates should not have taught his followers politics before he taught them self-control. To this remark I make no reply at present;† but I see that all teachers make themselves examples to their pupils how far they practice what they teach, and stimulate them by precepts; 18. and I know that Socrates made himself an example to those who associated with him as a man of honorable and excellent character, and that he discoursed admirably concerning virtue and other things that concern mankind. I know, too, that those men exercised self-control as long as they conversed with Socrates, not from fear lest they should be fined or beaten by him, but from a persuasion at the time that it was best to observe such conduct.

19. Perhaps, however, many of those who profess to be philosophers, may say that a man once just, can never become unjust, or once modest, immodest; and that, with regard to any other qualification (among such as can be taught), he who has once learned it can never become ignorant of it. But regarding such points I am not of that opinion; for I see that as those who do not exercise the body can not perform what is proper to the body, so those who can not exercise the mind, can not perform what is proper to the mind; for they can neither do that which they ought to do, nor refrain from that from which they ought to refrain. 20. For which reason fathers keep their sons, though they be of a virtuous disposition, from the society of bad men, in the belief that association with the good is an exercise of virtue, but that association with the bad is the destruction of it. One of the poets also bears testimony to this truth, who says, "From good men you will learn what is good; but if you associate with the bad, you will lose the understanding which is in you."‡|| 21. I also concur;§ for I see

* [I omit section 16.] † Xenophon leaves this point for the present, intending to reply to it in IV., iii.—*Kuehner*. ‡ [Watson appends here a note by Kuehner, of which the following is the greater part:] This distich is taken from Theognis [B. C. 548–485] v. 35, 36. That Socrates was fond of quoting it, appears also from Xen. Symp. ii., 4, and Plato, Menon, p. 95, D.¶¶ [I omit the remainder of section 20.] § [I omit part of section 21 at this point.]

that as people forget metrical compositions when they do not practice the repetition of them, so forgetfulness of precepts of instruction is produced in those who neglect them. But where a person forgets moral admonitions, he forgets also what the mind felt when it had a desire for self-government; and when he forgets this, it is not at all wonderful that he forgets self-government also.* 23. How is it impossible, then, that he who has once had a control over himself, may afterward cease to maintain it, and that he who was once able to observe justice, may subsequently become unable? To me everything honorable and good seems to be maintained by exercise, and self-control not the least; for sensual desires, generated in the same body with the soul, are constantly exciting it to abandon self-control, and to gratify themselves and the body as soon as possible.

24. Critias and Alcibiades, then, as long as they associated with Socrates, were able, with the assistance of his example, to maintain a mastery over their immoral inclinations; but, when they were separated from him, Critias, fleeing to Thessaly, formed connections there with men who practiced dishonesty rather than justice; and Alcibiades also, being† corrupted by many men, who were well able to seduce him by their flattery, on account of his influence in the city and among the allies, and being also honored by the people, and easily obtaining the pre-eminence among them; became like the wrestlers in the gymnastic games, who, when they are fairly superior to others, neglect their exercise; so he grew neglectful of self-control. 25. When such was their fortune, and when they were proud of their birth, elated with their wealth, puffed up with their power, corrupted by many associates, demoralized by all these means, and long absent from Socrates, what wonder is it if they became headstrong? 26. And then, if they did any thing wrong, does the accuser blame Socrates for it? and does Socrates seem to the accuser deserving of no praise, for having, when they were young, and when it is likely that they were most inconsiderate and intractable, rendered them discreet? 27. Yet other affairs are not judged of in such a way; for what flute-player, or what teacher of the harp, or what other instructor, if he produces competent pupils, and if they, attaching themselves to other masters, become less skillful, is blamed for their deterioration? Or what father, if his son, while he associated with one man, should be virtuous, but afterward, on uniting himself to some other person, should become vicious, would blame the former of the two? would he not rather, the more corrupt his son became with the second, bestow the greater praise on the first? Not even parents

*[I omit section 22.] †[I omit a part of section 24 at this point.]

themselves, when they have their sons in their society, are blamed if their sons do any thing wrong, provided they themselves are correct in their conduct. 28. In the same manner it would be right to judge of Socrates; if he had done any thing immoral, he would justly be thought to be a bad man; but if he constantly observed morality, how can he reasonably bear the blame of vice which was not in him?*

47. When Alcibiades and Critias, therefore, began to think themselves superior to those who were then governing the state, they no longer attended Socrates (for he was not agreeable to them in other respects, and they were offended, if they went to him at all, at being reproved for any error that they had committed), but devoted themselves to political employments, with a view to which they had at first associated with Socrates. 48. But Crito was also an attendant on Socrates, as well as Chærephon, Chærecrates, Hermocrates, Simmias, Cebes, and Phædonides, who, with others that attended him, did not seek his society that they might be fitted for popular orators or forensic pleaders, but that, becoming honorable and good men, they might conduct themselves irreproachably toward their families, connections, dependents, and friends, as well as toward their country and their fellow-citizens; and no one of all these, whether in youth or at a more advanced age, either was guilty, or was accused, of any crime.

49. "But Socrates," said the accuser, "taught children to show contempt for their parents, persuading his followers that he rendered them wiser than their fathers, and observing that a son was allowed by the law to confine his father on convicting him of being deranged, using that circumstance as an argument that it was lawful for the more ignorant to be confined by the wiser." 50. But what Socrates said was, that he thought he who confined another for ignorance, might justly be himself confined by those who knew what he did not know; and, with a view to such cases, he used to consider in what respect ignorance differed from madness, and expressed his opinion that madmen might be confined with advantage to themselves and their friends, but that those who did not know what they ought to know, might reasonably learn from those who did know.

51. "But Socrates," proceeded the accuser, "not only caused parents, but other relations, to be held in contempt by his followers, saying that relatives, as relatives, were of no profit to people who were sick, or to people going to law, but that physicians aided the one, and lawyers the other." 52. The accuser asserted, too,

*[I omit sections 29-46.]

that Socrates said concerning friends that "it was of no profit that they were well disposed, unless they were able also to assist; and that he insisted that those only were deserving of honor who knew what was for the advantage of others, and could make it intelligible to them; and that by thus persuading the young that he himself was the wisest of mankind, and most capable of making others wise, he so disposed his pupils toward him, that other people were of no account with them in comparison with himself." 53. I am aware, indeed, that he did express himself concerning parents and other relatives, and concerning friends, in such a manner as this: and used to say, besides, that when the soul has departed, in which alone intelligence exists, men take away the body of their dearest friend, and put it out of sight as soon as possible.* 55. But such observations Socrates uttered, not to teach any one of his followers to bury his father alive, or to cut himself to pieces, but, by showing that what is senseless is worthless, he exhorted each to study to become as intelligent and useful as possible, so that, whether he wished to be honored by his father, by his brother, or by any one else, he might not be neglectful of himself through trusting to his relationship, but might endeavor to be serviceable to those by whom he desired to be respected.

56. The accuser also said that Socrates, selecting the worst passages of the most celebrated poets, and using them as arguments, taught those who kept him company to be unprincipled and tyrannical. The verse of Hesiod, for example, "Work is no disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace," they say that he used to explain as intimating that the poet bids us abstain from no kind of work, dishonest or dishonorable, but to do such work for the sake of profit. 57. But when Socrates maintained that to be busy was useful and beneficial for a man, and that to be unemployed was noxious and ill for him, that to work was a good, and to be idle an evil, he at the same time observed that those only who do something good really work, and are useful workmen,† but those who gamble or do anything bad and pernicious, he called idle; and in this view the sentiment of the poet will be unobjectionable. "Work is no disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace."

58. That passage of Homer, too, the accuser stated that he often used to quote, in which (Il., ii., 188, *seqq.*) it is said that Ulysses,

Whatever king or eminent hero he found,
 Stood beside him, and detained him with gentle words:
 "Illustrious chief, it is not fit that you should shrink back as a coward;
 Sit down yourself, and make the rest of the people sit down."
 But whatever man of the people he noticed, and found clamoring,

* [I omit section 54.] † Compare III., ix., 9, [below.]

He struck him with his staff, and rebuked him with words :

"Worthless fellow, sit down in peace, and hear the exhortations of others,

Who are much better than you ; for you are unwarlike and powerless,

Neither to be numbered in the field nor in the council."

59. And he said that he used to explain it as if the poet recommended that plebeians and poor people should be beaten. Socrates, however, said no such thing (for he would thus have given an opinion that he himself ought to be beaten), but what he did say was, that those who benefited others neither by word nor deed, and who were incapable of serving the army, or the state, or the common people, if they should ever be called upon to serve, should, especially if, in addition to their incapacity, they were of an insolent spirit, be curbed in every way, even though they might be ever so rich. 60. But, contrary to the charge of the accuser, Socrates was evidently a friend to the common people, and of a liberal disposition ; for though he received numbers of persons desirous to hear him discourse, as well citizens as foreigners, he never required payment for his communications from any one, but imparted to every one in abundance from his stores, of which some* receiving fragments from him for nothing, sold them at a great price to others, and were not, like him, friends to the common people, for they declined to converse with such as had not money to give them. 61. But Socrates, in the eyes of other men, conferred glory on the city, far more than Lichas, who was celebrated in this respect. on that of the Lacedæmonians ; for Lichas indeed entertained the strangers that visited Lacedæmon at the *Gymnopædiæ*, but Socrates through the whole course of his life freely imparted whatever he had to bestow, and thus benefited in the highest degree all who were willing to receive from him, making those who associated with him better before he let them go.

62. To me, therefore, Socrates, being a man of such a character, appeared to be worthy of honor rather than of death ; and any one, considering his case according to the laws, would find such to be the fact ; for, by the laws, death is the punishment for a man if he be found stealing, or stripping people of their clothes, or cutting purses, or housebreaking, or kidnapping, or sacrilege, of which crimes Socrates was the most innocent of all men. 63. Nor was he ever the cause of any war ending unfortunately for the state, or of any sedition or treachery ; nor did he ever, in his private transactions, either deprive any man of what was for his good, or involve him in evil ; nor did he ever lie under suspicion of any of the crimes which I have mentioned.

* Xenophon alludes to other hearers of Socrates, but especially to Aristippus, who was the first of the Socratic philosophers that taught for hire.—*Ruhnken*. See *Diog. Laert.*, ii., 65.

64. How then could he have been guilty of the charges brought against him? a man who, instead of not acknowledging the gods, as was stated in the indictment, evidently paid respect to the gods more than other men; and instead of corrupting the youth, as the accuser laid to his charge, plainly led such of his associates as had vicious inclinations, to cease from indulging them, and exhorted them to cherish a love of that most honorable and excellent virtue, by which men successfully govern states and families. How then, pursuing such a course of conduct, was he not deserving of great honor from the city?

I., iii., 1 But to show how he appeared to improve those who associated with him, partly by showing them what his character was, and partly by his conversation, I shall record whatever I can remember of him relating to these points.

As to what had reference to the gods, then, he evidently acted and spoke in conformity with the answer which the priestess of Apollo gives to those who inquire how they ought to proceed with regard to a sacrifice, to the worship of their ancestors, or to any such matter; for the priestess replies that *they will act piously, if they act in agreement with the law of their country*; and Socrates both acted in this manner himself, and exhorted others to act similarly; and such as acted in any other way he regarded as doing what was not to the purpose, and guilty of folly.

2. To the gods he simply prayed that they would give him good things, as believing that the gods knew best what things are good; and those who prayed for gold, or silver, or dominion, or any thing of that kind, he considered to utter no other sort of requests than if they were to pray that they might play at dice, or fight, or do any thing else of which it is quite uncertain what the result will be.

3. When he offered small sacrifices from his small means, he thought that he was not at all inferior in merit to those who offered numerous and great sacrifices from ample and abundant means; for he said that it would not become the gods to delight in large rather than in small sacrifices; since, if such were the case, the offerings of the bad would oftentimes be more acceptable to them than those of the good; nor would life be of any account in the eyes of men, if oblations from the bad were better received by the gods than oblations from the good; but he thought that the gods had most pleasure in the offerings of the most pious. He also used to quote, with approbation, the verse, "Perform sacrifices to the gods according to your ability,"* and used to say that it was

* [Cf. St. Paul (II. Cor., viii., 12); Khordah-Avesta, xli. (page 201, above.) See Book IV., chapter iii., section 16, below.]

a good exhortation to men, with regard to friends, and guests, and all other relations of life, *to perform according to their ability*.

4. If anything appeared to be intimated to him from the gods, he could no more have been persuaded to act contrary to such intimation, than any one could have persuaded him to take for his guide on a journey a blind man, or one who did not know the way, instead of one who could see, and did know it; and he condemned the folly of others, who act contrary to what is signified by the gods, through anxiety to avoid the ill opinion of men. As for himself, he undervalued every thing human, in comparison with counsel from the gods.

5. He disciplined his mind and body by such a course of life, that he who should adopt a similar one, would, if no supernatural influence prevented, live in good spirits and uninterrupted health; nor would he ever be in want of the necessary expenses for it. So frugal was he, that I do not know whether any one could earn so little by the labor of his hands, as not to procure sufficient to have satisfied Socrates. He took only so much food as he could eat with a keen relish; and, to this end, he came to his meals so disposed that the appetite for his meat was the sauce to it. Every kind of drink was agreeable to him, because he never drank unless he was thirsty. 6. If he ever complied with an invitation to go to a feast, he very easily guarded, what is extremely difficult to most men, against loading his stomach to excess. Those who were unable to do so, he advised to be cautious of taking any thing that would stimulate them to eat when they were not hungry, and to drink when they were not thirsty; for he said that those were the things that disordered the stomach, the head and the mind.*

I., iv., 1. But if any suppose that Socrates, as some write and speak of him on conjecture, was excellently qualified to exhort men to virtue, but incapable of leading them forward in it, let them consider not only what he said in refutation, by questioning, of those who thought that they knew everything (refutations intended to check the progress of those disputants), but what he used to say in his daily intercourse with his associates, and then form an opinion whether he was capable of making those who conversed with him better. 2. I will first mention what I myself once heard him advance in a dialogue with Aristodemus, surnamed The Little,† concerning the gods; for having heard that Aristodemus neither sacrificed to the gods, nor prayed to them, nor attended to auguries, but ridiculed those who regarded such matters, he said to him,

* [I omit sections 7-15.] † An Athenian whom Plato names in his Symposium, a constant auditor of Socrates, and a man of much austerity."—*Schneider*.

"Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any men for their genius?" "I do," replied he. "Tell us their names, then," said Socrates. 3. "In epic poetry I most admire Homer, in dithyrambic Melanippides, in tragedy Sophocles, in statuary Polyeletus, in painting Zeuxis." 4. "And whether do those who form images without sense and motion, or those who form animals endowed with sense and vital energy, appear to you the more worthy of admiration?" "Those who form animals,* for they are not produced by chance, but by understanding." "And regarding things of which it is uncertain for what purpose they exist, and those evidently existing for some useful purpose, which of the two would you say were the productions of chance, and which of intelligence?" "Doubtless those which exist for some useful purpose must be the productions of intelligence." 5. "Does not he, then," proceeded Socrates, "who made men at first, appear to you to have given them, for some useful purpose, those parts by which they perceive different objects, the eyes to see what is to be seen, the ears to hear what is to be heard? What would be the use of smells, if no nostrils had been assigned us? What perception would there have been of sweet and sour, and of all that is pleasant to the mouth, if a tongue had not been formed in it to have a sense of them? 6. In addition to these things, does it not seem to you like the work of forethought, to guard the eye, since it is tender, with eyelids, like doors, which, when it is necessary to use the sight, are set open, but in sleep are closed? To make the eyelashes grow as a screen, that winds may not injure it? To make a coping on the parts above the eyes with the eye-brows, that the perspiration from the head may not annoy them? To provide that the ears may receive all kinds of sounds, yet never be obstructed?†—can you doubt whether such a disposition of things, made thus apparently with attention, is the result of chance or of intelligence?" 7. "No, indeed," replied Aristodemus, "but to one who looks at those matters in this light, they appear like the work of some wise maker who studied the welfare of animals?"‡

8. "And do you think that you yourself have any portion of intelligence?" "Question me, at least, and I will answer." "And can you suppose that nothing intelligent exists any where else? When you know that you have in your body but a small portion of the earth, which is vast, and a small portion of the water, which is vast, and that your frame is constituted for you to receive only a small portion of each of other things, that

* [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] † [I omit part of section 6, at this point.] ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 7.]

are vast, do you think that you have seized for yourself, by some extraordinary good fortune, intelligence alone which exists nowhere else, and that this assemblage of vast bodies, countless in number, is maintained in order by some thing void of reason?" 9.* "I do not see the directors, as I see the agent of things which are done here." "Nor do you see your own soul, which is the director of your body; so that, by like reasoning, you may say that you yourself do nothing with understanding, but every thing by chance."

10. "However, Socrates," said Aristodemus, "I do not despise the gods, but consider them as too exalted to need my attention." "But," said Socrates, "the more exalted they are, while they deign to attend to you, the more ought you to honor them." 11. "Be assured," replied Aristodemus, "that if I believed the gods took any thought for men, I would not neglect them." "Do you not, then, believe that the gods take thought for men? the gods who, in the first place, have made man alone, of all animals, upright (WHICH UPRIGHTNESS ENABLES HIM TO LOOK FORWARD TO A GREATER DISTANCE, AND TO CONTEMPLATE BETTER WHAT IS ABOVE, and renders those parts less liable to injury in which the gods have placed the eyes, and ears, and mouth); and in the next place, have given to other animals only feet, which merely give them the capacity of walking, while to men they have added hands, which execute most of those things through which we are better off than they. 12. And though all animals have tongues, they have made that of man alone of such a nature, as by touching sometimes one part of the mouth, and sometimes another, to express articulate sounds, and to signify everything that we wish to communicate one to another.† 13. Nor did it satisfy the gods to take care of the body merely, but, what is most important of all, they implanted in him the soul, his most excellent part. For what other animal has a soul to understand, first of all, that the gods, who have arranged such a vast and noble order of things, exist? What other species of animal, besides man, offers worship to the gods? What other animal has a mind better fitted than that of man, to guard against hunger or thirst, or cold or heat, or to relieve disease, or to acquire strength by exercise, or to labor to obtain knowledge; or more capable of remembering whatever it has heard, or seen, or learned? 14. Is it not clearly evident to you, that in comparison with other animals, men live like gods, excelling them by nature, both in body and mind? For an animal, having the body of an ox, and the understanding of a man, would

* [I omit the first part of section 9.] † [omit the remainder of section 12.]

be unable to execute what it might meditate; and animals which have hands,* but are without reason, have no advantage over others; and do you, who share both these excellent endowments, think that the gods take no thought for you? What then must they do, before you will think that they take thought for you?" 15. "I will think so," observed Aristodemus, "when they send me, as you say that they send to you, monitors, to show what I ought, and what I ought not, to do." "But when they send admonitions to the Athenians, on consulting them by divination, do you not think that they admonish you also? Or when they give warnings to the Greeks by sending portents, or when they give them to the whole human race, do they except you alone from the whole, and utterly neglect you? 16 Do you suppose, too, that the gods would have engendered a persuasion in men that they are able to benefit or injure them, unless they were really able to do so, and that men, if they had been thus perpetually deluded, would not have become sensible of the delusion? Do you not see that the oldest and wisest of human communities, the oldest and wisest cities and nations, are the most respectful to the gods, and that the wisest age of man is the most observant of their worship? 17. Consider also, my good youth," continued Socrates, "that your mind, existing within your body, directs your body as it pleases; and it becomes you therefore to believe that the intelligence pervading all things directs all things as may be agreeable to it, and not to think that while your eye can extend its sight over many furlongs, that of the divinity† is unable to see all things at once, or that while your mind can think of things here, or things in Egypt or Sicily, the mind of the deity is incapable of regarding every thing at the same time. 18. If, however, as you discover, by paying court to men, those who are willing to pay court to you in return, and, by doing favors to men, those who are willing to return your favors, and as, by asking counsel of men, you discover who are wise, you should, in like manner, make trial of the gods by offering worship to them, whether they will advise you concerning matters hidden from man, you will then find that the divinity is of such power, and of such a nature, as to see all things and hear all things at once, to be present every where, and to have a care for all things at the same time.

* Apes have hands resembling those of men, but are not on that account equal to men in ability.—*Schneider*. † Xenophon sometimes makes Socrates use the singular in speaking of the gods. But it is not *hence* to be inferred that he insinuated that there was only one god; for the Greeks frequently used the singular when they might have been expected to use the plural. Compare IV., iii., 14.

19. By delivering such sentiments, Socrates seems to me to have led his associates to refrain from what was impious, or unjust, or dishonorable, not merely when they were seen by men, but when they were in solitude, since they would conceive that nothing that they did would escape the knowledge of the gods.

BOOK I., chapter v., § 1. If temperance, moreover, be an honorable and valuable quality in a man, let us consider whether he at all promoted its observance by reflections of the following kind concerning it. "If, my friends, when a war was coming upon us, we should wish to choose a man by whose exertions we might ourselves be preserved, and might gain the mastery over our enemies, should we select one whom we knew to be unable to resist gluttony, or wine, or sensuality, or fatigue, or sleep? How could we think that such a man would either serve us, or conquer our adversaries? 2. Or if, being at the close of life, we should wish to commit to any one the guardianship of our sons, or the care of our unmarried daughters, or the preservation of our property, should we think an intemperate man worthy of confidence for such purposes? Should we intrust to an intemperate slave our herds, our granaries, or the superintendence of our agriculture? Should we be willing to accept such a slave as an agent, or purveyor, even for nothing? 3. But if we would not even accept an intemperate slave, how can it be otherwise than important for every man to take care that he himself does not become such a character? For the intemperate man is not injurious to his neighbor and profitable to himself (like the avaricious, who, by despoiling others of their property, seem to enrich themselves), but, while he is mischievous to others, is still more mischievous to himself, for it is, indeed, mischievous in the highest degree, to ruin not only his family, but his body and mind. 4. In society, too, who could find pleasure in the company of such a man, who, he would be aware, felt more delight in eating and drinking than in intercourse with his friends, and preferred the company of harlots to that of his fellows? Is it not the duty of every man to consider that temperance is the foundation of every virtue, and to establish the observance of it in his mind before all things? 5. For who, without it, can either learn any thing good, or sufficiently practice it? Who, that is a slave to pleasure, is not in an ill condition both as to his body and his mind?"*

6. While such were the remarks that he made, he proved himself more a friend to temperance by his life than by his words; for he was not only superior to all corporeal pleasures, but also to

* [I omit the remainder of section 5.]

those attendant on the acquisition of money; thinking that he who received money from any one,* set up a master over himself, and submitted to a slavery as disgraceful as any that could be.

I., vi., 1. It is due to Socrates, also, not to omit the dialogues which he held with Antipho the sophist. Antipho, on one occasion, wishing to draw away his associates from him, came up to Socrates when they were present, and said, 2. "I thought, Socrates, that those who studied philosophy were to become happier than other men; but you seem to have reaped from philosophy fruits of an opposite kind; at least you live in a way in which no slave would continue to live with his master; you eat food, and drink drink, of the worst kind; you wear a dress, not only bad, but the same both summer and winter, and you continue shoeless and coatless.† 3. Money, which cheers men when they receive it, and enables those who possess it to live more generously and pleasantly, you do not take; and if, therefore, as teachers in other professions make their pupils imitate themselves, you also shall produce a similar effect on your followers, you must consider yourself but a teacher of wretchedness." 4. Socrates, in reply to these remarks, said, "You seem to me, Antipho, to have conceived a notion that I live so wretchedly, that I feel persuaded you yourself would rather choose to die than pass your life as I pass mine. Let us then consider what it is that you find disagreeable in my mode of life. 5. Is it that while others, who receive money, must perform the service for which they receive it, while I, who receive none, am under no necessity to discourse with any one that I do not like? Or do you despise my way of living, on the supposition that I eat less wholesome or less strengthening food than yourself? Or is it that my diet is more difficult to procure than yours, as being more rare and expensive? Or is it that what you procure for yourself is more agreeable to you than what I provide for myself is to me? Do you not know that he who eats with the most pleasure is he who less requires sauce, and that he who drinks with the greatest pleasure is he who least desires other drink than that which he has? 6. You know that those who change their clothes, change them because of cold and heat, and that men put on sandals that they may not be prevented from walking through annoyances to the feet; but have you ever observed me remaining at home, on account of cold, more than any other man, or fighting with any one for shade because of heat,

* From any one that happened to present himself; from any one indiscriminately. † He wore only the inner tunic, not having the upper [it is here stated in a note from Ernesti].

or not walking wherever I please because my feet suffer? 7. Do you not know that those who are by nature the weakest, become, by exercising their bodies, stronger in those things in which they exercise them, than those who neglect them, and bear the fatigue of exercise with greater ease? And do you not think that I, who am constantly preparing my body by exercise to endure whatever may happen to it, bear everything more easily than you who take no exercise? 8. And to prevent me from being a slave to gluttony, or sleep, or other animal gratifications, can you imagine any cause more efficient than having other objects of attention more attractive than they, which not only afford pleasure in the moment of enjoying them, but give hopes that they will benefit me perpetually? You are aware of this also, that those who think themselves successful in nothing, are far from being cheerful, but that those who regard their agriculture, their seamanship, or whatever other occupation they pursue, as going on favorably for them, are delighted as with present success? 9. But do you think that from all these gratifications so much pleasure can arise as from the consciousness that you are growing better yourself, and are acquiring more valuable friends? Such is the consciousness, then, which I continue to enjoy.

"But if there should be occasion to assist our friends or our country, which of the two would have most leisure to attend to such objects, he who lives as I live now, or he who lives, as you think, in happiness? Which of the two would most readily seek the field of battle, he who can not exist without expensive dishes, or he who is content with whatever comes before him? Which of the two would sooner be reduced by a siege, he who requires what is most difficult to be found, or he who is fully content with what is easiest to be met with? 10. You, Antipho, seem to think that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance; but I think that to want nothing is to resemble the gods, and that to want as little as possible is to make the nearest approach to the gods; that the Divine nature is perfection, and that to be nearest to the Divine nature is to be nearest to perfection."*

I., vii., 1. Let us consider also, whether, by dissuading his followers from ostentation, he excited them to pursue virtue. He always used to say that there was no better road to honorable distinction, than that by which a person should **BECOME** excellent in that in which he wished to appear excellent.

2. That he said what was just, he used to prove by the following arguments: "Let us consider," he would say, "what a person

* [I omit sections 11-15.]

must do, if, not being a good flute-player, he should wish to appear so? Must he not imitate good flute-players in the adjuncts of their art? In the first place, as flute-players procure fine dresses, and go about with a great number of attendants, he must act in a similar manner; and as many people applaud them, he must get many to applaud him; yet he must never attempt to play, or he will at once be shown to be ridiculous, and not only a bad flute-player, but a vain boaster. Thus, after having been at great expense without the least benefit, and having, in addition, incurred evil repute, how will he live otherwise than in uneasiness, unprofitableness, and derision?

3. "In like manner, if any one should wish to be thought a good general, or a good steersman of a ship, without being so, let us reflect what would be his success. If, when he longed to seem capable of performing the duties of those characters, he should be unable to persuade others of his capability, would not this be a trouble to him? and, if he should persuade them of it, would it not be still more unfortunate for him? For it is evident that he who is appointed to steer a vessel, or to lead an army, without having the necessary knowledge, would be likely to destroy those whom he would not wish to destroy, and would come off himself with disgrace and suffering."

4. By similar examples he showed that it was of no profit for a man to appear rich, or valiant, or strong, without being so; for he said that demands were made upon such persons too great for their ability, and that, not being able to comply with them, when they seemed to be able, they met with no indulgence.

5. He called him, also, no small impostor, who, obtaining money or furniture from his neighbor by persuasion, should defraud him; but pronounced him the greatest of all imposters, who, possessed of no valuable qualifications, should deceive men by representing himself capable of governing his country. To me he appeared, by discoursing in this manner, to deter his associates from vain boasting.

BOOK II., chapter i., § 1. He appeared also to me, by such discourses as the following, to exhort his hearers to practice temperance in their desires for food, drink, sensual gratification, and sleep, and endurance of cold, heat, and labor. But finding that one of his associates was too intemperately disposed with regard to such matters, he said to him, "Tell me, Aristippus,* if it were

* Aristippus of Cyrene, the founder of the Cyrenaic sect of philosophers, who thought pleasure the greatest good, and pain the greatest evil. See b. III., ch. viii.

required of you to take two of our youths and educate them, the one in such a manner that he would be qualified to govern, and the other in such a manner that he would never seek to govern, how would you train them respectively? Will you allow us to consider the matter by commencing with their food, as with the first principles?" "Food, indeed," replied Aristippus, "appears to me one of the first principles; for a person could not even live if he were not to take food." 2. "It will be natural for them both, then," said Socrates, "to desire to partake of food when a certain hour comes." "It will be natural," said Aristippus. "And which of the two, then," said Socrates, "should we accustom to prefer the discharge of any urgent business to the gratification of his appetite?" "The one, undoubtedly," rejoined Aristippus, "who is trained to rule, that the business of the state may not be neglected during his administration." "And on the same person," continued Socrates, "we must, when they desire to drink, impose the duty of being able to endure thirst?" "Assuredly," replied Aristippus. 3. "And on which of the two should we lay the necessity of being temperate in sleep, so as to be able to go to rest late, to rise early, or to remain awake if it should be necessary?" "Upon the same, doubtless." "And on which of the two should we impose the obligation to control his sensual appetites, that he may not be hindered by their influence from discharging whatever duty may be required of him?" "Upon the same." "And on which of the two should we enjoin the duty of not shrinking from labor, but willingly submitting to it?" "This also, is to be enjoined on him who is trained to rule." "And to which of the two would it more properly belong to acquire whatever knowledge would assist him to secure the mastery over his rivals?" "Far more, doubtless, to him who is trained to govern, for without such sort of acquirements there would be no profit in any of his other qualifications."* 6. "And since the greater part of the most necessary employments of life, such as those of war and agriculture, and not a few others, are to be carried on in the open air, does it not appear to you to show great negligence, that the majority of mankind should be wholly unexercised to bear cold and heat?" Aristippus replied in the affirmative. "Does it not then appear to you that we ought to train him who is intended to rule, to bear these inconveniences also without difficulty?" "Doubtless," answered Aristippus. 7. "If, therefore, we class those capable of enduring these things among those who are qualified to govern, shall we not class such as are incapable of enduring them among those who will not even

* [I omit sections 4 and 5.]

aspire to govern?" Aristippus expressed his assent. "In conclusion, then, since you know the position of each of these classes of men, have you ever considered in which of them you can reasonably place yourself?" 8. "I have indeed," said Aristippus, "and I by no means place myself in the class of those desiring to rule; for it appears to me that, when it is a task of great difficulty to procure necessities for one's self, it is the mark of a very foolish man not to be satisfied with that occupation, but to add to it the labor of procuring for his fellow-countrymen whatever they need. And is it not the greatest folly in him, that while many things which he desires are out of his reach, he should, by setting himself at the head of the state, subject himself, if he does not accomplish all that the people desire, to be punished for his failure?" 9. For the people think it right to use their governors as I use my slaves; for I require my slaves to supply me with the necessities of life in abundance, but to take no part of them themselves; and the people think it the duty of their governors to supply them with as many enjoyments as possible, but themselves to abstain from all of them. Those, therefore, who wish to have much trouble themselves, and to give trouble to others,* I would train in this manner, and rank among those qualified to govern; but myself I would number with those who wish to pass their lives in the greatest possible ease and pleasure."

10. Socrates then said, "Will you allow us to consider this point also, whether the governors or the governed live with the greater pleasure?" "By all means," said Aristippus. "In the first place, then, of the nations of which we have any knowledge, the Persians bear rule in Asia, and the Syrians, Phrygians, and Lydians are under subjection; the Scythians govern in Europe, and the Mæotians† are held in subjection; the Carthaginians rule in Africa, and the Libyans are under subjection. Which of these do you regard as living with the greater pleasure? Or among the Greeks, of whom you yourself are, which of the two appear to you to live more happily, those who rule, or those who are in subjection?" 11. "Yet, on the other hand,"‡ said Aristippus, "I do not consign

* He that holds the reins of government, must not only undergo much toil and trouble himself, but must also enjoin many tasks and duties on others, and incite them to exertion and industry. [I omit the remainder of this note, at the end of which Mr. Watson appends the name of]—*Kuehner*. † The people bordering on the lake Mæotis, which was in Sarmatia Europæa, and is now called the sea of Azov.—*Kuehner*. ‡ Compare section 8, where Aristippus says that he does not rank himself among those who wish to rule; here he states that, *on the other hand*, he does not wish to be a slave.

myself to slavery; but there appears to me to be a certain middle path between the two, in which I endeavor to proceed, and which leads, not through slavery, but through liberty, a path that most surely conducts to happiness." 12. "If this path of yours, indeed," said Socrates, "as it lies neither through sovereignty nor servitude, did not also lie through human society, what you say would perhaps be worth consideration; but if, while living among mankind, you shall neither think proper to rule nor to be ruled, and shall not willingly pay respect to those in power, I think that you will see that the stronger know how to treat the weaker as slaves, making them to lament both publicly and privately. 13. Do those escape your knowledge who fell and destroy the corn and trees of others that have sown and planted them, and who assail in every way such as are inferior to them, and are unwilling to flatter them, until they prevail on them to prefer slavery to carrying on war against their superiors? In private life, too, do you not see that the spirited and strong enslave the timorous and weak, and enjoy the fruits of their labors?" "But for my part," answered Aristippus, "in order that I may not suffer such treatment, I shall not shut myself up in any one state, but shall be a traveler everywhere." 14. "Doubtless," rejoined Socrates, "this is an admirable plan that you propose; for since Sinis, and Sciron, and Procrustes* were killed, nobody injures travelers. Yet those who manage the government in their several countries, even now make laws, in order that they may not be injured, and attach to themselves, in addition to such as are called their necessary connections, other supporters; they also surround their cities with ramparts, and procure weapons with which they may repel aggressors, securing, besides all these means of defense, other allies from abroad; and yet those who have provided themselves with all these bulwarks, nevertheless suffer injury; 15. and do you, having no protection of the sort, spending a long time on roads on which a very great number are outraged, weaker than all the inhabitants of whatever city you may arrive at, and being such a character† as those who are eager to commit violence most readily attack, think, nevertheless, that you will not be wronged because you are a stranger? Or are you without fear, because these cities proclaim

*Celebrated robbers, put to death by Theseus. This is a pleasant irony, says Weiske, in the remark of Socrates: though Sinis, Sciron, and Procrustes no longer rob on the highways, yet there is no lack of successors to them. †A person without any settled abode, without friends or supporters: not under the protection of any particular state, but wandering from one state to another.—*Kuchner*.

safety to any one arriving or departing? Or because you think that you would prove a slave of such a character as would profit no master, for who, you perhaps ask yourself, would wish to keep in his house a man not at all disposed to labor, and delighting in the most expensive fare? 16. But let us consider how masters treat slaves of such a sort. Do they not tame down their fondness for dainties by hunger? Do they not hinder them from stealing by excluding them from every place from whence they may take anything? Do they not prevent them from running away by putting fetters on them? Do they not overcome their laziness with stripes? Or how do you yourself act, when you find any one of your slaves to be of such a disposition?" 17. "I chastise him," said Aristippus, "with every kind of punishment, until I compel him to serve me. But how do those, Socrates, who are trained to the art of ruling, which you seem to me to consider as happiness, differ from those who undergo hardships from necessity, since they will have (though it be with their own consent) to endure hunger, and thirst, and cold, and want of sleep, and suffer all other inconveniences of the same kind? 18. For I, for my own part, do not know what difference it makes to a man who is scourged on the same skin, whether it be voluntarily or involuntarily, or, in short, to one who suffers with the same body in all such points, whether he suffer with his consent or against it, except that folly is to be attributed to him who endures troubles voluntarily." "What then, Aristippus," said Socrates, "do not voluntary endurances of this kind seem to you to differ from the involuntary, inasmuch as he who is hungry from choice may eat when he pleases, and he who is thirsty from choice may drink when he pleases, the same being the case with regard to other voluntary sufferings, while he who endures such hardships from necessity has no liberty to relieve himself from them when he wishes? Besides, he who undergoes trouble willingly, is cheered in undergoing it with some expectation of good, as the hunters of wild animals bear fatigue with pleasure in the hope of capturing them. 19. And such rewards of toil are indeed but of small worth; but as for those who toil that they may acquire valuable friends, or that they may subdue their enemies, or they may, by becoming vigorous in body and mind, manage their own household judiciously, and be of service to their friends and of advantage to their country, how can you think that they labor for such objects otherwise than cheerfully, or that they do not live in happiness, esteeming themselves, and being praised and envied by others? 20. But indolence, moreover, and pleasures enjoyed at the moment

of desire, are neither capable of producing a good constitution of body, as the teachers of gymnastic exercises say, nor do they bring to the mind any knowledge worthy of consideration; but exercises pursued with persevering labor lead men to the attainment of honorable and valuable objects, as worthy men inform us; and Hesiod somewhere says, 'Vice it is possible to find in abundance and with ease; for the way to it is smooth, and lies very near. But before the temple of Virtue the immortal gods have placed labor, and the way to it is long and steep, and at the commencement rough; but when the traveler has arrived at the summit, it then becomes easy, however difficult it was at first.' A sentiment to which Epicharmus gives his testimony in this verse, 'The gods for labor sell us all good things;' and in another place he says, 'O wretched mortal, desire not what is soft, lest you find what is hard.'

21. "Prodicus the sophist, also, in his narrative concerning Hercules, which indeed he declaims to most people as a specimen of his ability, expresses a similar notion respecting virtue, speaking, as far as I remember, to the following effect: For he says that Hercules, when he was advancing from boyhood to manhood, a period at which the young, becoming their own masters, begin to give intimations whether they will enter on life by the path of virtue or that of vice, went forth into a solitary place, and sat down, perplexed as to which of these two paths he should pursue; 22. and that two female figures, of lofty stature, seemed to advance toward him, the one of an engaging and graceful mien, gifted by nature with elegance of form, modesty of look, and sobriety of demeanor, and clad in a white robe; the other fed to plumpness and softness, but assisted by art both in her complexion, so as to seem fairer and rosier than she really was, and in her gesture, so as to seem taller than her natural height.* 23. As they approached nearer to Hercules, she whom I first described came forward at the same pace, but the other, eager to get before her, ran up to Hercules, and exclaimed, 'I see that you are hesitating, Hercules, by what path you shall enter upon life; if, then, you make a friend of me, I will conduct you by the most delightful and easy road, and you shall taste of every species of pleasure, and lead a life free from every sort of trouble. 24. In the first place, you shall take no thought of wars or state affairs, but shall pass your time considering what meat or drink you may find to gratify your appetite, what you may delight yourself by seeing or hearing, what you may be pleased with smelling or touching, with what objects of affection

*[I omit the remainder of section 22.]

you may have most pleasure in associating, how you may sleep most softly, and how you may secure all these enjoyments with the least degree of trouble. 25. If an apprehension of want of means, by which such delights may be obtained, should ever arise in you, there is no fear that I shall urge you to procure them by toil or suffering either of body or mind; but you shall enjoy what others acquire by labor, abstaining from nothing by which it may be possible to profit, for I give my followers liberty to benefit themselves from any source whatever.'

26. "Hercules, on hearing this address, said, 'And what, O woman, is your name?' 'My friends,' she replied, 'call me Happiness, but those who hate me, give me, to my disparagement, the name of Vice.'

27. "In the mean time the other female approached, and said, 'I also am come to address you, Hercules, because I know your parents, and have observed your disposition in the training of your childhood, from which I entertain hopes that, if you direct your steps along the path that leads to my dwelling, you will become an excellent performer of whatever is honorable and noble, and that I shall appear more honorable and attractive through your illustrious deeds. I will not deceive you, however, with promises of pleasure, but will set before you things as they really are, and as the gods have appointed them; 28. for of what is valuable and excellent, the gods grant nothing to mankind without labor and care; and if you wish the gods, therefore, to be propitious to you, you must worship the gods; if you seek to be beloved by your friends, you must serve your friends; if you desire to be honored by any city, you must benefit that city; if you long to be admired by all Greece for your merit, you must endeavor to be of advantage to all Greece; if you are anxious that the earth should yield you abundance of fruit, you must cultivate the earth; if you think that you should enrich yourself from herds of cattle, you must bestow care upon herds of cattle; if you are eager to increase your means by war, and to secure freedom to your friends and subdue your enemies, you must learn the arts of war, and learn them from such as understand them, and practice how to use them with advantage; or if you wish to be vigorous in body, you must accustom your body to obey your mind, and exercise it with toil and exertion.'

29. "Here Vice, interrupting her speech, said, (as Prodicus relates), 'Do you see, Hercules, by how difficult and tedious a road this woman conducts you to gratification, while I shall lead you, by an easy and short path, to perfect happiness?'

30. "Wretched being," rejoined Virtue, 'of what good are you in possession? Or what real pleasure do you experience, when you are unwilling to do anything for the attainment of it? You, who do not even wait for the natural desire of gratification, but fill yourself with all manner of dainties before you have an appetite for them, eating before you are hungry, drinking before you are thirsty, procuring cooks that you may eat with pleasure, buying costly wines that you may drink with pleasure, and running about seeking for snow* in summer; while, in order to sleep with pleasure, you prepare not only soft beds, but couches, and rockers under your couches, for you do not desire sleep in consequence of labor, but in consequence of having nothing to do.† 31. Though you are one of the immortal, you are cast out from the society of the gods, and despised by the good among mankind; the sweetest of all sounds, the praises of yourself, you have never heard, nor have you ever seen the most pleasing of all sights, for you have never beheld one meritorious work of your own hand. Who would believe you when you give your word for any thing? Or who would assist you when in need of any thing? Or who, that has proper feeling, would venture to join your company of revelers? for while they are young they grow impotent in body, and when they are older they are impotent in mind; they live without labor, and in fatness, through their youth, and pass laboriously, and in wretchedness, through old age; ashamed of what they have done, oppressed with what they have to do, having run through their pleasures in early years, and laid up afflictions for the close of life. 32. But I am the companion of the gods; I associate with virtuous men; no honorable deed, divine or human, is done without me; I am honored, most of all, by the deities, and by those among men to whom it belongs to honor me, being a welcome co-operator with artisans, a faithful household guardian to masters, a benevolent assistant to servants, a benign promoter of the labors of peace, a constant auxiliary to the efforts of war, an excellent sharer in friendship. 33. My friends have a sweet and untroubled enjoyment of meat and drink, for they refrain from them till they feel an appetite. They have also sweeter sleep than the idle; and are neither annoyed if they lose a portion of it, nor neglect to do their duties for the sake of it. The young are pleased with praises from the old; the old are delighted with honors from the young. They remember their former acts with pleasure, and rejoice to perform their present occupations with success; being, through my influ-

* To cool wine [it is explained in a note here]. † [I omit the remainder of section 30.]

ence, dear to the gods, beloved by their friends, and honored by their country. And when the destined end of life comes, they do not lie in oblivion and dishonor, but, celebrated with songs of praise, flourish forever in the memory of mankind. By such a course of conduct, O Hercules, son of noble parents, you may secure the most exalted happiness.'

34. "Nearly thus it was that Prodicus related the instruction of Hercules by Virtue; adorning the sentiments, however, with far more magnificent language than that in which I now give them. It becomes you, therefore, Aristippus, reflecting on these admonitions, to endeavor to think of what concerns the future period of your life."

II., ii., 1. Having learned, one day, that Lamprocles, the eldest* of his sons, had exhibited anger against his mother, "Tell me, my son," said he, "do you know that certain persons are called ungrateful?" "Certainly," replied the youth. "And do you understand how it is they act that men give them this appellation?" "I do," said Lamprocles, "for it is those that have received a kindness, and that do not make a return when they are able to make one, whom they call ungrateful." "They then appear to you to class the ungrateful with the unjust?" "I think so." 2. "And have you ever considered whether, as it is thought unjust to make slaves of our friends, but just to make slaves of our enemies, so it is unjust to be ungrateful toward our friends, but just to be so toward our enemies?" "I certainly have," answered Lamprocles, "and from whomsoever a man receives a favor, whether friend or enemy, and does not endeavor to make a return for it, he is in my opinion unjust."

3. "If such, then, be the case," pursued Socrates, "ingratitude must be manifest injustice?" Lamprocles expressed his assent. "The greater benefits, therefore, a person has received, and makes no return, the more unjust he must be?" He assented to this position also. "Whom, then," asked Socrates, "can we find receiving greater benefits from any persons than children receive from their parents? children whom their parents have brought from non-existence into existence, to view so many beautiful objects, and to share in so many blessings, as the gods grant to men; blessings which appear to us so inestimable, that we shrink, in the highest degree, from relinquishing them; and governments have made death the penalty for the most heinous crimes, in the supposition that they could not suppress injustice by the terror of any greater evil.† 5. The man maintains her who joins with him to

* Socrates had three sons, Lamprocles, Sophroniscus, and Menexenus. See Cobet, *Prosopogr. Xen.* p. 57.—*Kuehner*. † [I omit section 4.]

produce offspring, and provides, for the children that are likely to be born to him, whatever he thinks will conduce to their support, in as great abundance as he can; while the woman receives and bears the burden, oppressed and endangering her life, and imparting a portion of the nutriment with which she herself is supported; and at length, after bearing it the full time, and bringing it forth with great pain, she suckles and cherishes it, though she has received no previous benefit from it, nor does the infant know by whom it is tended, nor is it able to signify what it wants, but she, conjecturing what will nourish and please it, tries to satisfy his calls, and feeds it for a long time, both night and day, submitting to the trouble and not knowing what return she will receive for it.

6. Nor does it satisfy the parents merely to feed their offspring, but as soon as the children appear capable of learning any thing, they teach them whatever they know that may be of use for their conduct in life; and whatever they consider another more capable of communicating than themselves, they send their sons to him at their own expense, and take care to adopt every course that their children may be as much improved as possible."

7. Upon this the young man said, "But, even if she has done all this, and many times more than this, no one, assuredly, could endure her ill-humor." "And which do you think," asked Socrates, "more difficult to be endured, the ill-humor of a wild beast, or that of a mother?" "I think," replied Lamprocles, "that of a mother, at least of such a mother as mine is." "Has she ever then inflicted any hurt upon you, by biting or kicking you, as many have often suffered from wild beasts?" 8. "No; but* she says such things as no one would endure to hear for the value of all that he possesses." "And do you reflect," returned Socrates, "how much grievous trouble you have given her by your peevishness, by voice and by action, in the day and in the night, and how much anxiety you have caused her when you were ill?" "But I have never said or done any thing to her," replied Lamprocles, "at which she could feel ashamed." 9. "Do you think it, then," inquired Socrates, "a more difficult thing for you to listen to what she says, than for actors to listen when they utter the bitterest reproaches against one another in tragedies?" "But actors, I imagine, endure such reproaches easily, because they do not think that, of the speakers, the one who utters reproaches, utters them with intent to do harm, or that the one who utters threats, utters them with any evil purpose." "Yet you are displeased at your mother, although you well know that whatever she says, she not only says

* [I have omitted part of section 8 at this point.]

nothing with intent to do you harm, but that she wishes you more good than any other human being. Or do you suppose that your mother meditates evil toward you?" "No, indeed," said Lamprocles, "that I do not imagine." 10. "Do you then say that this mother," rejoined Socrates, "who is so benevolent to you, who, when you are ill, takes care of you, to the utmost of her power, that you may recover your health, and that you may want nothing that is necessary for you, and who, besides, entreats the gods for many blessings on your head, and pays vows for you, is a harsh mother? For my part, I think that if you can not endure such a mother, you can not endure any thing that is good. 11. But tell me," continued he, "whether you think that you ought to pay respect to any other human being, or whether you are resolved to try to please nobody, and to follow or obey neither a general nor any other commander?" "No, indeed," replied Lamprocles, "I have formed no such resolutions." 12. "Are you then willing," inquired Socrates, "to cultivate the good will of your neighbor, that he may kindle a fire for you when you want it, or aid you in obtaining some good, or, if you happen to meet with any misfortune, may assist you with willing and ready help?" "I am," replied he. "Or would it make no difference," rejoined Socrates, "whether a fellow-traveler, or a fellow-voyager, or any other person that you met with, should be your friend or enemy? Or do you think that you ought to cultivate their good will?" "I think that I ought," replied Lamprocles. 13. "You are then prepared," returned Socrates, "to pay attention to such persons; and do you think that you ought to pay no respect to your mother, who loves you more than any one else? Do you not know that the state takes no account of any other species of ingratitude, nor allows any action at law for it, overlooking such as receive a favor and make no return for it, but that if a person does not pay due regard to his parents, it imposes a punishment on him, rejects his services, and does not allow him to hold the archonship, considering that such a person can not piously perform the sacrifices offered for the country, or discharge any other duty with propriety and justice? Indeed, if any one does not keep up the sepulchers of his dead parents, the state inquires into it in the examinations of candidates for office. 14. You therefore, my son, if you are wise, will entreat the gods to pardon you if you have been wanting in respect toward your mother, lest, regarding you as an ungrateful person, they should be disinclined to do you good; and you will have regard, also, to the opinion of men, lest, observing you to be neglectful of your parents, they should all condemn you, and you

should then be found destitute of friends; for if men surmise that you are ungrateful toward your parents, no one will believe that if he does you a kindness he will meet with gratitude in return."

II, iii., 1. Socrates, having observed that Chærephon and Chærecrates, two brothers well known to him, were at variance with each other, and having met with Chærecrates, said, "Tell me, Chærecrates, you surely are not one of those men, are you, who think wealth more valuable than brothers, when wealth is but a senseless thing, and a brother endowed with reason, when wealth needs protection, while a brother can afford protection, and when wealth, besides, is plentiful, and a brother but one? 2. It is wonderful, too, that a man should consider brothers to be a detriment to him, because he does not possess his brothers' fortunes, while he does not consider his fellow-citizens to be a detriment, because he does not possess their fortunes; but, in the latter case, he can reason with himself, that it is better for him, living in society with many, to enjoy a competency in security, than, living alone, to possess all the property of his fellow-citizens in fear of danger, while, with regard to brothers, he knows not how to apply such reasoning. 3. Those who are able, too,* procure friends, as being in need of supporters, while they neglect their brothers, as if friends could be made of fellow-citizens, but could not be made of brothers. 4. Yet it surely conduces greatly to friendship to have been born of the same parents, and to have been brought up together, since, even among brutes, a certain affection springs up between those that are reared together. In addition to these considerations, men pay more respect to those who have brothers than to those who have none, and are less forward to commit aggression on them."

5. To this Chærecrates made answer, "If, indeed, Socrates, the dissension between us were not great, it might perhaps be my duty to bear with my brother, and not shun his society for slight causes; for a brother, as you say, is a valuable possession, if he be such as he ought to be; but when he is nothing of the sort, and is indeed quite the reverse of what he should be, why should I attempt impossibilities?" 6. "Whether, then, Chærecrates," rejoined Socrates, "is Chærephon unable to please any body, as he is unable to please you, or are there some whom he certainly can please?" "Yes," replied Chærecrates, "for it is for this very reason that I justly hate him, that he can please others, while to me he is on all occasions, whenever he comes in contact with me, a harm rather than a good, both in word and deed." 7. "Is the case then thus," said Socrates, "that as a horse is a harm to him who knows not

* [I omit part of section 3 at this point.]

how to manage him, and yet tries to do so, so a brother is a harm, when a person tries to manage him without knowing how to do it?" 8. "But how can I be ignorant," replied Chærecrates, "how to manage my brother, when I know how to speak well of him who speaks well of me, and to do well to him who does well to me? As to one, however, who seeks to vex me both by word and deed, I should not be able either to speak well of him, or to act well toward him, nor will I try." 9. "You speak strangely, Chærecrates," rejoined Socrates, "for if a dog of yours were of service to watch your sheep, and fawned upon your shepherds, but snarled when you approached him, you would forbear to show any ill feeling toward him, but would endeavor to tame him by kindness; but as for your brother, though you admit that he would be a great good to you if he were such as he ought to be, and though you confess that you know how to act and speak well with respect to him, you do not even attempt to make him of such service to you as he might be." 10. "I fear, Socrates," replied Chærecrates, "that I have not wisdom enough to render Chærephon such as he ought to be toward me." "Yet there is no need to contrive any thing artful or novel to act upon him," said Socrates, "as it appears to me; for I think that he may be gained over by means which you already know, and may conceive a high esteem for you." 11. "Tell me first," said the other, "whether you have observed that I possess any love-charm, which I was not aware that I knew?" "Answer me this question," said Socrates: "If you wished to induce any one of your acquaintance, when he offered sacrifice, to invite you to his feast, what would you do?" "I should doubtless begin by inviting him when I offered sacrifice." 12. "And if you wished to prevail on any of your friends to take care of your property, when you went from home, what would you do?" "I should certainly first offer to take care of his property, when he went from home." 13. "And if you wished to induce an acquaintance in a foreign land to receive you hospitably when you visited his country, what would you do?" "I should unquestionably be the first to receive him hospitably when he came to Athens; and if I wished him to be desirous to effect for me the objects for which I went thither, it is clear that I must first confer a similar service on him." 14. "Have you not long been unawares acquainted, then, with all the love charms that exist among mankind? Or are you afraid," continued Socrates, "to make the first advances, lest you should seem to degrade yourself, if you should be the first to propitiate your brother? Yet he is thought to be a man deserving of great praise, who is the first to do harm

to the enemy, and to do good to his friends. If, then, Chærephon had appeared to me more likely to bring you to this frame of mind, I would have endeavored to persuade him first to try to make you his friend : but, as things stand, you seem more likely, if you take the lead, to effect the desired object." 15. " You speak unreasonably, Socrates," rejoined Chærecrates, " and not as might be expected from you, when you desire me, who am the younger, to take the lead ; for the established practice among all men is quite the reverse, being that the elder should always be first, both to act and speak." 16. " How," said Socrates, " is it not the custom every where that the younger should yield the path to the elder when he meets him, rise from his seat before him, honor him with the softest couch, and give place to him in conversation ? Do not therefore hesitate, my good young friend, but endeavor to conciliate your brother, and he will very soon listen to you. Do you not see how fond of honor, and how liberal-minded he is ? Mean-minded persons you can not attract more effectually than by giving them something ; but honorable and good men you may best gain by treating them in a friendly spirit." 17. " But what if he should become no kinder," said Chærecrates, " after I have done what you advise ? " " It will be of no consequence," replied Socrates, " for what other risk will you run but that of showing that you are kind and full of brotherly affection, and that he is mean-spirited and unworthy of any kindness ? But I apprehend no such result ; for I conceive that when he finds you challenging him to such a contest, he will be extremely emulous to excel you in doing kindnesses both by word and deed. 18. At present, you are in the same case as if the two hands, which the gods have made to assist each other, should neglect this duty, and begin to impede each other ; or as if the two feet, formed by divine providence to co-operate with one another, should give up this office, and obstruct one another. 19. Would it not be a great folly and misfortune to use for our hurt what was formed for our benefit ? And indeed, as it appears to me, the gods have designed brothers to be of greater mutual service than the hands, or feet, or eyes, or other members which they have made in pairs for men ; for the hands, if required to do things, at the same time, at greater distance than a fathom, would be unable to do them ; the feet can not reach two objects, at the same time, that are distant even a fathom ; and the eyes, which seem to reach to the greatest distance, can not, of objects that are much nearer, see at the same time those that are before and behind them ; but brothers, if they are in friendship, can, even at the greatest distance, act in concert and for mutual benefit."

II., iv., 1. I heard him, also, on one occasion, holding a discourse concerning friends, by which, as it seems to me, a person might be greatly benefited, both as to the acquisition and use of friends; for he said that he had heard many people observe that a true and honest friend was the most valuable of all possessions, but that he saw the greater part of mankind attending to any thing rather than securing friends. 2. He observed them, he added, industriously endeavoring to procure houses and lands, slaves, cattle, and furniture; but as for a friend, whom they called the greatest of blessings, he saw the majority considering neither how to procure one, nor how those whom they had might be retained. 3. Even when friends and slaves were sick, he said that he noticed people calling in physicians to their slaves, and carefully providing other means for their recovery, but paying no attention to their friends; and that, if both died, they grieved for their slaves, and thought that they had suffered a loss, but considered that they lost nothing in losing friends. Of their other possessions they left nothing untended or unheeded, but when their friends required attention, they utterly neglected them.

4. In addition to these remarks he observed that he saw the greater part of mankind acquainted with the number of their other possessions, although they might be very numerous, but of their friends, though but few, they were not only ignorant of the number, but even when they attempted to reckon it to such as asked them, they set aside again some that they had previously counted among their friends; so little did they allow their friends to occupy their thoughts. 5. Yet in comparison with what possession, of all others, would not a good friend appear far more valuable? What sort of horse, or yoke of oxen, is so useful as a truly good friend? What slave is so well disposed or so attached, or what other acquisition so beneficial? 6. For a good friend is ready to supply whatever is wanting on the part of his friend, whether in his private affairs, or for the public interests; if he is required to do a service to any one, he assists him with the means; if any apprehension alarms him, he lends him his aid, sometimes sharing expenditure with him, sometimes co-operating with him, sometimes joining with him to persuade others, sometimes using force toward others; frequently cheering him when he is successful, and frequently supporting him when he is in danger of falling. 7. What the hands do, what the eyes foresee, what the ears hear, what the feet accomplish, for each individual, his friend, of all such services, fails to perform no one; and oftentimes, what a person has not effected for himself, or has not seen, or has not

heard, or has not accomplished, a friend has succeeded in executing for his friend; and yet, while people try to foster trees for the sake of their fruit, the greater portion of mankind are heedless and neglectful of that most productive possession which is called a friend.

BOOK II., chapter v., § 1. I heard one day another dissertation of his, which seemed to me to exhort the hearer to examine himself, and ascertain of how much value he was to his friends. Finding that one of his followers was neglectful of a friend who was oppressed with poverty, he asked Antisthenes, in the presence of the man that neglected his friend, and of several others, saying, "Are their certain settled values for friends, Antisthenes, as there are for slaves? 2. For, of slaves, one, perhaps, is worth two minæ, another not even half a mina, another five minæ, another ten. Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is said to have bought an overseer for his silver mines at the price of a whole talent. I am therefore considering whether, as there are certain values for slaves, there are also certain values for friends." 3. "There are, undoubtedly," replied Antisthenes; "at least I, for my part, should wish one man to be my friend rather than have two minæ; another I should not value even at half a mina; another I should prefer to ten minæ; and another I would buy for my friend at the sacrifice of all the money and revenues in the world." 4. "If such be the case, therefore," said Socrates, "it would be well for each of us to examine himself, to consider of what value he is in the estimation of his friends; and to try to be of as much value to them as possible."*

II., vi., 1. He appeared to me, also, to make his followers wise in examining what sort of persons it was right to attach to themselves as friends, by such conversations as the following: "Tell me, Critobulus," said he, "if we were in need of a good friend, how should we proceed to look for one? Should we not, in the first place, seek for a person who can govern his appetite, his inclination to wine or sensuality, and abstain from immoderate sleep and idleness? for one who is overcome by such propensities would be unable to do his duty either to himself or his friend." "Assuredly he would not," said Critobulus. "It appears then to you that we must avoid one who is at the mercy of such inclinations?" "Undoubtedly," replied Critobulus. 2. "Besides," continued Socrates, "does not a man who is extravagant and yet unable to support himself, but is always in want of assistance from his neighbor, a man who, when he borrows, can not pay, and when

* [I omit the remainder of section 4, and the whole of section 5.]

he can not borrow, hates him who will not lend, appear to you to be a dangerous friend?" "Assuredly," replied Critobulus. "We must therefore avoid such a character?" "We must indeed." 3. "Again: what sort of friend would he be who has the means of getting money, and covets great wealth, and who, on this account, is a driver of hard bargains, and delights to receive, but is unwilling to pay?" "Such a person appears to me," said Critobulus, "to be a still worse character than the former." 4. "What then do you think of him, who, from love of getting money, allows himself no time for thinking of any thing else but whence he may obtain it?" "We must avoid him, as it seems to me; for he would be useless to any one that should make an associate of him." "And what do you think of him who is quarrelsome, and likely to raise up many enemies against his friends?" "We must avoid him also."* "But if a man have none of these bad qualities, but is content to receive obligations, taking no thought of returning them?" "He also would be useless as a friend. But what sort of person, then, Socrates, should we endeavor to make our friend?" 5. "A person, I think, who, being the reverse of all this, is proof against the seductions of bodily pleasures, is upright and fair in his dealings, and emulous not to be outdone in serving those who serve him, so that he is of advantage to those who associate with him." 6. "How then shall we find proof of these qualities in him, Socrates, before we associate with him?" "We make proof of statuaries," rejoined Socrates, "not by forming opinions from their words, but whomsoever we observe to have executed his previous statues skillfully, we trust that he will execute others well." 7. "You mean, then, that the man who is known to have served his former friends, will doubtless be likely to serve such as may be his friends hereafter?" "Yes; for whomsoever I know to have previously managed horses with skill, I expect to manage other horses with skill."

8. "Be it so," said Critobulus; "but by what means must we make a friend of him who appears to us worthy of our friendship?"† 9. "Assuredly," returned Socrates, "he is not to be caught by tracking him like the hare, or by wiles, like birds, or by making him prisoner by force, like enemies; for it would be an arduous task to make a man your friend against his will, or to hold him fast if you were to bind him like a slave; for those who suffer such treatment are rendered enemies rather than friends."‡ 14. "You appear to me to mean, Socrates, that if we would attach to

* [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] † [I omit the remainder of section 8.] ‡ [I omit sections 10-13.]

us any good person as a friend, we ourselves should be good both in speaking and acting." "And did you think it possible," said Socrates, "for a bad person to attach to himself good men as his friends?"*

17. "What perplexes you, Critobulus, is, that you often see men who are honorable in their conduct, and who refrain from every thing disgraceful, involved, instead of being friends, in dissensions with one another, and showing more severity toward each other than the worthless part of mankind." 18. "Nor is it only private persons," rejoined Critobulus, "that act in this manner, but even whole communities, which have the greatest regard for what is honorable, and are least inclined to any thing disgraceful, are often hostilely disposed toward one another.

19. "When I reflect on these differences," continued Critobulus, "I am quite in despair about the acquisition of friends, for I see that the bad can not be friends with one another; for how can the ungrateful, or careless, or avaricious, or faithless, or intemperate, be friends to each other? indeed the bad appear to me to be altogether disposed by nature to be mutual enemies rather than friends. 20. Again, the bad, as you observe, can never harmonize in friendship with the good; for how can those who commit bad actions be friends with those who abhor such actions? And yet, if those also who practice virtue fall into dissensions with one another about pre-eminence in their respective communities, and even hate each other through envy, who will ever be friends, or among what class of mankind shall affection and attachment be found?" 21. "But these affections act in various ways," rejoined Socrates, "for men have by nature inclinations to attachment, since they stand in need of each other, and feel compassion for each other, and co-operate for mutual benefit, and, being conscious that such is the case, have a sense of gratitude toward one another; but they have also propensities to enmity, for such as think the same objects honorable and desirable, engage in contention for them, and, divided in feelings, become enemies. Disputations and anger lead to war; the desire of aggrandizement excites ill-will; and envy is followed by hatred. 22. But, nevertheless, friendship, insinuating itself through all these hinderances, unites together the honorable and good; for such characters, through affection for virtue, prefer the enjoyment of a moderate competency without strife, to the attainment of unlimited power by means of war; they can endure hunger and thirst without discontent, and take only a fair share of meat and drink, and, though delighted with the attractions

* [I omit sections 15 and 16.]

of youthful beauty, they can control themselves, so as to forbear from offending those whom they ought not to offend. 23. By laying aside all avaricious feelings too, they can not only be satisfied with their lawful share of the common property, but can even assist one another. They can settle their differences, not only without mutual offense, but even to their mutual benefit. They can prevent their anger from going so far as to cause them repentance; and envy they entirely banish, by sharing their own property with their friends, and considering that of their friends as their own.

24. "How, then, can it be otherwise than natural, that the honorable and good should be sharers in political distinctions, not only without detriment, but even with advantage to each other? Those indeed who covet honor and power in states, merely that they may be able to embezzle money, to do violence to others, and to live a life of luxury, must be regarded as unprincipled and abandoned characters, and incapable of harmonious union with other men. 25. But when a person wishes to attain honors in a community, in order, not merely that he may not suffer wrong himself, but that he may assist his friends as far as is lawful, and may endeavor, in his term of office, to do some service to his country, why should he not, being of such a character, form a close union with another of similar character? Will he be less able to benefit his friends if he unite himself with the honorable and good, or will he be less able to serve his country if he have the honorable and good for his colleagues?"

33.* "When, therefore, Critobulus," said Socrates, "you wish to become a friend to any one, will you permit me to say to him concerning you, that you admire him, and desire to be his friend?" "You may say so," answered Critobulus, "for I have never known any one dislike those who praised him." 34. "But if I say of you, in addition, that, because you admire him, you feel kindly disposed toward him, will you not think that false information is given of you by me?" "No: for a kind feeling springs up in myself also toward those whom I regard as kindly disposed toward me." 35. "Such information, then," continued Socrates, "I may communicate regarding you to such as you may wish to make your friends: but if you enable me also to say concerning you, that you are attentive to your friends; that you delight in nothing so much as in the possession of good friends; that you pride yourself on the honorable conduct of your friends not less than on your own; that you rejoice at the good fortune of

* [I omit sections 26-32, and also the first sentence of section 33.]

your friends not less than at your own ; that you are never weary of contriving means by which good fortune may come to your friends ; and that you think it the great virtue of a man to surpass his friends in doing them good and his enemies in doing them harm, I think that I shall be a very useful assistant to you in gaining the affections of worthy friends.”* 37. “You are, therefore,” returned Critobulus, “a friend of such a kind to me, Socrates, as to assist me, if I have myself any qualities adapted to gain friends; but if not, you would not be willing to invent any thing to serve me.” “And whether, Critobulus,” said Socrates, “should I appear to serve you more by extolling you with false praises, or by persuading you to endeavor to become a truly deserving man? 38. If this point is not clear to you, consider it with the following illustrations: If, wishing to make the owner of a ship your friend, I should praise you falsely to him, pronouncing you a skillful pilot, and he, believing me, should intrust his ship to you to steer when you are incapable of steering it, would you have any expectation that you would not destroy both yourself and the ship? Or if, by false representations, I should persuade the state, publicly, to intrust itself to you as a man skilled in military tactics, in judicial proceedings, or in political affairs, what do you think that yourself and the state would suffer at your hands? Or if, in private intercourse, I should induce any of the citizens, by unfounded statements, to commit their property to your care, as being a good and diligent manager, would you not, when you came to give proof of your abilities, be convicted of dishonesty, and make yourself appear ridiculous? 39. But the shortest, and safest, and best way, Critobulus, is to strive to be really good in that in which you wish to be thought good. Whatever are called virtues among mankind, you will find, on consideration, capable of being increased by study AND EXERCISE. I am of opinion, that it is in accordance with these sentiments, that we ought to endeavor to acquire friends ; if you know any other way, make me acquainted with it.” “I should be indeed ashamed,” replied Critobulus, “to say any thing in opposition to such an opinion ; for I should say what was neither honorable nor true.”

II., vii., 1.—Such difficulties of his friends as arose from ignorance, he endeavored to remedy by his counsel ; such as sprung from poverty, by admonishing them to assist each other according to their means. With reference to this point, I will relate what I know of him from having been an ear-witness of what he said.

* [I omit section 36.]

Observing Aristarchus, on one occasion looking gloomily, "You seem," said he, "Aristarchus, to be taking something to heart; but you ought to impart the cause of your uneasiness to your friends; for perhaps we may by some means lighten it." 2. "I am indeed, Socrates," replied Aristarchus, "in great perplexity; for since the city has been disturbed, and many of our people have fled to the Piræus, my surviving sisters, and nieces, and cousins have gathered about me in such numbers, that there are now in my house fourteen free-born persons. At the same time, we receive no profit from our lands, for the enemy are in possession of them; nor any rent from our houses, for but few inhabitants are left in the city; no one will buy our furniture, nor is it possible to borrow money from any quarter; a person, indeed, as it seems to me, would sooner find money by seeking it on the road, than get it by borrowing it. It is a grievous thing to me, therefore, to leave my relations to perish; and it is impossible for me to support such a number under such circumstances." 3. Socrates, on hearing this, replied, "And how is it that Ceramon, yonder, though maintaining a great number of people, is not only able to procure what is necessary for himself and them, but gains so much more, also, as to be positively rich, while you, having many to support, are afraid lest you should all perish for want of necessaries?" "Because, assuredly," replied Aristarchus, "he maintains slaves, while I have to support free-born persons." 4. "And which of the two," inquired Socrates, "do you consider to be the better, the free-born persons that are with you, or the slaves that are with Ceramon?" "I consider the free persons with me as the better." "Is it not then a disgrace that he should gain abundance by means of the inferior sort, and that you should be in difficulties while having with you those of the better class?" "Such certainly is the case; but it is not at all wonderful; for he supports artisans; but I, persons of liberal education." 5. "Artisans, then," asked Socrates, "are persons that know how to make something useful?" "Unquestionably," replied Aristarchus. "Is barley-meal, then, useful?" "Very." "Is bread?" "Not less so." "And are men's and women's garments, coats, cloaks, and mantles, useful?" "They are all extremely useful." "And do those who are residing with you, then, not know how to make any of these things?" "They know how to make them all, as I believe." 6. "And are you not aware that from the manufacture of one of these articles, that of barley-meal, Nausicydes supports not only himself and his household but a great number of swine and oxen besides, and gains, indeed, so much more than he wants, that he often even assists the government

with his money? Are you not aware that Cyrebus, by making bread, maintains his whole household, and lives luxuriously; that Demea, of Collytus, supports himself by making cloaks, Menon by making woollen cloaks, and that most of the Megarians live by making mantles?" "Certainly they do," said Aristarchus; "for they purchase barbarian slaves and keep them, in order to force them to do what they please; but I have with me free-born persons and relatives." 7. "Then," added Socrates, "because they are free and related to you, do you think that they ought to do nothing else but eat and sleep? Among other free persons, do you see that those who live thus spend their time more pleasantly, and do you consider them happier, than those who practice the arts which they know, and which are useful to support life? Do you find that idleness and carelessness are serviceable to mankind, either for learning what it becomes them to know, or for remembering what they have learned, or for maintaining the health and strength of their bodies, or for acquiring and preserving what is useful for the support of life, and that industry and diligence are of no service at all? 8. And as to the arts which you say they know, whether did they learn them as being useless to maintain life, and with the intention of never practicing any of them, or, on the contrary, with a view to occupy themselves about them, and to reap profit from them? In which condition will men be more temperate, living in idleness, or attending to useful employments? In which condition will they be more honest, if they work, or if they sit in idleness meditating how to procure necessities? 9. Under present circumstances, as I should suppose, you neither feel attached to your relatives, nor they to you, for you find them burdensome to you, and they see that you are annoyed with their company. For such feelings there is danger that dislike may grow stronger and stronger, and that previous friendly inclination may be diminished. But if you take them under your direction, so that they may be employed, you will love them, when you see that they are serviceable to you, and they will grow attached to you, when they find that you feel satisfaction in their society; and remembering past services with greater pleasure, you will increase the friendly feeling resulting from them, and consequently grow more attached and better disposed toward each other. 10. If, indeed, they were going to employ themselves in any thing dishonorable, death would be preferable to it; but the accomplishments which they know, are, as it appears, such as are most honorable and becoming to women; and all people execute what they know with the greatest ease and expedition, and with

the utmost credit and pleasure. Do not hesitate, therefore," concluded Socrates, "to recommend to them this line of conduct, which will benefit both you and them; and they, as it is probable, will cheerfully comply with your wishes."*

12. The necessary means were accordingly provided; wool was bought; and the women took their dinners as they continued at work, and supped when they had finished their tasks; they became cheerful instead of gloomy in countenance, and, instead of regarding each other with dislike, met the looks of one another with pleasure; they loved Aristarchus as their protector, and he loved them as being of use to him. At last he came to Socrates, and told him with delight of the state of things in his house; adding that "the women complained of him as being the only person in the house that ate the bread of idleness."†

BOOK III., chapter i., § 1. I will now show that Socrates was of great service to those who aspired to posts of honor, by rendering them attentive to the duties of the offices which they sought.

Having heard that Dionysodorus had arrived at the city, offering to teach the art of a general, he said to one of those who were with him, whom he observed to be desirous of obtaining that honor in the state, 2. "It is indeed unbecoming, young man, that he who wishes to be commander of an army in his country should neglect to learn the duties of that office when he has an opportunity of learning them; and such a person would be far more justly punished by his country than one who should contract to make statues for it, when he had not learned to make them; 3. for as the whole state, in the perils of war, is intrusted to the care of the general, it is likely that great advantages will occur if he act well, and great evils if he fall into error. How, then, would not he, who neglects to learn the duties of the office, while he is eager to be elected to it, be deservedly punished?" By making such observations, he induced the young man to go and learn.‡

III., ii., 1. Having met, on some occasion, a person who had been elected general, Socrates said to him, "Why is it, do you think, that Homer has styled Agamemnon 'Shepherd of the people?' Is it not for this reason, that as a shepherd must be careful that his sheep be safe, and have food, and the object may be effected for which they are kept, so a general must take care that his soldiers be safe, and have provisions, and that the object be effected for which they serve? and they serve, no doubt, that they

*[I omit section 11.] †[I omit sections 13, 14, and the whole of chapters viii., ix., x.] ‡[I omit sections 4-11.]

may increase their gratifications by conquering the enemy.* 3. For a man is chosen king, not that he may take good care of himself, but that those who have chosen him may prosper by his means; and all men, when they take the field, take it that their lives may be rendered as happy as possible, and choose generals that they may conduct them to the accomplishment of that object. 4. It is incumbent on the leader of an army, therefore, to carry into execution the views of those who have chosen him their leader. Nor is it easy to find any thing more honorable than such exertion, or more disgraceful than an opposite course of conduct."

Thus considering what was the merit of a good leader, he omitted other points in his character, and left only this, *that he should render those whom he commanded happy.*† [Cf. §§ 403, 423; cf. Confucius, *Analects*, VI., xxviii. (pages 125, 126 above), and *Great Learning*, x., 21 (page 108 above).]

III., iv., 1. Seeing Nicomachides, one day, coming from the assembly for the election of magistrates, he asked him, "Who have been chosen generals, Nicomachides?" "Are not the Athenians the same as ever, Socrates?" he replied; "for they have not chosen me, who am worn out with serving on the list, both as captain and centurion, and with having received so many wounds from the enemy" (he then drew aside his robe, and showed the scars of the wounds), "but have elected Antisthenes, who has never served in the heavy-armed infantry, nor done any thing remarkable in the cavalry, and who indeed knows nothing, but how to get money." 2. "Is it not good, however, to know this," said Socrates, "since he will then be able to get necessaries for the troops?" "But merchants," replied Nicomachides, "are able to collect money; and yet would not, on that account, be capable of leading an army." 3. "Antisthenes, however," continued Socrates, "is given to emulation, a quality necessary in a general. Do you not know that whenever he has been chorus-manager he has gained the superiority in all his choruses?" "But,‡" rejoined Nicomachides, "there is nothing similar in managing a chorus and an army." 4. "Yet Antisthenes," said Socrates, "though neither skilled in music nor in teaching a chorus, was able to find out the best masters in these departments." "In the army, accordingly," exclaimed Nicomachides, "he will find others to range his troops for him, and others to fight for him!" 5. "Well, then," rejoined Socrates, "if he find out and select the best men in military affairs, as he has done in the conduct of his choruses, he will probably at-

* [I omit section 2.] † [I omit chapter iii.] ‡ [I omit part of section 3 here.]

tain superiority in this respect also; and it is likely that he will be more willing to spend money for a victory in war on behalf of the whole state, than for a victory with a chorus in behalf of his single tribe." 6. "Do you say, then, Socrates," said he, "that it is in the power of the same man to manage a chorus well, and to manage an army well?" "I say," said Socrates, "that over whatever a man may preside, he will, if he knows what he needs, and is able to provide it, be a good president, whether he have the direction of a chorus, a family, a city, or an army." 7. "* Socrates," cried Nicomachides, "I should never have expected to hear from you that good managers of a family would also be good generals." "Come, then," proceeded Socrates, "let us consider what are the duties of each of them, that we may understand whether they are the same, or are in any respect different." "By all means," said he. 8. "Is it not, then, the duty of both," asked Socrates, "to render those under their command obedient and submissive to them?" "Unquestionably." "Is it not also the duty of both to intrust various employments to such as are fitted to execute them?" "That is also unquestionable." "To punish the bad, and to honor the good, too, belongs, I think, to each of them." "Undoubtedly." 9. "And is it not honorable in both to render those under them well-disposed toward them?" "That also is certain." "And do you think it for the interest of both to gain for themselves allies and auxiliaries, or not?" "It assuredly is for their interest." "Is it not proper for both also to be careful of their resources?" "Assuredly." "And is it not proper for both, therefore, to be attentive and industrious in their respective duties?" 10. "All these particulars," said Nicomachides, "are common alike to both; but it is not common to both to fight." "Yet both have doubtless enemies," rejoined Socrates. "That is probably the case," said the other. "Is it not for the interest of both to gain the superiority over those enemies?" 11. "Certainly; but to say nothing on that point, what, I ask, will skill in managing a household avail, if it be necessary to fight?" "It will doubtless, in that case, be of the greatest avail," said Socrates; "for a good manager of a house, knowing that nothing is so advantageous or profitable as to get the better of your enemies when you contend with them, nothing so unprofitable and prejudicial as to be defeated, will zealously seek and provide everything that may conduce to victory, will carefully watch and guard against whatever tends to defeat, will vigorously engage if he sees that his force is likely to conquer, and, what is not the least important point, will cautiously

* [I omit part of section 7 at this point.]

avoid engaging if he finds himself insufficiently prepared. 12. Do not, therefore, Nicomachides," he added, "despise men skillful in managing a household; for the conduct of private affairs differs from that of public concerns only in magnitude; in other respects they are similar; but what is most to be observed, is, that neither of them are managed without men, and that private matters are not managed by one species of men, and public matters by another; for those who conduct public business make use of men not at all differing in nature from those whom the managers of private affairs employ; and those who know how to employ them conduct either public or private affairs judiciously, while those who do not know will err in the management of both."

Bk. III., ch. v., § 1. Conversing on one occasion with Pericles, the son of the great Pericles, Socrates said, "I have hopes, Pericles, that under your leadership the city will become more eminent and famous in military affairs, and will get the better of her enemies." "I wish, Socrates," said Pericles, "that what you say may happen; but how such effects are to be produced, I can not understand." "Are you willing, then," asked Socrates, "that we should have some conversation on these points, and consider how far there is a possibility of effecting what we desire?" "I am quite willing," replied Pericles. 2. "Are you aware, then," said Socrates, "that the Athenians are not at all inferior in number to the Bœotians?" "I am," said Pericles. "And whether do you think that a greater number of efficient and well-formed men could be selected from the Bœotians, or from the Athenians?" "The Athenians do not appear to me to be inferior in this respect." "And which of the two peoples do you consider to be more united among themselves?" "I think that the Athenians are; for many of the Bœotians, being oppressed by the Thebans, entertain hostile feelings toward them. But at Athens I see nothing of the kind." 3. "But the Athenians are, moreover, of all people most eager for honor and most friendly in disposition; qualities which most effectually impel men to face danger in the cause of glory and of their country." "The Athenians are certainly not to be found fault with in these respects." "And assuredly there is no people that can boast of greater or more numerous exploits of their ancestors than the Athenians; a circumstance by which many are prompted and stimulated to cultivate manly courage and to become brave."* 13. "I wonder, indeed, Socrates," said Pericles, "how our city ever degenerated." "I imagine," said Socrates, "that as some other nations have grown indolent through excessive exaltation and power, so like-

*[I omit sections 4-12.]

wise the Athenians, after attaining great pre-eminence, grew neglectful of themselves, and consequently became degenerate."

14. "By what means, then," said Pericles, "could they now recover their pristine dignity?" "It appears to me," replied Socrates, "not at all difficult to discover; for I think that if they learn what were the practices of their ancestors, and observe them not less diligently than they, they will become not at all inferior to them; but if they do not take that course, yet, if they imitate those who are now at the head of Greece, adhere to their institutions, and attend to the same duties with diligence equal to theirs, they will stand not at all below them, and, if they use greater exertion, even above them." 15. "You intimate," returned Pericles, "that honor and virtue are far away from our city; for when will the Athenians reverence their elders as the Spartans do, when they begin, even by their own fathers, to show disrespect for older men? Or when will they exercise themselves like them, when they not only are regardless of bodily vigor, but deride those who cultivate it? 16. Or when will they obey the magistrates like them, when they make it their pride to set them at naught? Or when will they be of one mind like them, when, instead of acting in concert for their mutual interests, they inflict injuries on one another, and envy one another more than they envy the rest of mankind? More than any other people, too, do they dispute in their private and public meetings; they institute more law-suits against one another, and prefer thus to prey upon one another than to unite for their mutual benefit. They conduct their public affairs as if they were those of a foreign state; they contend about the management of them, and rejoice, above all things, in having power to engage in such contests. 17. From such conduct much ignorance and baseness prevail in the republic, and much envy and mutual hatred are engendered in the breasts of the citizens; on which accounts I am constantly in the greatest fear lest some evil should happen to the state too great for it to bear." 18. "Do not by any means suppose, Pericles," rejoined Socrates, "that the Athenians are thus disordered with an incurable* depravity. Do you not see how orderly they are in their naval proceedings, how precisely they obey the presidents in the gymnastic games, and how, in the arrangement of the choruses, they submit to the directions of their teachers in a way inferior to none?" 19. "This is indeed surprising," said Pericles, "that men of that class should obey those who are set over them, and that the infantry and cavalry, who are thought to excel the ordinary citizens in worth and

* [*Sanabilibus aegrotamus malis*.—Seneca, quoted by Kant, in § 652.]

valor, should be the least obedient of all the people." 20. "The council of the Areopagus, too," said Socrates, "is it not composed of men of approved character?" "Undoubtedly," replied Pericles. "And do you know of any judges who decide causes and conduct all their business with more exact conformity to the laws, or with more honor and justice?" "I find no fault with them," said Pericles. "We must not, therefore, despair," said Socrates, "as if we thought that the Athenians are not inclined to be lovers of order." 21. "Yet in military affairs," observed Pericles, "in which it is most requisite to act with prudence, and order, and obedience, they pay no regard to such duties." "It may be so," returned Socrates, "for perhaps in military affairs men who are greatly deficient in knowledge have the command of them. Do you not observe that of harp-players, choristers, dancers, wrestlers, or pancratiasts, no one ventures to assume the direction who has not the requisite knowledge for it, but that all who take the lead in such matters are able to show from whom they learned the arts in which they are masters; whereas the most of our generals undertake to command without previous study? 22. I do not, however, imagine you to be one of that sort; for I am sensible that you can tell when you began to learn generalship not less certainly than when you began to learn wrestling. I am sure, too, that you have learned, and keep in mind, many of your father's principles of warfare, and that you have collected many others from every quarter whence it was possible to acquire any thing that would add to your skill as a commander. 23. I have no doubt that you take great care that you may not unawares be ignorant of any thing conducive to generalship, and that, if you have ever found yourself deficient in any such matters, you have applied to persons experienced in them, sparing neither presents nor civilities, that you might learn from them what you did not know, and might render them efficient helpers to you." 24. "You make me well aware, Socrates," said Pericles, "that you do not say this from a belief that I have diligently attended to these matters, but from a wish to convince me that he who would be a general must attend to all such studies; and I indeed agree with you in that opinion."*

III., vi., 1. When Glaucon,† the son of Ariston, attempted to harangue the people, from a desire, though he was not yet twenty years of age, to have a share in the government of the state, no

*[I omit sections 25-28.] †This Glaucon was the brother of Plato the philosopher. See Cobet, *Prosopogr. Xen.*, p. 66. On the other Glaucon, see III., vii., 1, [page 374 below.]-*Kuehner*.

one of his relatives, or other friends, could prevent him from getting himself dragged down from the tribunal, and making himself ridiculous ; but Socrates, who had a friendly feeling toward him on account of Charmides the son of Glaucon, as well as on account of PLATO, succeeded in prevailing on him, by his sole dissuasion, to relinquish his purpose. 2. Meeting him by chance, he first stopped him by addressing him as follows, that he might be willing to listen to him : " Glaucon," said he, " have you formed an intention to govern the state for us ? " " I have, Socrates," replied Glaucon. * " It is an honorable office, if any other among men be so ; for it is certain that, if you attain your object, you will be able yourself to secure whatever you may desire, and will be in a condition to benefit your friends ; you will raise your father's house, and increase the power of your country ; you will be celebrated, first of all in your own city, and afterward throughout Greece, and perhaps also, like Themistocles, among the Barbarians, and, wherever you may be, you will be an object of general admiration." 3. Glaucon, hearing this, was highly elated, and cheerfully staid to listen. Socrates next proceeded to say, " But it is plain, Glaucon, that if you wish to be honored, you must benefit the state." " Certainly," answered Glaucon. " Then,†" said Socrates, " do not hide from us how you intend to act, but inform us with what proceeding you will begin to benefit the state ? " 4. But as Glaucon was silent, as if just considering how he should begin, Socrates said, " As, if you wished to aggrandize the family of a friend, you would endeavor to make it richer, tell me whether you will in like manner also endeavor to make the state richer ? " " Assuredly," said he. 5. " Would it then be richer, if its revenues were increased ? " " That is at least probable," said Glaucon. " Tell me then," proceeded Socrates, " from what the the revenues of the state arise, and what is their amount ; for you have doubtless considered, in order that if any of them fall short, you may make up the deficiency, and that if any of them fail, you may procure fresh supplies." " These matters,‡" replied Glaucon, " I have not considered." 6. " Well then," said Socrates, if you have omitted to consider this point, tell me at least the annual expenditure of the state ; for you undoubtedly mean to retrench whatever is superfluous in it." " Indeed," replied Glaucon, " I have not yet had time to turn my attention to that subject." " We will therefore," said Socrates, " put off making our state richer for the present ; for how is it possible for him who is ignorant of its

* [I omit a part of section 2, at this point.] † [I omit a part of section 3, at this point.] ‡ [I omit a part of section 5, at this point.]

expenditure and its income to manage those matters?" 7. "But, Socrates," observed Glaucon, "it is possible to enrich the state at the expense of our enemies." "Extremely possible indeed," replied Socrates, "if we be stronger than they; but if we be weaker, we may lose all that we have." "What you say is true," said Glaucon. 8. "Accordingly," said Socrates, "he who deliberates with whom he shall go to war, ought to know the force both of his own country and of the enemy, so that, if that of his own country be superior to that of the enemy, he may advise it to enter upon the war, but, if inferior, may persuade it to be cautious of doing so." "You say rightly," said Glaucon. 9. "In the first place, then," proceeded Socrates, "tell us the strength of the country by land and sea, and next that of the enemy." "But,*" exclaimed Glaucon, "I should not be able to tell you on the moment, and at a word." "Well, then, if you have it written down," said Socrates, "bring it, for I should be extremely glad to hear what it is." "But to say the truth," replied Glaucon, "I have not yet written it down." 10. "We will therefore put off considering about war for the present," said Socrates, "for it is very likely that, on account of the magnitude of those subjects, and as you are just commencing your administration, you have not yet examined into them. But to the defense of the country, I am quite sure that you have directed your attention, and that you know how many garrisons are in advantageous positions, and how many not so, what number of men would be sufficient to maintain them, and what number would be insufficient, and that you will advise your countrymen to make the garrisons in advantageous positions stronger, and to remove the useless ones." 11. "† I shall recommend them to remove them all, as they keep guard so negligently that the property is secretly carried off out of the country," "Yet, if we remove the garrisons," said Socrates, "do you not think that liberty will be given to any body that pleases to pillage? But," added he, "have you gone personally, and examined as to this fact, or how do you know that the garrisons conduct themselves with such negligence?" "I form my conjectures," said he. "Well then," inquired Socrates, "shall we settle about these matters also, when we no longer rest upon conjecture, but have obtained certain knowledge?" "Perhaps that," said Glaucon, "will be the better course." 12. "To the silver mines, however," continued Socrates, "I know that you have not gone, so as to have the means of telling us why a smaller revenue is derived from them than came in some time ago." "I have not gone thither," said he. "Indeed

*[I omit a portion of section 9 here.] †[I omit a portion of section 11 here.]

the place," said Socrates, "is said to be unhealthy, so that, when it is necessary to bring it under consideration, this will be a sufficient excuse for you." "You jest with me," said Glaucon. 13. "I am sure, however," proceeded Socrates, "that you have not neglected to consider, but have calculated, how long the corn, which is produced in the country, will suffice to maintain the city, and how much it requires for the year, in order that the city may not suffer from scarcity unknown to you, but that, from your own knowledge, you may be able, by giving your advice concerning the necessities of life, to support the city, and preserve it." "You propose a vast field for me," observed Glaucon, "if it will be necessary for me to attend to such subjects." 14. "Nevertheless," proceeded Socrates, "a man can not order his house properly, unless he ascertains all that it requires, and takes care to supply it with every thing necessary; but since the city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and since it is difficult to provide for so many at once, how is it that you have not tried to aid one first of all, suppose that of your uncle, for it stands in need of help? If you be able to assist that one, you may proceed to assist more; but if you be unable to benefit one, how will you be able to benefit many? Just as it is plain that, if a man can not carry the weight of a talent, he need not attempt to carry a greater weight." 15. "But I would improve my uncle's house," said Glaucon, "if he would but be persuaded by me." "And then," resumed Socrates, "when you can not persuade your uncle, do you expect to make all the Athenians, together with your uncle, yield to your arguments? 16. Take care, Glaucon, lest, while you are eager to acquire glory, you meet with the reverse of it. Do you not see how dangerous it is for a person to speak of, or undertake, what he does not understand? Contemplate, among other men, such as you know to be characters that plainly talk of, and attempt to do, what they do not know, and consider whether they appear to you, by such conduct, to obtain more applause or censure? whether they seem to be more admired or despised? 17. Contemplate, again, those who have some understanding of what they say and do, and you will find, I think, in all transactions, that such as are praised and admired are of the number of those who have most knowledge, and that those who incur censure and neglect are among those that have least. 18. If therefore you desire to gain esteem and reputation in your country, endeavor to succeed in gaining a knowledge of what you wish to do; for if, when you excel others in this qualification, you proceed to manage the affairs of the state, I shall not wonder if you very easily obtain what you desire."

III., vii., 1. Observing that Charmides, the son of Glaucon, a man of worth, and of far more ability than those who then ruled the state, hesitated to address the people, or to take part in the government of the city, he said to him, "Tell me, Charmides, if any man, who was able to win the crown in the public games, and, by that means, to gain honor for himself, and make his birth-place more celebrated in Greece, should nevertheless refuse to become a combatant, what sort of person would you consider him to be?" "I should certainly think him indolent and wanting in spirit," replied Charmides. 2. "And if any one were able," continued Socrates, "by taking part in public affairs, to improve the condition of his country, and thus to attain honor for himself, but should yet shrink from doing so, might not he be justly regarded as wanting in spirit?" "Perhaps so," said Charmides; "but why do you ask me that question?" "Because," replied Socrates, "I think that you yourself, though possessed of sufficient ability, yet shrink from engaging even in those affairs in which it is your duty as a citizen to take a share." 3. "But in what transaction have you discovered my ability," said Charmides, "that you bring this charge against me?" "In those conferences," answered Socrates, "in which you meet those who are engaged in the government of the state; for when they consult you on any point, I observe that you give them excellent advice, and that, when they are in any way in the wrong, you offer judicious objections." 4. "But it is not the same thing, Socrates," said he, "to converse with people in private, and to try one's powers at a public assembly." "Yet," said Socrates, "he that is able to count, can count with no less exactness before a multitude than alone, and those who can play the harp best in solitude are also the best performers on it in company." 5. "But do you not see," said Charmides, "that bashfulness and timidity are naturally inherent in mankind, and affect us far more before a multitude than in private conversations?" "But I am prompted to remind you," answered Socrates, "that while you neither feel bashfulness before the most intelligent, nor timid before the most powerful, it is in the presence of the most foolish and weak that you are ashamed to speak. 6. And is it the fullers among them, or the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the copper-smiths, or the ship-merchants, or those who barter in the market, and meditate what they may buy for little and sell for more, that you are ashamed to address? For it is of all such characters that the assembly is composed. 7. How then do you think that your conduct differs from that of a wrestler, who, being superior to well-practiced opponents, should yet fear the unpracticed? For

is not this the case with you, that though you converse at your ease with those who have attained eminence in state affairs, and of whom some undervalue you, and though you are far superior to many who make it their business to address the people, you yet shrink from uttering your sentiments before men who have never thought of political affairs, and who have shown no disrespect for your talents, from an apprehension that you may be laughed at?"

8. "And do not the people in the assembly," asked Charmides, "appear to you often to laugh at those who speak with great judgment?" "Yes," said Socrates, "and so do the other sort of people;* and therefore I wonder at you, that you so easily silence one class of persons when they do so, and yet think that you shall not be able to deal with another?" 9. Be not ignorant of yourself, my friend, and do not commit the error which the majority of men commit; for most persons, though they are eager to look into the affairs of others, give no thought to the examination of their own. Do not you, then, neglect this duty, but strive more and more to cultivate your own powers; and do not be regardless of the affairs of your country, if any department of them can be improved by your means; for, if they are in a good condition, not only the rest of your countrymen, but your own friends and yourself, will reap the greatest benefit."

III., viii., 1. When Aristippus attempted to confute Socrates, as he himself had previously † been confuted by him, Socrates, wishing to benefit those who were with him, gave his answers, not like those who are on their guard lest their words be perverted, but like those who are persuaded that they ought above all things to do what is right. 2. What Aristippus had asked him, was, "whether he knew any thing good," in order that if he should say any such thing as food, or drink, or money, or health, or strength, or courage, he might prove that it was sometimes an evil. But Socrates, reflecting that if any thing troubles us we want something to relieve us from it, replied, as it seemed best to do, "Do you ask me whether I know anything good for a fever?" 3. "I do not." "Any thing good for soreness of the eyes?" "No." "For hunger?" "No, nor for hunger either." "Well then," concluded Socrates, "if you ask me whether I know any thing good that is good for nothing, I neither know any thing, nor wish to know."

4. Aristippus again asking him whether he knew any thing beautiful, he replied, "Many things." "Are they then," inquired Aristippus, "all like each other?" "Some of them," answered Socrates,

* Meaning those, says Kuehner, with whom he is mentioned as discoursing in section 3. † Book II., chapter i., [page 343 above.]

"are as unlike one another as it is possible for them to be." "How then," said he, "can what is beautiful be unlike what is beautiful?" "Because, assuredly," replied Socrates, "one man, who is beautifully formed for wrestling, is unlike another who is beautifully formed for running; and a shield, which is beautifully formed for defense, is as unlike as possible to a dart, which is beautifully formed for being forcibly and swiftly hurled." 5. "You answer me," said Aristippus, "in the same manner as when I asked you whether you knew anything good." "And do you imagine," said Socrates, "that the good is one thing, and the beautiful another? Do you not know that with reference to the same objects all things are both beautiful and good? Virtue, for instance, is not good with regard to some things and beautiful with regard to others; and persons, in the same way, are called beautiful and good with reference to the same objects; and human bodies, too, with reference to the same objects, appear beautiful and good; and in like manner all other things, whatever men use, are considered beautiful and good with reference to the objects for which they are serviceable."* 7. "Do you say, then, that the same things may be both beautiful and ugly?" "Yes, undoubtedly, and also that they may be good and bad; for oftentimes what is good for hunger is bad for fever, and what is good for a fever is bad for hunger; oftentimes what is beautiful in regard to running is the reverse in regard to wrestling, and what is beautiful in regard to wrestling is the reverse in regard to running; for whatever is good is also beautiful, IN REGARD TO PURPOSES for which it is well adapted, and whatever is bad is the reverse of beautiful, in regard to purposes for which it is ill adapted."

8. When Socrates said, too, that the same houses that were beautiful were also useful, he appeared to me to instruct us what sort of houses we ought to build. He reasoned on the subject thus, "Should not he, who purposes to have a house such as it ought to be, contrive that it may be most pleasant, and at the same time most useful, to live in? † 10. To sum up the matter briefly, that would be the most pleasant and the most beautiful residence, in which the owner, at all seasons, would find the most satisfactory retreat, and deposit what belongs to him with the greatest safety."

Paintings, and colored decorations of the walls,‡ deprive us, he thought, of more pleasure than they give.

*[I omit section 6.] †[I omit section 9.] ‡[In an explanatory note here the translator says that Kuehner] gives the following reason for the disapprobation which Socrates expresses of them: "That those ornaments might not be injured by the rays of the sun, the parts of the house in which they were, were

The most suitable ground for temples and altars, he said, was such as was most open to view, and least trodden by the public; for that it was pleasant for people to pray as they looked on them, and pleasant to approach them in purity.

III., ix., 1. Being asked, again, whether *Fortitude* was a quality acquired by education, or bestowed by nature, "I think," said he, "that as one body is by nature stronger for enduring toil than another body, so one mind may be by nature more courageous in meeting dangers than another mind; for I see that men who are brought up under the same laws and institutions differ greatly from each other in courage. 2. I am of opinion, however, that every natural disposition may be improved, as to fortitude, by training and exercise; for it is evident that the Scythians and Thracians would not dare to take bucklers and spears and fight with the Lacedæmonians; and it is certain that the Lacedæmoians would not like to fight the Thracians with small shields and javelins, or the Scythians with bows. 3. In other things, also, I see that men differ equally from one another by nature, and make great improvements by practice; from which it is evident that it concerns all, as well the naturally ingenious as the naturally dull, to learn and study those arts in which they desire to become worthy of commendation."

4. **PRUDENCE and TEMPERANCE*** he did not distinguish; for he deemed that he who knew what was honorable and good, and how to practice it, and who knew what was dishonorable, and how to avoid it, was both prudent and temperate. Being also asked whether he thought that those who knew what they ought to do, but did the contrary, were prudent and temperate, he replied, "No more than I think the imprudent and intemperate to be so;† for I consider that all persons choose from what is possible what they judge for their interest, **and do it**; and I therefore deem those who do not **ACT JUDICIOUSLY** to be neither prudent nor temperate."

so constructed as not to face the sun; and thus the inmates, in winter, were deprived of the heat of the sun (tali modo homines hiberno tempore solis calore privabantur), and exposed to the cold winds from the north." * **SOPHIA**, wisdom or prudence, is, as Kuehner remarks, right judgment about what ought to be done; **SOPHROSUNE** is temperance, self-control, or self-regulation, in acting. The word **SOPHIA** is used in another sense in Book IV., chapter vi., §7 [below]. "This subject, in conformity with the opinion of Socrates, is discussed in Plato's Charmides, ubi pariter *temperantia scientia* contineri demonstratur." See Stallbaum on that Dialogue, p. 81, seqq.—*Kuehner*. [Anthon (Xen. Mem., Harper, 1868, page 307) translates "wisdom and temperance," and says that "by **SOPHIAN** is here meant the knowledge of virtue."] † **Ii**, qui sciunt quidem

5. He said, too, that justice, and every other virtue, was a ((part of)) prudence, for that every thing just, and every thing done agreeably to virtue, was honorable and good; that those who could discern those things, would never prefer any thing else to them; that those who could not discern them, would never be able to do them, but would even go wrong if they attempted to do them; and that the prudent, accordingly, did what was honorable and good, but that the imprudent could not do it, but went wrong even if they attempted to do it; and that since, therefore, all just actions, and all actions that are honorable and good, are done in agreement with virtue, it is manifest that justice, and every other virtue, is ((comprehended in)) prudence.*

6. The opposite to prudence, he said, was MADNESS;† he did not, however, regard ignorance as madness; though for a man to be ignorant of himself, and to fancy and believe that he knew what he did not know, he considered to be something closely bordering on madness. The multitude, he observed, do not say that those are mad who make mistakes in matters of which most people are ignorant, but call those only mad who make mistakes in affairs with which most people are acquainted.‡

9. Considering what IDLENESS was, he said that he found most men did something; for that dice-players and buffoons did something; but he said that all such persons were idle, for it was in their power to go and do something better; he observed that a man was not idle, however, in passing from a better employment to a worse, but that, if he did so, he, as he ((previously)) had occupation, acted in that respect viciously.

10. KINGS and COMMANDERS, he said, were not those who held scepters merely, or those elected by the multitude, or those who gained authority by lot, or those who attained it by violence or deceit, but those who knew how to command. 11. For when some admitted that it was the part of a commander to enjoin what

bona, sed contraria faciunt, nihilo magis sapientes et temperantes sunt quam ii qui sunt insipientes et intemperantes.—*Kuehner*. The words in brackets are supplied as being necessary to the translation. [The words in brackets, here referred to, are omitted by me.] [Khordah-Avesta, xiii., page 183 above.]

* [Cf. Cicero de Officiis, III., xvii.] † MANIA, madness or insanity, is, according to the definition of Socrates, the contrary to wisdom or prudence. Madness is, therefore, ignorance of the virtues of justice, temperance, and fortitude; for prudence is manifested in the knowledge of these virtues. But the source and foundation, as it were, of prudence, is the knowledge of one's self. He, therefore, that is destitute of this knowledge of himself is bordering on madness. The multitude, however, do not, like Socrates, consider ignorance of virtue to be madness, but apply that term only to gross ignorance or misconduct with regard to other matters.—*Kuehner*. ‡ [I omit sections 7 and 8.]

another should do, and the part of him who was commanded, to obey, he showed that in a ship the skillful man is the commander, and that the owner and all the other people in the ship were obedient to the man of knowledge; that, in agriculture, those who had farms, in sickness, those who were ill, in bodily exercises, those who practiced them, and indeed all other people, who had any business requiring care, personally took the management of it if they thought that they understood it, but if not, that they were not only ready to obey men of knowledge who were present, but even sent for such as were absent, in order that, by yielding to their directions, they might do what was proper.* 12. But if any one remarked in reply to these observations, that a tyrant is at liberty not to obey judicious advisers, he would say, "And how is he at liberty not to obey, when a penalty hangs over him that does not obey a wise monitor? for in whatever affair a person does not obey a prudent adviser, he will doubtless err, and, by erring, will incur a penalty." 13. If any one also observed that a tyrant might put to death a wise counselor, "And do you think," he would say, "that he who puts to death the best of his allies will go unpunished, or that he will be exposed only to casual punishment? Whether do you suppose that a man who acts thus would live in safety, or would be likely, rather, by such conduct, to bring immediate destruction on himself?"

14. When some one asked him what object of study he thought best for a man, he replied, "**good conduct.**" When he asked him again whether he thought "good fortune" an object of study, he answered, "'Fortune' and 'Conduct' I think entirely opposed; for, for a person to light on any thing that he wants without seeking it, I consider to be 'good fortune,' but to achieve any thing successfully by learning and study, I regard as 'good conduct;,' and those who make this their object of study appear to me to do well."

15. The best men, and those most beloved by the gods, he observed, were those who, in agriculture, performed their agricultural duties well, those who, in medicine, performed their medical duties well, those who, in political offices, performed their public duties well; but he who did nothing well, he said, was neither useful for any purpose, nor acceptable to the gods.†

III., xii., 1. Noticing that Epigenes, one of his followers, was both very young and weak in body, he said to him, "How very unlike an athlete you are in frame, Epigenes!" "I am not an athlete, Socrates," replied he. "You are not less of an athlete,"

*[I omit the remainder of section 11.] †[I omit chapters x. and xi.]

rejoined Socrates, "than those who are going to contend at the Olympic games. Does the struggle for life with the enemy, which the Athenians will demand of you when circumstances require, seem to you to be a trifling contest? 2. Yet, in the dangers of war, not a few, through weakness of body, either lose their lives, or save them with dishonor; many, from the same cause, are taken alive, and, as prisoners of war, endure for the rest of their lives, if such should be their fate, the bitterest slavery; or, falling into the most grievous hardships, and paying for their ransom sometimes more than they possess, pass the remainder of their existence in want of necessities, and in the endurance of affliction; and many, too, incur infamy, being thought to be cowards merely from the imbecility of their bodily frame. 3. Do you think lightly of such penalties attached to weakness of body, or do you expect that you will endure such calamities with ease? I believe that what he must bear who attends to the health of his body, is far lighter and more pleasant than such afflictions. Or do you suppose that an ill condition of body is more salutary and advantageous than a good condition? Or do you despise the benefits secured by a good state of the body? 4. Yet the lot which falls to those who have their bodies in good condition is exactly the reverse of that which falls to those who have them in ill condition; for those who have their bodies in a good state are healthy and strong; and many, from being possessed of this advantage, save themselves with honor amid the struggles of war, and escape every peril; many, also, assist their friends and benefit their country, and, for such services, are thought worthy of favor, acquire great glory, and attain the highest dignities; and, on these accounts, pass the rest of their lives with greater pleasure and honor, and bequeath finer fortunes to their children. 5. Nor, because the city does not require warlike exercises publicly, ought we, on that account, to neglect them privately, but rather to practice them the more; for be well assured that neither in any other contest, nor in any affair whatever, will you at all come off the worse because your body is better trained than that of other men; since the body must bear its part in whatever men do; and in all the services required from the body, it is of the utmost importance to have it in the best possible condition; 6. for even in that in which you think that there is least exercise for the body, namely, THINKING, who does not know that many fail greatly from ill-health? and loss of memory, despondency, irritability, and madness, often, from ill-health of body, attack the mind with such force as to drive out all previous knowledge. 7. But to those who have their bodies in

good condition, there is the utmost freedom from anxiety, and no danger of suffering any such calamity from weakness of constitution; while it is likely, rather, that a healthy state of body will avail to produce consequences the reverse of those which result from an unhealthy state of it; and, indeed, to secure consequences the reverse of what we have stated, what would a man in his senses not undergo? 8. It is disgraceful, too, for a person to grow old in self-neglect, before he knows what he would become by rendering himself well-formed and vigorous in body; but this a man who neglects himself can not know; for such advantages are not wont to come spontaneously."

III.; xiii., 1. A person being angry, because, on saluting another, he was not saluted in return, "It is an odd thing," said Socrates to him, "that if you had met a man ill-conditioned in body you would not have been angry, but to have met a man rudely disposed in mind provokes you."

2. Another person saying that he ate without pleasure, "Acumenus," said Socrates, "prescribes an excellent remedy for that disease." The other asking, "What sort of remedy?" "To abstain from eating," said Socrates; "for he says that, after abstaining, you will live with more pleasure, less expense, and better health."

3. Another saying that the water which he had to drink at his house was warm, "When you wish to bathe in warm water, then," said Socrates, "it will be ready for you." "But it is too cold to bathe in," said the other. "Are your slaves, then," asked Socrates, "inconvenienced by drinking or bathing in it?" "No, *," replied he; "for I have often wondered how cheerfully they use it for both those purposes." "And is the water in your house," said Socrates, "or that in the temple of Æsculapius, the warmer for drinking?" "That at the temple of Æsculapius," replied he. "And which is the colder for bathing in, that at your house, or that in the temple of Amphiaraus?" "That in the temple of Amphiaraus," said he. "Consider, then," said Socrates, "that you seem to be harder to please than your slaves or the sick."

4. Another person beating his attendant severely, Socrates asked him why he was so angry at the slave. "Because," said he, "he is very gluttonous and very stupid, very covetous and very idle." "And have you ever reflected," rejoined Socrates, "which of the two deserves the greater number of stripes, you or your slave?"

5. A person being afraid of the journey to Olympia, "Why," said Socrates to him, "do you fear the journey? Do you not walk about at home almost all day? And, if you set out thither, you

*[I omit part of section 3 at this point.]

will walk and dine, walk and sup, and go to rest. Do you not know that if you were to extend in a straight line the walks which you take in five or six days, you would easily go from Athens to Olympia? But it will be better for you to start a day too soon than a day too late; for to be obliged to extend your days' journeys beyond a moderate length is disagreeable; but to spend one day more on the road gives great ease; and it is better, therefore, to hasten to start than to hurry on the way."

6. Another saying that he was utterly wearied with a long journey, Socrates asked him whether he carried any burden. "No,*" said he, "I did not, except my cloak." "And did you travel alone," said Socrates, "or did an attendant accompany you?" "An attendant was with me." "Was he empty-handed, or did he carry any thing?" "He carried, certainly, the bedding and other utensils." "And how did he get over the journey?" "He appeared to me to come off better than myself." "If you, then, had been obliged to carry his burden, how do you imagine that you would have fared?" "Very ill;† or rather, I should not have been able to carry it at all." "And how can you think that it becomes a man trained to exercise to be so much less able to bear fatigue than a slave?"

III., xiv., 1. When, among a number of persons who had met together to sup, some brought little meat, and others a great quantity, Socrates desired the attendant either to set the smallest dish on the table for common participation, or to distribute a portion of it to each. They, accordingly, who had brought a great deal, were ashamed not to partake of what was put on table for the company in general, and not, at the same time, to put their own on table in return. They therefore offered their own dishes for the participation of the company; and when they had no greater share than those who brought but little, they ceased to buy meat at great cost.‡ 7. He observed also that, "to fare well," was in the language of the Athenians called, "to eat;" and that the "well," was added to denote that we should eat such food as would disorder neither mind nor body, and such as would not be difficult to be procured; so that he applied, "to fare well," to those who fared temperately.

BOOK IV., chapter i., § 1. So serviceable was Socrates to others, in every kind of transaction, and by every possible means, that to any one who reflects on his usefulness (even though he possess but moderate discernment), it is manifest that nothing

* [I omit a portion of section 6 at this point.] † [I omit a portion of section 6 at this point.] ‡ [I omit sections 2-6.]

was of greater benefit than to associate with Socrates, and to converse with him, on any occasion, or on any subject whatever; since even the remembrance of him, when he is no longer with us, benefits in no small degree those who are accustomed to enjoy his society, and heard him with approbation; for he sought to improve his associates not less in his humorous than in his serious conversation. 2. He would often say that he loved some particular person; but he was evidently enamored, not of those formed by nature to be beautiful, but of those naturally inclined to virtue. He judged of the goodness of people's abilities from their quickness in learning the things to which they gave their attention, from their remembrance of what they learned, and from their desire for all those branches of knowledge by means of which it is possible to manage a family or an estate well, and to govern men and their affairs with success; for he thought that such characters, when instructed, would not only be happy themselves, and regulate their own families judiciously, but would be able to render other men, and other communities beside their own, happy. 3. He did not however make advances to all in the same manner. Those who thought that they had good natural abilities, but despised instruction, he endeavored to convince that minds which show most natural power have most need of education, pointing out to them that horses of the best breed, which are high-spirited and obstinate, become, if they are broken in when young, most useful and valuable, but if they are left unbroken, remain quite unmanageable and worthless; and that hounds of the best blood, able to endure toil, and eager to attack beasts, prove, if they are well trained, most serviceable for the chase, and every way excellent, but, if untrained, are useless, rabid, and disobedient. 4. In like manner, he showed that men of the best natural endowments, possessed of the greatest strength of mind, and most energetic in executing what they undertake, became, if well disciplined and instructed in what they ought to do, most estimable characters, and most beneficent to society (as they then performed most numerous and important services), but that, if uninstructed, and left in ignorance, they proved utterly worthless and mischievous; for that, not knowing what line of conduct they ought to pursue, they often entered upon evil courses, and, being haughty and impetuous, were difficult to be restrained or turned from their purpose, and thus occasioned very many and great evils.

5. But those who prided themselves on their wealth, and thought that they required no education, but imagined that their riches would suffice to effect whatever they desired, and to

gain them honor from mankind, he tried to reduce to reason by saying that the man was a fool who thought that he could distinguish the good and the evil in life without instruction [cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, xxi. (page 116 above), and Khordah Avesta, xiii. (page 183 above); and see Book IV., chapter vi. (below) immediately]; and that he also was a fool who, though he could not distinguish them, thought that he would procure whatever he wished, and effect whatever was for his interest, by means of his wealth. He also said that the man was void of sense who, not being qualified to pursue what was for his good, fancied that he would be prosperous in the world, and that every thing necessary for his comfort was fully, or at least sufficiently, provided for him; and that he was equally void of sense who, though he knew nothing, thought that he would seem good for something because of his riches, and, though evidently despicable, would gain esteem through their influence.

IV., ii., 1. I will now show how Socrates addressed himself to such as thought that they had attained the highest degree of knowledge, and prided themselves on their ability. Hearing that Euthydemus, surnamed the Handsome, had collected many writings of the most celebrated poets and sophists, and imagined that by that means he was outstripping his cotemporaries in accomplishments, and had great hopes that he would excel them all in talent for speaking and acting, and finding, by his first inquiries about him, that he had not yet engaged in public affairs on account of his youth, but that, when he wished to do any business, he usually sat in a bridle-maker's shop near the Forum, he went himself to it, accompanied by some of his hearers; 2. and as somebody asked, first of all, "whether it was from his intercourse with some of the wise men, or from his own natural talents, that Themistocles attained such a pre-eminence above his fellow-citizens, that the republic looked to him whenever it wanted the service of a man of ability," Socrates, wishing to excite the attention of Euthydemus, said that "it was absurd to believe that men could not become skilled in the lowest mechanical arts without competent instructors, and to imagine that ability to govern a state, the most important of all arts, might spring up in men by the unassisted efforts of nature."

3. On another occasion, when Euthydemus was one of the company, and Socrates saw him leaving it, from apprehension lest he should seem to admire him for his wisdom, he observed, "It is evident, my friends, from the studies that he pursues, that Euthydemus here, when he comes of age, and the government give liberty

of discussion on any point, will not refrain from offering his counsel; and I imagine that he has already framed an exordium for his public oration, taking precaution that he may not be thought to have learned any thing from any body; and it is pretty certain, therefore, that when he begins to speak, he will make his opening thus: 4. 'I, O men of Athens, have never learned any thing from any person, nor, though I heard of some that were skilled in speaking and acting, have I sought to converse with them; nor have I been anxious that any one of the learned should become my master; but I have done the exact contrary; for I have constantly avoided not only learning any thing from any one, but even the appearance of learning any thing; nevertheless I will offer you such advice as may occur to me without premeditation.' 5. So it might be proper for a person to commence a speech who desired to obtain a medical appointment from the government: 'I, O men of Athens, have never learned the medical art from any one, nor have been desirous that any physician should be my instructor; for I have constantly been on my guard, not only against learning any thing of the art from any one, but even against appearing to have learned any thing; nevertheless confer on me this medical appointment; for I will endeavor to learn by making experiments upon you.'" At this mode of opening a speech all who were present burst out into laughter.

6. As Euthydemus had now evidently begun to attend to what Socrates was saying, but was cautious of speaking himself, as thinking by his silence to clothe himself with reputation for modesty, Socrates, wishing to cure him of that fancy, said, "It is indeed strange that those who desire to play on the lyre, or on the flute, or to ride, or to become expert in any such accomplishment, should endeavor to practice, as constantly as possible, that in which they desire to excel, and not by themselves merely, but with the aid of such as are considered eminent in those attainments, attempting and undergoing every thing, so as to do nothing without their sanction, as supposing that they can by no other means attain reputation; but that of those who wish to become able to speak and act in affairs of government, some think that they will be suddenly qualified to achieve their object without preparation or study, and by their own unassisted efforts. 7. Yet these pursuits are manifestly more difficult of attainment than those, inasmuch as of the very many who attempt them a much smaller number succeed in them; and it is evident, therefore, that those who pursue the one are required to submit to longer and more diligent study than those who pursue the other."

8. Socrates used at first to make such remarks, while Euthydemus merely listened; but, when he observed that he staid, while he conversed, with more willingness, and hearkened to him with more attention, he at last came to the bridle-maker's shop unattended. As Euthydemus sat down beside him, he said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really, as I hear, collected many of the writings of men who are said to have been wise." "I have indeed, Socrates," replied he, "and I am still collecting, intending to persevere till I get as many as I possibly can." 9. * "I feel admiration for you, because you have not preferred acquiring treasures of silver and gold rather than of wisdom; for it is plain you consider that silver and gold are unable to make men better, but that the thoughts of wise men enrich their possessors with virtue." Euthydemus was delighted to hear this commendation, believing that he was thought by Socrates to have sought wisdom in the right course. 10. Socrates, observing that he was gratified with the praise, said, "And in what particular art do you wish to become skillful, that you collect these writings?"† "Do you wish, then," added Socrates, "to become a rhapsodist, for they say that you are in possession of all the poems of Homer?" "No, indeed," said he, "for I know that the rhapsodists, though eminently knowing in the poems of Homer, are, as men, extremely foolish." 11. "You are perhaps desirous, then," proceeded Socrates, "of attaining that talent by which men become skilled in governing states, in managing households, able to command, and qualified to benefit other men as well as themselves." "I indeed greatly desire," said he, "Socrates, to acquire that talent." ‡ "You aspire to a most honorable accomplishment, and a most exalted art, for it is the art of kings, and is called the royal art. But," added he, "have you ever considered whether it is possible for a man who is not just to be eminent in that art?" "I have certainly," replied he; "and it is not possible for a man to be even a good citizen without justice." 12. "Have you yourself, then, made yourself master of that virtue?" "I think," said he, "Socrates, that I shall be found not less just than any other man." "Are there then works of just men, as there are works of artisans?" "There are, doubtless," replied he. "Then," said Socrates, "as artisans are able to show their works, would not just men be able also to tell their works?" "And why should not I," asked Euthydemus, "be able to tell the works of justice; as also indeed those of injustice; for we may see and hear of no small number of them every day?"

*[I omit part of section 9 at this point.] †[I omit part of section 10 at this point.] ‡[I omit part of section 11 at this point.]

13. "Are you willing then," said Socrates, "that we should make a *delta* on this side, and an *alpha** on that, and then that we should put whatever seems to us to be a work of justice under the *delta*, and whatever seems to be a work of injustice under the *alpha*?" "If you think that we need those letters," said Euthydemus, "make them." 14. Socrates, having made the letters as he proposed, asked, "Does falsehood then exist among mankind?" "It does, assuredly," replied he. "Under which head shall we place it?" "Under injustice, certainly." "Does deceit also exist?" "Unquestionably." "Under what head shall we place that?" "Evidently under injustice." "Does mischievousness exist?" "Undoubtedly." "And the enslaving of men?" "That, too, prevails." "And shall neither of these things be placed by us, under justice, Euthydemus?" "It would be strange if they should be," said he. 15. "But," said Socrates, "if a man, being chosen to lead an army, should reduce to slavery an unjust and hostile people, should we say that he committed injustice?" "No, certainly," replied he. "Should we not rather say that he acted justly?" "Indisputably." "And, if, in the course of the war with them, he should practice deceit?" "That also would be just," said he. "And if he should steal and carry off their property, would he not do what was just?" "Certainly," said Euthydemus; "but I thought at first that you asked these questions only with reference to our friends." "Then," said Socrates, "all that we have placed under the head of injustice, we must also place under that of justice?" "It seems so," replied Euthydemus. 16. "Do you agree, then," continued Socrates, "that, having so placed them, we should make a new distinction, that it is just to do such things with regard to enemies, but unjust to do them with regard to friends, and that toward his friends our general should be as guileless as possible?" "By all means," replied Euthydemus. 17. "Well, then," said Socrates, "if a general, seeing his army dispirited, should tell them, inventing a falsehood, that auxiliaries were coming, and should, by that invention, check the despondency of his troops, under which head should we place such an act of deceit?" "It appears to me," said Euthydemus, "that we must place it under justice." "And if a father, when his son requires medicine, and refuses to take it, should deceive him, and give him the medicine as ordinary food, and, by adopting such deception, should restore him to health, under which head must we place such an act of deceit?" "It appears to me that we must put it under the same head." "And if a person, when his friend was in despondency,

* D. for ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ="just;" A. for ΑΔΙΚΟΣ="unjust."

should, through fear that he might kill himself, steal or take away his sword, or any other weapon, under which head must we place that act?" "That, assuredly, we must place under justice." 18. "You say, then," said Socrates, "that not even toward our friends must we act on all occasions without deceit?" "We must not indeed," said he, "for I retract what I said before, if I may be permitted to do so." "It is indeed much better that you should be permitted," said Socrates, "than that you should not place actions on the right side. 19. But of those who deceive their friends in order to injure them (that we may not leave even this point unconsidered), which of the two is the more unjust, he who does so intentionally or he who does so involuntarily?" "Indeed, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "I no longer put confidence in the answers which I give; for all that I said before appears to me now to be quite different from what I then thought; however, let me venture to say that he who deceives intentionally is more unjust than he who deceives involuntarily?"

20. "Does it appear to you, then, that there is a way of learning and knowing what is just, as there is of learning and knowing how to read and write?" "I think there is." "And which should you consider the better scholar, him who should purposely write or read incorrectly, or him who should do so unawares?" "Him who should do so purposely, for, whenever he pleased, he would be able to do both correctly." "He, therefore, that purposely writes incorrectly may be a good scholar, but he who does so involuntarily is destitute of scholarship?" "How can it be otherwise?" "And whether does he who lies and deceives intentionally know what is just, or he who does so unawares?" "Doubtless he who does so intentionally." "You therefore say that he who knows how to write and read is a better scholar than he who does not know?" "Yes." "And that he who knows what is just is more just than he who does not know?" "I seem to say so; but I appear to myself to say this I know not how." 21. "But what would you think of the man, who, wishing to tell the truth, should never give the same account of the same thing, but, in speaking of the same road, should say at one time that it led toward the east, and at another toward the west, and, in stating the result of the same calculation, should sometimes assert it to be greater and sometimes less, what, I say, would you think of such a man?" "It would be quite clear that he knew nothing of what he thought he knew."*

* This is the conclusion to which Socrates wished to bring Euthydemus with regard to his own knowledge of justice; and to exhort him, at the same time,

22. "Do you know any persons called slave-like?"* "I do." "Whether for their knowledge or their ignorance?" "For their ignorance, certainly." "Is it then for their ignorance of working in brass that they receive this appellation?" "Not at all." "Is it for their ignorance of the art of building?" "Nor for that." "Or for their ignorance of shoemaking?" "Not on any one of these accounts; for the contrary is the case, as most of those who know such trades are servile." "Is this, then, an appellation of those who are ignorant of what is honorable, and good and just?" "It appears so to me." 23. "It therefore becomes us to exert ourselves in every way to avoid being like slaves." "But,† Socrates," rejoined Euthydemus, "I firmly believed that I was pursuing that course of study, by which I should, as I expected, be made fully acquainted with all that was proper to be known by a man striving after honor and virtue; but now, how dispirited must you think I feel, when I see that, with all my previous labor, I am not even able to answer a question about what I ought most of all to know, and am acquainted with no other course which I may pursue to become better!"

24. Socrates then said, "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever gone to Delphi?" "Yes, twice," replied he. "And did you observe what is written somewhere on the temple wall, KNOW THYSELF?" "I did." "And did you take no thought of that inscription, or did you attend to it, and try to examine yourself, to ascertain what sort of character you are?" "I did not indeed try, for I thought that I knew very well already, since I should hardly know any thing else if I did not know myself." 25. "But whether does he seem to you to know himself, who knows his own name merely, or he who (like people buying horses, who do not think that they know the horse that they want to know, until they have ascertained whether he is tractable or unruly, whether he is strong or weak, swift or slow, and how he is as to other points which are serviceable or disadvantageous in the use of a horse, so he,) having ascertained with regard to himself how he is adapted for the service of mankind, knows his own abilities?" "It appears to me, I must confess, that he who does not know his own abilities, does not know himself." 26. "But is it not evident," said Socrates, "that men enjoy a great number of blessings in consequence of knowing themselves, and incur a great number of evils, through being deceived in themselves? For they who know themselves

to gain a knowledge of it. [I omit the remainder of this note.] * Compare I., i., 16. [page 327 above], and section 39 of this chapter. † [I omit part of section 23 at this point.]

know what is suitable for them, and distinguish between what they can do and what they can not; and, by doing what they know how to do, procure for themselves what they need, and are prosperous, and by abstaining from what they do not know, live blamelessly, and avoid being unfortunate. By this knowledge of themselves, too, they can form an opinion of other men, and, by their experience of the rest of mankind, obtain for themselves what is good, and guard against what is evil. 27. But they who do not know themselves, but are deceived in their own powers, are in similar case with regard to other men, and other human affairs, and neither understand what they require, nor what they are doing, nor the characters of those with whom they connect themselves, but, being in error as to all these particulars, they fail to obtain what is good, and fall into evil. 28. They, on the other hand, who understand what they take in hand, succeed in what they attempt, and become esteemed and honored; those who resemble them in character willingly form connections with them; those who are unsuccessful in life desire to be assisted with their advice, and to prefer them to themselves; they place in them their hopes of good, and love them, on all these accounts, beyond all other men. 29. But those, again, who do not know what they are doing, who make an unhappy choice in life, and are unsuccessful in what they attempt, not only incur losses and sufferings in their own affairs, but become, in consequence, disreputable and ridiculous, and drag out their lives in contempt and dishonor. Among states, too, you see that such as, from ignorance of their own strength, go to war with others that are more powerful, are, some of them, utterly overthrown, and others reduced from freedom to slavery."

30. "Be assured, therefore," replied Euthydemus, "that I feel convinced we must consider self-knowledge of the highest value; but as to the way in which we must begin to seek self-knowledge, I look to you for information, if you will kindly impart it to me."

31. "Well, then," said Socrates, "you doubtless fully understand what sort of things are good, and what sort are evil." "Yes,*" replied Euthydemus, "for if I did not understand such things, I should be in a worse condition than slaves are." "Come then," said Socrates, "tell me what they are." "That is not difficult," said he, "for, in the first place, health I consider to be a good, and sickness an evil, and, in the next, looking to the causes of each of them, as drink, food, and employments, I esteem such as conduce to health to be good, and such as lead to sickness to be evil." 32.

* [I omit part of section 31 at this point.]

"Consequently," said Socrates,^{*} "health and sickness themselves, when they are the causes of any good, will be good, and when they are the causes of any evil, will be evil." "But when," exclaimed Euthydemus, "can health be the cause of evil, and sickness of good?" "When, for example," said Socrates, "some portion of a community, from being in good health, take part in a disgraceful expedition by land, or a ruinous voyage by sea, or in any other such matters, which are sufficiently common, and lose their lives, while others, who are left behind from ill-health, are saved." "What you say is true," said Euthydemus, "but you see that some men share in successful enterprises from being in health, while others from being in sickness, are left out of them." "Whether then," said Socrates, "are those things which are sometimes beneficial, and sometimes injurious, goods, rather, or evils?" "Nothing^{*} is to be settled with regard to THEM by considering thus. 33. But as to WISDOM, Socrates, it is indisputably a good thing; for what business will not one who is wise conduct better than one who is untaught?" "Have you not heard, then, of Dædalus," said Socrates, "how he was made prisoner by Minos and compelled to serve him as a slave; how he was cut off, at once, from his country and from liberty, and how, when he endeavored to escape with his son, he lost the child, and was unable to save himself, but was carried away among barbarians, and made a second time a slave?" "Such a story is told, indeed," said Euthydemus. "Have you not heard, too, of the sufferings of Palamedes? for every body says that it was for his wisdom he was envied and put to death by Ulysses." "That, too, is said," replied Euthydemus. "And how many other men do you think have been carried off to the king† on account of their wisdom, and made slaves there?"

34. "But as to happiness, Sócrates," said Euthydemus, "that at least appears to be an indisputable good." "Yes, Euthydemus," replied Socrates, "if we make it consist in things that are themselves indisputably good." "But what," said he, "among things constituting happiness can be a doubtful good?" "Nothing," answered Socrates, "unless we join with it beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or any other such thing." 35. "But we must assuredly join them with it," said Euthydemus, "for how can a person be happy without them?" "We shall then join with it, ‡" said Socrates, "things from which many grievous calamities happen to mankind; for many, on account of their beauty, are ruined by those who are maddened with passion for their youthful attrac-

^{*} [I omit part of section 32 at this point.] † The king of Persia. ‡ [I omit a part of section 35 at this point.]

tions; many, through confidence in their strength, have entered upon undertakings too great for it, and involved themselves in no small disasters; many, in consequence of their wealth, have become enervated, been plotted against, and destroyed; and many, from the glory and power that they have acquired in their country, have suffered the greatest calamities." 36. "Well, then," said Euthydemus, "if I do not say what is right when I praise happiness, I confess that I do not know what we ought to pray for.*"

"These points, however," proceeded Socrates, "you have perhaps not sufficiently considered, from too confident a belief that you were already well acquainted with them; but since you intend to be at the head of a democratic government, you doubtless know what a democracy is." "Assuredly," said he. 37. "Do you think it possible for a person to know what a democracy is, without knowing what the DEMOS is?" "No, indeed." "And what do you conceive the DEMOS to be?" "I conceive it to be the poorer class of citizens." "Do you know, then, which are the poor?" "How can I help knowing?" "You know then which are the rich?" "Just as well as I know which are the poor." "Which sort of persons then do you call poor, and which sort rich?" "Those who have not sufficient means to pay for the necessities of life, I regard as poor; those who have more than sufficient, I consider rich." "Have you ever observed, then, that to some who have very small means, those means are not only sufficient, but that they even save from them, while, to many, very large fortunes are not sufficient?" "I have indeed," said Euthydemus, "(for you very properly put me in mind of it), since I have known some princes, who, from poverty, have been driven to commit injustice like the very poorest people." 39. "Then," said Socrates, "if such be the case, we must rank such princes among the DEMOS, and those that have but little, we must rank, if they be good managers, among the rich?" "My own want of knowledge, indeed," said Euthydemus; "obliges me to admit even this; and I am considering whether it would not be best for me to be silent; for I seem to know absolutely nothing."

He went away, accordingly, in great dejection, holding himself in contempt, and thinking that he was in reality no better than a slave.

40. Of those who were thus addressed by Socrates, many came to him no more; and these he regarded as too dull to be improved. But Euthydemus, on the contrary, conceived that he could by no other means become an estimable character than by associating

*[I omit part of section 36 at this point.]

with Socrates as much as possible; and he in consequence never quitted him, unless some necessary business obliged him to do so. He also imitated many of his habits.

When Socrates saw that he was thus disposed, he no longer puzzled him with questions, but explained to him, in the simplest and clearest manner, what he thought that he ought to know, and what it would be best for him to study.

§ **IV., iii., 1.** Socrates was never in haste that his followers should become skillful in speaking, in action, or in invention, but, previous to such accomplishments, he thought it proper that a love of self-control should be instilled into them; for he considered that those who had acquired those qualifications were, if devoid of self-control, only better fitted to commit injustice and to do mischief. 2. In the first place, therefore, he endeavored to impress his associates with right feelings toward the gods. Some, who were present with him when he conversed with others on this subject, have given an account of his discourses; but I myself was with him when he held a conversation with Euthydemus to the following effect.

3. "Tell me," said he "Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to consider how carefully the gods have provided for men every thing that they require?" "It has indeed never occurred to me," replied he. "You know at least," proceeded Socrates, "that we stand in need, first of all, of light, with which the gods supply us." "Yes,*" answered Euthydemus, "for if we had no light, we should be, as to the use of our eyes, like the blind." "But, as we require rest, they afford us night, the most suitable season for repose." "That is assuredly," said Euthydemus, "a subject for thankfulness." 4. "Then because the sun, being luminous, shows us the hours of the day, and every thing else, while the night, being dark, prevents us from making such distinctions in it, have they not caused the stars to shine in the night, which show us the night-watches, and under the direction of which we perform many things that we require?" "So it is," said he. "The moon, too, makes plain to us not only the divisions of the night, but also of the month." "Assuredly," said he, 5. "But that, since we require food, they should raise it for us from the earth, and appoint suitable seasons for the purpose, which prepare for us, in abundance and every variety, not only things which we need, but also things from which we derive pleasure, what do you think of such gifts?" "They certainly indicate love for man." 6. "And that they should supply us with water, an

* [I omit part of section 3 at this point.]

element of such value to us, that it causes to spring up, and unites with the earth and the seasons in bringing to maturity, every thing useful for us, and assists also to nourish ourselves, and, being mixed with all our food, renders it easier of digestion, more serviceable, and more pleasant; and that, as we require water in great quantities, they should supply us with it in such profusion, what do you think of such a gift?" "That also," said he, "shows thought for us." 7. "That they should also give us fire, a protection against cold and darkness, an auxiliary in every art and in everything that men prepare for their use (for, in a word, men produce nothing, among the various things necessary to life, without the aid of fire), what do you think of such a gift?" "That likewise," said he, gives eminent proof of regard for man.*

11. "But that, since there are numberless beautiful and useful objects in the world, greatly differing from one another, the gods should have bestowed on men senses adapted to each of them, by means of which we enjoy every advantage from them; that they should have implanted understanding in us, by means of which we reason about what we perceive by the senses, and, assisted by the memory, learn how far every thing is beneficial, and contrive many plans by which we enjoy good and avoid evil; 12. and that they should have given us the faculty of speech, by means of which we convey information to one another, and mutually impart whatever is good, and participate in it, enact laws, and enjoy constitutional government, what think you of such blessings?" "The gods certainly appear, Socrates, to exercise the greatest care for man in every way." "And that, since we are unable to foresee what is for our advantage with regard to the future, they should assist us in that respect, communicating what will happen to those who inquire of them by divination, and instructing them how their actions may be most for their benefit, what thoughts does that produce in you?" "The gods seem to show you, Socrates," rejoined he, "more favor than other men, since they indicate to you, without being asked, what you ought to do, and what not to do."

13. "And that I speak the truth,† you yourself also will know, if you do not expect to see the bodily forms of the gods, but will be content, as you behold their works, to worship and honor them. Reflect, too, that the gods themselves give us this intimation; ‡ for the other deities|| that give us blessings, do not bestow any of

* [I omit sections 8-10.] † In saying that the gods assist and admonish us.
‡ That we must not expect, when we consult the gods, to see their shapes.—
Kuehner. || Socrates and those who followed him, Plato, the Stoics, and Cicero,

them by coming manifestly before our sight; and he that orders and holds together the whole universe, in which are all things beautiful and good, and who preserves it always unimpaired, undisordered, and undecaying, obeying his will swifter than thought and without irregularity, is himself manifested only in the performance of his mighty works, but is invisible to us while he regulates them. 14. Consider also that the sun, which appears manifest to all, does not allow men to contemplate him too curiously, but, if any one tries to gaze on him steadfastly, deprives him of his sight. The instruments of the deities you will likewise find imperceptible; for the thunder-bolt, for instance, though it is plain that it is sent from above, and works its will with every thing with which it comes in contact, is yet never seen either approaching, or striking, or retreating; the winds, too, are themselves invisible, though their effects are evident to us, and we perceive their course. The soul of man, moreover, which partakes of the divine nature if any thing else in man does, rules, it is evident, within us, but is itself unseen. Meditating on these facts, therefore, it behooves you not to despise the unseen gods, but, estimating their power from what is done by them, to reverence what is divine."

15. "I feel clearly persuaded, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "that I shall never fail, in the slightest degree, in respect for the divine power, but I am dejected at the thought that no one among mankind, as it seems to me, can ever requite the favors of the gods with due gratitude." 16. "But be not dejected at that reflection, Euthydemus," said Socrates, "for you know that the deity at Delphi, whenever any one consults him how he may propitiate the gods, answers, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF YOUR COUNTRY;* and it is the law, indeed, every where, that every man should propitiate the gods with offerings according to his† ability; and how, therefore, can any man honor the gods better or more piously, than by acting as they themselves direct? 17. It behooves us, however, not to do less than we are able, for, when any one acts thus, he plainly shows that he does not honor the gods. But it becomes him who fails, in no respect, to honor the gods according to his means, to be

were advocates of the opinion that, besides the one supreme God, there were others, far inferior to him, but immortal, and of great power and endowments, whom the supreme God employed, as his ministers, in the government of the world; a subject which I have discussed at some length in a treatise *de M. T. Ciceronis in philosophiam meritis*, Hamb. 1825.—*Kuehner*. * See I., iii., 2, [page 335 above]. † [See I., iii., 3 (page 335 above), and cf. Mark. xii., 43, (page 235 above).]

of good courage, and to hope for the greatest blessings; for no one can reasonably hope for greater blessings from others than from those who are able to benefit him most; nor on any other grounds than by propitiating them; and how can he propitiate them better than by obeying them to the utmost of his power?"

18, By uttering such sentiments, and by acting according to them himself, he rendered those who conversed with him more pious and prudent.

IV., iv., 1. Concerning justice, too, he did not conceal what sentiments he entertained, but made them manifest even by his actions, for he conducted himself, in his private capacity, justly and beneficently toward all men, and, as a citizen, he obeyed the magistrates in all that the laws enjoined, both in the city and on military expeditions, so that he was distinguished above other men for his observance of order. 2. When he was president in the public assembly, he would not permit the people to give a vote contrary to law, but opposed himself, in defense of the laws, to such a storm of rage on the part of the populace as I think that no other man could have withstood.* 3. When the Thirty Tyrants commanded him to do any thing contrary to the laws, he refused to obey them; for both when they forbade him to converse with the young, and when they ordered him, and some others of the citizens, to lead a certain person away to death, he alone did not obey, because the order was given contrary to the laws. 4. When he was accused by Meletus, and others were accustomed, before the tribunal, to speak so as to gain the favor of the judges, and to flatter them, and supplicate them, in violation of the laws, and many persons, by such practices, had often been acquitted by the judges, he refused, on his trial, to comply with any practices opposed to the laws, and though he might easily have been acquitted by his judges, if he had but in a slight degree adopted any of those customs, he chose rather to die abiding by the laws than to save his life by transgressing them.

5. He held conversations to this effect with others on several occasions, and I know that he once had a dialogue of the following kind, concerning justice, with Hippias of Elis; for Hippias, on his return to Athens after an absence of some time, happened to come in the way of Socrates as he was observing to some people how surprising it was that, if a man wished to have another taught to be a shoemaker, or a carpenter, or a worker in brass, or a rider, he was at no loss whither he should send him to effect his object;†

* See I., i., 18 [page 327 above]. † [I omit part of section 5 at this point; see Mr. Watson's note.]

while as to justice, if any one wished either to learn it himself, or to have his son or his slave taught it, he did not know whither he should go to obtain his desire. 6. Hippias, hearing this remark, said, as if jesting with him. "What! are you still saying the same things, Socrates, that I heard from you so long ago?" "Yes," said Socrates, "and what is more wonderful, I am not only still saying the same things, but am saying them on the same subjects; but you, perhaps, from being possessed of such variety of knowledge, never say the same things on the same subjects." "Certainly," replied Hippias, "I do always try to say something new." 7. "About matters of which you have certain knowledge, then," said Socrates, "as, for instance, about the letters of the alphabet, if any one were to ask you how many and what letters are in the word 'Socrates,' would you try to say sometimes one thing, and sometimes another? or to people who might ask you about numbers, as whether twice five are ten, would you not give the same answer at one time as at another?" "About such matters, Socrates," replied Hippias, "I, like you, always say the same thing; but concerning justice I think that I have certainly something to say now which neither you nor any other person can refute." 8. * "It is a great good that you say you have discovered, since the judges will now cease from giving contradictory sentences, the citizens will cease from disputing about what is just, from going to law, and from quarreling, and communities will cease from contending about their rights and going to war; and I know not how I can part with you till I have learned so important a benefit from its discoverer." 9. "You shall not hear it,†" rejoined Hippias, "until you yourself declare what you think justice to be; for it is enough that you laugh at others, questioning and confuting every body, while you yourself are unwilling to give a reason to any body, or to declare your opinion on any subject." 10. "What then, Hippias," said Socrates. "have you not perceived that I never cease declaring my opinion as to what I conceive to be just?" "And what is this opinion of yours?" said Hippias. "If I make it known to you, not by words merely, but by ACTIONS, do not deeds seem to you to be a stronger evidence than words?" "Much stronger,‡" said Hippias, "for many who say what is just do what is unjust, but a man who does what is just can not be himself unjust." 11. "Have you ever then found me bearing false witness, or giving malicious information, or plunging my friends or the state into quarrels, or doing anything else that is unjust?" "I have

* [I omit part of section 8 at this point.] † [I omit part of section 9 at this point.] ‡ [I omit part of section 10 at this point.]

not." "And do you not think it justice to refrain from injustice?" "You are plainly, now," said Hippias, "endeavoring to avoid expressing an opinion as to what you think just; for what you say is, not what the just do, but what they do not do." 12. "But I thought," rejoined Socrates, "that to be unwilling to do injustice was a sufficient proof of justice. If this, however, does not satisfy you, consider whether what I next say will please you better; for I assert that what is in conformity with the laws is just." "Do you say, Socrates, that to be conformable to the laws, and to be just, is the same thing?" "I do, indeed." 13. "I am puzzled; for I do not understand what you call conformable to law, or what you call just." "Do you know the laws of the state?" said Socrates. "I do," said the other. "And what do you consider them to be?" "What the citizens in concert have enacted as to WHAT WE OUGHT TO DO, AND WHAT WE OUGHT TO AVOID DOING." "Would not he, therefore," asked Socrates, "be an observer of the laws who should conduct himself in the community agreeably to those enactments, and he be a violator of the laws who transgresses them?" "Undoubtedly," said Hippias. "Would not he, then, do what is just who obeys the laws, and he do what is unjust who disobeys them?" "Certainly." "Is not he, then, just who does what is just, and he unjust who does what is unjust?" "How can it be otherwise?" "He, therefore, that conforms to the laws is just," added Socrates, "and he who violates the laws, unjust."

14. "But," objected Hippias, "how can any one imagine the laws, or obedience to them, to be a matter of absolute importance, when the very persons who make them often reject and alter them?" "That objection is of no consequence," said Socrates, "for states, which have commenced war, often make peace again." "Undoubtedly they do," said Hippias. "What difference will there be in your conduct, then, think you, if you throw contempt on those who obey the laws, because the laws may be changed, and if you blame those who act properly in war, because peace may be made? Do you condemn those who vigorously support their country in war?" "I do not, indeed," replied Hippias. 15. "Have you ever heard it said of Lysurgus the Lacedæmonian, then," said Socrates, "that he would not have made Sparta at all different from other states, if he had not established in it, beyond others, a spirit of obedience to the laws? Do you not know, too, that of magistrates in states, those are thought the best who are most efficient in producing obedience to the laws, and that that state in which the citizens pay most respect to the laws, is in the best condition in peace, and invincible in war? 16. The greatest

blessing to states, moreover, is concord ; and the senates and principal men in them often exhort the citizens to unanimity ; and every where throughout Greece it is a law that the citizens shall take an oath to observe concord, an oath which they every where do take ; but I conceive that this is done, not that the citizens may approve of the same choruses, or that they may praise the same flute-players, or that they may prefer the same poets, or that they may take delight in the same spectacles, but that they may OBEY THE LAWS ; for while the citizens adhere to these, states will be eminently powerful and happy ; but without such unanimity, no state can be well governed, nor any family well regulated. 17. As an individual citizen, too, how could any person render himself less liable to penalties from the government, or more likely to have honors bestowed upon him, than by being obedient to the laws ? How else would he incur fewer defeats in the courts of justice, or how more certainly obtain sentence in his favor ? To whom would any one believe that he could more safely confide his money, or his sons or daughters ? Whom would the whole community deem more trustworthy than him who respects the laws ? From whom would parents, or relatives, or domestics, or friends, or citizens, or strangers, more certainly obtain their rights ? To whom would the enemy sooner trust in cessations of arms, or in making a truce, or articles of peace ? To whom would people more willingly become allies than to the observer of the laws, and to whom would the allies more willingly trust the leadership, or command of a fortress, or of a city ? From whom would any one expect to meet with gratitude, on doing him a kindness, sooner than from the observer of the laws ? Or whom would any one rather serve than him from whom he expects to receive a return ? To whom would any one more desire to be a friend, or less desire to be an enemy, than such a man ? With whom would any one be less inclined to go to war, than with him to whom he would most wish to be a friend, and least of all an enemy, and to whom the greatest part of mankind would wish to be friends and allies, and but a small number to be antagonists and enemies ? 18. I, therefore, Hippias, pronounce that to obey the laws and to be just is the same ; if you hold an opinion to the contrary, tell me." " Indeed, Socrates," rejoined Hippias, " I do not know that I entertain any sentiments opposed to what you have said of justice."

19. " But are you aware, Hippias," continued Socrates, " that there are unwritten laws ?" " You mean those," said Hippias, " that are in force about the same points, every where." " Can you affirm, then, that men made those laws ?" " How could they,"

said Hippias, "when they could not all meet together, and do not all speak the same language?" "Whom, then, do you suppose to have made these laws?" "I believe," said he, "that it was the gods who made these laws for men, for among all men the first law is to venerate the gods." 20. "Is it not also a law every where to honor parents?" "It is so." "Is it not a law, too, that parents shall not intermarry with their children, nor children with their parents?" "This does not, as yet, Socrates, appear to me to be a law of the gods." "Why?" "Because I find that some nations transgress it." 21. "Many others, too, they transgress," said Socrates; "but those who violate the laws made by the gods incur punishment which it is by no means possible for man to escape, as many transgressors of the laws made by men escape punishment, some by concealment, others by open violence."*

24. "Is it not every where a law, also," said Socrates, "that men should do good to those who do good to them?" "It is a law," answered Hippias, "but it is transgressed." "Do not those therefore who transgress it incur punishment," continued Socrates, "by being deprived of good friends, and being compelled to have recourse to those who hate them? Are not such as do service to those who seek it of them good friends to themselves, and are not those who make no return to such as serve them hated by them for their ingratitude; and yet, because it is for their advantage to have their support, do they not pay the greatest court to them?" "Indeed, Socrates," replied Hippias, "all these things seem to suit the character of the gods; for that the laws themselves should carry with them punishments for those who transgress them, appears to me to be the appointment of a lawgiver superior to man."

25. "Whether, therefore, Hippias," added Socrates, "do you consider that the gods appoint as laws, what is agreeable to justice, or what is at variance with justice?" "Not what is at variance with justice, certainly," said Hippias, "for scarcely would any other make laws in conformity with justice, if a god were not to do so." "It is the pleasure of the gods, therefore, Hippias," concluded Socrates, "that what is in conformity with justice should also be in conformity with the laws."

By uttering such sentiments, AND ACTING in agreement with them, he rendered those who conversed with him more observant of justice.

BOOK IV., chapter v., § 1. I will now relate how he rendered his followers better qualified for the management of public business. Thinking it expedient that temperance should be ob-

* [I omit sections 22 and 23.]

served by him who would succeed in anything honorable, he FIRST made it evident to those who conversed with him, that he PRACTICED this virtue beyond all other men, and then, by his discourse, he exhorted his followers, above everything, to the observance of temperance. He continued always, therefore, to make allusions to whatever was conducive to virtue; and I know that he once held a conversation on temperance with Euthydemus, to the following effect: 2. "Tell me," said he, "Euthydemus, do you regard liberty as an excellent and honorable possession for an individual or a community?" "The most excellent and honorable that can be," replied he. 3. "Do you consider him, then, who is held under control by the pleasures of the body, and is rendered unable, by their influence, to do what is best for him, to be free?" "By no means," replied Euthydemus. "Perhaps, then, TO HAVE THE POWER OF DOING WHAT IS BEST seems to you to be freedom, but to be under influences which will hinder you from doing it, you consider to be want of freedom?" "Assuredly," said he. 4. "Do not the intemperate appear to you, then, to be absolutely without freedom?" "Yes,* and naturally so." "And whether do the intemperate appear to you to be merely prevented from doing what is best, or to be forced, also, to do what is most dishonorable?" "They appear to me," replied Euthydemus, "to be not less forced to do the one than they are hindered from doing the other." 5. "And what sort of masters do you consider those to be, who hinder men from doing what is best, and force them to do what is worst?" "The very worst possible,†" replied he. "And what sort of slavery do you consider to be the worst?" "That," said he, "under the worst masters?" "Do not then the intemperate," said Socrates, "endure the very worst of slavery?" "It appears so to me," answered Euthydemus. 6. "And does not intemperance seem to you, by banishing from men prudence,‡ the greatest good, to drive them into the very opposite evil? Does it not appear to you to hinder them from attending to useful things, and learning them, by drawing them away to pleasure, and frequently, by captivating those who have a perception of good and evil, to make them choose the worse instead of the better?" "Such is the case," said he.

7. "And whom can we suppose, Euthydemus, to have less participation in self-control than the intemperate man? for assuredly the acts of self-control and of intemperance are the very opposite

*[I omit a portion of section 4 at this point.] †[I omit a portion of section 5 at this point.] ‡[Anthon (Harper, 1868, page 357) translates: "to shut out from men wisdom, the greatest good," etc.]

to each other." "I assent to this also," said he. "And do you think that any thing is a greater hinderance to attention to what is becoming, than intemperance?" "I do not." "And do you imagine that there is any greater evil to man, than that which makes him prefer the noxious to the beneficial, which prompts him to pursue the one and to neglect the other, and which forces him to pursue a contrary course of conduct to that of the wise?" "There is none," said Euthydemus.

8. "Is it not natural, then," said Socrates, "that temperance should be the cause of producing in men effects contrary to those which intemperance produces?" "Undoubtedly," said Euthydemus. "Is it not natural, therefore, also, that what produces those contrary effects should be best for man?" "It is natural," said he. "Is it not consequently natural then, Euthydemus, that temperance should be best for man?" "It is so, Socrates," said he. 9. "And have you ever reflected upon this, Euthydemus?" "What?" "That even to those pleasures, to which alone intemperance seems to lead men, it can not lead them, but that temperance produces greater pleasure than any thing else?" "How?" said he. "Because intemperance, by not allowing men to withstand hunger, thirst, or the desire of sensual gratification, or want of sleep (through which privations alone is it possible for them to eat, and drink, and gratify other natural appetites, and go to rest and sleep with pleasure, waiting and restraining themselves until the inclinations may be most happily indulged), hinders them from having any due enjoyment in acts most necessary and most habitual; but temperance, which alone enables men to endure the privations which I have mentioned, alone enables them to find delight in the gratifications to which I have alluded." "What you say," observed Euthydemus, "is indisputably true." 10. "From learning what is honorable and good, moreover, and from the study of those accomplishments by which a man may ably govern himself, judiciously regulate his household, become useful to his friends and the state, and gain the mastery over his enemies (from which studies arise not only the greatest advantages, but also the greatest pleasures), the temperate have enjoyment while they practice them, but the intemperate have no share in any of them; for to whom can we say that it less belongs to participate in such advantages, than to him who has the least power to pursue them, being wholly occupied in attention to present pleasures?" 11. "You seem to me, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "to say that the man who is under the influence of bodily pleasures, has no participation in any one virtue." "For what difference is there, Euthydemus," said he, "between an

intemperate man and the most ignorant brute? How will he, who has no regard to what is best, but seeks only to enjoy what is most seductive by any means in his power, differ from the most senseless cattle? To the temperate alone it belongs to consider what is best in human pursuits, to distinguish those pursuits, according to experience and reason, into their several classes, and then to choose the good and refrain from the evil."

12. Thus it was, he said, that men became most virtuous and happy, and most skillful in reasoning; and he observed that the expression *DIALEGESTHAI*, "to reason," had its origin in people's practice of meeting together to reason on matters, and distinguishing them, *DIA-LEGONTAS*, according to their several kinds. It was the duty of every one, therefore, he thought, to make himself ready in this art, and to study it with the greatest diligence; for that men, by the aid of it, became most accomplished, most able to guide others, and most acute in discussion.

IV., vi., 1. I will now endeavor to show that Socrates rendered those who associated with him more skillful in argument. For he thought that those who knew the nature of things severally, would be able to explain them to others; but as to those who did not know, he said that it was not surprising that they fell into error themselves, and led others into it. He therefore never ceased to reason with his associates about the nature of things. To go through all the terms that he defined, and to show how he defined them, would be a long task; but I will give as many instances as I think will suffice to show the nature of his reasoning.*

2. In the first place, then, he reasoned of *PIETY*, in some such way as this. "Tell me," said he, "Euthydemus, what sort of feeling do you consider piety to be?" "The most noble of all feelings," replied he. "Can you tell me, then, who is a pious man?" "The man, I think, who honors the gods." "Is it allowable to pay honor to the gods in any way that one pleases?" "No; there are certain laws in conformity with which we must pay our honors to them." 3. "He, then, who knows these laws, will know how he must honor the gods?" "I think so." "He therefore who knows how to pay honor to the gods, will not think that he ought to pay it otherwise than as he knows?" "Doubtless not." "But does any one pay honors to the gods otherwise than as he thinks that he ought to pay them?" "I think not." 4. "He therefore who knows what is agreeable to the laws with regard to the gods, will honor the gods in agreement with the

* [This chapter is of the highest importance in establishing the principles of the Socratic philosophy. Cf. IV., i., 5 (page 383), and III., ix (page 377).]

laws?" "Certainly." "Does not he, then, who honors the gods agreeably to the laws honor them as he ought?" "How can he do otherwise?" "And he who honors them as he ought, is pious?" "Certainly." "He therefore who knows what is agreeable to the laws with regard to the gods, may be justly defined by us as a pious man?" "So it appears to me," said Euthydemus.

5. "But is it allowable for a person to conduct himself toward other men in whatever way he pleases?" "No; but with respect to men also, he who knows what is in conformity with the laws, and how men ought, according to them, to conduct themselves toward each other, will be an observer of the laws." "Do not those, then, who conduct themselves toward each other according to what is in conformity with the laws, conduct themselves toward each other as they ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Do not those, therefore, who conduct themselves toward each other as they ought, conduct themselves well?" "Certainly." "Do not those, then, that conduct themselves well toward each other, act properly in transactions between man and man?" "Surely." "Do not those, then, who obey the laws, do what is just?" "Undoubtedly." 6. "And do you know what sort of actions are called just?" "Those which the laws sanction." "Those, therefore, who do what the laws sanction, do what is just, and what they ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Those who do just things, therefore, are just?" "I think so." "Do you think that any persons yield obedience to the laws who do not know what the laws sanction?" "I do not." "And do you think that any who know what they ought to do, think that they ought not to do it?" "I do not think so." "And do you know any persons that do other things than those which they think they ought to do?" "I do not." "Those, therefore, who know what is agreeable to the laws in regard to men, do what is just?" "Certainly." "And are not those who do what is just, just men?" "Who else can be so?" "Shall we not define rightly, therefore," concluded Socrates, "if we define those to be just who know what is agreeable to the laws in regard to men?" "It appears so to me," said Euthydemus.

7. "And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, whether do men seem to you to be wise, in things which they know, or in things which they do not know?" "In what they know, certainly; for how can a man be wise in things of which he knows nothing?" "Those, then, who are wise, are wise by their knowledge?" "By what else can a man be wise, if not by his knowledge?" "Do you think wisdom, then, to be any thing else than

that by which men are wise?" "I do not." "Is knowledge, then, wisdom?" "It appears so to me." "Does it appear to you, however, that it is possible for a man to know all things that are?" "No;* not even, as I think, a comparatively small portion of them." "It is not therefore possible for a man to be wise in all things?" "No, indeed." "Every man is wise, therefore, in that only of which he has a knowledge?" "So it seems to me."

8. "Shall we thus, too, Euthydemus," said he, "inquire what is good?" "How?" said Euthydemus. "Does the same thing appear to you to be beneficial to every body?" "No." "And does not that which is beneficial to one person appear to you to be sometimes hurtful to another?" "Assuredly." "Would you say, then, that any thing is good that is not beneficial?" "I would not." "What is beneficial, therefore, is good, to whomsoever it is beneficial?" "It appears so to me," said Euthydemus.

9. "And can we define the BEAUTIFUL in any other way than if you term whatever is beautiful, whether a person, or a vase, or any thing else whatsoever, beautiful for whatever purpose you know that it is beautiful?"† "No, indeed," said Euthydemus. "For whatever purpose, then, anything may be useful, for that purpose it is beautiful to use it?" "Certainly." "And is any thing beautiful for any other purpose than that for which it is beautiful to use it?" "For no other purpose," replied he. "What is useful is beautiful, therefore, for that purpose for which it is beautiful?" "So I think," said he.

10. "As to COURAGE, Euthydemus," said Socrates, "do you think it is to be numbered among excellent things?" "I think it one of the most excellent," replied Euthydemus.‡ "Does it appear to you to be useful, with regard to formidable and dangerous things, to be ignorant of their character?" "By no means." "They, therefore, who do not fear such things, because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?" "Certainly not; for, in that case, many madmen and even cowards would be courageous."||

11. "But do you think that any other persons are *good*, with reference to terrible and dangerous circumstances, except those who are able to conduct themselves well under them?" "No, those only," said he. "And you think those *bad* with regard to them, who are of such a character as to conduct themselves badly under them?" "Whom else can I think so?" "Do not each, then, conduct themselves under them as they think they ought?" "How can it be otherwise?" "Do those, therefore, who do not conduct

*[I omit part of section 7 at this point.] † Cf. III., viii., 7 [page 376 above].

‡[I omit part of section 10 at this point.] || [I omit the remainder of section 10.]

themselves properly under them, know how they ought to conduct themselves under them?" "Doubtless not." "Those then who know how they ought to conduct themselves under them, can do so?" "And they alone." "Do those, therefore, who do not fail under such circumstances, conduct themselves badly under them?" "I think not." "Those then who do conduct themselves badly under them, do fail?" "It seems so." "Those, therefore, who know how to conduct themselves well in terrible and dangerous circumstances are courageous, and those who fail to do so are cowards?" "They at least appear so to me," said Euthydemus.

12. Monarchy and tyranny he considered to be both forms of government, but conceived that they differed greatly from one another; for a government over men with their own consent, and in conformity with the laws of free states, he regarded as a monarchy; but a government over men against their will, and not according to the laws of free states, but just as the ruler pleased, a tyranny; and wherever magistrates were appointed from among those who complied with the injunctions of the laws, he considered the government to be an aristocracy; wherever they were appointed according to their wealth, a plutocracy; and wherever they were appointed from among the whole people, a democracy.

13. Whenever any person contradicted him on any point, who had nothing definite to say, and who perhaps asserted, without proof, that some person, whom he mentioned, was wiser, or better skilled in political affairs, or possessed of greater courage, or worthier in some such respect, ((than some other whom Socrates had mentioned)), he would recall the whole argument, in some such way as the following, to the primary proposition: 14. "Do you say that he whom you commend, is a *better citizen* than he whom I commend?" "I do say so." "Why should we then not consider, in the first place, what is the duty of a *good citizen*?" "Let us do so." "Would not he then be superior in the management of the public money who should make the state richer?" "Undoubtedly." "And he in war who should make it victorious over its enemies?" "Assuredly." "And in an embassy he who should make friends of foes?" "Doubtless." "And he in addressing the people who should check dissension and inspire them with unanimity?" "I think so." When the discussion was thus brought back to fundamental principles, the truth was made evident to those who had opposed him.

15. When he himself went through any subject in argument, he proceeded upon propositions of which the truth was generally acknowledged, thinking that a sure foundation was thus formed for

his reasoning. Accordingly, whenever he spoke, he, of all men that I have known, most readily prevailed on his hearers to assent to his arguments; and he used to say that Homer had attributed to Ulysses the character of *a sure orator*, as being able to form his reasoning on points acknowledged by all mankind.

IV., vii., 1. That Socrates expressed his sentiments with sincerity to those who conversed with him, is, I think, manifest from what I have said. I will now proceed to show how much it was his care that his followers should be competently qualified for employments suited to their powers. Of all men that I have known, he was the most anxious to discover in what occupation each of those who attended him was likely to prove skillful; and of all that it becomes a man of honor and virtue to know, he taught them himself, whatever he knew, with the utmost cheerfulness; and what he had not sufficient knowledge to teach, he took them to those who knew, to learn.

2. He taught them also how far it was proper that a well-educated man should be versed in any department of knowledge. Geometry, for instance, he said that a man should study until he should be capable, if occasion required, to take or give land correctly by measurement; or to divide it or portion it out for cultivation; and this, he observed, it was so easy to learn, that he who gave any attention at all to mensuration, might find how large the whole earth was, and perfectly understand how it was measured. 3. But of pursuing the study of geometry to diagrams hard to understand, he disapproved; for he said that he could not see of what profit they were,* though he himself was by no means unskilled in them; but he remarked that they were enough to consume a man's whole life, and hinder him from attaining many other valuable branches of knowledge.

4. He recommended his followers to learn astronomy also, but only so far as to be able to know the hour of the night, the month, and the season of the year, with a view to traveling by land or sea, or distinguishing the night-watches; and to be competent, by knowing the divisions of the above-mentioned times, to profit by the signs for whatever other things are done at a cer-

* Socrates did not altogether condemn the study of geometry and astronomy, but disapproved of the general practice of the philosophers of his own age, who devoted themselves wholly to difficult questions concerning the figure of the earth, etc., to the entire neglect of moral philosophy. Plato, *Phæd.* c. 46, agrees with Xenophon; and, indeed, an immoderate pursuit of such studies was altogether alien from the affairs of common life and morality, to which alone Socrates gave his serious attention.—*Zeune*. [I omit the remainder of this note.]

tain period of the night, or month, or year. These particulars, he said, were easily learned from men who hunted by night, from pilots, and from many others whose business it was to know them. 5. But to continue the study of astronomy so far as to distinguish the bodies which do not move in the same circle with the heavens* the planets, and the irregular stars,† and to weary ourselves in inquiring into their distances from the earth, the periods of their revolutions, and the causes of all these things, was what he greatly discountenanced; for he saw, he said, no profit in these studies either,‡ though he had himself given attention to them; since they also, he remarked, were enough to wear out the life of a man, and prevent him from attending to many profitable pursuits.

6. Concerning celestial matters in general, he dissuaded every man from becoming a speculator how the divine power contrives to manage them; || for he did not think that such points were discoverable by man, nor did he believe that those acted dutifully toward the gods who inquired into things which they did not wish to make known. He observed, too, that a man who was anxious about such investigations, was in danger of losing his senses, not less than Anaxagoras, who prided himself highly on explaining the plans of the gods, lost his. 7. For Anaxagoras, when he said that fire and the sun were of the same nature, did not reflect that people can easily look upon fire, but can not turn their gaze to the sun, and that men, if exposed to the rays of the sun, have complexions of a darker shade, but not if exposed to fire; he omitted to consider, too, that of the productions of the earth, none can come fairly to maturity without the rays of the sun, while, if warmed by the heat of fire, they all perish; and when he said that the sun was a heated stone, he forgot that a stone placed in the fire does not shine, or last long, but that the sun continues perpetually the most luminous of all bodies.

8. He advised his followers also to learn computations, but in these, as in other things, he exhorted them to avoid useless labor; as far as it was of any profit, he investigated every thing himself, and went through it with his associates.

9. He earnestly recommended those who conversed with him to take care of their health, both by learning whatever they could respecting it from men of experience, and by attending to it, each

* Edwards refers to Diog. Laert. vii., 144, where it is said that some of the heavenly bodies are carried round with the heaven, without changing their place, while others have motions peculiar to themselves. † Schneider, Bornemann, and Kuehner, agree in understanding *comets*. ‡ Any more than in difficult geometrical investigations. || [See I., i., 12 (page 326 above).]

for himself, throughout his whole life, studying what food or drink, or what exercise, was most suitable for him, and how he might act in regard to them so as to enjoy the best health; for he said it would be difficult for a person who thus attended to himself to find a physician that would tell better than himself what was conducive to his health.*

IV., viii., 1. But if any one thinks that he was convicted of falsehood with regard to his DÆMON, because sentence of death was pronounced on him by the judges although he said that the dæmon admonished him what he ought and what he ought not to do, let him consider, in the first place, that he was already so advanced in years, † that he must have ended his life, if not then, at least not long after; and, in the next, that he relinquished only the most burdensome part of life, in which all feel their powers of intellect diminished, while, instead of enduring this, he acquired great glory by proving the firmness of his mind, pleading his cause above all men, with the greatest regard to truth, ingenuousness, and justice, and bearing his sentence at once with the utmost resignation and the utmost fortitude.

2. It is indeed acknowledged that no man, of all that are remembered, ever endured death with greater glory; for he was obliged to live thirty days after his sentence, because the Delian festival happened in that month, and the law allowed no one to be publicly put to death until the sacred deputation should return from Delos; and during that time he was seen by all his friends living in no other way than at any preceding period; and, let it be observed, throughout all the former part of his life he had been admired beyond all men for the cheerfulness and tranquillity with which he lived. 3. How could any one have died more nobly than thus? Or what death could be more honorable than that which any man might most honorably undergo? Or what death could be happier than the most honorable? Or what death more acceptable to the gods than the most happy?

4. I will also relate what I heard ‡ respecting him from Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, who said that after Meletus had laid the accusation against him, he heard him speaking on any subject rather than that of his trial, and remarked to him that he ought to consider what defense he should make, but that he said at first, "Do I not appear to you to have passed my whole life meditating on that subject?" and then, when he asked him "How so?"

* [I omit section 10.] † He was seventy years old, according to Diog. Laert. ii., 44, and Maxim. Tyr. ix., 8. ‡ Xenophon himself was then with Cyrus in Asia.—*Schneider*.

he said that "he had gone through life doing nothing but considering what was just and what unjust, DOING what was just AND ABSTAINING from what was unjust, which he conceived to be the best meditation for his defense." 6.* "And do you think it strange," inquired Socrates, "that it should seem better to the divinity that I should now close my life? Do you not know, that, down to the present time, I would not admit to any man that he has lived either better or with more pleasure than myself? for I consider that those live best who study best to become as good as possible; and that those live with most pleasure who feel the most assurance that they are daily growing better and better.† 9. If I am to die unjustly, my death will be a disgrace to those who unjustly kill me; for if injustice is a disgrace, must it not be a disgrace to do anything unjustly? But what disgrace will it be to me, that others could not decide or act justly with regard to me? 10. Of the men who have lived before me, I see that the estimation left among posterity with regard to such as have done wrong, and such as have suffered wrong, is by no means similar; and I know that I also, if I now die, shall obtain from mankind far different consideration from that which they will pay to those who take my life; for I know that they will always bear witness to me that I have never wronged any man, or rendered any man less virtuous, but that I have always endeavored to make those better who conversed with me." Such discourse he held with Hermogenes, and with others.

11. Of those who knew what sort of man Socrates was, such as were lovers of virtue, continue to regret him above all other men, even to the present day, as having contributed in the highest degree to their advancement in goodness. To me, being such as I have described him, so pious that he did nothing without the sanction of the gods; so just, that he wronged no man even in the most trifling affair, but was of service, in the most important matters, to those who enjoyed his society; so temperate, that he never preferred pleasure to virtue; so wise, that he never erred in distinguishing better from worse, needing no counsel from others, but being sufficient in himself to discriminate between them; so able to explain and settle such questions by argument; and so capable of discerning the character of others, of confuting those who were in error, and of exhorting them to virtue and honor,‡ he seemed to be such as the best and happiest of men would be. But if any one disapproves of my opinion, let him compare the conduct of others with that of Socrates, and determine accordingly.

* [I omit section 5, and the first part of section 6.] † [I omit sections 7 and 8.]

§ 1040.—Aristotle and Plato. (page 37, line 7.) [*Eximious*: excellent. See Webster, who refers to Bacon.] Cf. §§ 511, 451, 3054, and the following extracts from ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS:*

BOOK I.—OF THE SUMMUM BONUM.

I., i., 1. Every art and every scientific system, and in like manner every course of action and deliberate preference, seems to aim at some good; and consequently "*the Good*" has been well defined as "that which all things aim at."

2. But there appears to be a kind of difference in ends; for some are energies; others again beyond these, certain works; but wherever there are certain ends besides the actions, there the works are naturally better than the energies.†

3. Now since there are many actions, arts, and sciences, it follows that there are many ends; for of medicine the end is health; of ship-building, a ship; of generalship, victory; of economy, wealth. 4. But whatever of such arts are contained under any one faculty, (as, for instance, under horsemanship is contained the art of making bridles, and all other horse furniture; and this and the whole art of war is contained under generalship; and in the same manner other arts are contained under different faculties;) in all these the ends of the chief arts are more eligible than the ends of the subordinate ones [cf. I., vii., 4]; because for the sake

* "The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Translated, with notes, original and selected; an analytical introduction; and questions for the use of students. By R. W. Browne, M.A., Professor of Classical Literature in King's College, London; and Prebendary of St. Paul's." (Bohn's Classical Library). [I have retained many of Prof. Browne's notes.] † The term energy, which I have retained as the translation of ENERGEIA, requires some explanation. Energy, then, implies an activity or active state; it is opposed to DUNAMIS, *i. e.* capacity, faculty, potentiality, inasmuch as the latter may be dormant, and though capable of improvement, may be left unimproved; and it is possible for a thing to have the capacity of being, and yet not to be: as, for example, a coal has the capacity for burning, and yet it may perhaps never do so. Energy implies actual and active existence, not a mere possible or potential one. It is opposed to 'EXIS, habit, because by means of it habits are acquired and formed. Hence we can see the difference between an energy and a work (ERGON) when considered as ends or final causes of action. Whenever we enter upon a course of action, we have one of two objects in view,—either the action itself, or some production or work to which it leads. For example, a painter paints either merely for the sake of painting, feeling an actual delight in this active exertion of his faculty for its own sake, or in order to produce a picture; in the former case, his end (TELOS) is an energy, in the latter a work. An energy, therefore, is perfect and complete, and has its end in itself, it looks to nothing further, it is eligible for its own sake. [I omit the remainder of this note.]

of the former, the latter are pursued. 5. It makes, however, [in regard to the activity itself], no difference whether the energies themselves, or something else besides these, are the ends of actions, just as it would make no difference in the sciences above mentioned.

I., ii., 1. If, therefore, there is some end of all that we do, which we wish for on its own account, and if we wish for all other things on account of this, and do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for thus we should go on to infinity, so that desire would be empty and vain), it is evident that this must be "the good," and the greatest good. 2. Has not, then, the knowledge of this end a great influence on the conduct of life? and, like archers, shall we not be more likely to attain THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, if we have a mark? If so, we ought to endeavor to give an outline at least of its nature, and to determine to which of the sciences or faculties it belongs.

3. Now it would appear to be the end of that which is especially the chief and master science, and this seems to be the political science; for it directs what sciences states ought to cultivate, what individuals should learn, and how far they should pursue them. 4. We see, too, that the most valued faculties are comprehended under it, as, for example, generalship, economy, rhetoric. 5. Since, then, this science makes use of the practical sciences, and legislates respecting WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE, AND WHAT ABSTAINED FROM, its end must include those of the others; so that this end must be *the good* of MAN. For although the good of an individual and a state be the same, still that of a state appears more important and more perfect both to obtain and to preserve. 6. To discover the good of an individual is satisfactory, but to discover that of a state or a nation is more noble and divine. This, then, is the object of my treatise, which is of a political kind.

I., iii, 3.* We must be content, then, when treating of, and drawing conclusions from such subjects, to exhibit the truth roughly, and in outline; and when dealing with contingent matter, to draw conclusions of the same kind. 4. According to the same rule ought we to admit each assertion; for it is the part of an educated man to require exactness in each class of subjects, only so far as the nature of the subject admits; for it appears nearly the same thing to allow a mathematician to speak persuasively, as to demand demonstrations from an orator.

5. Now each individual judges well of what he knows, and of these he is a good judge. In each particular science, therefore, he is a good judge who has been instructed in them; and universally,

* [I omit sections 1 and 2.]

he who has been instructed in all subjects. 6. Therefore a young man is not a proper person to study political science, for he is inexperienced in the ACTIONS of life: but these are the subjects and grounds of this treatise. Moreover, being inclined to follow the dictates of passion, he will listen in vain, and without benefit, since THE END IS NOT KNOWLEDGE, BUT PRACTICE. 7. But it makes no difference, whether he be a youth in age, or a novice in character; for the defect arises not from age, but from his life and pursuits being according to the dictates of passion; for to such persons knowledge becomes useless, as it does to the incontinent; but to those who regulate their appetites and actions according to REASON, the knowledge of these subjects must be very beneficial. Concerning the student, and in what manner he is to admit our arguments, and what we propose to treat of, let thus much be prefaced.

I., iv., 1. But let us resume the subject from the commencement. Since all knowledge and every act of deliberate preference aims at some good, let us show what that is, which we say that the political science aims at, and what is the highest good of all things which are done. 2. As to its name, indeed, almost all men are agreed; for both the vulgar and the educated call it *happiness*; but they suppose that to live well and do well are synonymous with being happy. 3. But concerning the nature of happiness they are at variance, and the vulgar do not give the same definition of it as the educated; for some imagine it to be an obvious and well-known object—such as pleasure, or wealth, or honor; but different men think differently of it: and frequently even the same person entertains different opinions respecting it at different times; for, when diseased, he believes it to be health; when poor, wealth; but, conscious of their own ignorance, they admire those who say that it is something great, and beyond them. 4. Some, again, have supposed that, besides these numerous goods, there is another self-existent good, which is to all these the cause of their being goods. Now, to examine all the opinions would perhaps be rather unprofitable; but it will be sufficient to examine those which lie most upon the surface, or seem to be most reasonable.

5. Let it not, however, escape our notice, that arguments *from* principles differ from arguments *to* principles; for well did Plato also propose doubts on this point, and inquire whether the right way is from principles [deduction] or to principles [induction]; just as in the course from the starting-post to the goal, or the contrary. 6. For we must begin from those things that are known; and things are known in two ways; for some are known to ourselves [aposteriori], others are generally known [apriori]; perhaps,

therefore, we should begin [inductively] from the things known to ourselves.

7. Whoever, therefore, is to study with advantage the things which are honorable and just, and in a word the subjects of political science, must have been well and MORALLY educated; for the point from whence we must begin is *the fact*, and if this is satisfactorily proved, it will be unnecessary to add *the reason* [rule or principle]. Such a student either possesses, or would easily acquire, the principles. But let him who possesses neither of these qualifications, hear the sentiments of Hesiod:—

“Far does the man all other men excel,
Who, from his wisdom, thinks in all things well,
Wisely considering, to himself a friend,
All for the present best, and for the end.
Nor is the man without his share of praise,
Who well the dictates of the wise obeys:
But he that is not wise himself, nor can
Hearken to wisdom, is a useless man.”

Hesiod, Op. et Di., translated.

Bk. I., ch. v., § 1. But let us return to the point where we commenced this digression; for men seem not unreasonably to form their notion of “the good,” and of happiness, from observing the different lives which men lead. The many and most sordid class suppose it to be pleasure, and therefore they are content with a life of enjoyment.* 4. But those who are educated, and fond of active pursuits, suppose it to be honor, for this may be almost said to be the end of political life; but it appears to be too superficial for the object of our inquiry; for it seems to reside rather in those who confer, than in those who receive, honor: but we have a natural conception, that “the good” is some thing peculiarly one’s own, and difficult to be taken away. 5. Moreover, men seem to pursue honor in order that they may believe themselves to be good; at any rate they seek to be honored by wise men, and by their acquaintances, and on account of virtue: it is plain, therefore, that, at least in *their* opinion, virtue is superior.†

8. But the money-getting life does violence to our natural inclinations;‡ and it is obvious that riches are not the good which we are in search of; for they are merely useful, and for the sake of some other end.||

I., vii., 1. Now let us again return to the good we are in search of, and inquire what it is; for it seems to be different in different

* [I omit sections 2 and 3.] † [I omit sections 6 and 7.] ‡ Which lead us to look upon money as a means, and not an end; whereas the man who devotes himself to getting money generally learns to consider it as an end. [Extract from the translator’s note.] || [I omit the remainder of section 8, and the whole of chapter vi.]

courses of action and arts; for it is different in the art of medicine, in generalship, and in like manner in the rest. What then is the good in each? Is it not that, for the sake of which the other things are done? Now in the art of medicine this is health; in the art of generalship, victory; in architecture, a house; in different arts, different ends. 2. But in every action and deliberate preference, it is the end; since for the sake of this all men do everything else. So that, if there is any end of ALL human actions, this must be the PRACTICAL GOOD; but if more ends than one, these must be it. By a different path, therefore, our argument has arrived at the same point [ch. ii.]; and this we must attempt to explain still further.

3. Since ends appear to be more than one, and of these we choose some for the sake of others, as, for instance, riches, musical instruments, and universally all instruments whatever, it is plain that they are not all perfect. But the chief good appears to be something perfect; so that if there is some one end which is alone perfect, that must be the very thing which we are in search of; but if there are many, it must be the most perfect of them. 4. Now we say, that the object pursued for its own sake is more perfect than that pursued for the sake of another; and that the object which is never chosen on account of another thing, is more perfect than those which are eligible both by themselves, and for the sake of that other: in fine, we call that completely perfect, which is always eligible for its own sake, and never on account of anything else.

5. Of such a kind does happiness seem in a peculiar manner to be; for this we always choose on its own account, and never on account of anything else. But honor, and pleasure, and intellect, and every virtue we choose partly on their own account (for were no further advantage to result from them, we should choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, because we suppose that we shall attain happiness by their means; but no one chooses happiness for the sake of these, nor in short for the sake of anything else.

6. But the same result seems also to arise from self-sufficiency, for the perfect good appears to be self-sufficient; but we attribute self-sufficiency not to him who leads, for himself alone, a solitary life, but to him who lives also for his parents and children, and wife, and, in short, for his friends and fellow-citizens; since man is naturally a social being.* 7. We define the "self-sufficient" as that which, when separated from everything else, makes life eligi-

* [I omit the remainder of section 6.]

ble, and in want of nothing; and such we suppose the nature of happiness to be; and moreover, we suppose it the most eligible of all things, even when not reckoned together with any other good; but more eligible, doubtless, even when reckoned together with the smallest good; for the part added becomes an excess of good; but of two goods the greater is always more eligible. Happiness, then, appears something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end of all human actions.

8. But, perhaps, to say that happiness is the greatest good, appears like stating something which is already granted; and it is desirable that we should explain still more clearly what it is. Perhaps, then, this may be done, if we take the peculiar work of man; for as to the musician, and statuary, and to every artist, and in short to all who have any work or course of action, the good and excellence of each appears to consist in their peculiar work; so would it appear to be with man, if there is any peculiar work belonging to him. Are there, then, certain peculiar works and courses of action belonging to the carpenter and shoemaker; 9. and is there no peculiar work of man, but is he by nature without a work? or, as there appears to be a certain work peculiarly belonging to the eye, the hand, and the foot, and, in fine, to each of the members, in like manner would not one assume a certain work besides all these peculiarly belonging to man?

10. What, then, must this peculiar work be? For life man appears to share in common with plants; but his *peculiar* work is the object of our inquiry: we must, therefore, separate the life of nutrition and growth. Then a kind of sensitive life would next follow; but this also he appears to enjoy in common with the horse, the ox, and every animal. 11. There remains, therefore, a certain PRACTICAL life of a being which possesses reason; and of this one part is, as it were, obedient to reason, the other as possessing it, and exercising intellect. But this life also being spoken of in two ways ((according to energy and according to habit)),† we must take that according to energy;* for that appears to be more properly so called. 12. Now if the work of man is an energy of the soul according to reason, or not without reason; and if we say that the work of man, and of a good man, is the same generically, as in the case of a harper, and a good harper (and so, in short, in all cases, superiority in each particular excellence being added to each particular work); for it is the work of a harper to play, of a good harper to play well: and if we assume the peculiar work of man

* [See the note to L. i., 2 (page 411 above).] † [I have substituted double parentheses ((thus)) for the brackets [thus] which I find in the text.]

to be a kind of life, and this life an **ENERGY** of the soul, and **ACTIONS** performed with reason; and the peculiar work of a good man to be the same things done well, and honorably; and everything to be complete according to its proper excellence: if, I repeat, these things are true, it follows, that man's chief good is "an energy of the soul according to virtue;" but if the virtues are more than one, according to the best and most perfect virtue; and besides this, we must add, in a perfect life:* for as neither one swallow, nor one day, makes a spring; so neither does one day, nor a short time, make a man blessed and happy.

13. Let this then be *the good* in its general outlines; for it is necessary, perhaps, first to sketch, then afterward to complete the drawing. But it would seem to be incumbent upon every one to improve and distinctly delineate the figures which are correctly sketched, and time would seem to be the discoverer of such features as these, or at least a good assistant; whence also proceed the improvements in the arts; for it is the duty of every one to supply deficiencies. 14. But it is necessary to bear in mind what has been mentioned already [ch. iii.], and not to demand exactness equally in all subjects, but in each according to its subject-matter, and just so far as is appropriate to the system to which it belongs: for the carpenter and geometrician examine a right angle with different views; the one, so far as it is useful for his work, whilst the other investigates its nature and properties; for his object is the contemplation of the truth, for he is a contemplator of the truth. 15. In the same manner, then, must we act in all other instances, that the mere accessories may not become more numerous than the works themselves. Nor, indeed, is the cause [the reason] to be required in all cases alike; but it suffices in some, as for instance, in first principles, that their existence be clearly shown; but the existence is the first and the principle.

16. Now of principles some are perceived by induction, others by sensation, others by a certain habit, and different principles in different ways; but we must endeavor to trace each of them in the manner in which they are formed by nature; and we must use our utmost endeavors that they be well defined, for that has great weight in the discussions which follow. For the principle seems to be more than the half of the whole, and many of the subjects of our inquiry seem to become clear by means of this.

I., viii., 1. But we must consider the subject of happiness not only as regards the conclusion which we have drawn, and the pre-

* By a perfect life (**BIOS TELEIOS**) Aristotle meant, first, the development of life to the highest degree of perfection; and, secondly, consistency from the beginning to the end.

misses from which our arguments are derived, but also as regards the statements of others concerning it; for all the properties of a thing accord with the truth; but the truth is at once discordant with falsehood.

2. Now, goods being divided into three classes,* and some being called external, others said to belong to the soul, and others to the body, we call those belonging to the soul, the superior, and good, in a higher sense than the others; but we assume, that the actions and energies of the soul belong to the soul. 3. So that our assertion would be correct, according to this opinion at least, which is ancient, and allowed by philosophers, that certain ACTIONS and ENERGIES are THE END; for thus it becomes one of the goods of the soul, and not one of the external ones.

4. Also, that the happy man lives well, and DOES well, harmonizes with our definition; for we have almost defined happiness as a kind of well living, and well DOING [St. James, i., 25].

5. Again, all the qualities required in happiness appear to exist in our definition;† for to some it seems to be virtue, to others prudence, and to others, a kind of wisdom: to some, again, these, or some one of these, with pleasure, or at least, not without pleasure; others, again, include external prosperity: but of these opinions, many ancient writers support some; a few celebrated philosophers the others; but it is reasonable to suppose that none of these have totally erred, but that in some one particular, at least, they are for the most part right.

6. Now with those, who say that it is every virtue, or some virtue, our definition accords; for to this virtue belongs the energy. But perhaps it makes no slight difference whether we conceive the chief good to consist in possession, or in USE; in habit, or in ENERGY. 7. For it is possible, that the habit, though really existing, should cause the performance of no good thing; as in the case of a man who is asleep, or in any other way is incapable of acting: but that the energy should do so is impossible; for of necessity it will ACT, and will ACT WELL. 8. But as in the Olympic games, it is not the most beautiful and the strongest who are crowned, *but those who engage in the conflict (for some of these are the conquerors);*

* This threefold division of goods is due to the Pythagoreans, and was adopted by the Peripatetics.—See Cic. Acad. i., 5; Tusc. v. 85.—Brewer. † These primary opinions respecting happiness our author also enumerates in his Eudemian Ethics. The first he refers to Socrates, Plato, and some others; the second to Socrates; the third to Thales and Anaxagoras. Amongst those who added external happiness, he mentions Xenocrates.—Zell, quoted by Cardwell. [See the note to III., viii., 5 below.]

thus it is those only who ACT ARIGHT, who obtain what is honorable and good in life. 9. Moreover, their life is of itself pleasant; for to be pleased, is one of the goods of the soul; but that is to every man pleasant, with reference to which he is said to be fond of such a thing; as, for example, a horse to the man who is fond of horses, and a spectacle to the man who is fond of spectacles; in like manner also, things just to the lover of justice; and, in a word, virtuous things to the lover of virtue.

10. Now the things that are pleasant to the generality of mankind, are at variance with each other, because they are not naturally pleasant; but things naturally pleasant, are pleasant to those who are fond of that which is honorable; and such are always the actions according to virtue; so that to these men they are pleasant, even of themselves. Their life therefore stands in no need of the addition of pleasure, as a kind of appendage or amulet, but possesses pleasure in itself; for, besides what has been said, the man who does not take pleasure in honorable actions, has no title to be called good; for neither would any person call that man just, who takes no pleasure in acting justly; nor that man liberal, who takes no pleasure in liberal actions; and in the other cases in like manner. But if this is the case, the actions of virtue must be pleasant of themselves; and yet they are also good and honorable, and each of these in the highest degree, if, indeed, the good man judges rightly concerning them; but he judges as we said. 11. Happiness, therefore, is the best, the most honorable, and the most pleasant of all things; and these qualities are not divided,* for all these qualities exist in the best energies; and these, or the best one of them, we say that happiness is.†

I., ix., 1. Hence also a question is raised, whether happiness is acquired by learning, by habit, or by exercise of any other kind; or whether it is produced in a man by some heavenly dispensation, or even by chance. 2. Now, if there is any other thing which is the gift of God to men, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is a divine gift, and more than anything else, inasmuch as it is the best of human things.‡ But this, perhaps, would more fitly belong to another kind of investigation: but, even if it be not sent from heaven, but is acquired by means of virtue, and of some kind of teaching or exercise, it appears to be one of the most divine of things; for the prize and end of virtue seems to be something which is best, godlike, and blessed. 3. It must also be common to many; for it is possible, that by means of some teaching and care,

*[I omit a part of section 11 at this point.] †[I omit sections 12-14.] ‡[Cf. Confucian Analects, XII., v., 3 (page 130 above).]

it should exist in every person who is not incapacitated for virtue.

4. But if it is better that people should be happy by these means, than by chance, it is reasonable to suppose it is so, since natural productions are produced in the best way in which it is possible for them to be produced; and likewise the productions of art, and of every efficient cause, **AND ESPECIALLY OF THE BEST CAUSE.** But to commit the greatest and the noblest of things to chance would be very inconsistent. 5. Now the thing we are at present in search of receives additional clearness from the definition; for happiness has been said to be a kind of energy of the soul according to virtue; but of the remaining goods it is necessary that some exist in it, and that others should be naturally assistant and useful, instrumentally. 6. But this will agree with what we stated in the beginning; for we set down the end of the political science as the good; and this devotes its principal attention to form the characters of the citizens, to make them good, and dispose them to honorable actions.

7. It is with reason, then, that we do not call an ox, a horse, or any other beast, happy; for none of them are able to participate in this kind of energy. For this cause, also, a child can not be called happy; for from his time of life he is not yet able to perform such actions; but those who are so called, are called happy from hope; for, as we said, there is need of perfect virtue, and of perfect life.*

I., xiii., 1. But since happiness is a certain energy of the soul according to perfect virtue, we must next consider the subject of virtue; for thus, perhaps, we should see more clearly respecting happiness. But he who in reality is skilled in political philosophy, appears to devote the principal part of his study to this;† 2. for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws; but we have an example of this in the legislators of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and any others who may have become like them. But if this is the peculiar study of political philosophy, it is clear that the investigation would be consistent with our original plan.

3. We must therefore next examine virtue, that is to say, of course, human virtue; for the good which we were in search of is human good, and the happiness, human happiness; but by human happiness we mean, not that of the body, but that of the soul; and happiness, too, we define to be an energy of the soul [I., vii., 12 (page 417 above)]. 4. But if these things are true, it is evidently necessary for the political philosopher to have some

* [I omit section 8, and the whole of chapters x., xi., and xii.] † [Virtue.]

knowledge of what relates to the soul; just as it is necessary for the man who intends to cure the eyes, to study the whole body; and still more, in proportion as political philosophy is more honorable and excellent than the science of medicine; and the best educated physicians take a great deal of pains in acquiring a knowledge of the human body.

5. The student of political philosophy must therefore study the soul, but he must study it for the sake of these things [see ch. viii., §§ 3 and 8 (page 418)], and only so far as is sufficient for the objects which he has in view [i. e. for a PRACTICAL behoof]; for greater exactness requires more labor perhaps than the subject in hand demands. 6. But some things are said about it sufficiently in my exoteric discourses; and these we must make use of: as, for instance, that one part of it [the appetitive] is irrational, and the other possessing reason. But whether these things are really separate, like the members of the body, and everything that is capable of division; or whether, being by nature indivisible, they are only in word two, as in a circumference the convex and concave side, matters not for our present purpose.

7. But of the irrational part, one division is like that which is common, and belonging to plants; that, I mean, which is the cause of nourishment and growth: for a person might assert that such a faculty of life as this exists in all beings that are nourished, even in embryos, and the very same in perfect beings: for it is more reasonable to call it the same than any other. 8. The excellence of this part, therefore, appears common to other beings, and not peculiar to man; for this part of the soul, and its faculties, seem to energize principally in sleep; but the good and the bad man are in sleep least distinguishable; whence men say, that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the miserable. 9. But it is reasonable that this should be the case; for sleep is the inaction of the soul, so far forth as it is called good or bad: (except if some emotions in a small degree reach it, and in this manner the visions of good men become better than those of the generality). But enough of these things; we must therefore put aside the part which consists in nourishment, since it has naturally no connection with human virtue.

10. Now another natural power of the soul appears to be irrational, but to participate in reason in some sort; for we praise the reason of the continent and incontinent man, and that part of the soul which is indued with reason; for it exhorts us aright, and to the best actions. But there seems to be in man something else by nature contrary to reason, which contends with and resists reason [St. Paul; Romans vii., 23]. 11. For, in reality, just as the par-

alyzed limbs of the body, when we intend to move them to the right hand, are turned aside the opposite way to the left, so it is with the soul; for the impulses of the incontinent are directed toward the contraries [contrary to virtue]. But in the case of the body we see the part that is turned aside, in the soul we do not see it; but perhaps we must no less believe that there is in the soul something contrary to reason, which opposes and resists it; but how it differs it matters not. 12. But this part also seems, as we said, to partake of reason; at least in the continent man it obeys reason; but in the temperate or brave man it is perhaps still more ready to listen to reason: for in them it entirely agrees with reason.

13. The irrational part therefore appears to be twofold; for the part which is common to plants does not at all partake of reason; but the part which contains the desires and the appetites generally in some sense partakes of reason, in that it is submissive and obedient to it.* 14. But the giving of advice, and all reproaching and exhorting, prove that the irrational part is in some sense persuaded by reason. 15. But if it is necessary to say that this has reason likewise, the part which has reason will be twofold also; one part properly and itself, the other as though listening to the suggestions of a parent.

But virtue also is divided according to this difference; for we call some of the virtues intellectual [giving law], others moral [obeying law]—wisdom, and intelligence, and prudence, we call intellectual, but liberality and temperance, moral; for when speaking of the moral character of a man, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is meek or temperate; but we praise the wise man also according to his habits; but praiseworthy habits we call virtues.

BOOK II.—OF VIRTUE.

II., i., 3.† The virtues, then, are produced in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but, we being naturally adapted to receive them; and this natural capacity is perfected by habit. 4. Further, in every case where anything is produced in us naturally,

*[I omit the remainder of section 13.] [In sections 6–13, Aristotle divides the soul into (1) rational, (2) irrational; the irrational part into (1) vegetative, (2) appetitive; and, finally, the appetitive part into (1) that which obeys reason, (2) that which resists reason. See the translator's table (page 32) and analysis (p. xviii.).] [But if it is better to consider that subdivision of the appetitive part which obeys reason, as belonging more properly to the rational part than to the irrational part, Aristotle (in sections 10–14) divides the rational part of the soul into (1) that which gives law, (2) that which obeys law.] †[I omit sections 1 and 2.]

we first get the capacities for doing these things, and afterward perform the energies; which is evident in the case of the senses; for it was not from frequently seeing or frequently hearing that we got the senses, but, on the contrary, we had them first, and then used them, and did not get them by having used them. But we get the virtues by having FIRST PERFORMED the ENERGIES, as is the case also in all the other arts; for those things which we must do after having learnt them we learn to do by DOING them; as, for example, by building houses men become builders, and by playing on the harp, harp-players; thus, also, by DOING just actions we become just, by performing temperate actions, temperate, and by performing brave actions we become brave.

5. Moreover, that which happens in all states bears testimony to this; for legislators, by giving their citizens good habits, make them good; and this is the intention of every lawgiver, and all that do not do it well fail; and this makes all the difference between states, whether they be good or bad. 6. Again, every virtue is produced and corrupted from and by means of the same causes;* and in like manner every art; for from playing on the harp people become both good and bad harp-players; and, analogously, builders and all the rest; for from building well men will become good builders, and from building badly bad ones; for if this were not the case, there would be no need of a person to teach, and all would have been by birth, some good and some bad. 7. The same holds good in the case of the virtues also; for by performing those ACTIONS which occur in our intercourse with other men, some of us become just and some unjust; and by ACTING in circumstances of danger, and being accustomed to be fearful or confident, some become brave and others cowards. 8. The same thing is true in cases of desire and anger; for some become temperate and mild, and others intemperate and passionate—one class from having behaved themselves in such cases in one way, and the other class in another. 9. In a word, the habits are produced out of similar energies; therefore, the energies which we perform must be of a certain character [that is, virtuous]; for, with the differences of the energies the habits correspond. It does not therefore make a slight, but an important, nay, rather, the whole difference, whether we have been brought up in these habits or in others from childhood.

* Actions produce contrary moral effects. Two men engaged in the same pursuits, exposed to the same temptations, may become, the one virtuous, the other vicious. In the order of nature, causes act uniformly, they can not produce opposite effects; therefore, virtue does not come by nature.

II., ii., 1. Since our present treatise is not for the purpose of mere speculation, as all others are, for the object of our investigation is not the knowing what virtue is, but TO BECOME GOOD (since otherwise there would be no use in it), it is necessary to study the subject of ACTIONS, and how we must perform them; for these have entire influence over our habits to cause them to become of a certain character, as we have said. 2. Now, to say that WE MUST ACT ACCORDING TO RIGHT REASON is a general maxim, and let it be assumed; but we will speak hereafter about it, and about the nature of right reason, and its relation to the other virtues.* 3. But this point must first be fully granted, that everything said on moral subjects ought to be said in outline, and not with exactness; just as we said in the beginning, that arguments must be demanded of such a nature only as the subject-matter admits; but the subjects of moral conduct and of expediency have no stability [moral duties are of indeterminate extent: see § 413 (page 34 above)], just as also things wholesome [we vary our food according to circumstances]. 4. But if the treatment of the subject generally is of this nature, still less does it admit of exactness in particulars; for it comes under no art or set of precepts, but it is the duty of the [moral] agents themselves to look to the circumstances of the occasion, just as is the case in the arts of medicine and navigation. But although the subject before us is of this description, yet we must endeavor to do the best we can to help it.

5. This, then, we must first observe, that things of this kind are naturally destroyed both by defect and excess (for it is necessary in the case of things which can not be seen to make use of illustrations which can be seen), just as we see in the case of strength and health; for too much as well as too little exercise destroys strength. 6. In like manner drink and food, whether there be too little or too much of them, destroy health, but moderation in quantity causes, increases, and preserves it. The same thing, therefore, holds good in the case of temperance, and courage, and the other virtues; for he who flies from and is afraid of everything, and stands up against nothing, becomes a coward; and he who fears nothing at all, but goes boldly at everything, becomes rash. [Not that a courageous man need fear, but that rashness is not courage.] 7. In like manner, he who indulges in the enjoyment of every pleasure, and refrains from none, is intemperate; but he who shuns all, as clowns do, becomes a kind of insensible man. [Not that a man can be too temperate (which is impossible), but that abstinence is not temperance.] For temperance and courage are

* Aristotle discusses the nature of right reason in the sixth book.

destroyed both by the excess and the defect, but are preserved by the mean. [This is a maxim of education, for the establishment of moral habit; not a limit of education, for the restricting of virtue. Aristotle must not be understood to say that a man can be too virtuous, and ought only to be moderately virtuous; but only that a man can not become virtuous by an intemperate repugnance to nature.]

8. But not only do the generation, and increase, and destruction of these [moral virtues] originate in the same sources and through the same means, but the energies also will be employed on the same [resisting evil produces moral strength; moral strength is employed in resisting evil]; 9. for this is the case in other things which are more plain to be seen; as in the case of strength, for it is produced by taking much food and sustaining many labors; and the strong man is more able to do these things than any other person. The case with the virtues is the same; for by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and when we have become so, we are best able to abstain from them. The same also is the case with courage; for by being accustomed to despise objects of fear, and to bear them, we become brave, and when we have become so, we are best able to bear them.

II., iii., 1. But we must make the pleasure or pain which follows after acts a test* of the [existence of] habits [not of their correctness]; for he who abstains from the bodily pleasures, and in this very thing takes pleasure, is temperate; but he who feels pain at it is intemperate; and he who meets dangers and rejoices at it, or at least feels no pain, is brave; but he who feels pain is a coward; for moral virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains; for by reason of pleasure we do what is wicked, and through pain we abstain from honorable acts. 2. (Therefore it is necessary to be in some manner trained immediately from our childhood, as Plato says, to feel pleasure and pain at proper objects; for this is right education.) 3. Again, if the virtues are conversant with actions and passions, and pleasure and pain are consequent upon every action and passion; on this account, also, virtue must be conversant with pleasures and pains. 4. Punishments also, which are inflicted by means of pleasure and pain, indicate the same thing.† Again, as we said before, every habit of the soul has a natural relation and reference to those things by which it natur-

* This is another instance of the practical turn of Aristotle's mind. We can scarcely have a more useful test. So long as any uneasiness or pain is felt at doing any action, we may be quite sure that the habit is imperfectly formed.

† [I omit part of section 4 at this point.]

ally becomes better and worse. But habits become bad by means of pleasures and pains, by pursuing or avoiding either improper ones, or at improper times, in improper ways, or improperly in any other manner, which reason determines. 5. Hence some have even defined the virtues to be certain states of apathy and tranquillity; but not correctly, in that they speak absolutely, and not in relation to propriety of time or manner, and so on through the other categories. Therefore virtue is supposed to be such as we have said, in relation to pleasures and pains, and apt to practise the best things; and vice is the contrary.

6. These subjects may also become plain to us from the following considerations. Since there are three things which lead us to choice, and three to aversion,—the honorable, the expedient, and the pleasant; and three contraries to them,—the disgraceful, the inexpedient, and the painful; on all these subjects the good man is apt to be right in his actions, and the bad man is apt to be wrong, and especially on the subject of pleasure; for this is common to all living creatures, and accompanies all things which are the objects of choice; for both the honorable and the expedient appear pleasant.* 9. Again, it is more difficult to resist pleasure than anger, as Heraclitus says, and both art and excellence are always conversant with that which is more difficult; for excellence in this case is superior. So that, for this reason also, the whole business of virtue, and political philosophy, must be with pleasures and pains; for he who makes a proper use of these [as helps to education] will be good, and he who makes a bad use [as rules of life] will be bad. 10. Now on the point that virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains, and that it is increased and destroyed by means of the same things from which it originally sprung, when they are differently circumstanced; and that its energies are employed on those things out of which it originates, let enough have been said.

II., iv., 1. But a person may be in difficulty as to what we mean when we say that it is necessary for men to become just by performing just actions, and temperate by performing temperate ones; for if they do just and temperate actions, they are already just and temperate; just as, if they do grammatical and musical actions, they are grammarians and musicians. 2. Or, is this not the case in the arts also? for it is possible to do a grammatical action accidentally, or at another's suggestion. A man, therefore, will only then be a grammarian, when he not only does a grammatical action, but also [consciously and intelligently] does it gram-

*[I omit sections 7 and 8.]

matically, that is, in accordance with the grammatical science, which he possesses in himself.

3. Again, the case is not similar in the arts and in the virtues, for the productions of art have their excellence in themselves. It is enough, then, that these should themselves be of a certain character; but acts of virtue are done justly and temperately, *not if they have themselves a certain character, but if the agent, being himself of a certain character, perform them*: first, if he does them knowingly; then if with deliberate choice, and deliberate choice ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT [without regard to the advantage or disadvantage which may result to himself]; and, thirdly, if he does them on a fixed and unchangeable principle. 4. Now as to the possession of all other arts, these qualifications, with the exception of knowledge, do not enter into the calculation; but toward the possession of the virtues, knowledge has little or no weight [a man may do wrong knowingly]; but the other qualifications are not of small, but rather of infinite importance, since they arise from the frequent practice of just and temperate actions.

5. Acts then are called [legally] just and temperate, when they are such as the [morally (§§ 291, 301)] just or temperate man would do; but he who [bene moratus] performs these acts is not [necessarily] a just and temperate man, but he who [moraliter bonus (§ 680)] performs them in such a manner as just and temperate men do them. 6. It is well said, therefore, that from performing just actions, a man becomes just; and from performing temperate ones, temperate; but without performing them no person would even be likely to become good. [If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them (St. John xiii., 17, page 256 above).] 7. But the generality of men do not **do** these things; but taking refuge in words, they think that they are philosophers, and that in this manner they will become good men; and what they do is like what sick people do, who listen attentively to their physicians, and then do not attend to the things which they prescribe [§§ 821, 724, 849]. Just as these, then, will never be in a good state of body under such treatment, so those will never be in a good state of mind, if this is their philosophy.

BOOK II., chapter v., § 1. But we must next find out what the genus of virtue is. Since, then, the qualities which have their origin in the soul are three,—Passions, Capacities, and Habits,—Virtue must be some one of these. 2. By passions, I mean, Desire, Anger, Fear, Confidence, Envy, Joy, Love, Hatred, Regret, Emulation, Pity; in a word, those feelings which are followed by pleasure or pain; 3. by capacities, those qualities by means of

which we are said to be able to be under the influence of these passions; as those by means of which we are able to feel anger, pain, or pity; 4. by habits, those by means of which we are well or ill disposed with relation to the passions.*

5. Neither the virtues, therefore, nor the vices are passions; because we are not called good or bad according to our passions, but according to our virtues or vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed according to our passions (for the man who fears or is angry, is not praised; nor is the man who is simply angry, blamed; but the man who is angry in a certain way); but according to our virtues and vices, we are praised or blamed. 6. Again, we feel anger and fear without deliberate preference; but the virtues are acts of deliberate preference, or at any rate, not without deliberate preference. But besides these things, we are said to be "moved" by our passions, but we are not said to be moved, but in some way to be "disposed,"† by our virtues and vices. 7. For these reasons, also, they are not capacities; for we are neither called good nor bad, neither praised nor blamed, for our being ABLE to feel passions simply. And again, we have our capacities by nature; but we do not become good or bad by nature; but of this we have already spoken [II., i., 4 (page 423 above)]. 8. If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor capacities, it remains that they are habits. What, therefore, the "genus" of virtue is, has been sufficiently shown.

II., vi., 1. But it is necessary not only to say that virtue is a habit, but also what sort of a habit it is. We must say, therefore, that every virtue‡ both makes that of which it is the virtue to be

*[I omit the remainder of section 4.] † Aristotle (Categ. c. vi., 4) thus explains the difference between disposition (DIATHESIS) and habit (EXIS):—"Habit is more lasting and more durable than disposition. The former term applies to the sciences, virtues, etc.; the latter to such states as are easily and quickly changed; as heat and cold, sickness and health." [I omit part of the note.] The following is, according to Aspasius, quoted by Michelet, the relation between DUNAMIS, ENERGEIA, and EXIS. "*Facultas a natura insita jam est potentia quædam, sed nondum vobis, ut loquimur, potentia, cujus ex ipso vigore operatio profuat; hanc demum potentiam philosophus habitum vocat.*" ‡ The word ARETE means not only moral virtue but the excellence and perfection of anything whatever. Thus Cicero says (de Leg. i., 8): "Est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura." [The reader interested will find the following note on page 41 (ed. Bohn).] Cicero, giving a short analysis of the doctrines of the Old Academy and Peripatetics (nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat), thus describes their doctrine of moral virtue:—"Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem (ETHOS): quam partim exercitationis assiduitate, partim ratione formabant; in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. In qua quod inchoatum est neque absolutum progressio quædam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturæ."—Acad. i., 5.—Brewer.

in a good state, and makes its work good also; for instance, the virtue of the eye makes both the eye and the work of the eye good; for by the virtue of the eye we see well. 2. In like manner, the virtue of a horse makes a horse good, and good in speed, and in carrying its rider, and in standing the attack of the enemy. If, then, this is the case in all instances, the virtue of man also must be a habit, from which man BECOMES GOOD, and from which he will perform his work well. But how this will be, we have already stated. (Book II., ch. ii.) [page 424 above.] 3. And again, it will be made manifest in the following manner, if we investigate the specific nature of virtue. Now, in all quantity, continuous or divisible, it is possible to take the greater, the less, or the equal; and these either with relation to the thing itself, or to ourselves; but the equal is some mean between excess and defect. 4. But by the mean with relation to the thing itself, I mean that which is equidistant from both of the extremes, and this is one and the same in all cases; but by the mean with relation to ourselves, I mean that which is neither too much nor too little FOR US. But this is not one and the same to all; as, for example, if ten is too many, and two too few, six is taken for the absolute mean, for it exceeds two as much as it is exceeded by ten. 5. But this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion. But the relative mean is not to be taken in this manner; for it does not follow, that if ten pounds are too much for any person to eat, and two pounds too little, the training-master will prescribe six pounds; for perhaps this is too much or too little for the person who is to eat it.* Thus, then, every person who has knowledge shuns the excess and the defect, but seeks for the mean, and chooses it; not the absolute mean, but the relative one.

6. If, then, every science accomplishes its work well, by keeping the mean in view, and directing its works to it (whence people are accustomed to say of excellent works, that it is impossible to take anything away, or add anything to them, since excess and defect destroy the excellence, but the being in the mean preserves it), and if good artisans, as we may say, perform their work, keeping this in view, then VIRTUE, being, like nature, more accurate and excellent than any art, must be apt to hit the mean. 7. But I mean MORAL virtue; for it is conversant with passions and actions; and in these there is defect and excess, and the mean; as, for example, we may feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and, in a word, pleasure and pain, both too much and too little, and in both cases improperly. But the time when, and the cases in which, and

* [I omit a part of section 5 at this point.]

the persons toward whom, and the motive for which, and the manner in which, constitute the mean and the excellence; and this is the characteristic property of virtue.

8. In like manner, in ACTIONS there are excess and defect, and the mean; but virtue is conversant with passions AND ACTIONS, and in them excess is wrong, and defect is blamed, but the mean is praised, and is correct; and both these are properties of virtue. Virtue, then, is a kind of mean state, being at least apt to hit the mean. 9. Again, it is possible to go wrong in many ways;* but we can go right in one way only; and for this reason the former is easy, and the latter difficult; it is easy to miss a mark, but difficult to hit it; and for these reasons, therefore, the excess and defect belong to vice, but the mean state to virtue; for, "we are good in one way only, but bad in all sorts of ways."

10. Virtue, therefore, is a "habit, accompanied with deliberate preference, in the relative mean, defined by reason, and as the prudent man would define it." It is a mean state between two vices, one in excess, the other in defect; and it is so, moreover, because of the vices one division falls short of, and the other exceeds what is right, both in passions and actions, whilst virtue discovers the mean and chooses it. 11. Therefore, with reference to its essence, and the definition which states its substance, virtue is a mean state [a virtuous man does not go to extremes in his daily life]; but with reference to the standard of "the best" and "the excellent," it is an extreme [a virtuous man does go to extreme virtue]. 12. But it is not every action, nor every passion, which admits of the mean state; for some have their badness at once implied in their name; as, for example, malevolence, shamelessness, envy; and amongst actions, adultery, theft, homicide. For all these, and such as these, are so called from their being themselves bad, not because their excesses or defects are bad. 13. In these, then, it is impossible ever to be right, but we must always be wrong. Nor does the right or wrong in such cases as these depend at all upon the person with whom, or the time when, or the manner in which, adultery [for example] is committed; but absolutely the doing of any one of these things is wrong. It would be equally absurd, then, to require a mean state, and an excess, and a defect, in injustice, and cowardice, and intemperance. 14. For thus there would be a mean state of excess and defect, and an excess of excess, and a defect of defect. But just as there is no excess and defect of temperance and courage (owing to the fact that the mean is in some sense an extreme), so neither in the case

* [I omit part of section 9 at this point.]

of these is there a mean state, excess, or defect; but however they be done, sin is committed. For, in a word, there is neither a mean state of excess and defect, nor an excess and defect of a mean state.*

BOOK III.—OF MORAL CHOICE. (Chapters i.-v. inclusive.)

III., i., 1. Since, then, virtue is conversant with passions and actions, and praise and blame are bestowed on voluntary acts, but pardon, and sometimes pity, on those which are involuntary, it is perhaps necessary for those who study the subject of virtue to define what is the *voluntary* and what is the *involuntary*. It is moreover useful to legislators, for the regulation of rewards and punishments.

2. Now, it appears that those things which are done by constraint, or through ignorance, are involuntary;† and that is done by compulsion, of which the principle is external, and is of such character that the agent or patient does not at all contribute toward it; as, for example, if the wind should carry a man anywhere, or persons having supreme authority over him.

3. But all those actions which are done through the fear of greater evils, or because of something honorable,—as if a tyrant, having in his power our parents and children, should order us to do some base deed, and they in the case of our obedience should be saved, but in the case of our refusal should be put to death,—[the student might perhaps without reflection think that] it admits of a question whether they are involuntary or voluntary. 4. Something of this kind happens likewise in the case of throwing things overboard in a storm; for, abstractedly, no one voluntarily throws away his goods, but for his own and his companions' safety every sensible man does it. 5. Such actions as these, therefore, are of a mixed character; but they resemble voluntary acts most, for at the time of their performance they are eligible, and the end of the action depends upon the time of performance. 6. An act, therefore, is to be called *voluntary* and *involuntary* at the time when

* [I omit chapters vii., viii., ix.] † Since those actions are voluntary of which the principle is in the agent, he not being ignorant of the particular circumstances, an act is involuntary if one of the two conditions which constitute voluntariness is wanting. If the agent knows the circumstances, but the principle is external, the act is done by compulsion; if the principle is internal, but the agent is ignorant of the circumstances, it is done through ignorance. [I omit the remainder of the note.]—*Michelet*. [But what is done through ignorance is only considered involuntary, as the lawyers say, *sub modo*; for if one fires a gun, thinking no one in range, and accidentally kills a man, the killing is involuntary, but the firing is voluntary, and he ought to have first assured himself that there was no one in range.]

a man does it. But he does it voluntarily, for the principle of moving the limbs, which are used as instruments, rests in such actions with the man himself; and where the principle is in himself, the DOING OR NOT DOING the actions is in himself also. 7. SUCH ACTIONS as these, therefore, ARE VOLUNTARY, but abstractedly they are perhaps involuntary, for no person would choose anything of the kind for its own sake.* 9. But there are some things which it is wrong to do, even on compulsion, and a man ought rather to undergo the most dreadful sufferings, even death, than do them.†

12. But it is not easy to lay down a rule as to what kind of things are eligible in preference to other things, for there are many differences in particulars. But if any one should say that pleasant and honorable things are compulsory, for, being external, they force a person to act, everything would in this way be compulsory; for, for the sake of these things, everybody does everything; and those who act from constraint, and involuntarily, do it painfully; but those who act for the sake of pleasure and honor do it pleasantly; consequently, it is ridiculous for a man to complain of external circumstances, and not himself, who has been a willing prey to such things; and to call himself the cause of his honorable acts, and pleasure the cause of his dishonorable ones. Now, the compulsory appears to be that of which the principle is external, and to which the person compelled contributes nothing.

13. But that which is through ignorance is in all cases NON-VOLUNTARY; but only that which is followed by pain and repentance, is INVOLUNTARY;‡ for he who has done any action through ignorance, and who feels no annoyance at it, did not indeed do it voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not know it; nor, on the other hand, did he do it involuntarily, inasmuch as he feels no pain at it. 14. Now, of the two kinds of people who act through ignorance, he who feels repentance appears to be an involuntary agent; but he who feels no repentance must be called, since he is not of the same character, by a different name—non-voluntary; for, since there is a difference, it is better that he should have a name of his own.

* [I omit the remainder of section 7, and the whole of section 8] † [I omit the remainder of section 9, and the whole of sections 10 and 11.] ‡ By the expression "acting ignorantly" is meant ignorance of the principle. This is considered by all moralists and jurists voluntary, and therefore blamable, as it is assumed that all persons are, or ought to be, acquainted with the principles of right and wrong, and with the law of the land. To act "through ignorance" signifies ignorance of the fact. If an action of this kind is followed by repentance, Aristotle calls it involuntary, and therefore considers it excusable; but if not repented of, he terms it non-voluntary, and pronounces it unpardonable.

15. But there seems to be a difference between acting *through ignorance*, and acting *ignorantly*; for he who is under the influence of drunkenness or anger does not seem to act through ignorance, but for one of the motives mentioned, not knowingly but ignorantly; for every vicious man is ignorant of what he ought to do, and from what he ought to abstain; and through such FAULTY ignorance men become unjust and altogether depraved. 16. But the meaning of the term "involuntary" is not if a person is ignorant of what is expedient, for ignorance in principle is not the cause of involuntariness, but of viciousness; nor is ignorance of universals the cause of involuntariness (for on account of such ignorance we are blamed), but ignorance of particulars in the circumstances of the action; for in these cases we are pitied and pardoned, for he who is ignorant of any of these things acts involuntarily. 17. Perhaps, then, it would be no bad thing to define what these circumstances are, and how many there are of them, and who the person is who acts, and what he does, and about what and in what case he does it; and sometimes with what, as the instrument; and from what motive, as safety; and in what manner, as gently or violently. 18. No person except a madman could be ignorant of all these particulars; and it is clear that he can not be ignorant of the agent, for how could he be ignorant of himself? But a man might be ignorant of what he does, as those who say that they had forgotten themselves, or that they did not know that they were forbidden to speak of it, as Æschylus said respecting the mysteries; or that, wishing to exhibit an engine, he let it off by mistake, as the man let off the catapult.* 20. Ignorance, therefore, being possible on all these circumstances connected with the act, he who was ignorant of any one of these, seems to have acted involuntarily, and particularly in the principal circumstances; but the principal circumstances appear to be those of the act itself, and the MOTIVE. But though involuntariness is said to consist in such ignorance as this, still the act must be painful, and followed by repentance.

21. But, since the involuntary is that which is done through constraint and that which is done through ignorance, it would appear that the voluntary is that of which the principle is in the doer himself, having a knowledge of the particulars, namely, the circumstances of the act; for perhaps it is not correct to say that the acts of anger or desire are involuntary. 22. For if so, in the first place, no other living creature except man, and no children, will be voluntary agents; and in the second place, we may ask the

* [I omit section 19.]

question, is no one of the acts of desire or anger, which we do, done voluntarily? or are the good ones done voluntarily, but the bad ones involuntarily? or is it not ridiculous to make such distinctions, when the cause of both is one and the same? * 24. Again, what is the difference with respect to involuntariness between the faults that are committed on principle and in anger? for both are to be avoided; and the irrational passions appear to be no less naturally belonging to man; and therefore irrational actions equally belong to him. It is absurd, therefore, to call these actions involuntary.

III., ii., 1. The nature of the voluntary and the involuntary having been described, the next thing is, that we should examine the object of deliberate preference; 2. for it appears to be most intimately connected with virtue, and even more than actions to be a test of character. Now, deliberate preference appears to be voluntary, but not the same as "the voluntary," but "the voluntary" is more extensive: for both children and other beings participate in the voluntary, but not in deliberate preference; and we call sudden and unpremeditated acts voluntary, but we do not say that they were done from deliberate preference. But those who say that it is desire, or anger, or volition [wish], or any opinion, do not seem to speak correctly. 3. For deliberate preference is not shared by irrational beings; but desire and anger are; and the incontinent man acts from desire, and not from deliberate preference; and the continent man, on the other hand, acts from deliberate preference, and not from desire. And desire is opposed to deliberate preference, but not to desire; and desire is conversant with the pleasant and painful, but deliberate preference with neither. 4. Still less is it anger; for acts done from anger do not at all seem done from deliberate preference. 5. Nor yet is it volition [wish], although it appears to approach very near it; for there is no deliberate preference of impossibilities; and if any person should say that he deliberately preferred them, he would be thought a fool; but there is volition [wishing] of impossibilities, as of immortality. And there is volition [wishing] about things which can not, by any possibility be performed by one's self; as, that a particular actor, or wrestler, should gain the victory; but no person deliberately prefers such things as these, but only such things as he thinks may come to pass by his own agency. 6. But, further, volition [wish] is rather of the end, and deliberate preference of the means; for instance, we wish to be in health, but we deliberately prefer the means of becoming so; and we

* [I omit section 23.]

wish to be happy, and say so; but it is not a suitable expression to say, we deliberately prefer it; for, in a word, there appears to be no deliberate preference in matters which are out of our power.

7. Nor yet can it be opinion; for opinion seems to be about all objects, and on things eternal and impossible, just as much as on things which are in our own power; and opinions are divided according to their truth and falsehood, not according to vice and virtue; but the contrary is the case with deliberate preference.

8. But, perhaps, no one says it is the same as opinion generally; but it is not even the same as any particular opinion; for we get our character from our deliberate preference of things good or bad, and not from our opinions.

9. And we deliberately prefer to take a thing, or not to take it, or something of this kind; but we form an opinion as to what a thing is, or to whom it is advantageous, or how; but we do not form an opinion at all about taking or not taking it; and deliberate preference is rather praised for its being directed to a right object, or for being rightly directed, but opinion, for its being true.

10. And we deliberately prefer those things which we most certainly know to be good, but we form opinions about those things which we do not know for certain. And it does not appear that the same people are the best both in forming opinions, and in exercising deliberate preference; but some are good in opinion, but through vice prefer not what they ought.

11. But whether opinion arises before deliberate preference, or whether it follows upon it, matters not; for this is not the point which we are investigating, but whether it is the same with any opinion. What, then, is its genus, and what its species, since it is not any of the things we have mentioned? It seems, in fact, voluntary; but not everything which is voluntary is the object of deliberate preference, but only that [ACTION] which has been previously the object of deliberation; for deliberate preference is joined with reason and intellect; and its name seems to signify that it is somewhat chosen before other things.

III., iii., 1. But do men deliberate about everything, and is everything an object of deliberation, or are there some things about which there is no deliberation? But perhaps we must call that an object of deliberation, about which, not a fool or a madman, but a reasonable man would deliberate.

2. About things eternal no man deliberates, as about the world, or the diagonal and the side of a square,* that they are incommensurable; nor yet about

*The diagonal and side of a square are incommensurable; for let the side = a , then the diagonal is equal to the square root of 2 multiplied by a , and the square root of 2 can not be expressed by a finite number.

things in motion, which always go on in the same manner, whether it be from necessity, or nature, or any other cause, as the solstices and the sunrise; nor yet about things which are different at different times, as droughts and showers; nor about things accidental, as the finding of a treasure; nor yet about everything human, as no Lacedæmonian deliberates how the Scythians might be best governed; for none of these things could be done through our own agency. 3. But we deliberate about those subjects of ACTION which are IN OUR OWN POWER; and these are the cases which remain.* But each individual man deliberates about those subjects of action which are in his own power. And respecting the exact and self-sufficient sciences, there is no deliberation; as respecting letters, for we do not doubt how we OUGHT to write. 4. But we deliberate about all those things which happen by our own means, and not always in the same manner; as about the art of medicine, of finance, and the art of navigation, more than gymnastics, inasmuch as it is less exactly described: and likewise about the rest; and more about the arts than the sciences;† for we debate more about them. But deliberation takes place in the case of things that generally happen, but respecting which it is uncertain how they may turn out, and in which there is indefiniteness. 5. But we take advice of others on great matters, because we distrust ourselves, as unable to decide with sufficient accuracy. 6. And we do not deliberate about ENDS, but about MEANS; for the physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor the orator whether he shall persuade, nor the lawgiver whether he shall make good laws, nor anybody else about the end; but having determined on some end, they deliberate how and by what means it may be effected.

7. And if it appears that it may be done by more means than one, they next deliberate by which it may be done most easily and honorably; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this, and by what means this can be effected, until they arrive at the first cause, which is the last in the analysis; for he who deliberates appears to investigate and analyze the subject like a mathematical problem, in the way that we have mentioned. 8. Now, not all investigation seems to be deliberation, as the in-

*[I omit a portion of section 3 at this point.] † We debate more about the arts than the sciences, because the former are concerned with contingent matter, the latter with necessary matter. Still, however, the Greeks divided the sciences into *AKRIBEIS* [exact] and *STOCHASTIKAI* [approximate (aimed at ends)], and of these the latter alone are capable of being made the subjects of deliberation. See on the subject of deliberation, *Rhet.* Book I., c. iv.

vestigations of mathematics; but every deliberation is an investigation; and the last thing in the analysis is the first in the execution. And if men come to an impossibility, they leave off deliberating; as, for example, if money is necessary, but it is impossible to get it; but if it appears possible, they set about ACTING. For those things which can be done through our own agency are possible; for those things which happen by means of our friends, happen in some sense through our own agency; for the principle is in ourselves. 9. But sometimes the instruments, and sometimes the use of them, are the subject of investigation, and in like manner in the other categories, sometimes we investigate by whose assistance, and sometimes how, or by what means. Therefore, as we have said, it seems that man is the origin of all actions; but deliberation is [only] about those subjects of moral conduct which are in one's own power; but actions are for the sake of other things. 10. The end, therefore, cannot be a subject of deliberation, but the means; nor yet are particulars the object of deliberation; as whether this is a loaf or whether it is baked as it ought; for these points belong to the province of sensual perception.* 11. Now, the object of deliberation and that of deliberate preference are the same, except that the object of deliberate preference has already [by its name] been restricted in its meaning [selected from among the objects of deliberation (see analysis p. xxvii.) and ACTED upon—borne forward, like the standard in battle]; for that which after deliberation is preferred, is an object of deliberate preference; for every person ceases to deliberate how he shall act, when he refers the principle to himself, and his ruling part [reason]; for it is this which deliberately prefers. 12.† Now, since the object of deliberate preference is the object of deliberation and of desire, and for things in our own power, it follows that deliberate preference is *the deliberate desire of things in our power*; for having made our decision after deliberation, we desire [§§ 157, 163] according to our deliberation. Now, let deliberate preference have been sufficiently described in outline, and its object stated, and that it is respecting the means.

III., iv., 1. That volition is of the end, has been stated; but to some it appears to be of the good, and to others of the apparent good. Now the conclusion to which they come who say that the object of volition is the good, will be, that what he wishes who chooses incorrectly, is no object of volition at all (for if it is to be an object of volition, it must also be good; 2. but it might be, if it so happens, bad); but according to those who, on the other hand, tell us

*[I omit the remainder of section 10.] †[I omit the first part of section 12.]

that the object of volition is the apparent good, there will be no natural object of volition; but only that which seems to each person to be so; and different things appear so to different persons, and as it might happen, contrary things.

3. Now if these accounts are unsatisfactory, must we then say that, abstractedly, and in reality, the good is the object of volition, and to each individual, that which to him appears to be so? That the good man's object of volition is the real good, but the bad man's anything which he may happen to think good? 4. Just as in the case of the body, those things are wholesome to persons in a good state of body, which are in reality wholesome, but different things to persons diseased; and likewise things bitter and sweet, and warm and heavy, and everything else; for the good man judges everything rightly, and in every case the truth appears so to him; for there are certain things honorable and pleasant in every habit. 5. And perhaps the principal difference between the good and the bad man is that the good man sees the truth in every case, since he is, as it were, the rule and measure of it. [St. Paul, Romans ii., 14, and I. Cor., ii., 15.] 6. But the generality of mankind seem to be deceived by pleasure; for it appears to be the good, though it is not so; and therefore men choose what is pleasant, under the idea [opinion] that it is good, and avoid pain, as an evil.

BOOK III., chapter v., § 1. Now the end being an object of volition, and the means objects of deliberation and deliberate preference, the actions which regard these must be in accordance with deliberate preference, and voluntary; and the energies of the virtues are conversant with these. And virtue also must be in our own power; and in like manner vice: for wherever we have the power to do, we have also the power not to do; and wherever we have the power not to do, we have also the power to do. 2. So that if it be in our power to do a thing, which is honorable, to leave it undone, which is disgraceful, will be in our power likewise; and if it be in our power to leave a thing undone, which [omission] is honorable, to do it, which is disgraceful, is in our power likewise. But if the doing things honorable and disgraceful be in our power, and the abstaining from them be likewise in our power (and this is the meaning of being good and bad), then the being good and bad will be in our power also.

3. But as to the saying, that "No person is willingly wicked, nor unwillingly happy," it seems partly true, and partly false; for no one is unwillingly happy; but vice is voluntary. Or else we must contradict what we have just said, and deny that man is the

origin and the parent of his actions, as of his children. 4. But if this appear true, and we have no other principles to which we may refer our actions than those which are in our own power, then those things, the principles of which are in our own power, are themselves also in our own power, and voluntary; and testimony seems to be borne to this statement both by private persons individually, and by legislators themselves; for they chastise and punish those who do wicked deeds, unless they do them upon compulsion, or through an ignorance for which they [legislators] are themselves to blame [since they ought to have provided sufficient means of education]; and they confer honor on those who do good actions, with a view to encouraging the one and restraining the other. 5. And yet no person encourages us to do those things which are neither in our own power, nor voluntary, considering it not worth while to persuade us not to be hot, or cold, or hungry, or anything of this kind; for we shall suffer them all the same. 6. For they punish people even for ignorance itself, if they appear to be the cause of their own ignorance; just as the punishment is double for drunken people; for the principle is in themselves, since it was in their own power not to get drunk, and this is the cause of their ignorance. 7. And they punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws, which they ought to know, and which is not difficult; and likewise in all other cases in which they appear to be ignorant through negligence, on the ground that it was in their own power not to be ignorant; for they had it in their own power to pay attention to it. 8. But perhaps [some one may object that] a person is unable to give his attention; but [in such cases] they are themselves the causes of their inability, by living in a dissipated manner; and persons are themselves the cause of their being unjust, by performing bad actions, and of being intemperate, by passing their time in drinking-bouts and such like; for energies of any description make men of such a character: but this is clear from those who practice any exercise or course of conduct; for they continue energizing. 9. Now, to be ignorant that by energizing on every subject the habits are produced, shows a man to be utterly devoid of sense.

10. And further, it is absurd to suppose that the man who does unjust actions does not wish to become unjust, or that the man who does intemperate actions does not wish to become intemperate. But if any one without involuntary ignorance does those acts, from doing which he will become unjust, he must be unjust voluntarily; nevertheless, he will not be able to leave off being unjust, and to become just, when he pleases; for the sick man can not be-

come well, even though it so happen that he is voluntarily ill, owing to an incontinent life, and from disobedience to physicians.

11. At the time, therefore, it was in his own power not to be ill, but when he has allowed himself to become ill, it is no longer in his own power; just as it is no longer in the power of a man who has thrown a stone, to recover it; and yet the throwing and casting it was in his own power; for the origin of the action was in his own power; and thus in the beginning it was in the power of the unjust and the intemperate man not to become such; and therefore they are so voluntarily; but when they have become so, it is no longer in their own power to avoid being so.

12. But not only are the faults of the soul voluntary, but in some persons those of the body are so likewise, and with these we find fault; for no person finds fault with those that are ugly by nature, but only with those who are so through want of gymnastic exercises or through carelessness. 13. The case is the same with weakness and mutilation; for no person would blame a man who is born blind, or who is blind from disease, or a blow, but would rather pity him; but everybody would blame the man who is blind from drunkenness, or any other intemperance. Now of the faults of the body, those which are in our own power are blamed, but those which are not in our own power are not blamed. And if this is true, it will follow that in the case of faults of every other description those which are blamed must be in our own power.

14. But if any one should say that all men aim at the apparent good, but that they have not power over their own imagination, and that, according to the character of each individual, is the end which presents itself to him; if, as we have said, every person is in some way the cause of his own habit, he will be in some way the cause of his own imagination.

15. But if no one is to himself the cause of his doing bad actions, but he does them through ignorance of the end, thinking that by these means he will have what is best; and that the [faculty of] aiming-at-the-end by which [faculty] he judges well, and will choose the true good, is not a matter of choice, but that it is necessary for a man to be born with it, as with the faculty of sight; and he is well gifted by nature, who is born with this good faculty; (for he will have a most honorable and excellent thing, and one which he can not get or learn from any other person, but which he must have just as he has it by nature, and to have this well and excellently by nature constitutes perfect and true natural goodness;) if this be true, how can virtue be more voluntary than

vice? for to both the good and the bad man alike the end is, by nature, or in some way apparent and laid down; and referring everything else to this, they act accordingly. 16. Whether then the end does not appear by nature to every man of one kind or other, but the light in which it presents itself depends in some measure upon himself; or whether the end is by nature fixed, and from the good man's performing the means voluntarily, virtue is voluntary; in both cases vice is just as voluntary as virtue; for the bad man is just as much a voluntary agent in his actions as the good man. 17. If, then, as is said, the virtues are voluntary, (for we are in some sense joint causes of our habits, and from our being of a certain [*e. g.* vicious] character, we propose to ourselves the same kind of end,) the vices must be voluntary also; for they are just as much so as the virtues.

18. Now about the virtues we have spoken generally; we have said in outline, as it were, that they are mean states, and that they are habits; we have stated from what things they derive their origin, and that these things they are themselves apt to practice; that they are in our own power, that they are voluntary, and that they are under the direction of right reason.

19. But the actions and the habits are not in the same manner voluntary; for we are masters of our actions from the beginning to the end, since we know the particulars; but we are masters only of the beginning of our habits; but the addition of particulars we are not aware of, as we are in the case of sicknesses; but because it was in our power to make this or that use of particulars in the first instance, on this account they [the resulting habits] are voluntary.* 20. Let us then take up the virtues again separately,

* It is plain that, according to Aristotle, virtue is the law under which we are born, the law of nature, that law which, if we would attain to happiness, we are bound to fulfil. Happiness, in its highest and purest sense, is our "being's end and aim;" and this is an energy or activity of the soul according to the law of virtue: an energy of the purest of the capacities of the soul, of that capacity which is proper and peculiar to man alone; namely, intellect or reason. Designed, then, as man is for virtuous energies, endowed with capacities for moral action, with a natural taste and appreciation for that which is morally beautiful, with a natural disposition or instinct, as it were, to good acts; virtue, and therefore happiness, becomes possible and attainable. Had this not been the case, all moral instruction would be useless. That for which nature had not given man a capacity would have been beyond his reach; for that which exists by nature can never by custom be made to be otherwise. But this natural disposition or bias is, according to Aristotle, a mere potentiality; it is possessed, but not active, not energizing. It is necessary that it should be directed by the WILL, and that the will in its turn should be directed to a right end by deliberate preference; *i. e.* by moral principle. From his belief in the existence of this natural capac-

and state what they are, what their subjects are, and how they are virtues; and it will be at the same time clear how many there are: and first of courage.

OF COURAGE AND TEMPERANCE. (Book III., chapters vi-xii. inclusive.)

III., vi., 1. Now that courage is a mean state on the subjects of fear and confidence has been already made apparent:* but it is evident that we fear things terrible; and these are, to speak generally, evils; and therefore people define fear "the expectation of evil." 2. Now we fear all evils, as disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, and death. But the brave man does not appear to have to do with all evils; for some it is right and good to fear, and not to fear them is disgraceful, as, for example, not to fear disgrace; for he who fears this is a worthy and modest man, and he who does not fear it is shameless.†

III., vii., 1. But the terrible is not to all persons the same; and there is something which we say is beyond the power of man to bear; this, therefore, is terrible to every man, at least to every man of sense. 2. But those which are within the power of man to bear differ in magnitude, and in being some greater and some less; and circumstances which cause confidence differ likewise. But the brave man is fearless, as becomes a man; therefore at such things he will feel fear; but he will bear up, as far as right and reason dictate, for the sake of what is honorable [RIGHTEOUSNESS]; for there is this same end to all the virtues. 3. But it is possible for these things to be feared too much and too little, and, again, for things not terrible to be feared as if they were so. But of faults, one is that the thing itself is not right; another, that the manner is not right; another, that the time is not right, and so on; and the case is similar with respect to things that cause con-

ity, and this bias or inclination toward virtue, and moreover from his believing that man was a free and voluntary agent, Aristotle necessarily holds the responsibility of man. Man has power over his individual actions to do or to abstain. By repeated acts, habits are formed either of virtue or vice; and, therefore, for his whole character when formed, as well as for each act which contributes to its formation, man is responsible. Not that men have always power over their acts, when their character is formed; but what he contends for is, that they have power over them whilst their moral character is in process of formation; and that, therefore, they must, in all reason, be held responsible for the permanent effects which their conduct in particular acts has produced, and which they must at every step have seen gradually resulting. [Extract from Prof. Browne's *Analytical Introduction*, pages vi. and vii.] * [See II., ii., 6 (page 424 above). The reference is perhaps to II., vii., 2 (which I have omitted), a passage which is more fully elaborated at III., vii., 6-8 (page 443 below).] † [I omit the remainder of section 2, and all of sections 3-10.]

fidence. 4. Now he who bears bravely, and who fears what he ought, and from the right motive, and in the right manner, and at the right time, and feels confidence in like manner, is brave. For the brave man suffers and acts just as the nature of the case demands, and RIGHT REASON warrants.

5. But the end of every energy is that which is according to the habit; and courage is that which is honorable in the case of the brave man; such therefore is his end; for everything is defined by its end. For the sake, therefore, of what is honorable, the brave man bears and performs those things which belong to courage. 6. But of those who are in the extreme of excess there are two kinds, one who is excessive in fearlessness, who is not named;* but he (if, as is said of the Celts, he fears nothing, neither earthquake nor waves) may be called mad or insensate. 7. The other, who is excessive in his confidence in terrible circumstances, is rash; and the rash man is thought to be arrogant, and a pretender to courage. He then wishes to seem what the courageous man is in terrible circumstances; wherever he can, therefore, he imitates him. Most of these, therefore, are at once bold and cowardly; for though they are bold in these cases, yet they do not bear up under circumstances of terror. 8. But he who is excessive in fear is a coward; for he has all the attendant characteristics of fearing what he ought not, and as he ought not, and so forth; besides, he is deficient in confidence; but where he is called upon to bear pain, he more especially shows that he is in excess. Now the coward is desponding, for he fears everything; but the brave man is just the reverse, for confidence belongs to the sanguine temper. 9. With the same subjects, therefore, are conversant the characters of the coward, the rash, and the brave man, but they are differently disposed with respect to them; for the two first are in excess and defect; the other is in the mean, and as he ought to be; the rash are precipitate, and though beforehand they are full of eagerness, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof; the brave are in action full of spirit, but beforehand tranquil. 10. As we said, therefore, courage is a mean state with respect to subjects of confidence and terror; *i. e.* in those which have been specified; and it chooses and bears up, because it is honorable to do so, or because it is disgraceful not to do so. 11. But to die, and thus avoid poverty or love, or anything painful, is not the part of a brave man, but rather of a coward; for it is cowardice to avoid trouble; and the suicide does not undergo death because it is honorable, but in order to avoid evil. Such, then, is the nature of courage.

* [I omit part of section 6 at this point.]

III., viii., 5.* Again, experience on every subject appears to be a kind of courage; whence even Socrates thought that courage was a science.† Now some people are experienced in one thing, and some in another; and in warlike matters soldiers are experienced; for there seem to be many things in war new to other men, with which soldiers, more than any one else, have become acquainted. They therefore appear courageous, because all other people are not aware of the nature of these things; besides, through their experience they are better able to do, and not to suffer, and to protect themselves, and to wound others, because they are able to use dexterously their arms, and because they have such arms as are best adapted for offense and defense.‡ 7. Now regular troops become cowardly when the danger surpasses their experience, and when they are inferior in numbers or equipments; for they are the first to fly; but a native militia stands its ground, and dies, which happened in the Hermæum;|| for to them flight is disgraceful, and death is preferable to such safety; while the others only expose themselves to danger at the beginning, under the idea that they are superior; but when they discover the true state of the case they fly, because they fear death more than disgrace. But this is not the character of the courageous man.§

12. Now it was said to be the part of the brave man to withstand everything which is or which appears to be terrible to man, because it is honorable to do so, and disgraceful not to do so. 13. And therefore, also, it appears to be characteristic of a brave man to be fearless and imperturbable in cases of sudden danger, rather than in those which are previously expected; for it arises more from habit, and less from preparation; for in the case of things previously expected, a man might prefer them from calculation and reason, but in things unexpected, from habit.**

* [I omit sections 1-4.] † The moral theory of Socrates was, that as virtue was the only way to happiness, and no one could be willingly his own enemy, so no one could do wrong willingly. Hence, whoever did wrong did it through ignorance of right, and therefore virtue [in so far as it could be theoretically taught] resolved itself into science (EPISTEME) [and PRACTICAL science would be a virtuous life]. Courage, therefore, being a virtue, would be, according to this theory, a science likewise. ‡ [I omit section 6.] || The Greek scholiast informs us that the Hermæum was an open space in the city of Coronæa, in Boeotia. Here the Coronæans, assisted by some Boeotian auxiliary troops, fought an engagement with Nonarchus the Phocian, who had got possession of the citadel. In this battle the native troops stood their ground, and were all killed to a man; the auxiliaries fled, on hearing of the death of one of their generals. § [I omit sections 8-11.] ** [I omit sections 14 and 15, and the whole of chapter ix.]

III., x., 1. But, after this, let us speak of temperance ; for these two, courage and temperance, seem to be the virtues of the irrational parts of the soul. Now, we have said that temperance is a mean state on the subject of pleasures ; for it has not the same, but less connection with pains ; and with the same intemperance appears to be conversant likewise. But let us now distinguish the kinds of pleasures which are the subject of it.

2. Let pleasures be divided into those of the soul, and those of the body ; as, for example, the love of honor, the love of learning ; for, in both these cases, a man takes pleasure in that which he is apt to love, while his body feels nothing, but rather his intellect ; but those who have to do with pleasures of this kind are neither called temperate nor intemperate. 3. Nor are those called temperate nor intemperate who have to do with the other pleasures which do not belong to the body ; for, as to those who are fond of fables, and telling long stories, and those who pass their days idly in indifferent occupations, we call them triflers, but not intemperate ; nor yet do we call those intemperate who are too much grieved at the loss of money or friends.

4. Temperance must therefore belong to bodily pleasures ; but not to all even of these. For those who are delighted at the pleasures derived from sight, as with color, and form, and painting, are neither called temperate nor intemperate, and yet it would seem to be possible for a man to be pleased even with these as they ought, or too much, or too little.*

III., xi., 6 † But there are, in fact, none who fall short on the subject of pleasure, and who delight less than they ought in it ; for such insensibility is not natural to man ; for all other animals discriminate between the things which they eat, and like some, and dislike others. But if any one thinks nothing pleasant, and sees no difference between one thing and another, he would scarcely be a man ; but this character has no name, because it is never found.

7. But the temperate man is in the mean in these matters ; for he is not pleased, but rather annoyed, at the principal pleasures of the intemperate man ; nor is he pleased with any improper objects, nor excessively with anything ; nor is he pained at their absence ; nor does he feel desire, except in moderation, nor more than he ought, nor when he ought not, nor in any case improperly. 8. But he feels moderate and proper desire for all those pleasant things which conduce to health, or a sound habit of body ; and he feels the same desire for those other pleasures which do not hinder

* [I omit sections 5-12.] † [I omit sections 1-5.]

these, which are not contrary to the honorable [i. e. righteousness], nor beyond his means; for he who feels otherwise sets too high a price upon such pleasures. But this is not the character of the temperate man; but he feels them according to the suggestions of right reason.

III., xii., 1. But intemperance seems more voluntary than cowardice; for one arises from pleasure, and the other from pain; one of which is to be chosen, and the other to be avoided. And pain puts a man beside himself, and disturbs his natural character; whereas pleasure has no such effect. It is, therefore, more voluntary, and for this reason more deserving of reproach; for it is easier to become accustomed to resist pleasures, because they frequently occur in life; and in forming the habits there is no danger; but the case of things formidable is just the contrary.

2. And it would appear that cowardice is not equally voluntary in the particular acts; for cowardice itself is not painful; but the particular circumstances through pain put a man beside himself, and cause him to throw away his arms, and to do other disgraceful things; and therefore it appears to be compulsory. 3. In the case, however, of the intemperate man, on the contrary, his particular acts are voluntary; for they are committed in obedience to his lusts and desires: but the whole habit is less voluntary; for no one desires to be intemperate. 4. We apply the term intemperance to children's faults also; for there is some resemblance between the two cases; but which use of the word is derived from the other, matters not for our present purpose. But it is evident that the latter meaning was derived from the former; and the metaphor seems to be by no means a bad one: for whatever desires those things which are disgraceful, and is apt to increase much, requires chastisement; and this is especially the case with desires and children; for children live in obedience to desire, and in them the desire of pleasure is excessive. 5. If, therefore, it is not obedient, and subject to rule, it will increase greatly; for the desire of pleasure is insatiable, and attacks the foolish man on all sides; and the indulgence of desire increases the temper which is congenial to it, and if the desires are great and strong, they expel reason also. 6. Hence it is necessary that they should be moderate and few, and not at all opposed to reason: and this state is what we call obedient and disciplined; for as a child ought to live in obedience to the orders of his master, so ought that part of the soul which contains the desires, to be in obedience to reason. 7. It is therefore necessary for that part of the soul of the temperate man which contains the desires, to be in harmony with reason; for

the honorable [i. e. **RIGHTEOUSNESS**] is the mark at which both aim; and the temperate man desires what he ought, and as he ought, and when he ought; and thus reason also enjoins. Let this suffice, therefore, on the subject of temperance.

BOOK IV.—OF LIBERALITY, SOCIABILITY, AND TRUTHFULNESS.

IV., i., 1. Let us next speak of liberality. Now it appears to be a mean on the subject of possessions; for the liberal man is praised, not for matters which relate to war, nor for those in which the temperate character is exhibited, nor yet for his judgment, but in respect to the giving and receiving of property; and more in giving than receiving. But by property we mean everything, of which the value is measured by money. 2. Now, the excess and defect on the subject of property are prodigality and illiberality; the term illiberality we always attach to those who are more anxious than they ought about money; but that of prodigality we sometimes use in a complex sense, and attach it to intemperate people, for we call those who are incontinent, and profuse in their expenditure for purposes of intemperance, prodigal; therefore they seem to be the most wicked, for they have many vices at once. 3. Now, they are not properly so called, for the meaning of the word prodigal is the man who has one single vice, namely, that of wasting his fortune.*

6. But actions according to virtue are honorable [righteous], and are done [§ 227] **FOR THE SAKE OF** the honorable [righteousness]; the liberal man, therefore, will give for the sake of the honorable, and will give properly, for he will give to proper objects, in proper quantities, at proper times; and his giving will have all the other qualifications of right giving, and he will do this pleasantly and without pain; for that which is done according to virtue is pleasant, or without pain, and by no means annoying to the doer. 7. But he who gives to improper objects, and not for the sake of the honorable, is not to be called liberal, but something else; nor yet he who gives with pain [cf. § 338], for he would prefer the money to the performance of an honorable [righteous] action, and this is not the part of a liberal man. 8. Nor yet will the liberal man receive from improper persons, for such receiving is not characteristic of him who estimates things at their proper value; nor would he be fond of asking, for it is not like a benefactor, readily to allow himself to be benefited; but he will receive from proper sources; for instance, from his own possessions; not because it is honorable, but because it is necessary, in order that he may have

*[I omit the remainder of section 3, and the whole of sections 4 and 5.]

something to give; nor will he be careless of his own fortune, because he hopes by means of it to be of use to others; nor will he give at random to anybody, in order that he may have something to give to proper objects and in cases where it is honorable [right] to do so.

9. It is characteristic of the liberal man to be profuse and lavish in giving, so as to leave but little for himself, for it is characteristic of him not to look to his own interest. But the term liberality is applied in proportion to a man's fortune, for the liberal consists not in the quantity of the things given, but in the habit of the giver; and this habit gives according to the means of the giver. And there is nothing to hinder the man whose gifts are smaller being more liberal, provided he gives from smaller means.*

14. But we have said that prodigality and illiberality are the excess and the defect, and that they are conversant with two things, giving and receiving, for we include spending under giving. Prodigality, therefore, exceeds in giving, and not receiving, and falls short in receiving; but illiberality is deficient in giving, but excessive in receiving, but only in cases of small expenditure. Both the characteristics of prodigality, therefore, are seldom found in the same person; for it is not easy for a person who receives from nobody to give to everybody, for their means soon fail private persons who give, and these are the very persons who seem to be prodigal.† 16. But the majority of prodigals, as has been stated, also receive from improper sources, and are in this respect illiberal. Now, they become fond of receiving, because they wish to spend, and are not able to do it easily, for their means soon fail them; they are, therefore, compelled to get supplies from some other quarter, and at the same time, owing to their not caring for the honorable [righteousness], they receive without scruple from any person they can; for they are anxious to give, and the how or the whence they get the money matters not to them. 17. Therefore their gifts are not liberal, for they are not honorable, nor done FOR THE SAKE OF the honorable, nor as they ought to be done; but sometimes they make men rich who deserve to be poor, and will give to men of virtuous characters nothing, and to flatterers, or those who provide them with any other pleasure, much. 18. Hence the generality of prodigals are intemperate also; for, spending money carelessly, they are expensive also in acts of intemperance, and, because they do not live with a view to the honorable [uprightly], they fall away toward pleasures. The prodigal, there

* [I omit seven sections, numbered 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 12, 13.] † [I omit section 15.]

fore, if he be without the guidance of a master, turns aside to these vices ; but if he happen to be taken care of, he may possibly arrive at the mean, and at propriety.

19. But illiberality is incurable, for old age and imbecility of every kind seem to make men illiberal, and it is more congenial to human nature than prodigality ; for the generality of mankind are fond of money rather than of giving, and it extends very widely, and has many forms, for there appear to be many modes of illiberality ; for as it consists in two things, the defect of giving, and the excess of receiving, it does not exist in all persons entire, but is sometimes divided ; and some exceed in receiving, and others fall short in giving. 20. For those who go by the names of parsimonious, stingy, and niggardly, all fall short in giving ; but do not desire what belongs to another, nor do they wish to receive, some of them from a certain fairness of character, and caution lest they commit a base action ; for some people seem to take care of their money, or at least say that they do, in order that they may never be compelled to commit a disgraceful action. 21. Of these also is the cumminsplitter, and every one of similar character, and he derives his name from being in the excess of unwillingness to give. Others, again, through fear abstain from other persons' property, considering it difficult for them to take what belongs to other people, without other people taking theirs. They therefore are satisfied neither to receive nor give.*

IV., vi., 1. But in the intercourse of life and society, and the interchange of words and actions, some people appear to be men-pleasers ; who praise everything with a view to give pleasure, and never in any case take the opposite side, but think they ought to give no pain or annoyance to those in whose society they happen to be ; others, contrary to these, who oppose everything, and are utterly careless of giving pain, are called cross and quarrelsome. 2. That these habits are blamable, is evident ; and likewise that the mean habit [sociability] between them is praiseworthy, according to which a man will approve and disapprove of proper objects, and in a proper manner.† 4. Generally, therefore, we have said, that in his intercourse he will behave properly ; and referring his conduct to the principles of honor [righteousness] and expediency, he will aim at not giving pain, or at giving pleasure [§ 409]. For he seems to be concerned with the pleasures and pains that arise in the intercourse of society ; and in all of these in which it is dishonorable or inexpedient to give pleasure, he will show disapprobation, and will deliberately prefer to give pain.

* [I omit sections 22-25, and also chapters ii-v.] † [I omit section 3.]

And if the action bring upon the doer disgrace or harm, and that not small, and the opposite course of conduct only slight pain, he will not approve, but will disapprove of it highly. 5. But his manner of intercourse will be different with persons of rank, and with ordinary persons, and with those who are more or less known to him; and in all other cases of difference he will act in like manner, awarding to each his due: and abstractedly preferring to give pleasure, and cautious about giving pain, but yet attending always to the results, I mean to the honorable and the expedient, if they be greater than the pain. And for the sake of giving great pleasure afterward, he will inflict small pain. Such, then, is he who is in the mean, but it has not a name. 6. But of those who give pleasure, he who aims at being pleasant, without any further object, is a man-pleaser; he who does it that some benefit may accrue to him in money or that which money purchases; is a flatterer. But as for him who gives pain and always disapproves, we have said that he is morose and quarrelsome. But the extremes appear opposed to each other, because the mean has no name. [Let it be called sociability.]

IV., vii., 1. The mean state on the subject of arrogance is concerned with almost the same object matter as the last; this also has no name. But it would be no bad plan to go through and enumerate such habits as these; for we should have a more accurate knowledge of what relates to moral character, when we have gone through them individually; and we should believe that the virtues are mean states, if we saw at one comprehensive view that the position was true in every instance. 2. Now, in social intercourse, those persons who associate with others for the purpose of giving pleasure, and those who do it for the purpose of giving pain, have been treated of. But let us speak of those who are *TRUE*, and those who are *FALSE*, in their words, their *ACTIONS*, and their pretensions.

3. Now, the arrogant man appears inclined to pretend to things honorable, which do not belong to him, and to things greater than what belong to him: the falsely modest, on the other hand, is apt to deny what really does belong to him, or to make it out to be less than it is. But he who is in the mean is, as it were, a *REAL* character, *TRUTHFUL* in his actions and his words, and ready to allow that he possesses what he really possesses, without making it greater or less. But it is possible to do all these things with or without a motive. But every one, except he acts with a motive, speaks, acts, and lives, according to his character. But falsehood, abstractedly, is bad and blamable, and truth honorable and praiseworthy; and thus the truthful man being in the mean, is praise-

worthy; while the false are both blamable; but the arrogant man more so than the other. 4. But let us speak about each separately: and first, about the truthful; for we are not speaking of him who speaks truth in his agreements, nor in matters that relate to injustice or justice; for this would belong to another virtue; but of him who in cases of no such consequence observes truth in his words and actions, from being such in character [§§ 505, 371].

5. But such a man would appear to be a worthy man; for the lover of truth, since he observes it in matters of no consequence, will observe it still more in matters of consequence; inasmuch as he who is cautious of falsehood for its own sake, will surely be cautious of it as being disgraceful; and such a man is praiseworthy.* 7. But the character of the arrogant man does not consist in the power of being so, but in the deliberate preference to be so; for he is arrogant, just as the liar, from the habit, and from his being of this character.†

IV., viii., 1. But since there are periods of relaxation in life, and in them sportive pastime is admissible, in this case also there seems to be a certain method of intercourse consistent with propriety and good taste, and also of saying proper things and in a proper manner; and likewise a proper manner of hearing. But there will be a difference in point of the persons among whom we speak, or whom we hear.‡

4. But tact peculiarly belongs to the mean habit; and it is the part of a clever man of tact to speak and listen to such things as befit a worthy man and a gentleman; for in sport there are some things which it is proper for such a man to say and to listen to.|| 5. Must we, then, define the man who jests with propriety as one who says such things as are not unbefitting a gentleman? or who takes care not to give pain to his hearer, but rather to give pleasure? or is such a thing as this incapable of definition? for different things are hateful and pleasant to different people. The things which he will say he will also listen to; for it is thought that a man would do those things which he would bear to hear of. Now, he will not do everything that he will listen to; for a scoff is a sort of opprobrious expression; and there are some opprobrious expressions which are forbidden by legislators; and perhaps there are things at which they ought to have forbidden men to scoff. Now, the refined and gentlemanly man will so behave, being as it were a law to himself.§

* [I omit the remainder of section 5, and the whole of section 6.] † [I omit the remainder of section 7, and the whole of sections 8 and 9.] ‡ [I omit sections 2 and 3.] || [I omit the remainder of section 4.] § [I omit the remainder of section 5, and also the remainder of the chapter.]

IV., ix., 1. But it is not proper to speak of the sense of shame as a virtue, for it is more like a passion than a habit; it is therefore defined as a kind of fear of disgrace; but in its effects it resembles very nearly the fear that is experienced in danger; for those who are ashamed grow red, and those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, appear to be in some sort connected with the body; and this seems characteristic of a passion rather than a habit. 2. But this passion befits not every age, but only that of youth; for we think it right that young persons should be apt to feel shame, because from living in obedience to passion they commit many faults, and are restrained by a sense of shame. And we praise those young persons who are apt to feel shame; but no man would praise an older person for being shame-faced; for we think it wrong that he should do anything to be ashamed of; for shame is no part of the character of the good man, if, indeed, it be true that it follows unworthy actions; for such things he ought not to do. But whether the things be in reality or only in opinion disgraceful, it makes no difference; FOR NEITHER OUGHT TO BE DONE; so that a man ought not to feel shame.

3. Moreover, it is a mark of a bad man to be of such character as to do any of these things.*

BOOK V.—OF JUSTICE.

V., i., 1. But we must inquire into the subject of justice and injustice, and see what kind of actions they are concerned with, what kind of mean state justice is, and between what things "the just," that is, the abstract principle of justice, is a mean. But let our investigation be conducted after the same method as in the case of the virtues already discussed. 2. We see, then, that all men mean by the term justice that kind of habit from which men are apt to perform just actions, and from which they act justly, and wish for just things; and similarly in the case of injustice, that habit from which they act unjustly, and wish for unjust things.† 6. Now, the transgressor of law appears to be unjust, and the man who takes more than his share, and the unequal man; so that it is clear that the just man also will mean the man who acts according to law, and the equal man [who acts according to equity]. The just will therefore be the lawful and the equal; and the unjust the unlawful and the unequal. But since the unjust man is also one who takes more than his share, he will be of this character with regard to goods; not, indeed, all goods, but only those in which there is good and bad fortune; and these are

*[I omit the remainder of section 3, and the whole of section 4.] †[I omit sections 3-5.]

absolutely always good, but relatively not always. 7. Yet men pray for and pursue these things; they ought not, however; but they ought to pray that absolute goods may be goods relatively to themselves [Xen. Mem. I., iii, 2 (page 335 above)], and they ought to choose those things which are good to themselves.

8. But the unjust man does not always choose too much, but sometimes too little, in the case of things absolutely bad, but because even the smaller evil appears to be in some sense a good, and covetousness is for what is good, for this reason he appears to take more than his share. He is also unequal; for this includes the other, and is a common term [§ 305]. 9. But since the transgressor of law is, as we said, unjust, and the keeper of law just, it is clear that all awful things are in some sense just; for those things which have been defined by the legislative science are lawful: and each one of these we assert to be just. [See Xen. Mem. IV., iv., 12 (page 398 above).] 10. But laws make mention of all subjects, with a view either to the common advantage of all, or of men in power, or of the best citizens;* according to virtue, or some other such standard. So that in one way we call those things just which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the social community. 11. But the law directs the performance of the acts of the brave man; for instance, not to leave his post, nor to fly, nor to throw away his arms; and the acts of the temperate man; for instance, not to commit adultery or outrage; and the acts of the meek man; for instance, not to assault or abuse; and in like manner, in the case of the other virtues and vices, it enjoins one class of actions, and forbids the other; a well-made law does it well, and one framed off-hand and without consideration badly.

12. This justice, therefore, is perfect virtue, not absolutely, but relatively. And for this reason justice often appears to be the most excellent of the virtues; and neither the evening nor the morning star is so admirable. And in a proverb we say, "In justice all virtue is comprehended." And it is more than any others perfect virtue, because it is the EXERCISE of perfect virtue; and it is perfect, because the possessor of it is able to exercise his virtue toward another person, and not only in reference to himself; for many men are able to exercise virtue in their own concerns, but not in matters which concern other people. For this reason, the saying of Bias seems to be a good one, "Power will show the man;"

* This distinction is drawn in order to make the assertion applicable to the circumstances both of democratical and aristocratical states. 'OF ARISTOI, the best citizens, *i. e.* the aristocracy.

13. for the man in power is at once associated with and stands in relation to others. And for this same reason justice alone, of all the virtues, seems to be a good to another person, because it has relation to another; for it does what is advantageous to some one else, either to the head, or to some member of the commonwealth. That man, therefore, is the worst who acts viciously both as regards himself and his friends; and that man is the best who acts virtuously not as regards himself, but as regards another; for this is a difficult task. 14. This kind of justice, therefore, is not a division of virtue, but the whole of virtue [only the wholly virtuous man completely fulfils his duties to others; cf. § 664]; nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice, but the whole of vice. But the difference between virtue and this kind of justice is clear from the preceding statements; for the habits are the same, but their essence is not the same; but so far as justice in this sense relates to another, it is justice; so far as it is such and such a habit, it is simply virtue.*

V., ii., 1. But that justice which is a part of virtue is the object of our investigation; for (as we say) there is such a kind of justice; and, likewise, that injustice which is a part of vice:† 5.† particular justice is a part of universal justice; so that we must speak of the particular justice and the particular injustice; and in like manner of the particular just, and the particular unjust. 6. Let us, then, dismiss that justice and injustice which is conversant with universal virtue, the one being the exercise of universal virtue with relation to another, and the other of universal vice; and it is clear that we must dismiss also the just and unjust which are involved in these; for one may almost say that the greater part of things lawful are those the doing of which arises from universal virtue; for the law enjoins that we live according to each particular virtue, and forbids our living according to each particular vice; and all those lawful things which are enjoined by law in the matter of social education are the causes which produce universal virtue.‡

8. But of the particular justice, and of the particular just which is according to it, one species is that which is concerned in the distributions of honor, or of wealth, or of any of those other things which can possibly be distributed among the members of

* Virtue and universal justice are substantially the same, but in the mode of their existence they differ; or, in other words, the same habit, which, when considered absolutely, is termed virtue, is, when considered as a relative duty, termed universal justice. † [I omit the remainder of section 1, and the whole of sections 2, 3, 4, and the first part of section 5.] ‡ [I omit section 7.]

a political community; for in these cases it is possible that one person, as compared with another, should have an unequal or an equal share; 9. the other is that which is corrective in transactions between man and man. And of this there are two divisions; for some transactions are voluntary, and others involuntary: the voluntary are such as follow; selling, buying, lending, pledging transactions, borrowing, depositing of trusts, hiring; and they are so called because the origin of such transactions is voluntary. Of involuntary transactions, some are secret, as theft, adultery, poisoning, pandering,* assasination, false witness; others accompanied with violence, as assault, imprisonment, death, robbery, mutilation, evil-speaking, contumelious language.†

*[I omit part of section 9 at this point.] †[I omit chapter iii. (of distributive justice) and chapter iv. (of justice in transactions between man and man), preferring to place before the reader the introductory portion of Prof. Browne's analysis of the fifth book (see the analysis, pages xxxvi.-xxxix.), as follows:]

Introductory.—The analysis of a subject by contemplating its ideal nature is a course by no means suited to the practical turn of Aristotle's mind. He prefers, therefore, generally speaking, to consider virtues, not in the abstract, but in the concrete, as the quality of an act, or as the characteristic of a moral agent. In this way he proceeds to treat of justice and injustice. He first investigates the nature of just and unjust actions, and of the just and unjust man, and thus arrives at his definition and description of justice and injustice. Of course, it is plain, from the nature of moral habits, that the knowledge of the principles of one contrary, namely, justice, conveys to us an acquaintance with the principles of the other contrary, injustice.

Now a man is termed unjust, for two reasons:—Firstly, as being a transgressor of the law, whether that be the written or the unwritten; and, Secondly, as being unequal or unfair, as taking more of good, and less of evil, which comes to the same thing, than he has a right and title to. Hence injustice, and therefore justice, is of two kinds: (1) a habit of obedience to law; (2) a habit of equality.

Now, as law, in the most comprehensive acceptance of the term, implies the enactment of all the principles of virtue which are binding on mankind as members of a social community (which, be it remembered, Aristotle considers their proper normal condition), the only difference between universal justice (1) and universal virtue is, that the habit of obedience to the fixed principles of moral rectitude is, when considered absolutely, termed virtue, when considered relatively to others, justice.

This universal justice is not the justice which Aristotle considers in this book; as of course it forms the subject-matter of his whole treatise (at least the whole of that division of it which treats of moral virtue), if we take into consideration the additional condition of "relation."

Particular justice, which he does investigate, is of two kinds, distributive and corrective. The former is a virtuous habit, which, strictly speaking, can only be exercised by man in his capacity as a free citizen intrusted with political functions, either legislative or executive, for it deals with the distribution, ac-

BOOK V., chapter v., § 1. Some people think that retaliation is absolutely just, as the Pythagoreans said; for they simply defined justice as retaliation to another. But retaliation does not fit in either with the idea of distributive or corrective justice; and yet they would have that this is the meaning of the Rhadamanthian rule, "If a man suffers what he has done, straightforward justice would take place:" for in many points it is at variance; as for example, if a man in authority has struck another, it is not right that he should be struck in return; and if a man has struck a person in authority, it is right that he should not only be struck, but punished besides. 2. Again, the voluntariness and involun-

cording to merit, of the public rewards and punishments of a state. But the exercise of this virtue is by no means so limited as this idea of it would lead us at first sight to suppose. For, in the first place, in the free states of Greece, every citizen was, to a certain extent, intrusted with these functions, which is not the case under the modern system of political institutions; and, in the second place, analogically, the same principles, *mutatis mutandis*, will regulate our conduct in the distribution of rewards and punishments, toward children, dependants, and so forth.

Besides, it is scarcely conceivable in how many instances a man is called upon to act as a judge, and to exercise his judicial functions as a divider and distributor of honors and rewards, of censures and of punishments, and thus to keep in mind the principles which Aristotle here lays down of equality and impartiality.

When we contemplate justice as one of the divine attributes, it is distributive justice to which we allude. God will, and always has, dealt with mankind on principles of justice, which are in accordance with, and proportioned to, the position amongst created beings in which he has himself placed him. He is the distributor of rewards and punishments to every man according to his works, the punisher of the ungodly, the rewarder of them that diligently seek him. He doubtless weighs well, with that strict and unerring justice of which Omniscience alone is capable, the circumstances and privileges of each individual, according to that analogy which is implied in the following words of inspiration:—"To whom much is given, from him much shall be required."

The second division of particular justice may also be viewed in two lights. Firstly, as that habit by which the state, either by criminal or civil processes, corrects the inequalities which unjust conduct produces between man and man; and, Secondly, as the habit, the observance of which prevents individuals from violating the principles of equality which we are bound to observe in our dealings or intercourse with each other.

We may illustrate the nature of corrective justice by reference to our own judicial system in the following way:—In civil actions, such as for assault, seduction, etc., the amount of the injury inflicted is estimated in the form of damages. The defendant is presumed to have more than he ought, and the plaintiff less by this amount, and the equality is restored by the former paying: to the latter the damages assessed by the jury. In criminal cases—the state, and not the person against whom the offense has actually been committed, is considered the injured party. A certain diminution has taken place in the pub-

tariness of an action make a great difference. But in the intercourse of exchange, such a notion of justice as retaliation, if it be according to proportion and not according to equality,* holds men together.† 4. For commercial intercourse does not take place between [for example] two physicians, but between a physician and an agriculturist, and generally between persons who are different, and unequal; but it is necessary that these be made equal. Therefore it is necessary that all things, of which there is interchange, should be in some manner commensurable. 5. And for this purpose money came into use; and it is in some sense a medium, for it measures everything; so that it measures excess and defect;

lie security of life and property, and the balance is restored by the penalty, either as to person or property, which the law inflicts.

There still remain to be considered the principles of commutative justice; but these Aristotle has not laid down quite so clearly as he has those of the other two divisions. He, evidently, as far as can be seen from the fifth chapter, considers it as a branch of corrective justice, but, at the same time, as regulated in some degree by the principles of distributive justice also. Equality is maintained by an equivalent payment for the commodities exchanged or purchased; and, therefore, arithmetical proportion is observed, as in corrective justice; but this equivalent is estimated, and the commodities and the parties compared, according to the law of geometrical proportion.

There is one point which requires observation as presenting an apparent difficulty. How is it that Aristotle considers natural justice as a division of political justice, whereas it might be supposed that the immutable principles of justice were implanted in, and formed a part of man's nature, antecedently even to any idea of his social condition as a member of political society? The answer to this question is, that the natural state of man is his social condition. Under any other circumstances, it would be in vain to look for the development of any one of his faculties. The history of the human race never presents man to us except in relation to his fellow-man. Even in savage life, the rude elements of civil society are discoverable. If we could conceive the existence of an individual isolated from the rest of his species, he would be a man only in outward form, he would possess no sense of right and wrong, no moral sentiments, no ideas on the subject of natural justice. The principles of natural justice are doubtless immutable and eternal, and would be the same had the man never existed; but as far as man is concerned, the development of them must be sought for in him as we find him; that is, in his social condition, and no other.

In the tenth chapter Aristotle treats of equity, the principles of which furnish the means of correcting the imperfections of law. These imperfections are unavoidable, because, from the nature of things, the enactments of law must be universal, and require adaptation to particular cases.

* [Suppose a farmer should offer a tanner a pound of oats for a pound of harness leather; this would be according to equality. But if the pound of oats is worth one cent and the pound of harness leather twenty-five cents, the farmer must offer twenty-five pounds of oats for one pound of harness leather; this would be according to proportion.] † [I omit the remainder of section 2, and the whole of section 3.]

for example, it measures how many shoes are equal to a house or to a certain quantity of food.* 8. There will, therefore, be retaliation, when equalization has taken place.† 13. Now we have said what the just and what the unjust are. But this being decided, it is clear that just acting is a mean between acting and suffering injustice; for one is having too much, and the other too little. But justice is a mean state, but not in the same manner as the before-mentioned virtues, but because it is of a mean, and injustice of the extremes.‡ And justice is that habit, according to which the just man is said to be disposed to practice the just in accordance with deliberate preference, and to distribute justly, between himself and another, and between two other persons; not so as to take more of the good himself, and give less of it to the other, and inversely in the case of evil; but to take an equal share according to proportion; and in like manner between two other persons. 14. But injustice, on the contrary, is all this with respect to the unjust; and this is the excess and defect of what is useful and hurtful, contrary to the proportionate. Wherefore injustice is both excess and defect, because it is productive of excess and defect; that is, in a man's own case excess of what is absolutely good, and defect of what is hurtful; but in the case of others, his conduct generally is the same: but the violation of proportion is on either side as it may happen. 15. But in the case of an unjust act, the defect is the being injured, and the excess to injure. Now, respecting justice and injustice, and the nature of each, as also respecting the just and the unjust, let the manner in which we have treated the subject be deemed sufficient.

V., vi., 3.|| But it ought not to escape our notice, that the abstract and political just is the just of which we are in search; but this takes place in the case of those who live as members of society, with a view to self-sufficiency, and who are free and equal

*[I omit sections 6 and 7.] †[I omit the remainder of section 8, and the whole of sections 9-12.] ‡ The other virtues are mean habits between two extremes; *e. g.*, courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice; justice, on the other hand, is not in the mean between two extremes, but its subject-matter (το δίκαιον) is a mean between too much and too little. [The same doctrine applied to the other virtues would perhaps have improved the whole treatise.] || From the discussion of the subject of moral justice, Aristotle proceeds to that of political, and states that, according to its principles, he who commits an unjust action is not necessarily a morally unjust man: as he might have acted not of deliberate purpose (which is essential to a moral act), but from impulse or passion. In morals, regard is paid to the intention, in civil wrongs we only look to the action done, and the damage or wrong inflicted.—See Michelet's *Com.* p. 177. [I omit sections 1 and 2, and the first part of section 3.]

either proportionately or numerically. 4. So that all those who are not in this condition have not the political just in relation to one another, but only a kind of just, so called from its resemblance. For the term JUST implies the case of those who have LAWS to which they are subject: and law implies cases of injustice; for the administration of law is the decision of the just and the unjust. Now, injustice always implies an unjust act, but an unjust act does not always imply [deliberate] injustice. Now, to act unjustly means to give to one's self too great a share of absolute goods, and too small a share of absolute evils.

5. This is the reason why we do not suffer a MAN to rule, but REASON; because a man rules for himself, and becomes a tyrant. But a ruler is the guardian of the just;* and if of the just, of equality [equity] also. But since a man [who is a ruler] seems to get no advantage himself if he is just (for he does not award too much absolute good to himself, except it be proportionately his due), for this reason he acts for others; and hence they say, as was before also observed, that justice is another man's good. 6. Some compensation must therefore be given; and this is honor and prerogative: but all those who are not content with theirs become tyrants.†

V., vii., 1. Of the political just, one part is natural, and the other legal. The natural is that which everywhere is equally valid, and depends not upon being or not being received. But the legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer.‡ 2. But to some persons all just things appear to be matters of law, because that which is natural is unchangeable, and has the same power everywhere, just as fire burns both here and in Persia; but they see that just things are subject to change. This is not really [altogether] the case, but only in some sense [is human justice mutable];** [even] with us [men] there is something [unchangeable] which exists by nature; still it may be argued, everything with us is subject to change, yet nevertheless there is that [law] which is by nature and [also] that [statute law] which is not|| [by nature].

* For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.—Rom. xiii., 3; see also I. Pet., ii., 14. †[I omit sections 7 and 8.] ‡[I omit the remainder of section 1.] || The text here followed is that of Bekker: that of Cardwell is somewhat different; but, nevertheless, whichever reading is adopted, the meaning of the passage will still be the same. Michelet gives the following Latin paraphrase: “Jus apud Deos est immutabile, jus apud homines mutabile omne; sunt tamen nihilominus hominum jura quædam naturalia, quædam non.” He adds, that he considers Bekker's reading the true one: for further discussion of this passage the reader is referred to his Commentary, p. 182. **[I omit part of section 2 at this point.]

3. Of things contingent, what is natural, and what is not natural, but legal, and settled by agreement (even granting that both are alike subject to change), is evident; and the same distinction will apply to all other cases; for, naturally, the right hand is stronger than the left; and yet it is possible for some people to use both equally. 4. But that justice which depends upon agreement and expediency, resembles the case of measures; for measures of wine and corn are not everywhere equal; but where men buy they are larger, and where they sell again smaller.* And in like manner, that justice which is not natural, but of man's invention, is not everywhere the same; since neither are all political constitutions, although there is one [if we could discover it] which would be by nature the best everywhere; but there can be but one by nature best everywhere [because human nature is everywhere the same].

5. Every principle of justice and of law has the relation of a universal to a particular; for the things done are many; but each principle is singular; for it is universal. 6. There is a difference between an unjust act and the abstract unjust, and between a just act and the abstract just; for a thing is unjust partly by nature, or by ordinance. But the same thing, as soon as it is done, becomes an unjust act; but before it was done, it was not yet an unjust act, but unjust; and the same may be said of a just act. The common term for a just act is more correctly DIKAIOPRAGEMA [honesty], and DIKAIOMA [justice] is [used in a more restricted sense to signify] the correction of an unjust act. But of each of these, what and how many species there are, and with what subjects they are conversant, must be ascertained afterward.

V., viii., 1. Now, since the abstract just and unjust are what they have been stated to be, a man acts unjustly and justly whenever he does these things voluntarily; but when he does them involuntarily, he neither acts unjustly nor justly, except accidentally; for he does acts which accidentally happen to be just or unjust. 2. But an unjust act and a just act are decided by the voluntariness and involuntariness of them; for whenever an act [of injustice] is voluntary it is blamed; and at the same time it becomes an unjust act: so that there will be something unjust which is not yet an unjust act, except the condition of voluntariness be added to it. 3. I call that voluntary, as also has been said before [Bk. III., ch. i., 21,

* [This sounds like sarcasm; but Archdeacon Browne, the English translator, thinks that Aristotle may possibly be referring to a custom] similar to that which exists in the London milk-trade, in which the barn gallon, as it is called, of the wholesale dealer, is larger than the imperial gallon, by which milk is retailed.

(page 433 above)], which (being in his own power) a man does knowingly, and not from ignorance of the person, the instrument, or the motive; as of the person he strikes, the instrument, and the motive of striking, and each of those particulars, not accidentally, nor by compulsion; as if another man were to take hold of his hand, and strike a third person; in this case he did it not voluntarily, for the act was not in his own power.* 7. But of voluntary acts, some we do from deliberate preference, and others not. We do those from deliberate preference which we do after previous deliberation; and we do those not from deliberate preference which we do without previous deliberation. 8. Now, since there are three kinds of hurts in the intercourse of society, those which are done in ignorance are mistakes.† 9. When, therefore, the hurt takes place contrary to expectation, it is an accident; when not contrary to expectation, but without wicked intent, it is a mistake [fault]; for a man makes a mistake when the principle of causation is in himself; but when it is external, he is unfortunate. 10. But when he does it knowingly, but without previous deliberation, it is an unjust act, as all those things which are done through anger, and the other passions, which are necessary or natural; for by such hurts and such mistakes they act unjustly, and the actions are unjust; still the doers [although culpable] are not yet on this account unjust or wicked; for the hurt did not arise from depravity. 11. But when any one acts from deliberate preference, he is then unjust and wicked.‡

13. In like manner, too, the just man is he who on deliberate preference acts justly; but he acts justly, only provided he acts voluntarily. But of involuntary actions, some are pardonable, and others unpardonable; for all those acts which are done, not only ignorantly, but through ignorance, are pardonable; but all which are done not through ignorance, but ignorantly [III., i., 15 (page 433 above)], through passion neither natural nor human,|| are unpardonable.

V., ix, 15. But men suppose, that to act unjustly is in their own power, and for this reason they think that to act justly is also easy; ** but to do this [to act justly] with a particular disposition [voluntarily and deliberately] is neither easy nor in one's own

* [I omit sections 4-6.] † [I omit the remainder of section 8.] ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 11, and the whole of section 12.] || Human passions are grief, fear, pity; the natural appetites are hunger and thirst. We are inclined to pardon him who acts at the instigation of these; *e. g.* we readily make allowance for a starving man who steals a loaf to satisfy the cravings of his hunger. ** [I omit part of section 15 at this point, and the whole of sections 1-14.]

power [because the habit required has not been established by the practice of virtue. Cf. Book II., ch. i. (page 423 above)]. 16. In like manner, men think that there is no wisdom in knowing things just and things unjust, because it is not difficult to comprehend the cases of which the laws speak; but these are not just acts except accidentally*—when, indeed, they are done in a certain manner, and distributed in a certain manner, they become just. But this is a more laborious thing than to know what things are wholesome, since even in that sort of knowledge it is easy to know honey, wine, and hellebore, and burning and cutting; but to know how to apply them for the purposes of health, and to whom, and at what time, is as difficult as to be a physician.† 18. But it is not merely doing these things (except accidentally), but doing them with a particular disposition, that constitutes the being a coward or an unjust man; just as it is not performing or not performing an operation, nor giving or not giving medicine, that constitutes medical treatment or healing, but doing it in this [or that] particular way.‡

V., X., 1. The next thing to speak of is the subject of "the equitable" and equity, and the relation that the equitable bears to the just, and equity to justice; for when we examine the subject, they do not seem to be absolutely the same, nor yet generally [generically, in every respect] different. And we sometimes praise "the equitable," and the man of that character; so that we even transfer the expression, for the purpose of praise, to other cases, showing by the use of the term "equitable" instead of "good," that equity is better. 2. Sometimes, again, if we attend to the definition, it appears absurd that equity should be praiseworthy, when it is something different from justice; for either justice must be not good, or equity must be not just, that is, if it is different from justice; or, if they are both good, they must be both the same.

3. From these considerations, then, almost entirely arises the difficulty on the subject of the equitable. But all of them are in one sense true, and not inconsistent with each other; for "the equitable" is just, being better than a certain kind of "just;" and it is not better than "the just," as though it were of a different genus. 4. Just and equitable, therefore, are identical; and both being good, "the equitable" is the better. The cause of the ambiguity is this, that "the equitable" is just, but not that justice which is according to [statute] law, but the correction of the legally

* [For example, he who refrains from theft because the statutory laws so command, is not necessarily an honest man.] † [I omit section 17.] ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 18.]

just. And the reason of this is, that law is in all cases universal [general], and on some subjects it is not possible to speak universally with correctness. 5. In those cases where it is necessary to speak universally, but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes [and is framed to meet the circumstances of] the most general case, though it is well aware of the incorrectness of it. And the law is not, therefore, less right; for the fault is not in the law, nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the thing; for the subject-matter of human actions is altogether of this description [made up of innumerable particulars, which can not be provided for by general legislation].

6. When, therefore, the law speaks universally, and something happens different from the generality of cases, then it is proper, where the legislator falls short, and has erred, from speaking generally, to correct the defect, as the legislator would himself direct if he were then present, or as he would have legislated if he had been aware of the case. Therefore the equitable is just, and better than some kind of "just;" not indeed better than the "absolute just," but better than the error which arises from universal enactments.

7. And this is the nature of "the equitable," that it is a correction of law, wherever it is defective owing to its universality. This is the reason why all things are not according to [statute] law, because on some subjects it is impossible to make a law. So that there is need of a special decree: for the rule of what is indeterminate, is itself indeterminate also; like the leaden rule in Lesbian building;* for the rule is altered to suit the shape of the stone, and does not remain the same; so do decrees differ according to the circumstances. 8. It is clear, therefore, what "the equitable" is, and that it is just, and also to what "just" it is superior. And from this it is clear what is the character of the equitable man; for he who is apt to do these things and to do them from deliberate preference, who does not push the letter of the law to the furthest on the worst side,† but is disposed to make allowances, even although he has the law in his favor, is equitable; and this habit is equity, being a kind of justice, and not a different habit from justice.

V., xi., 1.‡ For one class of things just is that which is enjoined by law, according to virtue, in the universal acceptance of the

* Michael Ephesius says,—“The Lesbians did not build with stones arranged so as to form a plane surface, but alternately projecting and retiring.”—*Michelet*
See also, *Rhet. I., i.* † This is the meaning of the well-known proverb,—“*Summum jus summa injuria.*” ‡ [I omit the first part of section 1.]

term ; as, for example, it does not command a man to kill himself ; and whatever it does not command, it forbids.* 2. Again, whenever a man does hurt contrary to law, provided it be not in retaliation, he voluntarily injures : and he acts voluntarily who knows the person, the instrument, and the manner. But he who kills himself through rage voluntarily does a thing CONTRARY TO RIGHT REASON, which the law does not allow.†

6. It is also plain, that both to be injured and to injure are bad ; for one implies having less, the other having more, than the mean ; and the case is like that of the wholesome in the science of medicine, and that which is productive of a good habit of body in gymnastics. 7. But yet to injure is the worse of the two ; for to injure involves depravity, and is culpable ; and either perfect and absolute depravity, or something like it ; for not every voluntary act is necessarily joined with injustice ; but to suffer injustice is unconnected with depravity and injustice.‡

BOOK VI.—OF PRUDENCE (i. e. MORAL WISDOM).

VI., i., 1. But since we happen to have already said that we ought to choose the mean, and not the excess or defect ; and since the mean is as RIGHT REASON determines, let us discuss this point. 2. In all the habits already mentioned, just as in everything else, there is a certain mark which he who possesses reason looks at, sometimes slackening, at others making more intense his gaze ; and there is a definite boundary of the mean states, which we assert to be between the excess and the defect, and to be IN OBEDIENCE TO RIGHT REASON. 3. But this statement, although it is true, is by no means clear ; for in all other studies which are the subjects of science, it is quite true to say, that we ought not to labor too much or too little, nor to be idle too much or too little, but in the mean, and according to the direction of right reason ; yet he who only knows this would not possess any more of the knowledge which he requires ; he would not, for instance, know what applications ought to be made to the body, if a person were to tell him, that they are those which the science of medicine orders, and

* The Greeks recognized the principle that it was the duty of their state to support the sanctions of virtue by legislative enactments ; the moral education of the people formed part of the legislative system. Hence the rule which Aristotle states, "*Quæ lex non jubet vetat.*" The principles of our law, on the contrary, are derived from the Roman law, which confines itself in all cases to forbidding wrongs done to society. Hence the rule with us is exactly the contrary, "*Quæ lex non vetat permittit.*"—See Michelet's Notes, p. 195. † [I omit the last part of section 2, and the whole of sections 3, 4, and 5.] ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 7, and the whole of sections 8 and 9.]

which the person acquainted with that science makes use of. 4. Hence, it is necessary with respect to the habits of the soul also, not only that this should be stated truly, but that it should also be determined what right reason is, and what is the definition of it. Now, we made a division of the virtues of the soul [I., xiii., 15 (page 422 above)], and said that part of them belonged to the moral character, and part to the intellect. The moral virtues, we have thoroughly discussed; but let us in the same manner discuss the remainder, after having first spoken about the soul.

There were before said to be two parts of the soul,—the rational and the irrational; but now we must make the same kind of division in the case of the rational part; and let it first be laid down, that there are two divisions of the rational part; one [theoretic reason; understanding], by which we contemplate those existing things, the principles of which are in necessary matter; the other [PRACTICAL reason], by which we contemplate those, the principles of which are contingent.* Let one of these be called the scientific, and the other the reasoning part;† for deliberating and reasoning are equivalent. But no person deliberates upon necessary matter; so that the reasoning part must be one division of the rational part.‡ We must therefore ascertain which habit is the best of each of these two parts; for this is the virtue of each; but the virtue has reference to its peculiar work.

VI., ii., 1. Now, there are three principles in the soul which have power over moral action and truth: Sensation, Intellect,|| and Appetite; but of these, sensation is the principle of no moral action.§ But pursuit and avoidance in appetite are precisely what affirmation and denial are in intellect.** 2. So that since moral

* [I omit part of the section at this point.] † [See the note to Bk. VI., ch. v., § 6, below.] ‡ [The faculty of deliberation and the faculty of reason being one and the same faculty, the use of the term "reasoning part" is not inappropriate, nor would the reader have been in danger of mistaking the meaning of PRACTICAL REASON (a faculty of ACTION, and not in strict literalness a faculty of contemplation) if that designation had been applied to theoretic reason in the act of contemplating practical subjects. But in calling this "the reasoning part," Aristotle reminds us that the faculty of reason is likewise employed upon necessary matter (as in mathematics and logic), and therefore the faculty of deliberation must be regarded as one division of the faculty of reason, and not as the whole of it.] || The word in the original, which is here translated "intellect," is *NOUS*, and is used in its most comprehensive sense; not in the limited sense in which it is used in chapter vi. By sensation (*AISTHESIS*) is meant the perception of the external senses. § [I omit part of section 1 at this point.]

** The Greek word is *DIANOIA*, which properly means "the movement of the intellect (*NOUS*) onward in the investigation of truth;" but here, as in some other places, it is used loosely as synonymous with *NOUS*.

virtue is a habit together with deliberate preference, and deliberate preference is appetite, together with deliberation, it is necessary, for these reasons, that the reasoning process be true, and the appetite correct, if the deliberate preference is good; and that the one affirm, and the other pursue, the same things. This intellect, therefore, and this truth are PRACTICAL.

3. Of the intellect, which is contemplative, and not practical, or productive; truth and falsehood constitute the goodness and the badness; for this is the work of every intellectual faculty; but of that part of it which is both practical and intellectual, [that] truth which is in agreement with right desire. [See §§ 163, 281.]

4. The DELIBERATE PREFERENCE, therefore, by which we are moved to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is the PRINCIPLE of action; and desire and reason, which is for the sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference; hence deliberate preference does not exist without intellect and reason, nor without moral habit; for a good course of action and its contrary can not exist without intellect and moral character.

5. Intellect of itself is not the motive principle of any action, but only that intellect which is for the something, and is PRACTICAL; for this governs the [pragmatic] intellect [see § 49] which produces also; for every person that makes anything, makes it for the sake of something; and the thing made is not an end absolutely, but it has reference to something, and belongs to some one: but this is not the case with the thing PRACTICED; for EXCELLENCE OF ACTION is the end, and appetite is for this. 6. Wherefore deliberate preference is either intellect influenced by appetite, or appetite influenced by intellect; and such a [compound] principle is man.*

7. Truth, therefore, is the work of both the intellectual parts of the soul; and those habits by which each part will best arrive at truth must be the virtues of them both.

VI., iii., 1. Beginning, therefore, from the commencement, let us speak of these things again. Let the habits, therefore, by which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation, or denial, be five in number; and these are Art [TECHNE], Science [EPISTEME], Prudence [PHRONESIS], Wisdom [SOPHIA], and Intuition [NOUS]; for it is possible to be deceived by supposition and opinion [which, therefore, can not be reckoned among the intellectual habits.—See the translator's question, page 316]. Now, the nature of science is evident from this consideration (if it is necessary to speak accurately, and not to be led by resemblances), that we all suppose, that what we know scientifically is necessary matter.† 3. Again, all science is

* [I omit the remainder of section 6.] † [I omit section 2.]

thought to be taught, and the subject of science to be acquired by learning. But all learning is derived from things previously known, as we also stated in the *Analytics*; and is derived partly from induction and partly from syllogism. Now, induction is the origin of the universal; but a syllogism is deduced from universals. There are, therefore, some principles, from which a syllogism is deduced, which are not themselves syllogistically established, they are therefore established by induction.* 4. Science, therefore, is a demonstrative habit, and to this definition we must add the other parts, which we have given in the *Analytics*;† for whenever a man is convinced of anything, and the principles are known to him, he knows it scientifically; for unless he knows the principles even better than the conclusion, he will only possess science accidentally. Let science, therefore, have been defined after this manner.

VI., iv., 1. Of contingent matter, one species is that which is made, and the other that which is practiced. Now making and practice differ from each other; but these points have been proved in our exoteric discourses: so that the practical habit, together with reason, differs from the productive habit together with reason: nor are they included one under the other: for neither is practice making, nor making practice [§§ 44, 2550, 151, 152, 392]. 2. But since house-building is an art, and the same thing as a habit of making joined with reason, and there is no art which is not a habit of making joined with reason, nor any such habit which is not an art, an art and a habit of making joined with reason must be one and the same thing.

3. All art is conversant with three processes,—Production, Contrivance, and Contemplation; in order that something may be produced, the existence and non-existence of which are contingent, and the principle of which is in the doer, and not in the thing done; for art is not concerned with things that exist or originate necessarily or naturally; for these things have their origin in themselves. 4. But since making and practice are different [ch ii., 5 (page 466 above)] things, it is necessary that art should relate to making, and not to practice.‡ Art, therefore, as has been said, is a certain habit of making joined with true reason; and absence of art, on the contrary, is a habit of making joined with false reason, in contingent matter.

* By the observation of a number of particular facts we arrive at a universal principle, which can be used as one of the premisses of a syllogism. This process is induction.—See Arist. *Rhet.* Book I., c. i.; also Whateley's *Logic*. [See § 1331 below.] † [The translator (analysis, page xliv.) refers to the *Later Analytics*, I., 1, 2.] ‡ [I omit part of section 4 at this point.]

BOOK VI., chapter v., § 1. We should best understand the subject of prudence, if we were first to consider whom we call prudent. Now it seems to be the mark of the prudent man to be able to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for himself; not in particular instances, as what sort of things are good for his health or strength, but what is good and expedient for LIVING WELL. And a sign of this is, that we call men prudent on any particular subject, when they reason well, with a view to obtain some good end, in subjects where art is not concerned. So that generally he who is apt to deliberate, is prudent. 2. But no one deliberates about things that can not possibly be otherwise than they are, nor about things which do not admit of being done by himself. So that if science is with demonstration, and there is no demonstration in matters the premisses of which are contingent (for such conclusions must all be contingent likewise), and it is not possible to deliberate on necessary matter, then prudence can not be science, or art: it is not science, because the subject-matter of moral action is contingent; it is not art, because the nature of practice differs from that of making. 3. It remains, therefore, that it is a true habit joined with reason, which is PRACTICAL on the subjects of human good and evil; for the end of making is something different from this, but the end of practice is not; for GOODNESS OF PRACTICE is itself the end [§ 152].

4. For this reason we think Pericles, and those like him, prudent men, because they were able to perceive what was good for themselves, and for mankind; and we think that this is the character of those who understand æconomics and politics. Hence likewise we give to temperance its appellation SOPHROSUNE, as preserving prudence;* for it preserves moral ideas: for the pleasant and the painful do not destroy or pervert all ideas; for instance,

* This derivation is given by Plato in the *Cratylus*, § 62. There are few truths more self-evident or more important than this, that temperance and virtue have a tendency to preserve, whilst intemperance and vice inevitably pervert and destroy the moral sense, and the knowledge of the principles of right and wrong. Although, owing to the intimate and close connection between the mind and the body, vicious indulgence of the passions will sometimes weaken the intellectual powers; yet it will not deprave and distort the power of apprehending scientific truth; and there is no impossibility in a vicious man being a good mathematician. But vice will inevitably and certainly destroy the moral judgment, and make us think evil good, and good evil. As in the case of revealed truth, a blessing is promised to obedience to that law of virtue under which we are born:—"He that DOETH my will shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God" [John vii., 17 (page 250 above)]; so in the case of moral truth. [I omit the remainder of the note].

that a triangle has or has not its interior angles equal to two right angles, but only the ideas which relate to moral conduct. 5. Now the MOTIVES of moral conduct are the PRINCIPLES of moral conduct; but to him who has been corrupted through pleasure, or pain, the principle will immediately be invisible, and the knowledge that he ought to choose and to do everything for the sake and on account of this; for vice has a tendency to destroy the principle. So that it necessarily follows that prudence is a true habit joined with reason, practical on the subject of human goods.

6. Moreover there are degrees of excellence in art, but not in prudence. And in art, he who voluntarily errs is the better man; but in prudence he is worse, just as is the case in the virtues; it is plain, therefore, that it is a virtue, and that it is not art. And since there are two parts of the soul which have reason, it must be the virtue of one; namely, the part which forms opinions:* for both opinion and prudence take cognizance of contingent subjects. But yet it is not only a habit joined with reason [but something more]: and a proof of this is, that there is a possibility of forgetting a habit of this kind, but no possibility of forgetting prudence.

VI., vii., 1. But in the arts we attribute wisdom to those who are most accurately skilled in the arts: for example, we call Phidias a wise worker in stone, and Polyclitus a wise statuary, in this use of the word, meaning nothing more by wisdom than that it is the excellence of art. But we think that some are universally wise; and not wise only in some particular art.† 2. So that it is clear that wisdom must be the most accurate of all the sciences. The wise man must therefore not only know the facts which are deduced from principles, but must also attain truth respecting the principles themselves. So that wisdom must be intuition‡ and science together.

* This is the same part of the soul which Aristotle has already called [the reasoning part: Book VI., ch. i.; Ueberweg (Hist. Phil. ed. Morris, vol. i., page 175) calls it "the faculty of deliberation:" see page 465 above]; for when it is employed upon contingent matter it arrives not at truth absolutely, but opinion. Stability and permanence are characteristic of virtuous energies, as contrasted with those of science; as our virtuous principles are developed and called into action every hour of our lives; and hence we can not forget them, as we can the subjects of scientific knowledge. † [I omit the remainder of section 1.]

‡ [It is stated in chapter iii., § 4 (page 467 above), that, "whenever a man is convinced of anything, and the PRINCIPLES are known to him, he knows it scientifically." Now the faculty by which he is convinced, which operates syllogistically, by ratiocination, is SCIENCE (EPISTEME), and this faculty takes cognizance of all propositions deduced from principles. But science does not take cognizance of its own first or fundamental principles; because these principles are not themselves deduced from other principles through that process of ratiocination by

3.* If, then, what is wholesome and good is different in the case of a man and a fish, but what is white, and straight, is always the same; all will allow, that wisdom is always the same, but prudence different in different cases.† 6. For this reason men call Anaxagoras, and Thales, and others of this description, wise, but not prudent, when they see that they are ignorant of what is expedient for themselves. And they say that they are acquainted with subjects which are superfluous, and wonderful, and difficult, and divine, but yet useless, because they do not study the subject of HUMAN GOOD. But prudence is concerned with human affairs, and those subjects about which it is possible to deliberate. For this, that is, to deliberate well, we say is the work of the prudent man especially.

7. But no one deliberates about things which can not be otherwise than they are, nor about those of which there is not some end, and this end a good capable of being the subject of moral action. But absolutely the good deliberator is he, who is skillful in aiming at the best of the objects of human action. Nor yet is prudence limited to universals only, but it is necessary to have a knowledge of particulars also: for prudence is practical, and practice turns upon particulars. Therefore some who have no theoretical knowledge, are more practical than others who have it; those, for example, who derive their skill from experience. 8. For if a man should know that light meats are easy of digestion, and are wholesome, without knowing what meats are light, he will never produce health; but he who knows nothing more than that the flesh of birds is light and wholesome, will be more likely to produce it. But prudence is practical, so that it is good to have both, or if not both, it is better to have this. But there must be in prudence also some master virtue.

VI., viii., 1. Now political prudence, and prudence, are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same. But of prudence which is conversant with the state, one division, which is, as it were, a kind of master-prudence, is legislative [senatorial]; a second, which is particular [executive], is called by the common name political; but this is practical; for a decree, as being the last thing, is the subject of action. Hence men say that practical statesmen

which science operates, but are known IMMEDIATELY, and are apodictic, absolute, and necessary. The faculty which IMMEDIATELY KNOWS these FIRST PRINCIPLES is INTUITION (NOUS), which Aristotle defines in chapter vi. (which I omit) as "the habit which takes cognizance of the PRINCIPLES of science." (See also the analysis, pages xlv., xlv.) * [I omit the remainder of section 2.]

† [I omit the remainder of section 3, and the whole of sections 4 and 5.]

alone regulate the state; for these alone act, like artificers. 2. But the prudence which refers to one's self and the individual appears to be most properly prudence: and this bears the common name of prudence. But of those three divisions,* one is economical, the second legislative, and the third political; and of this last [executive] there are two sub-divisions, one the deliberative [administrative], the other the judicial.

4.† But still, it is an obscure subject, and one which requires investigation, how one ought to manage one's own affairs. This [the following] is an evidence of the truth of what we have said, that young men become geometricians and mathematicians, and wise in things of this kind; but it is thought that a young man can not become prudent. 5. The reason of this is, that prudence is conversant with particulars, and the knowledge of particulars is acquired by experience alone; but a young man is not experienced; for length of time causes experience.‡

7. It is clear that prudence is not science; for prudence, as has been said, is of the extreme; for this is the subject of moral action. Prudence is therefore opposed to intuition: for intuition is of those [first] principles respecting which there is no reasoning; but prudence is of the extreme [VI., xi., 6], of which there is no science, but only perception, not that perception which takes cognizance of particular objects, but such perception as that by which we perceive the extreme in mathematics, a triangle for instance; for it will stop there. But this is rather perception than prudence; but still it is of a different kind from sensual perception || [and may be called moral perception].

VI., ix., 1. Investigation and deliberation differ, for deliberation is a kind of investigation. But it is necessary to ascertain the genus of good § deliberation, whether it is a kind of science,

* The divisions of prudencé may be denominated personal, economical, legislative, administrative, executive. † [I omit section 3, and the first part of section 4.] ‡ [I omit section 6.] || Prudence (PHRONESIS) is not science (EPISTEME), because science is conversant with universals, whereas prudence is conversant with particulars. These particulars are extremes (ESCHATA), since they are the last results at which we arrive before we begin to act. The faculty which takes cognizance of them is perception (AISTHESIS); not the perception of the five external senses, but that internal perception which is analogous to them, and which is popularly called common sense. Hence we can see the difference between prudence and intuition (NOUS); for the extremes of which intuition takes cognizance, are the first undemonstrable principles (ARCHAI, PROTOI 'OROI), such as the axioms, definitions, etc. in mathematical science. The intuition (NOUS), therefore, here spoken of, is the pure intellectual intuition, not practical or moral intuition. § [EUBOULIA is translated PRUDENCE by Ueberweg (Hist. Phil. ed. Morris, vol. i., page 176, where also PHRONESIS is translated PRACTICAL WISDOM).]

opinion, happy conjecture, or what not. Now it certainly is not science; for men do not investigate subjects which they know; but good deliberation [EUBOULIA] is a kind of deliberation; and he who deliberates investigates and reasons. 2. Nor yet is it happy conjecture; for this is something unconnected with reason, and quick; but we deliberate for a long time, and say, that it is right to execute quickly what we have resolved upon, but to deliberate slowly. Again, sagacity is a different thing from good deliberation; and sagacity is a kind of happiness of conjecture. 3. Therefore no kind of good deliberation is opinion. Now since he who deliberates badly, errs, but he who deliberates well, deliberates correctly, it is plain, that good deliberation is a kind of correctness. It is not correctness either of science or of opinion;* (for there is no correctness of science, because [in science] there is no error:) and truth is the correctness of opinion; besides, everything of which there is opinion has been already defined. 4. Still, however, good deliberation can not be without reason. It remains, therefore, that it is the correctness [uprightness] of the intellect, moving onward in the investigation of truth, *i. e.* DIANOIA, for it is not yet an assertion; but opinion is not investigation, but is at once an assertion. But he who deliberates, whether he does it well or ill, investigates something and reasons. But good deliberation is a sort of correctness of deliberation; therefore we must inquire what is the nature, and what the subject-matter, of deliberation.

5. Since the term correctness is used in more senses than one, it is plain that good deliberation is not every kind of correctness; for the incontinent and depraved man will from reasoning arrive at that which he proposes to himself to look to; so that he will [appear to] have deliberated† rightly, and yet have arrived at great evil. Whereas good deliberation seems to be a good thing; for good deliberation is only such a correctness of deliberation as is likely to arrive at good. 6. But it is possible to arrive at even this by a false syllogism [by false logic]; and to be right as to what one ought to do, but wrong as to the means, because the middle term is false. So that even this kind of deliberation, by which

* Good deliberation is (1) not a correctness of science because there is no such thing as incorrectness of it; (2) it is not a correctness of opinion (DOXA), because (a) the correctness of DOXA is truth; because (b) DOXA is an assertion (PHASIS), and not an investigation (ZETESIS) [= QUÆSTIO]. † [That is, his deliberation is right, insofar as it selects the best means for attaining his predetermined bad end (III., iii., 6, page 436 above); but it is not good deliberation, because he purposely directs it toward a bad end.]

one arrives at a proper conclusion, but by improper means, is not quite good deliberation. 7. Again, it is possible for one man to be right after deliberating for a long time, and another man very soon. So that even this is not quite good deliberation; but good deliberation is that correctness of deliberation, which is in accordance with the principle of utility, which has a proper object, employs proper means, and is in operation during a proper length of time [not too hasty, nor too long delaying].

8. Again it is possible to deliberate well both absolutely, and relatively to some specific end; and that is absolutely good deliberation which is correct with reference to the absolutely good end, and that is a specific kind of good deliberation which is correct with reference to some specific end. 9. If, therefore, to deliberate well is characteristic of prudent men, good deliberation [PRUDENCE] must be a correctness of deliberation, in accordance with the principle of expediency having reference to the end, of which prudence [MORAL WISDOM] is the true conception.

VI., x., 1. Intelligence [SUNESIS], and the want of intelligence, according to which we call men intelligent, and wanting in intelligence, are neither universally the same as science [EPISTEME] or opinion [DOXA], for then all men would be intelligent; nor is intelligence any one of the particular sciences, as medicine is the science of things wholesome; or as geometry is the science of magnitudes. 2. Nor is intelligence conversant with things eternal and immutable, nor with everything indiscriminately which comes to pass; but it is conversant with those things about which a man would doubt and deliberate. 3. Wherefore it is conversant with the same subjects as prudence, yet prudence and intelligence are not the same; for the province of prudence is to order (for its end is what it is right to **do**, or not to do); but the province of intelligence is only to decide; for intelligence, and good intelligence, are the same thing; for intelligent people, and people of good intelligence, are the same. 4. But intelligence is neither the possessing, nor yet the obtaining, of prudence; but just as learning, when it makes use of scientific knowledge, is called intelligence, thus the word intelligence is also used when a person makes use of opinion, for the purpose of making a decision, and making a proper decision, on the subjects of prudence, when another person is speaking; for the terms well and properly are identical. 5. And hence the name of intelligence, by which we call intelligent people, was derived, namely, from that intelligence which is displayed in learning; since for the expression "to learn," we often use the expression "to understand."

VI., xi., 1. But that which is called candor, with reference to which we call men candid, and say that they possess candor, is the correct decision of the equitable man.* But this is a sign of it; for we say that the equitable man, above all others, is likely to entertain a fellow-feeling, and that in some cases it is equitable to entertain it. Now fellow-feeling is the correct discriminating candor of the equitable man; and that is correct which is the candor of the truthful man. 2. But all these habits reasonably tend to the same point; for we speak of candor, intelligence, prudence, and perception, referring to the same characters the possession of candor, of [moral] perception, of prudence, and of intelligence; for all these faculties are of the extremes [see VI., viii., 7 (page 471 above)], and of particulars. And it is in being apt to decide on points on which the prudent man decides, that intelligence, kind feeling, and candor, are displayed. 3. For equitable considerations are common to all good men in their intercourse with others. But all matters of moral conduct are particulars and extremes; for the prudent man ought to know them, and intelligence and candor are concerned with matters of moral conduct, and these are extremes.

4. Intuition is of the extremes on both sides;† for intuition, and not reason, takes cognizance of the first principles, and of the last results: that intuition which belongs to demonstration takes cognizance of the immutable and first principles; that which belongs to practical subjects takes cognizance of the last result of contingent matters, and of the minor premiss; for these (*i. e.* minor premisses) are the origin of the motive; for universals are made up of particulars. Of these, therefore, it is necessary to have perception; and perception is intuition.‡

* Intelligence is that faculty which forms a judgment on things; candor that which judges of persons. † Intuition (*NOUS*), as we have seen above, properly signifies the faculty which takes cognizance of the first principles of science. Aristotle here, whether analogically or considering it a division of the same faculty, it is difficult to say, applies the term to that power which we possess of apprehending the principles of morals, of seeing what is right and wrong by an intuitive process, without the intervention of any reasoning process. It is what Bishop Butler calls "our sense of discernment of actions as morally good or evil." In this twofold use of the term *NOUS* there is no real inconsistency, because it is evidently, as Mr. Brewer says, p. 247, note, "the same faculty, whether employed upon the first principles of science or of morals." Every moral agent acts upon a motive (*OU 'ENEKA [CAUSA]*), whether good or bad. (This motive is, in other words, the principle upon which we act, and is the major premiss of the practical syllogism. But the minor premiss of the practical syllogism bears relation to the major, of a particular to a universal; therefore as universals are made up of particulars, it follows that the origin (*ARCHE*) of the motive or principle is the minor premiss. ‡ [I omit section 5.]

6. Therefore intuition is at once the beginning and the end ; for demonstrations have extremes both for their origin and their subjects.* So that we ought to pay attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, no less than to their demonstrations ; for because they have obtained from their experience an acuteness of moral vision, they see correctly. What, therefore, is the nature of wisdom and of prudence, what the objects of both, and the fact that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul, has been stated.

VI., xii., 1. The question might be asked, how are these habits useful? for wisdom does not contemplate any of the means by which a man will become happy ; for it relates to no production. Prudence, indeed, has this property ; yet with a view to what is there any need of it, if it is the KNOWLEDGE of the things which are just, and honorable, and advantageous to man, and these are what the good man PRACTICES? 2. But we are not at all the more apt to practice them because we know them, that is, if the virtues are habits ; just as we are not more apt to be healthy from the knowledge of wholesome things ;† for we are not at all more apt to put in practice the arts of medicine or gymnastics, merely because we know them.

3. But it may be said, if we must not call a man prudent on these grounds, but only for BECOMING VIRTUOUS, it would not be at all useful to those who are already good ; again, it would not be useful to those who do not possess prudence ; for it will make no difference to them whether they possess it themselves, or obey others who possess it ; for it would be quite sufficient for us, just as in the case of health ; for when we wish to be well, we do not begin to learn the art of medicine.‡

4. First, then, let us assert, that wisdom and prudence must be eligible for their own sakes, since they are the virtues, one of each part of the soul [VI., i., ad fin. (page 465 above)].|| Secondly, they do really produce an effect, although not in the same way as medicine produces health, but as health is the efficient cause of healthiness, so is wisdom the efficient cause of happiness ; for being part of virtue in the most comprehensive sense of the term, it causes, by being possessed, AND BY ENERGIZING, a man to be happy. 5.

* That is, demonstrations have for their origin and foundation first principles, of which intuition takes cognizance, and the object of demonstration is to arrive at conclusions which come under the province of intuition likewise.

† [I omit part of section 2 at this point.] ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 3.]

|| [I omit part of section 4 at this point.]

Again, its work will be accomplished by prudence and moral virtue; for virtue makes the end and aim correct, and prudence the means.*

To answer the objection, that we are not at all more likely to practice honor and justice on account of prudence, we must begin a little further back, making this our commencement. 6. Just as we say that some who do just actions, are not yet just; those, for instance, who do what is enjoined by the laws involuntarily, or ignorantly, or for some other cause, and not for its own sake, though nevertheless they do what they ought and what a good man ought to do; in the same manner, it seems, that a man must do all these things, being at the same time of a certain disposition, in order to be good; I mean, for instance, from deliberate preference, and for the sake of the acts themselves. 7. Virtue, therefore, makes the deliberate preference correct; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other faculty, to direct aright those things which must be done with a view to that principle. But we must stop and speak on these subjects with more clearness.

8. Now, there is a certain faculty which is called cleverness; † the nature of which is to be able to do, and to attain, those things which conduce to the aim proposed. If, therefore, the aim be good, the cleverness is praiseworthy; but if it be bad, it becomes craft: ‡ therefore we call prudent men clever, and not crafty. 9. Now prudence is not the same as this faculty, nor is it without this faculty. But the habit is produced upon this eye, as it were, of the soul, not without virtue, as we have already stated, and as is man-

* [I omit part of section 5 at this point.] † Cleverness (DEINOTES) is, according to Aristotle, a natural faculty, or aptness, which, in itself, is neither good nor bad; it may be either used or abused,—if abused, it is craft (PANOURGIA). It is capable of being cultivated and improved, and when perfected it becomes PHRONESIS. As cleverness thus perfected by the addition of moral virtue becomes prudence, so natural virtue, with Aristotle, who believes that man is endowed, becomes perfect virtue by the addition of prudence. Not that Aristotle believed that man was capable of actually attaining such a height of perfection: he evidently believed that it was beyond human power. It is the theoretical standard which he proposes to the Ethical student for him to aim at, and to approach as near as his natural powers will permit him. Thus, Revelation, whilst it teaches us the corruption of human nature, bids us be perfect even as our Father which is in heaven is perfect. [I omit the remainder of the note.] ‡ The original word here translated craft is PANOURGIA. As DEINOTES, which signifies cleverness, generally is, when directed to a good end, subject to the restrictions of sound and upright moral principles; so when these are removed, it degenerates into PANOURGIA, which signifies equal ability, but in addition, an unscrupulous readiness to do everything whatever. This is implied in its etymology.

ifest. For the syllogisms of moral conduct have as their principle, (*i. e.* their major premiss,) SINCE SUCH AND SUCH A THING IS THE END AND THE CHIEF GOOD, (*i. e.* anything. For let it be for the sake of argument, anything); but this is not visible except to the good man; for depravity distorts the moral vision, and causes it to be deceived on the subject of moral principles. So that it is clearly impossible for a person who is not good to be prudent.

VI., xiii., 1. We must again investigate the subject of virtue. For virtue admits of relation of the same kind as that which prudence bears to cleverness; that is, the two kinds of virtue are not identically the same, but similar; such is the relation which exists between natural virtue and virtue proper. For all men think that each of the points of moral character exists in us in some manner naturally; for we possess justice, temperance, valor, and the other virtues, immediately from our birth. 2. But yet we are in search of something different, namely, to be PROPERLY virtuous, and that these virtues should exist in us in a different manner; for natural habits exist in children and brutes, but without intellect they are evidently hurtful. Yet so much as this is evident to the senses, that as a strong body which moves without sight meets with great falls, from the want of sight, so it is in the present instance: but if it gets the addition of intellect, it acts much better. Now the case of the habit is similar, and under similar circumstances will be properly virtue. So that, as in the case of the faculty which forms opinions, there are two forms, cleverness and prudence; so in the moral there are likewise two, natural virtue and virtue proper; and of these, virtue proper is not produced without prudence.

3. Therefore it has been said, that all the virtues are prudences. And Socrates [*Xen. Mem. III., ix., 5* (page 378 above)], in one part was right in his inquiry, but in the other wrong. For in that he thought that all the virtues are prudences, he was wrong; but in that he said that they are not without prudence, he was right. And this is a sign; for now all men, when they define virtue, add also that it is a habit, according to right reason, stating also to what things it has reference; now that is right reason which is according to prudence. 4. All men, therefore, seem in some way to testify that such a habit as is according to prudence, is virtue. But it is necessary to make a slight change; for virtue is not only the habit according to, but IN CONJUNCTION WITH, RIGHT REASON; and prudence is the same as right reason on these subjects. Socrates, therefore, thought that the virtues were "reasons," *i. e.* reasoning processes; for he thought them all sciences: but we think them joined with reason.

5. It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that it is impossible to be properly virtuous without prudence, or prudent without moral virtue. Moreover, the argument by which it might be urged that the virtues are separate from each other, may in this way be refuted, for (they say) the same man is not in the highest degree naturally adapted for all: so that he will have got one already, and another not yet. Now this is possible in the case of the natural virtues; but in the case of those from the possession of which a man is called absolutely good, it is impossible; for with prudence, WHICH IS ONE, they will all exist together.*†

BOOK VII.—OF CONTINENCE.

VII., i., 1. After what has been already said, we must make another beginning,‡ and state, that there are three forms of things to be avoided in morals—vice, incontinence, brutality. The contraries of two of these are self-evident: for we call one virtue, the other continence: but, as an opposite to brutality, it would be most suitable to name the virtue which is above human nature, a sort of heroic and divine virtue, such as Homer has made Priam attribute to Hector, because of his exceeding goodness—

———“Nor did he seem
The son of mortal man, but of a god.”§

4. We must, however, treat of incontinence, and softness, and luxury, and of continence and patience: for we must neither form our conceptions of each of them as though they were the same habits with virtue and vice, nor as though they were belonging to a different genus. But, as in other cases, we must first state the

* If a man possesses perfect prudence, it develops itself in perfect obedience to the moral law; and the perfection of the one implies the perfection of the other also.—[Extract from the translator's note at this point] † [I omit section 6.] ‡ In a note at this point, in reference to the connection between the preceding six books and what follows, the translator presents the following] explanation given by Muretus. In the commencement of the sixth book Aristotle has taught that two conditions are requisite to the perfection of moral virtue: first, that the moral sense (τὸ ΝΟΥΣ τὸ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΟΣ) should judge correctly; next, that the appetites and passions should be obedient to its decisions. But though the moral judgment should be correct, the will is generally in opposition to it. If in this conflict reason is victorious, and compels the will, though reluctant, to obey, this moral state is continence; if, on the contrary, the will overcomes the reason, the result is incontinence. It was essential to a practical treatise to treat of this imperfect or inchoate virtue, as well as to discuss the theory of moral perfection. The case is somewhat analogous to that of physical science, in which we first lay down theoretically the natural laws without reference to the existence of any impediments, and then modify our theory by calculating and allowing for the effects of perturbations and resistances. || Il. xxiv., 258. [I omit sections 2 and 3.]

phenomena; and, after raising difficulties, then exhibit if we can all the opinions that have been entertained on the subject of these passions; or if not all, the greatest number, and the most important; for if the difficulties are solved, and the most approved opinions left, the subject will have been explained sufficiently.

5. It is a common opinion, then, first, that continence and patience belong to the number of things good and praiseworthy; but incontinence and effeminacy to that of things bad and reprehensible. That the continent man is identical with him who abides by his determination; and the incontinent, with him who departs from his determination. That the incontinent man, knowing that things are bad, does them at the instigation of passion; but the continent man, knowing that the desires are bad, refuses to follow them in obedience to reason. That the temperate man is continent and patient: but some think that every one who is both continent and patient is temperate; others do not. Some call the intemperate man incontinent, and the incontinent intemperate, indiscriminately; others assert that they are different. As to the prudent man, sometimes it is said that it is impossible for him to be incontinent; at other times, that some men both prudent and clever are incontinent. Lastly, men are said to be incontinent of anger, and honor, and gain. These are the statements generally made.

VII., ii., 1. A question might arise, how any one forming a right conception is incontinent. Some say, that if he has a scientific knowledge, it is impossible: for it is strange, as Socrates thought,* if science exists in the man, that anything else should have the mastery, and drag him about like a slave. Socrates, indeed, resisted the argument altogether, as if incontinence did not exist: for [he thought] that no one forming a right conception acted contrary to what is best, but only through ignorance. Now, this account is at variance with the phenomena; and we must inquire concerning this passion, if it proceeds from ignorance, what manner of ignorance it is; for that the incontinent man, before he is actually under the influence of passion, thinks that he ought not to yield, is evident. 2. There are some who concede one point,

* Aristotle (*Magna Moral.*) says, that in the opinion of Socrates no one would choose evil, knowing that it was evil: but the incontinent man does so, being influenced by passion, therefore he thought there was no such thing as incontinence. This doctrine of Socrates doubtless originated, firstly, from his belief that man's natural bias and inclination was toward virtue, and that therefore it was absurd to suppose he would pursue vice except involuntarily or ignorantly. Secondly, from his doctrine *that the knowledge of the principles and laws of morality was as capable of certainty and accuracy as those of mathematical science.* [Cf. *Xen. Mem.* IV., vi., 6; III., ix., 4 (pages 404, 377 above.)]

but not the rest; for that nothing is superior to science they allow: but that no one acts contrary to what they think best they do not allow: and for this reason they say, that the incontinent man is overcome by pleasures, not having science, but opinion. But still, if it is opinion, and not science, nor a strong conception, which opposes, but a weak one, as in persons who are doubting, the not persisting in this in opposition to strong desires is pardonable: but vice is not pardonable, nor anything else which is reprehensible.*

9. Again, if there are incontinence and continence on every object-matter, who is he who is simply called incontinent? for no one is guilty of every species of incontinence; but there are some whom we call incontinent simply. The difficulties, then, are somewhat of this nature; and of them we must remove some, and leave others; for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of the truth.

VII., iii., 1. First, then, we must consider whether men are incontinent, having knowledge or not, and in what way having knowledge. Next, with what sort of objects we must say that the continent and incontinent have to do; I mean, whether it is every pleasure and pain, or some particular ones. Thirdly, whether the continent and patient are the same or different. And in like manner we must consider all other subjects which are akin to this speculation.

2. The beginning of the discussion is, whether the continent and incontinent differ in the object, or in the manner: I mean, whether the incontinent man is incontinent merely from being employed in this particular thing; or whether it is not that, but in the manner; or whether it is not that, but the result of both. 3. Next, whether incontinence and continence are on every object-matter or not: for he that is called simply incontinent, is not so in everything, but in the same things with which the intemperate is concerned: nor is he so from having reference to these things absolutely (for then it would be the same as intemperance), but from having reference to them in a particular manner: for the intemperate is led on by deliberate choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue present pleasure: the incontinent does not think so, but nevertheless pursues it.

4. Now as to the question whether it be a true opinion, and not science, in opposition to which men are incontinent, makes no difference as to the argument: for some who hold opinions, do not feel any doubt, but think that they know for certain. If then [it

* [I omit sections 3-8.]

is contended that] those, who hold opinions, because their convictions are weak, will act contrary to their conception, more than those who have knowledge, then [even in that case it may be replied that] knowledge will [so far as it relates to incontinence] in nowise differ from opinion: for some are convinced of what they think, no less than others are of what they know: Heraclitus is an instance of this.* 5. But since we speak of knowing in two ways (for he that possesses, but does not use his knowledge, as well as he that uses it, is said to have knowledge), there will be a difference between the having it, but not using it, so as to see what we ought not to do, and the having it and using it.†

VII., iv., 1. We must next consider, whether any one is absolutely incontinent, or whether all are so in particular cases; and if the former is the case, with reference to what sort of things he is so. Now that the continent and patient, the incontinent and effeminate, are so with respect to pleasures and pains, is evident. 2. But since some of those things which produce pleasure are necessary, and others, though chosen for their own sakes, yet admit of excess, those which are corporeal are necessary: I mean those which relate to the gratification of the appetite, and such corporeal pleasures as we have stated [Book III., ch. x. (page 445 above)] to be the object of intemperance and temperance; others are not necessary, but chosen for their own sakes; I mean, for instance, victory, honor, wealth, and such like good and pleasant things. 3. Now those who are in excess in these, contrary to the right reason which is in them, we do not call simply incontinent, but we add, incontinent of money, of gain, of honor, or anger, but not simply incontinent; as if they were different, and called so only from analogy; just as to the generic term man we add the difference, "who was victor at the Olympic games;" for in this case the common description differs a little from that which peculiarly belongs to him.‡ And this is a sign: incontinence is blamed, not only as an error, but also as a sort of vice, either absolutely, or in some particular case; but of the other characters no one is so blamed. 4. But of those who indulge in carnal pleasures, with respect to which we call a man temperate and intemperate, he, who pursues

* Heraclitus, although he said that all his conclusions rested on opinion, not on knowledge, still defended them as pertinaciously, and believed their truth as firmly as other philosophers, who asserted that theirs were founded on knowledge.—*Giphanius*. †[I omit sections 6–14.] ‡ As we distinguish an Olympic victor from other men by the addition of this differential property to the common term man; so we distinguish simple from particular incontinence by adding to the word "incontinent" the difference "of anger," etc.

the excesses of things pleasant, and avoids the excesses of things painful, as hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and all things which have to do with touch and taste, not from deliberately preferring, but contrary to his deliberate preference and judgment, is called incontinent simply, without the addition, that he is so in this particular thing; anger, for example.

5. A sign of it is this: men are called effeminate in these [hunger, cold, etc.] but in none of the others [anger, honor, gain, etc.]; and for this reason we class together the incontinent and intemperate, and also the continent and temperate, but not any of the others, because the former are in a manner conversant with the same pleasures and pains. They are indeed concerned with the same, but not in the same manner; for the temperate and intemperate deliberately prefer them, the others [continent and incontinent] do not.*

7. But since some desires and pleasures belong to the class of those which are honorable and good (for of things pleasant, some are eligible by nature, some the contrary, and others indifferent, as, for instance, according to our former division, the pleasures connected with money, and gain, and victory, and honor), in all such pleasures, and in those which are indifferent, we are not blamed for feeling, or desiring, or loving them, but for doing this somehow in excess [II., vi., 12 (page 430 above)]. 8. Therefore all who are overcome by, or pursue, what is by nature honorable and good, contrary to reason, are blamed; as for example, those who are very anxious, and more so than they ought to be, for honor.† 9. There is therefore no depravity in those cases for the reason given, that each belongs to the class of things which are by nature chosen for their own sakes; but still the excesses are bad and to be avoided. So also there is no incontinence; for incontinence is not only to be avoided, but it belongs also to the class of things blamable. But from the similarity of the affection, we use the term incontinence, with the addition of the idea of relation: just as we call a man a bad physician and a bad actor, whom we would not absolutely call bad. As, therefore, in these instances we would not call them so absolutely, because each is not really a vice, but we call them so from analogy; so in the other case it is clear that we must suppose that only to be incontinence and continence, which has the same object-matter with temperance and intemperance. In the case of anger, we use the term analogically; and therefore we call a man incontinent, adding "of anger," just as we add "of honor," or "of gain."‡

* [Incontinence is aptly illustrated by St. Paul (Romans vii., 15) "For not what I desire, that do I; but what I hate, that I do."] [I omit section 6.] † [I omit the remainder of section 8.] ‡ [I omit chapter 5.]

VII., vi., 1. Let us now consider the fact, that incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire. For anger seems to listen somewhat to reason, but to listen imperfectly; as hasty servants, who before they have heard the whole message, run away, and then misunderstand the order; and dogs, before they have considered whether it is a friend, if they only hear a noise, bark: thus anger, from a natural warmth and quickness, having listened, but not understood the order, rushes to vengeance.. 2. For reason or imagination has declared, that the slight is an insult; and anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated. But desire, if reason or sense should only say that the thing is pleasant, rushes to the enjoyment of it.* 4. Again, it is more pardonable to follow natural appetites, for it is more pardonable to follow such desires as are common to all, and so far forth as they are common. But anger and asperity are more natural than excessive and unnecessary desires.† 8. Consequently, it is plain, that incontinence of desire is more disgraceful than that of anger, and that continence and incontinence are conversant with bodily desires and pleasures. But we must understand the different forms of these; for, as has been said at the beginning, some are human and natural, both in kind and in degree; others are brutal; and others arise from bodily injuries and disease; but temperance and intemperance are only conversant with the first of these.‡ 9. But brutality is a less evil than vice, though more formidable; for the best principle has not been destroyed, as in the human being, but it has never existed. It is just the same, therefore, as to compare the inanimate with the animate, in order to see which is worse; for the viciousness of that which is without principle is always the less mischievous; but intellect is the principle. It is therefore almost the same as to compare injustice with an unjust man; for it is possible that either may be the worse; for a vicious man can do ten thousand times as much harm as a beast.

VII., vii., 1. With respect to the pleasures and pains, the desires and aversions which arise from touch and taste (with which intemperance and temperance have already || been defined as being conversant), it is possible to be affected in such a manner, as to give way to those which the generality overcome; and it is possible to overcome those to which the generality give way. Whoever, then, is so affected as regards pleasure, is either incontinent or continent; and as regards pain, either effeminate or patient. But

* [I omit section 3.] † [I omit sections 5-7.] ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 8.] || [III., x., 9 (which I have omitted). See VII., iv., 2-4 above.]

the habits of the generality are between the two, although they incline rather to the worse. 2. Now, since some pleasures are necessary, while others are not so, or only up to a certain point, whilst their excesses and defects are not necessary; the same holds good with desires and pains; he who pursues those pleasures which are in excess, or pursues them to excess, or from deliberate preference, and for their own sakes, and not for the sake of any further result, is intemperate; for this man must necessarily be disinclined to repentance, so that he is incurable; for the impenitent is incurable. He that is in the defect [abstaining too much from pleasure], is [gone to] the opposite [extreme (II., ii., 7, and II., vi., 11, pp. 424, 430 above)]; he that is in the mean, is temperate. The case is similar with him who shuns bodily pains, not from being overcome, but from deliberate preference.

3. Of those who act without deliberate preference, one [incontinent] is led by pleasure; another [effeminate] by the motive of avoiding the pain which arises from desire; so that they differ from each other. But every one would think a man worse, if he did anything disgraceful when he felt no desire, or only a slight one, than if he felt very strong desires; and if he struck another without being angry, than if he had been angry; for what would he have done, had he been under the influence of passion? Therefore, the intemperate is worse than the incontinent. 4. Of those then that have been mentioned, one is rather a species of effeminacy, the other is incontinent. The continent is opposed to the incontinent, and the patient to the effeminate; for patience consists in resisting, continence in having the mastery; but to resist and to have the mastery differ in the same way as not being defeated differs from gaining a victory. Therefore, also, continence is more eligible than patience.*

VII., viii., 1. The intemperate, as has been said, is not inclined to repent; for he abides by his deliberate preference; but the incontinent, in every case, is inclined to repent. Therefore the former is incurable, and the latter curable; † for depravity resembles dropsy and consumption amongst diseases, and incontinence resembles epilepsy; for the former is a permanent, the latter not a permanent vice. The genus of incontinence is altogether different from that of vice; for vice is unperceived by the vicious; but incontinence is not. || 4. For as to virtue and de-

* [I omit sections 5-9.] † [I omit part of section 1 at this point.] ‡ [See note at foot of page 369 above.] || Intemperance is perfect vice, incontinence, imperfect. In the intemperate, therefore, the moral principle is destroyed, the voice of conscience silenced, the light which is within him is become darkness. He

pravity, one destroys, and the other preserves the principle: but IN MORAL ACTION THE MOTIVE IS THE PRINCIPLE, just as the hypotheses are in mathematics. Neither in mathematics does reason teach the [first] principles, nor in morals, but virtue, either natural or acquired by habit, teaches to think rightly respecting the principle. Such a character, therefore, is temperate, and the contrary character is intemperate.

5. But there is a character, who from passion is precipitate contrary to right reason, which passion so far masters, as to prevent him from acting according to right reason; but it does not master him so far, as to make him one who would be persuaded that he ought to follow such pleasures without restraint. This is the incontinent man; better than the intemperate, and not vicious absolutely; for the best thing, *i. e.* the principle, is preserved. But there is another character opposite to this; he that abides by his opinions, and is not precipitate, at least, not through passion. It is evident, then, from the above considerations, that one habit [continence] is good, the other [incontinence] bad.*

VII., x., 1. It is impossible for the same man to be at once prudent and incontinent: for it has been shown that a prudent man is at the same time good in moral character. Again, a man is not prudent from merely knowing, but from being also disposed to ACT: 2. but the incontinent is not disposed to act.† 3. The incontinent therefore is not like one who has knowledge and uses it, but like one asleep or drunk; and he acts willingly; for he in a manner knows both what he does and his motive for doing it; but he is not wicked; for his deliberate preference is good; so that he is half-wicked, and not unjust, for he is not insidious. For one of them is not disposed to abide by his deliberations; and the choleric is not disposed to deliberate at all. Therefore, the incontinent man resembles a state which passes all the enactments which it ought, and has good laws, but uses none of them;‡ but the wicked man resembles a city which uses laws, but uses bad ones.|| 5. What, then, continence is, and what incontinence, and patience,

does not even feel that he is wrong; he is like a man suffering from a chronic disease, which is so much the more dangerous and incurable because it is painless. Pain has ceased, mortification, so to speak, has begun. The incontinent man, on the other hand, feels the pangs of remorse, hears the disapproving voice of conscience, experiences uneasiness, the "sorrow which worketh repentance;" his disease is acute, and may be cured. [I omit sections 2 and 3.] * [I omit chapter ix.] † [I omit the remainder of section 2.] ‡ [I omit a portion of section 3 at this point.] || [I omit section 4.]

and effeminacy, and what relation these habits bear to one another, has been sufficiently explained.*

BOOKS VIII., IX.—OF FRIENDSHIP.

VIII, i., 1. It would follow next after this to treat of friendship; † for it is a kind of virtue, or joined with virtue. Besides, it is most necessary for life: for without friends no one would choose to live, even if he had all other goods. For to the rich, and to those who possess office and authority, there seems to be an especial need of friends; 2. for what use is there in such good fortune, if the power of conferring benefits is taken away, which is exerted principally and in the most praiseworthy manner toward friends? or how could it be kept safe and preserved without friends? for the greater it is, the more insecure it is. 3. And in poverty and in all other misfortunes men think that friends are the only refuge. It is also necessary to the young, in order to keep them from error, and to the old, as a comfort to them, and to supply that which is deficient in their actions on account of weakness; and to those in the vigor of life to further their noble deeds, as the poet says, "When two come together," etc. (Hom. II., x., 224. ‡) For

* The four concluding chapters of this book, as printed in the Greek, are considered spurious, it being most improbable that Aristotle would have treated of the subject of pleasure here in an imperfect manner, and again fully in the tenth book. The opinion of Casaubon is that these chapters were improperly transferred to this place from the Eudemean Ethics. They are therefore omitted. † Friendship, although, strictly speaking, it is not a virtue, is, nevertheless, closely connected with virtue. The amiable feelings and affections of our nature, which are the foundation of friendship, if cultivated and rightly directed, lead to the discharge of our moral and social duties. It is also almost indispensable to the highest notions which we can form of human happiness. On these accounts the subject is appropriately introduced in a treatise on Ethics. But friendship acquires additional importance from the place which it occupied in the Greek political system. As, owing to the public duties (LEITOURGIAI) which devolved upon the richer citizens, magnificence (MEGALOPREPEIA) was nearly allied to patriotism; as, again, to make provision for the MORAL EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE was considered one of the highest duties of a statesman, so friendships, under which term were included all the principles of association and bonds of union between individuals, involved great public interests. "The Greeks," says Mr. Brewer, "had been accustomed to look upon the friendships of individuals, and the 'ETAIREIAI' which existed in different forms among them, as the organs not only of great political changes and revolutions in the state, but as influencing the minds and morals of the people to an almost inconceivable extent. The same influence which the press exerts amongst us, did these political and individual unions exert amongst them." Many occasions will of course occur of comparing with this book the *Laelius* of Cicero. ‡ The whole passage is thus translated by Pope. (Hom. II., x. 265):—

"By mutual confidence, and mutual aid,
Great deeds are done, and great discoveries made;
The wise new prudence from the wise acquire,
And one brave hero fans another's fire."

they are more able to conceive and to execute. 4. It seems also naturally to exist in the producer toward the produced; and not only in men, but also in birds, and in most animals, and in those of the same race, toward one another, and most of all in human beings: whence we praise the philanthropic. One may see, also, in traveling, how intimate and friendly every man is with his fellow-man.

5. Friendship also seems to hold states together, and legislators appear to pay more attention to it than to justice; for unanimity of opinion seems to be something resembling friendship; and they are most desirous of this, and banish faction as being the greatest enemy. And when men are friends, there is no need of justice: * but when they are just, they still need friendship. 6. And of all just things that which is the most so is thought to belong to friendship. It is not only necessary, but also honorable; for we praise those who are fond of friends; and the having many friends seems to be one kind of things honorable.

8.† Now, let the physiological questions be passed over, for they do not belong to our present consideration. But as for all the questions which have to do with man, and refer to his moral character and his passions, these let us consider; as, for instance, whether friendship exists between all, or whether it is impossible for the wicked to be friends: and, whether there is only one species of friendship, or more; for those who think there is only one, because it admits of degrees, trust to an insufficient proof: for things differing in species admit of degrees; but we have spoken of this before ‡.

VIII., ii., 1. Perhaps we might arrive at clear ideas about these matters if it were known what the object of love is: for it is thought to be not everything which is loved, but only that which is an object of love; and this is the good, the pleasant, or the useful. That would be thought to be useful, by means of which some good or some pleasure is produced: so that the good and pleasant

* This is true upon the same principle which is the foundation of the Christian maxim, "Love is the fulfilling of the law." † [I omit section 7 and also the first part of section 8.] ‡ The scholiast says that the passage in which this subject was before spoken of must have been lost, but it probably refers to *Eth.* Book II., c. viii. [But it will be seen by reference to Book II. ch. vi. §§ 8 and 7 (page 430 above), that virtue and vice are specifically different. For example, rashness, cowardice, and courage, admit of degrees (III., vii., 10. page 443 above), and the first appears to be courage of too high a degree, the second, courage of too low a degree (II., ii., 6. page 424 above); while the truth is that they are not courage at all (II., vi. 14, page 430 above), but VICES of a different species from the VIRTUE of courage, no excess or deficiency of courage being possible.]

would be objects of love, considered as ends. Do men, then, love the good, or that which is good to themselves? for these sometimes are at variance. The case is the same with the pleasant. Each is thought to love that which is good to himself; and absolutely the good is an object of love, but relatively to each individual, that which is so to each.

2. Now, each loves not that which is in reality good to himself but that which appears so; but this will make no difference; for the object of love will be that which appears to be good. But since there are three motives on account of which men love, the term friendship can not be used to express a fondness for things inanimate: for there is no return of fondness, nor any wishing of good to them.* 3. But we say that men should wish good to a friend for his sake; and those who wish good to him thus, we call well-disposed, unless there is also the same feeling entertained by the other party; for good-will mutually felt is friendship; or must we add the condition, that this mutual good-will must not be unknown to both parties? 4. For many feel good-will toward those whom they have never seen, but who they suppose are good or useful to them; and this same feeling may be reciprocated. These, then, do indeed appear well-disposed toward one another; but how can one call them friends, when neither knows how the other is disposed to him? They ought, therefore, to have good-will toward each other, and wish each other what is good, not without each other's knowledge, and for one of the motives mentioned.

VIII., iii., 1. But these motives differ in species from one another; therefore the affections do so likewise, and the friendships; consequently there are three species of friendship, equal in number to the objects of love [VIII., ii., 1., (page 487 above)], since in each there is a return of affection, and both parties are aware of it. But those who love one another wish what is good to one another, according to the motive on account of which they love. 2. Now, those who love one another for the sake of the useful, do not love each other disinterestedly, but only so far forth as there results some good to themselves from one another. The case is the same with those who love for the sake of pleasure, for they do not love the witty from their being of such a character, but because they are pleasant to them; and, therefore, those who love for the sake of the useful love for the sake of what is good to themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure love for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not so far forth as the person loved exists, but so far forth as he is useful or pleasant.

* [I omit the remainder of section 2.]

3. These friendships, therefore, are accidental; for the person loved is not loved for being who he is, but for providing something either good or pleasant; consequently such friendships are easily dissolved, if the parties do not continue in similar circumstances; for if they are no longer pleasant or useful, they cease to love. Now the useful is not permanent, but becomes different at different times; therefore, when that is done away for the sake of which they became friends, the friendship also is dissolved; which clearly shows that the friendship was for those motives.*

7. The friendship of the good and of those who are alike in virtue is perfect; for these wish good to one another in the same way, so far forth as they are good; but they are good of themselves; and those who wish good to their friends for the friends' sake are friends in the highest degree, for they have this feeling for the sake of the friends themselves, and not accidentally; their friendship, therefore, continues as long as they are good; and virtue is a permanent thing.† And each is good absolutely and also relatively to his friend, for the good are both absolutely good and also relatively to one another; for to each their own actions and those which are like their own are pleasant, but the actions of the good are either the same or similar.

8. Such friendship as this is, as we might expect, permanent, for it contains in it all the requisites for friends; for every friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure, either absolutely or to the person loving, and results from a certain resemblance. In this friendship, all that has been mentioned exists in the parties themselves, for in this there is a similarity, and all the other requisites, and that which is absolutely good is also absolutely pleasant; but these are the principal objects of love, and therefore the feeling friendship, and friendship itself, exists, and is best, in these more than in any others.

9. It is to be expected that such would be rare, for there are few such characters as these [§ 606]. Moreover, it requires time and long acquaintance, for, according to the proverb, it is impossible for men to know one another before they have eaten a stated quantity of salt together, nor can they admit each other to intimacy nor become friends before each appears to the other worthy of his friendship, and his confidence. 10. Those who hastily perform offices of friendship to one another are willing to be friends, but are not really so unless they are also worthy of friendship, and are

* [I omit sections 4-6.] † *Virtus, virtus inquam, et conciliat amicitias et conservat; in ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia.*—*Cic. Læl. xxvii.*

aware of this ; for a wish for friendship is formed quickly, but not friendship. This species of friendship, therefore, both with respect to time and everything else, is perfect, and in all respects the same and like good offices are interchanged ; and this is precisely what ought to be the case between friends.

VIII., iv., 1. Friendship for the sake of the pleasant bears a resemblance to this, for the good are pleasant to one another ; so also that which is for the sake of the useful, for the good are useful to one another.* 4. Consequently, for the sake of pleasure and the useful, it is possible for the bad to be friends with one another;† but for the sake of one another, evidently only the good can be friends, for the bad feel no pleasure in the persons themselves, unless so far as there is some advantage. 5. The friendship of the good is alone safe from calumny, for it is not easy to believe any one respecting one who has been proved by ourselves during a long space of time ; and between such persons there is confidence and a certainty that one's friend would never have done wrong, and every thing else which is expected in real friendship. 6. In the other kinds of friendships there is nothing to hinder such things from occurring ; consequently, since men call those friends who are so for the sake of the useful, just as states do (for alliances seem to be formed between states for the sake of advantage), and also those who love one another for the sake of pleasure, as children do, perhaps we also ought to say that such men are friends, but that there are many kinds of friendship ; first and principally, that of the good so far forth as they are good, and the others from their resemblance ; for so far forth as there is something good or similarity of character, so far they are friends ; for the pleasant is a kind of good to those who love the pleasant.

7. These two latter kinds do not combine well, nor do the same people become friends for the sake of the useful and the pleasant ; for two things which are accidental do not easily combine. Friendship, therefore, being divided into these kinds, the bad will be friends for the sake of the pleasant and the useful, being similar in that respect ; but the good will be friends for the friends' sake, for they will be so, so far forth as they are good ; the latter, therefore, are friends absolutely, the former accidentally, and from their resemblance to the latter.

BOOK VIII., chapter v., § 4.‡ The friendship of the good, then, is friendship in the highest degree, as has been said frequently ; for that which is absolutely good or pleasant is thought

* [I omit sections 2 and 3.] † [I omit part of section 4 at this point.] ‡ [I omit sections 1-3.]

to be an object of love and eligible, and to each individual that which is so to him; but the good man is an object of love and eligible to the good, for both these reasons. Fondness is like a passion, and friendship like a habit; for fondness is felt no less toward inanimate things, but we return friendship with deliberate choice, and deliberate choice proceeds from habit. We also wish good to those whom we love for their sakes, not from passion but from habit; and when we love a friend, we love that which is good to ourselves; for the good man, when he becomes a friend, becomes a good to him whose friend he is. Each, therefore, loves that which is good to himself, and makes an equal return both in wish and in kind, for equality is said proverbially to be friendship. These conditions, therefore, exist mostly in the friendship of the good. [See § 600.]

VIII., vi., 3.* To be friends with many, is impossible in perfect friendship; just as it is to be in love with many at once; for love appears to be an excess; and such a feeling is naturally entertained toward one object. And that many at once should greatly please the same person is not easy, and perhaps it is not easy to find many persons at once who are good. They must also become acquainted with one another, and be on intimate terms, which is very difficult. For the sake of the useful and the pleasant, it is possible to please many; for many are of that character, and the services required are performed in a short time.†

VIII., vii., 1. There is another species of friendship, where one of the parties is superior; as that of a father for his son, and generally an older for a younger person, and a husband for his wife, and a governor for the governed. But these differ from one another; for the case is not the same between parents and children, as between governors and the governed; nor is the feeling of a father for his son the same as that of a son for his father, nor of a husband for his wife, as of a wife for her husband; for the perfection and office of each of these is different; therefore the motives of their friendship are different. Consequently their affections and their friendships themselves are different; hence the same offices are not performed by each to the other, nor ought they to be required. 2. But when children pay to their parents what is due to those who begat them, and parents to their children what is due to them, the friendship in such cases is lasting and sincere. But in all friendships, where one party is superior, the affection also ought to be proportionate; as, for example, that the better person should be loved in a greater degree than he loves, so also the more

* [I omit sections 1 and 2.] † [I omit sections 4-7.]

useful person, and in like manner in every other case. For when the affection is proportional, then there is in a manner an equality; which seems to be the property of friendship.*

VIII, vi i, 5.† But since friendship consists more in loving, and those who love their friends are praised, to love seems to be the excellence of friends. So that the parties between whom this takes place proportionately are lasting friends, and the friendship of such is lasting. In this manner those who are unequal, may also be the greatest friends; for they may be equalized. But equality and similarity constitute friendship, and particularly the similarity of those who are alike with respect to virtue; for as they possess stability in themselves, they also possess the same toward each other, and neither ask nor render base services, but, so to speak, they even prevent it: for it is the characteristic of the good neither to commit faults themselves, nor to suffer their friends to commit them. 6. The wicked have no stability; for they do not continue consistent even with themselves; but they become friends for a short time, taking delight in each other's wickedness. The useful and the pleasant continue friends longer than these; for they continue as long as they furnish pleasure and profit to one another.‡

VIII., x., 1. There are three forms of civil government, and as many defections, which are, as it were, corruptions of them. The former are, Monarchy, Aristocracy, and a third, on the principle of property, which it seems appropriate to call a Timocracy; but the generality are accustomed to apply the term "polity" exclusively to this last. Of these, monarchy is the best, and timocracy the worst. 2. The defection from monarchy is tyranny; for both are monarchies: but there is the greatest difference between them; for the tyrant looks to his own benefit, the king to that of his subjects; for he is not a king who is not independent, and who does not abound in all goods; but such an one as this wants nothing else; and consequently he would not be considering what is beneficial to himself, but to his subjects; for he that does not act so, must be a mere king chosen by lot.|| But tyranny is the opposite to this; for a tyrant pursues his own peculiar good. 3. And it is more evident on this ground, that it is the worst form of all; for that is worst, which is opposite to the best. But the transition from kingly power is to tyranny; for tyranny is a corruption of monarchy, and a bad king becomes a tyrant.

*[I omit sections 3-5.] †[I omit sections 1-4.] ‡[I omit sections 7-9, and the whole of chapter ix.] || That is, a king who owes his dignity to his good fortune, and not to any merits of his own.

4. The transition from aristocracy is to oligarchy, through the wickedness of those in power, who distribute the offices of the state without reference to merit, give all or most good things to themselves, and the offices of state constantly to the same people, setting the highest value upon wealth: consequently a few only are in power, and the bad instead of the best. 5. The transition from timocracy is to democracy; for they border upon one another, since a timocracy naturally inclines to be in the hands of the multitude, and all who are in the same class as to property are equal. But democracy is the least vicious, for its constitutional principles are but slightly changed. Such, then, are the principal changes in forms of government; for thus they change the least and in the most natural manner.

6. One may find resemblances, and as it were, examples of these, even in private families; for the relation of a father to his sons wears the form of monarchy: for the father takes care of the children. Hence, also, Homer calls Jupiter father; for the meaning of a kingdom is a paternal government. But in Persia the authority of a father is tyrannical, for they use their sons like slaves.*

VIII., xiii., 2.† Accusations and complaints arise in the friendship for the sake of the useful, and in that only, or mostly so, as might be expected; for those who are friends for virtue's sake, are anxious to benefit each other; for such is the property of virtue and friendship; and when they are struggling for this, there are no complaints or quarrels; for no one dislikes one who loves and benefits him; but if he is a man of refinement, he returns the kindness. And he who is superior to the other, since he obtains what he wants, can not complain of his friend; for each is aiming at the good.

3. Nor do they arise at all in friendships formed for the sake of pleasure; for both parties obtain at once what they want, if they take pleasure in living together; and he would appear ridiculous, who complained of another not giving him pleasure, when it is in his power to cease to live with him. 4. But the friendship for the sake of the useful is fruitful in complaints; for since each makes use of the other for his own benefit, they are constantly wanting the greater share, and think that they have less than their due, and complain that they do not receive as much as they want, although they deserve it; and those who confer benefits can not assist them as much as the receivers require.‡

*[I omit sections 7 and 8, and the whole of chapters xi. and xii.] †[I omit section 1.] ‡[I omit sections 5-7.]

8. But it admits of a question, whether we ought to measure the return by the benefit done to the receiver, and make it according to that; or by the kindness of him who confers it. For the receivers say that they have received such things from those who conferred them as were trifling to them, and which they might have received from others, thus depreciating the favor: the others, on the contrary, say that they were the greatest favors they had to bestow, and favors which could not have been received from any others, and that they were conferred in time of danger, or such like exigencies. 9. Is not, therefore, the benefit of the receiver the measure in friendship for the sake of the useful? for he is the person in want, and the other assists him, as if hereafter to receive an equivalent: the assistance therefore is as great as the benefit which the other receives: and consequently he must repay as much as the fruit which he has reaped from it, or more; for that is more honorable. But in friendships for the sake of virtue there are no complaints; and the deliberate preference of the conferrer seems to be the measure; for the essential part of virtue and moral character consists in the deliberate preference.*

IX., i., 1. In all cases of dissimilar† friendship, proportion equalizes and preserves the friendship, as has been stated; for example, in the political friendships, the shoemaker receives a return for his shoes according to their value, and the weaver, and every one else. In these instances a common measure is provided, namely, money; everything therefore is referred to this, and is measured by it.‡ 5. But who is to fix the value? the person who first gives? or he who first receives? for he who gives, seems to leave it to the other to fix the value: which they say is what Protagoras did; for when he gave any lessons, he ordered the learner to fix how much he thought the knowledge was worth, and so much he received. In such transactions, some persons approve of the principle, "Let a friend be content with a promised payment."—Hes. Op. et Di., v. 368. 6. But those who receive the money beforehand, and then perform none of their promises, because they were so extravagant, are with justice complained of; for they do not fulfill their agreements. And this, perhaps, the Sophists are obliged to do, because no one would give a piece of silver for what they know. These, therefore, because they do not perform that for which they received pay, are justly complained of.

7. Whenever there is no agreement made about the service performed, as has been stated, those who confer a favor freely for the

*[I omit chapter xiv.] †In the Greek *ANOMOEIDESI*, dissimilar in species, that is, when two parties become friends, each from a different motive. ‡[I omit sections 2-4.]

sake of the persons themselves on whom they confer it, can not complain; for friendship which is founded on virtue is of this kind. The return must be made according to the deliberate intention; for it is this which characterizes a friend and virtue. It seems also that those who have intercourse with one another in philosophy must act thus; for the value of it is not measured by money, and no equivalent price can be paid. But perhaps, as in the case of our duty to* our parents, that which is in our power is sufficient.

8. Where the act of giving is not of this kind, but for the sake of something, perhaps it is best that a return should be made, which seems to both parties to be proportionate. If this can not be, it would seem not only necessary that he who first receives should settle it, but also just: for in proportion to the benefit which one received, or to the cost at which he would have purchased the pleasure, will be the equivalent which the other ought to receive in return; for in things bought and sold, this seems to be done: and in some places there are laws forbidding suits upon voluntary contracts; as if it was right, when we have trusted any one, to settle with him, as we dealt with him originally: for they think that it is more just for him to fix the value who was trusted, than for him to do so who trusted him; for men do not in general put the same value upon things which they have received, as they did when they were wishing to receive them; for what belongs to us, and what we give away, seems to each of us to be very valuable. But, nevertheless, the return is made with reference to such a standard of value as the receiver would fix: though, perhaps, he ought not to value it at so much as it seems worth when he has got it, but according to what he valued it at before he got it.

IX., ii., 7.† And it would seem that we ought to assist our parents, in preference to all other persons, in supporting them; being, as it were, their debtors; and that it is more honorable to assist the authors of our existence in that respect than ourselves. We should also give honor to our parents.‡ 8. We should also give to every old man the honor becoming his age, by rising up in his presence, and giving him the place of honor, and such like marks of respect. To companions and brothers we should give liberty of speech, and a partnership in everything we have. 9. To our relations, and members of the same tribe, and fellow-citizens, and every one else, we should always endeavor to give what belongs to them.||

* [I omit part of section 7 at this point.] † [I omit sections 1-6.] ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 7.] || [I omit the remainder of section 9.]

IX., iii., 1. There is a difficulty in the question, whether or no we should dissolve friendship with those who do not continue the same as they originally were.* 3. But if he admits him to his friendship, as being a good man, and then he become wicked, or is thought to be so, must he still love him? or is this impossible, since not everything is an object of love, but only the good? We are not obliged, then, to love a wicked man, nor ought we; for we must not be lovers of wickedness [§ 611], nor assimilate ourselves to the bad: and it has been stated that like is friendly to like.†

IX., iv., 8 ‡ The vicious, also, seek for persons with whom they may pass their time, and fly from themselves; for they call to mind many unpleasant subjects, and expect others of the same kind when they are by themselves; but when they are with others, they forget them; and since they possess no amiable qualities, they have no friendly feeling toward themselves. 9. Therefore, such men do not sympathize with themselves in joy or sorrow; for their soul is divided, as it were, by faction, and one part from depravity feels pain, because it abstains from something, while the other part feels pleasure; and one draws him this way, another that, just as if they were dragging him asunder. But though it is impossible to feel pain and pleasure at the same time, yet after a little time he feels pain at having been pleased, and wishes that these things had not been pleasant to him; for bad men are full of repentance. It is plain, then, that the bad man has no friendly disposition even to himself, because he has in him nothing amiable. If, then, such a condition as this is excessively wretched, he should anxiously flee from wickedness, and strive to be good; for by this means a man may have friendly feelings toward himself, and become a friend of another.||

IX., viii., 1.** The bad man also seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more wicked he is. They therefore complain of him, as doing nothing without reference to himself: but the good man acts from honorable motives, and the better he is, the more he acts from honorable motives, and for his friend's sake; and he passes over his own interest.†† 5. Those, therefore, who use it as a reproach, call those men self-lovers, who give to themselves the greater share of money, or honor, or bodily pleasures; for the generality of men are grasping after these, and extremely anxious about them, as if they were the best things; whence, also, they are objects of contention. Those, therefore,

*[I omit the remainder of section 1, and the whole of section 2.] †[I omit sections 4-6.] ‡[I omit sections 1-7, and the first part of section 8.] ||[I omit chapters v., vi., vii.] **[I omit the first part of section 1.] ††[I omit sections 2-4.]

who are covetous of these things, gratify their desires, and, in short, their passions, and the irrational part of the soul. 6. But the generality are of this kind: whence, also, the appellation has arisen, from the generality, which are bad. Consequently reproach is justly cast upon those who are selfish in this sense. But that the generality are accustomed to call those self-lovers, who give such things as these to themselves, is quite plain. For if any one is constantly anxious that he himself more than any other person should do what is *JUST*, or temperate, or anything else in accordance with virtue, and in short is always for gaining something honorable for himself, no one would call such a man a self-lover, nor blame him.

7. And yet such a character as this would seem to be more than any other a self-lover; for he gives to himself what is most honorable, and the greatest goods, and gratifies the authoritative part of himself, and obeys it in everything. And as that part which has most authority seems especially to constitute the state, and every other system, so it constitutes a man; and therefore he who loves this part and gratifies it, is especially a self-lover. 8. So also a man is called continent or incontinent, according as the intellect has authority or not, as if this constituted each individual. And men think that what they do with *REASON*, they do themselves, and voluntarily, more than any other things. That this, therefore, especially constitutes the individual, is quite plain, and that the good man especially loves this. Therefore he must be especially a self-lover, after a different manner from the person who is reproached for it, and differing in as great a degree, as living in *OBEDIENCE TO REASON* differs from living in obedience to passion, and as desiring the honorable [*RIGHTEOUSNESS*] differs from desiring what seems to be advantageous.

9. Now, all approve of and praise those who are particularly earnest* about performing honorable [*RIGHT*] actions: and if all contended for what is honorable, and strove to perform the most honorable acts, there would be to every one generally what is right and proper, and to each individually the greatest goods; at least if virtue is such as we have described it. 10. So that the good man must necessarily be a self-lover; for he will be delighted in performing honorable acts himself, and will benefit others. But the wicked man ought to be so: for he injures both himself and his neighbors, by following evil passions. To the wicked man, therefore, what he *OUGHT* to do, and what he *DOES*, are at variance; but the good man *DOES* what he ought to do; for all intellect chooses.

* [Cf. Buddha's *Dharmapada*, 30 (page 271 above).]

what is best for itself; and the good man obeys his intellect. 11. It is true also of the good man, that he performs many acts for his friends and his country, nay, even if it is his duty to die for them: for he will give up money and honors, and, in short, all the good things which others contend for, if he can secure to himself that which is honorable.* 12.* With reason, then, he is thought to be a good man, for choosing what is honorable in preference to everything else. It is possible, also, that he may give up the performance of these actions to his friend, and that it may be more honorable for him to be the cause of a friend's doing a thing, than to do it himself. 13. In all praiseworthy things, therefore, the good man seems to give himself the greater share of what is honorable. In this sense, therefore, one ought to love one's self, as has been stated; but in the way that the generality do, one ought not.

IX, ix., 1. But a question also arises about the happy man, whether he will need friends or no: for it is commonly said that those who are prosperous and independent, do not need friends, since they have all goods already, and therefore that, being independent, they require nothing more; but that a friend, being another self, provides what a man is unable to provide of himself. Hence comes the saying,—

When fortune gives us good, what need of friends?

2. And yet it seems an absurdity to attribute all goods to the happy man, and yet not to give him friends, which are thought to be the greatest of all external goods. And if it is more the part of a friend to confer than to receive favors, and to do good is characteristic of a good man and of virtue, and it is more honorable to benefit friends than strangers, the good man will want some persons to be benefited. 3. Hence it has also been asked, whether there is a greater need of friends in adversity, or prosperity: as in adversity we want persons to benefit us, so in prosperity we want persons whom we may benefit. 4. And it is perhaps absurd to make the happy man a solitary being; for no one would choose to possess all goods by himself; since man is a social being, and formed by nature to associate: this, therefore, is the case with the happy man; for he possesses whatever is by nature a good. But it is evident that it is better to pass our time with friends and good men, than with strangers and anybody indiscriminately. The happy man, therefore, wants friends.

5. What, then, do the first-mentioned people say, and how far do they speak truth? is it not that the generality consider those only to be friends who are useful? The happy man will have no

*[I omit the remainder of section 11. and the first part of section 12.]

need of such friends as these, since he is in possession of all goods; nor, consequently, of those who are friends for the sake of the pleasant, or only in a small degree; for his life being pleasant, does not require any adventitious pleasure. But since he does not require such friends as these, he has been thought not to require friends at all. 6. This perhaps is not true; for it was stated at the beginning [I., vii., 8-12 (page 416 above)] that happiness is a kind of energy: and an energy is evidently produced, not merely possessed, like property. And if happiness consists in living and energizing, and the energy of the good man is good and pleasant in itself, as was stated at the beginning; and if that which peculiarly belongs to us is of the number of pleasant things, and we can contemplate others better than we can ourselves, and their actions better than our own, then the actions of good men, when they are their friends, are pleasant to the good; for both possess what is naturally pleasant; and consequently the happy man will want such friends as these, if he deliberately prefers to contemplate virtuous actions, and those which are [of a kind] peculiarly his own. 7. And the actions of the good man are such, when he is his [the happy man's] friend. But it is thought that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. Now, to a solitary person life is burdensome: for it is not easy to energize constantly by one's self, but with and in relation to others it is easy. The energy, therefore, will be more continuous when it is pleasant in itself, which ought to be the case with the happy man; for the good man, so far forth as he is good, takes delight in actions according to virtue, and feels pain at those which are according to vice: just as the musician is pleased with beautiful melodies, but feels pain at bad ones. And there may be a kind of practice of virtue from living with good men, as Theognis says.*

8. If we examine the question more physiologically, it appears probable that the good friend is by nature an object of choice to the good man; for it has been stated, that what is good by nature, is in itself good and pleasant to the good man. But life is defined to consist, in animals, in the faculty of sensation, and in men, of sensation and intelligence; and the faculty is referred to the energy, and properly consists in the energy. 9. Life, then, seems to be properly the exercise of sensation or intellect; and life is one of

* The verses of Theognis are as follows:—

“ With these eat and drink, with these
 Sit, and please those whose power is great.
 For from the good thou shalt learn good; but if with the wicked
 Thou minglest, thou wilt lose the intellect thou hast.”

the things which are good and pleasant absolutely.* 10.* But if life itself is a good, it is also pleasant; and this seems likely to be the case from all desiring it, and particularly the good and happy: for to them life is most eligible, and their life is most happy. 11. Now, he that sees, perceives that he sees; and he that hears, that he hears; and he that walks, that he walks; and in every other case, in the same manner, there is some faculty which perceives that we are energizing; so that we perceive that we are perceiving, and understand that we are understanding. But this is the same as saying that we perceive or understand that we exist; for existence was defined [§ 8] to be perceiving, or understanding. 12. Now, to perceive that one is alive, is of the number of those things which are pleasant in themselves: for life is a good by nature: and to perceive the good which is inherent in one's self is pleasant. But life is eligible, and particularly to the good, because existence is to them good and pleasant; for by the consciousness of that which is absolutely a good, they are pleased.

13. Now, the good man has the same relation to his friend as he has to himself; for a friend is another self; in the same manner, therefore, as to exist one's self is eligible to every one, so also is it for one's friend to exist, or nearly so. But existence was said to be eligible on account of the perception of that which is a good: and such a perception is pleasant in itself. 14. We ought, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of our friend; and this would result from associating with him, and sharing his words and thoughts; for this would seem to be the meaning of the word society, when applied to men, and not, as in the case of cattle, the merely feeding in the same place.† If, then, existence is in itself eligible to the happy man, being by nature something good and pleasant, and if the existence of a friend is nearly the same, then a friend must also be of the number of eligible things. But that which is eligible to a man, he ought to possess; or else he is deficient in that respect; he, therefore, that is to be happy, will need good friends.

IX., x., 1. Must we then make as many persons our friends as possible? or, as it seems to have been appropriately said in the case of hospitality,—“Have neither many guests nor none.”—(Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 713) So will the rule also apply in the case of

* [I omit the remainder of section 9 and the first part of section 10.] † The philosophy of Aristotle is the exact opposite of anything approaching to asceticism. The relation subsisting between a man and his friend is the same as that between him and another self. He is to love his friend as himself. The enjoyments of friendship are derived from as clear a consciousness of our friend's existence as we have of our own. The nourishment and support of friendship are intercourse, association, communion. [I omit the remainder of the note.]

friendship, that we should neither be without friends, nor yet have too many.* 5. Perhaps, then, it is as well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but only as many as are sufficient for society; for it would seem impossible to be a very strong friend to many.† 6. So it seems to be in real fact: for in friendship between companions, many do not become friends; and those friendships which are most celebrated, are between two only ‡ [see § 605]. Those who have many friends, and are familiar with everybody, are by no one thought to be friends, except in a political sense;|| and these are called men-pleasers. In the above sense, then, a man may be a friend to many, even without being a man-pleaser, but really as a good man: but for the sake of virtue and the persons themselves, it is impossible to be a friend to many; one must be content indeed to find a few such.

IX., xi., 3.** The presence of friends seems in a manner to cause a mixed feeling; for the fact of seeing friends is pleasant, and particularly to one in misfortune, and it becomes a kind of assistance, so as to prevent pain: since the sight and conversation of a friend is able to comfort us, if he has tact; for he knows the character of his friend, and what things give him pleasure and pain. But to perceive one's friend feeling pain at one's own misfortunes, is painful; for every one avoids being the cause of pain to his friends. 4. Therefore, those who are of a manly disposition are cautious how they let their friends share their pain; and unless a person is himself without sensibility, he can not endure that his friends should feel pain on his account: nor does he at all call in fellow-mourners, because he is not given to mourning himself. But women and effeminate men delight in having people to mourn with them, and love them as friends and partners in affliction. But in every case we ought of course to imitate the best.

5. The presence of friends in prosperity makes us pass our time pleasantly, and makes us conscious that our friends are feeling pleasure at our good. Therefore, it would seem that we ought to invite friends to share our prosperity with alacrity; for it is an honorable thing to be ready to do good to others: but to share our adversity, we should invite them with reluctance, for we ought to share our misfortunes as little as possible: whence the saying, "It is enough that I myself am unfortunate" 6. We should call them

* [I omit sections 2-4.] † [I omit the remainder of section 5.] ‡ The friendships of Saul and Jonathan, Damon and Pythias, Pylades and Orestes, and so forth. || In a political sense, *i. e.* in the same sense in which a man may be said to have a love for his country. The feeling of patriotism is of a wider and more extensive kind, not so much a matter of personal attachment; or based, as friendship is, in personal qualities. ** [I omit sections 1 and 2.]

in especially, when they may render us great assistance, with a little trouble. We should perhaps, on the contrary, go to those who are in misfortune, without being called in, and with alacrity. For it becomes a friend to confer benefits, and particularly upon those who are in need, and did not ask it as a right: for in both cases it is more honorable and pleasant; but to those who are in prosperity, if it is to co-operate with them, we should go willingly; for this is the use of a friend: but if it is to enjoy their good fortune, we should go reluctantly; for it is not honorable to be anxious to receive assistance [§ 603]. But perhaps we must guard against appearing ungracious in our refusal; for this sometimes takes place. The presence of friends, then, is necessary under all circumstances.

IX., xii., 2.* But the energy of friendship consists in society; so that it is with reason that friends are desirous of it. And in whatever each thinks that existence consists, or on whatever account they choose life, in this they wish to pass their time with their friends.† 4, Therefore, the friendship of bad men becomes depraved: for they partake of what is bad, being unstable; and they become depraved, by growing like each other; but the friendship of good men is good, being mutually increased by intercourse. 5. Besides, men are thought to become better by energizing, and by correcting one another: for they receive an impress from each other in whatever they are pleased with: whence it is said,—

You will learn what is good from the good.

Of friendship, therefore, let so much be said. The next thing is to treat of the subject of pleasure.

BOOK X.—OF HAPPINESS.

X., i., 1. After this, perhaps the next subject for discussion is pleasure; for it seems above everything else to be intimately connected with our nature. Hence, we educate the young, steering them, as it were, by pleasure and pain. 2. It seems also to be of the greatest consequence toward laying the foundation of the moral character, that men should take delight in what they ought, and hate what they ought; for these feelings continue throughout life, carrying with them great weight and influence on the side of virtue and a happy life; for men deliberately choose what is pleasant, and avoid what is painful.

3. It would seem, then, that we ought by no means to pass over such subjects as these; especially as they involve much difference

* [I omit section 1.] † [I omit section 3.]

of opinion. For some say that pleasure* is the chief good; others, on the contrary, that it is altogether bad; some of these last, perhaps, from a persuasion that it really is so; others, thinking that it is better in reference to human life, to declare pleasure to be among bad things, even if it be not so; because the mass of mankind have a propensity to it, and are slaves to their pleasures; and therefore that it is right to draw them away to the opposite; by which means they would arrive at the mean. But perhaps this is not well said; for arguments about matters of feeling and action are less convincing than facts.

4. When, therefore, arguments are at variance with what is evident to the senses, they are despised, and are the destruction of the truth also; for if he who [in moral teaching] censures pleasure is ever seen to be desiring it [any particular pleasure], he appears to have a leaning toward it [pleasure in general], as if all pleasure were of the same nature; for to draw nice distinctions [between lawful and unlawful pleasures] is not the character of the multitude.† True statements, therefore, seem not only to be the most useful for obtaining knowledge, but also for the regulation of life; for when they agree with facts, they are believed. Hence, men exhort those who understand them to LIVE according to them. Enough, then, of such matters: let us now enumerate the doctrines which have been held on the subject of pleasure.

X., ii., 1. Eudoxus‡ thought that pleasure was the chief good, because he saw all, both rational and irrational, seeking it; and in every case that which is an object of choice is good, and that which is most so is the greatest good; consequently, he considered that the fact of all having a bias toward the same object proved that object to be the best for all; because each finds what is good for

* "The opinion that pleasure is the chief good had been much advanced by the efforts of Democritus, the Sophists, Aristippus, and others, and was entertained by many of the contemporaries of Aristotle and Plato. The dialogues of the latter are full of objections to this popular theory: but in none are they refuted with more care and labor than in the *Philebus*."—*Brewer*. To this dialogue the ethical student is referred. † The slightest inconsistency of conduct is fatal to the authority and influence of a moral teacher. If he warns his hearers against pleasure, and is then seen to devote himself to the pursuit of pleasure, even of an innocent kind, his arguments are ineffectual, and his warnings are unheeded, because the mass of mankind are unable to draw nice distinctions, and to distinguish between lawful and unlawful pleasures. ‡ Eudoxus was a native of Cnidus, who flourished about Ol. c. iii. (B. C. 366). He was a disciple of the geometrician Archytas, and subsequently of Plato, by whom he was accompanied in his travels to Egypt. He was the author of a work on astronomy, which was translated into verse by Aratus. See *Matthiæ's History of Greek and Roman Lit.*, and *Clinton's Fasti*, p. 366, note (e).

himself, as he does food; he argued, therefore, that what is good to all, and what all aim at, was the chief good.

2. And his words were believed, more from the excellence of his moral character than for their own sake; for he had the reputation of being eminently temperate: it was therefore thought that he did not use this language as being a friend to pleasure, but that the case really was so. 3. But he considered this doctrine to be no less evident from considering the contrary of pleasure; for pain is in itself an object shunned by all, and its contrary is, in the same manner, an object chosen by all; and that is especially an object of choice, which we choose, not on account of anything else; but pleasure is confessedly of this nature; for no one asks for the sake of what he is pleased, as though he knew that pleasure was eligible on its own account; and pleasure, if added to any good whatsoever, makes it more eligible; for instance, if added to the act of justice or temperance; and good can only be increased by the addition of itself.

4. This argument certainly seems to prove it to be amongst goods, but not more so than anything else; for everything is more eligible when in conjunction with another good, than when left alone. 5. By a similar argument, indeed, Plato overthrows the idea of pleasure being the chief good; because a pleasant life is more eligible when joined with prudence than without; but if the union of the two is better, pleasure simply can not be the chief good; for you can add nothing to the chief good which will make it more eligible: and it is plain that nothing else can be the chief good, which becomes more eligible when joined to any of those things which are eligible on their own account.

What is there, then, of this nature in which we can participate? for such is the object of our inquiry.*

X., iii., 11.† In answer to those who bring forward reprehensible pleasures, one might say, that these are not pleasant; for we must not think that because they are pleasant to ill-disposed persons, they are also pleasant in themselves, except to these particular persons; in the same way as we must not think those things wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are so to the sick: nor those white, which appear so to those who suffer from ophthalmia. 12. Or should this be said, that pleasures are eligible, but not from these sources; just as wealth is eligible, but not to one who gets it by treason; or health, but not to one who gets it by eating all kinds of things? 13. Or may it be said that pleasures differ in kind? for those which proceed from honorable sources differ from those which proceed

*[I omit sections 6 and 7.] †[I omit sections 1-10.]

from disgraceful ones; and it is impossible to feel the pleasure of the just man without being just, or that of the musician, without being musical: and so on in other cases. 14. But the difference which exists between a friend and a flatterer seems to prove either that pleasure is not a good, or that pleasures are different in kind; for the former seems to associate with a view to the good, the latter with a view to pleasure; and the latter is reproached, but the former is praised; as associating with a different motive.

15. Again, no one would choose to live, having the intellect of a child all his life long, taking pleasure in those things which please children, even if that pleasure were the highest possible; nor to take delight in doing anything disgraceful, even if he was never to feel pain for so doing. Besides, we should be diligent about many things, even if they brought no pleasure; as about seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing virtue. 16. But whether pleasures are consequent upon these things of necessity or no, makes no difference; for we should choose them, even if pleasure did not result from them. 17. Consequently, that pleasure is not the chief good, nor every pleasure eligible, seems to be evident: and that some are eligible for their own sakes, differing either in kind, or in the source from whence they are derived. Let this, then, be sufficient as to the opinions which have been entertained upon the subject of pleasure and pain.

X., iv., 10.* But since every perception energizes with reference to its object, and that energizes perfectly which is well-disposed with reference to the best of all the objects which fall under it (for this more than anything else appears to be the nature of a perfect energy; and whether we say that the perception energizes, or that in which the perception resides, makes no difference: but in everything the energy is best of that which is well-disposed with reference to the best of all the objects which fall under it): this must be the most perfect and the most pleasant: for pleasure is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of intellect and contemplation; but the most perfect is the most pleasant, and the most perfect is the energy of that which is well-disposed with reference to the best of all the objects which fall under it. Pleasure, therefore, perfects the energy: but pleasure does not perfect it in the same manner that the object and the perceptive faculty do if they are good; just as health and the physician are not in the same manner causes of a person being healthy.† 12. But that there is

* [I omit sections 1-9.] † The physician is what the logicians call the efficient cause, whilst health is the formal cause, of our being healthy. In like manner, the object is the efficient cause, pleasure the formal cause.

a pleasure in every act of the perceptive faculty is evident: for we say that sights and sounds are pleasant: and it is also evident that this is most so, when the perceptive faculty is the best, and energizes upon the best object. When the object perceived, and the faculty which perceives it, are of this [best] nature, there will always be pleasure as long as there are an agent and a patient.

13. Again, pleasure makes the energy complete, not as the inherent habit would, but as some end added to it; it is just what the freshness of youth is to those in the prime of life.

As long, therefore, as the object of perception or intellect be SUCH AS IT OUGHT TO BE, as also the faculty which judges or contemplates, there will be pleasure in the energy: for when the patient and the agent are similar, and correspond to one another, the same effect is naturally produced. Why, then, is no one continually pleased? is it that he becomes fatigued? for no human faculties have the power of energizing continually. Pleasure, therefore, can not result, for it follows the energy.*

BOOK X., chapter v., § 9.† But since energies differ in goodness or badness, and some are to be chosen, some to be avoided, and others neither, the pleasures also are related in the same way; for there is a pleasure properly belonging to every energy. That, therefore, which is proper to the good energy is good, and that which is proper to the bad energy is bad; for the desires of honorable things are praiseworthy, the desires of disgraceful ones to be blamed.

10. But the pleasures, which are contained in the energies, more properly belong to them than the desires; for the latter are distinct [from the energies] both as to time and nature; but the former follow closely upon the energies, and are so inseparable from them, that it is questionable whether the energy is not the same as the pleasure. It appears, however, that pleasure is not an operation of intellect or of the senses; for that would be absurd; but because they are not separated, they appear to some to be identical.

11. As, therefore, the energies are different, so are the pleasures. Now sight differs from touch in purity, and hearing and smelling differ from taste; their pleasures, therefore, differ in the same way; and the pleasures of the intellect differ from these, and each differs from the other.

12. There seems to be a pleasure properly belonging to every animal, as there is to each its proper work; for it is that which is according to its energy. And if we examine each case separately by itself, this would seem to be the case; for the pleasures of a horse, of a dog, and of a man differ: as Hera-

* [I omit sections 14-16.] † [I omit sections 1-8.]

clitus says, that an ass would prefer litter to gold; for food is pleasanter than gold to asses. 13. The pleasures, therefore, of things which differ in kind are different also; but it is reasonable to expect that the pleasures of the same things should not differ. But they differ in no slight degree, at least in the case of men; for the same things give pain to some, and pleasure to others; and to some they are painful and objects of hate, to others pleasant and objects of love. The case is also the same in sweet things; for the same things are not thought sweet by a man in a fever, and a man in health; nor is the same thing thought warm by an invalid and by a man in a good state of body: the same also is the case with everything else. But in all such instances, that is thought to be the truth which appears so TO THE GOOD MAN.

14. If this is well said, as it appears to be, and if excellence, and the good man, so far forth as he is good, are the measure of everything: those must be pleasures which appear so to him, and those things pleasant in which he delights. But if what is disagreeable to him seems pleasant to any one, it is no wonder; for there are many things which deprave and injure men; but such things are not pleasant, except to those men [who do them], and to others who are so disposed. 15. With respect to those pleasures which are confessedly disgraceful, it is evident that we must not call them pleasures except to the depraved.*

X., vi., 1. Since we have spoken of the virtues, of the different kinds of friendships, and of pleasures, it remains that we should discuss the subject of happiness in outline, since we assumed this to be the end of human actions. Therefore, if we recapitulate what has been said before, the argument will be more concise.

2. We have said that it is not a habit; for if it were, it might exist in a man who slept throughout his life, living the life of a plant, and suffering the greatest misfortunes. 3. If, then, this does not please us, but if we must rather bring it under a kind of energy, as was said before; and if, of energies, some are necessary† and eligible for the sake of something else, others are eligible for their own sakes; it is plain that we must consider happiness as one of those which are eligible for their own sakes, and not one of those which are eligible for the sake of something else; for happiness is in want of nothing, but is self-sufficient. 4. Now those energies are eligible for their own sakes, from which nothing more is sought for beyond the energy. But of this kind, ACTIONS DONE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE seem to be: for the perform-

*[I omit the remainder of section 15 and the whole of section 16.] † Necessary does not here imply necessary *per se* (innere Nothwendigkeit), but means and instruments necessary to the accomplishment of some end.—*Michelet*.

ance of honorable and good acts is amongst things eligible for their own sakes.*

7. It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose, that as the things which appear honorable to children and men differ, so also those which appear so to the bad and the good will differ likewise, and therefore, as we have very often said, those things are honorable and pleasant which are so to the good man. But to every man that energy is most eligible which is according to his proper habit; and, therefore, to the good man, that is most eligible which is according to virtue.

8. Consequently happiness does not consist in amusement; for it is absurd that the end should be amusement; and that men should toil and suffer inconvenience all their life long for the sake of amusement; for we choose everything, as we might say, for the sake of something else, except happiness; for that is an end. 9. But to be serious and to labor for the sake of amusement appears foolish and very childish. But to amuse ourselves in order that we may be serious, as Anacharsis said, seems to be right: for amusement resembles relaxation. Relaxation, therefore, is not the end, for we have recourse to it for the sake of [renewing] the energy. But the happy life seems to be according to virtue; and this is serious, and does not consist in amusement.†

X., vii., 11.‡ If, then, the intellect be divine when compared with man, the life also, which is in obedience to that, will be divine when compared with human life. 12. But a man ought not to entertain human thoughts, as some would advise, because he is human, nor mortal thoughts, because he is mortal: but as far as it is possible he should make himself immortal, and do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best principle in him; although it be small in size, yet in power and value it is far more excellent than all.||

X., viii., 14.** We must not, however, imagine that the person who is to be happy will want many and great goods, because we say that without external good he can be blessed; for self-sufficiency does not consist in excess, nor does ACTION. 15. But it is possible to perform honorable things without being lord of earth and sea; for a man may be able to ACT ACCORDING TO VIRTUE with moderate means. We may see this plainly: for private individuals are thought to perform good acts no less than men in power, but

*[I omit the remainder of section 4 and the whole of sections 5 and 6.]
 †[I omit sections 10 and 11.] ‡[I omit sections 1-10.] ||[I omit sections 13 and 14.] **[I omit sections 1-13, and the first part of section 14.]

even more so. And it is sufficient to have a competence, for the life of that man will be happy, who energizes according to virtue.*

18. The opinions of wise men, therefore, seem to agree with what has been said; such statements, therefore, carry with them some weight. But we judge of truth, in practical matters, from facts and from life, for on them the decisive point turns; and we ought to try all that has been said by applying it to facts and to life; and if our arguments agree with facts, we may receive them; but if they are at variance, we must consider them as mere words.†

X., ix, 1. If, then, we have spoken at sufficient length of these matters, and of the virtues, and also of friendship and pleasure, must we think that our original plan is completed? or is the end in practical matters, according to the common saying, NOT THE CONTEMPLATING AND KNOWING ALL THINGS, BUT RATHER THE PRACTICING THEM? If so, *it is not sufficient to KNOW the theory of virtue*, but we must endeavor to possess AND EMPLOY it; or pursue whatever other means there may be of becoming good. 2. Now, if mere treatises were sufficient of themselves to make men good, justly "would they have received many and great rewards," as Theognis says, and it would be our duty to provide ourselves with them. 3. But the truth is, that they seem to have power to urge on and to excite young men of liberal minds, and to make a character that is generous and truly fond of the honorable [righteousness], easily influenced by virtue; but that they have no power to persuade the multitude to what is virtuous and honorable. 4. For it is not the nature of the masses to obey a sense of shame, but fear: nor to abstain from vicious things because it is disgraceful, but for fear of punishments; for they live according to the dictates of passion, and pursue their own peculiar pleasures, and the means of gratifying them; they fly also from the contrary pains; but of what is honorable and truly pleasant, they have no idea, inasmuch as they never had a taste for them. 5. What reasoning, then, can effect a change in such men as these? for it is not possible, or at least not easy, to alter what has been for a long time impressed upon the moral character; but it is perhaps a great thing, if, when everything is present by which we are thought to become good, we can partake of virtue.

6. But it is thought that men become good, some by nature,‡ others by PRACTICE, others by teaching. Now it is plain that whatever belongs to nature is not in our own power, but exists by some

*[I omit sections 16 and 17.] †[I omit section 19.] ‡[Cf. Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, ch. xxi. (§871, page 116 above); and Zoroaster, Khordah-Avesta, xiii. (§881, page 183 above).]

divine causes in those who are truly fortunate. But reasoning and teaching, it is to be feared, will not avail in every case, but the mind of the hearer must be previously cultivated by habits to feel pleasure and aversion properly, just as the soil must, which nourishes the seed. For he who lives in obedience to passion, would not listen to reasoning which turns him from it; nay, more, he would not understand it. And how is it possible to change the convictions of such a man as this? 7. On the whole, it appears that passion does not submit to reasoning, but to force. There must, therefore, previously exist a character in some way connected with virtue, loving what is honorable, and hating what is disgraceful. 8. But to meet with right education in the path of virtue from childhood is difficult, unless one is brought up under such laws: for to live temperately and patiently is not pleasant to the majority, and especially to the young. Therefore, education and institutions ought to be regulated by law; for they will not be painful when they have become familiar.

9. Perhaps it is not sufficient that we should meet with good education and attention when young; but since when we arrive at manhood we ought also to study AND PRACTICE what we have learnt, we should require laws also for this purpose: in short, we should want laws relating to the whole of life; for the masses are obedient to compulsion rather than to reason, and to punishments rather than to the principle of honor [of *RIGHTEOUSNESS*]. 10. Therefore, some think that legislators ought to exhort to virtue, and to urge men on by appealing to the principle of honor [the moral Law], since those who are good in their practice will obey when they are led; but to impose chastisements and punishments on those who are disobedient and naturally indisposed to virtue, and to banish altogether the incurable; because he who is good, and lives with regard to the principle of honor, will obey reason; but the bad man desires pleasure, and is corrected by pain, like a beast of burden.*

12. Now, then, as has been said, he that is to be a good man must have been educated well, and have been made to form good habits, and thus continue to live under good institutions, and never practice what is bad, either involuntarily or voluntarily; and this is to be done by living in obedience to some intelligent principle, and some right regulation, which has the power of enforcing its decrees. But the paternal authority has no strength, nor compulsory force; nor, in short, the authority of any one man, unless he is a king, or some one of that sort; but the law does possess a

*[I omit section 11.]

compulsory power, since it is reason proceeding from a certain prudence and intelligence; and besides, men hate those individuals who oppose their appetites, even if they do it rightly; but the law is not odious when it prescribes what is good.* 14. It would therefore be best that the state should pay attention to education, and on right principles, and that it should have power to enforce it: but if neglected as a public measure, it would seem to be the duty of every individual to contribute to the virtue of his children and friends, or at least to make this his deliberate purpose.† 16. For in the same way that legal enactments and customs have authority in states, so also the words of a father, and customs, have authority in private families; and still greater authority on account of the relationship, and the benefits conferred: for children have a natural affection for their parents, and are naturally disposed to obey.‡

§ 1041.—Epicureans and Stoics. (page 37, line 12.) Cf. §§ 2132, 730, 623, 624, 729, 734, 3054, 3052, 3012–3014.

§ 1042.—Academics and Skeptics. (page 38, line 3.)

§ 1043.—Cicero and the Roman Stoics. (p. 39, l. 10.) Cf. § 1074, and the following extracts from *CICERO DE OFFICIIS*:||

BOOK I., chapter i., § 1. MY SON MARCUS, although, as you have for a year been studying under Cratippus, and that, too, at Athens, you ought to be well furnished with the rules and principles of philosophy, on account of the pre-eminent reputation both of the master and the city, the one of which can improve you by his learning, the other by its examples; yet as I, for my own advantage, have always combined the Latin with the Greek, not only in philosophy but even in the practice of speaking, I recommend to you the same method, that you may excel equally in both kinds of composition. 2. In this respect, indeed, if I mistake not, I was of great service to our countrymen; so that not only such of them as are ignorant of Greek learning, but even men of letters, think they have profited somewhat by me both in speaking and reasoning.

3. Wherefore you shall study, nay, study as long as you desire, under the best philosopher of this age—and you ought to desire it,

*[I omit section 13.] †[I omit section 15.] ‡[I omit sections 17–31.]
 ||“Cicero’s Three Books of Offices, or Moral Duties; also his Cato Major, an essay on Old Age; Lælius, an essay on Friendship; Paradoxes; Scipio’s Dream; and Letter to Quintus on the Duties of a Magistrate. Literally translated, with notes, designed to exhibit a comparative view of the opinions of Cicero, and those of modern moralists and ethical philosophers. By Cyrus R. Edmonds,” (Harper & Brothers, 1871.) [I have retained a few of Mr. Edmonds’ notes, but only two of those which contain ethical opinions of modern writers.] [I have inserted in the text the section numbers which I found on the margin of Anthon’s *Cicero de Officiis* (Harper, 1872).]

as long as you are not dissatisfied with the degree of your improvement; but in reading my works, which are not very different from the Peripatetic—because we profess in common to be followers both of Socrates and Plato—as to the subject-matter itself, use your own judgment; but be assured you will, by reading my writings, render your Latin style more copious. I would not have it supposed that this is said in ostentation; 4. for, while I yield the superiority in philosophy to many, if I claim to myself the province peculiar to an orator—that of speaking with propriety, perspicuity, and elegance—I seem, since I have spent my life in that pursuit, to lay claim to it with a certain degree of right.

5. Wherefore, my dear Cicero, I most earnestly recommend that you carefully peruse not only my Orations, but even my philosophical works, which have now nearly equaled them in extent; for there is in the former the greater force of language, but you ought to cultivate, at the same time, the equable and sober style of the latter. 6. And, indeed, I find, that it has not happened in the case of any of the Greeks, that the same man has labored in both departments, and pursued both the former—that of forensic speaking—and the latter quiet mode of argumentation.; unless, perhaps, Demetrius Phalereus may be reckoned in that number—a refined reasoner, a not very animated speaker, yet of so much sweetness, that you might recognize the pupil of Theophrastus. 7. How far I have succeeded in both, others must determine; certain it is that I have attempted both. 8. Indeed, I am of opinion that Plato, had he attempted forensic oratory, would have spoken with copiousness and power; and that had Demosthenes retained and repeated the lessons of Plato, he would have delivered them with gracefulness and beauty. I form the same judgment of Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom was so pleased with his own pursuit that he neglected that of the other.

I., ii., 1. But having resolved at this time to write to you somewhat, and a great deal in time to come, I have thought proper to set out with that subject which is best adapted to your years and to my authority. 2. For, while many subjects in philosophy, of great weight and utility, have been accurately and copiously discussed by philosophers, the most extensive seems to be what they have delivered and enjoined concerning the duties of mankind; 3. for there can be no state of life, amid public or private affairs, abroad or at home—whether you transact any thing with yourself or contract any thing with another—that is without its obligations. In the due discharge of that consists all the dignity, and in its neglect all the disgrace, of life.

4. This is an inquiry common to all philosophers ; for where is the man who will presume to style himself a philosopher, and lay down no rules of duty? 5. But there are certain schools which pervert all duty by the ultimate objects of good and evil which they propose. 6. For if a man should lay down as the chief good that which has no connection with virtue, and measure it by his own interests, and not according to its moral merit ; if such a man shall act consistently with his own principles, and is not sometimes influenced by the goodness of his heart, he can cultivate neither friendship, justice, nor generosity. In truth, it is impossible for the man to be brave who shall pronounce pain to be the greatest evil, or temperate who shall propose pleasure as the highest good.

7. Though these truths are so self-evident that they require no philosophical discussion, yet they have been treated by me elsewhere.* 8. I say, therefore, that if these schools are self-consistent, they can say nothing of the moral duties. Neither can any firm, permanent, or natural rules of duty be laid down, but by those who esteem virtue to be solely, or by those who deem it to be chiefly, desirable for its own sake. 9. The teaching of duties, therefore, is the peculiar study of the Stoics, of the Academics, and the Peripatetics ; because the sentiments of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Herillus, have been long exploded. Yet even those professors would have been entitled to have treated upon the duties of men, had they left us any distinction of things, so that there might have been a path open to the discovery of duty. 10. We shall, therefore, upon this occasion, and in this inquiry, chiefly follow the Stoics, not as their expositors, but by drawing, as usual, from their sources, at our own option and judgment, so much and in such manner as we please.

11. I therefore think proper, as my entire argument is on moral obligation, to define what a duty is, a definition which I am surprised has been omitted by Panætius ; 12. because every investigation which is rationally undertaken, concerning any subject, ought to set out with a definition, that it may be understood what is the subject of discussion.

I., iii, 1. All questions concerning duty are of two sorts. The first [theoretical] relates to the final good ; the second [practical] consists of those rules which are to regulate the practice of life in all its relations. 2. Examples of the former are as follows :—Whether all duties are perfect in themselves? Whether one duty

*[Anthon (Cicero de Officiis, Harper, page 145) refers to "the treatise *De Finibus* (ii., 8, 23) and the fourth and fifth books of the *Tusculan Disputations*."]

is of more importance than another? together with other questions of the same nature. 3. Now the rules for moral duties relate, indeed, to the final good; but it is not so perceptible that they do, because they seem chiefly to refer to the regulation of ordinary life, and of them we are to treat in this book.*

6. In the opinion, therefore, of Panætius, there is a threefold consideration for determining our resolution; for men doubt whether the thing which falls under their consideration be of itself virtuous or disgraceful, and in this deliberation minds are often distracted into opposite sentiments. 7. They then examine and deliberate whether or not the subject of their consideration conduces to the convenience or enjoyment of life, to the improvement of their estate and wealth, to their interest and power, by which they may profit themselves or their relations; all which deliberation falls under the category of utility. 8. The third kind of doubtful deliberation is, when an apparent utility seems to clash with moral rectitude; for when utility hurries us to itself, and virtue, on the other hand, seems to call us back, it happens that the mind is distracted in the choice, and these occasion a double anxiety in deliberation. 9. In this division (although an omission is of the worst consequence in divisions of this kind), two things are omitted; for we are accustomed to deliberate not only whether a thing be virtuous or shameful in itself, but, of two things that are virtuous, which is the more excellent? And, in like manner, of two things which are profitable, which is the more profitable? 10. Thus, it is found that the deliberation, which he considered to be threefold, ought to be distributed into five divisions. We must, therefore, first treat of what is virtuous in itself, and that under two heads; in like manner, of what is profitable; and we shall next treat of them comparatively.

I, iv., 1. In the first place, a disposition has been planted by nature in every species of living creatures to cherish themselves, their life, and body; to avoid those things that appear hurtful to them; and to look out for and procure whatever is necessary for their living, such as food, shelter, and the like.† 3. But the greatest distinction between a man and a brute lies in this, that the latter is impelled only by instinct, and applies itself solely to that object which is present and before it, with very little sensibility to what is past or to come; but man, because, endowed with reason, by which he discerns consequences, looks into the causes of things and their progress, and being acquainted, as it were, with precedents, he compares their analogies, and adapts and connects the

* [I omit sections 4 and 5.] † [I omit section 2.]

present with what is to come. It is easy for him to foresee the future direction of all his life, and therefore he prepares what is necessary for passing through it.

4. Nature, likewise, by the same force of reason, conciliates man to man, in order to a community both of language and of life: above all, it implants in them a strong love for their offspring; it impels them to desire that companies and societies should be formed, and that they should mingle in them; and that for those reasons, man should take care to provide for the supply of clothing and of food; and that not only for himself, but for his wife, his children, and for all whom he ought to hold dear and to protect. This is an affection which arouses the spirit and makes it more strenuous for action.

5. The distinguishing property of man is to search for and to follow after truth. Therefore, when relaxed from our necessary cares and concerns, we then covet to see, to hear, and to learn somewhat; and we esteem knowledge of things either obscure or wonderful to be the indispensable means of living happily. From this we understand that truth, simplicity, and candor, are most agreeable to the nature of mankind. 6. To this passion for discovering truth, is added a desire to direct; for a mind, well formed by nature, is unwilling to obey any man but him who lays down rules and instructions to it, or who, for the general advantage, exercises equitable and lawful government. From this proceeds loftiness of mind, and contempt for worldly interests.

7. Neither is it a mean privilege of nature and reason, that man is the only animal who is sensible of order, of decency, and of propriety, both in acting and speaking. In like manner, no other creature perceives the beauty, the gracefulness, and the harmony of parts, in those objects which are discerned by the sight.

8. An analogous perception to which [harmony] nature and reason convey from the sight to the mind; and [nature and reason] consider that beauty, regularity, and order in counsels and actions should be still more preserved. She [nature] is cautious not to do aught that is indecent or effeminate, or to act or think wantonly in any of our deliberations or deeds. 9. The effect and result of all this produces that *honestum* [RIGHTEOUSNESS] which we are now in search of; that virtue which is honorable even without being ennobled; and of which we may truly say, that even were it praised by none it would be commendable in itself.

BOOK I, chapter v., § 1. My Son Marcus, you here perceive at least a sketch, and, as it were, the outline of virtue; which, could we perceive her with our eyes, would, as Plato says,

kindle a wonderful love of wisdom [§ 853 (page 66 above)]. 2. But whatever is virtuous arises from some one of those four* divisions: for it consists either in sagacity and the perception of truth; or in the preservation of human society, by giving to every man his due, and by observing the faith of contracts; or in the greatness and firmness of an elevated and unsubdued mind; or in observing order and regularity in all our words and in all our actions, in which consists moderation and temperance.

3. Though these four divisions are connected and interwoven with one another, yet certain kinds of duties arise from each of them. As, for instance, in that part which I first described, and under which I comprehended sagacity or wisdom, consists the search after and discovery of truth; and this is the characteristic function of that virtue: 4. for the man who is most sagacious in discovering the real truth in any subject, and who can, with the greatest perspicacity and quickness, both see and explain the grounds of it, is justly esteemed a man of the greatest understanding and discernment. 5. From hence it follows that truth is, as it were, the subject-matter which this faculty handles, and on which it employs itself. As to the other three virtues, they necessarily consist in acquiring and preserving those things with which the conduct of life is connected, in order to preserve the community and relations of mankind, and to display that excellence and greatness of soul which exhibits itself as well in acquiring resources and advantages both for ourselves and for our friends, as, still more conspicuously, in properly disregarding them. 6. As to order, resolution, moderation, and the like, they come into that rank of virtues which require not only an operation of the mind, but a certain degree of personal activity; for it is in observing order and moderation in those things which constitute the objects of active life, that we shall preserve virtue and decency.

I., vi., 1. Now, of the four divisions under which I have ranged the nature and essence of virtue, that which consists in the knowledge of truth principally affects the nature of man. 2. For all of us are impelled and carried along to the love of knowledge and learning, in which we account it glorious to excel, but consider every slip, mistake, ignorance, and deception in it, to be hurtful and shameful. 3. In this pursuit, which is both natural and virtuous, *two faults are to be avoided. The first is, the regarding things which we do not know as if they were understood by us, and thence rashly giving them our assent.* And he that wishes, as every man ought to wish, to avoid this error, must devote both his time and his industry to the study of things.

* [1 Wisdom, 2 honesty, 3 magnanimity, 4 temperance. See I., xliii., 3.]

4. The other fault is, that some people bestow too much study and pains upon things that are obscure, difficult, and even immaterial in themselves. 5. When those faults are avoided, all the pains and care a man bestows upon studies that are virtuous in themselves, and worthy of his knowledge, will be deservedly commended. Thus we have heard how Caius Sulpicius* excelled in astronomy, and Sextus Pompeius, to my own knowledge, in mathematics; many also in logic, and more in the civil law, 6. all which are arts that serve to investigate truth, in the pursuit of which our duty forbids us to be diverted from transacting our business, because *the whole glory of virtue consists in activity*. Yet this is often intermitted, and frequent are our returns to our studies. Then there is an incessant working of the mind, which, without our taking pains, is sufficient to keep us in the practice of thinking.† 7. Now, *all our thoughts, and every motion of the mind, should be devoted either to the forming of plans for virtuous actions, and such as belong to a good and happy life, or else to the pursuits of science and knowledge*. I have now treated of at least the first source of duty.

I., vii., 1. Now, as to the other three, the most extensive system is that by which the mutual society of mankind, and, as it were, the intercourse of life, is preserved. Of this there are two parts: justice, in which virtue displays itself with the most distinguished luster, and from which men are termed good; and allied to this, beneficence, which may likewise be termed benevolence, or liberality.‡

3. Now, by nature no property is private, but dependent either on ancient possession (as when men formerly came into unoccupied territories); or victory (as when they have taken possession of it in war); or public constitution, contract, terms, or lot. By those, the land of Arpinum is regarded as belonging to the Arpinates; the Tusculan; to the Tusculans. The like division holds with regard to matters of private property. 4. Thus, as every man holds his own, each should possess that portion which fell to his share of those things that by nature were common; and it follows, that no man can covet another's property without violating the laws of human society.

* "We have! in the Roman history, a remarkable story of this nobleman, by which we may see the excellent effects of learning in a man of consideration, who knows how to time it well. For we are told, that while he served against the Macedonians, under Julius Æmilius, he foretold to the Roman soldiers an eclipse, and explained its causes, and thereby prevented the consternation they otherwise would have fallen into, and which seizing the enemies, they were easily routed by the Romans."—*Guthrie*. † [Cf. Confucius, *Analects*, XV., xxx. (page 134 above) and II., xv. (page 122 above).] ‡ [I omit section 2.]

5. But (as has been strikingly said by Plato) we are not born for ourselves alone, and our country claims her share, and our friends their share of us; and, as the Stoics hold, all that the earth produces is created for the use of man, so men are created for the sake of men, that they may mutually do good to one another; in this we ought to take nature for our guide, to throw into the public stock the offices of general utility by a reciprocation of duties; sometimes by receiving, sometimes by giving, and sometimes to cement human society by arts, by industry, and by our resources.

6. Now the foundation of justice is faithfulness, which is a perseverance and truth in all our declarations and in all our promises. Let us therefore (though some people may think it over nice) imitate the Stoics, who curiously examine whence terms are derived, and consider that the word *fides*, or faithfulness, is no other than a performance of what we have promised (*quia FIAT quod dictum est, appellatam FIDEM*). 7. But there are two kinds of injustice; the first is of those who offer an injury, the second of those who have it in their power to avert an injury from those to whom it is offered, and yet do it not. 8. For if a man, prompted either by anger or any sudden perturbation, unjustly assaults another man, such a one seems as it were to lay violent hands on one's ally; and the man who does not repel or withstand the injury, if he can, is as much to blame as if he deserted the cause of his parents, his friends, or his country.

9. Those wrongs, however, which are inflicted for the very purpose of doing an injury, often proceed from fear; as for instance, when a man who is contriving to injure another is afraid, unless he executes what he is meditating, that he may himself sustain some disadvantage; 10. but the great incentive to doing wrong is to obtain what one desires, and in this crime avarice is the most pervading motive.

I., viii., 1. Now riches are sought after, both for the necessary purposes of life and for the enjoyment of pleasure. 2. But in men of greater minds the coveting of money is with a view to power and to the means of giving gratification. As M. Crassus lately used to declare, that no man who wanted to have a direction in the government had money enough, unless by the interest of it he could maintain an army. 3. Magnificent equipages, likewise, and a style of living made up of elegance and abundance give delight, and hence the desire for money becomes boundless. 4. Nor indeed is the mere desire to improve one's private fortune, without injury to another, deserving of blame; but injustice must ever be avoided.

5. But the main cause why most men are led to a forgetfulness of justice is their falling into a violent ambition after empire, honors, and glory. 6.* For where the object of ambition is of such a nature as that several can not obtain pre-eminence, the contest for it is generally so violent that nothing can be more difficult than to preserve the sacred ties of society. 7. This was shown lately in the presumption of C. Cæsar, who, in order to obtain that direction in the government which the wildness of his imagination had planned out, violated all laws, divine and human. 8. But what is deplorable in this matter is, that the desire after honor, empire, power, and glory, is generally most prevalent in the greatest soul and the most exalted genius; for which reason every crime of that sort is the more carefully to be guarded against. 9. But in every species of injustice it is a very material question, whether it is committed through some agitation of passion, which commonly is short-lived and temporary, or from deliberate, premeditated, malice; 10. for those things which proceed from a short, sudden fit, are of slighter moment than those which are inflicted by forethought and preparation. But enough has been said concerning inflicting injury.

I., ix., 1. Various are the causes of men omitting the defense of others, or neglecting their duty toward them. They are either unwilling to encounter enmity, toil, or expense; or, perhaps, they do it through negligence, listlessness, or laziness; or they are so embarrassed in certain studies and pursuits, that they suffer those they ought to protect to be neglected. 2. Hence we must take care lest Plato's observation with respect to philosophers should be falsified: "That they are men of integrity, because they are solely engaged in the pursuit of truth, and despise and neglect those considerations which others value, and which mankind are wont to contend for among themselves." 3. For, while they abstain from hurting any by the infliction of injury, they indeed assert one species of honesty or justice, but they fail in another; because, being entangled in the pursuits of learning, they abandon those they ought to protect. 4. Some, therefore, think that they would have no concern with the government unless they were forced to it; but still, it would be more just that it should be done voluntarily; for an action which is intrinsically right is only morally good in so far as it is voluntary. 5. There are others who, either from a desire to improve their private fortune, or from some personal resentments, pretend that they mind their own affairs only that they may appear not to do wrong to another. Now such persons are

*[I omit the first part of section 6.]

free from one kind of injustice, but fall into another; because they abandon the fellowship of life by employing in it none of their zeal, none of their labor, none of their abilities.*

7. For, to concern ourselves in other people's affairs is a delicate matter. Yet Chremes, a character in Terence, thinks, that there is nothing which has a relation to mankind in which he has not a concern.† Meanwhile, because we have the quicker perception and sensation of whatever happens favorably or untowardly to ourselves than to others, which we see as it were at a greater distance, the judgment we form of them is very different from what we form of ourselves. 8. Those therefore are wise monitors who teach us to do nothing of which we are doubtful whether it is honest or unjust; for whatever is honest manifests itself by its own luster, but doubt implies the entertainment of injustice.‡

I., xi., 1. Certain duties are also to be observed, even toward those who have wronged you; for there is a mean even in revenge and punishments. Nay, I am not certain whether it is not sufficient for the person who has injured you to repent of the wrong done, so that he may never be guilty of the like in future, and that others may not be so forward to offend in the same manner. 2. Now, in government the laws of war are to be most especially observed; for since there are two manners of disputing, one by debating, the other by fighting, (though the former characterizes men, the latter, brutes), if the former can not be adopted, recourse must be had to the latter. 3. Wars, therefore, are to be undertaken for this end, that we may live in peace without being injured; but when we obtain the victory, we must preserve those enemies who behaved without cruelty or inhumanity during the war.|| 6. In my opinion, we ought always to consult for peace, which should have in it nothing of perfidy. Had my voice been followed on this head, we might still have had some form of government (if not the best), whereas now we have none. 7. And, while we are bound to exercise consideration toward those whom we have conquered by force, so those should be received into our protection who throw themselves upon the honor of our general, and lay

* [I omit section 6.] † Heautontimorumenos, Act I., Scene 1: Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto. Augustin, who was made bishop of Hippo, A. D. 395, mentions the universal applause with which this admirable sentiment was received in the theater. He himself has left us an expression of the same idea in the following words: "Omnis homo est omni homini proximus, nec ulla cogitanda est longinquitas generis ubi est natura communis." "Every man is most closely connected with his every fellow man, nor should any distance of relationship enter into consideration where there is a common nature." ‡ [I omit chapter x.] || [I omit sections 4 and 5.]

down their arms, even though the battering rams should have struck their walls. 8. In which matter justice was cultivated with so much care among our countrymen, that it was a custom among our ancestors that they who received under their protection cities, or nations conquered in war, became their patrons.*

I., xiii., 1. Nay, if even private persons should, induced by circumstances, make a promise to the enemy, even in this fidelity should be observed. 2. Thus Regulus, when he was made a prisoner by the Carthaginians in the first Punic war, being sent to Rome to treat of an exchange of prisoners, he swore that he would return. The first thing he did when he came to Rome was to deliver his opinion in the senate that the prisoners should not be restored; and after that, when he was detained by his relations and friends, he chose to deliver himself up to a cruel death rather than to falsify his word to the enemy.†

9. Enough has now been said respecting the duties connected with warfare; but we must bear in mind, that justice is due even to the lowest of mankind; and nothing can be lower than the condition and fortune of a slave. And yet those prescribe wisely who enjoin us to put them upon the same footing as hired laborers, obliging them to do their work, **BUT GIVING THEM THEIR DUES.** 10. Now, as injustice may be done two ways, by force or fraud; fraud being the property of a fox, force that of a lion; both are utterly repugnant to society, but fraud is the more detestable. 11. But in the whole system of villainy, none is more capital than that of the men, who, when they most deceive, so manage as that they may seem to be virtuous men. Thus much, then, on the subject of justice.

I., xiv., 1. Let me now, as I proposed, speak of beneficence and liberality, virtues that are the most agreeable to the nature of man, but which involve many precautionary considerations. 2. For, in the first place, we are to take care lest our kindness should hurt both those whom it is meant to assist, and others. In the next place, it ought not to exceed our abilities; and it ought to be rendered to each in proportion to his worth. This is the fundamental standard of justice to which all these things should be referred. 3. For they who do kindnesses which prove of disservice to the person they pretend to oblige, should not be esteemed beneficent nor generous, but injurious sycophants. And they who injure one party in order to be liberal to another, are guilty of the same dishonesty as if they should appropriate to themselves what belongs to another.

* [I omit section 9-12, and also the whole of chapter xii.] † [I omit sections 3-8.]

4. Now many, and they especially who are the most ambitious after grandeur and glory, rob one party to enrich another; and account themselves generous to their friends if they enrich them by whatever means. This is so far from being consistent with, that nothing can be more contrary to, our duty. 5. We should therefore take care to practice that kind of generosity that is serviceable to our friends, but hurtful to none. 6. Upon this principle, when Lucius Sylla and Caius Cæsar took property from its just owners and transferred it to strangers,* in so doing they ought not to be accounted generous; for nothing can be generous that is not at the same time just.

7. Our next part of circumspection is, that our generosity never should exceed our abilities. For they who are more generous than their circumstances admit of are, first, guilty in this, that they wrong their relations; because they bestow upon strangers those means which they might, with greater justice, give or leave to those who are nearest to them. 8. Now a generosity of this kind is generally attended with a lust to ravish and to plunder, in order to be furnished with the means to give away. 9. For it is easy to observe, that most of them are not so much by nature generous, as they are misled by a kind of pride to do a great many things in order that they may seem to be generous; which things seem to spring not so much from good will as from ostentation. Now such a simulation is more nearly allied to duplicity than to generosity or virtue.

10. The third head proposed was, that in our generosity we should have regard to merit; and, consequently, examine both the morals of the party to whom we are generous, and his disposition toward us, together with the general good of society, and how far he may have already contributed to our own interest. 11. Could all those considerations be united, it were the more desirable; but the object in whom is united the most numerous and the most important of them, ought to have the greatest weight with us.

I., xv., 1. But as we live not with men who are absolutely perfect and completely wise, but with men who have great merit if they possess the outlines of worth, we are. I think, from thence to infer, that no man is to be neglected in whom there appears any indication of virtue; and that each should be regarded in proportion as he is adorned with the milder virtues of modesty, temperance, and that very justice of which I have so largely treated.†

*[Anthon (Harper, pages 167, 168) says "the allusion is to Sulla's enriching his followers by the proscription of his political opponents, and Cæsar's reckless plundering of provinces to reward his friends and followers."] †[I omit section 2.]

3. With regard to the kindness which a person expresses for us, our first duty is, to perform the most for him by whom we are most beloved. Now we are to judge of kindness, not like children, by a sort of ardor of affection, but by its stability and constancy. 4. But if its merits are such that we are not to court but to requite the kindness, the greater ought our care to be; for there is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness. 5. Now if, as Hesiod enjoins, we ought, if it is in our power, to repay what we have received for mere use with interest, how ought we to act when called upon by kindness? Are we not to imitate those fertile fields which yield far more than they have received? 6. For, if we readily oblige those who we* hope will serve us, how ought we to behave toward those who have served us already? For as generosity is of two kinds, the one conferring a favor, the other repaying it, whether we confer it or not is at our own option, but the not repaying it is not allowable in a good man, provided he can do so without injury to any. 8. Now there are distinctions to be made as to the benefits received; and it is clear that the greatest return is due in each case to the greatest obligation. Meanwhile, we are above all things to consider the spirit, the zeal, and the meaning with which a favor is conferred. 9. For many confer numerous favors with a sort of recklessness, without any judgment or principle, upon all mankind promiscuously, or influenced by sudden perturbation of mind, as if by a hurricane: such favors are not to be esteemed so highly as those which result from judgment, consideration, and consistency. 10. But in conferring or requiting kindness, the chief rule of our duty ought to be, if all other circumstances are equal, to confer most upon the man who stands in greatest need of assistance. The reverse of this is practiced by the generality, 11. who direct their greatest services to the man from whom they hope the most, though he may stand in no need of them.

I., xvi., 1. Now society and alliances among men would be best preserved if the greatest kindness should be manifested where there is the nearest relation. 2. But we ought to go higher, if we are to investigate the natural principles of intercourse and community among men. 3. The first is, that which is perceived in the society of the whole human race, and of this the bond is speech and reason, which by teaching, learning, communicating, debating, and judging, conciliate men together, and bind them into a kind of natural society. 4. There is nothing in which we differ more from the nature of brutes than in this; for we very often allow

* [The change which I have made is merely verbal, not material.]

them to have courage, as for instance, horses and lions; but we never admit that they possess justice, equity, and goodness; 5. because they are void of reason and speech. Now this is the kind of society that is most extensive with mankind among themselves, and it goes through all;* for here a community of all things that nature has produced for the common use of mankind is preserved, so† that they may be possessed in the manner prescribed by laws and civil statutes: of‡ which laws themselves some are to be observed in accordance with the Greek proverb, "that all things among friends are to be in common." 6. Now this community consists of things which are of that nature which, though placed by Ennius [B. C. 239-169] under one head, may be applied to many. "He (says that author) who kindly shows the bewildered traveler the right road, does as it were light his lamp by his own; which affords none the less light to himself after it has lighted the other."

7. By this single example he sufficiently enjoins on us to perform, even to a stranger, all the service we can do without detriment to ourselves. 8. Of which service the following are common illustrations: "That we are to debar no man from the running stream;" "That we are to suffer any who desire it to kindle fire at our fire;" "That we are to give faithful counsel to a person who is in doubt:" all which are particulars that are serviceable to the receiver without being detrimental to the bestower. We are therefore to practice them, and be constantly contributing somewhat to the common good.||

I., xvii., 1. Now the degrees of human society are many. For, to quit the foregoing unbounded kind, there is one more confined, which consists of men of the same race, nation, and language, by which people are more intimately connected among themselves.** 7. But among all the degrees of society, none is more excellent, none more stable, than when worthy men, through a similarity of manners, are intimately connected together; for, as I have often said, even when we discern the HONESTUM [righteousness] in another it touches us, and makes us friends to the man in whom it resides.

*[Hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes.] †["But so as, whatever things have been marked out as property by the laws and civil statutes, these be possessed in such a way as it has been settled (by those laws)."]—*Anthon's Cicero de Officiis* (Harper, 1872, page 170).] ‡["And in virtue of these same laws, let other matters be regarded in such a way as is expressed in the proverb of the Greeks."]—*Anthon* (at the place cited).] ||[I omit section 9.] **[I omit sections 2-6.]

8. Now, though virtue of every kind attracts and charms us to the love of those who possess it, yet that love is strongest that is effected by justice and generosity. 9. For nothing is more lovely, nothing is more binding, than a similarity of good dispositions; because among those whose pursuits and pleasures are the same, every man is pleased as much with another as he is with himself; and that is effected which Pythagoras chiefly contemplates in friendship, "that many become one." 10. A strong community is likewise effected by good offices mutually conferred and received; and, provided these be reciprocal and agreeable, those among whom they happen are bound together in close association.

11. But when you view everything with reason and reflection, of all connections none is more weighty, none is more dear, than that between every individual and his country. 12. Our parents are dear to us; our children, our kinsmen, our friends, are dear to us; but our country comprehends alone all the endearments of us all. For her what good man would hesitate to die if he could do her service? 13. The more execrably unnatural, therefore, are they who wound their country by every species of guilt, and who are now, and have been, employed in her utter destruction. 14. But were a computation or comparison set up, of those objects to which our chief duty should be paid, the principal are our country and our parents, by whose services we are laid under the strongest obligations; the next are our children and entire family, who depend upon us alone, without having any other refuge; the next our agreeable kinsmen, who generally share our fortune in common. 15. The necessary supports of life, therefore, are due chiefly to those I have already mentioned; but the mutual intercourses of life, counsels, discourses, exhortations, consultations, and even sometimes reproofs, flourish chiefly in friendships, and those friendships are the most agreeable that are cemented by a similarity of manners.*

I, xix., 1. But that magnanimity which is discovered in toils and dangers, if it be devoid of justice, and contend not for the public good, but for selfish interest, is blamable; for, so far from being a mark of virtue, it is rather that of a barbarity which is repulsive to all humanity. 2. By the Stoics, therefore, fortitude is rightly defined, when they call it "valor fighting on the side of justice." 3. No man, therefore, who has acquired the reputation of fortitude, attained his glory by deceit and malice; for nothing that is devoid of justice can be a virtue.

* [I omit chapter xviii.]

4. It is, therefore, finely said by Plato, that not only the knowledge that is apart from justice deserves the appellation of cunning rather than wisdom, but also a mind that is ready to encounter danger, if it is animated by private interest, and not public utility, deserves the character of audaciousness rather than of fortitude.

5. We therefore require that all men of courage and magnanimity should be at the same time men of virtue and of simplicity, lovers of truth, and by no means deceitful; for these qualities are the main glory of justice.

6. But there is one painful consideration, that obstinacy, and an undue ambition for power, naturally spring up from this elevation and greatness of spirit; 7. for, as Plato tells us, the entire character of the Lacedæmonians was inflamed with the desire of conquest.

Thus the man who is most distinguished by his magnanimity, is most desirous of being the leading, or rather the only potentate of all.

8. Now, it is a difficult matter, when you desire to be superior to all others, to preserve that equability which is the characteristic of justice.

9. Hence it is that such men will not suffer themselves to be thwarted in a debate, nor by any public and lawful authority; and in public matters they are commonly guilty of corruption and faction, in order to grasp at as great power as possible; and they choose to be superior by means of force, rather than equals by justice.

10. But the more difficult the matter [of self-restraint] is, it is the more glorious; for there is no conjuncture which ought to be unconnected with justice.

11. They, therefore, who oppose, not they who commit, injustice are to be deemed brave and magnanimous. Now, genuine and well-considered magnanimity judges that the *HONESTUM* [righteousness], which is nature's chief aim, consists in realities and not in mere glory, and rather chooses to *BE* than to *SEEM* pre-eminent:

12. for the man who is swayed by the prejudices of an ignorant rabble is not to be reckoned among the great; 13. but the man of a spirit the most elevated, through the desire of glory, is the most easily impelled into acts of injustice. This is, indeed, a slippery situation; for scarcely can there be found a man who, after enduring trials and encountering dangers, does not pant for popularity as the reward of his exploits.

I., xx., 1. A spirit altogether brave and elevated is chiefly discernible by two characters. The first consists in a low estimate of mere outward circumstances, since it is convinced that a man ought to admire, desire, or court nothing but what is virtuous and becoming; and that he ought to succumb to no man, nor to any perturbation either of spirit or fortune.

2. The other thing is

that possessed of such a spirit as I have just mentioned, you should perform actions which are great and of the greatest utility, but extremely arduous, full of difficulties and danger both to life and the many things which pertain to life.

3. In the latter of those two characters consist all the glory, the majesty, and, I add, the utility; *but the causes and the efficient means that form great men is in the former*, which contains the principles that elevate the soul, and give it a contempt for temporary considerations. 4. Now, this very excellence consists in two particulars: you are to deem that only to be good that is virtuous; and that you be free from all mental irregularity. 5. For we are to look upon it as the character of a noble and an elevated soul, to slight all those considerations that the generality of mankind account great and glorious, and to despise them, upon firm and durable principles; while strength of mind, and greatness of resolution, are discerned in bearing those calamities which, in the course of man's life, are many and various, so as not to be driven from your natural disposition, nor from the dignity of a wise man: 6. for it is not consistent that he who is not subdued by fear should be subjugated by passion; nor that he who has shown himself invincible by toil, should be conquered by pleasure. 7. Wherefore, we ought to watch and avoid the love of money: for nothing so truly characterizes a narrow, groveling disposition as to love riches; and nothing is more noble and more exalted than to despise riches if you have them not, and if you have them, to employ them in beneficence and liberality.*

8. An inordinate passion for glory, as I have already observed, is likewise to be guarded against; for it deprives us of liberty, the only prize for which men of elevated sentiments ought to contend. 9. Power is so far from being desirable in itself, that it sometimes ought to be refused, and sometimes to be resigned. 10. We should likewise be free from all disorders of the mind, from all violent passion and fear, as well as languor, voluptuousness, and anger, that we may possess that tranquillity and security which confer alike consistency and dignity. 11. Now, many there are, and have been, who, courting that tranquillity which I have mentioned here, have withdrawn themselves from public affairs and taken refuge in retirement.†

* "A reader, of very ordinary erudition," says Guthrie, "may easily perceive how greatly the best historians and poets among the Romans were indebted to this and the foregoing chapter, which have served as a commonplace for their finest sentiments." † [I omit the remainder of section 11 and the whole of section 12.]

I., xxi., 7.* But the men who inherit from nature appliances for government ought, laying aside all excuses, to undertake the discharge of all public offices and the management of state affairs; for neither can a state be governed, nor can magnanimity display itself, by any other means. 8. I am not, however, sure whether those who undertake the management of public affairs ought not to be equally distinguished by magnanimity as philosophers, if not more so, and impressed with a contempt of common affairs and to possess that tranquillity, that calm of mind, I have so much recommended; I mean, if they wish to live without anxiety, with dignity and consistency.

9. This may be the more easily practiced by philosophers, because in their lives there is less exposed for fortune to strike at; because their necessities are more contracted; and because, if any thing adverse should happen, they can not fall so heavily. 10. It is not, therefore, without reason, that in the mind of those who undertake the management of public affairs, more violent passions are excited, and mightier matters are to be attempted, than by those who are retired; they, therefore, ought to possess greater elevation of spirit, and freedom from disquiets. 11. But, whoever enters upon public life ought to take care that the question, how far the measure is virtuous, be not his sole consideration, but also how far he may have the means of carrying it into execution. 12. In this he is chiefly to take care that through indolence he do not meanly despond, nor through eagerness too much presume. Thus, in all affairs, before you undertake them, a diligent preparation should be entered into.

I., xxii., 1. But, since most persons are of opinion that the achievements of war are more glorious than civil affairs, this judgment needs to be restricted; 2. for many, as generally is the case with high minds and enterprising spirits, especially if they are adapted to military life and are fond of warlike achievements, have often sought opportunities of war from their fondness for glory; 3. but if we are willing to judge truly, many are the civil employments of greater importance, and of more renown, than the military.

4. For though Themistocles is justly praised—his name is now more illustrious than that of Solon, and his glorious victory at Salamis is mentioned preferably to the policy of Solon, by which he first confirmed the power of the Areopagus—the one should not be considered more illustrious than the other; 5. for the one availed his country only for once—the other is lastingly advan-

*[I omit sections 1–6.]

tageous; because by it the laws of the Athenians, and the institutions of their ancestors, are preserved. 6. Now, Themistocles could not have stated any respect in which he benefited the Areopagus, but the former* might with truth declare that Themistocles had been advantaged by him; for the war was carried on by the counsels of that senate which was constituted by Solon.

7. We may make the same observation with regard to Pausanias and Lysander among the Lacedæmonians; for all the addition of empire which their conquests are supposed to have brought to their country is not to be compared to the laws and economy of Lycurgus; for indeed, owing to these very causes they had armies more subordinate and courageous. 8. In my eyes, Marcus Scaurus (who flourished when I was but a boy) was not inferior to Caius Marius; nor, after I came to have a concern in the government, Quintus Catulus to Cneius Pompey. 9. An army abroad is but of small service unless there be a wise administration at home.†

10. That state described by the following line is best for a country, for which I understand that I am abused by the wicked and malicious :

Arms to the gown, and laurels yield to lore.‡

11. For, not to mention other persons, when I was at the helm of government did not "arms yield to the gown?" For never did our country know a time of more threatening danger or more profound tranquillity; 12. so quickly, through my counsel and my diligence, did the arms of our most profligate fellow-citizens drop of themselves out of their hands. 13. What so great exploit as this was ever performed in war, or what triumph can be compared with it?

The inheritance of my glory and the imitation of my actions are to descend to you, my son Marcus, therefore it is allowable for me to boast in writing to you. 14. It is, however, certain that Pompey, who was possessed of much military glory, paid this tribute to me, in the hearing of many, that in vain would he have returned to his third triumph, had not my public services preserved the place in which he was to celebrate it. 15. The examples of civil courage are therefore no less meritorious than those of military; and they require a greater share of zeal and labor than the latter.

*["But it might with truth have asserted."—*Anthon (Cicero de Officiis, Harper, 1872, page 179).*] †[I omit the remainder of section 9.] ‡Original: *Ce tant arma togæ, concedat laurea lingue.* The author is here speaking of his conduct in suppressing Catiline's conspiracy. [Anthon (page 180) says that "this line is an extract from a poem by Cicero on his own consulship."]

I., xxiii., 1. Now all that excellence [RIGHTEOUSNESS] which springs from a lofty and noble nature is altogether produced by the mental and not by the corporeal powers. Meanwhile, the body ought to be kept in such action and order, as that it may be always ready to obey the dictates of reason and wisdom, in carrying them into execution, and in persevering under hardships.*

I., xxv., 1. All who hope to rise in a state ought strictly to observe two rules of Plato.† The first is, that they so keep in view the advantage of their fellow-citizens as to have reference to it in whatever they do, regardless of their individual interest. The second is, that their cares be applied to the whole of the state, lest while they are cherishing one part they abandon the others. 2. For the administration of government, like a guardianship, ought to be directed to the good of those who confer, and not of those who receive the trust. 3. Now, they who consult the interests of one part of a community and neglect another, introduce into the state the greatest of all evils, sedition and discord. From this partiality some seem to court the people, some each great man, but few the whole. 4. Hence the great discords among the Athenians, and in our government not only seditions but the most destructive wars, which every worthy and brave citizen who deserves to rise in the state will avoid and detest; he will give himself entirely up to the service of his country, without regard to riches or to power, and he will watch over the whole so as to consult the good of all. 5. He will even be far from bringing any man into hatred or disgrace, by ill-grounded charges, and he will so closely attach himself to the rules of justice and virtue, that however he may give offense he will preserve them, and incur death itself rather than swerve from the principles I have laid down.

6. Of all evils, ambition and the disputes for public posts are the most deplorable. Plato, likewise, on this subject, says‡ very admirably, "that they who dispute for the management of a state, resemble mariners wrangling about who should direct the helm." 7. He then lays down as a rule that we ought to look upon those as our enemies who take arms against the public, and not those who want to have public affairs directed by their judgment. For instance, Publius Africanus and Quintus Metellus differed in opinion, but without animosity.

* [I omit sections 2-7, and also the whole of chapter xxiv.] † [Anthon (ed. Harper, page 185) says that "both occur in the *Republic*, the first in i., p. 343, A, and the second in iv., p. 420, B."] ‡ [Anthon (page 185) says that "the passage occurs in the *Republic*, vi., p. 488, B."]

8. Nor, indeed, are those to be listened to who consider that we ought to cherish a bitter resentment against our enemies, and that this is characteristic of a high-minded and brave man; for nothing is more noble, nothing more worthy of a great and a good man, than placability and moderation.

9. Nay, amid free nations and equality of rights, an equability and loftiness of temper is necessary, to prevent our falling into an idle, disagreeable peevishness, when we are irritated by persons approaching us unseasonably, or preferring to us unreasonable requests. 10. Yet this politeness and moderation ought to be so tempered, that for the sake of the interests of the state severity should be employed, otherwise public business could not be carried on. 11. Meanwhile, all reprimands and punishments ought to be inflicted without abuse, without regard to the party so punishing or reprimanding, but to the good of the state.

12. We ought, likewise, to take care that the punishment be proportioned to the offense, and that some be not punished for doing things for which others are not so much as called to account. 13. Above all things, in punishing we ought to guard against passion; for the man who is to pronounce a sentence of punishment in a passion, never can preserve that mean between what is too much and too little, which is so justly recommended by the Peripatetics, did they not too much commend the passion of anger, by asserting it to be a useful property of our nature. [See Arist. Nic. Eth., Book II., ch. v., § 5 (page 428 above).] 14. For my part, I think that it ought to be checked under all circumstances; and it were to be wished that they who preside in government were like the laws, which in punishing are not directed by resentments but by equity.

I., xxvi., 1. Now, during our prosperity, and while things flow agreeably to our desire, we ought with great care to avoid pride and arrogance; 2. for, as it discovers weakness not to bear adversity with equanimity, so also with prosperity. That equanimity in every condition of life is a noble attribute, and that uniform expression of countenance and appearance which we find recorded of Socrates, and also of Caius Lælius. 3. Though Philip of Macedon was excelled by his son in his achievements and his renown, yet I find him superior to him in politeness and goodness of nature; 4. the one, therefore, always appeared great, while the other often became detestable. So that they appear to teach rightly, who admonish us that the more advanced we are in our fortune the more affable ought we to be in our behavior.* 6. In

*[I omit section 5.]

the time of our greatest prosperity we should also have the greatest recourse to the advice of our friends, and greater authority should be conceded to them than before. 7. At such a time we are to take care not to lend our ears to flatterers, or to suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by adulation, by which it is easy to be misled: for we then think ourselves such as may be JUSTLY praised, an opinion that gives rise to a thousand errors in conduct; because, when men are once blown up with idle conceits, they are exposed to ignominious ridicule and led into the greatest mistakes. 8. So much for this subject.

One thing you are to understand, that they who regulate public affairs perform the greatest exploits, and such as require the highest style of mind, because their business is most extensive and concerns the greatest number. 9. Yet there are, and have been, many men of great capacities, who in private life have planned out or attempted mighty matters, and yet have confined themselves to the limits of their own affairs; or, being thrown into a middle state, between philosophers and those who govern the state, have amused themselves with the management of their private fortune, without swelling it by all manner of means, not debarring their friends from the benefit of it, but rather, when occasion calls upon them, sharing it both with their friends and their country. 10. This should be originally acquired with HONESTY, without any scandalous or oppressive practices; it should then be made serviceable to as many as possible, provided they be worthy; it should next be augmented by prudence, by industry, and frugality, without serving the purposes of pleasure and luxury rather than of generosity and humanity. 11. The man who observes those rules may live with magnificence, with dignity, and with spirit, yet with simplicity and honor, and agreeably to (the economy of) human life.

I., xxvii., 1. The next thing is, to treat of that remaining part of virtue in which consist chastity and those (as we may term them) ornaments of life, temperance, moderation, and all that allays the perturbations of the mind. 2. Under this head is comprehended what in Latin we may call DECORUM (or the graceful), for the Greeks term it the PREPON. Now, its quality is such that it is indiscernible from the HONESTUM [RIGHTEOUSNESS]; for whatever is graceful is virtuous, and whatever is virtuous is graceful.

3. But it is more easy to conceive than to express the difference between what is virtuous and what is graceful (or between the HONESTUM and the DECORUM); for whatever is graceful appears such, when virtue is its antecedent. 4. What is graceful, there-

fore, appears not only in that division of virtue which is here treated of, but in the three foregoing ones; 5. for it is graceful in a man to think and to speak with propriety, to act with deliberation, and in every occurrence of life to find out and persevere in the truth. On the other hand, to be imposed upon, to mistake, to falter, and to be deceived, is as ungraceful as to rave or to be insane. Thus, whatever is just is graceful; whatever is unjust is as ungraceful as it is criminal. 6. The same principle applies to courage; for every manly and magnanimous action is worthy of a man, and graceful; the reverse, as being unworthy, is ungraceful.

7. This, therefore, which I call gracefulness, is a universal property of virtue, and a property that is self-evident, and not discerned by any profundity of reasoning; 8. for there is a certain gracefulness that is implied in every virtue, and which may exist distinctly from virtue, rather in thought than in fact: 9. as grace and beauty of person, for example, can not be separated from health, so the whole of that gracefulness which I here speak of is blended with virtue, but may exist separately in the mind and in idea.

10. Now, the definition of this is twofold: for there is a general gracefulness that is the property of all virtue, and that includes another, which is fitted to the particular divisions of virtue. 11. The former is commonly defined to be that gracefulness that is conformable to that excellence of man, in which he differs from other sentient beings; 12. but the special, which is comprised under the general, is defined to be a gracefulness so adapted to nature as to exhibit propriety and sweetness under a certain elegant appearance.

I., xxviii., 1. We may perceive that these things are so understood from that gracefulness which is aimed at by the poets, and of which elsewhere more is wont to be said; 2. for we say that the poets observe that gracefulness to be when a person speaks and acts in that manner which is most becoming his character.* 4. Poets, therefore, in their vast variety of characters, consider what is proper and what is becoming, even in the vicious: but as nature herself has cast to us our parts in constancy, moderation, temperance, and modesty; as she, at the same time, instructs us not to be unmindful how we should behave to mankind, the effect is, that the extent both of that gracefulness which is the general property of all virtue, and of that particular gracefulness that is adapted to every species of it, is discovered. 5. For as personal beauty, by the symmetrical disposition of the limbs, attracts our attention and

*[I omit the remainder of section 2, and the whole of section 3.]

pleases the eye, by the harmony and elegance with which each part corresponds to another, so that gracefulness which manifests itself in life, attracts the approbation of those among whom we live, by the order, consistency, and modesty of all our words and deeds.

6. There is, therefore, a degree of respect due from us, suited to every man's character, from the best to the worst: for it is not only arrogant, but it is profligate, for a man to disregard the world's opinion of* himself; 7. but, in our estimate of human life, we are to make a difference between justice and moral susceptibility.†

*[*Negligere quid de se quisque sentiat*: for a man to disregard other persons' opinions of themselves.]

† *Justice and moral susceptibility.* Orig. *Justiciam et verecundiam.* This is a very fine passage, and deserves to be explained. *Verecundia* is commonly translated bashfulness or modesty; but in the sense of our author here, neither of these two words will do; nor am I sure that the word decency, or any word in the English tongue, comes fully up to his meaning, which is, an inborn reverence for what is right, and which supplies the place of, and sometimes controls, the law. Many actions may be agreeable to law, and yet disagreeable to this inborn principle. The tragedian Seneca has distinguished them very finely. He brings in Pyrrhus, saying,

Pyrr. Lex nulla capto pareit aut pœnam impedit.

To this Agamemnon replies,

Ag. Quod non vetat lex, hoc vetat fieri pudor.

Pyrr. "No law exempts a captive from the sword."

Ag. "Where the law does not, moral duties bind."

Our author inculcates the same principles in many other parts of his works; and it was afterward admitted by Justinian into his Institutes. "Fide commissa appellata sunt, quia nullo vinculo juris, sed tantum pudore eorum qui rogabantur, continebantur." "Deeds of trust were so called, because the party intrusted was not obligated by law, but by conscience or morality." Ovid has a very noble sentiment, which he seems to have taken from our author and from Plato.

Nondum justiciam facinus mortale fugarat,

Ultima de superis illa reliquit humum;

Proque metu, populum, sine vi, pudor ipse regebat.

"Nor justice yet had fled from human crimes,

Of all their godheads she the last remained;

For awful conscience, in those happy times,

Ruled without fear, and without force restrained."

Verecundia or *pudor*, therefore, is properly an inward abhorrence of moral turpitude, through which the conscience is awed, and may be said to blush. Plato, and from him Plutarch, makes justice and this *verecundia* to be inseparable companions. "God (says the former), being afraid lest the human race should entirely perish upon earth, gave to mankind justice and moral susceptibility, those ornaments of states and the bonds of society."

It is on the possession of this moral susceptibility, anterior to and independent of human laws, that Bishop Butler founds his ethical system. Thus he says of man, that "from his make, constitution, or nature, he is, in the strictest and most proper sense, a law to himself;" that "he hath the rule of right within," and that "what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it;" and, in enforcing the authority of this natural monitor, "your obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests

8. The dictate of justice is to do no wrong; that of moral susceptibility is to give no offense to mankind, and in this the force of the graceful is most perceptible. By these explanations I conceive that what we mean by the graceful and becoming may be understood.

9. Now the duty resulting from this has a primary tendency to an agreement with and conservation of our nature; and if we follow it as a guide we never shall err, but shall attain to that natural excellence which consists in acuteness and sagacity, to that

to such a course of action is itself alone an obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide—the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature. It, therefore, belongs to our condition of being; it is our duty to walk in that path, and to follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity." It is with a like reference that Lord Bacon says: "*The light of nature* not only shines upon the human mind through the medium of a rational faculty, but by an internal instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of man's first estate." But a parallel passage from the pen of Cicero himself, affords a still fuller and loftier enunciation of this principle: "There is, indeed, one true and original law, conformable to reason and to nature, diffused over all, invariable, eternal, which calls to the fulfillment of duty and to abstinence from injustice, and which calls with that irresistible voice which is felt in all its authority wherever it is heard. This law can not be abolished or curtailed, nor affected in its sanctions by any law of man. A whole senate, a whole people, can not dispense from its paramount obligation. It requires no commentator to render it distinctly intelligible, nor is it different at Rome, and at Athens, at the present, and in ages to come; but in all times and in all nations, it is, and has been, and will be, one and everlasting—one as that God, its great Author and promulgator, who is the common sovereign of all mankind, is himself one. No man can disobey it without flying, as it were, from his own bosom and repudiating his nature, and in this very act will inflict on himself the severest of retributions, even though he escape what is commonly regarded as punishment."

[I can not quite agree with the translator insofar as he seems to detract somewhat from the conception of justice, which ought not to be understood as of statutory obligation merely; and for this reason the examples from Seneca and Justinian are not well chosen. He has also too much confounded moral susceptibility with conscience, which latter taken purely enforces merely justice, and only by virtue of its operation upon our sensitive nature superadds modesty. PUDOR rather results from than "is properly an inward abhorrence of moral turpitude," which inward abhorrence is the work of conscience, and can not properly be said to awe conscience. But the PUDOR which awes conscience is more admirably illustrated by Paul (Romans xiv.): "All things indeed are pure; but it is evil for that man who eats with offense. It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbles, or is made to offend, or is weak." (Am. Bible Union, second revision.) The magnificent passage from Cicero cited, is therefore not an enunciation of verecundia, but of law (JUS) in its most exalted sense. Cf. Xen. Mem., IV., iv., 25 (page 400 above).]

which is best adapted to human society, and to that which is energetic and manly.* 10. But the chief force of the graceful lies in that suitableness of which I am now treating. For not only those emotions of a physical kind, but still more those of the mind are to be approved as they are conformable to nature. 11. For the nature and powers of the mind are twofold; one consists in appetite, by the Greeks called *ORME* (*i. e.* impulse), which hurries man hither and thither; the other in reason, which teaches and explains what we are to do, and what we are to avoid. The result is, that reason should direct and appetite obey.

I., xxix., 1. Now every human action ought to be free from precipitancy and negligence, nor indeed ought we to do any thing for which we can not give a justifiable reason. This indeed almost amounts to a definition of duty. 2. Now we must manage so as to keep the appetites subservient to reason, that they may neither outstrip it nor fall behind through sloth and cowardice. Let them be ever composed and free from all perturbation of spirit; 3. and thus entire consistency and moderation will display themselves. For those appetites that are too vagrant and rampant as it were, either through desire or aversion, are not sufficiently under the command of reason; such, I say, undoubtedly transgress bounds and moderation. For they abandon and disclaim that subordination to reason, to which by the law of nature they are subjected, and thereby not only the mind but the body is thrown into disturbance. 4. Let any one observe the very looks of men who are in a rage, of those who are agitated by desire or fear, or who exult in an excess of joy; all whose countenances, voices, motions, and attitudes, are changed.

5. But to return to my description of duty. From these particulars we learn that ALL our appetites ought to be contracted and mitigated; that ALL our attention and diligence ought to be awake, so that we do nothing in a rash, random, thoughtless, and inconsiderate manner. 6. For nature has not formed us to sport and merriment, but rather to seriousness, and studies that are important and sublime. 7. Sport and merriment are not always disallowable: but we are to use them as we do sleep and other kinds of repose, when we have dispatched our weighty and important affairs. 8. Nay, our very manner of joking should be neither wanton nor indecent, but genteel and good-humored. 9. For as we indulge boys not in an unlimited license of sport, but only in that which is not inconsistent with virtuous conduct, so in our very jokes there should appear some gleam of a virtuous nature.†

* In other words, to wisdom, justice, and fortitude. †[I omit sections 10-13.]

I., xxx., 1. But in all our disquisitions concerning the nature of a duty, it is material that we keep in our eye the great excellence of man's nature above that of the brutes and all other creatures. 2. They are insensible to every thing but pleasure, and are hurried to it by every impulse. Whereas the mind of man is nourished by study and reflection, and, being charmed by the pleasure of seeing and hearing, it is ever either inquiring or acting. 3. But if there is a man who has a small bias to pleasure, provided he is not of the brute kind (for there are some who are men only in name); but, I say, if he is more high-minded even in a small degree, though he may be smitten with pleasure, he yet, through a principle of shame, hides and disguises his inclination for it.

4. From this we are to conclude that mere corporeal pleasure is unworthy the excellence of man's nature; and that it ought therefore to be despised and rejected; but that if a man shall have any delight in pleasure, he ought to be extremely observant of limits in its indulgence. 5. Therefore the nourishment and dress of our bodies should be with a view not to our pleasure, but to our health and our strength; 6. and should we examine the excellence and dignity of our nature, we should then be made sensible how shameful it is to melt away in pleasure, and to live in voluptuousness and effeminacy; and how noble it is to live with abstinence, with modesty, with strictness, and sobriety.

7. We are likewise to observe that nature has, as it were, endowed us with two characters. The first is in common to all mankind, because all of us partake in that excellency of reason, which places us above the brutes; from which is derived all that is virtuous, all that is graceful, and by which we trace our connections with our several duties. The other character is peculiar to individuals. 8. For, as there are great dissimilarities in our persons—some for instance are swift in running, others strong in wrestling; and in style of beauty some have a dignity, and others a sweetness of aspect—so are there still greater varieties in our minds.*

I., xxxi., 1. Every man, however, ought carefully to follow out his peculiar character, provided it is only peculiar, and not vicious, that he may the more easily attain that gracefulness of which we are inquiring. 2. For we ought to manage so as never to counteract the general system of nature; but having taken care of that, we are to follow our natural bias; insomuch, that though other studies may be of greater weight and excellence, yet we are to regulate our pursuits by the disposition of our nature. 3. It is to no purpose to thwart nature, or to aim at what you can not attain.

* [I omit sections 9–17.]

We therefore may have a still clearer conception of the graceful I am recommending, from this consideration, that nothing is graceful that goes (as the saying is) against the grain, that is, in contradiction and opposition to nature.

4. If any thing at all is graceful, nothing surely is more so than a uniformity through the course of all your life, as well as through every particular action of it; and you never can preserve this uniformity, if, aping another man's nature, you forsake your own.

5. For as we ought to converse in the language we are best acquainted with, for fear of making ourselves justly ridiculous, as those do who cram in Greek expressions; so there ought to be no incongruity in our actions, and none in all the tenor of our lives.*

10. Every man ought, therefore, to study his own genius, so as to become an impartial judge of his own good and bad qualities, otherwise the players will discover better sense than we; 11. for they do not choose for themselves those parts that are the most excellent, but those which are best adapted to them.† 12. Shall a player, then, observe this upon the stage, and shall a wise man not observe it in the conduct of life? Let us, therefore, most earnestly apply to those parts for which we are best fitted; but should necessity degrade us into characters unsuitable to our genius, let us employ all our care, attention, and industry, in endeavoring to perform them, if not with propriety, with as little impropriety as possible: 13. nor should we strive so much to attain excellencies which have not been conferred on us, as to avoid defects.

I., xxxii., 1. To the two characters above described is added a third, which either accident or occasion imposes on us; and even a fourth, which we accommodate to ourselves by our own judgment and choice. 2. Now kingdoms, governments, honors, dignities, riches, interest, and whatever are the qualities contrary to them, happen through accident, and are directed by occasions; 3. but what part we ourselves should wish to act, originates from our own will. Some, therefore, apply to philosophy, to the civil law, and some to eloquence; and of the virtues themselves some endeavor to shine in one, and some in another.

4. Men generally are ambitious of distinguishing themselves in that kind of excellence in which their fathers or their ancestors were most famous: for instance, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius, in the civil law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the art of war. 5. Some, however, increase, by merits of their own, that glory which they have received from their fathers; for the same Afri-

*[I omit sections 6-9.] †[I omit the remainder of section 11.]

canus crowned his military glory with the practice of eloquence. In like manner, Timotheus, the son of Conon, who equaled his father in the duties of the field, but added to them the glory of genius and learning.*

I., xxxiii., 1. The rarest class is composed of those who, endowed with an exalted genius, or with excellent education and learning, or possessing both, have had scope enough for deliberating as to what course of life they would be most willing to adopt. **2.** Every design, in such a deliberation, ought to be referred to the natural powers of the individual; **3.** for since, as I said before, we discover this propriety in every act which is performed, by reference to the qualities with which a man is born, so, in fixing the plan of our future life, we ought to be still much more careful in that respect, that we may be consistent throughout the duration of life with ourselves, and not deficient in any one duty.†

10. But if, as I said above, we are to imitate our ancestors, this should be first excepted, that their bad qualities must not be imitated. **11.** In the next place, if nature does not qualify us to imitate them in some things, we are not to attempt it: for instance, the son of the elder Africanus, who adopted the younger son of Paulus, could not, from infirmity of health, resemble his father so much as his father did his grandfather. **12.** If, therefore, a man is unable to defend causes, to entertain the people, by haranguing, or to wage war, yet still he ought to do what is in his power; he ought to practice justice, honor, generosity, modesty, and temperance, that what is wanting may be the less required of him. **13.** Now, the best inheritance a parent can leave a child—more excellent than any patrimony—is the glory of his virtue and his deeds; to bring disgrace on which ought to be regarded as wicked and monstrous.

I., xxxiv., 1. And as the same moral duties are not suited to the different periods of life, some belonging to the young, others to the old, we must likewise say somewhat on this distinction. **2.** It is the duty of a young man to reverence his elders, and among them to select the best and the worthiest, on whose advice and authority to rely. For the inexperience of youth ought to be instructed and conducted by the wisdom of the aged. **3.** Above all things, the young man ought to be restrained from lawless desires, and exercised in endurance and labor both of body and mind, that by persevering in them, he may be efficient in the duties both of war and peace. **4.** Nay, when they even unbend their minds and give themselves up to mirth, they ought to avoid

* [I omit sections 6–13.] † [I omit sections 4–9.]

intemperance, and never lose sight of morality ; and this will be the more easy if even upon such occasions they desire that their elders should be associated with them.

5. As to old men, their bodily labors seem to require diminution, but the exercises of their mind ought even to be increased. Their care should be to assist their friends, the youth, and above all their country, to the utmost of their ability by their advice and experience. 6. Now there is nothing that old age ought more carefully to guard against, than giving itself up to listlessness and indolence. 7. As to luxury, though it is shameful in every stage of life, in old age it is detestable ; but if to that is added intemperance in lawless desires, the evil is doubled ; because old age itself thereby incurs disgrace, and makes the excesses of the young more shameless.

8. Neither is it foreign to my purpose to touch upon the duties of magistrates, of private citizens, and of strangers. 9. It is then the peculiar duty of a magistrate to bear in mind that he represents the state, and that he ought, therefore, to maintain its dignity and glory, to preserve its constitution, to act by its laws, and to remember that these things are committed to his fidelity. 10. As to a private man and citizen, his duty is to live upon a just and equal footing with his fellow-citizens, neither subordinate and subservient nor domineering. In his sentiments of the [re]public to be always for peaceful and virtuous measures ; for such we are accustomed to imagine and describe a virtuous citizen.

11. Now the duty of a stranger and an alien is, to mind nothing but his own business, not to intermeddle with another, and least of all to be curious about the affairs of a foreign government. 12. Thus we shall generally succeed in the practice of the moral duties, when we inquire after what is most becoming and best fitted to persons, occasions, and ages ; 13. and nothing is more becoming than in all our actions and in all our deliberations to preserve consistency.

I., xxxv., 1. But, because the graceful or becoming character we treat of appears in all our words and actions, nay, in every motion and disposition of our person, and consists of three particulars, beauty, regularity, and appointment suited to action (ideas which indeed are difficult to be expressed, but it is sufficient if they are understood) ; 2. and as in these three heads is comprehended our care to be approved by those among whom and with whom we live, on them also a few observations must be made.* 8. Let us, for our parts, follow nature, and avoid whatever is offensive to the eyes or ears ; let us aim at the graceful or becoming, whether

* [I omit sections 3-7.]

we stand or walk, whether we sit or lie down, in every motion of our features, our eyes, or our hands.*

I., xxxvi., 1. Now as beauty is of two kinds, one that consists in loveliness, and the other in dignity; loveliness we should regard as the characteristic of women, dignity of men: 2. therefore, let a man remove from his person every ornament that is unbecoming a man, and let him take the same care of every similar fault with regard to his gesture or motion.† 4. Now, comeliness in the person is preserved by the freshness of the complexion, and that freshness by the exercises of the body. 5. To this we are to add, a neatness that is neither troublesome nor too much studied, but which just avoids all clownish, ill-bred slovenness. 6. The same rules are to be observed with regard to ornaments of dress, in which, as in all other matters, a mean is preferable. 7. We must likewise avoid a drawling solemn pace in walking, so as to seem like bearers in a procession; and likewise in matters that require dispatch, quick, hurried motions; which, when they occur, occasion a shortness of breathing, an alteration in the looks, and a convulsion in the features, all which strongly indicate an inconstant character. 8. But still greater should be our care that the movements of our mind never depart from nature; in which we shall succeed if we guard against falling into any flurry and disorder of spirit, and keep our faculties intent on the preservation of propriety. 9. Now the motions of the mind are of two kinds, the one of reflection and the other of appetite. Reflection chiefly applies itself in the search of truth. Appetite prompts us to action. We are therefore to take care to employ our reflection upon the best subjects, and to render our appetite obedient to our reason.

I., xxxvii., 1. And since the influence of speech is very great and that of two kinds—one proper for disputing, the other for discoursing—the former should be employed in pleadings at trials, in assemblies of the people, and meetings of the senate; the latter in social circles, disquisitions, the meetings of our friends, and should likewise attend upon entertainments. 2. Rhetoricians lay down rules for disputing, but none for discoursing, though I am not sure but that likewise may be done. 3. Masters are to be found in all pursuits in which there are learners, and all places are filled with crowds of rhetoricians; but there are none who study this, and yet all the rules that are laid down for words and sentiments (in debate) are likewise applicable to conversation.

4. But, as we have a voice as the organ of speech, we ought to aim at two properties in it: first that it be clear, and secondly

*[I omit sections 9–14.] †[I omit section 3.]

that it be agreeable; both are unquestionably to be sought from nature; and yet practice may improve the one, and imitating those who speak nervously and distinctly, the other. 5. There was, in the Catuli, nothing by which you could conclude them possessed of any exquisite judgment in language, though learned to be sure they were; and so have others been. But the Catuli were thought to excel in the Latin tongue; 6. their pronunciation was harmonious, their words were neither mouthed nor minced; so that their expression was distinct, without being unpleasant; while their voice, without strain, was neither faint nor shrill. 7. The manner of Lucius Crassus was more flowing, and equally elegant; though the opinion concerning the Catuli, as good speakers, was not less. 8. But Cæsar, brother to the elder Catulus, exceeded all in wit and humor; insomuch that even in the forensic style of speaking, he with his conversational manner, surpassed the energetic eloquence of others. 9. Therefore, in all those matters, we must labor diligently if we would discover what is the point of propriety in every instance.

10. Let our common discourse therefore (and this is the great excellence of the followers of Socrates) be smooth and good-humored, without the least arrogance. Let there be pleasantry in it. 11. Nor let any one speaker exclude all others as if he were entering on a province of his own, but consider that in conversation, as in other things, alternate participation is but fair. 12. But more especially let him consider on what subjects he should speak. If serious, let him use gravity; if merry, good humor. 13. But a man ought to take the greatest care that his discourse betray no defect in his morals; and this generally is the case when for the sake of detraction we eagerly speak of the absent in a malicious, ridiculous, harsh, bitter, and contemptuous manner.

14. Now conversation generally turns upon private concerns, or politics, or the pursuits of art and learning. 15. We are, therefore, to study, whenever our conversation begins to ramble to other subjects, to recall it: 16. and whatever subjects may present themselves (for we are not at all pleased with the same subjects and that similarly and at all times) we should observe how far our conversation maintains its interest; and as there was a reason for beginning so there should be a limit at which to conclude.

I, xxxviii., 1. But as we are very properly enjoined, in all the course of our life, to avoid all fits of passion, that is, excessive emotions of the mind uncontrolled by reason; in like manner, our conversation ought to be free from all such emotions; 2. so that

neither resentment manifest itself, nor undue desire, nor slovenness, nor indolence, nor any thing of that kind; and, above all things, we should endeavor to indicate both esteem and love for those we converse with. 3. Reproaches may sometimes be necessary, in which we may perhaps be obliged to employ a higher strain of voice and a harsher turn of language. Even in that case, we ought only [and unintentionally] to seem to do these things in anger;* but as, in the cases of cautery and amputations, so with this kind of correction we should have recourse to it seldom and unwillingly; and indeed, never but when no other remedy can be discovered; but still, let all passion be avoided; for with that nothing can be done with rectitude, nothing with discretion.

4. In general it is allowable to adopt a mild style of rebuke, combining it with seriousness, so that severity may be indicated but abusive language avoided. 5. Nay, even what of bitterness there is in the reproach should be shown to have been adopted for the sake of the party reprov'd. 6. Now, it is advisable, even in those disputes which take place with our bitterest enemies, if we hear any thing that is insulting to ourselves to maintain our equanimity, and repress passion; 7. for whatever is done under such excitement can never be either consistently performed, or approved of by those who are present. 8. It is likewise indecent for a man to be loud in his own praise (and the more so if it be false), and so to imitate the swaggering soldier (in the play) amidst the derision of the auditors.

I., xxxix., 1. Now, as I touch, at least wish to touch, upon every matter of duty, I shall likewise treat of the kind of house which I think suited to a man of high rank and office; the end of this being utility, to it the design of the building must be adapted, but still regard must be paid to magnificence and elegance.† 4. For dignity should be adorned by a palace, but not be wholly sought from it:—the house ought to be ennobled by the master, and not the master by the house.‡ 8. But you are to take care, especially if you build for yourself, not to go beyond bounds in grandeur and costliness. Even the example of an excess of this kind does much mischief. 9. For most people, particularly in this respect, studiously imitate the example of their leaders. For instance, who imitates the virtue of the excellent Lucius Lucullus? But how many there are who have imitated the magnificence of

*[That is, we ought not to BE angry, even if others, judging from our sternness, think that we are angry. Cicero must not be understood to say that we ought deliberately to simulate anger.] †[I omit sections 2 and 3.] ‡[I omit sections 5-7.]

his villas. To which certainly a bound ought to be set, and it reduced to moderation, and the same spirit of moderation ought to be extended to all the practice and economy of life.

10.* Now in undertaking every action we are to regard three things. First, that appetite be subservient to reason, than which there is no condition better fitted for preserving the moral duties. We are, secondly, to examine how important the object is which we desire to accomplish, that our attention or labor may be neither more nor less than the occasion requires. Thirdly, we are to take care that every thing that comes under the head of magnificence and dignity should be well regulated. 11. Now, the best regulation is, to observe that same graceful propriety which I have recommended, and to go no further. But of those three heads, the most excellent is that of making our appetites subservient to our reason.

I., xl., 1. I am now to speak concerning the order and the timing of things. In this science is comprehended what the Greeks call EUTAXIA, not that which we Romans call moderation, an expression that implies keeping within bounds; whereas that is EUTAXIA in which the preservation of order is involved. 2. This duty, which we will denominate moderation, is defined by the Stoics as those things which are either said or done in their appropriate places of ranging. 3. Therefore, the signification of order and of arrangement seems to be the same. For they define order to be the disposing of things into fitting and convenient places. Now they tell us that the appropriate place of an action is the opportunity of doing it. The proper opportunity for action being called by the Greeks EUKARIA, and by the Latins, *occasio*, or occasion. 4. Thus, as I have already observed, that *modestia* which we have thus explained is the knowledge of acting according to the fitness of a conjuncture.

5. But prudence, of which we have treated in the beginning of this book, may admit of the same definition. Under this head, however, I speak of moderation and temperance, and the like virtues. Therefore, the considerations which belong to prudence have been treated in their proper place. But at present I am to treat of those virtues I have been so long speaking of, which relate to morality, and the approbation of those with whom we live.

6. Such then should be the regularity of all our actions, that in the economy of life, as in a connected discourse, all things may agree and correspond. 7. For it would be unbecoming and highly blamable, should we, when upon a serious subject, introduce the language of the jovial or the effeminate.†

* [I omit the first part of section 10.] † [I omit sections 8 and 9.]

10. But those actions that are in wide discrepancy with good-breeding, such, for instance, as singing in the forum, or any such absurdity, are so easily discernible, that they require no great degree of reprehension or advice. 11. But faults that seem to be inconsiderable, and such as are discernible only by a few, are to be more carefully avoided. 12. As in lutes or pipes, however little they be out of tune, it is perceived by a practiced ear; so in life we are to guard against all discrepancy, and the rather as the harmony of morals is greater and much more valuable than that of sounds.

I., xli., 1. Thus, as the ear is sensible to the smallest discord in musical instruments, so we, if we desire to be accurate and attentive observers of faults, may make great discoveries from very trifling circumstances. 2. The cast of the eye, the bending or unbending of the brow, an air of dejection or cheerfulness, laughter, the tone of words, silence, the raising or falling of the voice, and the like circumstances, we may easily form a judgment which of them are in their proper state, and which of them are in discord with duty and nature. 3. Now in this case, it is advisable to judge from others, of the condition and properties of every one of those, so that we ourselves may avoid those things that are unbecoming in others. 4. For it happens, I know not how, that we perceive what is defective more readily in others than we do in ourselves. 5. Therefore, when masters mimic the faults of boys that they may amend them, those boys are most easily corrected.

6. Neither is it improper, in order to fix our choice in matters which involve a doubt, if we apply to men of learning and also of experience, and learn what they think of the several kinds of duty; 7. for the greatest part of such men are usually led to that conclusion to which nature herself directs; and in these cases, we are to examine not only what a man says, but what he thinks, and upon what ground he thinks it. 8. For as painters, statuaries, and even poets, want to have their works canvassed by the public in order to correct any thing that is generally condemned, and examine both by themselves and with others where the defect lies; thus we ought to make use of the judgment of others to do, and not to do, to alter and correct, a great many things.* 11. But as to the whole system of the Cynics; we are absolutely to reject it, because it is inconsistent with moral susceptibility without which nothing can be honest, nothing can be virtuous.

12. Now it is our duty to esteem and to honor, in the same manner as if they were dignified with titles or vested with command.

* [I omit sections 9 and 10.]

those men whose lives have been conspicuous for great and glorious actions, who feel rightly toward the state and deserve well or have deserved well of their country. We are likewise to have a great regard for old age; to pay a deference to magistrates; to distinguish between (what we owe to) a fellow-citizen and a foreigner, and to consider whether that foreigner comes in a public or a private capacity. 13. In short, not to dwell on particulars, we ought to regard, to cultivate, and to promote the good will and the social welfare of all mankind.*

I., xliii., 1. I have I think sufficiently explained in what manner the duties are derived from the constituent parts of virtue. 2. Now it often may happen that an emulation and a contest may arise among things that are in themselves virtuous;—of two virtuous actions which is preferable. A division that Panætius has overlooked. 3. For as all virtue is the result of four† qualities, prudence, justice, magnanimity and moderation; so in the choice of a duty, those qualities must necessarily come in competition with one another.

4. I am therefore of opinion that the duties arising from the social relations are more agreeable to nature than those that are merely notional. 5. This may be confirmed from the following argument. Supposing that this kind of life should befall a wise man, that in an affluence of all things he might be able with great leisure to contemplate and attend to every object that is worthy his knowledge; yet if his condition be so solitary as to have no company with mankind, he would prefer death to it.‡ 8. For the knowledge and contemplation of nature is in a manner lame and unfinished, if it is followed by no activity; now activity is most perspicuous when it is exerted in protecting the rights of mankind.

It therefore has reference to the social interests of the human race, 9. and is for that reason preferable to knowledge; and this every virtuous man maintains and exhibits in practice. 10. For who is so eager in pursuing and examining the nature of things, that if, while he is handling and contemplating the noblest objects of knowledge, the peril and crisis of his country is made known to him, and that it is in his power to assist and relieve her, he would not instantly abandon and fling from him all those studies, even though he thought he would be enabled to number the stars, or measure the dimensions of the world? And he would do the same were the safety of a friend or a parent concerned or endangered. 11. From this consideration I infer, that the duties of

*[I omit chapter xlii.] †[See chapter v., section 2 (page 516 above).] ‡[I omit sections 6 and 7.] [Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. VIII., i., 1 (page 486 above).]

justice are preferable to the studies and duties of knowledge, relating as they do to the interests of the human race, to which no anterior consideration ought to exist in the mind of man.

I., xliv., 1. But some have employed their whole lives in the pursuits of knowledge, and yet have not declined to contribute to the utility and advantage of men. 2. For they have even instructed many how they ought to be better citizens and more useful to their country. Thus Lysis the Pythagorean educated Epaminondas of Thebes, as did Plato Dion of Syracuse, and so of many others; and as to whatever services I have performed, if I have performed any to the state, I came to it after being furnished and adorned with knowledge by teachers and learning.

3. Nor do those philosophers only instruct and educate those who are desirous of learning while alive and present among us; but they continue to do the same after death, by the monuments of their learning; 4. for they neglect no point that relates to the constitution, the manners and the morals of their country; so that it appears as if they had dedicated all their leisure to our advantage. 5. Thus while they are themselves devoted to the studies of learning and wisdom, they make their understanding and their skill chiefly available to the service of mankind. 6. It is therefore more serviceable to the public for a man to discourse copiously, provided it is to the purpose, than for a man to think ever so accurately without the power of expression; the reason is, because thought terminates in itself alone, but discourse affects those with whom we are connected in a community.

7. Now as the swarms of bees do not assemble in order to form the honey-comb, but form the honey-comb because they are by nature gregarious; so, and in a far greater degree, men, being associated by nature, manifest their skill in thinking and acting. 8. Therefore, unless knowledge is connected with that virtue which consists in doing service to mankind, that is, in improving human society, it would seem to be but solitary and barren.

9. In like manner greatness of soul, when utterly disunited from the company and society of men, becomes a kind of uncouth ferocity. Hence it follows that the company and the community of men are preferable to mere speculative knowledge.

10. Neither is that maxim true which is affirmed by some, that human communities and societies were instituted from the necessity of our condition, because we can not without the help of others supply what our nature requires; and that if we could be furnished, as by a kind of magic wand, with every thing that relates to food and raiment, that then every man of excelling genius, laying aside all other occupations, would apply himself to knowledge and learn-

ing. 11. The fact is not so; for he would fly from solitude and look out for a companion in his pursuits; and would desire sometimes to teach and sometimes to learn, sometimes to listen and sometimes to speak. 12. Every duty therefore that operates for the good of human community and society, is preferable to that duty which is limited to speculation and knowledge.

I., xlv., 5.* Hence it follows, that in the choice of our duties we are to prefer that kind of duty that contributes to the good of society. 6. For well-directed action is always the result of knowledge and prudence. And therefore it is of more consequence to act properly, than to deliberate justly.†

BOOK II, chapter i., §1. MARCUS, MY SON, I think I have in the former Book sufficiently explained in what manner our duties are derived from morality, and every kind of virtue. 2. It now remains that I treat of those kinds of duties that relate to the improvement of life, and to the acquirement of those means which men employ for the attainment of wealth and interest. In this inquiry, as I have already observed, I will treat of what is useful, and what is not so. Of several utilities. I shall speak of that which is more useful, or most so. Of all this I shall treat, after premising a few words concerning my own plan of life and choice of pursuits.

3. Although my works have prompted a great many to the exercise not only of reading but of writing, yet I sometimes am apprehensive that the name of philosophy is offensive to some worthy men, and that they are surprised at my having employed so much of my pains and time in that study. 4. For my part, as long as the state was under the management of those into whose hands she had committed herself, I applied to it all my attention and thought. 5. But when the government was engrossed by one person, when there was an end of all public deliberation and authority; when I in short had lost those excellent patriots who were my associates in the protection of my country, I neither abandoned myself to that anguish of spirit which, had I given way to it, must have consumed me, nor did I indulge those pleasures that are disgraceful to a man of learning.

6. Would that the constitution had remained in its original state; and that it had not fallen into the hands of men whose aim was not to alter but to destroy it! 7. For then I would first, as I was wont to do when our government existed, have employed my labors in action rather than in writing; and in the next place, in

* [I omit sections 1-4.] † [I omit the remainder of section 6, and the whole of sections 7-10.]

my writings I should have recorded my own pleadings as I had frequently done, and not such subjects as the present. 8. But when the constitution [RES PUBLICA], to which all my care, thoughts, and labor used to be devoted, ceased to exist, then those public and senatorial studies were silenced.

9. But as my mind could not be inactive, and as my early life had been employed in these studies, I thought that they might most honorably be laid aside by betaking myself anew to philosophy. 10. having, when young, spent a great deal of my time in its study, with a view to improvement. When I afterward began to court public offices and devoted myself entirely to the service of my country, I had so much room for philosophy as the time that remained over from the business of my friends and the public. But I spent it all in reading, having no leisure for writing.

II., ii., 1. In the midst of the greatest calamities, therefore, I seem to have realized the advantage that I have reduced into writing, matters in which my countrymen were not sufficiently instructed, and which were most worthy their attention. 2. For* what is more desirable, what is more excellent, than wisdom? What is better for man? what more worthy of him? 3. They therefore who court her are termed philosophers; for philosophy, if it is to be interpreted, implies nothing but the love of wisdom.

4. Now the ancient philosophers defined wisdom to be the knowledge of things divine and human, and of the causes by which these things are regulated; a study that if any man despises, I know not what he can think deserving of esteem.

5. For if we seek the entertainment of the mind, or a respite from cares, which is comparable to those pursuits that are always searching out somewhat that relates to and secures the welfare and happiness of life? Or if we regard the principles of self-consistency and virtue, either this is the art, or there is absolutely no art by which we can attain them. 6. And to say that there is no art for the attainment of the highest objects, when we see that none of the most inconsiderable are without it, is the language of men who speak without consideration, and who mistake in the most important matters.†

II., iii., 1. Having laid down [I., iii, 6-10 (page 514 above)] the five principles upon which we pursue our duty, two of which relate to propriety and virtue, two to the enjoyments of life, such as wealth, interest, and power, the fifth to the forming of a right judgment in any case, if there should appear to be any clashing between the principles I have mentioned: the part assigned to

*[I omit a portion of section 2 at this point.] †[I omit sections 7-17.]

virtue is concluded, and with that I desire you should be thoroughly acquainted. 2. Now the subject I am now to treat of is neither more nor less than what we call expediency; 3. in which matter custom has so declined and gradually deviated from the right path, that, separating virtue from expediency, it has determined that some things may be virtuous that are not expedient, and some expedient which are not virtuous; than which doctrine nothing more pernicious can be introduced into human life.

4. It is indeed with strictness and honesty that philosophers, and those of the highest reputation, distinguish in idea those three principles which really are blended together. 5. For they give it as their opinion that whatever is just is expedient; and in like manner whatever is virtuous is just; from whence it follows that whatever is virtuous is also expedient. 6. Those who do not perceive this distinction often admire crafty and cunning men, and mistake knavery for wisdom. 7. The error of such ought to be eradicated; and every notion ought to be reduced to this hope, that men may attain the ends they propose, by virtuous designs and just actions, and not by dishonesty and wickedness.

8. The things then that pertain to the preservation of human life are partly inanimate, such as gold, silver, the fruits of the earth, and the like; and partly animal, which have their peculiar instincts and affections. Now of these some are void of, and some are endowed with, reason.* 13. For even the very inanimate things I have mentioned, are generally procured through man's labor; nor should we have had them but by his art and industry, nor can we apply them but by his management. 14. For there could neither be the preservation of health, navigation, nor the gathering and preserving the corn and other fruits, without the industry of mankind. 15. And certainly there could have been no exportation of things in which we abound, and importation of those which we want, had not mankind applied themselves to those employments. 16. In like manner, neither could stones be hewn for our use, nor iron, nor brass, nor gold, nor silver, be dug from the earth, but by the toil and art of man.

II., iv., 1. As to buildings, by which either the violence of the cold is repelled, or the inconveniences of the heat mitigated, how could they have originally been given to the human race, or afterward repaired when ruined by tempests, earthquakes, or time, had not community of life taught us to seek the aid of man against such influences? 2. Moreover, from whence but from the labor of man could we have had aqueducts, the cuts† of rivers, the irrigation

*[I omit sections 9-12.] †[“*Derivationes fluminum.* ‘Canals.’”—*Anthoen.*]

of the land, dams†† opposed to streams, and artificial harbors?* 6. Why should I enumerate the variety of arts without which life could by no means be sustained? For did not so many arts minister to us, what could succor the sick, or constitute the pleasure of the healthy, or supply food and clothing?

Polished by those arts, the life of man is so different from the mode of life and habits of brutes. 7. Cities, too, neither could have been built nor peopled but by the association of men: hence were established laws and customs, the equitable definition of rights, and the regulated order of life. 8. Then followed gentleness of disposition and love of morality; and the result was that life was more protected, and that by giving and receiving, and by the exchange of resources and articles of wealth, we wanted for nothing.

BOOK II., chapter v., § 5.† As this point therefore admits of no doubt, that man can do the greatest good and the greatest injury to man, I lay it down as the peculiar property of virtue, that it reconciles the affections of mankind, and employs them for its own purposes. 6. So that all the application and management of inanimate things and of brutes for the use of mankind, is effected by the industrial arts; but the quick and ready zeal of mankind for advancing and enlarging our conditions, is excited through the wisdom and virtue of the best of mankind.

7. For virtue in general consists of three properties. First, in discerning in every subject what is true and genuine; what is consistent in every one; what will be the consequence of such or such a thing; how one thing arises from another, and what is the cause of each. 8. The next property of virtue is to calm those violent disorders of the mind which the Greek call *PATHE*, and to render obedient to reason those appetites which they call *ORMAI*. The third property is to treat with moderation and prudence those with whom we are joined in society, that by their means we may have the complete and full enjoyment of all that nature stands in need of; and likewise by them repel every thing adverse that may befall us.‡

II., vii., 1. Now, of all things there is none more adapted for supporting and retaining our influence than to be loved, nor more prejudicial than to be feared. 2. Ennius says very truly, "People hate the man they fear, and to each the destruction of him whom he hates is expedient." 3. It has been lately shown,|| if it was

* [I omit sections 3-5.] † [I omit sections 1-4.] ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 8, and also the whole of chapter vi.] || Cicero here alludes to the assassination of Cæsar in the senate. †† ["Breakwaters."—*Anthon* (page 226).]

not well known before. that no power can resist the hatred of the many. 4. Nor indeed is the destruction of that tyrant, who by arms forced his country to endure him, and whom it obeys still more after his death, the only proof how mighty to destroy is the hatred of mankind, but the similar deaths of other tyrants; few of whom have escaped a similar fate. 5. For fear is but a bad guardian to permanency, whereas affection is faithful even to perpetuity.*

7. But of all madmen, they are the maddest who in a free state so conduct themselves as to be feared. 8. However under the power of a private man the laws may be depressed and the spirit of liberty intimidated, yet they occasionally emerge, either by the silent determinations of the people, or by their secret suffrages with relation to posts of honor. 9. For the inflictions of liberty, when it has been suspended, are more severe than if it had been retained. 10. We ought therefore to follow this most obvious principle, that dread should be removed and affection reconciled, which has the greatest influence not only on our security, but also on our interest and power; and thus we shall most easily attain to the object of our wishes, both in private and political affairs.†

II., viii., 1. Upon such a subject I more willingly record foreign than domestic examples; 2. as long, however, as the empire of the Roman people was supported by beneficence, and not injustice, their wars were undertaken either to defend their allies or to protect their empire, the issues of their wars were either merciful or unavoidable; and the senate was the harbor and the refuge of kings, people, and nations.

3. Moreover, our magistrates and generals sought to derive their highest glory from this single fact, that they had upon the principles of equity and honor defended their provinces and their allies. 4. This therefore might more justly be designated the patronage than the empire of the world; 5. for some time we have been gradually declining from this practice and these principles; but after the victory of Sylla, we entirely lost them; 6. for when such cruelties were exercised upon our fellow-citizens, we ceased to think any thing unjust toward our allies. 7. In this case, therefore, a disgraceful conquest crowned a glorious cause; for he had the presumption to declare, when the goods of worthy men, of men of fortune, and, to say the least, of citizens, were selling at public auction, that he was disposing of his own booty. 8. He was followed by a man who, with a impious cause and a still more detestable victory, did not indeed sell the effects of private citizens, but

* [I omit section 6.] † [I omit sections 11-17.]

involved in one state of calamity whole provinces and countries. 9. Thus foreign nations being harassed and ruined, we saw Mar-seilles,* the type of our perished constitution, carried in triumph, without whose aid our generals who returned from Transalpine wars had never triumphed. 10. Were not this the most flagrant indignity the sun ever beheld, I might recount a great many other atrocities against our allies. 11. Deservedly, therefore, were we punished; for had we not suffered the crimes of many to pass unpunished never could so much licentiousness have been concentrated in one, the inheritance of whose private estate descended indeed to but a few, but that of his ambition devolved upon many profligates.

12. Nor, indeed, will there ever be wanting a source and motive for civil war, while men of abandoned principles call to mind that bloody sale, and hope for it again. For when the spear† under which it was made was set up for his kinsman [L. Sylla ††] the dictator, by Publius Sylla, the same [P. ††] Sylla, thirty-six years after, was present at a still more detestable sale; while another [C. Sylla ††] who in that dictatorship [of L. Sylla ††] was only a clerk, in the latter one [of Cæsar ††] was city-quæstor. 13. From all which we ought to learn, that while such rewards are presented, there never can be an end of our civil wars. 14. Thus the walls of our city alone are standing, and even these awaiting the crimes that must destroy them; but already we have utterly lost our constitution; 15. and to return to my subject, we have incurred all those miseries, because we chose rather to be feared than to endear ourselves and be beloved. 16. If this was the case with the people of Rome when exercising their dominion unjustly, what consequence must private persons expect? 17. Now, as it is plain that the force of kindness is so strong, and that of fear so weak, it remains for me to descant upon the means by which we may most readily attain to that endearment which we desire, consistently with fidelity and honor.‡

II., ix., 9.|| For we have confidence in those who we think understand more than ourselves, and who we believe see further into the future, and, when business is actually in hand and matters

* This was a favorite state with the Roman republicans; but having too inconsiderately shut their gates against and provoked Cæsar, he treated it as is here described.—*Guthrie*. † Cicero here alludes to the sales of the estates of the Roman citizens made by Sylla; and which always were, among the Romans, carried on under a spear stuck into the ground. The like sales were afterward made by some of Cæsar's party.—*Guthrie*. ‡ [I omit sections 18–21.] || [I omit sections 1–8.] †† [See Anthon's notes, page 233.]

come to trial, know how to pursue the wisest measures and act in the most expedient manner, as the exigency may require; all mankind agreeing that this is real and useful wisdom. 10. Such confidence, also, is placed in honest and honorable men, that is, in good men, as to exclude all suspicion of fraud or injury. We therefore think we act safely and properly in intrusting them with our persons, our fortunes, and our families.

11. But of the two virtues, honesty and wisdom, the former is the most powerful in winning the confidence of mankind. For honesty without wisdom has influence sufficient of itself; but wisdom [prudential] without honesty [sine justitia] is of no effect in inspiring confidence; 12. because, when we have no opinion of a man's probity, the greater his craft and cunning the more hated and suspected he becomes; 13. honesty, therefore, joined to understanding, will have unbounded power in acquiring confidence; honesty without understanding can do a great deal; but understanding without honesty can do nothing.

II., x., 1. But lest any one should wonder why, as all philosophers are agreed in one maxim, which I myself have often maintained, that the man who possesses one of the virtues is in possession of them all,†† I here make a distinction which implies that a man may be just but not at the same time prudent; 2. there is one kind of accuracy which in disputation refines even upon truth, and another kind, when our whole discourse is accommodated to the understanding of the public. 3. Therefore I here make use of the common terms of discourse, by calling some men brave, some good, others prudent. 4. For when we treat of popular opinions, we should make use of popular terms, and Panætius did the same.*

6. Now every thing that men observe to be great and above their comprehension they commonly admire; and with regard to individuals, those in whom they can see any unexpected excellences. 7. They therefore behold with reverence and extol with the greatest praise, those men in whom they think they can perceive some distinguished or singular virtues; 8. whereas they despise those whom they think to possess no virtue, spirit, or manliness.† 10. Therefore, as I have already said, those are despised who can neither serve themselves nor any one else, who have no assiduity, no industry, and no concern about them; but those men are the objects of admiration who are thought to surpass others in virtue, and to be free as well from every disgrace, as especially from those vices which others can not easily resist. 11. For

* [I omit section 5.] † [I omit the remainder of section 8 and the whole of section 9.] †† [See Arist. Nic. Eth., VI., xiii., 5, page 478 above.]

pleasures* turn aside the greater number of minds from virtue, and most men, when the fires of affliction are applied to them, are unmeasurably terrified. 12. Life and death, poverty and riches, make the deepest impressions upon all men. 13. But as to those who, with a great and elevated mind, look down on these indifferently;—men whom a lofty and noble object, when it is presented to them, draws and absorbs to itself;—in such cases, who does not admire the splendor and the beauty of virtue?

II., xi., 1. This sublimity of soul, therefore, produces the highest admiration; and above all, justice, from which single virtue men are called good, appears to the multitude as something marvelous. And with good reason; 2. for no man can be just if he is afraid of death, pain, exile, or poverty, or prefers their contraries to justice. 3. Men especially admire him who is incorruptible by money, and they consider every man in whom that quality is seen as ore purified by the fire.†

7. And with those likewise who buy or sell, who hire or let out, or who are engaged in the transaction of business, justice is necessary to the carrying of their pursuits, 8. for its influence is so great, that without some grains of it, even they who live by malpractices and villainy could not subsist. 9. For among those who thieve in company, if any one of them cheat or rob another he is turned out of the gang; and the captain of the band himself, unless he should distribute the spoils impartially, would either be murdered or deserted by his fellows ‡ 12. If, therefore, the influence of justice is so forcible as to strengthen and enlarge the power of robbers, how great must we suppose it to be amid the laws and administration of a well-constituted government?

II., xii., 1. It appears to me, that not only among the Medes, as we are told by Herodotus, but by our own ancestors, men of the best principles were constituted kings, for the benefit of their just government.|| 2. For when the helpless people were oppressed by those who had greater power, they betook themselves to some one man who was distinguished by his virtue, who not only protected the weakest from oppression, but by setting up an equitable system of government, united highest and lowest in equal rights. 3. The cause of the institution of laws was the same as that of kings; for equality of rights has ever been the object of desire; nor otherwise can there be any rights at all.

4. When mankind could enjoy it under one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; but when that was not the case,

*[I omit part of section 11 at this point.] †[I omit sections 4–6.] ‡[I omit sections 10 and 11.] ||[See Xen. Mem., pages 366, 378 sup.]

laws were invented, which perpetually spoke to all men with one and the same voice. 5. It is therefore undeniable that the men whose reputation among the people was the highest for their justice, were commonly chosen to bear rule. But when the same were likewise regarded as wise men, there was nothing the people did not think themselves capable of attaining under such authority. 6. Justice, therefore, is by all manner of means to be revered and practiced; both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice), and for the enlargement of our own dignity and popularity. 7. But as there is a system not only for the acquisition of money but also for its investment, so that it may supply ever-recurring expenses, not only the needful but the liberal; so popularity must be both acquired and maintained by system.

8. It was finely said by Socrates [Xen. Mem. II., vi., 39 (page 362 above)] that the shortest and most direct road to popularity, is "for a man to be the same that he wishes to be taken for." 9. People are egregiously mistaken if they think they ever can attain to permanent popularity by hypocrisy, by mere outside appearances, and by disguising not only their language but their looks. 10. True popularity takes deep root and spreads itself wide; but the false falls away like blossoms; for nothing that is false can be lasting.*

II., xiii., 1. Let the man therefore who aspires after true popularity, perform the duties of justice. What these are has been laid down in the former book. 2. But although we may most easily seem to be just what we are (though in this of itself there is very great importance), yet some precepts require to be given as to how we may be such men as we desire to be considered. 3. For if any one from early youth has the elements of celebrity and reputation, either derived from his father (which I fancy, my dear Cicero, has happened to you), or by some other cause or accident; the eyes of all mankind are turned toward him, and they make it their business to inquire what he does and how he lives; and, as if he were set up in the strongest point of light, no word or deed of his can be private.

4. Now those whose early life, through their mean and obscure rank, is passed unnoticed by the public, when they come to be young men, ought to contemplate important purposes, and pursue them by the most direct means, which they will do with a firmer resolution, because not only is no envy felt, but favor rather is shown toward that period of life.† 9. As in other matters the powers of the mind are far more important than those of the body, so the

* [I omit sections 11 and 12.] † [I omit sections 5-8.]

objects we pursue by intelligence and reason are more important than those we effect by bodily strength. 10. The most early recommendation, therefore, is modesty, obedience to parents, and affection for relations. 11. Young men are likewise most easily and best known, who attach themselves to wise and illustrious men who benefit their country by their counsels. Their frequenting* such company gives mankind a notion of their one day resembling those whom they choose for imitation.

12. The frequenting of the house of Publius Marcus commended the early life of Publius Rutilius to a reputation for integrity and knowledge of the law. 13. Lucius Crassus indeed, when very young, was indebted to no extrinsic source, but by himself acquired the highest honor from that noble and celebrated prosecution he undertook; at an age when even those who exercise themselves are highly applauded (as we are told in the case of Demosthenes), Crassus, I say, at that age showed that he could already do that most successfully in the forum, which at that time he would have gained praise had he attempted at home.

II., xiv., 1. But as there are two methods of speaking; the one proper for conversation, the other for debate, there can be no doubt but the disputative style of speech is of the greatest efficacy with regard to fame; for that is what we properly term eloquence. Yet it is difficult to describe how great power, affability and politeness in conversation have to win the affections of mankind. 2. There are extant letters from Philip, from Antipater, and from Antigonus, three of the wisest men we meet with in history, to their sons Alexander, Cassander, and Philip, recommending to them to draw the minds of the people to kindly sentiments by a generous style of discourse, and to engage their soldiers by a winning address. 3. But the speech which is pronounced in debate before a multitude often carries away a whole assembly. 4. For great is their admiration of an eloquent and sensible speaker, that when they hear him, they are convinced he has both greater abilities and more wisdom than the rest of mankind. 5. But should this eloquence have in it dignity combined with modesty, nothing can be more admirable, especially should those properties meet in a young man.

6. Various are the causes that require the practice of eloquence; and many young men in our state have attained distinction before the judges and in the senate; but there is the greatest admiration for judicial harangues, the nature of which is twofold, 7. for it consists of accusation and defense. Of those, though the latter is

* [Cf. Confucius, *Analects*, I., xiv. (page 121 above).]

preferable in point of honor; yet the other has often been approved. 8. I have spoken a little before of Crassus; Marcus Antonius when a youth did the same. An accusation also displayed the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius, when he brought to trial Caius Norbanus, a seditious and worthless citizen.*

13. Moreover, this precept of duty also must be carefully observed, that you never arraign an innocent man on trial for his life, for this can by no means be done without heinous guilt. 14. For what can be so unnatural as to prostitute to the prosecution and the ruin of the good, that eloquence which nature has given us for the safety and preservation of mankind? †

II., xv., 1. But having explained the duties of young men, which avail to the attainment of glory, we have next to speak about beneficence and liberality, the nature of which is twofold; 2. for a kindness is done to those who need it, by giving either our labor or our money. The latter is easier, especially to a wealthy person; but the former is the more noble and splendid, and more worthy of a brave and illustrious man. ‡

II., xviii., 2. || The case is different of him who is oppressed with misfortune, and of him who seeks to better his fortune without being in any adversity. 3. Our benignity will require to be more prompt toward the distressed, unless perhaps they merit their distress; yet from those who desire to be assisted, not that they may be relieved from affliction, but that they may ascend to a higher degree, we ought by no means to be altogether restricted, but to apply judgment and discretion in selecting proper persons. For Ennius observes well—"Benefactions ill bestowed, I deem malefactions." 4. But in that which is bestowed upon a worthy and grateful man there is profit, as well from himself as also from others; 5. for liberality, when free from rashness, is most agreeable, and many applaud it the more earnestly on this account, because the bounty of every very exalted man is the common refuge of all. 6. We should do our endeavor, then, that we may serve as many as possible with those benefits, the recollection of which may be handed down to their children and posterity, that it may not be in their power to be ungrateful; 7. for all men detest one forgetful of a benefit, and they consider that an injury is done even to themselves by discouraging liberality, and that he who does so is the common enemy of the poor. 8. And besides, that benignity is useful to the state by which captives are redeemed from slavery, and the poor are enriched. That it was indeed the

* [I omit sections 9-12.] † [I omit sections 15-19.] ‡ [I omit sections 3-15, and also the whole of chapters xvi. and xvii.] || [I omit section 1.]

common custom that this should be done by our order.* we see copiously described in the speech of Crassus. 9. This kind of bounty, therefore, I prefer far before the munificent exhibition of shows. That is the part of dignified and great men—this of flatterers of the populace, tickling, as it were, with pleasures the levity of the multitude. 10. It will, moreover, be expedient that a man, as he should be munificent in giving, so that he should not be harsh in exacting; and in every contract, in selling, buying, hiring, letting, to be just and good-natured to the vicinage and surrounding occupiers; conceding to many much that is his own right, but shunning disputes as far as he can conveniently, and I know not but even a little more than he can conveniently.†

II., xx., 11.‡ But our morals are corrupted and depraved by the admiration of other men's wealth. Though what concern is its amount to any of us? 12. Perhaps it is of use to him who owns it; not always even that: but admit that it is of use to himself, to be sure he is able to spend more, but how is he an honest man? 13. But if he shall be a good man besides, let his riches not prevent him from getting our assistance—only let them not help him to get it, and let the entire consideration be not how wealthy, but how worthy each individual is. 14. But the last precept about benefits and bestowing our labor is, do nothing hostile to equity—nothing in defense of injustice. For the foundation of lasting commendation and fame is justice—without which nothing can be laudable.

II., xxi., 1. But since I have finished speaking about that kind of benefits which have regard to a single citizen, we have next to discourse about those which relate to all the citizens together, and which relate to** the public good. 2. But of those very ones, some are of that kind which relate to all the citizens collectively; some are such that they reach to all individually, which are likewise the more agreeable. 3. The effort is by all means to be made, if possible, to†† consult for both, and notwithstanding, to consult also for them individually; but in such a manner that this may either serve, or at least should not oppose, the‡‡ public interest. 4. The grant of corn proposed by Caius Gracchus was large, and therefore would have exhausted the treasury; that of Marcus Octavius was moderate, both able to be borne by the‡‡ state, and necessary for

* The senatorial. † [I omit sections 11–16, and also the whole of chapter xix.]
 ‡ [I omit sections 1–10.] ** [Ad rem publicam.] †† [“We ought by all means to lend our endeavors to practice both kinds (of benefits), if it can be done, and that the interests of individuals also be provided for no less (than those of the community at large).”—*Antho*n (page 253).] ‡‡ [Rei publicæ.]

the commons; therefore it was salutary both for the citizens and for the nation. 5. But it is in the first place to be considered by him who shall have the administration of the government, that each may retain his own, and that no diminution of the property of individuals be made by public authority.*

14. But the principal matter in every administration of public business and employments is, that even the least suspicion of avarice be repelled. 15. "Would †," said Caius Pontius, the Samnite, "that fortune had reserved me for those times, and I had been born then, whenever the Romans may have begun to accept bribes—I would not have suffered them to reign much longer." 16. He surely would have had to wait many generations. For it is of late that this evil has invaded this state; therefore I am well pleased that Pontius was in existence rather at that time, since so much power resided in him. 17. It is not yet a hundred and ten years since a law about bribery was passed by Lucius Piso, when previously there had been no such law. But afterward there were so many laws, and each successive one more severe, so many persons arraigned, so many condemned, such an Italian war excited through fear of condemnations, such a rifling and robbing of our allies, those laws and judgments were suspended, that we are strong through the weakness of others, not through our own valor.

II, xxii., 1. Panætius applauds Africanus because he was self-denying. Why not applaud him? But in him there were other and greater characteristics; the praise of self-restraint was not the praise of the man only, but also of those times. 2. Paullus having possessed himself of the whole treasure of the Macedonians, which was most immense, brought so much wealth into the treasury, that the spoils of one commander put an end to taxes; but to his own house he brought nothing except the eternal memory of his name. 3. Africanus, imitating his father, was nothing the richer for having overthrown Carthage. 4. What! Lucius Memmius, who was his colleague in the censorship, was he the wealthier for having utterly destroyed the wealthiest of cities? He preferred ornamenting Italy rather than his own house—although by the adornment of Italy, his own house itself seems to me more adorned. 5. No vice, then, is more foul (that my discourse may return to the point from whence it digressed) than avarice, especially in great men and such as administer the republic. 6. For to make a gain of the republic is not only base, but wicked also, and abominable. 7. Therefore, that which the Pythian

* [I omit sections 6–13.] † [I omit part of the translation.]

Apollo delivered by his oracle, "that Sparta would perish by nothing but its avarice," he seems to have predicted not about the Lacedæmonians alone, but about all opulent nations. 8. Moreover, they who preside over the state can by no way more readily conciliate the good-will of the multitude than by abstinence and self-restraint.

9. But they who wish to be popular, and upon that account either attempt the agrarian affair, that the owners may be driven out of their possessions, or think that borrowed money should be released to the debtors, sap the foundations of the constitution; namely, that concord, in the first place, which can not exist when money is exacted from some, and forgiven to others; and equity, in the next place, which is entirely subverted, if each be not permitted to possess his own.*

II., xxiii, 1. And on account of this kind of injustice, the Lacedæmonians expelled their Ephorus Lysander, and put to death their king Agis—a thing which never before had happened among them. 2. And from that time such great dissensions ensued, that tyrants arose, and the nobles were exiled, and a constitution admirably established fell to pieces. 3. Nor did it fall alone, but also overthrew the rest of Greece by the contagion of evil principles, which having sprung from the Lacedæmonians, flowed far and wide. 4. What! was it not the agrarian contentions that destroyed our own Gracchi, sons of that most illustrious man Tiberius Gracchus, and grandsons of Africanus? 5. But, on the contrary, Aratus, the Sicyonian, is justly commended, who, when his native city had been held for fifty years by tyrants, having set out from Argos to Sicyon, by a secret entrance got possession of the city, and when on a sudden he had overthrown the tyrant Nicoteles, he restored six hundred exiles, who had been the wealthiest men of that state, and restored freedom to the state by his coming. 6. But when he perceived a great difficulty about the goods and possessions, because he considered it most unjust both that they whom he had restored, of whose property others had been in possession, should be in want, and he did not think it very fair that possessions of fifty years should be disturbed, because that after so long an interval many of those properties were got possession of without injustice, by inheritance, many by purchase, many by marriage portions; he judged neither that the properties ought to be taken from the latter, nor that these to whom they had belonged should be without satisfaction. 7. When, then, he had concluded that there was need of money to arrange that mat-

* [I omit sections 10-14.]

ter, he said that he would go to Alexandria, and ordered the matter to be undisturbed until his return. He quickly came to his friend Ptolemy, who was then reigning, the second after the building of Alexandria. 8. and when he had explained to him that he was desirous to liberate his country, and informed him of the case, this most eminent man readily received consent from the opulent king that he should be assisted with a large sum of money. 9. When he had brought this to Sicyon, he took to himself for his council fifteen noblemen, with whom he took cognizance of the cases, both of those who held other persons' possessions, and of those who had lost their own; and by valuing the possessions, he so managed as to persuade some to prefer receiving the money, and yielding up the possessions; others to think it more convenient that there should be paid down to them what was the price, rather than they should resume possession of their own. Thus it was brought about that all departed without a complaint, and concord was established. 10. Admirable man, and worthy to have been born in our nation! Thus it is right to act with citizens, not (as we have now seen twice*) to fix up a spear in the forum, and subject the goods of the citizens to the voice of the auctioneer. 11. But that Greek thought, as became a wise and superior man, that it was necessary to consult for all. And this is the highest reason and wisdom of a good citizen, not to make divisions in the interests of the citizens, but to govern all by the same equity. Should any dwell free of expense in another man's house? 12. Why so? Is it that when I shall have bought, built, repaired, expended, you, without my will, should enjoy what is mine? What else is this but to take from some what is theirs; to give to some what is another man's? But what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, unless that you should buy an estate with my money—that you should have the estate, and I should not have my money?

II., xxiv., 1. Wherefore, it ought to be provided that there be not such an amount of debt as may injure the state—a thing which may be guarded against in many ways; not that if there shall be such debt the rich should lose their rights, and the debtors gain what is another's—2. for nothing holds the state more firmly together than public credit, which can not at all exist unless the payment of money lent shall be compulsory. 3. It never was more violently agitated than in my consulship, that debts should not be paid; the matter was tried in arms and camps, by every rank and description of men, whom I resisted in such a manner, that this mischief of such magnitude was removed from the

* Under Sylla, and under Cæsar.

state. 4. Never was debt either greater, or better and more easily paid. For the hope of defrauding being frustrated, the necessity of paying followed.* 6. From this kind of liberality, then, to give to some, to take from others, they will keep aloof who would preserve the commonwealth, and will take particular care that each may hold his own in equity of right and judgments; and neither that advantage be taken of the poorer class, on account of their humbleness, nor that envy be prejudicial to the rich, either in keeping or recovering their own.†

8. Now, in these precepts about things profitable, Antipater the Tyrian, a Stoic, who lately died at Athens, considers that two things are passed over by Panætius—the care of health and of property—which matters I fancy were passed over by that very eminent philosopher because they were obvious; they certainly are useful. 9. Now, health is supported by understanding one's own constitution, and by observing|| what things are accustomed to do one good or injury; and by temperance in all food and manner of living, for the sake of preserving the body; and by forbearance in pleasures; and lastly, by the skill of those to whose profession these things belong. 10. Wealth ought to be acquired by those means in which there is no disgrace, but preserved by diligence and frugality, and increased, too, by the same means. 11. These matters Xenophon, the Socratic philosopher, has discussed very completely in that book which is entitled *Œconomics*, which I, when I was about that age at which you are now, translated from the Greek into Latin.‡

BOOK III., chapter i., § 1. Publius Scipio, my son Marcus, he who first was surnamed Africanus, was accustomed, as Cato, who was nearly of the same age as he, has written, to say “that he was never less at leisure than when at leisure, nor less alone than when he was alone.” 2. A truly noble saying, and worthy of a great and wise man, which declares that both in his leisure he was accustomed to reflect on business, and in solitude to converse with himself; so that he never was idle, and sometimes was not in need of the conversation of another. Thus, leisure and solitude, two things which cause languor to others, sharpened him. 3. I could wish it were in my power to say the same. But if I can not quite attain to any imitation of so great an excellence of disposition, I come very near it, in will at least. 4. For, being debarred by impious arms and force from public affairs and forensic business, I remain in retirement; and on that account having left

*[I omit section 5.] †[I omit the remainder of section 6 and the whole of section 7.] ‡[I omit chapter xxv.] ||[Xen. Mem. IV., vii., 9 (page 409 above).]

the city, wandering about the fields, I am often alone. 5. But neither is this leisure to be compared with the leisure of Africanus, nor this solitude with that. 6. For he, reposing from the most honorable employments of the state, sometimes took leisure to himself, and sometimes betook himself from the concourse and haunts of men into his solitude as into a haven: 7. but my retirement is occasioned by the want of business, not by the desire of repose. For, the senate being extinct, and courts of justice abolished, what is there that I could do worthy of myself, either in the senate-house or in the forum? 8. Thus, I who formerly lived in the greatest celebrity, and before the eyes of the citizens, now shunning the sight of wicked men, with whom all places abound, conceal myself as far as it is possible, and often am alone. 9. But since we have been taught by learned men, that out of evils it is fit not only to choose the least, but also from those very evils to gather whatever is good in them, I therefore am both enjoying rest—not such, indeed, as he ought who formerly procured rest for the state,—and I am not allowing that solitude which necessity, not inclination, brings me, to be spent in idleness.* 12. And thus I have written more in a short time, since the overthrow of the republic, than in the many years while it stood.

III., ii., 1. But as all philosophy, my Cicero, is fruitful and profitable, and no part of it uncultivated and desert—so no part in it is more fruitful and profitable than that about duties, from which the rules of living consistently and virtuously are derived. 2. Wherefore, although I trust you constantly hear and learn these matters from my friend Cratippus, the prince of the philosophers within our memory, yet I think it is beneficial that your ears should ring on all sides with such discourse, and that they, if it were possible, should hear nothing else. 3. Which, as it ought to be done by all who design to enter upon a virtuous life, so I know not but it ought by no one more than you; 4. for you stand under no small expectation of emulating my industry—under a great one of emulating my honors—under no small one, perhaps, of my fame. 5. Besides, you have incurred a heavy responsibility both from Athens and Cratippus; and since you have gone to these as to a mart for good qualities, it would be most scandalous to return empty, disgracing the reputation both of the city and of the master. 6. Wherefore, try and accomplish as much as you can, labor with your mind and with your industry (if it be labor to learn rather than a pleasure), and do not permit that, when all things have been supplied by me, you should seem

* [I omit sections 10 and 11.]

to have been wanting to yourself. 7. But let this suffice; for we have often written much to you for the purpose of encouraging you. Now let us return to the remaining part of our proposed division.

8. Panætius, then, who without controversy has discoursed most accurately about duties, and whom I, making some correction, have principally followed, having proposed three heads under which men were accustomed to deliberate and consult about duty—one, when they were in doubt whether that about which they were considering was virtuous or base; another, whether useful or unprofitable; a third, when that which had the appearance of virtue was in opposition to that which seemed useful, how this ought to be determined; he unfolded the two first heads in three books, but on the third head he said that he would afterward write, but did not perform what he had promised.*

III., iii., 1. Wherefore, there can not be a doubt about the opinion of Panætius; but whether it was right in him, or otherwise, to join this third part to the investigation of duty, about this, perhaps, there may be a question. 2. For whether virtue be the only good, as is the opinion of the Stoics, or whether that which is virtuous be, as it appears to your Peripatetics, so much the greatest good, that all things placed on the other side have scarcely the smallest weight; it is not to be doubted but that utility never can compare with virtue. 3. Therefore we have learned that Socrates used to execrate those who had first separated in theory those things cohering in nature. 4. To whom, indeed, the Stoics have so far assented, that they considered that whatever is virtuous is useful, and that nothing can be useful which is not virtuous. 5. But if Panætius was one who would say that virtue was to be cultivated only on this account, because it was a means of procuring profit, as they do who measure the desirableness of objects either by pleasure or by the absence of pain, it would be allowable for him to say that our interest sometimes is opposed to virtue. 6. But as he was one who judged that alone to be good which is virtuous, but that of such things as oppose this with some appearance of utility, neither the accession can make life better, nor the loss make it worse, it appears that he ought not to have introduced a deliberation of this kind, in which what seems profitable could be compared with that which is virtuous. 7. For what is called the *summum bonum* by the Stoics, to live agreeably to nature, has, I conceive, this meaning—always to conform to virtue; and as to all other things which may be according to nature, to

* [I omit sections 9–14.]

take them if they should not be repugnant to virtue. 8. And since this is so, some think that this comparison is improperly introduced, and that no principle should be laid down upon this head. 9. And, indeed, that perfection of conduct†† which is properly and truly called so, exists in the wise alone, and can never be separated from virtue. But in those persons in whom there is not perfect wisdom, that perfection can indeed by no means exist; but the likeness of it can.*

III., iv., 2.† Nor, indeed, when the two Decii or the two Scipios are commemorated as brave men, or when Fabricius and Aristides are called just, is either an example of fortitude looked for from the former, or of justice from the latter, as from wise men. 3. For neither of these was wise in such a sense as we wish the term wise man to be understood. Nor were these who were esteemed and named wise, Marcus Cato and Caius Lælius, wise men; nor were even those famous seven,‡ but from the frequent performance of mean duties they bore some similitude and appearance of wise men. 4. Wherefore, it is neither right to compare that which is truly virtuous with what is repugnant to utility, nor should that which we commonly call virtuous, which is cultivated by those who wish to be esteemed good men, ever be compared with profits. 5. And that [so much of] virtue which falls within our comprehension is as much to be maintained and preserved by us, as that which is properly called, and which truly is [the whole of] virtue, is by the wise. 6. For otherwise, whatever advancement is made toward virtue, it can not be maintained.|| But these remarks are made regarding those who are considered good men, on account of their observance of duties; 7. but those who measure all things by profit and advantage, and who do not consider that those things are outweighed by virtue, are accustomed, in deliberating, to compare virtue with that which they think profitable; good men are not so accustomed. 8. Therefore, I think that Panætius, when he said that men were accustomed to deliberate on this comparison, meant this very thing which he expressed—only that it was their custom, not that it was also their duty. 9. For not only to think

* [I omit sections 10–13.] † [I omit section 1.] ‡ The seven wise men of Greece. || [Perfect wisdom holds that nothing can be useful which is not virtuous; therefore virtue and utility can not conflict with each other (III., iii., 2–8). The imperfect wisdom of common men ought not to permit its imperfect conception of virtue to seem to stand opposed to utility (iii., 9; iv., 2–6). But the actual fact is that men do make comparisons which imply that virtue and expediency may be at variance (iv., 7–9); therefore instruction is necessary (iv., 10 and 14), and this is the object of this third book (III., ii., 8; II., iii., 1; I., iii., 8; III., vii., 7–8).] †† [HONESTUM, i. e. righteousness.]

more of what seems profitable than what is virtuous, but even to compare them one with the other, and to hesitate between them, is most shameful.

10. What is it, then, that is accustomed at times to raise a doubt, and seems necessary to be considered? I believe, whenever a doubt arises, it is what the character of that action may be about which one is considering.* 14. Therefore, that we may be able to decide without any mistake, if ever that which we call expediency (*utile*) shall appear to be at variance with that which we understand to be virtuous (*honestum*), a certain rule ought to be established, which if we will follow in comparing such cases, we shall never fail in our duty. 15. But this rule will be one conformable to the reasoning and discipline of the Stoics chiefly, which, indeed, we are following in these books, because, though both by the ancient Academicians and by your Peripatetics, who formerly were the same sect,† things which are virtuous are preferred to those which seem expedient; nevertheless, those subjects are more nobly treated of by those‡ to whom whatever is virtuous seems also expedient, and nothing expedient which is not virtuous, than by those according to whom that may be virtuous which is not expedient, and that expedient which is not virtuous. 16. But to us, our Academic sect gives this great license, that we, whatever may seem most probable, by our privilege are at liberty to maintain. But I return to my rule.

BOOK III., chapter v., § 1. To take away wrongfully, then, from another, and for one man to advance his own interests by the disadvantage of another man, is more contrary to nature than death, than poverty, than pain, than any other evils which can befall either our bodies or external circumstances. 2. For, in the first place, it destroys human intercourse and society; for if we will be so disposed that each for his own gain shall despoil or offer violence to another, the inevitable consequence is, that the society of the human race, which is most consistent with nature, will be broken asunder. 3. As, supposing each member of the body was so disposed as to think it could be well if it should draw to itself the health of the adjacent member, it is inevitable that the whole body would be debilitated and would perish; so if each of us should seize for himself the interests of another, and wrest whatever he could from each for the sake of his own emolument, the necessary consequence is, that human society and community would be overturned. 4. It is indeed allowed, nature not opposing, that each should rather acquire for himself than for another,

*[I omit sections 11–13.] †[See note ‡ page 423 above.] ‡ The Stoics.

whatever pertains to the enjoyment of life; but nature does not allow this, that by the spoliation of others we should increase our own means, resources, and opulence. 5 Nor indeed is this forbidden by nature alone—that is, by the law of nations—but it is also in the same manner enacted by the municipal laws of countries, by which government is supported in individual states, that it should not be lawful to injure another man for the sake of one's own advantage.* 6. For this the laws look to, this they require, that the union of the citizens should be unimpaired; those who are for severing it they coerce by death, by banishment, by imprisonment, by fine. 7. But what declares this much more is our natural reason, which is a law divine and human, which he who is willing to obey (and all will obey it who are willing to live according to nature) never will suffer himself to covet what is another person's, and to assume to himself that which he shall have wrongfully taken from another. 8. For loftiness and greatness of mind, and likewise community of feeling, justice and liberality, are much more in accordance with nature, than pleasure, than life, than riches—which things, even to condemn and count as nothing in comparison with the common good, is the part of a great and lofty soul. 9. Therefore, to take away wrongfully from another for the sake of one's own advantage, is more contrary to nature than death, than pain, than other considerations of the same kind. 10. And likewise, to undergo the greatest labors and inquietudes for the sake, if it were possible, of preserving or assisting all nations,† is more in accordance with nature than to live in solitude, not only without any inquietudes, but even amid the greatest pleasures, abounding in all manner of wealth, though you should also excel in beauty and strength. 11. Wherefore, every man of the best and most noble disposition much prefers that life to this.

12. From whence it is evinced that man, obeying nature, can not injure men.‡

III., vi., 1. One thing, therefore, ought to be aimed at by all men; that the interest of each individually, and of all collectively, should be the same; for if each should grasp at his individual interest, all human society will be dissolved. 2. And also, if nature

* “La plus sublime vertu est negative; elle nous instruit de ne jamais faire du mal a personne.”—*Rousseau*. [So also Paul. (Romans, ch. xiii., verse 10: “Love works no ill to one's neighbor; therefore love is the fulfillment of the Law.” American Bible Union, second revision, New York, 1873.) Cf. Koran, LIV., 4, in Rodwell's version (page 74).] † [I omit part of section 10 at this point.] ‡ [I omit sections 13–15.]

enjoins this, that a man should desire to consult the interest of a man, whoever he is, for the very reason that he is man, it necessarily follows that, as the nature, so the interest, of all mankind, is a common one. 3. If that be so, we are all included under one and the same law of nature; and if this too be true, we are certainly prohibited by the law of nature from injuring another. But the first is true; therefore, the last is true. 4. For that which some say, that they would take nothing wrongfully, for the sake of their own advantage, from a parent or brother, but that the case is different with other citizens, is indeed absurd. 5. These establish the principle that they have nothing in the way of right, no society with their fellow-citizens, for the sake of the common interest—an opinion which tears asunder the whole social compact. 6. They, again, who say that a regard ought to be had to fellow-citizens, but deny that it ought to foreigners, break up the common society of the human race (which being withdrawn, beneficence, liberality, goodness, justice, are utterly abolished. But they who tear up these things should be judged impious), 7.* the closest bond of which society is the consideration that it is more contrary to nature that man, for the sake of his own gain, should wrongfully take from man, than that he should endure all such disadvantages, either external or in the person, or even in the mind itself, as are not the effects of injustice. 8. For that one virtue, justice, is the mistress and queen of all virtues.

Some person will perhaps say—should not the wise man, then, if himself famished with hunger, wrest food from another, some good-for-nothing fellow? 9. By no means; for my life is not more useful to me than such a disposition of mind that I would do violence to no man for the sake of my own advantage.† 13. Disease, then, or poverty, or any thing of this sort, is not more contrary to nature than is the wrongful taking or coveting what is another's. But the desertion of the common interest is contrary to nature, for it is unjust.‡

III., vii., 3.|| But since I am putting, as it were, the top upon a work incomplete, yet nearly finished, as it is the custom of geometers not to demonstrate every thing, but to require that some postulates be granted to them, that they may more readily explain what they intend, so I ask of you, my Cicero, that you grant me, if you can, that nothing except what is virtuous is worthy to be sought for its own sake. 4. But if this be not

*[I omit the remainder of section 6 and the first part of section 7. I have used a () to enforce a close connection between the parts of the sections retained.]

†[I omit sections 10–12.] ‡[I omit sections 14–19.] ||[I omit sections 1 and 2.]

allowed you by Cratippus,* still you will at least grant that what is virtuous is most worthy to be sought for its own sake. Whichever of the two you please is sufficient for me, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other, seems the more probable; nor does any thing else seem probable.†

5. And in the first place, Panætius is to be defended in this, that he did not say that the really expedient could ever be opposed to the virtuous (for it was not permitted to him‡ to say so), but only those things which SEEMED expedient. 6. But he often bears testimony that nothing is expedient which is not likewise virtuous—nothing virtuous which is not likewise expedient; and he denies that any greater mischief has ever attacked the race of men than the opinion of those persons who would separate these things. 7. It was not, therefore, in order that we should prefer the expedient to the virtuous, but in order that we should decide between them without error, if ever they should come in collision, that he introduced that opposition which seemed to have, not which has, existence. 8. This part, therefore, thus abandoned, I will complete with no help, but, as it is said, with my own forces. 9. For there has not, since the time of Panætius, been any thing delivered upon this subject, of all the works which have come to my hands, that meets my approbation.

III., viii||., 1. When, therefore, any appearance of expediency is presented to you, you are necessarily affected by it; but if, when you direct your attention to it, you see moral turpitude attached to that which offers the appearance of expediency, then you are under an obligation not to abandon expediency, but to understand that there can not be real expediency where there is moral turpitude; 2. because, since nothing is so contrary to nature as moral turpitude (for nature desires the upright, the suitable and the consistent, and rejects the reverse), and nothing is so agreeable to nature as expediency, surely expediency and turpitude can not co-exist in the same subject. 3. And again, since we are born for virtue, and this either is the only thing to be desired, as it appeared to Zeno, or is at least to be considered weightier in its entire importance than all other things, as is the opinion of

* Cratippus, as a Peripatetic, held that virtue was not the only good, but that other things, such as health, etc., were good, and therefore to be sought for their own sakes, though in a less degree than virtue; or, in other words, the Peripatetics admitted natural as well as moral good—the Stoics did not. † That is to say, he does not admit the probability of the correctness of such as Epicurus, or Hieronymus, etc., who held that pleasure, the absence of pain, etc., were worth seeking on their own account. ‡ Because he was a Stoic. || [See note to chapter xiii., section 11, below.]

Aristotle, it is the necessary consequence, that whatever is virtuous either is the only, or it is the highest good; but whatever is good is certainly useful—therefore, whatever is virtuous is useful.

4. Wherefore, it is an error of bad men, which, when it grasps at something which seems useful, separates it immediately from virtue. 5. Hence spring stilettos, hence poisons, hence forgery of wills, hence thefts, embezzlements, hence robberies and extortions from allies and fellow-citizens, hence the intolerable oppressions of excessive opulence—hence, in fine, even in free states, the lust of sway, than which nothing darker or fouler can be conceived. 6. For men view the profits of transactions with false judgment, but they do not see the punishment—I do not say of the laws, which they often break through, but of moral turpitude itself, which is more severe. 7. Wherefore, this class of skeptics should be put out of our consideration (as being altogether wicked and impious), who hesitate whether they should follow that which they see is virtuous, or knowingly contaminate themselves with wickedness. For the guilty deed exists in the very hesitation, even though they shall not have carried it out. 8. Therefore, such matters should not be at all deliberated about, in which the very deliberation is criminal; and also from every deliberation the hope and idea of secrecy and concealment ought to be removed. 9. For we ought to be sufficiently convinced, if we have made any proficiency in philosophy, that even though we could conceal any transaction from all* [persons], yet that nothing avaricious should be done, nothing unjust, nothing licentious, nothing incontinent.†

III., x., 1. Many cases frequently occur, which disturb our minds by the appearance of expediency. Not when this is the subject of deliberation, whether virtue should be deserted on account of the magnitude of the profit (for on this, indeed, it is dishonest to deliberate), but this, whether or no that which seems profitable can be done without baseness.‡ 7. Chrysippus has judiciously made this remark like many others:—“He, who runs a race, ought to make exertions, and struggle as much as he can to be victor; but he ought by no means to trip up or push with his hand the person with whom he is contesting. Thus in life it is not unjust that each should seek for himself what may pertain to his advantage—it is not just that he should take from another.”

8. But our duties are principally confused in cases of friendship; for both not to bestow on them what you justly may, and to bestow what is not just, are contrary to duty. 9. But the rule re-

* [I omit a portion of section 9 at this point.] † [I omit chapter ix.] ‡ [I omit sections 2-6.]

garding this entire subject is short and easy. For those things which seem useful—honors, riches, pleasures, and other things of the same kind—should never be preferred to friendship. 10. But, on the other hand, for the sake of a friend a good man will neither act against the state, nor against his oath and good faith—not even if he shall be judge in the case of his friend—for he lays aside the character of a friend when he puts on that of a judge. 11. So much he will concede to friendship that he would rather the cause of his friend were just, and that he would accommodate him as to the time of pleading his cause as far as the laws permit. 12. But when he must pronounce sentence on his oath, he will remember that he has called the divinity as witness—that is, as I conceive, his own conscience, than which the deity himself has given nothing more divine to man.* [page 508 above.]

18. When, therefore, that which seems useful in friendship is compared with that which is virtuous, let the appearance of expediency be disregarded, let virtue prevail. 19. Moreover, when, in friendship, things which are not virtuous shall be required of us, religion and good faith should be preferred to friendship. Thus that distinction of duty which we are seeking will be preserved.

III., xi., 1. But it is in state affairs that men most frequently commit crimes under the pretext of expediency—as did our countrymen in the demolition of Corinth: the Athenians still more harshly, since they decreed that the thumbs of the Æginetans, who were skillful in naval matters, should be cut off. This seemed expedient; 2. for Ægina, on account of its proximity, was too formidable to the Piræus. But nothing which is cruel can be expedient; for cruelty is most revolting to the nature of mankind, which we ought to follow. 3. Those, too, do wrong who prohibit foreigners to inhabit their cities, and banish them, as Pennus did among our ancestors, and Papius did lately. 4. For it is proper not to permit him to be as a citizen who is not a citizen—a law which the wisest of consuls, Crassus and Scævola, introduced: but to prohibit foreigners from dwelling in a city is certainly inhuman. 5. Those are noble actions in which the appearance of public expediency is treated with contempt in comparison with virtue.† 10. Themistocles, after the victory in that war which took place with the Persians, said in the assembly, that he had a plan salutary for the state, but that it was necessary that it should not be publicly known. He demanded that the people should appoint somebody with whom he might communicate. 11. Aristides was appointed. To him he disclosed that the fleet of the Lacedæmonians,

*[I omit sections 13–17.] †[I omit sections 6–9.]

which was in dock at Gytheum, could secretly be burned; of which act the necessary consequence would be, that the power of the Lacedæmonians would be broken; 12. which, when Aristides had heard, he came into the assembly amid great expectations of the people, and said that the plan which Themistocles proposed was very expedient, but by no means honorable. Therefore, the Athenians were of opinion that what was not upright was not even expedient, and on the authority of Aristides, rejected that entire matter which they had not even heard. 13. They acted better than we who have pirates free from tribute, and allies paying taxes.

III., xii., 1. Let it be inferred, then, that what is base never is expedient, not even when you obtain what you think to be useful. For this very thinking what is base to be expedient, is mischievous. 2. But, as I said before, cases often occur, when profit seems to be opposed to rectitude, so that it is necessary to consider whether it is plainly opposed, or can be reconciled with rectitude. 3. Of that sort are these questions. If, for example, an honest man has brought from Alexandria to Rhodes a great quantity of grain during the scarcity and famine of the Rhodians, and the very high prices of provisions; if this same man should know that many merchants had sailed from Alexandria, and should have seen their vessels on the way laden with corn, and bound for Rhodes, should he tell that to the Rhodians, or keeping silence, should he sell his own corn at as high a price as possible? 4. We are supposing a wise and honest man; we are inquiring about the deliberation and consultation of one who would not conceal the matter from the Rhodians if he thought it dishonorable, but is in doubt whether it be dishonorable.* 5. In cases of this sort, one view was habitually taken by Diogenes, the Babylonian, a great and approved Stoic; and a different view by Antipater, his pupil, a very acute man. It seems right to Antipater, that every thing should be disclosed, so that the buyer should not be ignorant of any thing at all that the seller knew. To Diogenes it appears that the seller ought, just as far as is established by the municipal law, to declare the faults, to act in other respects without fraud; but since he is selling, to wish to sell at as good a price as possible.†

III., xiii, 2.‡ An honest man would dispose of a house on account of some faults which he himself knows, but others are ignorant of.|| 3. I ask, if the seller should not tell these things to the buyer, and should sell the house for a great deal more than he

* [See the note to xiii., 11, below.] † [I omit sections 6-10.] ‡ [I omit section 1.] || [I omit the remainder of section 2.]

thought he could sell it for, whether he would have acted unjustly or dishonestly? He surely would, says Antipater. 4. For if suffering a purchaser to come to loss, and to incur the greatest damage by mistake, be not that which is forbidden at Athens with public execrations, namely, a not pointing out the road to one going astray, what else is? 5. It is even more than not showing the way; for it is knowingly leading another astray. 6. Diogenes argues on the other side. Has he forced you to purchase who did not even request you to do so? He advertised for sale a house that did not please him; you have purchased one that pleased you. 7. But if they who advertised "a good and well-built country-house," are not thought to have practiced fraud, even though it be neither good nor well built; much less have they who have not praised their house. For where there is judgment in the buyer, what fraud can there be in the seller? 8. But if it be not necessary to make good all that is said, do you think it necessary to make good that which is not said? For what is more foolish than that the seller should relate the defects of that which he sells? Or, what so absurd as that, by the command of the owner, the auctioneer should thus proclaim: "I am selling an unhealthy house."

9. In some doubtful cases, then, virtue is thus defended on the one side; on the other side, it is said on the part of expediency, that it not only is virtuous to do that which seems profitable, but even disgraceful not to do it. This is that dissension which seems often to exist between the profitable and the virtuous. 10. Which matters we must decide. For we have not proposed them that we might make a question of them, but that we might explain them. 11. That corn merchant, then, seems to me* to be bound not to practice concealment on the Rhodians, nor this house-seller on the purchasers. For it is not practicing concealment if you should be

*[Chancellor Kent (Comm., lect., xxxix., vol. ii., page *491, note) (12th ed., 1873, pages [678], [679]) says that "Grotius (b. ii., ch. 12, sec. 9), and Puffendorf (*Droit de la Nature*, liv. 5, c. 3, sec. 4), as well as Pothier and others, dissent from the opinion of Cicero, and hold that one party is only bound not to suffer the other to be deceived as to circumstances relating *intrinsically* to the substance of the article sold." "It is a little singular, however," Kent remarks (*loc. cit.*), "that some of the best ethical writers, under the Christian dispensation, should complain of the moral lessons of Cicero as being too austere in their texture, and too sublime in speculation, for actual use. There is not, indeed, a passage in all Greek and Roman antiquity equal, in moral dignity and grandeur, to that in which Cicero lays it down as a fixed principle, that we ought to do nothing that is avaricious, nothing that is dishonest, nothing that is lascivious, even though we could escape the observation of" all. See Bk. III., ch. viii., (pages 570, 571 above), to which Kent explicitly refers.]

silent about any thing; but when for the sake of your own emolument you wish those, whose interest it is to know that which you know, to remain in ignorance. 12. Now, as to this sort of concealment, who does not see what kind of thing it is, and what kind of a man will practice it? Certainly not an open, not a single-minded, not an ingenuous, not a just, not a good man; but rather a wily, close, artful, deceitful, knavish, crafty, double-dealing, evasive fellow. Is it not inexpedient to expose ourselves to the imputations of so many vices, and even more?

III., xiv., 1. But if they are to be blamed who have kept silent, what ought to be thought of those who have practiced falsehood in word? 2. Caius Canius, a Roman knight, not without wit, and tolerably learned, when he had betaken himself to Syracuse, for the sake, as he was himself accustomed to say, of enjoyment, not of business, gave out that he wished to purchase some pleasure-grounds, whither he could invite his friends, and where he could amuse himself without intruders. 3. When this had got abroad, one Pythius, who practiced discounting at Syracuse, told him that he had pleasure-grounds, not indeed for sale, but that Canius was at liberty to use them as his own if he desired, and at the same time he invited the gentleman to dinner at the pleasure-grounds on the following day. 4. When he had promised to go, then Pythius, who, as a discounter, was well liked among all ranks, called some fishermen to him, and requested of them that upon the following day they should fish in front of his grounds, and told them what he wished them to do. 5. In due time, Canius came to dinner—the entertainment was sumptuously provided by Pythius—a crowd of fishing-boats before their eyes. Each fisherman for himself brought what he had caught; the fish were laid before the feet of Pythius. 6. Then Canius says, “What is this, pray [QUÆSO], Pythius—so much fish—so many boats?” And he answers, “What’s the wonder? Whatever fish there are at Syracuse are taken at this place; here is their watering-place; these men could not do without this villa.” Canius, inflamed with desire, presses Pythius to sell. 7. He is unwilling at first; but, to be brief, he obtains his wish. The man, eager and wealthy, purchases the place at as much as Pythius demands, and purchases it furnished. 8. He draws the articles and completes the transaction. Canius on the following day invites his friends. He comes early himself; he sees not a boat; he asks of his next neighbor, was it any holiday with the fishermen, that he saw none of them. “None that I know,” said he: “but none used to fish here, and therefore I was amazed at what happened yesterday.” Canius got angry; 9. yet

what could he do? for my colleague and friend Aquillius had not yet brought out the forms about criminal devices; 10. in which very forms, when it was inquired of him, "What is a criminal device?" he answered, "When one thing is pretended, and another thing done." Very clearly, indeed, was this laid down; as by a man skilled in definition. 11. Therefore, both Pythius, and all those who do one thing, while feigning another, are perfidious, base, knavish. No act of theirs, then, can be useful, when it is stained with so many vices.

III., xv., 1. But if the Aquillian definition is true, pretense and dissimulation ought to be banished from the whole of life; so that neither to buy better, nor to sell, will a good man feign or disguise any thing. 2. And this criminal device was punished both by the statute laws (as in the case of guardianship by the twelve tables, in that of the defrauding of minors, by the Plætorian law), and by judicial decisions without legal enactment, in which is added "according to good faith (EX FIDE BONA)."* 5. But criminal device, as Aquillius says, is comprised in pretense; therefore all deceit should be excluded from contracts. 6. The seller should not bring a person to bid over the value, nor the buyer one to bid under him. Each of the two, if he should come to name a price, should not name a price more than once. 7. Quintus Scævola, indeed, the son of Publius, when he required that a price of a property of which he was about to become a purchaser should be named to him once for all, and the seller had done so, said that he valued it at more, and gave in addition a hundred sestertia. 8. There is no person who can deny that this was the act of an honest man; they deny that it was of a prudent man; just as it would be if a man should sell a thing for less than he could get. 9. This, then, is the mischief—that persons think some men honest, others prudent; through which mistake Ennius remarks, "that the wise man is wise in vain, who can not be of use to himself." That indeed is true, if it be only agreed on between me and Ennius what "to be of use" means.† 13. But if pretense and dissimulation are criminal devices, [and since, moreover] there are few affairs in which that criminal device may not be employed; or [in other words] if a good man is he who serves whom he can, injures nobody—certainly we do not easily find such a good man. 14. To do wrong, then, is never profitable, because it is always base; and to be a good man is always profitable, because it is always virtuous.

III., xvi., 1. And with respect to the law of landed estates, it is ordained among us by the civil law, that in selling them, the

* [I omit sections 3 and 4.] † [I omit sections 10–12.]

faults should be declared which were known to the seller. 2. For though by the twelve tables it was sufficient to be answerable for those defects which were expressly mentioned, which he who denied suffered a penalty of double the value, yet a penalty for silence also was established by the lawyers. 3. For they determined that, if the seller knew whatever defect there was in an estate, he ought to make it good, unless it was expressly mentioned. 4. Thus, when the augurs were about to officiate on the augurs' hill, and had commanded Titus Claudius Centumalus, who had a house on the Cælian Mount, to take down those parts of it, the height of which obstructed their auspices, Claudius set up the house for sale, and he sold it; Publius Calpurnius Lanarius purchased it. That same notice was given to him by the augurs; 5. therefore, when Calpurnius had pulled it down, and had discovered that Claudius had advertised the house after he had been commanded by the augurs to pull it down, he brought him before an arbitrator, to decide "what he ought to give or do for him in good faith." 6. Marcus Cato pronounced the sentence; the father of this our Cato (for as other men are to be named from their father, so he who begot that luminary ought to be named from his son). 7. This judge, then, decreed as follows:—"Since in selling he had known that matter, and had not mentioned it, that he ought to make good the loss to the purchaser." Therefore he established this principle, that it concerned good faith that a defect which the seller was aware of should be made known to the purchaser.*

III., xvii., 1. But the laws abolish frauds in one way, philosophers in another: the laws, as far as they can lay hold of them by their arm; philosophers, as far as they can check them by reason and wisdom. Reason, then, requires that nothing be done insidiously, nothing dissemblingly, nothing falsely. 2. Is it not then an ensnaring to lay a net, even though you should not beat up the game, nor hunt them to it? For the wild creatures often fall into it of themselves, no one pursuing them. So is it fit you should set up your house for sale, put up a bill like a net, sell the house because of its defects, and that somebody should rush into it unwittingly? 3. Though I see that this, on account of the corruption of manners, is neither esteemed base in morals, nor forbidden either by statutable enactments or by civil law; yet it is forbidden by the law of nature. 4. For there is the social tie between man and man which is of the widest extent, which, though I have often mentioned it, yet needs to be mentioned oftener. There is a closer tie between those who are of the same nation; a closer still be-

*[I omit sections 8-11.]

tween those who are of the same state. 5. Our ancestors, therefore, were of opinion that the law of nations [*JUS GENTIUM*] was one thing, the municipal law [*JUS CIVILE*] a different thing. Whatever is civil law, the same is not, for that reason, necessarily the law of nations; but whatever is the law of nations, the same ought to be civil law. 6. But we possess no solid and express image of true right and its sister justice: we use merely their shade and faint resemblances. Would that we followed even these, for they are taken from the best patterns of nature and truth! 7. For how admirable are those words, "that I be not ensnared and defrauded on account of you and your honesty." What golden words those—"that among honest men there be fair dealing, and without fraud." But who are honest men, and what is fair dealing, is the great question. 8. Quintus Scævola, indeed, the high priest, used to say that there was the greatest weight in all those decisions in which was added the form "of good faith;" and he thought the jurisdiction of good faith extended very widely, and that it was concerned in wardships, societies, trusts, commissions, buyings, sellings, hirings, lettings, in which the intercourse of life is comprised; that in these it is the part of a great judge to determine (especially since there were contrary decisions in most cases) what each ought to be accountable for to each. 9. Wherefore craftiness* ought to be put away, and that knavery which would fain seem, indeed, to be prudence, but which is far from it, and differs most widely. 10. For prudence consists in the distinguishing of good and evil†—knavery, if all things that are vicious are evil, prefers evil to good.‡

13. From which it will be understood, since nature is the fountain of right, that it is according to nature that no one should act in such a manner, that he should prey on the ignorance of another. 14. Nor can there be found in life any greater curse than the pretense of wisdom in knavery; from which those innumerable cases proceed, where the useful seems to be opposed to the virtuous. For how few will be found who, when promised perfect secrecy and impunity, can abstain from injustice?

III., xviii., 1. Let us test the principle, if you please, in those examples in which, indeed, the mass of mankind do not think perhaps that there is any crime. 2. For it is not necessary in this place to treat of assassins, poisoners, will-forgers, robbers, embezzlers, who are to be kept down, not by means of words and the disputation of philosophers, but by chains and a dungeon. But let us consider these acts, which they who are esteemed honest

* [Arist. Nic. Eth. VI., xii., 8 (page 476 above).] † [Cf. Xen. Mem. III., 5 (page 378 above).] ‡ [I omit sections 11 and 12.]

men commit. 3. Some persons brought from Greece to Rome a forged will of Lucius Minucius Basilus, a rich man. 4. That they might the more easily obtain their object, they put down as legatees along with themselves, Marcus Crassus and Quintus Hortensius, the most powerful men of that day; who, though they suspected that it was a forgery, but were conscious of no crime in themselves, did not reject the paltry gift of other men's villainy. 5. What then? Was this enough, that they should not be thought to have been culpable? To me, indeed, it seems otherwise; though I loved one of them when living, and do not hate the other, now that he is dead.* 6. But when Basilus had willed that Marcus Satrius, his sister's son, should bear his name, and had made him his heir (I am speaking of him who was patron of the Picene and Sabine districts; oh! foul stigma upon those times!*) was it fair that those noble citizens should have the property, and that nothing but the name should come down to Satrius? 7. For if he who does not keep off an injury, nor repel it if he can from another, acts unjustly, as I asserted in the first book, what is to be thought of him who not only does not repel, but even assists in the injury? 8. To me, indeed, even true legacies do not seem honorable, if they are acquired by deceitful fawning—not by the reality, but by the semblance of kind offices. 9. But in such matters the profitable is sometimes accustomed to be thought one thing, and the honest another thing. Falsely; for the rule about profit is the same as that which obtains respecting honesty. 10. To him who will not thoroughly perceive this, no fraud, no villainy will be wanting; 11. for, considering thus, "that, indeed, is honest, but this is expedient," he will dare erroneously to separate things united by nature—which is the fountain of all frauds, malpractices, and crimes.

III., xix., 1. If a good man, then, should have this power, that by snapping his fingers his name could creep by stealth into the wills of the wealthy, he would not use this power, not even if he had it for certain that no one at all would ever suspect it. 2. But should you give this power to Marcus Crassus, that by the snapping of his fingers he could be inscribed heir, when he really was not heir; believe me, he would have danced in the forum. 3. But the just man, and he whom we deem a good man, would take

* Marcus Satrius, having taken his uncle's name, Lucius Minucius Basilus, was chosen as patron by those districts—he was a partisan of Cæsar in the civil war. In the eyes of Cicero it was, of course, a foul stain upon the times that a friend of Cæsar should be chosen as patron, especially since, as he insinuates in the 2d Philippic, it was through fear, not love, he was selected for that honor.

nothing from any man in order to transfer it wrongfully to himself. Let him who is surprised at this confess that he is ignorant of what constitutes a good man. 4. But if any one would be willing to develop the idea involved in his own mind, he would at once convince himself that a good man is he who serves whom he can, and injures none except when provoked by injury. 5. What then? Does he hurt none, who, as if by some enchantment, accomplishes the exclusion of the true heirs, and the substitution of himself in their place? 6. Should he not do, then, somebody will say, what is useful, what is expedient? Yes, but he should understand that nothing is either expedient or useful which is unjust. He who has not learned this, can not be a good man.

7. When a boy, I learned from my father that Fimbria, the consular,* was judge in the case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthia, Roman knight, a truly honest man, when he had given security,† (*which he was to forfeit*) "unless he was a good man;" and that Fimbria thereupon told him that he never would decide that matter, lest he should either deprive a worthy man of his character if he decided against him, or should be seen to have established that any one was a good man, when this matter was comprised in innumerable duties and praiseworthy actions. 8. To this good man, then, whom even Fimbria, not Socrates alone had known, any thing which is not morally right can, by no means seem to be expedient. 9. Such a man, then, not only will not venture to do, but not even to think, what he would not venture openly to proclaim. 10. Is it not disgraceful that philosophers should hesitate about this, which not even rustics doubt—from whom is derived this proverb, which has now become trite through antiquity; for when they commend the integrity and worthiness of any person, they say "he is one with whom you might play odd and even in the dark." 11. What meaning has this proverb but this, that nothing is expedient which is not morally right, even though you could obtain it without any body proving you guilty. 12.‡ For as, how much soever that which is base may be concealed, yet it can by no means become morally right (*honestum*), so it can not be made out that whatever is morally wrong can be expedient, since nature is adverse and repugnant.

* So called to distinguish him from Caius Fimbria, who having by his intrigues occasioned the death of Lucius Flaccus, the proconsul of Asia (eighty-five years B. C.), was subsequently conquered by Sylla, and terminated his career by suicide. † The "sponsio" was a sum deposited in court, or promised with the usual formula—*ni veram causam haberet*. If the party who thus gave security was defeated, the money was forfeited to the treasury. ‡ [I omit the first part of section 12.]

III., xx., 1. But when the prizes are very great, there is a temptation to do wrong. When Caius Marius was far from the hope of the consulship, and was now in the seventh year of his torpor, after obtaining the prætorship, and did not seem likely ever to stand for the consulship, he accused Quintus Metellus, a very eminent man and citizen, whose lieutenant he was, before the Roman people of a charge that he was protracting the war, when he had been sent to Rome by him—his own commander;—stating that if they would make himself consul, that he would in a short time deliver Jugurtha, either alive or dead, into the power of the Roman people. 2. Upon this he was indeed made consul, but he deviated from good faith and justice, since, by a false charge, he brought obloquy upon a most excellent and respectable citizen, whose lieutenant he was, and by whom he had been sent. 3. Even my relative Gratidianus did not discharge the duty of a good man at the time when he was prætor, and the tribunes of the people had called in the college of the prætors, in order that the matter of the coinage might be settled by a joint resolution. For at that period the coinage was in a state of uncertainty, so that no man could know how much he was worth. 4. They drew up in common an edict, with a fine and conviction annexed, and agreed that they should all go up together to the rostra, in the afternoon. 5. And while the rest of them, indeed, went off each a different way, Marius, from the judgment seats, went straight to the rostra, and singly published that which had been arranged in common. And this proceeding, if you inquire into the result, brought him great honor. In every street statues of him were erected, and at these incense and tapers were burned. What need of many words? No man ever became a greater favorite with the multitude. 6. These are the things which sometimes perplex our deliberations, when that in which equity is violated seems not a very great crime, but that which is procured by it appears a very great advantage. Thus to Marius it seemed not a very base act to snatch away the popular favor from his colleagues and the tribunes of the people, but it appeared a very expedient thing by means of that act to become consul, which at that time he had proposed to himself. 7. But there is for all, the one rule which I wish to be thoroughly known to you; either let not that which seems expedient be base, or if it be base let it not seem expedient. 8. What then? Can we judge either the former Marius or the latter,* a good man? Unfold and examine your understanding, that you may see what in it is the idea, form, and notion of a good man.

* Namely, Marcus Marius Gratidianus.

9. Does it then fall under the notion of a good man to lie for the sake of his own advantage, to make false charges, to overreach, to deceive? Nothing, indeed, less so. 10. Is there, then, any thing of such value, or any advantage so desirable, that for it you would forfeit the splendor and name of a good man? 11. What is there which that expediency, as it is called, can bring, so valuable as that which it takes away, if it deprive you of the name of a good man, if it rob you of your integrity and justice? *

III., xxi., 1. What? Are not they who disregard all things upright and virtuous, provided they can attain power, doing the same as he † who was willing to have even for his father-in-law, that man ‡ by whose audacity he might himself become as powerful? 2. It seemed expedient to him to become as powerful as possible by the unpopularity of the other. He did not see how unjust that was toward his country, and how base and how useless. 3. But the father-in-law himself always had in his mouth the Greek verses from the Phœnissæ, which I will translate as well as I can—inelegantly, perhaps, yet so that the meaning can be understood:—“For if justice ought ever to be violated, it is to be violated for the sake of ruling; in other cases cherish the love of country.”

4. Eteocles, or rather Euripides, deserved death for making an exception of that one crime, which is the most accursed of all. Why, then, do we repress petty villainies, or fraudulent inheritances, trades, and sales? 5. Here is a man for you, who aspired to be king of the Roman people, and master of all nations, and accomplished it—6. if any one says this desire is an honest one, he is a madman. For he approves of the murder of our laws and liberty; the foul and abominable oppression of these he thinks glorious. 7. But by what reproof, or rather by what reproach, should I attempt to tear away from so great an error the man who admits that to usurp kingly power in that state which was free, and which ought to be so, is not a virtuous act, but is expedient for him who can accomplish it? ||

9. Expediency, then, should be guided by virtue, and indeed so that these two may seem to differ from each other in name, but to signify the same in reality. 10. In vulgar opinion I know not what advantage can be greater than that of sovereign sway, but, on the contrary, when I begin to recall my reason to the truth, I

* [I omit section 12.] † Pompey ‡ Caesar, whose daughter Julia was sought and obtained in marriage by Pompey, who being, from his great power, suspected of ambitious designs by the people, with whom Cæsar was a favorite, wished by the alliance to bring a share of the suspicion under which himself labored upon his rival, and thus to diminish his popularity. || [I omit section 8.]

find nothing more disadvantageous to him who shall have attained it unjustly. 11. Can torments, cares, daily and nightly fears, a life full of snares and perils, be expedient for any man? 12. "The enemies and traitors to sovereignty are many, its friends few," says Accius. But to what sovereignty? That which was justly obtained, having been transmitted by descent from Tantalus and Pelops. 13. Now, how many more do you think are enemies to that king, who with the military force of the Roman people crushed that very Roman people, and compelled a state that was not only free, but also the ruler of the nations, to be slaves to him? What stains, what stings of conscience do you conceive that man to have upon his soul? 14. Moreover, could his life be a beneficial one to himself, when the condition of that life was this, that he who deprived him of it would be held in the highest esteem and glory? 15. But if these things be not useful, which seem so in the highest degree, because they are full of disgrace and turpitude, we ought to be quite convinced that there is nothing expedient which is not virtuous.

III., xxii., 1. But this indeed was decided, as well on other occasions frequently, as by Caius Fabricius, in his second consulship, and by our senate in the war with Pyrrhus. 2. For when king Pyrrhus had made aggressive war upon the Roman people, and when the contest was maintained for empire with a generous and potent monarch, a deserter from him came into the camp of Fabricius, and promised him, if he would propose a reward for him, that as he had come secretly, so he would return secretly into the camp of Pyrrhus, and dispatch him with poison. Fabricius took care that this man should be sent back in custody to Pyrrhus, and this conduct of his was applauded by the senate. 3. And yet if we pursue the appearance and notion [*opinionem*] of advantage, one deserter would have rid us of that great war, and of that formidable adversary; but it would have been a great disgrace and scandal, that he, with whom the contest was for glory, had been conquered, not by valor, but by villainy. 4. Whether was it then more expedient, for Fabricius, who was such a person in our state as Aristides was at Athens, or for our senate, which never separated expediency from dignity, to fight against an enemy with arms or with poison? 5. If empire is to be sought for the sake of glory, away with guilt in which there can not be glory; but if power itself* is to be sought by any means whatever, it can not be expedient when allied to infamy. 6. That proposition, therefore,

*[For itself, for its own sake, not for the sake of glory, but for the sake of power.]

of Lucius Philippus, the son of Quintus, was not expedient that those states, which, by a decree of the senate, Lucius Sylla, on receiving a sum of money, had made free, should again be subject to tribute, and that we should not return the money which they had given for their freedom. 7. To this the senate agreed. Disgrace to the empire! For the faith of pirates is better than was the senate's. But our revenues have been increased by it—therefore it was expedient! 8. How long will people venture to say that any thing is expedient which is not virtuous? Now, can odium and infamy be useful to any empire which ought to be supported by glory and the good-will of its allies? 9. I often disagreed in opinion even with my friend Cato. For he seemed to me too rigidly to defend the treasury and tributes; to deny all concessions to the farmers of the revenue; and many to our allies, when we ought to have been munificent toward the latter, and to have treated the former as we were accustomed to do our colonists, and so much the more, because such a harmony between the orders* conduced to the safety of the republic.†

III., xxiii., 1. The sixth book of Hecaton "*De Officiis*" is full of such questions—whether it be the part of a good man, in an exceedingly great scarcity of provisions, not to feed his slaves.‡ 9. He also asks, if a wise man should receive base money unawares for good, shall he, when he shall have come to know it, pay it instead of good, if he owes money to any person? 10. Diogenes affirms this; Antipater denies it—and with him I rather agree.||

12. It is plain now, both what is my view, and what is the controversy between those philosophers whom I have mentioned.**

III., xxv., 9.†† Now, indeed, of those things which seem to be profitable, contrary to justice, but with the semblance of prudence, I think enough has been said. 10. But since in the first book [ch. v., § 2 (page 516 above)] we derived duties from the four sources of virtue, we shall be engaged with those same, while we show that those things which seem to be useful are not so as long as they are hostile to virtue. 11. And indeed of prudence, which craft is apt to imitate, and likewise of justice, which is always expedient, we have already treated. 12. Two parts of

*The equestrian order, who were the farmers of the revenue, and the senators, who exacted too rigidly the full amount of the contracts, notwithstanding any event that might render the taxes less valuable to the farmers. This disgusted the knights with the senate, and threw them into the arms of Cæsar, who procured for them a remission of part of their liabilities. †[I omit sections 10 and 11.] ‡[I omit the remainder of section 1, and the whole of sections 2-8]. ||[I omit the remainder of section 10, the whole of section 11, and the first part of section 12.] **[See ch. xii., xiii. (pages 573, 574 above).] ††[I omit sections 1-8, and also the whole of chapter xxiv.]

virtue remain, of which the one is discerned in the greatness and pre-eminence of an elevated mind; the other in the habit and regulation of continence and temperance.

III., xxvi., 7.* Marcus Atilius Regulus, when in his second consulship taken in Africa by stratagem by Xanthippus, the Lacedæmonian general—but when Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, was the commander-in-chief—was sent to the senate, bound by an oath, that unless some noble captives were restored to the Carthaginians, he should himself return to Carthage. 8. When he arrived at Rome, he saw the semblance of advantage, but, as the event declares, judged it a fallacious appearance, which was this — to remain in his country, to stay at home with his wife and his children; and, regarding the calamity which he had experienced as incident to the fortune of war, to retain the rank of consular dignity. Who can deny these things to be profitable? Who do you think? Greatness of mind and fortitude deny it.

III., xxvii., 4.† When his authority had prevailed, the captives were retained, and he returned to Carthage; nor did the love of his country or of his family withhold him. 5. Nor was he then ignorant that he was returning to a most cruel enemy, and to exquisite tortures. But he considered that his oath ought to be observed. 6. Therefore, at the very time when he was undergoing death by want of sleep, he was in a better condition than if he had remained at home an aged captive, and a perjured‡ consular.||

III., xxviii., . Men pervert those things which are the foundations of nature, when they separate expediency from virtue. For we all desire our own interest—we are carried along to it; nor can we by any means do otherwise. 2. For who is there that shuns his own advantage? or rather, who is there that does not most eagerly pursue it? 3. But because we never can find real advantage except in good report, honor, virtue; therefore we esteem these things first and chief; we consider the name of utility not so much noble as necessary. 4. What is there, then, somebody will say, in an oath? **

III., xxix., 3.†† But in an oath it ought to be considered, not what is the FEAR, but what is the FORCE. 4. For an oath is a religious affirmation; but what you solemnly promise, as if the deity were witness, to that you ought to adhere.‡‡

*[I omit sections 1–6.] †[I omit sections 1–3.] ‡[See I., xiii., 2 (page 521 above).] ||[I omit sections 7 and 8.] **[I omit the remainder of section 4, and the whole of sections 5–10.] ††[I omit sections 1 and 2.] ‡‡[I omit the remainder of section 4, and the whole of sections 5–9.]

10. But as to what they say, choose the least of evils—that is [choose] baseness rather than calamity—can there be any evil greater than baseness? And if this implies something of disgust in the deformity of person [CORPORIS], how much worse should appear the depravity and foulness of a debased mind?*

III., xxx., 6.† But, say they, that which was extorted by force ought not to be ratified; as if, indeed, force could be used to a man of fortitude. 7. Why, then, you say, did Regulus go to the senate, if he was about to dissuade them concerning the captives? You are reprehending that which was the noblest thing in that transaction; 8. for he did not rely upon his own judgment, but he undertook the cause that there might be a decision of the senate; by whom, had not he himself been the adviser of the measure, the prisoners, indeed, would have been restored to the Carthaginians. Thus Regulus would have remained in safety in his country; 9. which, because he thought inexpedient for his country, therefore he believed it virtuous in himself both to think and to suffer these things. 10. Now, as to what they say, that whatever is very useful becomes virtuous, I say, Nay, it is so really, and does not merely become so; for nothing is expedient which is not likewise virtuous; and it is not because it is expedient that it is virtuous, but because it is virtuous it is expedient.‡

III., xxxiii., 1. The fourth part remains, which is comprehended in propriety, moderation, modesty, continence, temperance. 2. Can any thing, then, be expedient, which is contrary to this train of such virtues? 3. However, the Cyrenæans, followers of Aristippus, and the Annicerians, misnamed philosophers, have made all good consist in pleasure, and have thought virtue to be commended on this account, because it is productive of pleasure; but, as they are antiquated, Epicurus flourishes, the advocate and author of nearly the same opinion. 4. Against these we must fight with man and horse, as it is said, if it is our intention to defend and retain virtue. 5. For if not only expediency, but all the happiness of life, be contained in a strong bodily constitution, and in the certain hope of that constitution, as it is written by Methrodorus; certainly this expediency, and that the greatest (as they think), will stand in opposition to virtue. 6. For, in the first place, where will room be given for prudence? Is it that it may seek on all sides after sweets? 7. How miserable the servitude of virtue, when the slave of pleasure? Moreover, what would be the office of Prudence? Is it to select pleasures ingeniously? Admit

*[I omit sections 11–22.] †[I omit sections 1–5.] ‡[I omit section 11, and also the whole of chapters xxxi. and xxxii.]

that nothing could be more delightful than this; what can be imagined more base? 8. Now, what room can Fortitude, which is the contemning of pain and labor, have in his system, who calls pain the greatest of evils? 9. For though Epicurus may speak, as he does in many places, with sufficient fortitude regarding pain; nevertheless, we are not to regard what he may say, but what it is consistent in him to say, as he would confine good to pleasure, evil to pain; so if I would listen to him on the subject of continence and temperance, he says, indeed, many things in many places; but there is an impediment in the stream,* as they say. 10. For how can he commend temperance who places the chief good in pleasure? For temperance is hostile to irregular passions; but irregular passions are the companions of pleasure. 11. And yet, in these three classes of virtue, they make a shift, in what ever manner they can, not without cleverness. 12. They introduce prudence as the science which supplies pleasures and repels pain. Fortitude, too, they explain in some manner, when they teach that it is the means of disregarding death, and enduring pain. 13. Even temperance they introduce—not very easily, indeed—but yet in whatever way they can. For they say that the height of pleasure is limited to the absence of pain.† Justice staggers, or rather falls to the ground, and all those virtues which are discerned in society, and the association of mankind. 14. For neither kindness, nor liberality, nor courtesy can exist, any more than friendship, if they are not sought for their own sakes, but are referred to pleasure and interest. 15. Let us, therefore, sum up the subject in a few words. For as we have taught that there is no expediency which can be contrary to virtue: so we say that all bodily pleasure is opposed to virtue. 16. On which account I think Calipho and Dinomachus the more deserving of censure, for they thought they would put an end to the controversy if they should couple pleasure with virtue.‡ 17. Virtue does not admit that combination—it spurns, it repels it [§ 242]. Nor can, indeed, the ultimate principle of good and evil, which ought to be simple, be compounded of, and tempered with these most dissimilar ingredients. 18. But about this (for it is an important subject), I have said more in another place. Now to my original proposition. 19. How, then, if ever that which seems expedient is opposed to virtue, the matter is to be decided, has been sufficiently treated of above. 20. But if pleasure be said to have even the semblance of

* Meaning that the system of Epicurus presents impediments to the flowing of the virtues, like obstructions in a water-course. † That is, that the greatest pleasure consists in the absence of pain. ‡ [I omit the remainder of section 16.]

expedience, there can be no union of it with virtue. 21. For though we may concede something to pleasure, perhaps it has something of a relish, but certainly it has in it nothing of utility.

III., xxxiv., 1. You have a present from your father, my son Marcus; in my opinion, indeed, an important one—but it will be just as you will receive it. However, these three books will deserve to be received by you as guests among the commentaries of Cratippus. 2. But as, if I myself had gone to Athens (which would indeed have been the case had not my country, with loud voice, called me back from the middle of my journey), you would sometimes have listened to me also: so, since my voice has reached you in these volumes, you will bestow upon them as much time as you can; and you can bestow as much as you wish. 3. But when I shall understand that you take delight in this department of science, then will I converse with you both when present, which will be in a short time, as I expect—and while you will be far away. I will talk with you, though absent. Farewell, then, my Cicero, and be assured that you are indeed very dear to me, but that you will be much more dear if you shall take delight in such memorials and precepts.

§ 1044.—Arabians, Scholastics, and Eclectics. (page 39, line 19.)

§ 1045.—Bacon and Descartes. (page 40, line 5.)

§ 1046.—Leibnitz and Locke. (page 40, line 23.)

§ 1047.—Faulty method of Leibnitz and Wolf. (page 41, line 4.)

§ 1048.—Newton. (page 41, line 14.)

§ 1049.—Our age is that of criticism. (page 41, line 22.)

Chapter V.—Cognition in general—Intuitive and discursive cognition; intuition and conception, and their distinction in particular—Logical and æsthetical perfection of cognition. (§§ 1050–1063 inclusive.)

§ 1050.—All our cognition refers (1) to the object, and (2) to the subject. (1) Representation; (2) consciousness. (page 42, line 17.)

§ 1051.—Every cognition has (1) a matter, and (2) a form. (page 43, line 1.)

§ 1052.—Consciousness is the essential condition of all logical form of cognitions. (page 43, line 12.)

§ 1053.—Representation is not cognition; but cognition always presupposes representation. (page 43, line 19.)

§ 1054.—All clear representations (to which alone the logical rules can be applied) may be distinguished with regard to distinctness and to indistinctness. (page 44, line 7.)

§ 1055.—Indistinct representations improperly termed confused (by the disciples of Wolf). (page 45, line 5.)

§ 1056.—Distinctness may be two-fold: (1) sensual; (2) intellectual. (page 46, line 1.)

§ 1057.—All our cognitions are either (1) intuitions (of the sensitivity), or (2) conceptions (of the understanding). (page 46, line 26.)

§ 1058.—Perfection of cognition is either (1) æsthetical (relating to the sensitivity), or (2) logical (relating to the understanding). (page 47, line 20.)

§ 1059.—Essential æsthetical perfection (the BEAUTIFUL) specifically distinguished from the unessential (the agreeable). (page 48, line 7.)

§ 1060.—Study to furnish logically perfect cognitions with an æsthetical perfection. (page 48, line 27.)

§ 1061.—Rules for the conjunction of æsthetical and logical perfection in our cognitions. (page 49, line 28.)

§ 1062.—Logical and æsthetical perfections of cognition compared in regard to (1) quantity, (2) quality, (3) relation, and (4) modality. (page 50, line 15.)

§ 1063.—Unity is essential to all perfection of cognition. (page 51, line 26.)

PARTICULAR LOGICAL PERFECTIONS OF COGNITION. (A) QUANTITY; (B) RELATION; (C) QUALITY; (D) MODALITY.
(§§ 1064-1149 inclusive.)

Chapter VI.—Greatness—Extensive and intensive greatness—Copiousness and profoundness or importance and fertility of cognition—Determination of the horizon of our cognition. (§§ 1064-1076 inclusive.)

TITLE A.—LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION AS TO QUANTITY.

§ 1064.—Greatness of cognition may be taken in a two-fold sense: (1) extensive; (2) intensive (§ 1076). (page 52, line 24.)

§ 1065.—Horizon of our cognitions may be determined (1) logically, (2) æsthetically, and (3) practically. (page 53, line 7.)

§ 1066.—Objectively, the horizon of cognition is either historical or rational. (page 54, line 11.)

§ 1067.—Subjectively, the horizon of cognition is either universal or particular. (page 55, line 1.)

§ 1068.—Every logically perfect cognition is always of some possible use. (page 55, line 17.)

§ 1069.—Rules for our demarkation of our cognition. (page 57, line 1.)

§ 1070.—Ignorance, objectively, is either material or formal. (page 58, line 27.)

§ 1071.—Ignorance, subjectively, is either learned or common. (page 59, line 10.)

§ 1072.—Learning which is cyclopic (or wants an eye—the eye of philosophy). (page 60, line 26.)

§ 1073.—Pedantry and gallantry in science. (page 62, line 12.)

§ 1074.—Learn true popularity. (p. 63, l. 24.) Cf. §§ 1146, 1060.
See page 556 above. [*Cicero's philosophical writings*, § 1043.]

§ 1075.—Architectonic of the sciences. (page 65, line 17.)

§ 1076.—Intensive greatness of cognition. (page 66, line 9.)
See § 1064.

Chapter VII.—Truth—Material and formal or logical truth.—Criteria of logical truth—Falsity and error—Appearance, as the source of error—Means to avoid errors. (§§ 1077-1092 inclusive.)

TITLE B.—LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION AS TO RELATION.

§ 1077.—Truth is the essential and indispensable condition of all perfection of cognition. (page 67, line 12.) Cf. §§ 1062, 1063.

§ 1078.—Is there a universal criterion of truth? (page 68, line 9.) Cf. § 1539.

§ 1079.—Universal material criterion of truth is not possible. (page 68, line 24.) Cf. § 1540.

§ 1080.—*Conditio sine qua non* of objective truth. (page 69, line 11.) Cf. § 1541.

§ 1081.—Formal criteria of truth in logic: (1) contradiction; (2) sufficient reason. (page 69, line 29.)

§ 1082.—Inferences from the logical coherence of a cognition with grounds and consequences: (1) negative (*modus tollens*); (2) positive (*modus ponens*). (page 70, line 13.) Cf. §§ 2538, 2539.

§ 1083.—Universal formal criteria of truth: (1) contradiction and identity; (2) sufficient reason; (3) excluded middle. (page 72, line 1.)

§ 1084.—Error takes the appearance of truth for truth itself. (page 72, line 16.)

§ 1085.—Ground of the origin of all error. (page 72, line 21.) Cf. § 1928.

§ 1086.—Nature does not occasion error; the fault of error we have to attribute to ourselves. (page 73, line 24.)

§ 1087.—All error of the human understanding is but partial. (page 74, line 11.)

§ 1088.—Exactness as an objective perfection of cognition. (page 74, line 16.) See § 1089.

§ 1089.—Subtlety as a subjective perfection of cognition. (page 75, line 10.)

§ 1090.—Must endeavor to discover and explain the source of errors (page 75, line 30.)

§ 1091.—Must avoid the reproach of absurdity or insipidity. (page 76, line 30.) Cf. § 589.

§ 1092.—Rules for avoiding error. (page 77, line 24.)

Chapter VIII.—Clearness—Conception of a mark in general—Various sorts of marks—Determination of the logical essence of a thing—Its distinction from the real essence—Distinctness, a higher degree of clearness—Æsthetical and logical distinctness—Discrepancy between analytic and synthetic distinctness. (§§ 1093-1113 inclusive.)

TITLE C.—LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION AS TO QUALITY. (§§ 1093-1113.)

§ 1093.—All thinking is nothing but a representing by means of marks (i. e. discursive). (page 79, line 12.)

§ 1094.—Every mark may be considered as (1) a representation; (2) a ground of cognition. (page 79, line 25.)

§ 1095.—Analytic or synthetic marks. (page 80, line 13.)

§ 1096.—Co-ordinate or subordinate marks. (page 80, line 24.)

§ 1097.—Series of subordinate marks is grounded upon insoluble conceptions, and with respect to the consequences is infinite. (page 81, line 11.)

§ 1098.—Profundity of cognition. Intensive distinctness increases with the further analysis of the conceptions in the series of subordinate marks. (page 81, line 18.)

§ 1099.—Affirmative or negative marks. (page 81, line 28.)

§ 1100.—Important and fertile or empty and unimportant marks. Logical fertility distinct from the practical. (page 82, line 13.)

§ 1101.—Sufficient and necessary or insufficient and contingent marks. (page 82, line 26.)

§ 1102.—Necessary marks are either primitive and constitutive (grounds of other marks), or consequential (attributes). (p. 83, l. 10.)

§ 1103.—Unessential marks regard either internal determinations (modi), or external relations. (page 83, line 23.)

§ 1104.—Logical essence is nothing but the first fundamental conception of all the necessary marks. (page 83, line 29.)

§ 1105.—Distinctness of cognition consists in the clearness of the marks. (page 84, line 25.) Cf. §§ 1052, 1054, 1055, 1056.

§ 1106.—Logical distinctness (objective) must be distinguished from the æsthetical. Perspicuity consists in the conjunction of both. (page 84, line 30.) Cf. §§ 1060, 1061.

§ 1107.—Logical distinctness may be extensively complete (amplitude of the conception), or intensively complete (solidity). (page 86, line 1.) Cf. § 1098.

§ 1108.—Amplitude and precision together make up the adequateness of cognition. (page 86, line 20.)

§ 1109.—All distinctness does not depend upon the analysis of a given conception. (page 86, line 30.)

§ 1110.—Synthetic distinctness, as to the matter, enlarges the conception by that which is superadded to it as a mark in the (pure or empirical) intuition. (page 87, line 12.) Cf. § 2461.

§ 1111.—Analytic distinctness by no means increases the conception (as to the matter). (page 88, line 3.)

§ 1112.—Synthetic procedure is sometimes used in rendering the conceptions distinct; but the analytic procedure is the chief requisite. (page 88, line 14.)

§ 1113.—Objective value of cognition: (1) representing; (2) perceiving; (3) kenning*; (4) cognizing; (5) understanding; (6) perspecting; (7) comprehending. (2) *percipere*; (3) *noscere*; (4) *cognoscere*; (5) *intelligere*; (6) *perspicere*. [*So denominated by Mr. Richardson to prevent confusion with knowing (*scire*) § 1126]. (page 89, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1963 and 1729. [(1) *repraesentare*; (7) *comprehendere*.] [*Perspect, comprehend, understand*: Our duties as obligatory in respect of ourselves and our fellow men, we comprehend; our duties MERELY SUBJECTIVELY CONSIDERED *quasi* divine commandments, we perspect; our duties *qualibet* commandments of God, considered objectively, we can not so much as understand. Cf. § 2577.] See § 2735

Chapter IX.—Certainty—Conception of holding true in general—Modes of holding true: opining, believing, and knowing—Conviction and persuasion—Reserving and suspending a judgment—Previous judgments—Prejudices, their sources and their chief sorts. (§§ 1114–1149 inclusive.)

TITLE D.—LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION AS TO MODALITY. (§§ 1114–1149 inclusive.)

§ 1114.—Holding true is the subjective judgment by which something is represented as true. (page 91, line 11.) Cf. §§ 2579, 2583.

§ 1115.—Holding true is either certain (objectively sufficient) or uncertain (objectively insufficient). (page 91, line 16.)

§ 1116.—Three modes of holding true: (1) problematical (opining); (2) assertive (believing); (3) apodictic (knowing). (page 91, line 26.)

§ 1117.—Opining may be considered as a previous judging, and has place in empirical cognitions only. (page 92, line 22.) Cf. §§ 2584, 2585, 1135.

§ 1118.—Believing is a holding true of that which we assume on moral grounds, in such a manner as to be certain that the contrary never can be proved. (page 94, line 8.) Cf. §§ 2593, 2594, 1133.

§ 1119.—Believing (when considered as limited to matters of belief only) is distinguished from opining, not by the degree, but by the relation which it as a cognition bears to acting. (page 94, line 20.) Cf. § 2592. [*Must not merely opine*: but must have something akin to belief, which analogon (§ 2590) may be considered as a superior degree of opining or prejudging, and upon which his action is grounded. But moral action is never to be grounded on the moral belief, which latter rises out of the necessity which

enforces moral action. (See § 140, cf. § 144.) [Not a necessary reference of our arbitrament: that is, objectively it is not necessary that the final object or end of the human will should ever exist, it being quite sufficient to satisfy reason that the *summum bonum* is a cogitable possibility which may be regarded as an ideal toward which moral actions tend. Indeed, it is rather probable that the realization of this ideal end would militate against the moral interests of mankind, which are centered in the EDUCATION of virtue, an education belonging to battle, not to victory. (Cf. §§ 232, 384, 454.)]

§ 1120.—Subjective necessity of believing in God, freedom, and immortality, rests upon the necessary determination of the will. (page 95, line 23.) Cf. §§ 643–645, and § 877, and see § 2595.

§ 1121.—Belief of reason is merely a presupposition of reason with a subjective, but absolutely necessary practical, view. (page 96, line 21.) Cf. § 2361 and see § 2556 *et seqq.*

§ 1122.—Matters of belief are (1) not objects of empirical cognition. (page 95, line 1.)

§ 1123.—Matters of belief are (2) not objects of the cognition of reason, theoretical or practical. (page 97, line 5.)

§ 1124.—Belief only supplies the place of a cognition, without being itself a cognition, and affords no conviction which may be communicated. (page 98, line 3.) [*Practical belief*: belief of such a sort that I act in view of it, although my action is not determined by it. (Cf. § 1119.)] Cf. § 1133.

§ 1125.—Moral unbelief does not assume that which it is impossible to know, but morally necessary to presuppose. (page 98, line 17.)

§ 1126.—Knowing (*scire*) is holding true on a ground of cognition which is both objectively and subjectively sufficient, and is either empirical or rational. (page 98, line 26.) Cf. § 2583.

§ 1127.—Certainty of reason is either intuitive (EVIDENCE; mathematical) or discursive (philosophical). (page 99, line 4.) Cf. § 2475.

§ 1128.—Empirical certainty is either original or derived (historical). (page 99, line 13.)

§ 1129.—Certainty of reason is distinguished from the empirical by the consciousness of necessity. (page 99, line 18.)

§ 1130.—All certainty is either a mediate or an immediate one. (page 100, line 1.)

§ 1131.—Proofs, upon which all the mediate certainty of a cognition depends. (page 100, line 9.)

§ 1132.—Science the complex of cognition as a system. (page 100, line 24.)

§ 1133.—Conviction is either logical (produced by objective certainty) or practical (the belief of reason). (page 101, line 9.) [Cf. § 2594 as to practical conviction, and §§ 2580–2583 as to logical conviction.]

§ 1134.—Persuasion, a holding true on insufficient grounds, which we do not know whether they are merely subjective or also at the same time objective. (page 102, line 1.) Cf. §§ 2580–2582.

§ 1135.—Persuasion may be true as to the matter, even though formally false. (page 102, line 23.)

§ 1136.—Will can not contest convincing proofs, and has no immediate influence on holding true. (page 103, line 13.)

§ 1137.—Will, by exciting the understanding to the investigation of truth or withholding it from it, has a mediate influence on conviction. (page 104, line 1.)

§ 1138.—Suspension of judgment consists in the intention not to allow a merely previous judgment to become a determining one. (page 104, line 7.)

§ 1139.—Previous judgments serve to guide the understanding in meditation and in investigation. (page 105, line 17.)

§ 1140.—Prejudices are sometimes true previous judgments; only their serving us for principles or for determining judgments is wrong. (page 106, line 5.)

§ 1141.—Principal fountains of prejudice: (1) imitation; (2) habit; (3) inclination. (page 107, line 8.)

§ 1142.—Things which contribute to accustom us to the maxim of imitation, and thereby to make reason a soil fertile in prejudices: (1) formulae; (2) sayings; (3) sentences; (4) canons; (5) proverbs. (page 107, line 26.)

§ 1143.—Prejudices (1) of authority: (1) arising from the authority of a person. (page 109, line 9.)

§ 1144.—Prejudice arising from the authority (2) of a multitude. (page 110, line 20.) [See § 1145.]

§ 1145.—Common sense in moral philosophy. (page 110, line 30.) Cf. §§ 2638, 2850.

§ 1146.—Prejudice of the authority (3) of the age. (page 112, line 1.) Cf. §§ 569, 1074, 219. [Doctrine of the Mean, xxviii., 1.]

§ 1147.—Prejudice of novelty. (page 113, line 15.)

§ 1148.—Prejudices (II) from self love, or logical egotism. (page 114, line 1.)

§ 1149.—Extirpation of prejudices will be productive of great good. (page 114, line 9.) [*But whether* in reference to one's self.]

Chapter X.—Probability—Explication of the probabilities—Distinction of probability from verisimilitude—Mathematical and philosophical probability—Doubt both subjective and objective—Skeptical, dogmatical, and critical way of thinking or method of philosophizing.—Hypothesis. (§§ 1150–1163 inclusive.)

§ 1150.—Probability is a holding true on insufficient grounds, but which have a greater relation to sufficient ones than the grounds of the contrary. (page 115, line 10.)

§ 1151.—Probability is an approximation to certainty; but in verisimilitude we compare the insufficient grounds, not with the sufficient ones, but with those of the contrary. (page 116, line 1.)

§ 1152.—Mathematician alone can determine the relation of insufficient grounds to the sufficient holding true. (page 116, line 12.)

§ 1153.—Logic of probability is not possible. (page 116, line 29.)

§ 1154.—Doubt is a contrary reason for holding true, or a mere impediment to it. Objectively, as the knowledge of the insufficiency of the reasons for holding true, it is named an objection. (page 117, line 9.)

§ 1155.—Scruple is a merely subjectively valid contrary reason for holding true. (page 117, line 18.)

§ 1156.—Scruples must be removed by exposing their grounds and origin. It is not enough merely to answer every doubt. (page 118, line 4.)

§ 1157.—Skeptical and dogmatic methods, when they become universal, are both faulty. (page 118, line 17.)

§ 1158.—Skeptical method is very useful to the critical procedure. (page 119, line 3.)

§ 1159.—Absolute skepticism contradicts itself. (p. 119, l. 16.)

§ 1160.—Hypothesis is the holding of a presupposition true as a ground (being sufficient to explain other cognitions as consequences). (page 119, line 25.) Cf. 2518.

§ 1161.—Probability of a hypothesis may increase to an analogon of certainty. (Induction.) (page 120, line 17.)

§ 1162.—Must be apodictically certain in every hypothesis: (1) the possibility of the presupposition itself; (2) the consequence; (3) the unity (needing no subsidiary hypotheses). (p. 120, l. 27.)

§ 1163.—Sciences which do not allow of hypotheses. (page 121, line 30.)

Appendix.—Of the distinction of theoretical and practical cognition. (§§ 1164–1168.)

§ 1164.—Practical cognitions either are imperatives or comprise the grounds to possible imperatives. (page 122, line 7.) Cf. § 1242.

§ 1165.—Imperative is a proposition expressing a possible free action, by which a certain end is to be realized. (page 122, line 15.)

§ 1166.—Theoretical cognitions are such as express (not what must be and ought to be, but) what is. (p. 123, l. 1.) Cf. § 2360.

§ 1167.—Speculative cognitions are those from which no rules of conduct can be derived. Every theoretical cognition is not speculative. (page 123, line 6.) Cf. § 2363.

§ 1168.—Morality the absolute practical (to which every practical use of our cognition must finally be referred). (page 123, line 21.) [The relative practical (relative to arbitrary ends) should be termed pragmatical. (See § 2550.)] Cf. §§ 3036, 2607.

LOGIC.—PART I.

GENERAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. (§§ 1169–1344 inclusive.)

Chapter I.—Conceptions. (§§ 1169–1298 inclusive.)

Article I.—Conception in general, and its distinction from intuition. (§§ 1169–1171 inclusive.)

§ 1169.—All cognitions are either intuitions or conceptions. Cognition by conceptions is termed thinking (*cognitio discursiva*). (page 125, line 9.)

§ 1170.—Conception is a representation of that which is common to several objects. (p. 125, l. 17.) [§§ 1170, 1171 are scholia.]

§ 1171.—Tautology to speak of universal or of common conceptions. (page 126, line 4.)

Article II.—Matter and form of conceptions. (§ 1172.)

§ 1172.—Matter (the object) and form (the universality) are to be distinguished in every conception. (page 126, line 11.)

Article III.—Empirical and pure conceptions. (§§ 1173–1180.)

§ 1173.—Pure conception is not taken from experience, but arises, as to both form and matter, from the understanding. (page 126, line 16.)

§ 1174.—Idea is a conception of reason, whose object can not be met with in experience. (page 126, line 20.) Cf. § 1963.

§ 1175.—Reality of pure conceptions must be investigated by metaphysic. (page 127, line 1.) [§ 1175 is a scholion.]

§ 1176.—Ideas serve to guide the understanding by means of reason with regard to experience and to the use of the rules of the understanding. (page 127, line 11.) [§§ 1176–1180 are a scholion.]

§ 1177.—Ideas are regulative principles of the subordinate intellectual operations of the understanding. (page 128, line 6.)

§ 1178.—Can not prove the objective reality of any theoretical idea but the idea of liberty. (page 128, line 26.) Cf. § 897.

§ 1179.—Idea of the whole is architectonic. (page 129, line 4.) Cf. § 2598.

§ 1180.—Wanting to most men. (page 129, line 11.)

Article IV.—Conceptions given (apriori or aposteriori), and factitious conceptions. (§§ 1181, 1182.)

§ 1181.—All conceptions are, as to the matter, either given or factitious. (page 129, line 20.)

§ 1182.—Form of conceptions is always factitious. (page 129, line 26.) [§ 1182 is a scholion.]

Article V.—Logical origin of conceptions. (§§ 1183–1185 inclusive.)

§ 1183.—Origin of conceptions as to the mere form depends upon reflection and upon abstraction. (page 130, line 3)

§ 1184.—Universal logic has to investigate, not the source of conceptions, but the distinction of reflection. (page 130, line 11.) [§§ 1184, 1185 are scholia]

§ 1185.—Origin of conceptions with regard to their matter, must be investigated by metaphysic. (page 131, line 3.)

Article VI.—Logical acts of comparison, of reflection, and of abstraction. (§§ 1186–1189 inclusive.)

§ 1186.—Logical acts of the understanding, by which conceptions as to their form are engendered: (1) comparison; (2) reflection; (3) abstraction. (page 131, line 10.)

§ 1187.—Essential and universal conditions of the engendering of every conception in general. (page 131, line 21.) [§§ 1187–1189 are scholia.]

§ 1188.—Abstraction (the word) is not always used right in logic. (page 132, line 5.)

§ 1189.—Abstraction is but the negative condition on which universally valid representation can be generated. (page 133, line 1.)

Article VII.—Matter and sphere of conceptions. (§§ 1190, 1191.)

§ 1190.—Every conception, as a partial one, is contained in the representation of things; but, as the ground of cognition, these things are contained under it. (page 133, line 9.)

§ 1191.—Universal validity of a conception depends upon the conception's being a ground of cognition. (page 133, line 18.) [§ 1191 is a scholion.]

Article VIII.—Greatness of the sphere of conceptions. (§§ 1192, 1193.)

§ 1192.—Sphere of a conception is the greater, the greater the number of things that rank under it. (page 133, line 23.)

§ 1193.—Conception, as a ground of cognition, contains under it all those things from which it has been obtained by means of abstraction. (page 133, line 26.) [§ 1193 is a scholion.]

Article IX.—Superior and inferior conceptions. (§§ 1194, 1195.)

§ 1194.—Conceptions, if they have under them other conceptions (which in relation to them are named inferior ones), are denominated superior ones. (page 134, line 18.)

§ 1195.—Very same conception, taken in various references, may

be at once a superior and an inferior one. (page 134, line 24) [§ 1195 is a scholion.]

Article X.—Kind (genus) and sort (species). (§ 1196.)

§ 1196.—Generic and special conceptions are distinguished, not as to their nature, but with regard to their relation to one another in the logical subordination. (page 135, line 5.)

Article XI.—Highest genus and lowest species. (§§ 1197, 1198)

§ 1197.—Highest genus is not a species. (page 135, line 15.)

§ 1198.—No such thing as a lowest conception or a lowest species, under which no other conception or species is contained (page 135, line 22.) Cf. § 2391. [§ 1198 is a scholion.] Cf. § 1735.

Article XII.—Larger and stricter conceptions. Alternate conceptions. (§ 1199.)

§ 1199.—Superior conception is also named a larger; an inferior, a stricter or narrower. Conceptions which have the same sphere are named alternate. (page 136, line 29.)

Article XIII.—Relation of the inferior to the superior, of the larger to the stricter, conceptions. (§ 1200)

§ 1200.—Inferior conception is not contained in the superior, but under it. (page 137, line 6.) Cf. § 1190.

Article XIV.—Universal rules relative to the subordination of conceptions. (§§ 1201, 1202.)

§ 1201.—What agrees with or is repugnant to a superior conception, likewise agrees with or is repugnant to all the inferior ones contained under it. (page 137, line 18.)

§ 1202.—Can not conclude that what agrees with or is repugnant to an inferior conception, likewise agrees with or is repugnant to other inferior conceptions which belong with it to a superior one. (page 138, line 1.) [§ 1202 is a scholion.]

Article XV.—Conditions of the origin of superior and of inferior conceptions: logical abstraction and determination. (§§ 1203, 1204.)

§ 1203.—Logical abstraction continued yields higher and higher conceptions; logical determination continued, lower and lower ones. (page 138, line 14.)

§ 1204.—Cognitions as intuitions only, but not as conceptions, can be thoroughly determined. (See § 1198 [and cf. §§ 1170 and 1093. That a conception can not be a completely determined cognition, is evident from the mere definition of conception].) (page 138, line 25.) [§ 1204 is a scholion.]

Article XVI.—Use of conceptions in the abstract and in the concrete. (§§ 1205–1208 inclusive.)

§ 1205.—Every conception may be used both universally and particularly. (page 139, line 6.)

§ 1206.—*Abstract and concrete* refer not so much to conceptions themselves, as to their use. (page 139, line 11.) [§§ 1206–1208 are scholia.]

§ 1207.—Cognize by very abstract conceptions, in many things little; by very concrete ones, in few things much. (p. 139, l. 22)

§ 1208.—Whereby the maximum of cognition, with regard as well to the sphere as to the matter, is attained. (p. 140, l. 5.)

Chapter II.—Judgments. (§§ 1209–1259 inclusive.)

Article XVII.—Explication of a judgment in general. (§ 1209.)

§ 1209.—Judgment is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations. (page 141, line 6.)

Article XVIII.—Matter and form of judgments (§ 1210)

§ 1210.—Matter of a judgment consists in the cognitions which are given and conjoined in the unity of consciousness in the judgment; the form of the judgment, in the determination of the way in which the various representations, as such, belong to one consciousness. (page 141, line 12.)

Article XIX.—Object of logical reflection—the mere form of judgments. (§ 1211.)

§ 1211.—Logic has to consider merely the distinction of judgments with regard to their bare form. (page 141, line 22.)

Article XX.—Logical forms of judgments: quantity, quality, relation and modality. (§ 1212.)

§ 1212.—Distinctions of judgments with respect to their form may be reduced to the four main points of quantity, quality, relation and modality. (page 142, line 6.)

Article XXI.—Quantity of judgments: universal, particular, singular. (§§ 1213–1218.) [Plurative § 2716 (Richardson's reference).]

§ 1213.—Subject in the judgment is either quite included in the notion of the predicate, or excluded from it, or but in part included in it, in part excluded from it. (page 142, line 14.)

§ 1214.—Single judgments as to the form, are to be esteemed in the use equal to universal. (page 143, line 9.) [§§ 1214–1218 are scholia.]

§ 1215.—Real distinction between general and universal propositions. (page 143, line 16.)

§ 1216.—Universal rules are either analytically or synthetically universal. (page 143, line 26.)

§ 1217.—Can not hold heuristically* in the application, but are only problems. (page 144, line 1.) [*i. e. can not be used as secure principles for the further extension of knowledge; can not be made premises for the further discovery of truth. (Cf. § 2401.)]

§ 1218.—Subject of particular judgments, if they are to have a

rational (not merely an intellectual) form, must be a larger conception than the predicate. (page 144, line 17.) [See § 1199.]

Article XXII.—Quality of judgments: affirmative, negative, indefinite. (§§ 1219–1222 inclusive.)

§ 1219.—Subject of the judgment is thought of under the sphere of the predicate, or is placed without that sphere, or is put within the sphere of a conception which lies without the sphere of another conception. (page 145, line 7.)

§ 1220.—Indefinite judgment represents the sphere of the predicate as limited. (page 145, line 14.) Bounds are positive conceptions of limited objects. [§§ 1220–1222 are scholia.]

§ 1221.—Distinction of the indefinite from the negative judgments does not appertain to logic. (page 146, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1214, 1556, 1557.

§ 1222.—Negation always affects the copula in negative judgments, but the predicate in indefinite. (page 146, line 11.)

Article XXIII.—Relation of judgments: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive. (§ 1223.)

§ 1223.—Given representations in a judgment are subordinated to one another in the unity of consciousness either as the predicate to the subject, or as the consequent to the antecedent, or as a member of the division to the divided conception. (page 146, line 18.) Cf. §§ 1290, 1558, 1559.

Article XXIV.—Categorical judgments. (§§ 1224, 1225.)

§ 1224.—Subject and predicate make up the matter of categorical judgments; the form is termed the copula. (page 147, line 3.)

§ 1225.—Categorical judgments make up the matter of other judgments; but all the three judgments depend upon essentially distinct logical functions of the understanding. (page 147, line 8.) [§ 1225 is a scholion.]

Article XXV.—Hypothetical judgments. (§§ 1226–1228 inclusive.)

§ 1226.—Matter of hypothetical judgments consists of two judgments which are connected together as antecedent and consequent. (page 147, line 19.)

§ 1227.—What the copula is to categorical judgments, the consequence is to hypothetical ones, (their form). (page 148, line 3.) [§§ 1227 and 1228 are scholia.]

§ 1228.—Essential distinction between categorical and hypothetical propositions. (page 148, line 6.)

Article XXVI.—Modes of connection in hypothetical judgments: modus ponens and modus tollens. (§ 1229.)

§ 1229.—When the antecedent or ground is true, the consequent determined by it is likewise true. When the consequent is false,

the antecedent or ground is likewise false. (page 148, line 26.) Cf. §§ 1082, 1131.

Article XXVII.—Disjunctive judgments. (§ 1230.)

§ 1230.—When the parts of the sphere of a given conception determine one another in the whole or to a whole as complements. (page 149, line 8.)

Article XXVIII.—Matter and form of disjunctive judgments. (§§ 1231, 1232.)

§ 1231.—Form of disjunctive judgments consists in the determination of the relation of the various judgments as members of the whole sphere of the divided cognition excluding one another. (page 149, line 15.)

§ 1232.—Not one member in this judgment determines another but with a proviso, that all the members are in commerce as parts of a whole sphere of cognition. (page 149, line 23.) [Cf. § 1822 in reference to *commercium*.] [§ 1232 is a scholion.]

Article XXIX.—Peculiar character of disjunctive judgments. (§§ 1233, 1234.)

§ 1233.—All the members of disjunction are problematical judgments, of which nothing else is thought than that they, as parts of the sphere of a cognition, each the complement of the other to the whole, taken together, are equal to that sphere. (page 150, line 11.)

§ 1234.—Comparison between categorical and disjunctive judgments. In disjunctive judgments we go from the whole to all the parts taken together. (page 151, line 1.) [§ 1234 is a scholion.]

Article XXX.—Modality of judgments: problematical, assertive, apodictical. (§§ 1235–1238 inclusive.)

§ 1235.—Relation of the whole judgment to the cognitive faculty. (page 152, line 15.)

§ 1236.—Concerns the judgment itself only, by no means the thing which is judged of. (page 152, line 23.) [§§ 1236–1238 are scholia.]

§ 1237.—Subject in problematical judgments must always have a smaller sphere than the predicate. (page 153, line 10.)

§ 1038.—Distinction between judgments and propositions. (page 153, line 15.)

Article XXXI.—Expoundable propositions. (§§ 1239, 1240.)

§ 1239.—Propositions in which both an affirmation and a negation are comprised. (page 154, line 5.)

§ 1240.—Nature of expoundable propositions depends entirely upon conditions of language. (p. 154, l. 9.) [§ 1240 is a scholion.]

Article XXXII.—Theoretical and practical propositions. (§§ 1241, 1242.)

§ 1241.—Practical propositions express the action which is the necessary condition whereby an object is possible. (p. 154, l. 21.)

§ 1242.—Practical propositions belong to logic as to the form only; as to the matter, to moral philosophy. (page 154, line 26.) [§ 1242 is a scholion.] Cf. § 1164.

Article XXXIII.—Indemonstrable and demonstrable propositions. (§ 1243.)

§ 1243.—Demonstrable propositions are those capable of proof. (page 155, line 8.)

Article XXXIV.—Principles. (§ 1244.)

§ 1244.—Principles are immediately certain judgments apriori, by which other judgments can be evinced. (page 155, line 16.)

Article XXXV.—Intuitive and discursive principles: Axioms and acroams. (§ 1245.)

§ 1245.—Principles are either intuitive or discursive. The latter can not be expressed but by conceptions. (page 155, line 25.)

Article XXXVI.—Analytic and synthetic propositions. (§§ 1246–1248 inclusive.)

§ 1246.—Propositions whose certainty depends upon the identity of the conceptions are analytical. (page 156, line 8.)

§ 1247.—Synthetic propositions increase the cognition *materialiter*. (page 156, line 13.) [§§ 1247 and 1248 are scholia.]

§ 1248.—Analytic principles are not axioms. (p. 156, l. 23.)

Article XXXVII.—Tautological propositions. (§§ 1249–1251.)

§ 1249.—Identity of the conceptions in analytic judgments may be either explicit or implicit. (page 156, line 28.)

§ 1250.—Tautological propositions are void of consequence, whereas implicitly identical propositions are not. (page 157, line 3.) [§§ 1250, 1251 are scholia.]

§ 1251.—Propositions void of sense. (page 157, line 14.)

Article XXXVIII.—Postulate and problem. (§§ 1252–1255.)

§ 1252.—Postulate is a practical immediately certain proposition. (page 157, line 20.)

§ 1253.—Problems express an action whose way of being performed is not immediately certain. (page 158, line 1.)

§ 1254.—Theoretical postulates too for the behoof of practical reason. (p. 158, l. 5.) Cf. § 2361. [§§ 1254 and 1255 are scholia.]

§ 1255.—Problems contain (1) the question, (2) the resolution, and (3) the demonstration. (page 158, line 10.)

Article XXXIX.—Theorems, corollaries, lemmas, and scholia. (§§ 1256, 1257.)

§ 1256.—Theorems are theoretical propositions capable and standing in need of a proof; corollaries are immediate consequences; scholia are mere illustrative propositions. (page 158, line 20.)

§ 1257.—Distinction between theorems and corollaries. (page 158, line 28.) [§ 1257 is a scholion.]

Article XL.—Judgments of perception and experience. (§§ 1258, 1259.)

§ 1258.—Judgment of perception is merely subjective; an objective judgment from perceptions is a judgment of experience. (page 159, line 8.) [Lemma: a judgment must be examined in reference to its objective validity, before we can presume to call it a judgment of experience.]

§ 1259.—What is merely in the subject, must not be considered as belonging to the object. (p. 159, l. 11.) [§ 1259 is a scholion.]

Chapter III.—Syllogisms. (§§ 1260-1344 inclusive.)

Article XLI.—Syllogism in general. (§ 1260.)

§ 1260.—Syllogism in general is the deduction of one judgment from another. (page 160, line 6.)

Article XLII.—Immediate and mediate syllogisms. (§ 1261.)

§ 1261.—Immediate syllogism is the deduction of one judgment from another without an intermedial judgment. (page 160, line 13.)

Article XLIII.—Syllogisms of the understanding, of reason, and of judgment. (§ 1262.)

§ 1262.—Immediate syllogisms are styled syllogisms of the understanding. (page 161, line 4.)

TITLE I.—SYLLOGISMS OF THE UNDERSTANDING. (§§ 1263-1281 inclusive.)

Article XLIV.—Peculiar nature of the syllogisms of the understanding. (§§ 1263-1265.)

§ 1263.—Consist entirely in an alteration of the mere form of the judgments. (page 161, line 12.)

§ 1264.—Distinguished from all mediate ones. (page 161, line 17.) [§§ 1264 and 1265 are scholia.]

§ 1265.—Intermedial judgment, it is true, may be thrown in. (page 162, line 4.) In that case the middle term is a tautological proposition.

Article XLV.—Moods of syllogisms of the understanding. (§ 1266.)

§ 1266.—Syllogisms of the understanding go through all the classes of the logical functions of judging: (1) quantity; (2) quality; (3) relation; (4) modality. (page 162, line 13.) Cf. § 1212.

Article XLVI.—Class I.—Syllogisms of the understanding (with regard to the quantity of judgments) per judicia subalternata. (§§ 1267, 1268.)

§ 1267.—Both the judgments are distinct as to quantity, and the particular judgment is deduced from the universal. (p. 162, l. 23.)

§ 1268.—Judgment, when it is contained under another, is termed subaltern. (page 163, line 3.) [§ 1268 is a scholion.]

Article XLVII.—Class II.—Syllogisms of the understanding (with regard to the quality of judgments) per judicia opposita. (§§ 1269, 1270.)

§ 1269.—Immediate syllogizing (*a*) by contradictorily opposed judgments, (*b*) by contrary, and (*c*) by subcontrary ones. (page 163, line 12.)

§ 1270.—Syllogisms of the understanding by equipollent judgments. (page 163, line 19.) [§ 1270 is a scholion.]

Article XLVIII.—(a) Syllogisms of the understanding per judicia contradictorie opposita. (§ 1271.)

§ 1271.—Truth of the one of the contradictory judgments is inferred from the falsity of the other, *and conversely*. (Principle of the exclusive third, cf. §§ 1081, 1083.) (page 164, line 4.)

Article XLIX.—(b) Syllogisms of the understanding per judicia contrarie opposita. (§ 1272.)

§ 1272.—Inference of the falsity of the one of the contrary judgments from the truth of the other, holds; *but not conversely*. (page 164, line 21.)

Article L.—(c) Syllogisms of the understanding per judicia subcontrarie opposita. (§§ 1273, 1274.)

§ 1273.—When the one of the subcontrarily opposed judgments is false, the other is true; *but not conversely*. (page 165, line 10.)

§ 1274.—No pure strict opposition obtains in the subcontrary judgments. (page 165, line 17.) [§ 1274 is a scholion.]

Article LI.—Class III.—Syllogisms of the understanding (with regard to the relation of judgments) per judicia conversa, sive per conversionem. (§ 1275.)

§ 1275.—Consist in the transposition of the subject and of the predicate in both judgments. (page 166, line 6.)

Article LII.—Pure and altered conversion. (§ 1276.)

§ 1276.—Either the quantity of the judgment is altered, or it remains unaltered. (page 166, line 14.)

Article LIII.—Universal rules of conversion. (§ 1277–1279.)

§ 1277.—Universally affirmative judgments can not be converted but *per accidens*; but all universally negative judgments, and all particularly affirmative, may be *simpliciter* converted. (p. 166, l. 27.)

§ 1278.—Reason why universally negative judgments are *simpliciter* convertible. (p. 167, l. 15.) [§§ 1278, 1279 are scholia.]

§ 1279.—Several universally assertive judgments may be simply converted. (page 167, line 25.)

Article LIV.—Class IV.—Syllogisms of the understanding (with regard to the modality of judgments) per judicia contraposita. (§ 1280.)

§ 1280.—Consists in that metathesis of the judgments by which

the quantity remains the same, but the quality is altered. (page 168, line 5.)

Article LV.—Universal rule of contraposition. (§ 1281.)

§ 1281.—All universally affirmative judgments may be simply contraposed. (page 168, line 13.)

TITLE II.—SYLLOGISMS OF REASON. (§§ 1282–1324 inclusive.)

Article LVI.—Syllogisms of reason in general. (§ 1282.)

§ 1282.—Syllogism of reason is the knowledge of the necessity of a proposition by the subsumption of its condition under a given universal rule. (page 169, line 6.) [See § 1284.]

Article LVII.—Universal principle of all syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1283, 1284.)

§ 1283.—What ranks under a condition of a rule, ranks under the rule itself. (page 169, line 12.)

§ 1284.—Cognize the conclusion apriori not in the single, but as comprehended in the universal and as necessary on a certain condition. (page 170, line 3.) [§ 1284 is a scholion.]

Article LVIII.—Constituents of a syllogism of reason. (§§ 1285, 1286.)

§ 1285.—Three essential parts belong to every syllogism of reason: (1) universal rule; (2) assumption; (3) conclusion. (page 170, line 13.)

§ 1286.—Subsumption means the knowledge that the condition has place. (page 171, line 1.) [§ 1286 is a scholion.]

Article LIX.—Matter and form of syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1287–1289 inclusive.)

§ 1287.—Form of syllogisms of reason consists in the conclusion, provided that it comprises the consequence. (page 171, line 12.) [As to the consequence, see § 1286.]

§ 1288.—Truth of the premises must be first proved, and then the rightness of the consequence. (page 171, line 15.) [§§ 1288, 1289 are scholia.]

§ 1289.—Conclusion is given the moment the premises and the consequence are. (page 171, line 21.)

Article LX.—Division of the syllogisms of reason (as to relation) into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. (§§ 1290–1292.)

§ 1290.—Conditions of the objective unity of the consciousness of the multifarious of cognition. (Either as the subject of the inherence of the marks, or as the ground of the dependence of one cognition upon another, or as the conjunction of the parts in a whole.) (page 172, line 5.) Cf. § 1223.

§ 1291.—Only possible ground of the division of the syllogisms of reason (relation). (page 172, line 19.) [§§ 1291, 1292 are scholia.] [Equipollent: equivalent. Polleo: potvaleo.]

§ 1292.—All these three species are productions of equally right functions of reason. (page 173, line 1.) Cf. §§ 1228, 1234, 1225.

Article LXI.—Proper distinction between categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms of reason. (§ 1293.)

§ 1293.—Lies in the major proposition. (page 173, line 11.)

Article LXII.—Categorical syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1294, 1295.)

§ 1294.—Three principal conceptions in every categorical syllogism (major, minor, and middle terms.) (page 173, line 18.)

§ 1295.—Distinction of the terms has not place except in categorical syllogisms. (page 174, line 7.) [§ 1295 is a scholion.]

Article LXIII.—Principle of categorical syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1296, 1297.)

§ 1296.—What agrees with the mark of a thing agrees with the thing itself. (page 174, line 19.)

§ 1297.—*Dictum de omni et nullo* may be easily deduced. (page 174, line 27.) [§ 1297 is a scholion.]

Article LXIV.—Rules for the categorical syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1298, 1299.)

§ 1298.—Eight rules which flow from the nature and the principle of categorical syllogisms of reason. (page 175, line 14.)

§ 1299.—Conclusion must always follow the negative and the particular proposition in the premises. (page 176, line 16.) [§ 1299 is a scholion.]

Article LXV.—Pure and impure categorical syllogisms of reason. (§ 1300.)

§ 1300.—Categorical syllogism is pure or simple when in it neither an immediate consequence is intermixed nor the legitimate order of the premises altered. (page 177, line 4.)

Article LXVI.—Impure syllogisms of reason by the metathesis of the propositions.—Figures. (§ 1301.)

§ 1301.—Arise from the transposition of the propositions (in the last three figures). (page 177, line 15.)

Article LXVII.—Four figures of syllogisms. (§ 1302.)

§ 1302.—Four modes of syllogizing, whose distinction is determined by the particular disposition of the premises and of their conceptions. (page 177, line 23.)

Article LXVIII.—Determinative of their distinction by the various disposition of the middle term. (§ 1303.)

§ 1303.—Middle term may occupy either the place of the subject or that of the predicate. (page 178, line 4.)

Article LXIX.—Rule of the first, as the only legitimate, figure. (§§ 1304, 1305.)

§ 1304.—Rule of the first figure is that the major be a universal, the minor an affirmative proposition. (page 178, line 22.)

§ 1305.—First figure may have a conclusion of every quantity and of every quality. (page 179, line 7.) [§ 1305 is a scholion.]

Article LXX.—Condition of the reduction of the last three figures to the first one. (§ 1306.)

§ 1306.—Middle term must obtain in the propositions a place whence their order may arise by means of immediate consequences according to the rules of the first figure. (page 179, line 24.)

Article LXXI.—Rule of the second figure. (§§ 1307, 1308.)

§ 1307.—Major must therefore be converted so that it may remain universal. (page 180, line 7.)

§ 1308.—Rule of the second figure is, that to which the mark of a thing is repugnant, is repugnant to the thing itself. (page 180, line 14.) [§ 1308 is an explanatory scholion.]

Article LXXII.—Rule of the third figure. (§§ 1309, 1310.)

§ 1309.—Minor must be converted, yet so that an affirmative proposition may result from it. (page 181, line 6.)

§ 1310.—Rule of the third figure is, what agrees or is repugnant to a mark, agrees or is repugnant to some things under which this mark is contained. (page 181, line 12.) [§ 1310 is a scholion.]

Article LXXIII.—Rule of the fourth figure. (§§ 1311, 1312.)

§ 1311.—When in this figure the major is universally negative, it may be simply converted. (page 181, line 24.)

§ 1312.—Predicate adheres to the middle term; this to the subject (of the conclusion); consequently the subject to the predicate. (page 182, line 6.) [§ 1312 is an explanatory scholion.]

Article LXXIV.—Universal result of the last three figures. (§ 1313.)

§ 1313.—All these three modes of syllogizing must be named impure syllogisms. (page 183, line 3.)

Article LXXV.—Hypothetical syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1314–1316 inclusive.)

§ 1314.—Hypothetical proposition for its major. (page 184, line 6.) Cf. §§ 1290–1293.

§ 1315.—Nothing is shown in them but the consequence of one proposition of another. (p. 184, l. 12.) [§§ 1315, 1316 are scholia.]

§ 1316.—Immediate consequence evincible from an antecedent and a consequent. (page 185, line 10.)

Article LXXVI.—The principle of hypothetical syllogisms. (§ 1317.)

§ 1317.—Principle of the ground is the principle of hypothetical syllogisms. (page 185, line 25.) Cf. §§ 1081, 1082.

Article LXXVII.—Disjunctive syllogisms of reason. (§§ 1318–1320 inclusive.)

§ 1318.—Argue either from the truth of one member of dis-

junction to the falsity of all the others, or from the falsity of all the members except one to the truth of this one. (p. 186, l. 3.)

§ 1319.—All the members of disjunction, one excepted, taken together, make up the contradictory opposite of this one. (page 186, line 12.) [§§ 1319, 1320 are scholia.]

§ 1320.—All disjunctive ratiocinations of more than two members of disjunction, are, properly speaking, polysyllogistic. (page 186, line 20.)

Article LXXVIII.—Principle of the disjunctive syllogisms. (§ 1321.)

§ 1321.—Principle of the exclusive third. (page 187, line 3.) Cf. § 1083.

Article LXXIX.—Dilemma. (§§ 1322, 1323.)

§ 1322.—Dilemma is a hypothetical argument whose consequent is a disjunctive judgment. (page 187, line 9.)

§ 1323.—Sophistical artifice not to refute propositions directly, but to point out difficulties. (p. 187, l. 19. [§ 1323 is a scholion.]

Article LXXX.—Formal and cryptical syllogisms of reason. (§ 1324.)

§ 1324.—Cryptical syllogisms, in which either the premises are displaced, or one of them is omitted, or the middle term only conjoined with the conclusion. (page 188, line 18.)

TITLE III.—SYLLOGISMS OF JUDGMENT. (§§ 1325–1332 inclusive.)

Article LXXXI.—Determining and reflecting judgment. (§ 1325.)

§ 1325.—Reflecting judgment goes from the particular to the universal, and is but of subjective validity. (page 189, line 13.)

Article LXXXII.—Syllogisms of (the reflecting) judgment. (1326.)

§ 1326.—Determine not the object, but the way of thinking of it, in order to obtain the knowledge of it. (page 189, line 22.)

Article LXXXIII.—The principle of these syllogisms. (§§ 1327, 1328.)

§ 1327.—Many do not agree in one without a common ground. (page 190, line 3.)

§ 1328.—Syllogisms of judgment can not be held immediate. (page 190, line 8.) [§ 1328 is a scholion.]

Article LXXXIV.—Induction and analogy the two species of syllogism of judgment. (§§ 1329–1332 inclusive.)

§ 1329.—Judgment infers either from many all things of a sort, or from many determinations and properties in which things of the same sort agree, the others. (page 190, line 13.) [See § 2826.]

§ 1330.—Induction extends the empirically given from the particular to the universal with regard to many objects; analogy, on the other hand, the given properties of a thing to several of the very same thing. (page 190, line 22.) [§§ 1330–1332 are scholia.]

§ 1331.—Induction and analogy not syllogisms of reason, but logical presumptions, or empirical syllogisms. (page 191, line 21.)

§ 1332.—Enlarging our cognition of experience. (p. 191, l. 26.)

Article LXXXV.—*Simple and compound syllogisms of reason.* (§ 1333.)

§ 1333.—Ratiocination, when it consists of but one syllogism, is simple. (page 192, line 4.)

Article LXXXVI.—*Polysyllogistic ratiocination.* (§ 1334.)

§ 1334.—Concatenation of syllogisms (conjoined by subordination). (page 192, line 9.)

Article LXXXVII.—*Prosyllogisms and episyllogisms.* (§ 1335.)

§ 1335.—Argue either from the grounds down to the consequences, or from these up to those. (page 192, line 16.)

Article LXXXVIII.—*Sorites.* (§ 1336.)

§ 1336.—Syllogism consisting of several abridged syllogisms producing one conclusion. (page 193, line 3.)

Article LXXXIX.—*Categorical and hypothetical sorites* (§ 1337.)

§ 1337.—That consists of categorical propositions as a series of predicates; this, of hypothetical ones as a series of consequences. (page 193, line 12.)

Article XC.—*Fallacy.—Paralogism.—Sophism.* (§§ 1338, 1339.)

§ 1338.—Fallacy, when one deceives himself with it, is a paralogism; and when he endeavors to deceive others with it, a sophism. (page 193, line 19.)

§ 1339.—Art of framing sophisms ancient. (page 194, line 1.) [§ 1339 is a scholion.]

Article XCI.—*Leap in syllogizing.* (§ 1340.)

§ 1340.—Saltus is the conjunction of the one premiss with the conclusion, so that the other is left out. (page 195, line 3.)

Article XCII.—*Petitio principii. Circulus in probando.* (§§ 1341, 1342.)

§ 1341.—Assuming, for the purpose of an argument, a proposition as an immediately certain one, though it requires a proof. (page 195, line 13.)

§ 1342.—Circle in proving is often difficult to be detected; and this fault is usually committed the oftenest just when the proofs are difficult. (page 195, line 20.) [§ 1342 is a scholion.] Richardson asks, "Would it not, for example, were the scriptures to be proved to be the word of God by the authority of the church, and the authority of the church to be proved by the scriptures as the word of God, be a glaring circle?"

Article XCIII.—*Probatio plus et minus probans.* (§§ 1343, 1344.)

§ 1343.—Proof may prove too much, as well as too little. (page 196, line 3.)

§ 1344.—Proof that proves too little may be true. (page 196, line 7.) [§ 1344 is a scholion.] [In saying that a proof which proves too much is false, Kant instances the proof against suicide, *That whoever has not given life can not take it away.* "For on this ground," he adds, "we could not kill any animal," whence it is probable that the need of proof of the assumed right to kill animals never even occurred to him. Cf. § 540.]

LOGIC.—PART II.

GENERAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. (§§ 1345–1398 inclusive.)

Article XCIV.—Manner and method. (§ 1345)

§ 1345.—All cognition must be conformable to a rule. (page 197, line 6.) [Note Richardson's scholion.]

Article XCV.—Form of science.—Method. (§ 1346.)

§ 1346.—Cognition, as science, must be arranged after a method. (page 197, line 16.) Cf. § 471.

Article XCVI.—Doctrine of method—its object and its end. (§ 1347.)

§ 1347.—Doctrine of method has to treat of the form of a science in general. (page 198, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1007, 1008, 1013.

Article XCVII.—Means of promoting the logical perfection of cognition. (§ 1348.)

§ 1348.—Doctrine of method must show the way in which we attain the perfection of cognition. (page 198, line 14.)

Article XCVIII.—Conditions of the distinctness of cognition. (§ 1349.)

§ 1349.—Means of promoting the distinctness of conceptions with respect to their (1) matter and (2) sphere. (page 198, line 25.) Cf. § 1190.)

TITLE I.—PROMOTION OF THE LOGICAL PERFECTION OF COGNITION BY THE DEFINITION, THE EXPOSITION, AND THE DESCRIPTION OF CONCEPTIONS. (§§ 1350–1376 inclusive.)

Article XCLX.—Definition. (§§ 1350, 1351.)

§ 1350.—Definition is a sufficiently distinct and adequate conception. (page 199, line 14.)

§ 1351.—Definition alone is to be considered as a logically perfect conception. (page 199, line 17.) [§ 1351 is a scholion.] [Cf. Abelard (Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, § 94, vol. i., page 393): "*Nihil est definitum, nisi declaratum secundum significationem vocabulorum.*" (Cf. § 1366.)]

Article C.—Analytic and synthetic definition. (§ 1352.)

§ 1352.—All definitions are either analytical or synthetical. (page 199, line 24.)

Article CI.—Given and factitious conceptions a priori and a posteriori. (§ 1353.)

§ 1353.—Conceptions of an analytic definition are GIVEN, either apriori or aposteriori. (page 200, line 4.)

Article CII.—Synthetic definitions by exposition or by construction. (§§ 1354, 1355.)

§ 1354.—Synthesis of the factitious conceptions, from which the synthetic definitions arise, is either that of exposition (of phenomena) or that of construction. (page 200, line 11.)

§ 1355.—All definitions of the mathematical conceptions must be synthetically framed. (page 200, line 20.) [§ 1355 is a scholion.]

Article CIII.—Impossibility of empirically synthetic definitions. (§§ 1356, 1357.)

§ 1356.—Empirical conceptions can not be defined. (p. 201, l. 7.)

§ 1357.—None but the arbitrable conceptions are capable of being defined. (page 201, line 12.) [§ 1357 is a scholion.]

Article CIV.—Analytical definitions by the dissection of conceptions given apriori or aposteriori. (§§ 1358, 1359.)

§ 1358.—No given conceptions, whether given apriori or aposteriori, can be defined but by analysis. (page 201, line 24.)

§ 1359.—All analytical definitions are to be held uncertain. (page 202, line 7.) [§ 1359 is a scholion.]

Article CV.—Expositions and descriptions. (§§ 1360–1365.)

§ 1360.—Expounding of a conception consists in the coherent (successive) representation of its marks, provided that they are found by analysis. (page 202, line 13.) [Now read §§ 1361–1365.]

§ 1361.—Description of a conception is its exposition, provided that it is not precise. (page 202, line 21.)

§ 1362.—Experience is expounded by synthesis. (page 202, line 23.) See § 1354. [§ 1362 is a scholion.]

§ 1363.—Exposition distinguished from declaration. (page 202, line 26.) See § 1357. [§§ 1363, 1364 are a scholion.]

§ 1364.—Incomplete exposition, as part of a definition. (page 203, line 3.)

§ 1365.—Description can not take place but with respect to conceptions empirically given. (p. 203, l. 10.) [§ 1365 is a scholion.]

Article CVI.—Nominal and real definitions. (§§ 1366–1370.)

§ 1366.—Real definitions suffice to the cognition of the object; nominal definitions serve merely to distinguish it from other objects. (page 203, line 16.) [See § 1351.]

§ 1367.—Illimited external sufficiency is not possible without the internal. (page 203, line 26.) [§ 1367 is a scholion.]

§ 1368.—Real definitions are taken from the essence of the thing, from the first ground of possibility. (page 204, line 5.) [§§ 1368–1369 are a scholion.]

§ 1369.—Real definitions must, in moral philosophy, always be sought for. (page 204, line 17.)

§ 1370.—Mathematical definitions are genetical. (page 204, line 22.) [§ 1370 is a scholion.]

Article CVII.—Chief requisites of definition. (§§ 1371, 1372.)

§ 1371.—Essential and universal requisites of the perfection of a definition in general, considered under the four main points of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. (page 204, line 28.)

§ 1372.—Condition of nominal definitions. (That the generic conception and the conception of the specific distinction must make up the definition.) (page 205, line 16.) [§ 1372 is a scholion.]

Article CVIII.—Rules for the proving of definitions. (§ 1373.)

§ 1373.—Must be investigated as to whether a definition is (1) true, (2) distinct, (3) ample, (4) determinate. (page 205, line 24.) Cf. § 1371.

Article CLIX.—Rules for the framing of definitions. (§§ 1374–1376.)

§ 1374.—Very same operations which are requisite to the proving of definitions, are to be performed in the framing of them. (page 206, line 10.)

§ 1375.—Must set forth an analytical definition as an essay only. (page 206, line 20.) Cf. §§ 1359, 1364. [§§ 1375, 1376 are scholia.]

§ 1376.—Defining by a circle. (page 207, line 3.)

TITLE II.—PROMOTION OF THE PERFECTION OF COGNITION BY THE LOGICAL DIVISION OF CONCEPTIONS. (§§ 1377–1397 inclusive.)

Article CX.—Conception of the logical division. (§§ 1377–1379.)

§ 1377.—Determination of a conception with regard to all the possible distinct representations contained under it. (p. 207, l. 7.)

§ 1378.—Dissection and division of a conception are very distinct operations. (page 207, line 25.) [§§ 1378, 1379 are scholia.]

§ 1379.—Descend from superior to inferior conceptions. (page 208, line 7.)

Article CXI.—Universal rules of the logical division. (§§ 1380, 1381.)

§ 1380.—Members of division (1) exclude one another, and (2) rank under a superior conception, to which they (3) collectively taken are equal. (page 208, line 12.)

§ 1381.—Members of division must be separated from one another by a contradictory opposition. (page 208, line 20.) [§ 1381 is a scholion.] See §§ 1271, 1272.

Article CXII.—Codivision and subdivision. (§§ 1382–1384.)

§ 1382.—Codivisions are the various divisions of a conception, which are made with various views. (page 208, line 25.)

§ 1383.—Division may be continued indefinitely. (page 209, line 3.) [§§ 1383 and 1384 are scholia.]

§ 1384.—Division according to the variety of the conceptions of the same object. (page 209, line 8.)

Article CXIII.—Dichotomy and polytomy. (§§ 1385–1387.)

§ 1385.—Dichotomy is a division into two members. (page 209, line 14.)

§ 1386.—Dichotomy is the sole division according to principles apriori. (page 209, line 17.) [§§ 1386 and 1387 are scholia.]

§ 1387.—Division according to the principle of the synthesis apriori has trichotomy. (page 209, line 23.)

Article CXIV.—Various divisions of method. (§ 1388.)

§ 1388.—Elaboration and treatment of scientific cognition. (page 210, line 10.)

Article CXV.—(1) Scientific or popular method. (§§ 1389, 1390.)

§ 1389.—Scholastic method sets out from fundamental and elemental propositions. (page 210, line 16.)

§ 1390.—Popular and scientific methods are distinguished as to the species. (page 210, line 22.) Cf. § 1013. [§ 1390 is a scholion.]

Article CXVI.—(2) Systematical or fragmentary method. (§§ 1391, 1392.)

§ 1391.—Transition from one proposition to another distinctly made. (page 211, line 3.)

§ 1392.—Propounding externally fragmentary, but methodical in itself, is aphoristical. (page 211, line 12.) [§ 1392 is a scholion.]

Article CXVII.—(3) Analytic or synthetic method. (§§ 1393, 1394.)

§ 1393.—Analytic method begins with the conditionate and the founded, and proceeds to the principles (regressive method). (page 211, line 20.)

§ 1394.—Analytic method is usually named the heuristical. (page 212, line 1.) [§ 1394 is a scholion.]

Article CXVIII.—(4) Syllogistic or tabellary method. (§ 1395.)

§ 1395.—Syllogistic method, according to which a science is propounded in a series or concatenation of syllogisms. (p. 212, l. 9.)

Article CXIX.—(5) Acroamatic or erotematic method. (§§ 1396, 1397.)

§ 1396.—Method when one teaches only, is acroamatical. (page 212, line 16.) Cf. §§ 473, 474.

§ 1397.—Can not teach erotematically but by the Socratic dialogue. (page 212, line 22.) [§ 1397 is a scholion.] Cf. § 614.

Article CXX.—Meditation. (§ 1398.)

§ 1398.—Meditation must accompany all reading as well as all learning. (page 213, line 11.)

VOLUME IV.—CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

Translated from the German of IMMANUEL KANT. By J. M. D. MEIKLEJOHN. (§§ 1399–2628 inclusive.) Paging of the edition included in Bohn's Philosophical Library (London, Bell & Daldy, 1866). [The student will please remember that the following pages contain, not an exposition or explanation of the Critique, but, as is sufficiently described at page 9 above, some references from one section to another, set forth on a series of section heads nearly all selected from the text.]

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. (A. D. 1781.) (§§ 1399–1409 inclusive.)

§ 1399.—Reason is called upon to consider questions which it can not decline, but which it can not answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. (page xvii., line 2.)

§ 1400.—Arena of these endless contests is called metaphysic. (page xvii., line 20.)

§ 1401.—Vain to profess indifference in regard to inquiries, the object of which can not be indifferent to humanity. (p. xviii., l. 22.)

§ 1402.—Call to reason again to undertake the most laborious of all tasks—that of self-examination. (page xix., line 2.)

§ 1403.—Critical investigation of pure reason entered upon by Kant. (page xix., line 9.)

§ 1404.—Chief aim in this work has been thoroughness. (page xx., line 7.) Pure reason is a perfect unity: cf. § 1424.

§ 1405.—Two indispensable conditions of a critique of pure reason: (1) certitude; (2) clearness. (page xx., line 38.)

§ 1406.—Opinion is perfectly inadmissible; and hypothesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions. (page xxi., line 3.)

§ 1407.—Deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. (§§ 1578–1652.) (page xxi., line 25.) Cf. § 2869, and Prof. Mahaffy's note.

§ 1408.—Examples and explanations are necessary only from a popular point of view; but logical clearness is essential. (page xxii., line 14.)

§ 1409.—Metaphysic of Nature—What reason produces from itself can not be concealed. (p. xxiii., l. 14.) Cf. §§ 2611, 2613, 2614, 2729, 2841, 1424.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. (A. D. 1787.) (§§ 1410–1435.)

§ 1410.—Metaphysics far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress. (page xxiv., line 15.)

§ 1411.—Logic has advanced in this sure course. (p. xxiv., l. 32.)

§ 1412.—Logic is properly only a propaedeutic—forms as it were the vestibule of the sciences. (page xxv., line 16.)

§ 1413.—Sciences must contain elements of a priori cognition, theoretical or practical. (page xxv., line 30.)

§ 1414.—Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences. (page xxv., line 40.)

§ 1415.—Mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science, among that wonderful nation, the Greeks. (p. xxvi., l. 1.)

§ 1416.—Physics exhibits a rapid intellectual revolution. (page xxvi., line 35.)

§ 1417.—Reason must approach nature, not in the character of a pupil, but in that of a judge. (page xxvii., line 1.)

§ 1418.—Metaphysics, a purely speculative science, deals with mere conceptions. We find that reason perpetually comes to a stand. (page xxvii., line 28.)

§ 1419.—Assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. (page xxviii., line 25.) Cf. in Fischer (p. 37, Mahaffy's translation, Longmans, Green & Co., 1866), where Mahaffy says that Kant refers to the rotation of the earth, and "not to the heliocentric hypothesis, as Cousin and Professor Webb suppose." [Cf. the views of the Chinese scholar Ch'ing, according to Choo He, at the foot of page 104 above.]

§ 1420.—Objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which can not be given in experience. (page xxix., line 29.)

§ 1421.—Conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience. (page xxx., line 1.)

§ 1422.—Unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves. (page xxx., line 20.)

§ 1423.—Practical data to determine the transcendent conception of the unconditioned. (page xxxi., line 6.)

§ 1424.—Aim of the critique of pure speculative reason. No principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it is at the same time viewed in relation to the total use of pure reason. (page xxxi., line 18.)

§ 1425.—Removes an obstacle which impedes and even threatens to destroy the use of practical reason. (page xxxii., line 28.)

§ 1426.—Must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we reserve the power of thinking objects as things in themselves. (page xxxiii., line 29.) Cf. §§ 2911, 2983, Mahaffy's notes.

§ 1427.—While I can not cognize, I can quite well think freedom (that is to say, my representation of it involves at least no contradiction). (page xxxiv., line 2.)

§ 1428.—Morality does not require the speculative cognition of liberty; it is enough that I can think it. (page xxxiv., line 39.) Cf. § 897.

§ 1429.—Abolish knowledge, to make room for belief. I can not

even make the assumption (as the practical interests of morality require) of God, freedom, and immortality, if I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. (page xxxv., line 21.) Cf. § 2596.

§ 1430.—All the objections urged against morality and religion, may be silenced for ever by the Socratic method. (p. xxxv., l. 38.)

§ 1431.—Genesis of the practical convictions of mankind so far as they depend on rational grounds. (1) the hope of a future life; (2) the consciousness of freedom; (3) the belief in a wise and great Author of the universe. (page xxxvi., line 18.) Cf. § 877.

§ 1432.—Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious, as well as of idealism and skepticism. (page xxxvii., line 16.)

§ 1433.—Criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics, which must perform its task entirely apriori. (page xxxviii., line 10.)

§ 1434.—Second edition.—Greater clearness of the exposition as it now stands. (page xxxix, line 10.)

§ 1846.—Proves the existence of external objects in space. (page xl, line 14.) See § 1434, and cf. § 1846 below, and also §§ 2033, 1634, 1635, 2970, and Mahaffy's note to § 2919.

§ 1435.—Task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the statement. (page xli., line 16.)

INTRODUCTION. (§§ 1436–1472 inclusive.)

Article I.—Of the difference between pure and empirical knowledge. (§§ 1436–1439 inclusive.)

§ 1436.—All our knowledge begins with experience. (p. 1, l. 4.)

§ 1437.—Question which requires close investigation (whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience.) (page 1, line 14.)

§ 1438.—Knowledge apriori must be taken to mean such as is absolutely independent of all experience. (page 1, line 29.)

§ 1439.—Knowledge apriori is either pure or impure. (p. 2, l. 17.)

Article II.—The human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state, is in possession of certain cognitions apriori. (§§ 1440–1442.)

§ 1440.—Necessity and strict universality are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge. (page 2, line 26.)

§ 1441.—FACT that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure apriori cognition. We have judgments which are necessary. (page 3, line 19.) [Cf. Fischer, page 13 of Mahaffy's translation, and also (same page 13, note †) where Mahaffy translates from Kant's first edition.]

§ 1442.—Apriori origin manifest even in conceptions. (p. 4, l. 6.)

Article III.—Philosophy stands in need of a science which shall determine the possibility, principles, and extent of human knowledge apriori. (§§ 1443–1447 inclusive.)

§ 1443.—Unavoidable problems of mere pure reason—(God, freedom, and immortality). (page 4, line 25.)

§ 1444.—Solution of these problems is undertaken by the science of metaphysics. (page 5, line 1.)

§ 1445.—Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example. (page 5, line 16.) [Mathematics, radically meaning *science*, or that which is to be learned, is (strictly speaking) the science based on (or consisting of and in) definitions, axioms, and demonstrations. See §§ 2466 et seqq., and cf. §§ 2603.]

§ 1446.—Deceived by such a proof of the power of reason. (page 5, line 41.)

§ 1447.—What frees us from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us into an unstable belief. (page 6, line 19.)

Article IV.—Of the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments. (§§ 1448–1451 inclusive.)

§ 1448.—Synthetical judgments add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein. (page 7, line 3.)

§ 1449.—Judgments of experience, as such, are always synthetical. (page 7, line 34.) [See Fischer (page 12, note) where Mahaffy translates from Kant's first edition, and Mahaffy's note to § 2653. (Proleg., page 19.)]

§ 1450.—Synthetical judgments apriori can not be founded on experience. (page 8, line 30.) [Cf. § 1441.]

§ 1451.—Depends the whole aim of our speculative knowledge apriori. Synthesis alone is a real acquisition. (page 9, line 14.)

Article V.—In all theoretical sciences of reason, synthetical judgments apriori are contained as principles. (§§ 1452–1458 inclusive.)

§ 1452.—Mathematical judgments are always synthetical. (page 9, line 23.) Cf. § 2654.

§ 1453.—Mathematical propositions (pure) are always judgments apriori, and not empirical. (page 9, line 37.)

§ 1454.—Arithmetical propositions are always synthetical. (page 10, line 5.) [See Mahaffy's note to § 2654. (Proleg., page 22.)]

§ 1455.—Just as little is any principle of pure geometry analytical. (page 10, line 35.) [The last half of this section (page 11, lines 3 to 11) is parenthetical. See Monck's observation mentioned by Mahaffy (Fischer, page 16, note*), and Mahaffy's note to § 2654. (Proleg., page 23.)]

§ 1456.—Predicate pertains to these conceptions but by virtue of an intuition. (page 11, line 11.) Cf. § 2654.

§ 1457.—Science of natural philosophy contains in itself synthetical judgments apriori as principles. (page 11, line 24.)

§ 1458.—Metaphysics, according to the proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical propositions apriori. (p. 11, l. 40.)

Article VI.—The universal problem of pure reason. (§§ 1459–1466.)

§ 1459.—How are synthetical judgments apriori possible? (page 12, line 15.) [Cf. § 2667.]

§ 1460.—Hume came the nearest of all to this problem. (page 12, line 30.) [Cf. §§ 2634–2640, and § 2670.]

§ 1461.—Possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge apriori of objects. (page 13, line 9.) Cf. Fischer, page 17, and see § 1511 (to which Mahaffy refers) in regard to motion.

§ 1462.—How is metaphysics as a natural disposition possible? (page 13, line 19.)

§ 1463.—How is metaphysics possible as a science? (p. 14, l. 8.)

§ 1464.—Critique of reason leads at last naturally and necessarily to science. (page 14, line 25.)

§ 1465.—[Metaphysical?] science can not be of great and formidable prolixity. (page 14, line 30.) [I am not sure that Kant is

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

"An Analysis of Kant's Critick of Pure Reason, by the translator of that work." London, William Pickering, 1844. [On the title page of my copy, underneath the line "translator of that work," some person has written with a pencil, "F. Haywood."] [The preface (after the first four sentences) is concluded as follows:] The present analysis is founded upon and couched in the words of the original work: for though different great commentators have been more or less closely followed, yet, as they themselves have in most cases borrowed their phraseology from Kant himself, they are not so entirely copied in this analysis as, in looking merely at the expressions used, might seem to be the case. In several instances, however, not only their mode of reasoning, but their form of language, has been implicitly adopted, and from Wirgman in particular, as well as from Schœn, and Beck, and from Jouffroy's translation of a German Analysis, much that is in the following work will be found to have been taken. The object of the author or compiler was less originality, than to render his subject comprehensible; and, if this be attained, the end he had in view will be fully accomplished, and for this he is willing to forego any higher claim of authorship.

[In the following first part of the Analysis I have inserted [in brackets] a few words (nearly all from Meiklejohn's translation of the Critique), and also some references to the Critique, (sections according to the numbering of the Clavis). An asterisk * indicates that at that point I have omitted a word or words out of Haywood's text. I have omitted the letter k from the words

speaking of metaphysical science in its entirety: it may be that he refers to science concerning the possibility of metaphysics. Cf. §§ 2841, 1467.]

§ 1466.—Attempts hitherto made to establish metaphysical science dogmatically, may be regarded as non-existent. (p. 14, l. 41.)

Article VII.—Idea and division of a particular science, under the name of a critique of pure reason. (§§ 1467–1472 inclusive.)

§ 1467.—Critique of pure reason, to purify our reason, and to shield it against error. (page 15, line 25.)

§ 1468.—Transcendental critique aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance of our knowledge. Transcendental knowledge is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. (page 16, line 3.)

§ 1469.—Transcendental philosophy is the system of all the principles of pure reason: the whole plan of this science is sketched architectonically by the critique of pure reason. (page 17, line 5.)

§ 1470.—No conceptions must enter into it which contain aught empirical. (Hence the science of morals is not pure transcendental philosophy. For all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and these belong to empirical sources of cognition. (page 17, line 39.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

analytick and dialectick, changed the spelling Critick to Critique, omitted parenthetical marks () in one sentence, sometimes used a semicolon instead of a comma which I found printed, made perhaps some other minor changes in punctuation, and in a few cases made minor changes or transposition in the text: which small matters, not often occurring, I have not thought it necessary to bring to the notice of the reader except in this general way, so that if I have done anything wrong, I may receive the blame.]

In 1781, Kant published his first edition of this celebrated work, the preface to which is short, and hardly does more than introduce the subject generally; but in 1790, together with a second edition a second preface appeared, wherein the leading principles of the system are set forth. The exposition commences by showing that Logic, unlike the cognition of Reason, is a science which from the earliest times has proceeded in a right path, and that even so soon as the days of Aristotle this was discovered; and that though the subject may not have made great advances since that period, it has not retrograded.

If psychological, metaphysical, or anthropological elements have been incorrectly pushed into Logic, this, it is contended, though it may have disfigured the science,—inasmuch as it added considerations which do not properly appertain to it,—was a mistake, rather than a fault. Logic in Kant's view of the matter has, in fact, nothing to do but with the formal rules of all thinking, whether such be a priori, or empirical [§ 1411].

Logic then being limited in this way, the Understanding therein is only

§ 1471.—Division of this science: (I.) doctrine of the elements, and (II.) doctrine of the method of pure reason. (page 18, line 16.) [Cf. § 1008.]

§ 1472.—Two sources of human knowledge: sense and understanding. (page 18, line 21.) Cf. § 1524. [*Probably* Mahaffy (Fischer, page 4) translates *perhaps*.]

TOME I.—TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. (§§ 1473–2444 inclusive.)

PART I.—TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC. (§§ 1473–1523.)

Article I.—Introductory. (§§ 1473–1477 inclusive.)

§ 1473.—Sensibility is the capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects. (page 21, line 5.) [Cf. § 1787.]

§ 1474.—Sensation is the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object. (page 21, line 21.)

§ 1475.—Pure intuition, which exists apriori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation. (page 22, line 1.)

§ 1476.—Transcendental æsthetic is the science of all the principles of sensibility apriori. (page 22, line 16.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

concerned with itself and its form. Reason, the particular subject-matter of Kant's investigation, is twofold, theoretical or practical, and its cognitions may be so referred to its object [i. e., the apriori cognition of reason, in reference to its object, is either theoretical or practical. § 1413]. But, in the present instance, the pure part of both is only to be treated, that is to say, that part wherein reason determines its object wholly apriori; and that which proceeds from other sources must not be mixed up with it.

Mathematics and Physics are adduced as the two theoretical cognitions of Reason which have to determine their objects apriori [§ 1414], the first of which is stated to have always proceeded in a right track from the earliest period of Greece [§ 1415]; it had, however, more difficulty in getting into this proper way than Logic, where, as it was before said, the understanding or reason has only to do with itself. With Physics, again, this was more difficult, and it was not until the time of Galileo that a light is supposed to have dawned upon natural philosophers. It was then discovered that reason only perceives that which it itself produces, and that its judgments coincide with certain laws existing in the understanding. Reason, in this way, though it refers to nature, in order to be instructed by it, experimentally, yet in fact itself gives laws to nature, compelling the answers to be rendered in certain forms [§ 1417].

This is the essence of the system of Kant, and upon which every thing depends; and though it seems something like the exploded doctrine of innate ideas, yet it will be ascertained in the sequel to be very different.

§ 1477.—Two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge apriori: (1) space; (2) time. (page 22, line 22.)

TITLE I.—OF SPACE. (§§ 1478-1494 inclusive.)

Article II.—Metaphysical exposition of this conception. (1478-1483.)

§ 1478.—Represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in space. (page 23, line 9.)

§ 1479.—Exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception as given apriori. (page 23, line 27.)

§ 1480.—External experience is itself only possible through the antecedent representation of space. (page 23, line 33.)

§ 1481.—Space is a necessary representation apriori, and must be considered the condition of the possibility of phenomena. (page 24, line 6.)

§ 1482.—Space is no discursive or general conception of the relations of things, but a pure intuition. (page 24, line 15.) A discursive conception is one which has received from the faculty of judgment (ratio) some addition to the content with which (as an intuition) it enters the mind. Cf. §§ 1550, 1551.

§ 1483.—Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. No conception, as such, can be so conceived as if it contained within itself an infinite multitude of representations. (page 24, line 31.) Cf. Fischer, page 41, where Mahaffy translates, "For all the parts

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

Metaphysics not having, like Mathematics, the advantage of Intuition, has been longer in falling into the sure path of a science; for reason comes to a stand-still, when it wishes to discover, apriori, laws which, it insists, the most common experience confirms [§ 1418]. The error in metaphysical speculations seems to have been, that it has hitherto been laid down, that our cognition was to regulate itself according to the objects, whilst, under such a supposition, all attempts to make out any thing, apriori, respecting these objects, by means of conceptions, whereby our cognition would be extended, have failed. The next thing then to be tried is whether it would not be better to admit that the objects are regulated according to our cognition [§ 1419]. This accords more with the possibility that is desired of their cognition apriori, which is to determine something respecting them before they are given.

Copernicus, it is known, made little progress in his knowledge of the motions of the heavenly bodies so long as he supposed that the stars revolved round the spectator, but when he reversed the idea, and made the spectator to turn and the sun itself to be at rest, he arrived at the true result. All objects according to this improved mode of thinking regulate themselves as objects of experience, in which character alone they are known, according to cognitions apriori, existing in the understanding. The contradictions that arise in our investigations of reason, flow from confounding the objects that are presented to us in one case as Objects of experience, and in another as Things in themselves.

This is the great distinction of the Kantian system. Reason, for instance,

of space, ad infinitum, exist simultaneously." See § 1639, cf. § 2684, and Mahaffy's note in reference to unendlich (Proleg., page 47), and see especially § 2427. Cf. §§ 2178, 2181.

Article III.—Transcendental exposition of the conception of space. (§§ 1484–1488 inclusive.)

§ 1484.—Transcendental exposition is the explanation of a conception as a principle whence can be discerned the possibility of other synthetical apriori cognitions. (page 25, line 2.)

§ 1485.—Representation of space must be originally intuition. (page 25, line 9.) Cf. §§ 1455 and 1440.

§ 1486.—Must be found in the mind apriori. (page 25, line 15.)

§ 1487.—How can an external intuition anterior to objects themselves, and in which our conception of objects can be determined apriori, exist in the human mind? (page 25, line 21.)

§ 1488.—Possibility of geometry, as a synthetical science apriori, becomes comprehensible. (page 25, line 29.)

Article IV.—Conclusions from the foregoing conceptions. (§§ 1489–1494 inclusive.)

§ 1489.—Space does not represent any property of objects as things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to each other. (page 25, line 36.)

§ 1490.—Space is the subjective condition of the sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible. (page 26, line 9.)

§ 1491.—Can not make the special conditions of sensibility into

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

aspires to the Unconditioned. But if we admit our cognition of experience regulates itself according to objects, as Things in themselves, the unconditioned can not be thought without contradiction [stated hypothetically in § 1422]; whilst if we suppose that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not regulate itself according to these, as things in themselves, but that these objects, as phenomena, rather regulate themselves according to our mode of representation, the contradiction disappears. The analysis of pure cognition apriori by the metaphysician is or ought to be divided into the two classes mentioned, namely, that of Things in themselves, and Things as phenomena. Carrying the experience-view of things out to its strict consequences, it would seem to exalt Sensibility or Sensation high above all other principles, but this Kant is peculiarly anxious to avoid; and by endeavoring to show that the practical or moral use of Reason is no less true and demonstrable than the speculative, and in having cleared the way of all that was obstructive, he thinks he affords freer passage to the dictates of the moral principle [§ 1423]. The Critique of Pure Reason limits the use of reason, in this way, that it admits Space and Time to be merely Forms of sensible intuition, consequently only the conditions of things as phenomena; and it further shows, that we can have no elements at all for the cognition of things, excepting so far as a corresponding intuition can be given to these conceptions—consequently, that we can have

conditions of the possibility of things, but only of the possibility of their existence as far as they are phenomena. (page 26, line 19.)

§ 1492.—Reality (i. e. the objective validity) of space in regard of all which can be presented to us externally as object, and at the same time also the ideality of space in regard to objects when they are considered (by means of reason) as things in themselves (that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility). (page 26, line 40.) Cf. § 1614.

§ 1493.—Space excepted, there is no representation subjective and referring to something external to us, which could be called objective a priori. (page 27, line 19.) See Fischer, (page 57) where Mahaffy translates from the first edition, and refers to § 1515.

§ 1494.—Outward objects are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be. (page 27, line 41.)

TITLE II.—OF TIME. (§§ 1495-1508 inclusive.)

Article V.—*Metaphysical exposition of this conception.* (§§ 1495-1499 inclusive.)

§ 1495.—Time is not an empirical conception. (page 28, line 14.)

§ 1496.—Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions. (page 28, line 20.)

§ 1497.—Apodictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms of time in general. (page 28, line 29.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but merely so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, so far as it is Phenomenon [§ 1425].

The analytical part of the Critique of Pure Reason is devoted to the proof of these assertions, and restrains thereby the speculative cognition of Reason, as has been remarked, to mere objects of experience. But then there arises the greatest difference between cognizing or knowing objects, and, thinking them [§ 1426]; and the antagonist views which Kant afterward develops in what he terms Antinomies, are only to be explained by admitting two modes of contemplating the objects, namely, in the one case, to look upon things, as things in themselves, and in the other, as they are phenomenal, or as they appear [§ 1427]. Kant intimates, that through his view of the case, and the great distinction which he establishes, the doctrines of materialism and atheism are totally uprooted, and he insists that the outcry raised against his system arises not from the public, who are never injured by any speculative opinion, but from schoolmen, who alone are interested in maintaining their selfish and prejudiced positions [§ 1432].

[Here we leave]* the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason.* The reasoning by which these principles are to be supported forms the subject of a work which, however disfigured by a harsh and singular terminology, must always be regarded as one of the most important productions connected with the history of the human mind.

§ 1498.—Time is not a discursive or general conception but a pure form of the sensuous intuition. (page 29, line 1.) Cf. § 1482.

§ 1499.—Infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of one time lying at the foundation. (page 29, line 11.) Cf. § 1639.

Article VI.—Transcendental exposition of the conception of time. (§ 1500.)

§ 1500.—Explains the possibility of so much synthetical knowledge apriori as is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion. (page 29, line 22.) Cf. § 1632.

Article VII.—Conclusions from the above conceptions. (§§ 1501–1505 inclusive.)

§ 1501.—Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which inheres in things as an objective determination. (page 30, line 4.)

§ 1502.—Time is nothing else than the form of our internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. (page 30, line 17.)

§ 1503.—Time is the formal condition apriori of all phenomena whatsoever. (page 30, line 33.) Cf. §§ 291, 1490.

§ 1504.—Time is merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition, and in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing. (page 31, line 9.) Cf. § 1492.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

The Introduction to the work itself of the Critique of Pure Reason begins by exposing the difference between pure and empirical cognition or knowledge; and whilst it admits that this said cognition begins with experience [§ 1436], it denies that it springs up out of experience [§ 1437]—empirical cognition being a compound of that which we have received through our impressions; and that which our own inherent, as it may be termed, cognition-faculty, (called however only into action by impressions made upon the senses), has supplied from or out of itself. Hence, according to this view, although all knowledge commences its operations from experience, which is designated variously as sensible, sensual, or sensitive, the one does not flow from the other; the very facts of experience being conceived and arranged according to innate forms of the understanding, and which are subsequently shown to be so many Categories of Pure Reason. Cognitions apriori are such as are entirely independent of experience, though by this experience alone are they called into operation; and cognitions aposteriori are, on the other hand, those which have their source in experience. Pure knowledge, apriori, is that with which nothing at all empirical is mixed, so that the proposition that “every change has its cause,” notwithstanding that it is a proposition apriori, is not pure; because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience [§ 1439]. In the same way it is erroneous, in speaking of one who undermines the foundation of his house, to say that he might, apriori, have known the house would fall; because this entirely, apriori, he could not be acquainted with, for heaviness is in this case

§ 1505.—Transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition, it is nothing. (page 31, line 33.) Cf. § 1493.

Article VIII.—Elucidation. (§§ 1506–1511 inclusive.)

§ 1506.—Objection urged against this theory: Changes are only possible in time, and therefore time must be something real. (page 32, line 17.)

§ 1507.—Reason why this objection is so unanimously brought. (page 33, line 6.)

§ 1508.—Genus phenomenon, which has always two aspects. (page 33, line 18.)

§ 1509.—Time and space, being merely conditions of our sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly determine their own range and purpose. The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity. (page 33, line 28.)

§ 1510.—Validity of our empirical knowledge unshaken. (page 34, line 5.)

§ 1511.—Transcendental æsthetic can not contain any more than these two elements, space and time. (page 35, line 12.)

Article LX.—General remarks on transcendental æsthetic. (§§ 1512–1522 inclusive.)

Scholium I.— (§§ 1512–1516 inclusive.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

added; and that bodies* are heavy, and that they fall when their supports are taken away, is a species of knowledge only derivable from experience [§ 1438].

[In order to show]* that the human mind is always in possession of certain cognitions apriori, the only question then is, what is the criterion by which such are distinguished from those that are aposteriori [§ 1440]? This criterion is Necessity and strict Universality, and wherever either of these belongs to a judgment, they are such characteristics as indicate a peculiar source of cognition, or the one which is apriori. Experience can only give contingent judgments; and Hume's idea of the necessary connection of Cause and Effect being simply in our minds the result of Habit [§ 1441], is precisely the doctrine which Kant opposes, and to which the world is indebted for the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Now if what has been stated as to cognitions apriori be true, the necessity of a science which should establish positively the principles and extent of the same is obvious, and the most important of all [the problems of pure reason]* to man are the questions of God, Liberty, and Immortality [§ 1443], and the Critique of Pure Reason is the essential preliminary to that of Practical Reason, wherein these three points are to be fully proved and determined. To prepare the way for this investigation, it will be first necessary to show the difference [§ 1447] that exists between the different kinds of judgments, or those which are analytical and those which are synthetical.

A judgment is called analytical, when the predicate adds nothing to the con-

§ 1512.—Fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general. (Recapitulation.) (page 35, line 29.) See § 1822.

§ 1513.—Difference between a confused and a clear representation is merely logical, and has nothing to do with content. (page 36, line 27.) Cf. §§ 1052–1055, and 1109–1112.

§ 1514.—Distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual is plainly transcendental, and concerns not merely the clearness or obscurity, but the content and origin of both. (Leibnitz–Wolfian philosophy erroneous.) (page 37, line 13.) See § 1513.

§ 1515.—Question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental. (page 37, line 28.) See § 1493.

§ 1516.—Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective, and conditions of the possibility of objects as things in themselves. Whence do you obtain the propositions of geometry, cognized synthetically apriori, and with apodictic certainty? (page 38, line 22.) See § 2277.

Scholium II.—(§§ 1517–1520 inclusive.)

§ 1517.—All in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. (page 40, line 12.)

§ 1518.—External sense in its representation can contain only

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

ception of the subject, but only by analysis separates it into its constituent parts [§ 1448]. This is merely an explicative judgment, but a synthetical one is an extending or amplifying judgment; inasmuch as it adds a predicate to the conception of the subject, which was not at all thought in it, and could not by any analysis of the same have been added to it. Thus mathematical judgments are all synthetical, and mathematical propositions are judgments apriori, and not empirical, because they carry along with them the test of necessity, which it is evident is not derivable from experience [§ 1453].

The questions then arise, how these synthetical judgments apriori, are possible, as well as how pure Mathematics and pure Physics are possible [§ 1461].

* These sciences * [must be possible, because they really exist. Regarding] Metaphysics,* the question is then asked also as to possibility in this case, and this again leads to the idea and division of a particular science, to be denominated by the title of the Critique of Pure Reason [§ 1467].

Here the objects and limits of the work itself are determined. It is not to be designated Transcendental Philosophy [§ 1468], because, to be a complete system in this sense, it ought to contain a full analysis of the whole of human cognition apriori; but whilst "the Critique" as a work lays before us a complete enumeration of all the fundamental conceptions of the human mind, or of the categories which form the aforesaid pure cognition, it refrains from a full analysis of these conceptions themselves, as well as * such as are thence derived. Limiting itself thus to the consideration of synthetical cognition apriori, the science is separated into the two great divisions of the Elemental Doctrine, or the doctrine of the elements of the subject, and the Methodical Doctrine, or that which is to determine the method that is to be applied to these elements [§ 1471].

the relation of the object to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in itself. (page 40, line 23.)

§ 1519.—Nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity. (page 40, line 30.) See Mahaffy's Introduction to Fischer, page liv., and Kant's note to § 1633, to which Mahaffy refers.

§ 1520.—Subject intuites itself according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected, consequently as it appears and not as it is. (page 41, line 7.) Cf. § 1629.

Scholium III.—(§ 1521.) [Cf. §§ 1856, 1896.]

§ 1521.—Illusory appearance never can be attributed as a predicate to an object. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also the self-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses (that is, as they appear), this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory appearances. (p. 41, l. 35.)

Scholium IV.—(1522.)

§ 1522.—Intuition in space and time is dependent on the existence of the object. (page 43, line 5.) See §§ 2282, 2700.

Article X.—Conclusion of the transcendental æsthetic. (§ 1523.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

The interpretation is here to be afforded of what is termed by Kant, Transcendental Æsthetic, or the theory or rules of sensibility in general; and intuition is declared to be the only means by which reference is made to objects, and whereby immediate (as distinct from other) cognition is afforded [§ 1473]. To realize this the object must be given to us, and the effect of the object upon the representation-faculty of man is Sensation [§ 1474]; that which corresponds, in the phenomenon, to the sensation is Matter, and that which causes that the diversity of the phenomenon is adduced in certain relationship is Form.

By means of the external sense we represent to ourselves every thing as in Space; and by the internal sense all is represented in the relationship of Time [§ 1478]. But the question arises what are these two things, space and time? Are they determinations or relations of things, but yet such as would belong to things in themselves, though they should not be intuited or envisaged; or are they such things that they belong only to the form of the intuition, and consequently to a subjective property ["to the subjective constitution of the mind," Meiklejohn translates (1478)] of mind, without which these attributes could not be attached to any thing.

After discussing* what space is, Kant arrives at the conclusion that space is an intuition apriori, and not a [discursive] conception [§ 1482]. Space* is held to be nothing but the form of all phenomena of the external sense, or the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible to us [§ 1490]; and it will be seen from considering the doctrine, that the Reality or objective validity of space is positive, in reference to all that, externally, as object, can be presented to us; but at the same time that it is an Ideality in reference to things if they are considered in themselves, by mean

§ 1523.—Valid only for objects of possible experience. (page 44, line 2.)

PART II.—TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. (§§ 1524–2444.)

Introduction.—Idea of a Transcendental Logic. (§§ 1524–1545.)

Article I.—Of logic in general. (§§ 1524–1534 inclusive.)

§ 1524.—Knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind: (1) the power of receiving representations; (2) the power of cognizing by means of these representations. (page 45, line 8.) See §§ 1544, 1551, 1473, and Mahaffy's note in Fischer, page 5, with which compare Kant's note to § 1639.

§ 1525.—Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the elements of our knowledge; so that neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. (page 45, line 15.) [§ 1526 (page 45, line 28).]

§ 1526.—Sensibility is the faculty of receiving representations.

§ 1527.—Understanding is the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous intuition. (page 46, line 1.)

§ 1528.—Understanding can not intuit, and the sensuous faculty can not think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. (page 46, line 11.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

of reason or without regard to the nature of our sensibility [§ 1492]. Here the distinction shows itself, between things in themselves, and things as they appear. Space is not a form which is proper to things in themselves [§ 1494], nor are such things at all known to us. What we term external objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is in space, but whose true correlative, that is to say, the thing in itself, is not thereby, nor can it be, known.

Neither is Time any empirical conception which can be adduced from experience [§ 1495]. It is a necessary representation which lies at the foundation of all intuition [§ 1496.] Time is given, apriori:—it is the form of the internal sense, and the formal condition, apriori, of phenomena in general [§ 1503]. Hence it will be seen that all intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we see or envisage are not in themselves what they are taken for; that if we did away with ourselves, that is to say, the subject or the subjective quality of our senses in general, every quality that we discover in time and space, and even time and space themselves, would disappear [§ 1512] What objects may be in themselves, separated from the receptivity of our sensibility, is quite unknown to us. We only are acquainted with our own mode of perceiving these objects. The pure intuitions are space and time; the empirical is sensation. Here the error of the Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophy becomes palpable, for in the view there taken of our cognitions, the difference between that which was intellectual and that which appertains to the

§ 1529.—Logic distinguished from æsthetic. (page 46, line 17.)

§ 1530.—Logic is either logic of the general or of the particular use of the understanding. (page 46, line 20.) Cf. § 993. [It does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Meiklejohn that a particular designation is desirable for so much of logic as is found necessary as a propaedeutic to a particular science. This may be called the organon of the science, or logic of the particular use, to distinguish it from the completeness of universal logic.]

§ 1531.—General logic is either pure or applied. (page 47, line 18.) Cf. § 994.

§ 1532.—Pure general logic is a canon of understanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use. (page 48, line 2.) Cf. § 1001.

§ 1533.—Pure general logic is a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain completely apriori. (page 48, line 15.) Cf. § 996.

§ 1534.—Applied logic is a representation of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary employment in concreto. (page 48, line 31.) Cf. §§ 1531, 1532, 1009.

Article II.—Of transcendental logic. (§§ 1535–1538 inclusive.)

§ 1535.—Distinction between pure and empirical thought (of objects). (page 49, line 10.) Cf. § 1000.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

sensibility was considered merely as logical; whereas it is transcendental, concerning not merely the form as to clearness or obscurity, but the origin and content of our cognitions themselves [§ 1514.]

The science which treats of the laws of the understanding in general is termed Logic, as that which treated of the science of sensibility or sensitivity was Æsthetic [§ 1529]. But logic is divided into two branches accordingly as it signifies [relates to] the universal or the particular use of the understanding [§ 1530]. The one contains the absolutely necessary rules of Thinking in general; the other contains rules as to thinking correctly, in regard to particular kind of objects. The one is Elemental Logic, or general logic, the other is the Organon or understanding-instrument of this or that particular science.*

Now this elemental or general logic may be divided again into two branches, pure and applied [§ 1531]. In the one, abstraction is made of all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is exercised, as for instance, the influence of the senses, the power of custom, of inclination, desire, passion, the sources of prejudices, etc.; as well as all causes of experience-cognitions, inasmuch as these merely concern the application of the understanding to sensible impressions. Pure elemental, or universal, or general logic, only regards pure principles, apriori; and is therefore a canon of the understanding and reason [§ 1532], (or a complex of rules for the faculty of forming conceptions, and judging and concluding), [and]* it [only] considers the formal part and what, as thinking, is necessarily required for thinking, the content of the same being

§ 1536.—Examine the origin of our cognitions of objects, so far as that origin can not be ascribed to the objects themselves. (page 49, line 21.)

§ 1537.—Must bear well in mind that not every cognition apriori is transcendental. Distinction of the transcendental and empirical. (page 49, line 33) [The apriori determinations of space are empirical, because they do not transcend the sensible world; but they are not of empirical origin, because determined apriori by the intuition.] *See Mahaffy's note in Fischer, page 32*

§ 1538.—Idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely apriori. (page 50, line 10.) Cf. § 1535.

Article III.—Of the division of general logic into analytic and dialectic. (§§ 1539–1543 inclusive.)

§ 1539.—“What is truth?” To know what questions we may reasonably propose, is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. (page 50, line 26.) Cf. §§ 1114, 1133.

§ 1540.—No universal test of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter can be demanded, because such a demand is self-contradictory. (page 51, line 6.) [This demonstration is remarkable for its terseness.] Cf. § 1079.

§ 1541.—Accordance of a cognition with the universal and

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

[what it may,] either empirical, that is, derived from experience, or transcendental, that is to say, concerning cognitions apriori. This elemental or universal logic is termed applied elemental logic when it is directed to the rules of the use of the understanding under alleged subjective empirical-psychological conditions, as for example, when it is directed to the play of the imagination, etc. Still it is universal logic, though it has empirical principles, for this reason, that it refers to the use of the understanding without distinction of objects, and in this way it becomes neither exactly an Organon (or an understanding-instrument) of particular sciences, (which contains the rules of thinking as to a particular kind of objects,) nor a Canon of the understanding in general, because it contains the application of the use of the understanding to a determinate thinking subject, that is to say, man; but it is only a Cathartikon, (means of purification) of the common understanding from error.

In elemental logic the part which is pure, or which regards pure reason, must be separated from that which constitutes what is applied, though still elemental or universal logic [§ 1533]. As a science it appears dry. It is, however, a systematic cognition, though a short one. It derives all its positions from the understanding, and is nothing else but an analysis or development of the functions of the understanding in thinking or in thought generally. Logicians must therefore at all times have the two [following] rules before them in treating of elemental logic; for [first rule] when it is considered under the sense of universal, it makes abstraction of the content of all understanding-cognition;

formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing more than the *conditio sine qua non*, or negative condition of all truth. (page 51, line 23.) Cf. § 1080.

§ 1542.—No one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of, or decide concerning, objects. (page 52, line 1.)

§ 1543.—Any attempt to employ logic as an instrument (*organon*) in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge, must end in mere prating. (page 52, line 18.) Cf. §§ 1003, 1004, 1545.

Article IV.—Of the division of transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and dialectic. (§§ 1544, 1545)

§ 1544.—Transcendental analytic treats of the elements of pure cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without which no object at all can be thought. (page 53, line 18.) Cf. §§ 1522, 1524, 1542, 1546.

§ 1545.—Transcendental dialectic is a critique of dialectical illusion. (page 53, line 32.) See § 1543, and cf. §§ 1925, 1926.

Division I.—Transcendental Analytic. (§§ 1546–1924 inclusive.)

Article I.—(§ 1546.)

§ 1546.—Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our *apriori* knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. (page 54, line 26.) Books (1) the conceptions, and (2) the principles of pure understanding.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

or of all reference of the same to the object; consequently [it makes abstraction] in respect to the same, whether the cognition be pure or empirical; whether the object springs from the cognition-faculty itself, or is given by means of sensible impressions. For if it were admitted that it has reference to the difference of objects of thought, then by reason of this difference, and because the same is frequently given, by experience, it could not assume strict universality, [or possibly the meaning here is that by reason of this difference of objects, logic could not assume strict universality, nor could the frequent repetition of experience ever warrant the assumption of strict universality] as to its rules, because these rules might change according to the difference of objects. Elemental logic in this way considers simply the logical form in respect of cognitions one to another [the logical form of cognitions in respect to one another], that is, it has only to do with the pure form of thought. But [second rule] as pure logic it has no empirical principles, and consequently it derives nothing from psychology, which has no influence upon the canon of the understanding [§ 1533]. Pure elemental logic is a demonstrated doctrine. All is entirely in it *apriori*, that is, must carry along with it necessity and universality.

Applied Logic is a representation of the necessary understanding-use under the contingent conditions of the subject [§ 1534]. It treats of attention, its obstacles and consequences, the origin of error, etc. Universal and pure logic has the same reference to this that pure morality has to [practical] Ethics.

Logic must again be further divided into different parts, and the divisions

BOOK I.—ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTIONS. (§§ 1547-1652 inclusive.)

Article II.—(§ 1547.)

§ 1547.—Dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions apriori, by looking for them in the understanding alone. (page 55, line 22.)

Chapter I.—Of the transcendental clue to the discovery of all pure conceptions of the understanding. (§§ 1548-1577 inclusive.)

Article III.—*Introductory.* (§§ 1548, 1549.)

§ 1548.—Present themselves by no means in order and systematic unity. (page 56, line 7.)

§ 1549.—Conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other according to one conception or idea. (page 56, line 22.) Cf. § 1569.

TITLE I.—OF THE LOGICAL USE OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN GENERAL. (§§ 1550-1554 inclusive.)

Article IV.—(§§ 1550-1554 inclusive.)

§ 1550.—Cognition of every human understanding is a cognition through conceptions, not intuitive, but discursive. (page 56, line 37.) [A discursive conception is a conception formed after the manner of a judgment, a rational or argumentative process. See §§ 1169, 1963, 1057.]

§ 1551.—Conceptions are based on the spontaneity of thought,

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

before given of universal and particular and of pure and applied will not suffice. There is besides a transcendental logic [§ 1535]. Universal logic, as we have observed, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, that is, reference to its object, or of all relationship to the object, considering only logical form in the relations of cognitions to each other, or the form of thought in general. But as we are aware that there are pure as well as empirical intuitions,—there is also a difference between pure and empirical thinking, and there is likewise a logic in which we should not make abstraction of all content of * [cognition], as universal or elemental logic does, which has nothing to do with difference as to pure or empirical thinking in particular, but with thinking in general. This other science, or that of conceptions, apriori, is called transcendental Logic [§ 1538], and it forms a part of transcendental philosophy [cf. § 1469]. It shows not only that there are pure conceptions apriori, but it distinguishes also how many there are of them,—how they spring up, whether the understanding cognizes through them alone, how far they may be applied, and if and how, consequently, they limit the understanding. This science stands in the same light, in regard to pure conceptions apriori, that Transcendental Aesthetic does to pure intuitions apriori [cf. § 1544]. It has only to do with the laws of the understanding and of reason, so far simply as it has reference to objects apriori; and it differs in this way from Logic Universal which refers indifferently to cognitions empirical as well as to those appertaining to pure reason.

as sensuous intuitions are on the receptivity of impressions. (page 57, line 5.) [*Functions*—faculties of judgment—from *fungor*, to perform.] [*Affections*—capacities of being acted upon.] *Spontaneity*: see §§ 1524 and 1544 (exercise depends).

§ 1552.—All judgments are functions of unity in our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions are collected into one. (page 57, line 11.)

§ 1553.—Understanding may be represented as the faculty of judging. (page 57, line 32.)

§ 1554.—All the functions of the understanding can be discovered when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgments. (page 58, line 2.)

TITLE II.—OF THE LOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN JUDGMENTS. (§§ 1555–1562 inclusive.)

Article V.—(§§ 1555–1562 inclusive.)

§ 1555.—Function of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads, of which each contains three momenta. (Table of judgments). (page 58 line 9.) Cf. §§ 1573, 1186. [As to infinite, cf. §§ 1219–1221 and § 2717 (where Richardson translates indefinite, page 76.)]

§ 1556.—Singular judgment relates to the general one as unity

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

Universal logic again is divided into * Analytic and * Dialectic [§§ 1542, 1543]. Analytic, by dissecting, discovers all the operation of reason which we perform in thinking in general. It is therefore an analytic of the understanding and of reason, and is justly named the Logic of Truth, because it contains the necessary rules of all (formal) truth, and without which our cognition is, with regard to the objects, untrue in itself [§ 1544]. Should this merely theoretical and universal doctrine be used as a practical art, that is, as an Organon, it would become a Dialectic or Logic of Appearance, which arises from a mere abuse of the Analytic [§§ 1543, 1545], when, according to the bare logical form, the appearance of a true cognition, whose marks must however be taken from the agreement with the objects, and consequently from the matter [cf. §§ 1540, 1541], is fabricated.

In Transcendental Logic we isolate the understanding, as in Transcendental Aesthetic we isolate sensibility, and we extract merely that part of thought from our cognition, which has its origin solely in the understanding; and the use of this pure cognition rests upon this as its condition, that objects can be given to us in intuition to which the pure cognition can be applied [§ 1544]. Care must be taken in making use of these pure understanding-cognitions and principles, that a material use is not made of what is merely formal [§ 1545]. When transcendental Analytic is considered as an Organon of universal and unlimited use, instead of a Canon of judgment in an empirical sense, it falls into mistakes

to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different. (page 58, line 33.) Cf. § 1214.

§ 1557.—Infinite must be distinguished from affirmative judgments (in transcendental logic). (p. 59, l. 13). See §§ 1219–1222.)

§ 1558.—All relations of thought in judgments are those (a) of the predicate to the subject; (b) of the principle to its consequence; (c) of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each other. (page 60, line 3.) See § 1225.

§ 1559.—Disjunctive judgment a relation not only of logical opposition, but also at the same time of community, in so far as all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cognition. (page 60, line 15). Cf. §§ 1230–1234.

§ 1560.—Modality of judgments contributes nothing to the content of a judgment, but concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to thought in general. (p. 60, l. 40.) Cf. § 1236.

§ 1561.—Problematical judgment expresses only logical possibility; the assertorical speaks of logical reality, or truth; the apodictical expresses logical necessity. (page 61, line 7.) See § 1238.

§ 1562.—Reckon these three functions of modality as so many momenta of thought. (page 61, line 33.)

TITLE III—OF THE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR CATEGORIES. (§§ 1563–1577 inclusive.) Cf. in Fischer (page 72) Mahaffy's note.

Article VI—(§§ 1563–1572 inclusive.)

§ 1563.—Matter to the pure conceptions of the understanding. (page 62, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1522, 1544.

§ 1564.—Examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order afterward to form a cognition out of it. (page 62, line 12.)

§ 1565.—Synthesis—the process of joining different representations to each other, and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition. (page 62, line 21.)

§ 1566.—Blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever. (page 62, line 36.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

and error and the use becomes dialectical. The second part of Transcendental Logic will be a criticism of this dialectical Appearance to expose its fallacy and correct its errors [cf. §§ 1925–1933].

Transcendental Analytic, then, is the dissection of our whole cognition, *a priori*, into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding, and the following are the conditions:—That the conceptions must be pure and not empirical; * that they do not belong to intuition or sensibility, but to thought and understanding; and that they are elemental, and not derived or composed; that they fill up the whole field of the pure understanding, which is.

See §§ 543, 544, 2938. [I do not know, however, that the "function of the soul" spoken of in § 1566, is one of those "powers of soul" to which § 544 refers.]

§ 1567.—Pure synthesis—that which rests upon a basis of apriori synthetical unity. (page 63, line 6.) [The decade is a bad example, inasmuch as it (at least as represented in the Arabic notation) is altogether conventional (notwithstanding it may stand on digital ground). But the unit is not conventional, but essential.]

§ 1568.—Duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. (page 63, line 15.) [A critical intimation that we may apprehend the synthesis without attending to the voice of judgment concerning it.] See Mahaffy's Introduction to Fischer, page xlvii.

§ 1569.—Unity to the mere synthesis of different representations. (page 63, line 28) Cf. §§ 1563, 1549.

§ 1570.—Function of unity in understanding divided systematically from a common principle, namely, the faculty of judgment. (Table of the categories.) (page 64, line 1.) See § 1555, cf. §§ 1553, 1554, 1549. [*Category*: that which may be predicated; predication.]

§ 1571.—Deduced and subsidiary conceptions can easily be added, and the genealogical tree of the understanding completely delineated. (page 65, line 17.)

§ 1572.—Definitions of the categories omitted. (page 66, line 21.) See §§ 1595, 2722, 2912. [Cf. §§ 1643, 1674, 1835, 1858, and 2914, all referred to by Mahaffy (Introduction to Fischer, page xxxv.)] See also §§ 1687 and 2009.

Article VII.—Observations on the table of categories. (§§ 1573–1576 inclusive.)

§ 1573.—Table of categories is useful in the theoretical part of philosophy. (page 67 line 5.)

§ 1574.—Categories divided into two classes: (1) mathematical; (2) dynamical. (page 67, line 18). Cf. § 2203.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

a unity, self-subsisting and self-sufficient. This part of Transcendental Logic consists of two divisions, one of which concerns the conceptions, the other the principles of the pure understanding [§ 1546]. Transcendental Analytic is termed the dissection of the understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions apriori, and to look at them as they lie prepared, as it were, in the human intellect, until developed by experience, whence we again liberate them from such empirical conditions as attach to them when seen in action [§ 1547]. The different kind of judgments afford us the means of ascertaining which are the functions of the understanding.

§ 1575.—Number of the categories in each class is always the same, namely, three. (page 67, line 29.) [It is perhaps only in the categories of quantity and quality that the third rises out of the first and second. As to the rest, all causality is the causality of substance; and possibility must be predicated of all existence. The disjunctive is the categorical plus something not hypothetical, and the apodictical is the assertorical plus something not problematical. Totality may be regarded as a plural view of the unity of plurality (that is, a view in which that which is considered is rather the plurality in unity than the unity in plurality), and limitation may be regarded as a negative view or phase of the negation of reality (two minus signs equal plus). Plurality and negation are the correlates (see § 1574) of unity and reality.] [*Thus, the conception of a number:* The remark is true but irrelevant. For if it were otherwise than true, the conception of totality is no clearer. There is totality of the infinite and totality of the finite: insofar as the conception of totality is concerned, there is absolutely no difference.] [*The conception of influence:* By "the conception of a cause" I understand the conception of causality, and by "the conception of influence," the conception of reciprocity of influence. The conception of community is at least as independent of substance as is that of causality. Although it is evident that a particular act of the understanding is necessary, Kant's illustrations unfortunately confuse me in endeavoring to seize the evidence.]

§ 1576.—Accordance of the category of community with the form of the disjunctive judgment. (page 68, line 18.) Cf. § 1559.

Article VIII.—(§ 1577.)

§ 1577.—Unum, verum, bonum. (page 69, line 16.) See Mahaffy's

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

If we can expose with certainty the functions of unity in judgments, which judgments are the mediate cognitions of objects [§ 1552], we can then find the functions of the understanding [§ 1554], which we before explained as a non-sensible cognition faculty [§§ 1550, 1526, 1528]. Now all functions of thought in judgments are found reducible to four heads, each of which is again divided into three classes [§ 1555]. These are—

I.	II.	III.	IV.
<i>Quantity of Judgments.</i>	<i>Quality.</i>	<i>Relation.</i>	<i>Modality.</i>
Universal.	Affirmative.	Categorical.	Problematical.
Particular.	Negative.	Hypothetical.	Assertorical.
Individual.	Infinite.	Disjunctive.	Apodictical.

Thus it is in making abstraction of the object as to which a judgment is given, that we arrive at form; and when we are acquainted with all the forms and modes of judgment, we are then acquainted with all the forms of the understanding.

note in Fischer (page 75). [(1) These are deduced conceptions; therefore they do not determine the possibility of thought. (2) They are apriori; therefore they possess logical truth, and non-conformable conceptions may properly be condemned. (3) They are altogether formal, their matter being merely the form of sensuous intuition; therefore they have no material force or validity, and ought to be regarded merely as affections of the ego. The first remark removes them from the table of the categories; the third shows that no ontological use can be made of them; the second explains their history and renown. Now, since the human mind can not obviate the categories of quantity, upon which these deduced concepts are based, it must not be said that the logical use of the deductions is unauthorized, but only the ontological.]

Chapter II.—Of the deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding.
(§§ 1578-1652 inclusive.)

TITLE I.—OF THE THE PRINCIPLES OF A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION IN GENERAL. (§§ 1578-1595 inclusive.) Cf. Fischer (and Mahaffy), pages 9 and 67.

Article IX.—(§§ 1578-1587 inclusive)

§ 1578.—Distinguish in a cause the question of right (*quid juris*) from the question of fact (*quid facti*). (page 71, line 10.)

§ 1579.—Transcendental deduction of conceptions (explanation of the manner in which conceptions can apply apriori to objects), distinguished from the empirical deduction. (page 72, line 1.)

§ 1580.—Deduction of pure apriori conceptions must always be transcendental. (page 72, line 15.) [No empirical deduction can account for the elements of necessity and universality which are found in these conceptions, and which we must clearly show before we have the right to ground and argument therein.]

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

Now just as many pure understanding-conceptions arise which refer, apriori, to objects of intuition in general, as there are logical functions of all the possible judgments just detailed, and these *[twelve] understanding-conceptions are what are termed the Categories [§ 1570], and they are the following!—

TABLE OF CATEGORIES.

I.	II.	IV.
<i>Of Quantity.</i>	<i>Of Quality.</i>	<i>Of Modality.</i>
Unity.	Reality.	Possibility. Impossibility.
Plurality.	Negation.	Existence. Non-existence.
Totality.	Limitation.	Necessity. Contingence.

III.

Of Relation.

Inherence and Subsistence (Substantia et Accidens).

Causality and Dependence (Cause and Effect).

Community (Reciprocity between the Agent and the Patient).

§ 1581.—Discover in experience the occasioning causes of their production. (page 72, line 28.)

§ 1582.—All attempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure apriori conceptions, are vain. (page 73, line 5.)

§ 1583.—Not for that reason perfectly manifest that a deduction is absolutely necessary. (page 73, line 19.)

§ 1584.—Must be quite convinced of the absolute necessity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step. (p. 73, l. 35.)

§ 1585.—Can not discover how the subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity. (page 75, line 8.) Cf. § 1620.

§ 1586.—Phenomena might be so constituted as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought. (For example, the conception of cause.) (page 75, line 31.)

§ 1587.—Must either have an apriori basis in the understanding, or be rejected as a mere chimera. (For example, the conception of cause.) (page 76, line 17.)

Article X.—Transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories. (§§ 1588–1595.)

§ 1588.—Either the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible. (page 77, line 7.)

§ 1589.—Intuition, under which alone objects can be intuited,

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

Such is the enumeration of all the originally pure conceptions of that synthesis which the understanding contains within itself apriori, and by reason of which it simply is pure understanding, inasmuch as by means of the said pure conceptions only can it comprehend anything in the diversity of the intuition [§ 1570]. Aristotle had an idea of this faculty of the understanding, but it was an incorrect one, as he added some conceptions and omitted others which disfigured the catalogue. To this table of the categories Kant added another list, which he called Predicables, but which he merely indicated without developing [§ 1571].

The existence of the categories and their number being deduced and proved, the next question naturally is as to their application, for without this they are nothing more than inert capacities remaining in total inaction. To us they are absolutely non-existing, so long as they have not been called into operation by external objects [§ 1581]. Now, in order to know an object, two things are necessary, the intuition by which the object is given, and the idea [conception, §§ 1589, 1593] by which this same object, corresponding to the intuition, is converted into thought. This is the operation of the understanding. Kant, in imitation of certain jurists, calls the right by which we establish the connexion, the Deduction, which in a *general sense* means the proof of claim, or a claim of right [§ 1578]. In a *particular sense* it signifies the legitimating, if it may be so expressed, of a representation, or proof of the right to use the same, or that the representation possesses sense, meaning, and objective validity; and more

must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, apriori in the mind. (page 77, line 20.)

§ 1590.—Conditions under which alone something, if not intuited, is yet thought as object. (page 77, line 31.)

§ 1591.—Conceptions of objects in general must lie as apriori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition; and consequently the objective validity of the categories, as apriori conceptions, will rest upon the fact that experience (as far as regards the form of thought) is possible only by their means. (page 77, line 38.)

§ 1592.—Conceptions which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience, are for that very reason necessary (i. e. apriori conditions of the possibility of all experience). (page 78, line 10.)

§ 1593.—Empirical derivation, which both Locké and Hume attributed to these conceptions, can not possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do possess scientific apriori cognitions. (page 78, line 22) Cf. Fischer, page 76, where Mahaffy translates from the first edition.

§ 1594.—Extravagance and skepticism. Safely to conduct reason between these two rocks. (page 79, line 7.)

§ 1595.—Categories are conceptions of an object in general, by

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

especially that it is not void, but refers to objects in reality. Then again there is another distinction between empirical and transcendental deduction [§ 1579]. It is the former which explains the validity of an empirical representation through the proof of its origin from experience itself, showing that the representation necessarily refers to the object, since the one makes the other possible. Transcendental deduction, on the other hand, shows that a representation can be referred apriori to an object, and, without having its origin from experience, can still be valid as to the objects themselves.* It was because Locke did not see the necessity of something in the understanding previous to experience, namely, conditions apriori, that he was led into error. Meeting with pure conceptions of the understanding in experience, this great philosopher derives the same from experience, and he ventured in this way upon attempts at cognitions which extend far beyond the limits of experience [§ 1593]. Hume saw that in order to do this, it was necessary (which Kant also contends is the case) that these conceptions should have their origin apriori. But not being able to explain how it was possible that the understanding should be compelled to think conceptions, which are not in themselves conjoined in the understanding, yet as necessarily conjoined in the object, he deduced the same from experience, or subjective necessity, or habit. It did not enter into his imagination that possibly the understanding itself, by means of these conceptions, was the author of the experience. But he acted more consistently than Locke in this respect in declaring that with the conceptions in question and the principles they gave

means of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgment. (page 79, line 18.) Cf. § 1572. On Kant's connection of the terms substance and subject, see §§ 1624, 1687, 1858, 1870, 1881, 1895, 1969, 2010, 2016, 2049, and especially § 2022.

TITLE II.—TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING. (§§ 1596-1652 inclusive.) Cf. §§ 2866-2912, Mahaffy's translation from the first edition.

Article XI.—Of the possibility of a conjunction of the manifold representations given by sense. (§§ 1596-1598 inclusive.)

§ 1596.—All conjunction (whether conscious or unconscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous, or of several conceptions) is an act of the understanding (synthesis). (page 80, line 9.)

§ 1597.—Possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of the spontaneous activity of the subject. Analysis, which appears to be its contrary, must always presuppose it. (page 80, line 25.) [Without the function or faculty, no conjunction would be possible for the subject; and if we suppose such conjunction possible to any other than human understanding, we thereby presuppose in that unknown understanding the same function of synthesis which we recognize as subsisting in the human understanding.] Cf. Mahaffy's Introduction to Fischer, page xlvii.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

rise to, it was impossible to go out beyond the limits of experience. The fact, however, of both pure mathematics and general physics proving cognitions a priori to exist, overthrows the system of both of these great philosophers.

Synthesis or conjunction is the operation of the understanding alone, and we can represent to ourselves nothing as conjoined in the object, unless we ourselves have previously conjoined it [§ 1596]. This is an act of self-activity [§ 1597]. Analysis is posterior to synthesis, for only as conjoined by the understanding can anything be presented to us, and admit of being decomposed. Conjunction is the synthetic unity of the multiplex or diverse [§ 1598]. The representation of this unity does not arise out of the composition; it precedes every thing, and therefore is to be distinguished especially from the Category of Unity.

As in Transcendental Aesthetic, or the first division of the work, it is declared that all diversity of what appertains to sensibility, or what appertains to the domain of sense in general, must stand as to intuitions, under the formal conditions of space and time; so the highest principle [of the possibility of intuition] with reference to the understanding [is, that all diversity of intuition] must stand under an original Unity of Apperception [§ 1607]. And this is the "I think" which must be able to accompany all my representations [§ 1599]. It is pure or original apperception. It accompanies every other. Self-consciousness is at the bottom of all my representations, for otherwise they would not be.

§ 1598.—Unity which apriori precedes all conceptions of conjunction (i. e. qualitative unity). (page 80, line 37.) Cf. § 1577.

Article XII.—Of the originally synthetical unity of apperception. (§§ 1599–1606 inclusive.) Cf. § 1729.

§ 1599.—*I think* must accompany all my representations. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has therefore a necessary relation to the *I think*, in the subject in which this diversity is found. (page 81, line 19.)

§ 1600.—*I think* is an act of spontaneity (pure apperception). It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same; and unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me. (page 81, line 27.)

§ 1601.—Transcendental unity of self-consciousness. The manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. (page 82, line 6.)

§ 1602.—Analytical unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity. (page 82, line 16.)

§ 1603.—Synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every operation of the understanding, even the whole of logic. (page 82, note.) See § 1482 as to general conceptions, and see also Kant's note to § 1607.

§ 1604.—Synthetical unity of the manifold in intuitions, as given apriori, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

mine [§ 1601]. Analytical unity of apperception is opposed to [or ought to be distinguished from] the synthetical unity [§ 1602]. The distinction as laid down is a little difficult to be understood when expressed simply in the language of Kant; but when divested of technicality, the difference is obvious. Analytical unity is that by means of which conceptions are thought as conjoined. If the Understanding thinks two conceptions as conjoined in one judgment, the representation by which they are thought as conjoined is analytical unity. The conception of a black dish, for instance, is an analytical unity, inasmuch as the representation of the conjunction of the two conceptions, black and dish, in one judgment, is that the "dish is black." The idea of man in general is an analytical unity, as the term applies to men of every color. It is called the analytical unity of apperception or consciousness, by reason of many conceptions being conjoined through it in one consciousness. For instance, if I think of the color red, I represent to myself a quality which is common to different representations; all of which are thought as red. It is the analytical unity of consciousness which makes a representation into a common conception [§ 1603]. It is opposed to [or presupposes] the synthetical unity of consciousness, by which I represent to myself the part-representations as conjoined [or, by which I conjoin the manifold] *in one object*, which always presupposes intuition, and not in a judgment, which is an analytical proceeding. It is also a similar act when I attach the color, as for instance, redness in general to several objects;

itself, which antecedes apriori all determinate thought. (page 82, line 32.)

§ 1605.—Operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining apriori, and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception. (page 83, line 13.)

§ 1606.—Explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without which the identity of self consciousness would be incogitable. (page 83, line 22.) [My intuition belongs to me no less than my understanding, and I am conscious of both. See §§ 1472, 1632.]

Article XIII.—*The principle of the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest principle of all exercise of the understanding.* (§§ 1607–1611 inclusive.)

§ 1607.—Supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold in intuition be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical unity of apperception. (page 84, line 9.) See Mahaffy's note in Fischer (page 59), and Kant's note to § 1639, to which Mahaffy refers.

§ 1608.—Unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and consequently the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself. (page 84, line 23.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

but it is a synthetical one, to think the color itself, when diversity of intuitions is thought or envisaged as conjoined. The pure conception of the understanding, or the category, is synthetic unity, because through it different representations in an intuition are conjoined in one conception, whether of quantity, quality, reality or substance. The principle of the synthetical unity of the apperception is the highest principle of all use of the understanding [§ 1611], and leads to the logical form of all judgments, which consist in the objective unity of the conceptions therein contained [§ 1614]; and we perceive that the diversity contained in the intuition, which I call mine, is represented by the synthesis of the understanding as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness. This occurs through the category which shows that the empirical consciousness of a given diversity of an intuition is subject, just in the same way, to a pure self-consciousness apriori, as empirical intuition is to a pure sensible intuition, which also takes place apriori [§ 1616]. But at the same time that the category is spoken of as being that by which alone unity is given to the diversity of a given intuition generally, it must not be overlooked that the category is of no other use for the cognition of things than so far as it has application to objects of experience [§§ 1620, 1622]. Two parts belong to cognitions, first, the conception in which the object is thought, or the category; and secondly, the intuition whereby it is given; for if a corresponding intuition to conception could not be

§ 1609.—Objective condition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must necessarily be subject, in order to become an object for me. (page 85, line 3.) Cf. Mahaffy's note in Fischer, page 41.

§ 1610.—Synthetical unity the condition of all thought. (page 85, line 22.)

§ 1611.—First principle of all the operations of our understanding. (page 85, line 30.)

Article XIV.—What objective unity of self consciousness is. (§ 1612.)

§ 1612 —Transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid. (page 86, line 8) [Empirical intuition may attach various qualities (as colors or scents) to the same object (as a rose). These intuitions would possess only subjective validity (§ 1493).]

Article XV.—The logical form of all judgments consists in the objective unity of apperception of the conceptions contained therein. (§§ 1613-1614)

§ 1613.—Definition which logicians give of a judgment, the representation of a relation between two conceptions, does not determine in what the said relation consists. (page 86, line 37.)

§ 1614.—Judgment is nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions under the objective unity of apperception. (page 87, line 9.) *Reproductive imagination*, see § 1628. [*Belong to each other*: It is possible to think an intuition which does not at all contain

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

given, it might, as to its form, be thought, but being without an object, no cognition of it would be at all possible [§ 1623]. The thought or the thinking of an object in general by means of the category or pure understanding-conception can only become cognition in us so far as the same has reference to objects of the senses [§§ 1626, 1620].

It must at the same time be observed that Synthesis is divided into two kinds, *Speciosa* and *Intellectualis* [§ 1627]. By the former, or *speciosa* or *figurative*, is meant that which is possible and necessary *apriori*, in contradistinction to that which, in respect of the diversity of an intuition in general, would be thought in the mere category, and is termed on its part *synthesis intellectualis*, or conjunction of the understanding. Both are transcendental, not merely because they themselves are *apriori*, but because they form the basis of the possibility of other cognition *apriori*. The figurative synthesis is the Synthesis of the Imagination,† which is the faculty of representing an object without its presence in the intuition. [At the bottom of the pages, below the above paragraph, Haywood prints the following note:] † In the first edition of the Critique, when speaking of the faculty of the Imagination, Kant shows that in order to present a whole, it was necessary to see each of the several parts, and to collect them successively and finally to unite them in one image. This was in fact Imagination. The conjunction or union of these was the "Synthesis of the Apprehen-

the sensation of weight. But if the sensation be given, the unity of apperception unites it with "body" necessarily.]

Article XVI.—All sensuous intuitions are subject to the categories, as conditions under which alone the manifold content of them can be united in one consciousness. (§ 1615.)

§ 1615.—Categories are nothing else than the logical functions of judgment, so far as the manifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them. (page 88, line 14). Cf. §§ 1595, 1588–1592, 1607–1611, 1613, 1614, and 1578–1587 (§ 1615 being a brief statement of the results previously attained).

Article XVII.—Observation. (§§ 1616–1619 inclusive.)

§ 1616.—Beginning of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. (page 88, line 31.)

§ 1617.—Make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclusively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of the category. (page 89, line 7.) Cf. §§ 1615, 1641.

§ 1618.—One thing of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it. (page 89, line 20.) Cf. § 1544.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

sion of the Intuition;" and as this act of apprehension was successive, and it was necessary to reproduce one part before passing to another, the Imagination became necessarily a reproduction-faculty, and the Synthesis of the Reproduction in the Imagination occurs. This reproduction would be of no avail unless we were conscious that each part was the same before and after the reproduction, and from this resulted the synthesis of the cognition of the idea, so that objective cognition in experience is only possible by means of a triple synthesis, that of the Apprehension in the Intuition, that of the Reproduction in the Imagination, and that of Cognition in the idea by means of consciousness. The analysis, in this form at least, is omitted or changed in all the editions of the Critique that succeeded to the first. [End of Haywood's note] [See §§ 1407 and 2870]. [Cf. immediately the head of § 2870 below.]

It is at this point [§ 1629] that, after having exposed the different kinds of syntheses, Kant digresses into an explanation of a position which he had laid down in an earlier part of his work, in some degree, dogmatically, in order at this stage of his system to justify the assertion that the *I* may be both active and passive.

But to understand this it will be necessary to consider rather more in detail the characteristics or qualities of the *I*, which, being the foundation of all other acquisitions, requires to be investigated in its innermost nature and capacity. It is the *I*, then, which connects in man all his intuitions and thoughts. There is nothing beyond this *I* that is either diverse or multiplex, but it is that

§ 1619.—Categories are merely rules for an understanding whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it in intuition from a very different quarter, to the unity of apperception. (page 89, line 24.)

Article XVIII.—*In cognition, its application to objects of experience is the only legitimate use of the category.* (§§ 1620–1622 inclusive)

§ 1620.—Thought as regards its form, but without any object. (page 90, line 4.) [(1) A cognition is something which *may* be known, not necessarily *is* known. It is the objective phase of that act of the understanding which consists in bringing the manifold in intuition under the unity of apperception. Now, if we do not critically examine the united manifold with reference to the categories, we have nevertheless a cognition, but are not entitled to pronounce a judgment upon it. (2) If we do not examine the manifold with reference to its empirical reality, we can predicate of the cognition nothing but possibility; that is to say, it is cognition, but no knowledge is given by it. (3) If the manifold which we unite be not intuitive (possible to be perceived by the faculty of sensibility), we have no cognition, but only a thought. This thought can not possibly become knowledge for us, so long as we are intellectually so constituted as now. (4) A mathematical con-

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

wherewith all that is diverse in the intuition and the conception as therein conjoined, is represented. This *I*, however, does not envisage its own self, for it is neither an intuition-faculty, which would be, as it were, something supersensible or intellectual; nor is it an object given to the intuition, but it is merely the ground of the conjunction of the diverse in an object. I call all representations mine, because I am one and the same person who conjoins them [cf. §§ 1604, 1606]. In this manner the *I* is termed the *original synthetic* unity of the apperception, or consciousness: *original*, because this representation of the *I* can be derived from nothing else; *synthetic*, since it lies at the foundation or root of all conjunction or synthesis, and makes this same synthesis possible. The representation *I*, or *I think*, is the manifestation of a spontaneity (not the being-affected state of the sensibility), and it is termed the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order thereby to show that without the same, no conjunction is possible a priori, and that it precedes all experience, and yet is not derived from experience.

As space and time are forms of all intuitions, so, according to the sense Kant attaches to the *I*, does this *I* appear to be the form of the pure original conceptions of the understanding, and to lie at the bottom of them, so that the difference of the two *I*s is rendered comprehensible by referring the one to reason and the other to sense [cf. § 1607].

The *I* that thinks is rational, the *I* that is thought is empirical. Thus unity is the original characteristic of the understanding or mind, or by whatever name

ception is a cognition of the conception itself, regarding that conception as void of real content. Such a cognition is not a cognition of *things*, because no possible combination of an empty formal intuition with a purely formal understanding can constitute any content. $0+0=0$; $0 \times 0=0$; $0+0=0$, etc. See § 1621.] Cf. § 1701.

§ 1621.—Mathematical conceptions are not *per se* cognition, except in so far as we presuppose that there exist things which can only be represented conformably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition. (page 90, line 17.)

§ 1622.—Categories do not (even by means of pure intuition) afford us any cognition of things; they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition. (page 90, line 27.)

Article XIX.—(§§ 1623, 1624.)

§ 1623.—Empty conceptions of objects, as to the possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no means of discovery. (page 91, line 4.)

§ 1624.—Ignorant whether there can really be any thing to correspond to such a determination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me the occasion for its application. (page 91, line 27.) Cf. § 1595. See § 1618.

Article XX.—Of the application of the categories to objects of the senses in general. (§§ 1625–1633 inclusive.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

the intellectual principle in man is denominated, and everything is presented to it as a unity; consequently, conjunction, or synthesis or unity, is the first condition of thought; but then again it must not be forgotten that this Unity, *I think*, lying at the foundation of the human mind as elemental principle, is not to be confounded with that category of Unity which exists in the table of the categories and is the first division of the category of quantity. The unity now in question is a higher unity than the categorical one, and is to be found at the root of the possibility of the understanding itself in its logical use [§ 1598]. It is independent of all conditions of sensible intuition, and is the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception [cf. § 1609]; whilst categories, it may be repeated, are of no value to procure Knowledge, excepting so far as they apply to objects presented to us by experience [§ 1619]. They are all forms of Thought.

To think an object and to know an object are two distinct things [§ 1620]. We have the conception whereby a thing is thought, and that is the category; and we have the intuition whereby the thing is given—for could an intuition corresponding to the conception not be given, the latter would be a thought, as to its form, but without any object, and by means of it no cognition at all of an object would be possible, since, so far as I know, there was neither any thing, nor could be any thing, to which *my* thought could be applied. Sensible intuition is either *pure*, that is, it is space or time; or it is *empirical*, that is, that which is immediately represented in space and time as real by means of sensa-

§ 1625.—Synthesis of apperception is not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual. (page 92, line 11.) Cf. § 1605.

§ 1626.—Unity of apperception, in relation to the manifold of sensuous intuition *a priori*. (page 92, line 22.) Cf. §§ 1569, 2899. [Space and time determine all sensuous intuition. But the manifold represented in these intuitions of space and time, is subject to the unity of apperception. All that is determined by these intuitions, is therefore with them subject to the unity of apperception. But all sensuous intuition is of phenomena (see § 1512).]

§ 1627.—Transcendental synthesis of imagination. (page 92, line 35.) Cf. § 1609.

§ 1628.—Imagination a faculty of determining sensibility *a priori*. (page 93, line 8.) Cf. §§ 1626, 2902, 2904, 2906. [I am inclined to retract my censure of Kant's definition of imagination, on the ground that to rigidly define it as a purely intellectual faculty is not essential to the purposes of philosophy, while Kant's use keeps close to the popular understanding. See in Webster Stewart's homely definition: "A power of modifying our conceptions by combining the parts of different ones so as to form new wholes of our own creation." (See *Jour. Sp. Phil.*, Vol. V., page 113, § 42. The last sentence of the section arose out of a misconception of § 1639 below, and must also be retracted.)] § 1632.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

tion [§ 1621]. Through the determination of the first we obtain cognition *a priori* of objects, as in mathematics, but yet only according to their form as phenomena, and thus every thing is reduced ultimately to experience, so far as knowledge is concerned, the categories themselves affording us no cognition of objects, except through their possible application to empirical intuition [§ 1622], which [resulting cognition] is "experience [§ 2707]. To think is to unite several ideas in the unity of consciousness, and thought and judgment are valid when they are conformable to the axiom of Identity, whether they have or have not an object corresponding to them in the reality. Thought can teach us nothing, but to know an object is to have an intuition corresponding to the idea [conception, cf. 1649]; and a pure idea can not be known except inasmuch as it refers to an intuition which is sensible.

The difference of the internal sense and of consciousness, according to our author, has been overlooked by psychologists [§ 1629], and led to confusion and embarrassment. The internal sense is time, and this internal sense is determined by the understanding [§ 1630], or, it may be said, by ourselves, and this determination takes place according to the synthesis which the understanding thinks for the internal intuition. Pure apperception, or consciousness, is the source or principle of all synthesis; and whether an object is given to it or not, it refers *a priori* to the variety of intuitions in general [§ 1631]. The internal sense, on the other hand, is the simple form of the intuitions, and it contains no synthesis, and consequently no determinate intuition, for this is only possible by a tran-

§ 1629.—How the internal sense represents us to our own consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. (page 93, line 34.) Cf. § 1520.

§ 1630.—Synthesis of understanding is (considered *per se*) nothing but the unity of action of which as such it is self-conscious, even apart from sensibility. (page 94, line 7.) Cf. § 1642.

§ 1631.—Internal sense (on the contrary) contains merely the form of intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold therein. (page 94, line 22.) [See § 1639.]

§ 1632.—Understanding, therefore, does by no means find in the internal sense any such synthesis, but produces it, in that it affects this sense. (page 94, line 35.) Cf. § 1500. [But the understanding does find in the sensibility the manifold, and operates (not on the sensibility which gives the manifold, but) on the manifold which the sensibility gives. Sensibility can not give synthesis. (See §§ 1596–1598.) Notwithstanding that the understanding can not (so far as I know) operate on any manifold not given by sensibility, I do not think it necessary, therefore, to say that understanding operates upon sensibility, a mode of expression which, while it perhaps prevents the misconception that the synthetic power can lay hold of any manifold not given by sensibility, also (and as it seems to me needlessly) obscures the cogitable absolute unity of the rational faculty. (See §§ 1472, 246, and cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V, page 113, §§ 43, 44.)]

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

scendental synthesis, or by the influence of the understanding upon the internal sense. It is thus that we can not represent to ourselves a line, nor a circle, nor a triangle, without tracing it visibly, and the three dimensions of space, length, breadth and thickness, are designated by drawing one line which is perpendicular to another [§ 1632].

In general logic all *content* of cognition being abstracted, its business is to expose analytically the *form* of cognition in conceptions, judgments, and conclusions [§ 1653], and thereby to establish formal rules of the use of the understanding [§ 1654], but with all this it can not give any precepts for the faculty of judgment [§ 1659]. Transcendental logic is differently circumstanced; and it would seem as if it had for its peculiar province to correct and secure, by means of determinate rules, the faculty of judgment, in the use of the pure understanding [§ 1662]. Transcendental philosophy goes even further than this, for besides the rule (or rather the general condition for rules) which is given in the pure use of the understanding, it can at once indicate *a priori* the case wherein the rule is to be applied [§ 1663]. It has a preference over all other branches of science, excepting mathematics, inasmuch as it treats of conceptions which are to refer to their objects *a priori*; and the objective validity of these, which are the categories, can not be demonstrated *aposteriori*. But at the same time that transcendental science does this, it must likewise expose, as gen-

§ 1633.—Cognize our own subject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself. (page 95, line 12.) [*Necessitated to take*—A weighty consideration, as such necessity could not exist if we could cognize ourselves directly without the intervention of phenomena of ourselves. (Cf. § 1846.)]

Article XXI.—Consciousness of self is very far from a knowledge of self. (§§ 1634, 1635.)

§ 1634.—Conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I AM. This representation is a thought, not an intuition. (page 96, line 9.) Cf. §§ 1635, 1846, 1849. [A man who stands before a mirror knows that he intuits a reflection of his body. But to suppose that the reflection intuits the body, is to presuppose that the reflection embodies the intuiting consciousness; which, if possible, is no advantage, since the difficulty is not thereby obviated. Suppose I possess an intuition which gives the determining in me prior to my own act of self-determination. Now, that intuition, as to its content, must necessarily be either determined or practically nothing. I must therefore assume that it is determined. But if it is determined, it must be determined as to its form by me, else it can be no intuition. Therefore, I must again preposit a determining ego, and am thereby reduced either to an infinite series of appearances, or to admit that the determining ego (of which I am conscious) can not be intuited prior to self-determination, nor otherwise than as self-determined.] § 2009.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

eral or sufficient characteristics, the conditions under which such objects can be given, in accordance with such conceptions. If it were not so, these conceptions or categories would be without content, and mere logical forms, and not pure conceptions of the understanding.

The first point then to be considered (and this is the work of Transcendental Analytic) is, how this pure conception of the understanding can be used, or what is the sensible condition, under which alone it can be of avail. The next inquiry then to be made is into those synthetic judgments which flow from the pure conceptions of the understanding under conditions apriori, and which lie at the foundation of all other cognitions apriori. The one may be called the schematism, the other the principles of the pure understanding [§ 1664]. This forms another of the great divisions of the work before us.

In all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the representation of the one must be homogeneous with the other, or the conception itself must contain that which is represented in the object to be subsumed under it [§ 1665]. The empirical conception of a *plate* is homogeneous with the pure geometrical one of a *circle*—the roundness which is thought in the plate is envisaged in the conception of a circle. But pure conceptions of the understanding are quite heterogeneous with those that are empirical, and they can never be met with in any intuition [§ 1666]; and to render the application of the categories to phe-

§ 1635.—Require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the consciousness of myself, or the thought that I think myself, but in addition, an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine this thought. (page 97, line 5.) Cf. § 1634. [*If its intuition were intellectual*: If a dog were an eagle, it could fly; but if it had wings, it would scarcely be a dog.] [*Thought of an object in general*, which thought may be called the consciousness of not-self, and is inseparable from self-consciousness.]

Article XXII.—Transcendental deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the pure conceptions of the understanding. (§§ 1636–1648 inclusive.)

§ 1636.—Possibility of cognizing apriori, by means of the categories, all objects which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed, according to the form of their intuition, but according to the laws of their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature. (page 97, line 32.) Cf. §§ 1615–1619.

§ 1637.—Synthesis of apprehension. (page 98, line 7.) Cf. §§ 1729, 1731, 1642, 2873.

§ 1638.—Synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon must be always conformable to the apriori forms of the external and internal sensuous intuition. (page 98, line 11.)

§ 1639.—Space and time contain apriori the determination of the unity of the manifold which they contain. (The unity of this intuition apriori belongs to [i. e., qualifies—see § 1598] space and time, and not to the conception of the understanding [i. e., is not the cat-

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

nomena possible, we must adopt a medium which shall be itself pure, and yet be on the one hand (in reference to the understanding) intellectual, and on the other hand, sensible [§ 1668]. The transcendental doctrine of judgment is to show how this is to be effected, and the representation itself is termed a Transcendental Schema.

The conception of the understanding or the category contains pure synthetic union of the diverse generally; and Time, as the formal condition of the diversity of the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all representations, contains a diverse apriori in the pure intuition [§ 1669]. Now a transcendental determination of time,* the unity of [which is constituted by] the category [but see § 1639], is so far homogeneous with it as it is *general* [or universal], and rests upon a rule apriori; and this transcendental determination, on the other hand, is so far homogeneous with the phenomenon, as time is contained in every empirical representation of the diverse; and in this way an application of the category to phenomena is possible by means of this transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding, operates as a medium of the subsumption of the phenomena under the category. The term Schema, however, is not to be confounded with the Greek

egory of unity]. Cf. §§ 1483, 1499, and Fischer, p. 41.) (p. 98, l. 15.) [See § 1628.] Cf. §§ 1607, 1701, and Mahaffy's note to § 2873.

§ 1640.—Unity of the synthesis of the manifold without or within us, consequently also a conjunction to which all that is to be represented as determined in space or time must correspond, is given *a priori* along with (not in) these intuitions, as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of them. (page 98, line 19.) [See the definition of transcendental deduction in § 1579.] Cf. §§ 2873, 2874. [The understanding acts, as the condition of the action of the understanding.]

§ 1641.—All synthesis, whereby alone is even perception possible, is subject to the categories. (page 98, line 28.) Cf. § 1617. [In the transcendental unity of the imagination, we make abstraction of the empirical manifold. and view the unity as an original act of consciousness. (See Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V., page 113, § 41.)]

§ 1642.—Synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual. (page 99, note.) See §§ 1641, 1637.

§ 1643.—Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws *a priori* to phenomena, consequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena. (page 99, line 33.) [To say that the human understanding necessarily imposes upon nature certain laws, is cogitably equivalent to saying that certain laws have been imposed upon nature by whatsoever power has subjected the human understanding to the necessity of enouncing those laws. Hence, if nature is

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

word, *Image*, from which it is derived, which is something particular or specific or individual, and therefore empirical; whereas the word schema in the present philosophical sense is generic, and includes in its meaning what is universal in its character [§§ 1672, 1674]; as for instance, the conception of man, which is subsumed under that of mortal, and the conception of ball under that of a sphere. A polyhedron drawn is an image of the figure which I have in view when I entertain its idea [conception, § 1963]. A polyhedron in general is not an image, but only a rule, in order to represent this figure by an image, which never can attain to the idea [can never be adequate to the conception (1673)] that exists within us. The medium which renders categories homogeneous with intuitions is Time. This is the connection between the pure conceptions of the understanding and objects; categories rendered sensible by time are schemata, and these are products of the imagination. All our ideas ["pure sensuous conceptions," (§ 1673)] possess a schema as their foundation, but they have not images of the object, for no image of an object can entirely coincide with the pure idea [conception (see § 1963).] [Take]* the figure before mentioned, the polyhedron, for example, this in its generality can never have an adequate or complete image, because the image can not attain to the generality of my idea, and would be

objectively valid *in se*, it does not follow that the rational doctrine of nature is false or illusory.] Cf. § 1827 and see § 1651.

§ 1644.—Laws do not exist except by relation to the subject in which the phenomena inhere, insofar as it possesses understanding, just as phenomena have no existence except by relation to the same existing subject insofar as it has senses. (page 100, line 11.)

§ 1645.—Things in themselves must necessarily conform to law, independently of an understanding to cognize them. (page 100, line 22.) Cf. §§ 1826, 1856.

§ 1646.—Phenomena, as mere representations, stand under no law of conjunction except that which the conjoining faculty prescribes. (page 100, line 24.)

§ 1647.—All possible perceptions, and therefore every thing that can attain to empirical consciousness, that is, all phenomena of nature, must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to the categories. (page 100, line 28.)

§ 1648.—Understanding is not competent to enounce other or more laws than those on which a nature in general depends. Experience must be superadded in order to know particular laws. (page 100, line 41.) Cf. §§ 1743, 1624.

Article XXIII.—Result of this deduction of the conceptions of the understanding. (§§ 1649–1652 inclusive.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

limited to a part only of the idea [conception]. The image could only represent a tetrahedron, a hexahedron, or an octahedron, whilst the idea of a polyhedron in general comprehends in itself all these figures. The schema of a polyhedron can only exist in the idea, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with relation to figures in space.

As there are as many classes of schemata as there are categories, we shall under the schema of Quantity necessarily find Unity, Plurality, and Universality. This schema is Number [§ 1675] in general, or the synthesis of time, as One, Several and the Whole. [Number is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition, etc. (§ 1675).] The schema of quality [§ 1676] is a degree in general, or the synthesis of sensations in time. Reality is that to which sensation corresponds in every intuition; and as there is an infinite number of degrees between sensation and the absence of sensation, we have in the one case Limitation, and in the other Negation, or the state of the transition of the degree of intensity of a sensation until its final extinction. The schema of Relation is the relationship of sensations between themselves in the order of time. [The schema of] Substance [§ 1677] is the perdurability [permanence] of a reality in time, or that which remains whilst all its accidents change. [The schema of] Causality [§ 1678] is the determinate succession of realities in time, so that when one event occurs, another necessarily follows. [The schema of] Community or concurrence is the co-existence of realities in space, so that one determines the place of the other [see the

§ 1649.—No apriori cognition is possible for us, except of objects of possible experience. (page 101, line 14.) Cf. § 269.

§ 1650.—Categories do contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience. (page 101, line 21.) Cf. § 1588.

§ 1651.—Conclusive objection to the hypothesis that the categories are merely subjective aptitudes for thought. (page 102, line 15.) Cf. § 1643. [Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V., page 27, § 1.]

Short view of the above deduction. (§ 1652.)

§ 1652.—Exposition of the pure conceptions of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical apriori cognition), as principles of the possibility of experience, but of experience as the *determination* of all phenomena in space and time *in general*—of experience, finally, from the principle of the *original* synthetical unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility. (p. 103, l. 3.)

BOOK II.—ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. (§§ 1653-1924 inclusive.)

§ 1653.—General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. (page 103, line 20.)

§ 1654.—Must contain, in its analytic, a canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law, which, without taking into consideration the particular nature of the cognition about which it is

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

Clavis, §1679]. The schema of Modality is the mode of existence of sensations in time, or the complex of time. [The schema of] Possibility is the idea [conception, see § 1963] of an object being able to exist only in time [perhaps Haywood designed "only" to qualify "being able," and indicate that the conception does not go so far as real existence. See § 1680]. [The schema of] Existence is the being of a reality in a given time [§ 1681]. [The schema of] Necessity is the idea [conception] of an object, always existing in time [§ 1682]. Hence it will be seen how the connection of a variety, and therefore the representation of an object, is possible. The categories, as pure intellectual conceptions, could not effect this; but the schemata being employed as media, the necessary unity of the given variety is represented. The categories rendered sensible by time are the schemata, and all objects are given by their means. We may think a thing through the categories, but we can not say any thing of it, or attribute any predicate to it, and the pure origin of the category does not assist in saying what an object is, because we must have an intuition before we can make any thing of it. We can not know any thing of Noumena, or Things in themselves, but only of Phenomena, or Things as they appear. Time being the form of the internal sense, schemata produce the synthesis of the intuition of the internal sense, and they are the only mode by which reality can be given to the categories in establishing their relationship to objects [§ 1684]. But although the schemata of sensibility give reality to the categories, yet they at the same time limit them [§ 1686], and the schema being the sensible conception of an object

employed, can be discovered apriori, by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its momenta. (page 103, line 27.)

§ 1655.—Transcendental logic can not imitate general logic in this division. (Transcendental employment of Reason is not objectively valid.) (page 103, line 35.) §§ 1934, 1942.

§ 1656.—Understanding and Judgment possess in transcendental logic a canon of objectively valid and therefore true exercise. (page 104, line 6.)

§ 1657.—Analytic of principles will be merely a canon for the faculty of judgment. (page 104, line 15.)

Introduction.—Of the transcendental faculty of judgment in general. (§§ 1658-1664 inclusive.)

§ 1658.—Judgment may be termed the faculty of subsumption under the rules of understanding. (page 104, line 27.)

§ 1659.—General logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgment, nor can it contain any such. (p. 104, l. 31.)

§ 1660.—Judgment is a peculiar talent, which does not and can not require tuition, but only exercise. (page 105, line 4.)

§ 1661.—Examples are commonly injurious rather than otherwise, because, as *casus in terminis*, they seldom adequately fulfill the conditions of the rule. (The grand and only use of examples is to sharpen the judgment.) (page 105, line 26.)

§ 1662.—Duty of transcendental logic is to secure and direct, by means of determinate rules, the faculty of judgment in the employment of the pure understanding. (p. 106, l. 4.) Cf. § 1656.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

in unison with the category, it is evident that schemata only represent things as they appear, and not as they are, which the categories, in their pure signification, would do, were it possible that there could be an application of them in this sense. Without schemata, the categories are simply functions of the understanding for conceptions, but they represent no object [§ 1687]. Meaning comes to them from sensibility, and this, whilst it realizes, at the same time necessarily restricts the understanding.

Having thus disposed of the schemata, it will be necessary to investigate the second portion of the division of the faculties of the understanding, and to explain what is meant by principles of the pure understanding [§ 1688], and with this one main branch of the subject will be completed. Analytical judgments have been shown to be those which are tested by the principle of non-contradiction [§ 1693]. The principle of their legitimacy consists in this, that the idea [conception] of the predicate is contained in the subject, as for instance, "bodies are extended," where the predicate extended is contained in the idea, "body." The two ideas [conceptions, see § 1963] also are identical, the predicate in fact doing nothing but developing and extending the subject. But with synthetical judgments the case is quite different [§ 1698]. In these the subject does not contain the predicate, and this may or may not agree with the

§ 1663.—Indicate a priori the case to which the rule must be applied. (page 106, line 18.) [If objects can not be given in harmony with the pure conceptions of the understanding, the conceptions may be said nevertheless to exist as logical forms; but since they could receive no content, they would be mere *thoughts*, could not enter into *cognition*, and therefore would not belong to *understanding*, which is the faculty of cognition.]

§ 1664.—Transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment will treat (1) of the schematism and (2) of the principles of the pure understanding. (page 106, line 32.) [(1) Outward form or shape; habit. (2) Although subsidiary to the conceptions, they are properly termed principles, or fundamenta, because the conceptions themselves have effect only by force of the copula in a judgment. See Fischer, pages 97, 301, 302, and § 2479, to which Mahaffy (Fischer, page 97) refers.]

Chapter I.—Of the schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding.
(§§ 1665-1687 inclusive.)

§ 1665.—Representation of the object must be homogeneous with the conception. (page 107, line 6.)

§ 1666.—Pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared with empirical intuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in general, are quite heterogeneous, and never can be discovered in any intuition. (page 107, line 15.)

§ 1667.—Real cause of the necessity of a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment. (page 107, line 22.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

subject without there being any contradiction, and without the affirmation or negation being contrary to the axiom of contradiction spoken of; hence it is evident that this is not the principle of synthetic, as it was of analytical judgments.

In the analytical judgment, I stop at the given conception, in order to make out something with respect to it. If it is to be affirmative, I merely attribute to this conception that which was already thought in it. If it is to be negative, I exclude only the contrary thereof from it. But in synthetical judgments I must go beyond the given conception, in order to consider, in reference to the same, something quite different from that which was thought in it [§ 1448],—which, therefore, is never either a relationship of identity or of contradiction,—and whereby in the judgment in itself, neither the truth nor the error can be seen.

Experience arises when together with the necessary unity of consciousness, variety [or manifold] of the empirical intuition is thought, and such experience reposes upon the synthetical unity of phenomena, without which it would never be cognition, but merely a rhapsody or unconnected body of perceptions which would not arrange themselves together in any context according to the rules of an absolutely connected consciousness. Experience, therefore, has lying, even

§ 1668.—Must be some third thing, which on the one side is homogeneous with the category, and with the phenomenon on the other, and so makes the application of the former to the latter possible. ('Transcendental schema.') (page 107, line 32.)

§ 1669.—Application of the category to phenomena becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which (as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding) mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former. (page 108, line 4.) [The unity of apperception, from which the categories are deduced, is objectively valid in sensuous intuition (§ 1607). The subsumption of phenomena under the categories ultimately rests upon this objective validity, which has been already demonstrated. The present argument is merely an explication, developing and applying the logical results of the deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding.]

§ 1670.—Conceptions can not possibly apply to objects as things in themselves without regard to the question whether and how these may be given to us. (page 108, line 18.)

§ 1671.—General condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. (page 108, line 32.)

§ 1672.—Schema of the conception of the understanding:—representation of a general procedure of the imagination to present its image to a conception. (page 108, line 38.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

at its foundation, the principles of its form apriori, or general rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena [§ 1702], and the highest principle of all synthetical judgments is that every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of the diversity of the intuitions in a possible experience [§ 1705]. The conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and they have for this reason objective validity in a synthetical judgment apriori [§ 1706].

That there are synthetical principles of the pure understanding, is clear from the fact that experience being general or valid for every body, and this experience, consisting in the representation of a necessary connexion of the variety of empirical intuitions, having only been rendered possible by the application of the categories to intuition, the understanding must therefore contain within itself these rules which are necessary to determine the cases of application [cf. §§ 1663, 1707].

The principles of the pure understanding are divided like the categories and schemata, into four classes [§ 1713], and they comprehend first, as relating to the principle of Quantity, the Axioms of Intuition. Secondly, in reference to that of Quality, the Anticipations of Perception. Thirdly, with respect to Relation, the Analogies of Experience. Fourthly, in regard to Modality, the Postulates of Empirical Thought in general. These principles are not all of the same nature, the two former being those which are termed *constitutive*—

§ 1673.—Schema of sensuous conceptions is a product and as it were a monogram of the pure imagination *apriori*, whereby and according to which images first become possible, which however can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully adequate to it. (p. 109, l. 17.) Cf. Fischer, page 94, where Mahaffy retranslates. Cf. § 2452 (referred to by Mahaffy, Fischer, page 97).

§ 1674.—Schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something that can not be reduced into any image—it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category, conformably to a rule of unity according to conceptions. (page 110, line 8.)

§ 1675.—Schema of quantity as a conception of the understanding, is number. (page 110, line 24.)

§ 1676.—Schema of a reality as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time, is the continuous and uniform generation of the reality in time, as we descend in time from the *sensation* which has a certain *degree*, down to the vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend from negation to the quantity thereof. (page 110, line 33.)

§ 1677.—Schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time. (page 111, line 16.)

§ 1678.—Schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real which, when posited, is always followed by something else. (page 111, line 25.) It consists therefore in the succession of the

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

[cf. § 1752] or absolutely necessary [§ 1712], inasmuch as they concern intuitions without which the object would not be given, determining really what the phenomenon contains with reference to the form of the intuition. The two latter on the other hand are merely *discursive* or produced by the ideas, and are only necessary under the condition of a possible experience, which is always contingent. These are also termed Dynamical, in opposition to the former, which are designated Mathematical, but without its being intended to limit the meaning to the principles of the mathematics on the one hand, or to those of physical dynamics on the other; but only to those of the pure understanding in relation to the internal sense, without any distinction of the representations therein given. The title is allotted rather in consideration of their application than their content † [§ 1714]. [At the bottom of the page, Haywood prints the following note:] † A subtle distinction is made by Kant in the connexion of the variety of empirical intuition according to the categories. This is stated to be of two kinds, one a connexion of the homogeneous, or *Compositio*, the other of the heterogeneous, or *Nexus*; all *conjunctio* belonging to either of these classes. The one is mathematical, the other dynamical, and this last is subdivided into the physical and metaphysical. *Compositio* is a square divided into two triangles by a diagonal. *Nexus* is when one thing necessarily belongs to another, as accident to substance, or effect to cause. [End of Haywood's note.] [§ 1715.]

manifold, insofar as that succession is subjected to a rule. [It is not intended to define the conception, but only to indicate the connection of the conception with the rule. What or why causality is, is not cognized. See §§ 1793, 1803.]

§ 1679.—Schema of community (reciprocity of action and reaction), or the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is the coexistence of the determinations of the one with those of the other, according to a general rule. (page 111, line 29.)

§ 1680.—Schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general. (page 111, line 33.) Cf. Fischer, page 96.

§ 1681.—Schema of reality is existence in a determined time. (p. 111, l. 39.) Cf. Haywood, p. 653 above. [I would confine the use of the word reality to the category of quality (existence in sensation); the category of modality indicates something more (reality in a determined time). Meiklejohn notes that in the table of categories (§ 1570), the term used is existence (Daseyn).]

§ 1682.—Schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time. (page 112, line 1.) Cf. § 1851. [Be careful not to confuse the

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

It is to be here borne in mind, that the point under consideration is the possibility of experience itself, and the mode in which it is practicable. But it must not be supposed that the synthetical principles apriori in question have meaning irrespective of sensible application [cf. § 1703]. They afford no rules as to what objects are absolutely, without reference to given intuition, and to the form of the internal sense, as condition of the synthetical unity of the intuition. The laws of the understanding are in ourselves, that is to say, in our understanding, and they are not derived from elsewhere: and the possibility of experience itself reposes upon the synthetic unity of phenomena or Ideas apriori or categories.

In the division of the principles of the pure understanding, it has just been observed, that "the Axioms of Intuition" are at the head of the list, and the principle of these is that "all intuitions are extensive quantities" [§ 1716], that is, that they possess extensive quantities, or as it may be otherwise expressed, it is impossible to represent to ourselves any thing if it be not in space and time. The proof adduced is this, that all phenomena contain, according to form, an intuition in space and time, lying at the foundation of the whole of them apriori [§ 1717]. They can therefore only be apprehended or received into empirical consciousness through the synthesis of the diverse, whereby the representations of a determined space or time are generated. This synthesis is the conjunction of a diverse-homogeneous [the conjunction of a homogeneous manifold], and its representation is the conception of Quantity. All phenomena are, in fact, quantities, and they are extensive quantities, the character of this kind of quantity being that the representation of the parts renders possible the representation of the whole, and so far, consequently, the one precedes the other [§ 1718]. I can represent to myself no line, however small it may be, without drawing it

schema of necessity with the conception of permanence. See §§ 1760-1763.]

§ 1683.—Schemata are nothing but *a priori* determinations of time according to rules. (page 112, line 3.) See in Fischer, page 96, Mahaffy's note.

§ 1684.—Schematism of the understanding, by means of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as a function corresponding to the internal sense. (page 112, line 18.) Cf. § 1642. [I refer the word "function" to "schematism." Cf. §§ 1551 and 1632.]

§ 1685.—Categories are only capable of empirical use, inasmuch as they serve merely to subject phenomena to the universal rules of synthesis, by means of an *a priori* necessary unity. (page 112, line 26.)

§ 1686.—Schema is properly only the phenomenon, or the sensuous conception of an object in harmony with the category. (page 112, line 36.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

at least in idea—thereby deducing from one point all the parts in succession, and so dissecting as it were the intuition. And in respect of time, the same process takes place, for with regard to the smallest portion of it, I therein think to myself only the successive progression from one moment to another, and in this way by means of all the portions of time, and their addition, a determinate quantity of time is ultimately produced. The simple intuition in all phenomena must be either space or time, and each phenomenon is, as intuition, an extensive quantity, because only through successive quantities from part to part [by successive synthesis] can it be recognized in apprehension [§ 1719].

The second principle of the understanding, the principle of Quality, is termed "Anticipations of Perception;" and here it is shown that "in all phenomena, the Real which is an object of sensation or a sensible object, possesses intensive quantity, that is, it has a degree" [§ 1724]: or in other words it may be said, that all our sensations have a certain degree of intensity. The proof of this rests upon the fact, that each sensation filling up only one moment, the reality of phenomenon is only perceived at once, and not successively [§ 1729]. But between each sensation or reality in the phenomenon and negation, there is a continual connection of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference of which from one to the other is always smaller than the difference between the given one and zero, or total negation [§ 1730]. Every sensation, however small it may be, has in fact a degree or intensive quantity, which may always be further diminished; and between reality and negation there is a continual connexion of possible realities, and of possible smaller perceptions [§ 1734]. Every color, for instance, as red or blue, has a degree, which, however delicate it may be, is never the most delicate; and it is the same with the qualities of heat, weight, etc., generally. This property of quantities is termed their con-

§ 1687.—Categories, without schemata, are merely functions of the understanding for the production of conceptions, but do not represent any object. (page 113, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1649, 1595.

Chapter II.—System of all principles of the pure understanding. (§§ 1688-1862.)

§ 1688.—Exhibit in systematic connection those judgments which the understanding really produces apriori. (Table of categories will certainly afford us the natural and safe guidance. For it is precisely the categories whose application to possible experience must constitute all pure apriori cognition of the understanding; and the relation of which to sensibility will on that very account present us with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the transcendental principles of the use of the understanding.) (page 113, line 33.)

§ 1689.—Principles apriori are so called, not merely because they contain in themselves the grounds of other judgments, but also because they themselves are not grounded in higher and more general cognitions. This peculiarity, however, does not raise them altogether above the need of a proof. (page 114, line 10.)

§ 1690.—Limit our investigations to those principles which relate to the categories. (page 114, line 23.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

tinuity, and space and time are *quanta continua*, because no parts thereof can be given without the same being included within points or instants as limits [§ 1735]. Space, therefore, consists of spaces, and Time of times. Phenomena are all continuous quantities, extensive with reference to their intuition, and intensive as regards their mere perception [§ 1736]. Between the reality in the phenomenon and the negation there may be any number of degrees, the total vanishing of the reality at any determinate point not being provable either as to space or time [§ 1739]. With respect to what constitutes the empirical in a phenomenon, this can not be known except aposteriori [cf. §§ 1743, 1737]; but that a phenomenon must have a reality, we know apriori, and from looking at the nature of experience we anticipate what is to arise, and by this principle of anticipation, the determination of the particular realities belonging to objects of experience becomes possible.

The third principle of the understanding or Relation is designated the "Analogies of experience," and here it has to be shown that experience is only possible by means of the representation of a necessary connexion of perceptions [§ 1744]: and these analogies are divided into three classes, termed the Principle of the Perdurability [permanence] of substance [§ 1757]; Succession of time according to the laws of causality [§ 1771]; Coexistence according to the laws of reciprocity or community [§ 1813].

With regard to the proof of one [the general] principle of this division, or that experience is only possible by means of a necessary connexion of apprehensions, it must be evident that experience is only empirical cognition [§ 1745], or a synthesis of perceptions, which itself is not contained in the perception, and the cognition of phenomena is only possible by means of synthetic unity; so that,

§ 1691.—Principle of analytical judgments, in opposition to synthetic judgments. (page 114, line 39.)

TITLE I.—OF THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF ALL ANALYTICAL JUDGMENTS.
(§§1692-1696 inclusive.)

§ 1692.—Universal although only negative condition of all our judgments is that they do not contradict themselves. (Without being self-contradictory, a judgment may nevertheless be either false or groundless.) (page 115, line 7.)

§ 1693.—Principle of contradiction. (Universal but purely negative criterion of all truth.) “No subject can have a predicate that contradicts it.” (page 115, line 19.)

§ 1694.—Positive use of this principle. (If the judgment is analytical, be it affirmative or negative, its truth must always be recognizable by means of the principle of contradiction.) (page 115, line 25.) § 2652.

§ 1695.—Principle of contradiction the *sine qua non*, but not the determining ground of the truth of our cognition. (p. 115, l. 36.)

§ 1696.—Reason why Kant altered the formula of this principle. (Must not by any means limit its application merely to relations of time.) (page 116, line 10.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

in order to determine the existence of objects in any given time, it is necessary that the synthesis thereof must be possible in time [§ 1747]. Now as the synthesis of apprehension can only occur in time, the variety in experience must occur in general according to the three modes of time, and which are those of perdurability, succession, and coexistence, and these three laws, which are those of all the relationships of time in phenomena, will precede and render possible all experience, whereby to each phenomenon, its existence, in respect of the unity of time, can be determined [§ 1748].

The first analogy asserting the principle of the perdurability of substance, necessarily maintains that in all change of phenomena the substance is permanent, and that its quantum in nature is neither diminished nor increased [§ 1757]. * Succession and determinations of time can only be represented by means of a substratum, which represents time in general, and in which all change or coexistence can be perceived by means of the relationship of phenomena to this substratum in the apprehension, [§ 1759]. Now substance is the substratum of all that is real, or of all that belongs to the existence of things, in the which substance all that appertains to existence can be thought only as determination [§ 1760]. There must be an invariable and durable principle in time, whereof succession and simultaneousness are only modifications, and consequently all phenomena must have this principle, which is the object itself [“the object *in itself*” (§ 1763)]. No relationships can be given by time itself, which is in itself nothing, and can not be perceived [§ 1762]; and they can not be given by our perceptions, for the synthesis of these is always successive. It can not therefore teach us whether the diverse in phenomena, as object of experience, is co-existent or successive, provided something does not lie [or unless

TITLE II.—OF THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF ALL SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS. (§§ 1697-1706 inclusive.)

§ 1697.—Explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgments is the most important matter in transcendental logic. (page 117, line 9.)

§ 1698.—Relation which is consequently never one either of identity or of contradiction. (page 117, line 18.)

§ 1699.—Third thing is necessary, in which alone the synthesis of two conceptions can originate. (*Time*.) (page 117, line 29.)

§ 1700.—Synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination; their synthetical unity (which is requisite to a judgment), upon the unity of apperception. (page 117, line 36.)

§ 1701.—Necessary that the object be given in some way or another. Without this, our conceptions are empty, and we may indeed have thought by means of them, but by such thinking we have not in fact cognized any thing. (page 118, line 7.) [Pure logic and pure mathematics give no cognition of any thing.] Cf. §§ 1620, 2461, 1626, 1544.

§ 1702.—Possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective validity to all our apriori cognitions. (page 118, line 27.)

§ 1703.—Pure synthetical judgments do relate (though but mediately) to the possibility of experience. (page 119, line 4.)

§ 1704.—Synthesis, as cognition apriori, possesses truth, that is, accordance with its object, only insofar as it contains nothing more

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

something does lie] at the foundation which is or exists always, that is to say, which is something fixed and permanent, and as to which all change and co-existence are nothing else but so many modi of time wherein the permanent exists, because only in the permanent are the relationships of time possible [§ 1761]. The determinations of a subject which are nothing else but its particular modes of existing, are termed Accidents, and these are always real because they concern the existence of the substance [§ 1766]. Upon permanence alone can we ground the conception of change. Change is one mode of existence, which follows upon another of the same object, and therefore all that changes is permanent, its state alone varies [§ 1768]. Neither absolute rise or origin nor extinction can be a possible perception; for if it be assumed that something begins to be, there must be a point of time wherein it was not, but only a void time. [But a void time is] no object of perception, [nor can it be assumed that a thing has become absolutely extinct in]* time, for this would be to suppose an empirical representation of time when there was no phenomenon [§ 1769]. Permanence is thus a necessary condition under which alone phenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible experience [§ 1770]. What the empirical criterium of this necessary permanence may be, and of the substantiality of the phenomena, will be remarked hereafter.

The second analogy is the principle of production or of succession, accord-

than what is necessary to the synthetical unity of experience. (page 119, line 15.)

§ 1705.—Supreme principle of all synthetical judgments is: *Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.* (page 119, line 22.) [Observe the radical importance of §§ 1705, 1706.]

§ 1706.—Conditions of the *possibility* of *experience* in general are at the same time conditions of the *possibility* of the *objects* of *experience*, and have for that reason objective validity in an apriori synthetical judgment. (page 119, line 26.) Cf. § 2479.

TITLE III.—SYSTEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF ALL SYNTHETICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING. (§§ 1707-1862 inclusive.)

§ 1707.—Source of principles according to which every thing that can be presented to us as an object is necessarily subject to rules. (page 120, line 5.)

§ 1708.—All laws of nature, without distinction, are subject to higher principles of the understanding. (page 120, line 10)

§ 1709.—No danger of our mistaking merely empirical principles for principles of the pure understanding. (page 120, line 23.)

§ 1710.—Pure principles apriori, which nevertheless I should not ascribe to the pure understanding. (page 120, line 28.)

§ 1711.—Possibility and objective validity apriori of principles of the mathematical science. (page 120, line 38)

§ 1712.—Principles of the mathematical use of the categories

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

ing to the laws of causality, and this corresponds to the second of the three modes of time, and the import of it is, that "all changes occur according to the law of connexion of cause and effect" [§ 1771]. This answers to the principle of *nihil est sine ratione sufficiente*, as the preceding law did to the dictum *gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti* [§ 1765]. As the first analogy showed that all the phenomena of the succession of time are only changes, the present indicates that all changes occur according to the law of the synthesis of cause and effect, or in other words every phenomenon which appears supposes another to which it succeeds, by virtue of a necessary law [§ 1784]. Now what is necessary must arise from a category, and we see in the table of the categories, that under the head of Relation, the second in that division is the one of causality and dependence [§ 1570].* In looking at a house or a statue, the apprehension of it may begin with one man at the roof or the head, or with another at the foundation or foot; but if the conception carries with it a necessity of synthetic unity, this being a pure conception of the understanding, or a category, the same does not lie in the perception. Such a conception is that of the relationship of Cause and Effect [§ 1774]. I perceive that phenomena succeed one another, or I connect two opposite states of substance in time. All this takes place in my own mind, and the connexion is either voluntary, that is, it remains with me which state shall be first, and which last; or it is necessary,

will possess a character of absolute necessity (that is, will be apodictic); those on the other hand, of the dynamical use, the character of an apriori necessity indeed, but only under the condition of empirical thought in an experience, therefore only mediately and indirectly. (page 121, line 6.)

§ 1713.—All principles of the pure understanding are: (1) axioms of intuition; (2) anticipations of perception; (3) analogies of experience; (4) postulates of empirical thought in general. (page 121, line 24.)

§ 1714.—Mathematical principles are possessed of an intuitive, but the dynamical of a merely discursive, though in both instances a complete certitude. (These principles are named rather with reference to their application than their content.)* (p. 122, l. 1.)

* *Exempli gratia*, the first principle is not an axiom, but is merely the formulation of a rule whereby axioms are possible. An axiom is an apriori synthetical rule possessing immediate and apodictic certainty; but the rule "all intuitions are extensive quantities," requires proof. See §§ 2474, 2475.

§ 1715.—All combination (*conjunctio*) is either composition or connection (*nexus*). (page 122, line 27.)

Article I.—Axioms of intuition. (§§ 1716–1723.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

that is, I am conscious that the one state must ever be the first, and the other the last. In the first case, the connexion is subjective, or it is in my imagination, and not in the objects [§ 1773]; but in the second case, the subjective connexion is changed into an objective one, or it is represented not merely as to be found in my mind, but is at the same time in the phenomena, or the objects of experience. If, consequently, the objective succession of things is to be distinguished from the subjective, and the first not held to be the last, this must arise from the principle of Necessity [§ 1774], and this again brings us back to the same point, that necessity is only possible apriori; and the connexion discovered must be a work of the understanding. * It is the conception of cause in general, or that there is a cause for every change, which enters into our consideration here; and as this is a necessary law of thought, this is, as it was before stated to be, itself a Category. We are certainly ignorant apriori of the definite cause of any particular change [§ 1803], but we are thoroughly convinced that every change has a cause. Neither can this conception of cause be obtained empirically, because then * ["the rule which it furnishes us with—'everything that happens must have a cause'—would be just as contingent as experience itself. The universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it. Indeed, it could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as it would not in this case be apriori, but founded on de[*in*]duction." § 1785]. * This law of causality can not be borrowed from experience, because, as just mentioned, it is a necessary law; for unless it were so, it would be impossible to conceive the necessary succession of perceptions, and to distinguish

§ 1716.—All intuitions are extensive quantities. (p. 122, l. 24.)

Proof.—(§§ 1717–1719 inclusive.)

§ 1717.—All phenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, because, as intuitions in space and time, they must be represented by means of the same synthesis through which space and time themselves are determined. (page 123, line 2.)

§ 1718.—Extensive quantity I call that wherein the representation of the parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes) the representation of the whole. (page 123, line 22.)

§ 1719.—Every phenomenon in its character of intuition is an extensive quantity, inasmuch as it can only be cognized in our apprehension by successive synthesis (from part to part). (page 123, line 32.)

§ 1720.—Founded the mathematics of extension, or geometry, with its axioms. (page 124, line 1.) Quanta.

§ 1721.—Regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas). (No axioms.) (page 124, line 10.)

§ 1722.—Can not be called axioms, but numerical formulae. (As to the relation of numbers.) (page 124, line 21.) Cf. § 1454.

§ 1723.—Greatly enlarges our apriori cognition. For it is by this principle alone that pure mathematics is rendered applicable in all

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

that necessary succession which is objective, from the subjective succession of perceptions [§ 1783]. Hence the principle, *In mundo non datur fatum* [cf. § 1855].

When two apprehensions follow one another, it is evident that this is nothing but the succession of two representations, and this is subjective, and yet to this subjective act we attribute continually reference to an object [§§ 1784, 1782], and this arises, it may be again repeated, from the category, for without it, the objective relationship would be merely a subjective play of the imagination, and we should merely say that one apprehension followed upon another, but not that it was necessarily so [§§ 1783, 1775, 1797]. In thinking of cause and effect, or the law of causality, continual reference is made to what is termed, Power, Action, Force, and Substance; and it is thereby meant that where there is action, consequently activity and force, there also is substance, and in this substance alone must the seat of that fruitful source of phenomena, action, be found. Action signifies the relationship of the subject of causality to the effect; and since the effect consists in that which happens, consequently in the *Mutable* which time indicates according to succession, the last subject of this is the *Permanent* as the substratum of the changeable, that is, the substance. For according to the principles of causality, actions are always the first foundation of all change of phenomena, and can not therefore lie in a subject which itself changes, because otherwise other actions and another subject determining such change would be required. In consequence of this, action, as a sufficient empirical criterium, shows substantiality, without its being necessary first of all to seek the permanence of this substance by means of compared perceptions [§ 1801].

its precision to objects of experience. (page 125, line 5.) Cf. §§ 1810, 1811.

Article II.—Anticipations of perception. (§§ 1724–1743 inclusive.)

§ 1724.—Real, that which is an object of sensation, has intensive quantity, that is, has a degree. (page 125, line 38.)

Proof.—(§§ 1725–1732 inclusive.)

§ 1725.—Gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness is possible, inasmuch as the real in this consciousness entirely vanishes, and there remains a merely formal consciousness (apriori) of the manifold in time and space. (page 126, line 2.)

§ 1726.—Must ascribe intensive quantity (that is, a degree of influence on sense) to all objects of perception, insofar as this perception contains sensation. (page 126, line 19.)

§ 1727.—Sensation is just that element in cognition which can not be at all anticipated. (page 126, line 29.) Anticipation—prolepsis—foretaking.

§ 1728.—Deserve to be called anticipation in a special sense. (page 127, line 5.)

§ 1729.—Apprehension, by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment. (page 127, line 13.) Cf. § 1642. [Meiklejohn remarks that “apprehension is the Kantian word for perception, in the largest sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus which includes under it as species, perception proper and sensation proper.” I should rather say, in the most limited sense, excluding merely possible perception. See §§ 1796, 1824, 1839,

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

The first subject of the causality of all origin and extinction can not itself, in the field of phenomena, arise or perish. This runs into [or leads to the conception of] empirical necessity and permanency of existence, and consequently into the conception of substance as phenomenon. When an origin arises from an extraneous cause, it is termed creation, which can not be admitted amongst phenomena as an event, for its possibility would annihilate the unity of experience; although, when things are considered not as phenomena, but as things in themselves and objects of the mere understanding, then, notwithstanding they are substances, they may be regarded as dependent upon an extraneous cause, in respect of their existence [§ 1802]. But this would not be phenomena, as possible objects of experience. In conclusion, it should not be overlooked, that concomitance, as well as succession, belongs to cause and effect; for though one position of causal connexion amongst phenomena is limited in our formula to the succession of their series, we still find, in the use of the same position, that it suits with their concomitancy, and can at the same time be cause and effect. There is, for instance, warmth in a room which can not be met with in the open air. I look for the cause, and find it in a heated stove. Now this stove, as cause, and warmth as its effect, are co-existent, and consequently there is here no succession of series, according to time, between cause and effect, but

1963, 2873. For the same reason that Kant uses apperception (§ 1600) to indicate the pure act of consciousness, he uses apprehension to indicate the empirical act of consciousness—namely, to bring prominently forward the idea of activity of the subject. (See § 1776 and cf. §§ 1749, 1754.)] Cf. §§ 1731, 1736.

§ 1730.—Every sensation is capable of a diminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually disappear. (page 127, line 19.)

§ 1731.—Real in a phenomenon has always a quantity, which however is not discoverable in apprehension. (page 127, line 28.)

§ 1732.—Quantity which is apprehended only as unity. (page 127, line 35.)

§ 1733.—Call the degree of reality, in its character of cause, a momentum. (p. 128, l. 1.) § 1807 See Meiklejohn's note to § 1742.

§ 1734.—Every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena, however small it may be, has a degree. (page 128, line 9.)

§ 1735.—Property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest possible, is called their continuity. (page 128, line 17.)

§ 1736.—All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect both to intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with it reality). In the former case, they are extensive quantities; in the latter, intensive. (page 128, line 33.)

§ 1737.—Dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate general physical science, which is built upon certain fundamental experiences. (page 129, line 15.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

they are contemporaneous; and yet the law in question holds good. The greater part of the effective causes in nature are together in time with their effects; and the succession of time in the latter only arises through this, that the cause can not produce the whole effect in a moment. But in the moment when this first begins, it is always co-existent with the causality of its cause, because if that (the cause) had ceased to be a moment previously, this (the effect) would not at all have taken place. We must also here particularly observe, that we are here to look at the order of time, and not the flow of time—the relationship remaining, although no time have elapsed. The time between the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may be vanishing away (therefore it be co-existent the effect) but still the relationship of one to the other always remains determinable according to time. If I consider a ball which lies upon a stuffed cushion, and makes an impression thereon, as a cause, it is contemporaneous with the effect. But I still distinguish both, through the relationships of time of the dynamic connection of the two. For if I place the ball upon the cushion, the dent succeeds to its previous smooth shape; but if the cushion have (I know not whence) a dent, a leaden ball does not succeed to that [§ 1798].

Succession is, therefore, absolutely the single empirical criterium of effect, in reference to the causality of the cause which precedes [§ 1799]. The glass is the

§ 1738.—Shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly draw. (page 129, line 36.)

§ 1739.—No perception, and consequently no experience, is possible, which can prove, either immediately or mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon; in other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty space or of empty time. (page 129, line 41.)

§ 1740.—Erroneous to regard the real in a phenomenon as equal *quoad* its degree, and different only *quoad* its aggregation and extensive quantity. (Hypothesis of empty spaces.) (p. 130, l. 22.)

§ 1741.—Must somewhat startle an inquirer. (page 131, line 29.)

§ 1742.—Real (that which corresponds to sensation, in opposition to negation = 0) only represents something the conception of which in itself contains a being, and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical consciousness. (page 132, line 1.)

§ 1743.—All sensations, therefore, as such, are given only *aposteriori*; but this property thereof, namely, that they have a degree, can be known *apriori*. (page 132, line 16.) Cf. § 1648.

Article III—Analogies of experience. (§§ 1744–1829 inclusive.)

§ 1744.—Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. (page 132, line 27.) Cf. Fischer, page 107. [Dr. Fischer, after quoting Kant's expression

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

cause of the rise of water above its horizontal surface, although both phenomena are co-existent. For as soon as I have drawn this water with the glass out of a larger vessel, something ensues, that is to say, change of the horizontal state which it had (in the vessel), into a concave one, which it assumes in the glass.

Hence we see that it is the Intellect which connects [§§ 1774–1797; especially §§ 1793–1795]. One species of this connection is, that it makes some of the realities of time to follow upon some other realities agreeably to the laws of its constitution. This species of connection considered separately comprehends the categories of cause and effect, but applied to time it is the schema of this category [§ 1678], and it presents such connexion as inhering to the realities of time [see § 1812].

The law of continuity, or the proposition that in the transition from one state to the other, no change can be the smallest, comes under this analogy. It is found *apriori*, because all changes occur in time, and each perception only renders perceptible the succession of time. To find the law, we anticipate our perceptions in time, in order to conceive how the succession of time occurs in general. All the determinations of time therefore being *apriori*, the law itself must be so necessarily [§§ 1804–1812].

The third analogy is the principle of co-existence according to the law of reciprocity or community, and the law is that "all substances, so far as they can be perceived in space in the same time, are in thorough reciprocalness of action" [§ 1813], and so far as they are co-existent, that they stand in absolute commu-

in the first edition of the Critique, "All phenomena stand (as to their existence) apriori under rules of the determinations of their mutual relations in time," says, "The expression in the second edition is not so accurate, and leaves out the time-relation, which is here essential." But if the time-relation is essential only because time is the sole form of the internal sense, in which all that happens passes, and if the point to be here considered is the necessary relation of perceptions, I do not know why the logical statement of the principle should be confused by introducing into it the fact that this is a time relation. See § 1749.] Cf. § 2727.

Proof.—(§§ 1745–1747 inclusive.)

§ 1745.—Unity constitutes the essential of our cognition of objects of the senses, that is, of experience. (page 132, line 31.)

§ 1746.—Apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition; and no representation of a necessity in the connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings together, is to be discovered therein. (page 133, line 3.) Cf. § 1729.

§ 1747.—Determination of the existence of objects in time can only take place by means of their connection in time in general, consequently only by means of apriori connecting conceptions. (page 133, line 10.) [The objective validity of apriori conceptions

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

nity or reciprocalness with one another [§ 1821], or that they are in thorough action or reaction [§ 1817]. It has been observed in speaking of and explaining the second principle or analogy, that in the succession of phenomena the perception of one thing can not follow upon the perception of another reciprocally [§§ 1780, 1782], but is determined in the mind [§ 1793]. In the analogy, however, now to be explained, the contrary occurs, as for instance, in looking at the earth or moon, it is immaterial which is the first perception in order. It is of no consequence whether I begin my perception first with the moon, and afterward the earth, or conversely, first with the earth, and then with the moon; and because the perceptions of these objects follow one another reciprocally, they are said to exist contemporaneously [§ 1814]—contemporaneousness being the existence of what is diverse in the same time [§ 1815]. We know that things are in one and the same time when the order in the synthesis of the apprehension of the diversity is of no consequence, or when it can proceed regularly from A, through B, C, D, E, or, on the other hand, retrograde from E to A. If this order in time were successive, or in the order which begins from A and terminates in E, it would be then impossible to begin the apprehension in the perception from E, and proceed backward to A, because A belongs to past time, and could no longer be an object of apprehension [§ 1818]. If it were assumed that in a diversity of substances as phenomena, no one operated upon the other, nor partook of reciprocal influence, then contemporaneousness [or co-existence] of the same could not be an object of possible perception, and the

is not here in question (see § 1669). But it is shown that except by such conceptions, the existence of objects in time can not be connected into experience.] [Whatever color objects determined in time may take from the apprehending subject, it is certain that they do not take from the subject their existence. (Cf. § 1751.)]

§ 1748.—Three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon is determined in respect of the unity of all time; and these antecede all experience, and render it possible. (page 133, line 21.)

§ 1749.—General principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness (perception) at every time. (page 133, line 27.)

§ 1750.—All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time. (page 133, line 36.)

§ 1751.—Existence of phenomena can not be known apriori. (page 134, line 6.) Cf. §§ 1522, 1544, 1619, 1624, 2282, 2700.

§ 1752.—Constitutive (mathematical) principles relate to phenomena only in regard to their possibility. (page 134, line 20.) *Mathematic*—Science of relation and measurement of quantity.

§ 1753.—Regulative principles only concern the relations of existence (qualitative relations, not quantitative). (page 134, line 33.) *Analogy in philosophy*.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

existence of the one, by no way of empirical synthesis, could lead to the existence of the other [§ 1819]. For if it were fancied that these substances were separated by means of a completely void space, the perception which proceeds from one to the other in time, would then determine, by means of a subsequent perception to this other, its existence, but it could not decide whether the phenomenon followed objectively upon the first *["or is co-existent with it. Besides the mere fact of existence, then, there must be something by means of which A determines the position of B in time, and conversely, B the position of A." § 1819]. Through *reciprocity, therefore, alone can the objective contemporaneity of objects be distinguished from the subjective succession of the same in the mind. The apprehension of the diverse of representations occurs at all times successively, first comes A, then B, then C, etc., and then it must be determined whether this is merely a contingent succession in me. *This occurs only through the understanding-conception [§ 1816] apriori of concurrence, which makes it general and necessary, that it is indifferent whether the series is A, B, C, D, or D, C, B, A, since *B not only follows upon A, and *C upon B, but equally the same occurs if the series be reversed. ["Now that alone determines the position of another thing in time, which is the cause of it or of its determinations. Consequently every substance (inasmuch as it can have succession predicated of it only in respect of its determinations) must contain the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself." § 1820.] This necessity in the

§ 1754.—Analogy of experience is therefore a rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects (phenomena) not as a *constitutive* but merely as a *regulative* principle. (page 135, line 21.) [But see § 2402.] As to perception, cf. §§ 1749, 1729, and 2949.

§ 1755.—Analogies possess significance and validity, not as principles of the transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such; and consequently the phenomena must not be subjoined directly under the categories, but only under their schemata. (page 136, line 3.) Cf. §§ 1858, 1870, 2914, 1687.

§ 1756.—Authorize us to connect phenomena according to an analogy, with the logical and universal unity of conceptions. (page 136, line 19.) *Restricting conditions, under the title of formulæ of the categories*: cf. § 1687.

A.—First Analogy.—Principle of the permanence of substance. (§§ 1757–1770 inclusive.)

§ 1757.—Substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished. (page 136, line 33.)

Proof.—(§§ 1758–1760 inclusive.)

§ 1758.—Time, in which all changes of phenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not. (page 136, line 37.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

succession when I reverse the series, causes that I must think the things as side by side and contemporaneous, because it does not depend upon my will to let them follow upon one another according to an order necessarily, but I am tied and bound to this necessity in the order when I reverse the series, and I cognize only through the relationship of my successive representations to an object, in which this double succession of representations is cognized as necessary. Hence it will be seen that the co-existence of substances in space is the application of the category of community or concurrence or reciprocity* to empirical intuition. In looking at certain objects one apprehension follows after another empirically; and I am conscious of the same successively, but still no succession is attributed to the objects because the apprehensions are reciprocally related to one another. The light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies, for instance, produces a mediate community between us and them, and thereby manifests contemporaneousness [or co-existence]; but if the objects were separated by void space, so that one object could not act upon the other, it would then be impossible to say that the objects coexist; [the illustration (see § 1822) is perhaps somewhat defective, in so far as it disregards the time occupied by the light in transmission; but the defect may be remedied by abstraction]. The apprehending intellect is the connecting link by which we remark that objects coexist, and whereby the arbitrary order of apprehensions is represented as objectively and universally valid.

In reflecting upon the three analogies just considered, or those into which

§ 1759.—Must be found a substratum which represents time in general. (page 137, line 4.)

§ 1760.—Permanent, in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined, is substance in the world of phenomena. (page 137, line 9.)

§ 1761.—Permanent is the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all determination of time is possible. (page 137, line 19.)

§ 1762.—Permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the condition of the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions, i. e. of experience. (page 137, line 30.)

§ 1763.—All that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or substances. consequently to its determinations. (page 138, line 12.)

§ 1764.—Valid only in relation to possible experience, and therefore can not be proved except by means of a deduction of the possibility of experience. (page 138, line 17.) [*Dogmatical*: see also § 2478.] See especially Fischer, pages 108–110.

§ 1765.—Dependence (even in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a Supreme Cause. (page 139, line 3.) *This permanence*: see § 1687.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

the third [principle (§ 1744) or rule for the objective employment (§ 1713) of the categories]* of Relation is subdivided, we see that they are nothing else than the principles of the determination of existence of phenomena in time, according to all three modes of the same, namely, the relationship to time itself as a Quantity (or duration), the relationship in time as of a Series (in succession), and the relationship in time as a Complex of all existences (contemporaneously) [§ 1825]. In this way we come to the consideration of nature generally; these analogies, in fact, being its laws [§ 1826]. The question of how is nature possible [§§ 2747–2749, 2702] arises naturally from these considerations; and we arrive at the conclusion by an easy process, that it is the understanding which does not derive its laws, apriori, from nature, but presents the same to it [§§ 1643–1648].

Under the term Nature is meant, in the empirical sense, the coherence of phenomena in respect of their existence according to necessary rules or laws; and, consequently, there must be, in this view of the matter, certain laws apriori which make nature possible [§ 1826]. Only by experience and by reason of those original laws, by virtue of which experience itself is possible, can empirical laws be discovered [§ 1648]; and the three analogies which are three dynamic relationships of Inherence, Consequence, and Composition [§ 1825], represent the unity of nature in the connexion of all phenomena under certain exponents, which express nothing else but the relationship of time—so far as this comprehends all unity [all existence § 1826] in itself—to the unity of the apperception,

§ 1766.—Accident is the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined. (page 139, line 39.)

§ 1767.—Category of substance stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition thereof, than because it contains in itself any relation. (page 140, line 10.)

§ 1768.—Change is but a mode of existence which follows on another mode of existence of the same object; hence, all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. (page 140, line 18.)

§ 1769.—Origin or extinction in an absolute sense (that does not concern merely a determination of the permanent) can not be a possible perception. (page 140, line 30.)

§ 1770.—Permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible experience. (page 141, line 8.)

B.—Second Analogy—Principle of the succession of time according to the law of causality. (§§ 1771–1812 inclusive.)

§ 1771.—All changes take place according to the law of the connection of cause and effect. (page 141, line 26.)

Proof.—(§§ 1773–1775 inclusive.) § 1772 is premonitory.

§ 1772.—All alteration (succession) of phenomena is merely change. (page 141, line 29.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

which can only take place in synthesis according to rules. Unity of apperception [§§ 1601, 1605] is that which unites all the given diversity in an intuition, into one conception of object, and consequently is the objective. This object must be determined in respect of time, and this time comprehends all existence in itself. This [determination] happens only through conjunction or synthesis according to the three analogies, or laws of the understanding just now under consideration, whereby the object is determined as necessarily changing (accident), or as the necessary consequence of another (effect), or as necessarily contemporaneous with another object (reciprocity); so that these three analogies of Change, Succession and Contemporaneousness are the three possible relationships of time to the unity of apperception.

The fourth leading division of the categories has been already stated to be that of "Modality" [§ 1570]; and under this are to be found the "Postulates of empirical thinking in general" [§ 1713], and these are subdivided into three principles, and are thus stated [§ 1830]:

Firstly, that which accords with the formal condition of experience (according to intuitions and conceptions) is possible.

Secondly, that which coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real.

Thirdly, that whose coherence with the real is determined according to the general [i. e., universal] conditions of experience, is, or exists, necessarily.

These three postulates develop the meaning of the three divisions [or con-

§ 1773.—Objective relation of the successive phenomena remains quite undetermined by means of mere perception. (p. 142, l. 5.)

§ 1774.—Conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding, which does not lie in mere perception. (p. 142, l. 20.)

§ 1775.—Only because we subject the sequence of phenomena, and consequently all change, to the law of causality, that experience itself (that is, empirical cognition of phenomena) becomes possible. (page 142, line 32.)

§ 1776.—Manifold of phenomena is always produced successively in the mind. (page 142, line 38.) As to apprehension, see § 1729.

§ 1777.—Utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition. (How things may be in themselves.) (page 143, line 11.)

§ 1778.—Phenomenon, in opposition to the representations of apprehension, can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them, if it is subject to a rule, which distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold. That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension, is the object. (page 143, line 17.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

ceptions] of possibility, reality, and necessity, which were before stated to be those of *modality [see pages 637 and 653 above], and they are so named postulates, in imitation of geometry. *["This expression," says Kant (in § 1857), "I do not here use in the sense which some more recent philosophers (contrary to its meaning with mathematicians, to whom the word properly belongs) attach to it—that of a proposition, namely, immediately certain, requiring neither deduction nor proof." - - - "Now a postulate in mathematics is a practical proposition which contains nothing but the synthesis by which we present an object to ourselves, and produce the conception of it, for example,—'With a given line, to describe a circle upon a plane, from a given point;' and such a proposition does not admit of proof, because the procedure, which it requires, is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate the conception of such a figure. With the same right, accordingly, can we postulate the principles of modality, because they do not augment the conception of a thing, but merely indicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition."]* Modality, itself, has its seat necessarily in the understanding, and thereby an empirical object is so conjoined with the faculty of cognition, that not only is it thought with reference to the same, but also as a product of it, and the conception of modality is the conception of the way in which the representation of the object inheres in the subject of it, as thought, sensation, or [effect (§ 1852) in conformity with] law. By the term * [possible], we require not that a thing should be only logically possible, for every thing that does not imply contradiction is logically possible, but it also requires that the object should [be such as can] be given in an intuition [§ 1834].* The principle of possibility precedes our having the idea [conception] of what is, or what is not possible;

§ 1779.—Every apprehension of an event is a perception which follows upon another perception. (page 144, line 8.)

§ 1780.—Rule is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary. (page 144, line 16.)

§ 1781.—Deduce the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena. (page 145, line 1.)

§ 1782.—Because there certainly is something that follows. (page 145, line 16.)

§ 1783.—Suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event must follow in conformity with a rule. (p. 145, l. 31.)

§ 1784.—Only therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phenomena are determined in their sequence (that is, as they happen) by the preceding state, can I make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective; and it is only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is possible. (page 146, line 9.) [It must be remembered, that the conception of causality has been already deduced from the unity of apprehension, and its objective validity established. In this place, Kant

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

and we examine whether this * [conception of a possible object] may be conformable to the conditions of experience [§ 1832]. Now the difference between the principle of Possibility and Reality, which is the second postulate, is that the former only requires the formal conditions of experience [§ 1837], whilst the latter requires conditions which are material; as for instance, the simple idea [mere conception (§ 1840)] of an object can not cause us to know the objective existence, or the reality of the object; for in order to do this sensation is required [§ 1839], and real existence is only possible to us by means of such proof.

In the third principle, or the postulate of Necessity, we declare that whatsoever has a connexion with reality, according to the laws of experience, exists necessarily. This postulate does not imply necessity in thought merely, but also in existence [§ 1851]. Yet effects are the only thing whose existence can positively be known [to be necessary (§ 1852)]. One existence is known to be necessary, as far as it refers to others, but still not of itself alone, and in this way there is no individual substance whose existence is absolutely, or rather, abstractedly necessary. It is only in relation to the effects it produces as connected with causes that this necessity can be attributed. This necessity, therefore, only regards accidents, and not substances. It is not the existence of things (substances), but of their state whereof the necessity is cognizable by us, and this only from other states given in the perception, according to the empirical laws of causality; and thus it follows, that the criterion of necessity alone lies in the law of possible experience.

The question of Idealism naturally arises out of this discussion, because, as the second postulate is a description of Reality, the antagonist principle of Idealism has necessarily to be refuted [§ 1842]. Now this, as it is known, may

designs merely to show that except by means of the conception objectively applied, we can not find in phenomena any synthesis of existence in its relations. (See § 1747.)]

§ 1785.—Ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded it *a priori*. (page 146, line 21.)

§ 1786.—First renders possible the representation of a succession in the object. (page 147, line 7.)

§ 1787.—Objective significance can not consist in a relation to another representation. (page 147, line 16.)

§ 1788.—Relation to an object has no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a certain manner, and of subjecting them to a rule. (p. 147, l. 30.)

§ 1789.—Must assign a certain determinate position in time, which can not be altered. (page 147, line 39.)

§ 1790.—Something antecedes, because it is only in relation to this that the phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time. (page 148, line 8.)

§ 1791.—Whereby the present gives a sure indication of some previously existing state, as a correlate. (page 148, line 17.)

§ 1792.—Indispensable law of empirical representation of the series of time. (page 148, line 29.)

§ 1793.—First step which understanding takes in the sphere of

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

be considered under two points of view [§ 1843]; one of which was adduced by Des Cartes, and the other by Berkeley. The first system may be designated problematical Idealism, the other dogmatical. The French philosopher declared only one empirical assertion to be undoubted, namely, the "I am"—the English philosopher, on the other hand, has declared that space, with all the things to which it adheres as inseparable condition, is impossible in itself; and consequently, also, that the things in space are mere imaginations. The latter view is inevitable, if we regard space as a property which is to belong to things in themselves, for then, together with all to which it serves as a condition, it is a non-entity [§ 1844]. But the foundation of this idealism is destroyed if the views adopted in the transcendental *Æsthetic* are admitted; and the problematical idealism of Des Cartes only remains to be answered. This seems easily effected by proving that it is not imagination of external things which we only possess, but that we attain to this knowledge by experience; and the point, therefore, is to show that even our internal, and what was to Des Cartes, indubitable experience, is only possible by means of the external [§ 1845].

The lemma here [§ 1846] laid down is, that "the simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence, proves the existence of the objects out of me;" and the proof is thus adduced: Man is conscious of his existence as determined in time. Every determination of time presupposes something permanent in the perception. But this permanent can not be an intuition in me, for all the grounds of determination of my existence that can be

experience, is, not to render the representation of objects clear, but to render the representation of an object in general possible. (page 148, line 41.)

§ 1794.—Phenomena must reciprocally determine the places in time of one another, and render these necessary in the order of time. (page 149, line 9.) Cf. § 1784.

§ 1795.—Principle of cause and effect is the principle of possible experience, that is, of objective cognition of phenomena, in regard to their relations in the succession of time. (page 149, line 22.)

§ 1796.—Perception, if it is to contain the cognition of an event, must be an empirical judgment, wherein we think that the succession is determined. (page 149, line 34) Cf. §§ 1729, 1963, 1754.

§ 1797.—Condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments in regard to the sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience. (p. 150, l. 13.)

§ 1798.—Cause and effect may be simultaneous. (We must consider the order of time; and not the lapse thereof.) (page 150, line 28.) [Both fire and heat are continuous quantities. But if I represent to myself the smallest possible quantity of each, I am compelled to represent the fire as antecedent to the heat. Neither do I find any simultaneity as to cause and effect when I represent simultaneous quantities. I necessarily regard each moment of

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

met with in me are representations, and require as such, themselves, a permanent which is different from them, and whereupon can be determined in relation the change thereof,—consequently my existence in the time in which they change. [The following is Meiklejohn's version (though I do not prefer it before Haywood's), page xl, preface: "For all the determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me, are representations, and, as such, do themselves require a permanent, distinct from them, which may determine my existence in relation to their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they change."] Against this observation an objection may possibly be taken, that I am not conscious of external things as things in themselves, but as representations to which things in themselves may [or may not] lie at the foundation, which they represent. The rejoinder to this, then, is, I am conscious of my internal state in a determinate time, and this through internal experience. This has reference not merely to the representations which I have, but [proves] that I may have them, and, consequently, how in a certain determinate time, I am existing. This [determination of my internal state] would not be possible without something out of me,—consequently the external is not imagination; it is experience of an external, and I come to the consciousness of the same through the being-affected of my senses, and not through fancy of my imagination-faculty, by which [i. e., by experience] the external is inseparably connected with my internal sense. Provided through the mere idea [representation], 'I am' (wherein intellectual consciousness manifests itself), I could alone

heat as the effect of a preceding moment of fire. For I represent cause and effect as two states, of which the one must cease to be before the other can entirely be.]

§ 1799.—Law of succession of time is in all instances the only empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the antecedent cause. (page 151, line 20.) See § 1795.

§ 1800.—Remarks on the empirical criterion of a substance. (page 151, line 29.)

§ 1801.—Action alone, as an empirical criterion, is a sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality. (page 152, line 3.) Cf. Fischer, page 121, where Mahaffy refers to § 2049 to show that Kant does not mean that we go back to substance in a regressive series, and to §§ 1849, 2337, and 1895, as to what effects suggest action.

§ 1802.—Conception of a substance as phenomenon. (Creation can not be admitted as an event among phenomena.) (page 152, line 30.) See §§ 1763, 1768, 1769. [*A very different meaning in the words: For example, it would require us to regard phenomenal substance no longer as substance, but only as a mode of substance.*]

§ 1803.—How a thing can be changed—of this we have not the smallest conception a priori. (page 153, line 15.)

§ 1804.—When a substance passes from one state (a) into another

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

be conscious of [or determine] my state (through intellectual intuition), it would [in that case] not require for internal experience necessarily the consciousness of a relationship to something out of me (or in the external sense). But as I am become conscious of my state, only through the being-affected of my internal sense, and this must be * in time, whilst to this something permanent must necessarily belong—which is not to be found in the internal sense, and consequently must be found in the external—I am equally as conscious that there are things out of me, or which refer to my external sense, as I am conscious that I myself exist in time, with certain determinations.* In this proof it will be seen that the game idealism plays of referring every thing to internal sense, is played upon it back again [§ 1847] by attributing all to the external one; as only by means of it is the consciousness of [the determination of] our own existence possible, as determined in time,—which is, in fact, that very determined experience, or consciousness of existence, whereupon Des Cartes would make all to depend, instead of itself being dependent upon that which is external.

The categories being so far examined in detail, it becomes now advisable to make some general observations upon the system of principles as laid down, and to draw attention still more strongly to the fact, that the possibility of a thing is not to be perceived by the mere category, but that an intuition is always necessary to show the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding [§ 1858]. In the categories of relation, for instance, it would be im-

state (b), the point of time in which the latter exists is different from and subsequent to that in which the former existed. (page 153, line 29.)

§ 1805.—Every transition from one state into another is always effected *in a time*. (page 154, line 1.)

§ 1806.—Cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at once, or in one moment, but *in a time*. (page 154, line 13.)

§ 1807.—All change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the causality, which, insofar as it is uniform, we call a momentum. (page 154, line 20.) See § 1733.

§ 1808.—No smallest degree of reality in a phenomenon, just as there is no smallest degree in the quantity of time. (p. 154, l. 25.) (Law of the continuity of all change.)

§ 1809.—Appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of nature. (page 154, line 36.)

§ 1810.—Nothing more than an extension of the determination of the internal sense. (page 155, line 7.)

§ 1811.—Merely anticipate our own apprehension, the formal condition of which, inasmuch as it is itself to be found in the mind antecedently to all given phenomena, must certainly be capable of being cognized *a priori*. (page 155, line 22.)

§ 1812.—Understanding, by virtue of the unity of apperception,

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

possible to see* from mere conceptions* how something can exist,* only as subject, and not as mere determination of other things; that is, can be substance—or how because something is, something else must be,—and consequently how something* can be cause—or how, if several things exist, because one of these exists, something follows in the others and reciprocally; and in such manner a community of substances takes place. These, however, are all pure conceptions of the understanding, and if we proceed to the other categories, we shall find they are equally* without application so long as intuition is wanting to manifest their* [objective reality]. Without intuition it is quite impossible to know whether we think an object by means of the categories, or whether, in fact, any object can belong to them; and it is then[ce] shown that they are no cognitions, but merely forms of thought whereby cognitions arise, called into action by intuition. No synthetical proposition can be made from the mere categories, as for example, that in every existence there is “substance,” that is, that something [which] can exist as subject only, and not as mere predicate, or that every thing is a quantum, for in these cases there is nothing [without intuition] to aid us to go out beyond a given conception and to connect another with it; and in this way it will [furthermore] be obvious that from mere pure conceptions of the understanding, no synthetical proposition can be proved [§ 1859]. Besides this—and which is still more remarkable—it must not be overlooked, that in order to understand the possibility of things, and therefore to represent the objective reality of the same [categories], not

contains the condition apriori of the possibility of a continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena. (page 155, line 29.) Cf. § 1723.

C.—Third Analogy.—Principle of co-existence, according to the law of reciprocity or community. (§§ 1813–1824 inclusive.)

§ 1813.—All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space at the same time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action. (page 156, line 5.)

Proof.—(§§ 1814–1821 inclusive.)

§ 1814.—Things are co-existent, when in empirical intuition the perception of the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and *vice versa*. (page 156, line 8.)

§ 1815.—Can not conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time, the other fact, that the perceptions of these things can follow each other reciprocally. (page 156, line 16.)

§ 1816.—Requisite to justify us in saying that the reciprocal succession of the perceptions has its foundation in the object. (A conception of the understanding.) (page 156, line 27.)

§ 1817.—Co-existence of substances in space can not be cognized in experience, otherwise than under the precondition of their reciprocal action. (page 156, line 33.) [The pure conceptions of the understanding having been previously deduced from the unity of

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

only intuitions are required, but intuitions that are external [§ 1861]. For instance, if we take the pure conceptions of relation, we first find that in order to give, corresponding to the conception of substance, something permanent in the intuition (thereby to prove the objective * [reality] of this conception), an intuition in space (of matter) is required, since space alone determines permanently—whilst time, consequently all that is in the internal sense, flows constantly. Secondly, that in order to represent change as the corresponding intuition to the conception of causality, we must, for example, take motion as change in space, and that in fact, thereby alone can we render perceptible to ourselves changes, the possibility of which no pure understanding can comprehend. Change is the conjunction of contradictory opposing determinations [contradictorily opposed] one to the other, in the existence of one and the same thing. Now, how it is possible that from a given state an opposite one to it should follow of [in] the same thing, pure reason can not, not only [can not only not] without an example, render conceivable, but without an intuition, not even intelligible; and this intuition is that of the motion of a point in space, the existence of which point in different places (as a consequence of opposite determinations) first alone makes change capable of intuition, or visible to us; for in order afterward to render imaginable even internal changes, we [first] make time comprehensible to ourselves, figuratively, by means of a line, as the form of the internal sense, and the internal change by means of the drawing of this line (motion)—consequently [we make comprehensible to our-

apperception, and their objective validity established, Kant intends here merely to show that we have no other basis for the cognition of co-existence than the conception of community. See §§ 1784, 1747. Cf. § 1689.] [*The relation of influence*: See Mahaffy (Fischer, page 123) on Fischer and Schopenhauer, and cf. § 1575.]

§ 1818.—Observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold is arbitrary. (page 157, line 4.)

§ 1819.—Besides the mere fact of existence, there must be something by means of which A determines the position of B in time, and conversely, B the position of A. (page 157, line 15.)

§ 1820.—Substances must stand (mediately or immediately) in dynamical community with each other, if co-existence is to be cognized in any possible experience. (page 157, line 31.)

§ 1821.—Absolutely necessary = without which the experience of these objects would itself be impossible. (page 157, line 40.)

§ 1822.—Community contains the two notions conveyed in the Latin *communio* and *commercium*. (Kant employs it here in the latter sense, that of a dynamical community.) (page 158, line 6.)

§ 1823.—Community of phenomena in apperception (*communio*). (page 158, line 35.) See § 1601. Cf. § 1729.

§ 1824.—Community of substances in perception (*commercium*). (page 159, line 1.) See §§ 1715, 1729.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

selves] the successive existence of ourselves in different states, by means of external intuition; the particular ground of which is this, that all change [although, I suppose, only in order itself to be perceived as change] necessarily presupposes something permanent in the intuition, in order itself only to be perceived as change, though in the internal sense no permanent intuition at all is to be met with. [Meiklejohn translates: "The proper ground of this fact is, that all change to be perceived as change presupposes something permanent in intuition, while in the internal sense no permanent intuition is to be found."] Lastly, the category of community is, in respect of its possibility, not possible to be comprehended by means of mere reason; and therefore the objective reality of this conception without intuition, and this again external in space, is not possible to be seen. For how can we conceive the possibility that if several substances exist, something as effect can follow, from the existence of the one to the existence of the other, reciprocally, and therefore, because there was something in the former, something must also be in the latter, which from the existence of that latter alone can not be understood. For this is required for community, but is not at all comprehensible amongst those things where each thing is entirely isolated by means of its subsistence. Hence the final consequence is, that all principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than principles apriori of the possibility of experience, and all synthetical principles apriori relate to this last alone, nay, their possibility itself rests entirely upon such relationship [§ 1862].

§ 1825.—Unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical. (The rule of the understanding, through which alone the existence of phenomena can receive synthetical unity as regards relations of time, determines for every phenomenon its position in time, and consequently apriori, and with validity for all and every time.) (page 159, line 15.)

§ 1826.—Purpose of the analogies is therefore to represent the unity of nature in the connection of all phenomena. (page 159, line 37.) Cf. §§ 1644, 2055, 2056.

§ 1827.—All phenomena exist in one nature, and must so exist, inasmuch as without this apriori unity, no unity of experience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience, is possible. (page 160, line 9.)

§ 1828.—Mode of proof employed in treating of these transcendental laws of nature. (To demonstrate the possibility of experience as a cognition in which at last all objects must be capable of being presented to us, if the representation of them is to possess any objective reality.) (page 160, line 14.) Cf. §§ 1764, 1744, 2732.

§ 1829.—Always been silently employed by the mind. (page 161, line 1.) [*The other two analogies: causality and community.* Cf. §§ 1764, 1765.]

Article IV.—The postulates of empirical thought. (§§ 1830–1857.)

§ 1830.—Principles of modality.—Postulates (1) of possibility, (2) of reality, (3) of necessity. (page 161, line 14.) Cf. § 1706.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

In the observations which have hitherto been made, the difference between things in themselves, or Noumena [but see § 2920], and things as they appear, or Phenomena, has been especially alluded to [pages 653, 628, 621, above], and it is the great object of the present investigation to distinguish continually these particular and opposite views. In the pure understanding, the divisions or categories have been distinctly marked out and their connexion with human intuitions exemplified, and in some degree explained. But if the inquiry were to rest here, it would appear incomplete. It seems necessary to show how from the very nature of man those errors have arisen which have thus far injured the advance of truth, and converted the science of mind into a play of logical and metaphysical subtlety and error. Now in the present instance, in his journey through the country of the pure understanding, Kant says, he has endeavored to take into his view each portion of the land, carefully, measuring it out, and determining therein to each thing its place specifically [§ 1863]. But then this region, to continue the metaphor, is said to be an island surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, and the very especial seat of false or deceptive appearance, where clouds which assume the form of banks, and masses of ice which speedily melt away, constantly delude and deceive the philosophic sailor seeking to discover new lands, and whereby he is continually led on to entertain hopes never to be realized,—hopes no sooner generated than proved to be fal-

§ 1831.—Categories of modality do not in the least determine the object, or enlarge the conception to which they are annexed as predicates, but only express its relation to the faculty of cognition. (page 161, line 22.) Cf. § 2728.

§ 1832.—Restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone. (page 162, line 6.) Cf. §§ 1622, 1670, 1751, 1755, 1872.

Postulate I.—Of the possibility of things. (§§ 1833–1838 inclusive.)

§ 1833.—Conception which contains a synthesis must be regarded as empty and without reference to an object, if its synthesis does not belong to experience. (page 162, line 17.)

§ 1834.—Apply to possible things, because they contain apriori the form of experience in general. (p. 162, l. 29.) *Reality*: validity.

§ 1835.—Express apriori the relations of perceptions in every experience, and consequently possess objective reality, that is, transcendental truth; and that independent of experience, though not independent of all relation to the form of an experience in general and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects can be empirically cognized. (page 163, line 5.)

§ 1836.—Conceptions the possibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For they are not based upon experience and its known laws. (page 163, line 27.)

§ 1837.—Possibility of things is not derived from apriori conceptions *per se*, but only when considered as formal and objective conditions of an experience in general. (page 164, line 18.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

lacious. But if we take warning by the errors of those who have preceded us, after well examining the chart of the country clearly held in our possession, we shall find we do well to be satisfied with what we have already acquired, without grasping at more; and we shall rather endeavor to understand and explain the principles we feel to be true, than to seek after others which surpass the bounds of human cognition.

We have seen that every thing which the understanding derives from itself, without borrowing it from experience, it still only possesses for the use of experience alone [§ 1864]. The principles of the pure understanding, whether apriori constitutive, as the mathematical, or merely regulative, as the dynamical, contain nothing, as it were, but the pure schema only for possible experience; for such experience has its unity simply from the synthetical unity which the understanding imparts of itself and originally, to the synthesis of the imagination, in reference to the apperception, and to which the phenomena, as data of a possible cognition, must already stand in relation and accordance [§§ 1640, 1626]. But the understanding, it must never be forgotten, can not make of all its principles apriori, or of its conceptions, any other than an empirical, but never a transcendental use [§§ 1866, 1649, 1702, 1862]. The transcendental use of a conception in any principle is this, that it is referred to things as things in general, and * [as things in themselves]; but the empirical

§ 1838.—Possible only in relation to experience and within its limits. (page 165, line 4.)

Postulate II.—Concerning the cognition of the reality of things. (§§ 1839–1850 inclusive.)

§ 1839.—Requires that the object have some connection with a real perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience (§ 1744) which exhibit all kinds of real connection in experience. (page 165, line 13.) Cf. § 1729.

§ 1840.—Perception, which presents matter to the conception—that is the sole criterion of reality. (page 165, line 20.)

§ 1841.—Reason in the series of possible perceptions from a thing which we do really perceive to the thing we do not perceive. (page 165, line 29.)

§ 1842.—Knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be inferred from them according to empirical laws, extend. (page 166, line 7.)

Appendix to Postulate II.—Refutation of Idealism. (§§ 1843–1849.)

§ 1843.—Idealism declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either (1) doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. (page 166, line 18.)

§ 1844.—Idealism of Berkeley. (The foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental æsthetic.) (page 166, line 23.) See § 1510, and § 2700.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

use is when it is merely referred to phenomena, that is to objects of a possible experience. And that * only [the empirical use can be permitted] * is seen from this. To each conception is required, first, the logical form of a conception (of thinking) in general, and then, secondly, also the possibility of offering an object to the conception, to which [object] it refers. Without the object, the conception has no sense, and is quite void of content, although it may still always contain the logical function for forming a conception from certain data. Now the object can not be given to a conception otherwise than in the intuition, and if a pure intuition is even possible apriori before the object, such intuition still can receive its object, consequently objective validity, only by means of the empirical intuition, of which it is the mere form [§ 1866]. Therefore all conceptions and with them all principles, however much they may be possible apriori, still refer to empirical intuitions, that is, to data of possible experience [§ 1867]. Without this, they have no objective validity at all, but are a mere play either of the imagination or the understanding respectively, with their representations. Let us take, for example, only the conceptions of mathematics, and first of all in their [its] pure intuitions, "Space has three dimensions." "Between two points there can be only a [one] straight line," etc. Although all these principles, and the representation of the object with which this Mathematic occupies itself, are entirely generated in the mind apriori, yet they would mean nothing at all, could we not always expose their meaning in phenomena (empirical ob-

§ 1845.—Idealism of DesCartes alleges our incapacity to prove the existence of any thing besides ourselves by means of immediate experience. (page 166, line 32.) Cf. § 2699.

§ 1846.—Proves the existence of external objects in space. (page 167, line 7.) See §§ 1634, 1635. Cf. §§ 1434, 1507, 2156, 2158, 2953, 2785, 2958. [Mahaffy refers to §§ 1870, 2956, 2265, to prove that Kant uses thing in the sense of object. See Mahaffy's Introduction to Fischer, page li., and § 2956, and cf. §§ 1770, 1837.] Cf. also Fischer, page 178. Cf. § 2691.

§ 1847.—External experience is properly immediate. Internal experience is itself possible only mediately and through external experience. (page 167, line 30.) [Read the third and fourth sentences as one—for *although* it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things, our proof shows, etc.]

§ 1848.—Idea of permanence is not itself derived from external experience, but is an apriori necessary condition of all determination of time, consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own existence, and that through the existence of external things. (page 168, line 16.) [All that is given by the relation of the representation in me to the permanent in me is the fact of time. I can, however, no more get cognition out of the fact of the existence of the relation of time than out of the fact of the exist-

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

jects). Consequently it is requisite also to *make sensible* a [any] separate conception, that is to expose the object corresponding to it in the intuition, since without this object, the conception (so to speak) would remain without *sense*, that is, without meaning [§ 1868]. Mathematics fulfill this condition by means of the construction of figure, which is a phenomenon present to the senses (although produced apriori). The conception of quantity seeks even in science its support and sense, in number [§ 1675]—and this on the fingers,—or counters of a calculating table—or in the lines and points which are exposed to our view. The conception always remains generated apriori, together with the synthetical principles or formulæ from such conceptions; but the use of these, and reference to supposed objects, can, finally, never be sought [found] any where but in experience, the possibility of which (according to the form) they contain apriori.

This is the case with the categories and the principles thence deduced, for we can not make the possibility of the object of one of those to be understood, without submitting ourselves to the conditions of sensibility immediately, and consequently to the form of phenomena, in respect of which as to their sole objects, the categories must be limited. If we remove this condition, all meaning or reference to the object disappears [§ 1869].

No one can explain the conception of quantity in general, except in this way, that it is the determination of a thing, whereby it can be thought, how many times the number One can be placed in it [§ 1870]. But this how many

ence of the permanent in me, which is immediately given in consciousness. (See § 1635.) For the purposes of cognition, I require something more, namely, a definite determination of that relation. This is given only by reference to the permanent without me. Whence I find that by assigning my objective representations to the permanent within me as their substance or cause, I uproot my whole internal experience, and am lost in *maya*.]

§ 1849.—*I* has not any predicate of intuition which, in its character of permanence, could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the internal sense (in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition.) (page 168, line 29.)

§ 1850.—Mere products of the imagination. (page 169, line 8.)

Postulate III.—Of material necessity in existence. (§§ 1851–1855.)

§ 1851.—Necessity of existence can never be cognized from conceptions. (page 169, line 23.)

§ 1852.—Criterion of necessity is to be found only in the law of a possible experience. (page 169, line 34.) [*Not the necessity of the existence of things (as substances):* which would be merely duplicating the conception of substance, a category of relation.]

§ 1853.—Possesses no application beyond the field of possible experience. (page 170, line 6.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

times, is founded upon successive repetition, consequently upon time, and the synthesis (of the homogeneous) therein. Reality we can only then explain in opposition to negation, provided we think a time (as the complex of all being) which either is filled therewith, or is void. If I omit permanence (which is an existence in all time), there remains to me of the conception of substance, nothing more than the logical representation of the subject, which I believe [Meiklejohn translates "endeavor," § 1870] to realize from this, that I represent to myself something which can take place merely as subject (without being a predicate²). But, not only, do I not know any conditions at all under which then this logical prerogative is proper to a thing, but there is likewise nothing further thence to be made, and not the least consequence to be drawn, inasmuch as thereby no object at all of the use of this conception is determined, and consequently we do not know whether it means any thing at all. With respect to the conception of cause (if I omit time, in which something follows upon something else according to a rule), I should find nothing further in the pure category than that there is something whence it may be concluded as to the existence of something else; and thereby cause and effect would not only not at all be able to be separated [distinguished] from one another, but since this capability of conclusion still immediately requires conditions of which I know nothing, the conception would then have no determination as to the way it agrees with an object. The pretended principle, "All that is contingent has a cause," presents itself certainly with tolerable gravity, as if it had its own value in itself. But if I ask,

§ 1854.—Subjects the changes which take place in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence, without which nature herself could not possible exist. (page 170, line 11.)

§ 1855.—Admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or be foreign to the understanding and the continuous connection of all phenomena. Necessity in nature is not blind. (page 170, line 18.)

§ 1856.—Whether the sphere of possibility is wider than that of experience. (Whether some other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no power to decide, its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that which is given.) (page 171, line 22.) [Whether that may be possible which can not be real, or that real which can not be necessary. If I think to myself other forms of intuition and understanding, through which other experience becomes possible, I nevertheless, in so thinking, think that other experience as subject to law; and whatever that law be, I think it includes under it no less reality than possibility, no less necessity than reality. (See §§ 2309–2311)]

§ 1857.—*Postulate* the principles of modality, because they do not augment the conception of a thing, but merely indicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition. (page 173, line 1.) [See page 674 above.]

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

what do you understand by contingent? and you answer, that whose non-being is possible, I should like to know by what you would cognize this possibility of non-being, if you do not represent to yourself a succession in the series of phenomena, and in this succession an existence, which follows upon a non-existence (or conversely)—consequently a change. For that the non-being of a thing does not contradict itself, is a poor appeal to a logical condition, which is certainly necessary for the conception, but which is far from being sufficient for the real possibility, as I* may annihilate every existing substance in thought without contradicting myself, but can not at all thence conclude as to the objective contingency of the same in its existence, that is, the possibility of its non-being in itself. As to what regards the conception of community, it is easy to appreciate that as the pure categories of substance as well as causality [abstract from their sensuous schemata] admit of no explanation determining the object, reciprocal causality in the relationship of substances to one another (commmercium) is just as little capable of it. Possibility, Existence, Necessity, no one would be able to explain otherwise than by a manifest tautology, if we would deduce their definition singly from the pure understanding. For the illusion of exchanging the logical possibility of the conception (where it does not contradict itself) for the transcendental possibility of things (where an object corresponds to the conception) can only deceive and satisfy the inexperienced.

In a word, all these conceptions are not to be supported by means of any thing, and thereby their real possibility demonstrated, if all sensible intuition

General remark on the system of principles. (§§ 1858–1862.)

§ 1858.—Can not perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding. (Categories are not in themselves cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions.) (page 174, line 9.)

§ 1859.—No synthetical proposition can be made from categories alone. (page 174, line 30.) [Cf. §§ 1685, 1832.]

§ 1860.—Contingent existence.—“Every thing that is contingent must have a cause,” is an analytical proposition. (p. 175, l. 16.)

§ 1861.—Objective validity of the categories can be grounded only in external intuition. (To understand the possibility of things according to the categories, and thus to demonstrate the objective reality of the latter, we require not merely intuitions, but external intuitions.) (page 176, line 4.) Cf. § 1834. [Cf. §§ 1454, 1868, referred to by Mahaffy (Fischer, page 15, qv).]

§ 1862.—All principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than apriori principles of the possibility of experience, and to experience alone do all apriori synthetical propositions apply and relate. (page 177, line 32.) Cf. § 1938.

Chapter III.—Of the ground of the division of all objects into phenomena and noumena. (§§ 1863–1887 inclusive.)

§ 1863.—Inclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits. (page 178, line 7.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

(the only one which we have) is taken away; and there then only remains besides, the logical possibility—that is, that the conception (thought) is possible, but as to which it is not the question, but [the question is] whether the conception refers to an object, and therefore signifies something [§ 1871].

Now it hence follows incontestably, that the conceptions of the pure understanding can never be of *transcendental*, but at all times only of *empirical* use, and that the principles of the pure understanding [see § 1872] in relation to the general conditions of a possible experience, can be referred only to objects of the senses, but never to things in general (without paying regard to the manner in which we may envisage [intuite] them).

Transcendental Analytic has therefore this important result, that the understanding can never apriori do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience in general; and that, as that which is not phenomenon can be no object of experience, the understanding can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given to us [§ 1873].

The pure categories, without formal conditions of sensibility, have mere transcendental meaning, but are of no transcendental use, since this is impossible in itself, because ALL CONDITIONS OF ANY USE (in judgments) leave them, that is, the formal conditions of the subsumption of a supposed object under

§ 1864.—Every thing which the understanding draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience. (page 178, line 32.) *Constitutive*: see §§ 1752, 1753.

§ 1865.—One advantage in such transcendental inquiries, which can be made comprehensible to the dullest. (page 179, line 11.)

§ 1866.—Understanding can not make of its apriori principles, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use. (page 180, line 1.) Cf. §§ 1832, 1859.

§ 1867.—All conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles, however high the degree of their apriori possibility, relate to empirical intuitions—that is, to data toward a possible experience. (page 180, line 20.)

§ 1868.—Requisite that an abstract conception be made sensuous—that is, that an object corresponding to it in intuition be forthcoming; otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without sense, that is, without meaning. (page 180, line 25.) [*Evident to the senses*: Mahaffy translates “present to the senses (although produced apriori). In the same science the concept of quantity finds support and significance in number; this in turn finds it in the fingers, or in counters, or in lines and points placed before our eyes.” (See Fischer, page 16.)] [*The same science*: cf. Haywood’s translation, page 685 above.]

§ 1869.—Can not render intelligible the possibility of an object corresponding to the categories, without having recourse to the

HAYWOOD’S ANALYSIS.

these conceptions [leave them, or are wanting]. As, therefore [in the supposed case which we are now considering] (as mere pure categories [i. e., without formal conditions of sensibility]) they are not to be of empirical use, and [for precisely the same reason, it has just been stated in the preceding sentence] can not be of transcendental, they are of no use at all, if we separate them from all sensibility, that is, they can not be applied to any supposed object. They are merely the pure form of the use of the understanding in respect of objects in general and of thinking, without, however, our being able by means of these alone to determine or think an object [§ 1875].

The question then now arises, since we see that things are divided into noumena and phenomena, whether, though the pure conceptions of the understanding, or the categories, are of no avail themselves, and signify nothing unless they are connected with objects or phenomena, they might not have some meaning in reference to noumena, and [whether we do not therefore] possess some means of cognizing such [noumena] [§ 1876]. Yet this is easily answered if we pay attention to the distinction of the word noumena, when taken in a positive, and when used in a negative sense. If we understand by noumenon, a thing so far as it is an object of our sensible intuition [*at the same time*] making abstraction of our mode of intuition of the same, this would be the

conditions of sensibility, consequently to the form of phenomena, to which, as their only proper objects, their use must be confined, inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all significance (that is, all relation to an object) disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think under such conceptions. (page 181, line 6.) Cf. § 2913 and § 1687.

§ 1870.—Categories, without the condition of sensuous intuition, have no definite relation to any object. (page 181, line 16.) See §§ 1869, 1871, 2914. [Cf. § 1595 as to substance and subject. After reflection, I have become reconciled to Kant's use of the latter term to assist in explaining the former, and am inclined to think that I was hasty in assuming that such use of the words might lead to confusion. (Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V., page 112, § 40.)]

§ 1871.—Real possibility of the categories can not be demonstrated, if we take away sensuous intuition. (page 182, note.) See § 1870, and cf. § 2914, where Mahaffy translates from the first edition.

§ 1872.—Principles of the pure understanding relate *only* to the general conditions of a possible experience, to objects of the senses, and *never* to things in general, apart from the mode in which we intuit them. (page 183, line 1.) Cf. § 1832.

§ 1873.—Understanding is competent to effect nothing apriori, except the anticipation of the form of a possible experience in

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

negative sense [§ 1878; cf. 1877, and see immediately § 2920 below]. But if we understand by it an object of nonsensible intuition, we thus assume a particular mode of intuition, namely, an intellectual one; and this would be a noumenon in a positive sense, although this intellectual mode of intuition is not our mode, nor is it one the possibility of which we as at present constituted can understand. If we apply categories to objects which are not considered as phenomena, we * must lay at the foundation an intuition, other than a sensible one [§ 1880]. This [supposed object] is, as before stated, noumenon in the positive sense; but such an intuition, namely the intellectual one, lying quite out of our faculty of cognition, the use of the categories can by no means extend beyond the limits of objects of experience; and [nevertheless] if beings of the understanding correspond to beings of the senses, there may be likewise beings of the understanding to which our sensible intuition-faculty has no relation whatever. Our understanding-conceptions as mere forms of thought, do not extend in the least to these; and that therefore which is called by us noumenon, must, as such, only be understood in the negative meaning. But if we continue the investigation a little further, we shall arrive at another point, which is of importance to our present inquiry; for if I take away all thinking (or what occurs through the categories) from an empirical cognition, it is then found that there remains no cognition at all of an object, for by means of mere intuition it has been before declared and explained that nothing at all is thought [see §§ 1527,

general. (Ontology must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding.) (page 183, line 7)

§ 1874.—Beyond the sphere of possible experience, no synthetical apriori principles are possible. (page 183, line 18.)

§ 1875.—Categories are of no use at all when separated from sensibility. (They are not of transcendental use.) (p 183, l. 41.) [Cf. Haywood's translation, page 689 above.]

§ 1876.—Lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion. (Categories *seem* to be capable of an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects.) (page 184, line 14.) Cf. §§ 2915–2920, where Mahaffy translates from the first edition. [*Through them an object*: purely formal. But this formal object has no meaning apart from its possible matter.] Cf. § 1687.

§ 1877.—Led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our sensibility, for a *determinate* conception of an existence which we can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding. (page 184, line 40.)

§ 1878.—Noumena (1) in the negative sense of the word, and (2) in the positive sense. (page 185, line 14.)

§ 1879.—Doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense. (page 185, line 23.) Cf. § 1858.

§ 1880.—Noumenon must be understood by us as such in a nega-

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

1528, 1473, and cf. pages 642, 646, 655, 664, 679, above], and because such representation of the sensibility is in me, this does not constitute any relationship of such a representation to any object. But if, on the contrary, I take away all intuition, the form of thought still remains, that is, the manner of determining an object to the diversity of a possible intuition. Hence the categories extend themselves in this mode much further than the sensible intuition, that is, they think objects in general, but still without looking to the particular mode (the sensibility) whereby they may be given. Yet they do not in this way determine a larger sphere of objects, because we can not admit, that such could be given, without presupposing as possible a kind of intuition other than a sensible one, and yet in respect of which [presupposition] we are not in the least justified [§ 1881]. The conception of a Noumenon, however, or the conception of a thing, which is to be thought, not at all as an object of the senses, but as a thing in itself, by means only of a pure understanding, is not in any degree contradictory, for we can not assert of sensibility that such is the only possible mode of intuition [§ 1882]. Besides this, the conception also is necessary [in order to remind us] not to extend sensible intuition up to things in themselves, and therefore [the conception serves] to limit the objective validity of sensible [sensuous (see the note to § 1885)] cognition [§ 1882]. The conception of a noumenon is, therefore, strictly a limiting conception, circumscribing the pretensions of sensibility, and it is, consequently, only of negative use, in order thereby to

tive sense. (page 185, line 40.) [A noumenon in the positive sense I do not think at all as a noumenon, but only as a chimera. (See Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V., page 111, §36.) Cf. §§ 1915, 2944.]

§ 1881.—Think objects in general, without regard to the mode (of sensibility) in which these objects are given. (page 186, line 16.) [There is no conflict between this section and § 1872. A thing in general is perfectly indeterminate, but an object in general contains the synthetical unity of the understanding.] Cf. § 2920.

§ 1882.—Conception of a noumenon is merely a limitative conception, and therefore only of negative use. (page 186, line 33. [*Connected with the limitation* : for we can not conceive a limit and wholly exclude the conception of the possibility of something beyond. *Not even the conception of a possible intuition* : but only the conception of the possibility of an intuition, or (more rigidly expressed) the knowledge of our complete ignorance of any possible intuition by means of which, etc.]

§ 1883.—Division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into *mundus sensibilis* and *intelligibilis*, is therefore quite inadmissible in a positive sense. . (page 187, line 20.) [I can not conceive a *mundus intelligibilis* (that is, capable of entering as content into the pure forms of my intellect) except as a *mundus sensibilis* (that is, capable of sensuous representation provided my sensibility were so modified as to receive it). Cf. § 2086.]

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

show that cognition through the senses is not to pretend to be the only possible cognition. Still this conception is not arbitrarily imagined, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, yet without being able to place any thing positive beyond its sphere. Now, though the division of objects, phenomena and noumena, into a sense-world and an understanding-world, can not be granted in a positive signification, it is possible to imagine an intellectual and sensible division of conceptions. It is obvious, if we abandon the senses, there is no mode by which we can cause the categories to signify any thing at all, since in order to refer to an object, something beyond the unity of thought must be given, that is to say, an intuition, whereupon the unity or category could be applied [§ 1883]. Notwithstanding this, the conception of a noumenon, however, still remains as fixing the sensibility within certain limits, though it is not an intelligible object to the understanding, and we know nothing of such understanding as that to which it could belong, or an understanding of that kind which cognizes its objects, not discursively or by means of the application of the categories to sensible intuition, but intuitively, in a non-sensible intuition—in respect to the possibility of which we have no idea [or conception § 1884]. Our understanding receives in this way a negative extension, inasmuch as, though limited to a certain degree by the sensibility, it on the other hand also itself limits the same so far as it makes a distinction between noumena and phenomena, and terms things in themselves by the former title, as contra-dis-

§ 1884.—Noumenon is not a particular intelligible object for our understanding (page 187, line 31) [but merely a hypothetical object for a problematical understanding, of the possibility of which understanding we have no conception whatever]. Cf. § 1918.

§ 1885.—Quite departs from the meaning of the ancients. (page 188, line 6.) Cf. § 2080.

§ 1886.—Understanding and sensibility (with us) can determine objects only in conjunction. (page 188, line 30.) Cf. § 1528.

§ 1887.—Abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories, completely renouncing pure and nonsensuous judgment. (page 189, line 8.)

APPENDIX TO DIVISION I.—OF THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OR AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION FROM THE CONFUSION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WITH THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE UNDERSTANDING. (§§ 1888-1921 inclusive.)
[Amphi-ballo: Strike both ways.] See Meiklejohn's erratum, page 518.

§ 1888.—Reflection is that state of mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions. (page 190, line 6.)

§ 1889.—All judgments require reflection, that is, a distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong. (page 190, line 10.)

§ 1890.—Transcendental reflection is the act whereby I compare my representations with the faculty of cognition which originates

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

tinguished from the latter. The expressions in modern writers of *mundus sensibilis*, and *mundus intelligibilis*, present a meaning so different from that in which they are used by the ancient philosophers, that some explanation becomes necessary.* *Mundus sensibilis*, or the world of sense, has been used to mean the complex of phenomena so far as this is envisaged [intuited] or perceived; but so far as the connection according to the general laws of the understanding is thought, it is termed *mundus intelligibilis*, or the world of the understanding.* Visible astronomy, which proposes the mere visual observation of the heavens, would represent the first; and contemplative or scientific astronomy, such as that explained by Copernicus or Newton, would represent the second. But this still would only be a perversion of words in order to avoid troublesome points, wherein each party modifies his meaning so as to meet his own views. The question at last is resolved into this, whether understanding and reason can be used, if the object submitted to them is any thing but phenomenon; for in the sense of noumenon only must it be taken if thought in itself as intelligible, or as given to the understanding alone, and not to the senses [§ 1885]. Hence, if we say that the senses represent to us the objects as they appear, but the understanding as they are, the last expression is not to be taken in a transcendental but in a mere empirical signification, namely, how they, as objects of experience, must be represented in the universal connection of phenomena, and not according to what they may be, independent of the relation to possible

them, and whereby I distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition. (page 190, line 26.)

§ 1891.—Conceptions of comparison. (Identity and difference, etc. §§ 1893–1896.) (page 191, line 1.)

§ 1892.—Transcendental reflection contains the ground of the possibility of objective comparison of representations with each other. (page 191, line 9.)

§ 1893.—Identity and difference. (Difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical difference of objects (of sense).) (page 191, line 38.) Cf. § 1901.

§ 1894.—Agreement and opposition. (Real in a phenomenon may very well be in mutual opposition.) (page 192, line 28.) [The only *realitas noumenon* (that which corresponds to the matter of the phenomenon given in sensation) which the pure understanding represents, is substance. For in thinking to the substance an infinity of possible manifestations, I think nothing more than an infinity of phenomenal changes, and add nothing whatever to the reality of substance. But *realitas phenomenon* is the given manifestation; and being thought as accidental and in process of change, it may well be thought in opposition.]

§ 1895.—Internal and external. (Internal determinations of a *substantia phenomenon* in space are nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere relations.) (page 192,

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

experience and to the senses in general—consequently as objects of the pure understanding [§ 1886]. The conception of mere pure intelligible objects is wholly void of all principle of application, because we can not imagine any thing as to the mode in which these are to be afforded, and the problematical idea [thought, or conception of a noumenon] which we have been referring to, and which as noumenon yet leaves a place open to them, serves simply as a void space for circumscribing empirical principles, without however containing in itself or showing any other object of cognition out of the sphere of such principles [§ 1887].

The Amphiboly of the conceptions of Reflection which [amphiboly originates in such deceptive misapprehension and want of care as permit or] occasion the exchange of the empirical use of the understanding for the transcendental, comes now to be considered, and this is added by Kant in the way of an appendix, to the preceding explanation of phenomena and noumena. In order however, to make this clear, a definition and an explanation of what reflection is, necessarily precedes, and this is given in the following manner. Reflection, without which no judgment is possible, is that state of mind in which we set ourselves, in order to discover the subjective conditions under which we may attain to conceptions [§ 1888]. It has nothing to do with the objects themselves for the purpose of obtaining conceptions of them. It is the consciousness of

line 41.) On phenomenal substance, see § 2199. On substance and subject, see § 1595 and references. On monads, see § 1903. [I presume that I understand by *matter* that *complex of mere relations* which Kant terms *substantia phenomenon*. But I do not use the words matter and substance as convertible. By the former, I do not indicate any thing more than the determinable in sensation. By the latter, I cogitate that in the matter which is permanent and I suppose it the same in the phenomenon and in the noumenon. (Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V, page 111.) But whether substance has internal determinations in any intellectual sense, is a question with which I do not find it necessary to concern myself at all. That it *is*, and that it manifests forces and modes of existence, is all that I think. Cf. §§ 1886, 1767, 1880.] Cf. § 1915.

§ 1896.—Matter and form. (Form of intuition (as a subjective property of sensibility) must antecede all matter (sensations).) (p. 193, l. 22.) § 1224. [J. Sp. Ph., Vol. VIII., p. 341, § 87, note.]

Remark on the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection. (§§ 1897–1921 inclusive.)

§ 1897.—Transcendental topic: the appointment of the position which must be taken by each conception according to the difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place to all conceptions according to rules. (page 194, line 31.)

§ 1898.—Contains nothing more than the above mentioned four titles (§§ 1893–1896) of all comparison and distinction. (p. 195, l. 1.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

the relationship of given representations to our different sources of cognition, by which consciousness alone their relationship with one another can be correctly determined. The first question before any further treating of our representations is this, to what faculty of cognition do they together belong? Is it the understanding or the senses by [in] which they are connected or compared? All judgments, that is, all comparisons, require the reflection we are now speaking of, which is a distinguishing of that cognition-faculty—that is, the understanding or the senses—to which the given conceptions belong [§ 1889]; and it is the action whereby I connect the comparison of representations in general with the faculty of cognition, wherein it is effected, and whereby I distinguish whether those representations are compared with one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to the sensible intuition [§ 1890]. It is termed transcendental reflection, the ideas [conceptions] being reflective. Besides this, there is another kind of reflection, which is the logical reflection, but [if we wish to establish an apriori judgment upon things (§ 1892; cf. § 1899)] this is only possible by means of that which is transcendental. Through the logical we only seek to know whether certain objects [representations] are identical or different, to collect those which may produce a general idea [judgment (§ 1891)]; and as objects may be in respect of the understanding identical, and not so with regard to the sensibility [§§ 1892, 1893], it is necessary [if we

§ 1899.—Previous transcendental reflection is necessary if we wish to employ conceptions in respect of objects. (p. 195, l. 20.)

§ 1900.—Leibnitz, deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, constructed an intellectual system of the world. (page 195, line 31.) [*Noogony*: genesis of understanding.]

§ 1901.—Leibnitz's application of the principle of indiscernibles (which is valid solely of conceptions of things in general) to objects of sense (*mundus phenomenon*). (page 196, line 29.) Cf. § 1893.

§ 1902.—Leibnitz employed the principle "Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically contradict each other," for the establishment of new propositions. (page 197, line 16.) Cf. §§ 1080–1083 and 1894.

§ 1903.—Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding. (page 198, line 8.) § 1895.

§ 1904.—Leibnitz's view of the possible community of substances could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony, and by no means as a physical influence. (page 198, line 25.)

§ 1905.—Leibnitz's celebrated doctrine of space and time as the intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and their states) in themselves. (page 198, line 40.) Cf. § 1514.

§ 1906.—Could not apply to phenomena. (page 199, line 22.)

§ 1907.—Matter is not an object for the pure understanding. (page 199, line 32.) Cf. § 1896.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

wish to employ conceptions in respect of objects (§ 1899)] before all logical reflection, to be certain whether the two ideas [conceptions] to be compared belong to the same faculty, or whether one of them does not belong to the understanding, and the other the sensibility, and in this way it is clear that it is the transcendental reflection which establishes the seat of the idea [conception]. If attention is not paid to this distinction, noumena and phenomena are confounded together, and hence arises the amphiboly of reflection, or the subject now under consideration. In this way the reflexive ideas [conceptions] have been placed [I do not know by whom (cf. § 1911)] erroneously amongst the categories, the first only serving to indicate the relationship of the given ideas [representations (§ 1898)], whose origin is known, whilst the last are, as has already been shown, used for the synthesis of objects [see §§ 1636–1641, and § 1647].

The relationships in which conceptions to be compared can stand to one another, are [indicated by] the reflexive ideas [conceptions] of Identity and Difference, Accordance and Opposition, Internal and External, and the Determinable and the Determination (Matter and Form) (§ 1899). The right determination of this relationship rests upon this, as to [quoad] what cognition-faculty these conceptions subjectively belong to each other—whether to [in]

§ 1908.—Penetrate into the interior of nature by observation and analysis of phenomena. (page 200, line 7.)

§ 1909.—Nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared with each other in the understanding alone. (page 200, line 34.)

§ 1910.—Must therefore make abstraction of all objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them under conditions of sensuous intuition. (page 201, line 3.) Cf. § 1882.

§ 1911.—Origin of these * false principles of Leibnitz. (page 201, line 34.) *§§ 1900–1905.

§ 1912.—Dictum de omni et nullo. (Absurd so to alter this.) (page 202, line 4.)

§ 1913.—Abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition. (page 202, line 17.) Cf. §§ 1901, 1902.

§ 1914.—Can not say: *Because* a thing can not be represented by mere conceptions without something absolutely internal, there is also in the things themselves (which are contained under these conceptions) and in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation. (page 203, line 6.)

§ 1915.—What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations. (page 204, line 13.) [*Does away with the possibility*: a noumenon can not possibly be or become object for me, except through its external relations, in its phase of phenomenon.]

§ 1916.—Conception of a noumenon is problematical, that is to

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

the sensibility or the understanding. The difference between these two last makes the difference as to the manner in which the conceptions are to be thought. With respect to identity and difference, accordance and opposition, internal and external, matter and form, Kant says, first as to

Identity and Difference [§ 1893]—"If an object is presented to us several times, but every time with the self-same internal determinations, (*qualitas et quantitas*) it is the same thing if it is valid as an object of the pure understanding, it is ever the very same—and not several—but only one thing, (*numérica identitas*); but if it is phenomenon, the point is not at all then as to the comparison of conceptions, and however identical all may be in respect to the same, still the difference of the places of this phenomenon at the like time is a sufficient ground for the *numerical* difference of the object itself (of the senses). Thus in two drops of water we can entirely make abstraction of all internal difference (of quality and quantity), and it is enough that they can be perceived in different places contemporaneously, in order to hold them as numerically different. Leibnitz took phenomena for things in themselves, consequently for intelligibilia, that is, objects of the pure understanding (although on account of the confusion of their representations he gave them the name of phenomena), and then his principle of the *indistinguishable* (*principium identitatis indis-*

say, it is the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible nor that it is impossible. (page 205, line 3.)

§ 1917.—Categories are not of themselves sufficient for the cognition of things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding. (page 205, line 28.)

§ 1918.—Conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object. (page 206, line 4.) Cf. § 1884.

§ 1919.—Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time enlarging its own field. (page 206, line 17.) [The word *noumenon* means object of the understanding.]

§ 1920.—Critique of the pure understanding does *not* permit us to stray into intelligible worlds. (page 206, line 38.)

§ 1921.—Transcendental employment of the understanding is contrary to its proper purpose and destination. (page 207, line 1.)

SUPPLEMENT TO DIVISION I.—THE CONCEPTION OF NOTHING.
(§§ 1922-1924 inclusive.)

§ 1922.—Conception of an object in general, problematically understood, and without its being decided whether it is something or nothing. (page 207, line 20.)

§ 1923.—Distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories. (page 207, line 28.)

§ 1924.—Division of the conception of nothing. (p. 208, l. 15.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

cernibilium) certainly could not be contested: but as they are objects of sensibility, and the understanding in respect thereof is not of pure but of simply empirical use, plurality and numerical difference is thus already given through space itself, as the condition of the external phenomena. For a part of space, although indeed it may be entirely similar and equal to another, is still out of it, and precisely, thereby, a part different from the first, which is added to it, in order to make up a greater space—and thence this must hold true of all which is at the same time in the various places of space, however else such thing be similar and equal to itself.

2. *Accordance and Opposition* [§ 1894]—"If reality is only represented to us by means of the pure understanding (*realitas noumenon*), no contradiction can be thought between the realities, that is, such a relationship as that these conjoined in a subject destroy mutually one another, and $3-3$ is $=0$. On the other hand, the real in the phenomenon (*realitas phenomenon*) may certainly be in opposition with one another; and [in that case, if such opposed realities are] united in the same subject, one annihilates the consequence of the other wholly, or in part, as two moving forces in the same straight line, so far as they draw or force a line [or point] in an opposite direction—or also [exemp. grat.] pleasure which holds the balance with pain.

3. *The Internal and External* [§ 1895]—"In an object of the pure under-

Division II.—Transcendental Dialectic. (§§ 1925–2444 inclusive.)

INTRODUCTION. (§§ 1925–1951 inclusive.)

TITLE I.—OF TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSORY APPEARANCE. (§§ 1925–1933.)

§ 1925.—Dialectic does not signify a doctrine of probability. (page 209, line 7.) Cf. §§ 1545, 1003 and see § 1150.

§ 1926.—Illusory appearance does not reside in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment upon the object, insofar as it is thought. (page 209, line 12.)

§ 1927.—Neither the understanding *per se* (without the influence of another cause), nor the senses *per se*, would fall into error. (page 209, line 21.) Cf. § 1085.

§ 1928.—Error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. (page 209, line 32.)

§ 1929.—Leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, completely beyond the empirical employment of the categories. (page 210, line 16.)

§ 1930.—Transcendent principles are those which transgress the limits of possible experience. (page 210, line 27.)

§ 1931.—Principles of the pure understanding (which are limited in their employment to the sphere of experience) may be called immanent [i. e. remaining in]. (page 211, line 2.) Transcendental and transcendent are not identical terms.

§ 1932.—Transcendental illusion does not cease to exist, even after it has been exposed. (page 211, line 13.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

standing, that only is internal, which has no relation at all (according to existence) to any thing different from it[*self*]. On the other hand the internal determinations of a *substantia phaenomenon* in space are only relationships, and it itself (*substantia phaenomenon*) wholly a complex of pure relations. Substance in space we only know by means of forces, which are real in this space, either to urge others on therein (attraction), or to restrain from forcing into it, (repulsion and impenetrability). Other properties we do not know, which constitute the conception of substance that appears in space, and which we name matter. Every substance, on the other hand, as object of the pure understanding must have internal determinations and forces, which refer to internal reality. But what kind of internal accidents can I think to myself, except those which my internal sense offers to me? namely, that which either itself is a *thinking*, or is analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, from all substances, as he represented them to himself as noumena, even from the component parts of matter, after he had taken away in idea [in conception] all that might signify external relation, consequently *composition* also, produced simple subjects invested with powers of representation—in a word, *Monads*.

4. *Matter and Form* [§ 1896]—“These are two conceptions which are laid at the foundation of all other reflection, so very inseparably are they joined with every use of the understanding. The first signifies the determinable in

§ 1933.—Rests upon subjective principles, and imposes these upon us as objective. (page 211, line 35.)

TITLE II.—OF PURE REASON AS THE SEAT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSORY APPEARANCE. (§§ 1934-1951 inclusive.)

Article A.—Of reason in general. (§§ 1934-1942 inclusive.)

§ 1934.—Reason divided into a logical and a transcendental faculty. (page 212, line 17.)

§ 1935.—Reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles. (page 213, line 1.)

§ 1936.—Principle is an ambiguous term. Every general proposition is not a principle. (page 213, line 4.) Cf §§ 1244, 1284, 147.

§ 1937.—Cognition from principles is that cognition in which I cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions. (page 213, line 17.)

§ 1938.—Apriori principles of the pure understanding are not cognitions from conceptions. (page 213, line 27.) Cf. §§ 1702, 1711, 1858, 1862.

§ 1939.—Principles are synthetical cognitions from conceptions, and can not be supplied by the understanding. (page 213, line 37.)

1940.—Secret of simplifying legislation. (page 213, line 41.) Cf. §§ 1959, 2065, 342.

§ 1941.—Cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means of the understanding. (page 214, line 9.)

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

general; the second, the determination of it: (both in a transcendental sense, as we make abstraction of the difference of that which is given, and of the manner in which it is determined). Logicians formerly called the universal, matter, but the specific difference, form. In each judgment we may name the given conceptions, logical matter (for judgment); their relationship, (by means of the copula), the form of the judgment. In every being, the constituent parts (essentialia) of it are matter; the mode in which they are connected in a thing, the essential form. In respect of things in general, unlimited reality was also regarded as the matter of all possibility, but the limitation thereof (negation) as that form, whereby a thing distinguished itself, from another, according to transcendental conceptions. The understanding requires, first, namely, that something is given (at least in the conception) in order to be able to determine it in a certain manner. Consequently matter precedes form in the conception of the pure understanding; and Leibnitz first assumes on this account things (monads), and internally a representation-force [an internal power of representation] belonging to them, in order afterward to found thereupon their external relationship, and the community of their states, (that is, of the representations). Hence, space and time were possible, as causes and consequences, the first [space] only by means of the relationship of substances, the latter [time] through the connection of their determinations with one another. And so in fact would it likewise necessarily be, if the pure under-

§ 1942.—Reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. (page 214, line 20.)

Article B.—Of the logical use of reason. (§§ 1943–1945 inclusive.)

§ 1943.—Conclusion of reason can be deduced only by means of a mediating judgment. (Conclusion of the understanding is immediate.) (page 214, line 35.) See §§ 1262, 1282.

§ 1944.—Relations which the major proposition, as the rule, represents between a cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms: (1) categorical; (2) hypothetical; (3) disjunctive. (page 215, line 24.) Cf. §§ 1290, 1293.

§ 1945.—Reason endeavors to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity. (page 216, line 1.)

Article C.—Of the pure use of reason. (§§ 1946–1951 inclusive.)

§ 1946.—Does pure reason contain apriori synthetical principles and rules? (page 216, line 15.)

§ 1947.—Unity of reason is not the unity of a possible experience. (page 217, line 3.)

§ 1948.—Reason, in its logical use, endeavors to find for the conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former is completed. (page 217, line 23.) Cf. § 1959 *sub fin.*

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

standing could be referred immediately to objects, and if space and time were determinations of things in themselves. But if they are only sensible intuitions in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, then the form of the intuition (as a subjective quality of the sensibility) precedes all matter, the sensations, consequently space and time precede all phenomena and all data of experience—or rather make experience first of all possible. The intellectual philosopher could not permit that the form would precede the things themselves, and determine their possibility; a censure entirely correct, if he admitted that we see things as they are (although in confused representation). But as the sensible intuition is wholly a particular subjective condition, which lies at the foundation, apriori, of all perception, and the form of which is original, the form thus of itself alone is given; and so far from its being the case, that matter (or the things themselves which appear) is to lie at the foundation (as one must judge according to mere conceptions), its own possibility presupposes rather a formal intuition (time and space) as given."

Here it will be seen that besides explaining these ideas [conceptions], the author has also another object in view, which was to refute the theory of Leibnitz, on the same questions, and in furtherance of this he adds, what he terms a scholium [§ 1897 et seqq.] to the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, wherein he further exposes his own view of the subject. In this scholium, the place or situation which is assigned to a conception whether in the sensibility or

§ 1949.—Principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical. (page 217, line 34.)

§ 1950.—Principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to phenomena. (page 217, line 41.) *Cognition*: Mahaffy says *condition*. Cf. in Fischer, page lxi.

§ 1951.—Duty in the transcendental dialectic. To discover whether the principle, that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the unconditioned, is objectively true, or not; what consequences result therefrom affecting the empirical use of the understanding, or rather whether there exists any such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not, on the contrary, a merely logical precept, which directs us TO ASCEND PERPETUALLY to still higher conditions, to APPROACH completeness in the series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of reason. (page 218, line 15.) [§ 740.]

BOOK I.—OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON. (§§ 1952-1992.)

§ 1952.—Conceptions of pure reason are not obtained by reflection, but by inference or conclusion. (page 219, line 4.)

§ 1953.—Aim of rational conceptions is the COMPREHENSION, as that of the conceptions of understanding is the UNDERSTANDING of perceptions. (page 219, line 19.)

§ 1954.—Conceptions of pure reason are called transcendental ideas. (page 220, line 3.) See § 1975.

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

understanding, is characterized as the transcendental place, and the indication, for determining this place, for all conceptions, according to rules, would be termed transcendental topic, or a system which would guarantee us completely from the subreptions of the pure understanding, and the delusions thence arising, inasmuch as it at all times distinguishes to what faculty of cognition the conceptions strictly belong.

To close finally the system of Transcendental Analytic, the table of the division of the conception of *Nothing* is introduced as opposed to *Something* [§§ 1922-1924], and as the categories are the only conceptions which refer to objects in general, the distinction of an object whether it is *something* or *nothing* proceeds according to the order and directions of the categories.†

[Haywood prints, at the foot of the page, the following note:] † Kant proved himself the umpire between Sensuality and Intellect. Until his time, ever since that of Des Cartes, it had been a subject of bitter dispute, whether philosophical knowledge or conceptions were, as according to the Sensualists, derived from experience, or, as according to the Intellectualists, from pure reason. Kant demonstrated that all phenomenal knowledge must arise from the co-operation of the outward and the inward. An intellect that loses sight of experience, has no object on which to act. The objects which experience pre-

Chapter I.—Of Ideas in general. (§§ 1955-1963 inclusive.)

§ 1955.—Better to adhere to and confirm its proper meaning. (page 220, line 10.)

§ 1956.—Ought not to employ the expression improvidently. (page 220, line 26.)

§ 1957.—Plato employed the expression IDEA in a way that plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself). (page 220, line 39.)

§ 1958.—Plato found his ideas especially in all that is practical (that is, which rests upon freedom). (page 221, line 21.)

§ 1959.—Platonic Republic. Neglect of true ideas in legislation. Although a perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just which holds up this *maximum* as the archetype or standard of a constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. (page 222, line 22.)

§ 1960.—Plato's mental power exhibited in the ascent from the ectypal * mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonic† connection thereof according to ends, that is, ideas. (page 223, line 22.) [*Taken from the original.—*Webster*.] [† "That has power or skill to build," Webster says, and refers to Smellie.—Designed by an architect (the Author of reason). Cf. § 2616.]

§ 1961.—Plato has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

sents to us, can not truly be said to exist until intellect, with its arranging and combining power, commences its operation upon them.—*See Foreign Quarterly Review*, 98. [End of Haywood's note.]

NOTHING as

1. Void conception without object:—Ens rationis.
2. Void object of a conception:—Nihil privativum.
3. Void intuition without object:—Ens imaginarium.
4. Void object without conception:—Nihil negativum.

Here terminates one of the most important divisions of the critical philosophy. The first part of the work, as we have seen, is termed transcendental elemental doctrine, and is composed of the two great divisions of transcendental Æsthetic and transcendental Logic. The first of these, or transcendental Æsthetic, is only concerned with the explanation of space and time; the second, or transcendental Logic, enters into the subject generally, [first defining logic], whether general or transcendental; and [sub-dividing]* each of these divisions, [general logic into]* analytic and dialectic [and transcendental logic into]* transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic, [and then, under the first of these latter divisions, Transcendental Analytic], the whole faculty of the understanding becomes dissected and explained with reference to the

merit as regards the principles of ethics, of legislation, and of religion. (page 224, line 2.)

§ 1962.—Confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of moral science. (page 224, line 13.)

§ 1963.—Idea (or conception of reason) is a conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience. (p. 224, l. 24.) [As to perception, cf. §§ 2949, 2957, 1754, 1729.] Cf. § 1113. [INTUITION, I.—objective phase: the manifold content of an objective perception. It has an immediate relation to the object, and is singular and individual. II.—subjective phase: the act of intuiting or immediately beholding (receiving into the sensibility) the sensuous content of objective perception. III.—faculty: reason in the act of intuition.] [CONTEMPLATION II.—subjective phase: prolonged intuition. Intuition refers more immediately to the matter acted upon, while contemplation relates rather to the state of mind. *Ex. gr.*, “You can not learn by introspection; you must contemplate external nature.” Cf. §§ 1639, 1473.]

Chapter II.—Of Transcendental Ideas. (§§ 1964–1984 inclusive.)

§ 1964.—Form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

categories, their schematism, and to judgments. The synthetical principles also of the pure understanding, when more fully explained, are shown to be axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, and analogies of experience, whether regarded as principles of the permanence of substance, of succession, or of co-existence, and postulates of empirical thinking in general.

To this development of the qualities of the intelligence, another division [chapter] has been added, showing the grounds of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena—and lastly, an explanation is subjoined of the amphiboly that arises from exchanging the empirical use of the understanding for the transcendental [or better, according to Meiklejohn's erratum, from the confusion of the transcendental with the empirical use]. This leads naturally to the second great division of [transcendental] logic, or that which is to be treated of in a succeeding part, under the title of Transcendental Dialectic.

Before entering however upon this new subject, it may not be useless to recapitulate succinctly those principles which we have had under consideration and the connection existing between them; and if any thing further should be required for the more complete understanding of the doctrines of the critical philosophy than is to be found in the “Critique,” reference must be made to the “Prolegomena,” where the writer's views are still more [analytically] developed, and to the “Logic” where questions appertaining to this subject [logic] particularly are explained at length, and where they are perhaps more systematically handled than in the work now under analysis. In the particular work before

the origin of particular apriori conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason, or transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of experience according to principles. (page 225, line 16.)

§ 1965.—Function of reason in arguments consists in the universality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgment which is determined apriori in the whole extent of its condition. (page 225, line 31.)

§ 1966.—Transcendental conception of reason is nothing else than the conception of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. (page 226, line 10.)

§ 1967.—Pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the conception of the unconditioned, insofar as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned. (page 226, line 14.)

§ 1968.—Number of pure rational conceptions corresponds to the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by means of the categories. (page 226, line 20.) Cf. § 2999.

§ 1969.—Exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned: (1) to the subject* which can not be employed as a predicate;

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

us, however, most of the questions as to the logical use of the understanding in general are discussed at considerable length; and the application of those laws which regulate that operation of mind which is denominated thinking, is most especially considered.

This operation is shown to be an act wherein we represent objects to ourselves, by adding certain designations to them. The representation is termed a conception, whilst the designations are predicates of the object itself. Logic as a science is found to be universal and particular, and the first is divided into pure and applied. In pure we abstract [from] all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is exercised. The science is called applied when it is directed toward the rules of the understanding-use, under those subjective empirical conditions which Psychology teaches. Universal logic contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking; whilst particular logic contains the rules of thinking correctly on a certain sort of objects. Applied logic* treats of attention, of whatever hinders or promotes it, of the origin of error, illusion, prejudices, etc. Pure logic is divided into the doctrines of the understanding, of judgment and of reason, or the doctrines of conceptions, judgments and syllogisms. The understanding possesses conceptions as so many rules for the thinking of objects; but it is not the design of the science under consideration, to inquire after the origin of these. Judgment is the placing of objects under these rules. A syllogism is the deduction of one judgment from another. If we separate the designations, (by the addition of which we represent an object to ourselves,) in the object, that which we retain in thought, divested of its designations, is the

(2) to the presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself; (3) to an aggregate of the members of the complete division of a conception. (page 226, line 27.) *§§ 1595, 1870.

§ 1970.—Pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human reason. (page 226, line 32.)

§ 1971.—Absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity. Absolutely possible signifies that which is possible in all relations and in every respect. (page 227, line 1.)

§ 1972.—Reason restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the conceptions of the understanding, and aims at carrying out the synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the unconditioned. (page 228, line 12.)

§ 1973.—Objective employment of the pure conceptions of reason is always transcendent. (page 228, line 25.)

§ 1974.—Idea is a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense. (page 228, line 38.)

§ 1975.—Pure conceptions of reason are transcendental ideas. (page 228, line 40.)

§ 1976.—Practical idea is always in the highest degree fruitful,

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

analytical unity of consciousness, and it forms the basis of all conceptions or of all thinking. [See pages 596, 599, 603, and 322, above.]

In all judgments, conjunction and agnition are to be distinguished from one another; the first consists in the transition of consciousness from one conception to the other, so that both come to one consciousness, but agnition consists in the placing of an object under a precise conception. The original use of the understanding, (it can not be too often repeated,) consists of the categories, and their exhibition as postulates is that same original use, and this is seen to consist every where in original composition or synthesis, and in original agnition or schematism. Transcendental philosophy is the science of the original use of the understanding in the categories. Critical idealism consists in the position that the understanding conjoins originally in the categories; and that the use of the categories as predicates of objects, (that is to say, the conjunction we place in things), entirely rests on the original intellectual conjunction. Synthetic unity and analytical unity seem in the first instance embarrassing, because they appear to run into one another, but duly considered, a marked distinction is shown to exist between them, though from the corresponding nature of their functions to separate faculties of the mind, they are frequently confounded. In an analytical judgment those designations are added to a thing, which are already thought in the conception of this thing, and whereby the analytical unity of this conception is first fixed. Now it has been shown that this analytical unity is the basis of all conceptions, or of all thinking, and the analytical unity of consciousness is the simple point we retain in thought in reference to an object, when we have separated the designations by whose addition we rep-

and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary. (page 229, line 9.) [*Subject*: § 1595.]

§ 1977.—Pure reason possesses even causality, and the power of producing that which its conception contains. Hence we can not say of wisdom, in a disparaging way, “*it is only an idea.*” (page 229, line 33.)

§ 1978.—Canon for the extended and self-consistent exercise of the understanding. Transition from our conceptions of nature and the *non-ego* to the practical conceptions. (page 229, line 41.)

§ 1979.—Source of conceptions which enable us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically apriori in relation to one or other of the functions of reason. (page 230, line 15.) See § 1881. Cf. §§ 1993, 1995.

§ 1980.—Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate judgment—by means of the subsumption of the condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment. (page 230, line 26.) Cf. §§ 1943, 1284.

§ 1981.—Reason attains to a cognition by means of acts of the understanding which constitute a series of conditions. (p. 230, l. 39.)

§ 1982.—Conducts us to the *ratiocinatio polysyllogistica*, which is

HAYWOOD'S ANALYSIS.

resent any object to ourselves. Synthetic unity conjoins the different representations in every intuition; and as it refers to the understanding, it may, so far only as it merely renders possible the various ways of uniting the given diverse or multiplex through intuition, be termed the pure conception of the understanding. The supreme unity thereof is that whereby every compounded cognition is thought as something, or as an object; and we have seen that the number of these pure synthetic unities or categories is twelve. The synthetic unity is opposed to the analytic. With the further development of these principles, but preceded by a full explanation of the doctrines of time and space which form the basis of the Kantian philosophy, and wherein it is assumed that these qualities are only forms of thought and not any thing in themselves, the first great division of the subject is concluded, and the attention is afterward directed to the application and proof of the positions, rather than to any further elucidation of the nature and quality of the human mind.

[As Mr. Haywood's Analysis stands in no relation to my index, and is entirely outside of my purpose, I shall print no more of it here. I hope that I have presented indubitable evidence of the fidelity and excellency of Haywood's work. I do not mean to say that it is as good as Meikejohn's translation, which the student ought by all means to keep open before him and consult at every point. I do not suppose that the Kantian philosophy can be learned from any analysis, synopsis, epitome, introduction, or brief exposition or commentary, or by any other process whatever than that intimated by Kant himself (in § 2641, Prof. Mahaffy's translation), namely, THINKING, thinking THROUGH, thinking through THE CRITIQUE.]

a series of syllogisms that can be continued either on the side of the conditions (*per prosyllogismos*) or of the conditioned (*per episyllogismos*) to an indefinite extent. (page 231, line 10.)

§ 1983.—Reason can attain to this cognition only under the presupposition that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses). (page 231, line 17.)

§ 1984.—Series of premisses may have a first or highest condition, or it may not possess this, and so be *a parte priori* unlimited; but it must nevertheless contain totality of conditions, and the whole series must be unconditionally true. (page 232, line 2.)

Chapter III.—System of Transcendental Ideas. (§§ 1985-1992 inclusive.)

§ 1985.—Form of the transcendental ideas. (page 232, line 17.) Cf. §§ 1944, 1969, 1948, and Fischer, page 157. [The student must be on his guard in reading Fischer, or he may get the *thing per se* confused with the idea of the unconditioned. Mahaffy's caution (for example, see in Fischer, pages 159, 189, 196, 34) should be noted and imitated. See § 1991.]

§ 1986.—Content of the transcendental ideas: (1) the relation of the representation to the subject; (2) the relation to the manifold of the object as a phenomenon; (3) the relation to all things in general. (page 232, line 34.) Cf. § 2989.

§ 1987.—All transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the *first* of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) *unity of the thinking subject*, the *second* the absolute *unity of the series of the conditions* of a phenomenon, the *third* the absolute *unity of the condition of all objects of thought* in general. (page 233, line 4.)

§ 1988.—Pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul (*psychologia rationalis*), of a transcendental science of the world (*cosmologia rationalis*), and finally of a transcendental doctrine of God (*theologia transcendentalis*). (page 233, line 13.)

§ 1989.—Reason's logical procedure necessarily produces the transcendental ideas. They follow the guiding thread of the categories. (page 233, line 28.)

§ 1990.—Objective deduction of the transcendental ideas is impossible. (page 234, line 1.) See § 1614. Cf. § 1579.

§ 1991.—Transcendental ideas are available only for *ascending* in the series of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, *that is*, PRINCIPLES. (page 234, line 8.)

§ 1992.—Reason, by means of the transcendental ideas, collects all its cognitions into one system. From the cognition of self to

the cognition of the world, and through these to the SUPREME BEING, the progression is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from the premisses to the conclusion. (The science of metaphysics has for the proper object of its inquiries only three grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY.) (page 234, line 33.)

BOOK II.—OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON. (§§ 1993-2371 inclusive.)

§ 1993.—Conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. (page 235, line 18.)

§ 1994.—Subjective reality of the transcendental ideas. (page 236, line 3.)

§ 1995.—Conclude from something that we do know to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we nevertheless, by an unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. (page 236, line 5.)

§ 1996.—Dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corresponding to the number of the ideas which their conclusions present: (1) transcendental paralogism; (2) antinomy of pure reason; (3) ideal of pure reason. (page 236, line 20.) See §§ 1968-1970.

Chapter I.—Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. (§§ 1997-2035 inclusive.)

§ 1997.—Transcendental paralogism concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. (page 237, line 7.) Cf. § 2991.

§ 1998.—“I THINK” is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also. Cf. §§ 1599-1601 and § 1634. (page 237, line 14.) [Cf. Fischer, page 178. Mahaffy says that Meiklejohn mistranslates, but I do not see that any particular harm is done.]

§ 1999.—“*I*,” as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology. (page 237, line 25.)

§ 2000.—Smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain) that should be included in the general representation of self-consciousness, would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology. (page 237, line 36.) Cf. carefully § 1537, and Fischer, page 32 (where Mahaffy refers to §§ 2000, 1537).

§ 2001.—“I THINK” is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from which it must develop its whole system. (p. 238, l. 27.)

§ 2002.—Topic of the rational doctrine of the soul: (1) The soul is SUBSTANCE; (2) as regards its quality, it is SIMPLE; (3) as regards the different times in which it exists, it is numerically identical, that is UNITY, not plurality; (4) it is in relation to *possible* objects in space. (page 238, line 33.) Cf. § 2021.

§ 2003.—Originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone. (page 239, line 11.)

§ 2004.—Foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation *I*, which can not even be called a conception. (page 239, line 23.) Cf. § 1998.

§ 2005.—Necessarily attribute to things apriori all the properties which constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. (page 240, line 10.)

§ 2006.—Never be available for discovering those properties which do not belong to possible experience. (page 240, line 32.) Cf. § 2967.

§ 2007.—Conclusions are drawn from the proposition "*I think*," only by a transcendental employment of the understanding. (page 241, line 3.) Cf. §§ 2921–3000, where Mahaffy translates from the first edition.

§ 2008.—Cognize myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought. (page 241, line 14.) Cf. § 2032. § 2934.

§ 2009.—All the modi of self-consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (conceptions of the understanding—categories); they are mere logical functions, which do not present to thought an object to be cognized. (page 241, line 22.) Cf. § 2025.

§ 2010.—Not signify that *I*, as an object, am for myself a self-subsistent being, or substance. (page 241, line 32.) Cf. § 1635.

§ 2011.—Not tantamount to declaring that the thinking ego is a simple substance. (page 242, line 1.) [That the *ego* of apperception is singular and can not be otherwise cogitated, is true; but when I think to the ego simplicity, I construct a synthesis just as much as when I think to it substance. I can construct just as many such syntheses as I please, but I find no knowledge in the thought. My own determination of my ego in my internal sense gives reality, but by no means simplicity. I believe that the latter thought belongs solely to the sphere of reason, growing out of the tendency of that faculty to complete the series of the conditioned. Whether the thought contains transcendental truth, is a question which I do not propose to myself at all, since no solution is possible. Cf. §§ 2083, 2022.] Kant's use of the singular to assist in explaining the simple is a logical explication parallel to the explication of substance by subject. See § 1870. [Cf. § 2532.]

§ 2012.—Can not therefore enounce the identity of the PERSON. (page 242, line 19.)

§ 2013.—Whether this consciousness of myself is possible with-

out things external to me, can not be known or inferred from this proposition. (page 242, line 31.) Cf. § 1846.

§ 2014.—Logical exposition of thought in general, is mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object. (p. 242, l. 40.)

§ 2015.—Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there existed a possibility of proving apriori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances. (page 243, line 4.)

§ 2016.—Lurks in the procedure of rational psychology a paralogism. The conclusion is arrived at by a *sophisma figuræ dictionis*. (page 243, line 31.) Cf. § 2991.

§ 2017.—Conception of the simple nature of substance, which is connected with the objective reality of this conception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be in fact nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought; whilst we remain perfectly ignorant whether the subject is composite or not. (page 244, line 5.) Cf. § 1598.

§ 2018.—Refutation of the argument of Mendelssohn for the substantiality or absolute* permanence of the soul. (page 245, line 3.) [*Can not refuse to it a degree of reality*: We must therefore deny to it simplicity. Cf. § 2011.] *See Meiklejohn's note.

§ 2019.—Unable to explain the possibility of a thinking nature. We can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul—even that of consciousness—as diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. (page 246, line 12.) Cf. Fischer, page 197, and Mahaffy's note. See § 2037 (to which Mahaffy refers), and cf. § 865.

§ 2020.—Idealism—at least, problematical idealism—is perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic system. (page 247, line 1.) See §§ 2001–2003.

§ 2021.—“*I think*” as a proposition containing in itself an existence as given (consequently modality being the principle): (1) I think, (2) as subject, (3) as simple subject, (4) as identical subject, in every state of my thought. (page 247, line 17.) Cf. §§ 2020, 2002.

§ 2022.—Impossibility of a definition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my ego as a merely thinking subject. (page 248, line 1.) [*Simplicity of its nature*: I confess that I must give this up. It is no more possible for me to predicate simplicity of apperception than to predicate of it color, or any other absurd rule. See §§ 2011, 2532. Cf. Fischer, page 198, where Mahaffy translates “and its UNITY is given in the very fact of its possibility.”

§ 2023.—Mode of my existence, whether as substance or as accident, can not be determined by means of this simple self-consciousness. Thus, if materialism is inadequate to explain the mode in

which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient; and the conclusion is, that we are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge of the constitution of the soul, insofar as relates to the possibility of its existence apart from external objects. [Cf. § 2970.] (page 248, line 18.)

§ 2024.—Rational psychology is nothing more than a discipline, which sets impassable limits to speculative reason, to prevent it on the one hand from throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and on the other from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism. (page 248, line 33.)

§ 2025.—Subject of the categories can not, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness, the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe. (page 249, line 13.) Cf. §§ 2914, 2934, 2997, 2009, 2909, 2032.

§ 2026.—Can not say, "Every thing which thinks, exists." My existence can not be considered as an inference from the proposition "*I think*," as Des Cartes maintained. (page 249, line 32.) *Identical*: On this point see § 2782 (Kant's note, which note carefully) and cf. § 2932, and Mahaffy's note in Fischer, page 199. See also a remarkable passage in § 952.

§ 2027.—Severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not unimportant service by the demonstration of the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience. (page 250, line 1.)

§ 2028.—Necessity to admit a future life, upon principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use of reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation. (page 250, line 18.) Cf. § 2593. [*Who alone is the final end and aim of this order: gratuitous assumption.*]

Conclusion of the solution of the psychological paralogism. (§§ 2029, 2030.)

§ 2029.—Dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the conception (in every respect undetermined) of a thinking being in general. (page 251, line 36.)

§ 2030.—Task of explaining the community of the soul with the body. (page 252, line 9.) Cf. § 2937 referred to by Mahaffy in Fischer, page 183. Mahaffy also refers to Schwegler on Spinoza, page 188 of Seelye's translation (1864, Appleton). §§ 2938, 2939.

General remark on the transition from rational psychology to cosmology. (§§ 2031–2035 inclusive.)

§ 2031.—Theory appears to maintain that the soul, even in thought, is only a phenomenon. (page 252, line 35.)

§ 2032.—Consciousness of myself in mere thought does not present to me any property of my being as material for thought. (page 253, line 1.) Cf. §§ 2009, 2025, 2934.

§ 2033.—Internal empirical intuition is sensuous, and presents us with nothing but phenomenal data, which do not assist the object of pure consciousness in its attempt to cognize itself as a separate existence. (page 253, line 22.) Cf. §§ 2231, 1846, 1434.

§ 2034.—Find ourselves possessed of a spontaneity by which our actual existence would be determinable without the aid of the conditions of empirical intuition. (page 254, line 1.)

§ 2035.—Still in need of sensuous intuitions. For this wonderful faculty which the consciousness of the moral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual—but by what predicates? (page 254, line 14.) Cf. Mahaffy, in Fischer, pages 200, 201.

Chapter II.—The Antinomy of Pure Reason. (§§ 2036-2257 inclusive.)

§ 2036.—Second kind of dialectical argument (following the analogy with hypothetical syllogisms) is concerned with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon. (page 255, line 4.) Cf. § 1996.

§ 2037.—Transcendental paralogism produced in the mind only a one-sided illusion, in regard to the idea of the subject of our thought; and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to maintain the contrary proposition. (page 255, line 21.) [*Pneumatism*: doctrine of spiritual substances (Latin *anima*). See Webster, sub voce *pneumatics*.]

§ 2038.—Very different is the case when we apply reason to the *objective synthesis* of phenomena. (page 255, line 28.)

§ 2039.—Natural antithetic, which does not require to be sought for by subtile sophistry, but into which reason of itself unavoidably falls. (page 255, line 33.)

§ 2040.—All transcendental ideas, insofar as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, are called cosmical conceptions. (page 256, line 7.) Cf. §§ 2057, 2058.

§ 2041.—Antinomy of pure reason will present us with the transcendental principles of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology—not, however, to declare it valid. (page 256, line 21.)

TITLE I.—SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. (§§ 2042-2058 inclusive.)

§ 2042.—Reason does not properly give birth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the understanding from the un-

avoidable limitation of a possible experience, and thus endeavors to raise it above the empirical. (page 256, line 32.)

§ 2043.—Transcendental ideas are properly nothing but categories elevated to the unconditioned. All the categories are not available for this purpose. (page 257, line 12.) See § 1984. Cf. § 2999. [Cf. Mahaffy in Fischer, p. lxiii., whereupon I remark that what we aim at, in all critical inquiry, is cognition; and it is therefore essential that our conclusions be well grounded. The entire series of premises must consequently be unconditionally true (§ 1984), and we are rationally concerned with the totality of the regressive series of conditions (§ 1983). Kant's remark must therefore be restricted, not to the cosmological ideas (as Mahaffy says Monck suggested; cf. Monck's Introduction to the Critical Philosophy, pages 90, 100) but to the interest of reason, an interest too often overlooked in speculative inquiries, but which ought always to be peremptorily decisive. To the question, Why call Reason a special faculty, it may be replied that the distinct terminology gives to the argument a precision which would be otherwise unattainable without much circumlocution. To say that Understanding can not transcend, is equivalent to saying that Reason, if it transcends, can not understand. (Jour. Sp. Phil., Vol. V., pp. 113, 114, 115, §§ 43, 44, 46.)]

§ 2044.—Absolute totality is required of reason only insofar as concerns the ascending series of the conditions of a conditioned. (page 257, line 18.) Cf. § 1983.

§ 2045.—Cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the totality of the regressive synthesis, and proceed *in antecedentia*, not *in consequentia*. (page 258, line 7.) See § 2051.

§ 2046.—Transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of the conditions of a given conditioned, relates merely to all past time. (page 258, line 20.)

§ 2047.—Transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the *synthesis* in a series of conditions applies to space also. (page 258, line 30.)

§ 2048.—Regressive synthesis of the real in space, the absolute totality of which is a demand of reason. (page 259, line 21.)

§ 2049.—Series of causes to a given effect, and in which we ascend from the latter as the conditioned to the former as the conditions. (Accidents, insofar as they inhere in a substance, are coordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series.) (page 259, line 30.) [*Subject*: see § 1595.]

§ 2050.—Contingent in existence must always be regarded as conditioned, and as indicating, according to a law of the under-

standing, a condition, under which it is necessary to rise to a higher, till, in the totality of the series, reason arrives at unconditioned necessity. (page 260, line 15.)

§ 2051.—Only four cosmological ideas (§§ 2046–2050) corresponding with the four titles of the categories. The absolute completeness (1) of the COMPOSITION of the given totality of all phenomena, (2) of the DIVISION of a given totality in a phenomenon, (3) of the ORIGINATION of a phenomenon, and (4) of the DEPENDENCE of the EXISTENCE of what is changeable in a phenomenon. (p. 260, l. 22.)

§ 2052.—Idea of absolute totality relates to nothing but the exposition of phenomena, and therefore not to the pure conception of a totality of things. (page 260, line 41.)

§ 2053.—Reason sets out from the idea of totality, although its proper and final aim is the unconditioned (of the whole series, or of a part thereof). (page 261, line 9.)

§ 2054.—Unconditioned may be cogitated either as existing only in the entire series, or as only a part of the series. In the second case, there exists a first in the series. (page 261, line 39.)

§ 2055.—WORLD is termed NATURE when it is regarded as a dynamical whole—when our attention is not directed to the aggregation in space and time, for the purpose of cogitating it as a quantity, but to the unity in the *existence* of phenomena. (page 262, line 15.)

§ 2056.—Nature *substantive* (*materialiter*), the sum total of phenomena insofar as they, by virtue of an internal principle of causality, are connected with each other throughout. (page 262, line 35.) Cf. §§ 1643, 1826.

§ 2057.—Cosmical conceptions. [In a more limited signification, only the two mathematical ideas are so called, according to § 2058.] (page 263, line 3.) Cf. § 2040.

§ 2058.—Transcendent physical conceptions (the two dynamical ideas). (page 263, line 17.) See § 2203.

TITLE II.—ANTITHETIC OF PURE REASON. (§§ 2059–2118 inclusive.)

§ 2059.—Antithetic is engaged in considering the contradictory nature of the general cognitions of reason, and its causes. (page 263, line 28.)

§ 2060.—Transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and result. (page 263, line 35.)

§ 2061.—Questions which naturally arise in the consideration of this dialectic of pure reason. (page 264, line 9.)

§ 2062.—Distinguishable from all sophistical propositions. A natural and unavoidable illusion. (page 264, line 15.)

§ 2063.—Relates to the unity of reason in pure ideas. If it is

adequate to the unity of reason, it is too great for the understanding. (page 264, line 27.)

§ 2064.—Allow the combat to be first decided. (p. 264. l. 37.)

§ 2065.—Skeptical method aims at certainty, by endeavoring to discover in a conflict of this kind, conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides, the point of misunderstanding. It is thoroughly distinct from skepticism. (page 265, line 16.)

§ 2066.—Skeptical method is essentially peculiar to transcendental philosophy. Transcendental reason presents us with no other criterion than that of an attempt to reconcile such assertions, and for this purpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict between them. (page 265, line 36.)

Article I.—First conflict of the transcendental ideas. (§§ 2067–2080 inclusive.)

Text of the first thesis. (§ 2067.)

§ 2067.—Thesis of the first antinomy. The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in regard to space. (page 266, line 20.) [Cf. article Buddhism (vol. iii., page 396) American Cyclopædia: “A Buddha alone can conceive the worlds. It is heresy to believe the worlds limited or illimited, or neither limited nor illimited.” “‘The worlds are, from the not-beginning, in a continual revolution of arising and of perishing.’”]

Proof of the first thesis. (§§ 2068, 2069.)

§ 2068.—Infinite series already elapsed is impossible. (page 266, line 25.)

§ 2069.—Infinite aggregate of actual things can not be considered as a given whole. (page 267, line 10.)

Text of the first antithesis. (§ 2070.)

§ 2070.—Antithesis of the first antinomy. The world has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is, in relation both to time and space, infinite. (page 266, line 20.)

Proof of the first antithesis. (§§ 2071, 2072.)

§ 2071.—Origination of a thing in a void time is impossible. (page 266, line 26.)

§ 2072.—Relation of the world to a void space is merely a relation to *no object*. Empirical intuition is not a composition of phenomena and space. (page 267, line 14.)

Observations on the first antinomy. (§§ 2073–2080 inclusive.)

On the first thesis. (§§ 2073–2077 inclusive.)

§ 2073.—Advantage presented by the mistakes of the dogmatists has been completely set aside. (page 268, line 22.)

§ 2074.—Thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated by the introduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a given quantity. (page 269, line 7.)

§ 2075.—True conception of an infinite whole. (p. 269, l. 26.)

§ 2076.—True (transcendental) conception of infinity is that the successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can never be completed. (page 270, line 10.)

§ 2077.—Conception of the totality of the manifold of a world infinite in extension, is the representation of a completed synthesis of its parts; and this completion, and consequently its conception, is impossible. (page 270, line 23.)

On the first antithesis. (§§ 2078–2080 inclusive.)

§ 2078.—Some ways of escaping this conclusion. (p. 268, l. 32.)

§ 2079.—Space (filled or void) may be limited by phenomena, but phenomena can not be limited by an empty space without them. (page 269, line 10.)

§ 2080.—Question relates to the *mundus phenomenon* and its quantity; and in this case we can not make abstraction of the conditions of sensibility, without doing away with the essential reality of this world itself. (page 270, line 6.) See § 1885.

Article II—Second conflict of the transcendental ideas. (§§ 2081–2093 inclusive.)

Text of the second thesis. (§ 2081.)

§ 2081.—Thesis of the second antinomy. Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and there exists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed of simple parts. (page 271, line 21.)

Proof of the second thesis. (§§ 2082, 2083.)

§ 2082.—Impossible to annihilate composition in thought; or else after such annihilation, there must remain something that subsists without composition. (page 271, line 28.)

§ 2083.—Although we never can separate and isolate the elementary substances from the state of composition, reason must cogitate these as the primary subjects of all composition, and consequently as prior thereto—and as simple substances. (page 272, line 30.) [The thesis amounts simply to showing that the conception of substance is not the conception of the composite. But the category authorizes us merely to predicate substance (of accidents, or appearances) as an *existent* substratum or foundation. Whatever predicates (e. g. simplicity) we choose to think to substance, we can not conjoin them with it in cognition unless we have them given in (at least possible) intuition. But simplicity is not given in intuition. (See §§ 2022, 2011.)]

Text of the second antithesis. (§ 2084.)

§ 2084.—Antithesis of the second antinomy. No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and there does not exist in the world any simple substance. (page 271, line 29.)

Proof of the second antithesis. (§§ 2085–2087 inclusive.)

§ 2085.—Every thing real that occupies a space, contains a manifold the parts of which are external to each other. Every part of the composite must occupy a space. (page 271, line 35.)

§ 2086.—Simplicity can not be inferred from any perception whatever. The absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can not be demonstrated in any possible experience. (page 272, line 30.) [§ 1883.]

§ 2087.—Drives it entirely out of nature. (page 273, line 33.)

Observations on the second antinomy. (§§ 2088–2093 inclusive.)

On the second thesis. (§§ 2088–2091 inclusive.)

§ 2088.—Substantial whole, as the true composite. (p. 274, l. 5.)

§ 2089.—Space ought not to be called a *compositum*, but a *totum*. (page 274, line 16.)

§ 2090.—Inference of the simple from the composite is valid only of self-subsisting things. (page 275, line 3.)

§ 2091.—Proper signification of the word *monas*. (p. 275, l. 34.)

On the second antithesis. (§§ 2092, 2093.)

§ 2092.—Against the assertion of the infinite sub-divisibility of matter, whose ground of proof is purely mathematical, objections have been urged by the monadists. (page 274, line 11.)

§ 2093.—Dogmatical proposition which (among all such sophistical statements) is the only one that undertakes to prove in the case of an object of experience, that which is properly a transcendental idea (the absolute simplicity of substance). (page 276, line 34.) Cf. § 2011.

Article III.—Third conflict of the transcendental ideas. (§§ 2094–2104 inclusive.)

Text of the third thesis. (§ 2094.)

§ 2094.—Thesis of the third antinomy. Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena. (page 278, line 3.)

Proof of the third thesis. (2095, 2096.)

§ 2095.—Nothing can happen without a sufficient apriori determined cause. [Self-contradictory law of nature.] (p. 278, l. 12.)

§ 2096.—Follows that a causality must be admitted by means of which something happens without its cause being determined according to necessary laws by some other cause preceding. (page 279, line 33.)

Text of the third antithesis. (§ 2097.)

§ 2097.—Antithesis of the third antinomy. There is no such

thing as freedom, but every thing in the world happens solely according to the laws of nature. (page 278, line 14.)

Proof of the third antithesis. (§§ 2098, 2099.)

§ 2098.—Transcendental freedom is opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such a conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of the possibility of unity in experience, and for that reason not to be found in experience, and is consequently a mere fiction of thought. (page 278, line 20.)

§ 2099.—Nature and transcendental freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness. (page 279, line 21.) [*Guarantee of a unity complete*: a poor guarantee, since it absolutely requires the unconditioned to complete the unity.] [This section is a well written and striking demonstration of the transcendental helplessness of the understanding.]

Observations on the third antinomy. (§§ 2100–2104 inclusive.)

On the third thesis. (§§ 2100–2102 inclusive.)

§ 2100.—Transcendental idea of freedom merely presents us with the conception of spontaneity of action, as the proper ground for imputing freedom to the cause of a certain class of objects. (page 280, line 14.) Cf. Mahaffy, in Fischer, page 216. Mahaffy refers also to § 2553 (or possibly to § 2552). [*Look entirely to experience*: and experience gives us merely a method, never a *rational*. Cf. § 784.]

§ 2101.—Action of a free agent must be termed, in regard to causality, if not in relation to time, an absolutely primal beginning of a series of phenomena. (page 281, line 29.) Cf. § 2214 *et seqq.*

§ 2102.—Need of reason to rest upon a free act as the first beginning of the series of natural causes. (page 283, line 16.)

On the third antithesis. (§§ 2103, 2104.)

§ 2103.—Assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to causality (transcendental physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of freedom. (page 280, line 27.)

§ 2104.—Faculty must at least exist out of and apart from the world. (If the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is granted.) (page 282, line 8.) [*Subject to the intrusive influences*: as indeed they are. Witness Kant getting out of his chair opposite. But since the materialist must cogitate a material substance or none, he must think freedom as lawlessness—i. e. antagonistic to law.]

Article IV.—Fourth conflict of the transcendental ideas. (§§ 2105–2118 inclusive.)

Text of the fourth thesis. (§ 2105.)

§ 2105.—Thesis of the fourth antinomy. There exists either in or in connection with the world, either as a part of it or as the cause of it, an absolutely necessary being. (page 284, line 3.)

Proof of the fourth thesis. (§§ 2106, 2107.) Cf. § 2163.

§ 2106.—Existence of a given condition presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. (page 284, line 10.)

§ 2107.—Supreme condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the time in which this series itself did not exist (consequently must belong to time). (page 284, line 31.)

Text of the fourth antithesis. (§ 2108.)

§ 2108.—Antithesis of the fourth antinomy. An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world or out of it—as its cause. (page 284, line 3.)

Proof of the fourth antithesis. (§§ 2109, 2110.)

§ 2109.—Two cases are possible: (1) at variance with the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena in time; (2) self-contradictory. (page 284, line 8.)

§ 2110.—Must also begin to act, and its causality would therefore belong to time. (page 284, line 31.)

Observations on the fourth antinomy. (§§ 2111–2118 inclusive.)

On the fourth thesis. (§§ 2111–2115 inclusive.)

§ 2111.—Can not be permitted in this place to employ any other than the cosmological argument. (p. 286, l. 4.) Cf. §§ 2162, 2318.

§ 2112.—Leaves it quite unsettled whether this being is the world itself, or quite distinct from it. (page 286, line 20.)

§ 2113.—Not at liberty to break off from this mode of demonstration, and to pass over to something which is not itself a member of the series. (page 287, line 6.)

§ 2114.—Certain philosophers have nevertheless allowed themselves the liberty of making such a *saltus*. (page 287, line 37.)

§ 2115.—Can not reason from empirical contingency to intellectual. (page 288, line 31.)

On the fourth antithesis. (§§ 2116–2118 inclusive.)

§ 2116.—Objections must not be ontological, but must be directed against the causal connection with a series of phenomena of a condition which is itself unconditioned. (page 286, line 4.)

§ 2117.—Observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast. The very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the existence of a supreme being, demonstrated in the antithesis—and with equal strictness—the non-existence of such a being. (page 286, line 35.) [§ 2147.]

§ 2118.—Cause of this seeming incongruity. (page 287, line 18.)

TITLE III.—OF THE INTEREST OF REASON IN THESE SELF-CONTRADICTIONS. (§§ 2119-2135 inclusive.) [The whole of this is admirably written, and should receive especial attention. See also § 2484 *et seqq.*]

§ 2119.—Cosmological ideas not arbitrary fictions of thought. Attempts to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. (page 290, line 15.)

§ 2120.—Philosophy discovers a value and a dignity which, if it could but make good its assertions, would raise it far above all other departments of human knowledge—professing, as it does, to present a sure foundation for our highest hopes and the ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason. Questions for the solution of which the mathematician would willingly exchange his whole science; for in it there is no satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent desires of humanity. (page 290, line 30.)

§ 2121.—Reason, in the midst of her highest anticipations, finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and contradictory conclusions. (page 291, line 32.)

§ 2122.—Consider for a little—what side in the controversy we should most willingly take. (page 292, line 5.)

§ 2123.—Dogmatism* of pure reason. Principles of the thesis not simple. (page 292, line 21.) * Cf. §§ 2477, 2478.

§ 2124.—Practical interest, which must be dear to every right-thinking man. (page 292, line 37.)

§ 2125.—Speculative interest of reason manifests itself also on the side of dogmatism. (page 293, line 8.)

§ 2126.—Advantage of popularity. The common understanding does not find the least difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis—accustomed, as it is, rather to follow out consequences, than to seek for a proper basis for cognition. (page 293, line 24.)

§ 2127.—Can not discover, on the side of the antithesis, any such practical interest arising from pure principles of reason, as morality and religion present. (page 293, line 36.)

§ 2128.—Empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in its speculative interests, certain important advantages. (p. 294, l. 7.)

§ 2129.—Receive an objective basis for all our conceptions, and instruction in the unvarying laws of things. (page 294, line 31.)

§ 2130.—Direct us to the right mode of extending the province of the understanding, by the help of the only true teacher, experience. (page 295, line 6.)

§ 2131.—Empiricism, if it becomes dogmatic, falls itself into the error of intemperance. (page 295, line 31.)

§ 2132.—Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know. (page 295, line 37.)

§ 2133.—Seems very extraordinary that empiricism should be utterly unpopular. (page 296, line 9.)

§ 2134.—Architectonic interest of reason, which requires a unity not empirical but apriori and rational, forms a natural recommendation for the assertions of the thesis. (page 297, line 22.)

§ 2135.—CALLED TO ACTION—the play of the merely speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream. (page 298, line 1.) I. Cor., xiv., 8.

TITLE IV.—OF THE NECESSITY IMPOSED UPON PURE REASON OF PRESENTING A SOLUTION OF ITS TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS. (§§ 2136–2145 inclusive.) [Mahaffy (Fischer, page lxx.) gives a different version of this head.]

§ 2136.—Every question arising within certain spheres must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge already possessed. (page 298, line 27.)

§ 2137.—No question relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble by that reason. (page 299, line 17.)

§ 2138.—Only the cosmological questions, to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation to the constitution of their object. (page 299, line 28.)

§ 2139.—Case where no answer is the only proper answer. (page 300, note.)

§ 2140.—Answer to the transcendental cosmological question need not be sought out of the idea. (page 300, line 3.)

§ 2141.—Nothing uncertain in the pure sciences of reason (1, Mathematics; 2, Ethics; 3, Philosophy). (page 300, line 21.)

§ 2142.—Can not escape the responsibility of at least a critical solution of the questions of reason. (page 301, line 25.)

§ 2143.—Idea of the absolute whole is by no means necessary for the explanation of any phenomenon, and the idea can not have been in any sense given by the object itself. (page 302, line 13.)

§ 2144.—Can not seek for explanations of this whole beyond itself, in other perceptions. (page 303, line 5.)

§ 2145.—Must not permit ourselves to say that it is uncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted. (page 303, line 13.)

TITLE V.—SKEPTICAL EXPOSITION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED IN THE FOUR TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. (§§ 2146–2149 inclusive.) [Cf. Abelard (Ueberweg, Hist. Phil., tr. Morris, 1873, vol. i., page 335): "dubitando enim ad inquisitionem venimus," etc.]

§ 2146.—Irresistible summons to institute a critical investigation of the question, for the purpose of discovering whether it is based on a groundless presupposition. (page 303, line 31.)

§ 2147.—Cosmological idea either too great or too small for every conception of the understanding, consequently completely void in relation to an object of experience (i. e. theoretically invalid, and

of merely practical significance). (page 304, line 17.) [Cf. Fischer, page 227, and Mahaffy's note referring to the fourth antinomy. It seems ridiculous to remark that system is not the object of the thesis; but I can not think of any other way to obviate Mahaffy's difficulty. In § 2170, to which Mahaffy refers, Kant is concerned with the series; while in the antinomy (§ 2109) he regards the unconditioned, and therefore (§ 2147 fourthly) it is the conditioned which is too small for the series. To say that the series is too large would merely repeat the third antithesis (§ 2147 thirdly), and mistake the fourth cosmological idea, which is the object of the fourth antinomy. Furthermore, since by hypothesis (§ 2109) the unconditioned may reside in the whole series I can not see that the time required to complete the synthesis is "quite beside the question," as Mahaffy thinks.] [§ 2177.]

§ 2148.—Possible experience alone can give reality to our conceptions. Hence a possible empirical conception must be the standard by which we are to judge whether an idea is possessed of truth or relation to an object. (page 306, line 4.)

§ 2149.—How to expose the illusion (by a critical examination of our conception of the mode in which the object of the cosmological ideas is presented to us. (page 306, line 30)

TITLE VI.—TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS THE KEY TO THE SOLUTION OF PURE COSMOLOGICAL DIALECTIC. (§§ 2150-2159 inclusive.)

§ 2150.—All objects of a possible experience are nothing but phenomena. The realist in the transcendental sense regards these modifications of our sensibility—these mere representations—as things subsisting in themselves. (page 307, line 5.) Cf. § 2952.

§ 2151.—Unjust to accuse us of holding the long decried theory of empirical idealism. (page 307, line 14.) [§ 2699.]

§ 2152.—Empirical truth of phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt. (page 307, line 23.)

§ 2153.—Objects of experience are not things in themselves, but are given only in experience. (page 308, line 11.)

§ 2154.—Phenomena, as mere representations, are real only in perception. To call a phenomenon a real thing prior to perception means either that we must meet with this phenomenon in the progress of experience, or it means nothing at all. (page 308, line 24.) Cf. § 1729 and references, as to perception.

§ 2155.—*Transcendental object*—the non-sensuous cause of phenomena, but merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a receptivity. (page 308, line 40.) [§ 2920.]

§ 2156.—Phenomena corresponding to it are not given as things in themselves, but in experience alone. (page 309, line 14.)

§ 2157.—Series in past time is represented as real, not in itself, but only in connection with a possible experience. (p. 309, l. 23.)

§ 2158.—Represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time: nothing more than the notion of a possible experience, in its absolute completeness. (page 309, line 37.)

§ 2159.—Without any relation to possible experience, they are for me non-existent. (page 310, line 5.)

TITLE VII.—CRITICAL SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM. (2160-2174 inclusive.)

§ 2160.—Antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following dialectical argument: If that which is conditioned is given, the whole series of its conditions is also given; but sensuous objects are given as conditioned; consequently...(page 310, line 30.)

§ 2161.—Evident and indubitably certain: If the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required. (page 311, line 4)

§ 2162.—Synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, if both are things in themselves, is a synthesis of the understanding merely, which represents things *as they are*, without regarding whether and how we can cognize them. (page 311, line 14.) [If therefore we grant that the conditioned as a thing in itself is given to us merely as to its existence, the unconditioned is likewise so given. My consciousness of self (§§ 1634, 2782) gives conditioned existence or else (since existence must be either conditioned or unconditioned) unconditioned existence, and if the former (which I have no doubt is the true alternative), then the latter along with it, necessarily, and therefore consciousness of God. But this my consciousness of God is not knowledge of God, and to it the categories can not be applied. (For the statement of this cosmological argument in precise terms, see § 2318)]

§ 2163.—Synthesis which constitutes the empirical condition of a given conditioned, if I have to do with phenomena, can be established only by an *actual* regress in the series of conditions. (page 311, line 25.)

§ 2164.—Dialectical fallacy in the cosmological syllogism (§ 2160). The major takes the conditioned in the transcendental signification which it has in the pure category; while the minor speaks of it in the empirical signification which it has in the category as applied to phenomena. (This is a *SOPHISMA FIGURÆ DITIONIS*. § 1339.) (page, 312, line 3.) Cf. Fischer, page lxx., where Mahaffy excellently makes the following brief statement: "In all four antinomies the theses and antitheses are not contradictories, but contraries. Hence we can not argue from the falsity of one

to the truth of the other. All the arguments, therefore, offered, are invalid; but in the case of the latter two, a modification in their statement makes them sub-contraries, in which case we can not argue from the truth of one to the falsity of the other." (Cf. Abp. Thomson's Laws of Thought, § 84.) See § 2169.

§ 2165.—Synthesis of the conditioned with the condition, and the complete series of the latter (in the major) are not limited by time, and do not contain the conception of succession* (page 312, line 22) [*but only that of causality. The fact that the complete series is not limited by time, is further proved by the fact that when we do so limit it, we fall instantly into the conflict of the antinomy, from which there is no escape. (See § 2172)] [*—can not presuppose*: nor is it at all necessary to presuppose this absolute totality, which is not necessary to the understanding. (See § 2143.)]

§ 2166.—Disputing about nothing. (page 312, line 38.)

§ 2167.—Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by Plato. (page 313, line 18).

§ 2168.—Contingent condition of the conception. If two opposite judgments presuppose a contingent impossible or arbitrary condition, both (in spite of their opposition—which is, however, not properly or really a contradiction) fall away; because the condition, which insured the validity of both, has itself disappeared. (page 314, line 1.) See § 2164.

§ 2169.—Dialectical opposition of judgments distinguished from analytical. Of two dialectically opposed judgments, both may be false, from the fact that the one is not a mere contradictory of the other, but actually enounces more than is requisite for a full and complete contradiction. *Ex. gr.* The world is either infinite or finite. (page 314, line 19.) [The word *noninfinite* obscures the conception, and should be omitted.]

§ 2170.—Deny that it is a thing in itself,—the contradictory opposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one. (page 314, line 40.)

§ 2171.—Series of conditions is discoverable only in the regressive synthesis itself, and not in the phenomenon considered as a thing in itself—given prior to all regress. (page 315, line 17.)

§ 2172.—Antinomy of pure reason furnishes us with an indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of phenomena. (p. 315, l. 34.)

§ 2174.—Proofs of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophistries—are not fallacious, but grounded on the nature of reason, and valid—under the supposition that phenomena are things in themselves. (page 316, line 14.)

§ 2174.—Transcendental dialectic does not favor skepticism. (page 316, line 21.)

TITLE VIII.—REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF PURE REASON IN RELATION TO THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. (§§ 2175-2183.)

§ 2175.—Valid, not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as actual, but as a *problem* for the understanding, requiring it to institute and to continue, in conformity with the idea of totality in the mind, the regress in the series of the conditions of a given conditioned. (page 316, line 35.)

§ 2176.—Principle for the enlargement and extension of experience as far as is possible for human faculties. Prohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely unconditioned. (page 317, line 13.) See §§ 1752, 1753. [*Subreptio*: stealing, purloining; the application of a conception or principle beyond or out of its legitimate sphere.]

§ 2177.—Idea of absolute totality can not be regarded as valid—except as a rule for the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions, according to which we must proceed from the conditioned, through all intermediate and subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned; although this goal is unattained and unattainable. (page 317, line 38.) [§§ 2413, 2147.]

§ 2178.—Determine clearly our notion of a synthesis which can never be complete. (*Progressus in indefinitum*.) (page 318, line 18.) Cf. §§ 1483, 1555, 2427, 2684, and Mahaffy's note on *unendlich*.

§ 2179.—*Progressus in infinitum* in all cases when we speak of a *progressus*, i. e. an advancement from the condition to the conditioned. (page 318, line 31.) [But even in case of *progressus*, it is better to say *in indefinitum*, because, how far soever we produce or proceed, our series is finite. I can not agree that the expression *in infinitum* is correct in reference to the power or possibility, because I deny these. Although reason supposes possible totality in the series of the conditioned, it can no more represent to itself this possible totality in a possible experience than it can the totality in the regressus. It must posit this totality (as conditioned) in its entirety, in order to predicate of it infinity. However, we may excuse any science from observing any greater accuracy than is required to make its representation clear. (§§ 1983, 2044.)]

§ 2180.—Problem—how far the regress, which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions, must extend. (p. 319, l. 9.)

§ 2181.—Answer to this question is: If the series is given in empirical intuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its internal conditions proceeds *in infinitum*; but if only one member of the series is given, from which the regress is to proceed to absolute totality, the regress is possible only *in indefinitum*. (page 319, line 20) [I predicate infinite divisibility of body because body fills space, and not with any reference to the content or matter

(see § 2182), except insofar as that matter is itself nothing more than the schematism of the understanding. The proof is, that if an empirical regress terminates in an atom (proceeds *in finitum*) reason has no ground of complaint. Until the regress has empirically proceeded *in infinitum*, we have no ground in experience for asserting that the series has been empirically given as a whole. I therefore prefer the expression *in indefinitum* in the case of the division of a portion of matter given within certain limits.] See §§ 2195, 2196. Cf. §§ 2179, 2427.

§ 2182.—Series of conditions is not in either case (the *regressus in infinitum* or the *regressus in indefinitum*) to be considered as actually infinite in the object itself. (page 320, line 5.) See Mahaffy's note in Fischer, pages 237, 238.

§ 2183.—Question no longer is, "What is the quantity of this series of conditions in itself—is it finite or infinite?" for it is nothing in itself; but "How is the empirical regress to be commenced, and how far ought we to proceed with it?" (page 320, line 10.)

TITLE IX.—OF THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF REASON WITH REGARD TO THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. (§§ 2184-2255.)

§ 2184.—Demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in the world of sense arises from a transcendental employment of reason. (page 321, line 5.)

§ 2185.—Doctrinal principle of reason. A rule for the extension of a possible experience. Its influence and value are just as great as if it were an axiom for the apriori determination of objects. (page 321, line 18.)

Article I.—Solution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the composition of phenomena in the universe. (§§ 2186-2194 inclusive.)

§ 2186.—Ground of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition that in our empirical regress *no experience of an absolute limit*, and consequently no experience of a condition which is itself *absolutely unconditioned*, is discoverable. (page 322, line 4.)

§ 2187.—Rule *in terminis*, which requires me, to whatever extent I may have proceeded in the ascending series, always to look for some higher member in the series, whether this member is to become known to me through experience or not. (page 322, line 14.)

§ 2188.—Regress to the unconditioned quantity of the universe (as regards space and time) ought to be called a *regressus in indefinitum*. (page 322, line 21.)

§ 2189.—Follows that I am not entitled to make any assertion at all respecting the whole object of experience (the world of sense); I must limit my declarations to the rule according to which experience or empirical knowledge is to be attained. (page 323, line 29.)

§ 2190.—Negative answer respecting the cosmical quantity. The world has no beginning in time and no absolute limit in space. (page 324, line 1.)

§ 2191.—Affirmative answer. The regress in the series of phenomena, as a determination of the cosmical quantity, proceeds in *indefinitum*. (page 324, line 13.)

§ 2192.—Rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of phenomena. (page 324, line 26.)

§ 2193.—Phenomena in the world are conditionally limited ; but the world itself is not limited either conditionally or unconditionally. (page 325, line 5.)

§ 2194.—Conception of the cosmical quantity is given only in and through the regress, and not prior to it. (page 325, line 10.)

Article II.—Solution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the division of a whole given in intuition. (§§ 2195–2201 inclusive.)

§ 2195.—Division of the parts of a given whole proceeds in *indefinitum*. (page 325, line 25.) [§ 2181.]

§ 2196.—Can not affirm of a whole which is divisible in *indefinitum*, that it consists of an infinite number of parts. (page 326, line 3.)

§ 2197.—Every limited space is divisible to infinity. (page 326, line 16.)

§ 2198.—Body is consequently divisible to infinity, though it does not for that reason consist of an infinite number of parts. (page 326, line 20.)

§ 2199.—Substance in the phenomenal world is merely a permanent sensuous image, and nothing more than an intuition, in which the unconditioned is not to be found. (page 326, line 26.) See §§ 1595, 1895.

§ 2200.—Organized body. Rule of progress to infinity is not applicable to a whole consisting of a number of distinct parts and constituting a *quantum discretum*.† (page 327, line 4) [† disjoined, distinct, separate (see Webster) ; opposed to continuous.]

§ 2201.—How far the transcendental division of a phenomenon must extend, we can not know from experience ; it is a question which experience can not answer ; it is answered only by the principle of reason which forbids us to consider the empirical regress, in the analysis of extended body, as ever absolutely complete. (page 327, line 29.) See § 2182, and Mahaffy, loc. cit.

Concluding remark on the solution of the transcendental mathematical ideas, and introductory to the solution of the dynamical ideas. (§§ 2202–2206 inclusive.)

§ 2202.—Homogeneity of the whole series was assured. We did not consider the object (that is, the conditioned), but the series of

conditions belonging to the object, and the magnitude of that series. (page 328, line 6.)

§ 2203.—Dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Opens up to us an entirely new view of the conflict in which reason is involved. (page 328, line 30.) Cf. §§ 270, 2058.

§ 2204.—Conception of the understanding which lies at the basis of these ideas, contains a synthesis either of the homogeneous or of the heterogeneous. (page 329, line 15.)

§ 2205.—Dynamical series of sensuous conditions admits a heterogeneous condition, which is not a member of the series, but, as purely intelligible, lies out of and beyond it. (page 329, line 24.)

§ 2206.—Result which we should not have expected from an antinomy. Both propositions of reason may be shown to be true in their proper signification. (page 329, line 33.)

Article III.—Solution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the deduction of cosmical events from their causes. (§§ 2207–2245.)

§ 2207.—Only two modes of causality cogitable. The causality of *nature*, or of *freedom*. (page 330, line 12.)

§ 2208.—Freedom in the cosmological sense: a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a state. (page 330, line 22.)

§ 2209.—Practical conception of freedom is based upon the transcendental idea. The question of the possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the consideration of the truth of the latter. (page 331, line 9.)

§ 2210.—Question of the possibility of freedom is properly transcendental. (page 331, line 35.)

§ 2211.—Dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. The dynamical ideas relate to an object considered (not as a quantity, but) as an existence. (page 332, line 6.)

§ 2212.—Question is: Whether an effect, determined according to the laws of nature, can *at the same time* be produced by a free agent. (page 332, line 18.)

§ 2213.—Freedom is impossible if phenomena are things in themselves. (page 332, line 31.) [A careful reading of § 2213 leads me to think that Mahaffy is wrong (Fischer, page lxxiv.) in saying “*phenomenally speaking from nothing*”—phenomenal ground being always to be found in the preceding time.]

Possibility of freedom in harmony with the universal law of natural necessity. (§§ 2214–2221 inclusive.)

§ 2214.—Causality may be considered to be intelligible as regards its action (the action of a thing which is a thing in itself), and sensible as regards its effects (the effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensible world). (page 333, line 21.) Cf. Mahaffy

(Fischer, page lxxix). See Mahaffy's appendix to the Prolegomena (page 273), and his appendix to Fischer (page 369), and his preface to Fischer (page lxxii). [I do not think Prof. Mahaffy's retranslation (of §§ 2214–2231) necessary. I have noted the principal variations (§§ 2218, 2219, 2226 and 2228). I have not discovered any difficulty of importance in Meiklejohn.] [*Sensuous*: see Kant's note to § 1885.]

§ 2215.—Twofold manner of cogitating a power residing in a sensible object does not run counter to any of the conceptions which we ought to form of the world of phenomena, or of possible experience. (page 333, line 31.)

§ 2216.—Every effective cause must possess a character,* that is to say a law of its causality, without which it would cease to be a cause. (page 334, line 5). [*“The peculiar qualities or properties by which one thing is distinguished from another.”—*Webster*.]

§ 2217.—Causality of the subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form part of the series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an event in the world of sense. No action would begin or cease to be in this subject. (page 334, line 21.)

§ 2218.—Intelligible character of a thing can not be immediately cognized, but it must be capable of being cogitated in harmony with the empirical character. (page 334, line 31.) *For*: so *wie*: Prof. Mahaffy renders this *just as*, making it an illustration. Dr. Harris says *just as* is more literal, and more stiff also, than *for*. [I am indebted to Dr. Harris for the German words. I do not possess the German text, and could not understand it if I did.]

§ 2219.—All requisites for a complete and necessary determination of these actions must be presented to us by experience. (page 334, line 38.) *How*: Mahaffy translates, “when influenced by external phenomena—when cognized through experience in its empirical character, i. e. in the law of its causality—all its actions must be explicable according to natural laws, and all the requisites for their complete and necessary determination must occur in possible experience.” (M. Proleg, page 275.)

§ 2220.—Must in its actions be free from and independent of natural necessity, for this necessity exists only in the world of phenomena. (page 335, line 8.)

§ 2221.—Determined by prior empirical conditions, by virtue of the empirical character, which is the phenomenon of the intelligible character. (page 335, line 18.)

Exposition of the cosmological idea of freedom in harmony with the universal law of natural necessity. (§§ 2222–2245 inclusive.)

§ 2222.—Now proceed to exhibit the several momenta of this solution. (page 335, line 32.)

§ 2223.—Law of the understanding from which no departure, and to which no exception, can be admitted. (page 335, line 38.)

§ 2224.—Obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes, in which, however, absolute totality can not be found. (page 336, line 13.)

§ 2225.—Action which forms an absolute beginning is beyond the causal power of phenomena. (page 336, line 26.)

§ 2226.—Empirical causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality, its connection with natural causes remaining nevertheless intact. (page 336, line 36.) *A phenomenon* : Professor Mahaffy translates, "The causality of their cause, which (cause) is also a phenomenon, must be merely empirical?" See in Fischer, page lxxii., and see different translations by Professor Mahaffy in Fischer, page 372, and in the Prolegomena (appendix) page 278.

§ 2227.—Physical explanations of physical phenomena may proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without opposition. (page 337, line 9.)

§ 2228.—Phenomenon* of the subject (with all its phenomenal† causality) would nevertheless contain certain conditions which, if we ascend from the empirical to the transcendental object, must necessarily be regarded as intelligible. (page 237, line 16.) [*Prof. Mahaffy translates *noumenon*; but I do not see how a noumenon can contain conditions, while I can easily think that conditions may refer to (i. e. indicate) a noumenon. Dr. Harris says that Kant's second edition reads *phenomenon*, but Hartenstein has changed it to *noumenon* as a conjectural emendation. It seems to me that the source of the confusion is to be found in the conjunctions. Meiklejohn renders it, "and the phenomenon only of the subject," which will not do at all. Dr. Harris says that it should read, "and only the phenomenon of the subject." This points us at once to the real meaning, which would then be conveyed by merely omitting *and* as superfluous—i. e. "only the phenomenon," that is to say, "observe furthermore that the phenomenon of the subject," or, "and notwithstanding this natural nexus the phenomenon of the subject," in which latter case we may preserve the comma which Harris says precedes *and* in the German (Meiklejohn has a semicolon), and which I take it indicates the closeness of Kant's thought, and accounts for the double conjunction. (It is the closeness of the thought which occasions Kant's long sentences, and makes Mahaffy's attempts to break them up disastrous.

He might better have imitated Richardson, who in § 2834 omitted to supply a verb which Kant forgot, but who conscientiously gave the reader all the aid to excogitation afforded by the original. "The German has a comma here," Harris writes, "and goes right on to say 'and only the phenomenon.'" That is Kant, exactly. He always "goes right on to say;" and if you do not go right on with him, you are apt to lose the thought.)] [† *Mit aller desselben Causalitact in der Erscheinung*: "With all its causality in the phenomenal world." So Dr. Harris writes.] *When the cause is phenomenized*: Mahaffy translates, "but so that the action in the phenomenon of this cause must be in accordance," etc. (page 279).

§ 2229.—Intelligible ground of phenomena in the subject, does not concern empirical questions. (page 337, line 30.) *It has to do only with pure thought*: Mahaffy renders, "*Perhaps it.*"

§ 2230.—Man must have an empirical character. (p. 338, l. 4.)

§ 2231.—Man, in respect of certain faculties, is a purely intelligible object—intelligible, because its action can not be assigned to sensuous receptivity. (page 338, line 14.) See the definition of cognition in § 1963, and cf. §§ 2025, 2026, 2032, 2033, 1634, 1635. [Self cognition through consciousness of self determination in accordance with the moral law is empirical, not apriori. Man's knowledge of the law is apriori, and the apperception is pure; but while his knowledge that he OUGHT to act is apriori,* his knowledge that he DOES so ACT is aposteriori. He finds in consciousness the motives of actions which as perceptions are also *at the same time* sensuously determined. Upon practical ground, therefore, we attain a result which we could not anticipate apriori, to-wit, that we possess an empirical and aposteriori cognition, through pure apperception, of an intelligible man, or that at least we are compelled so to represent it, provided we certainly have the needed certain knowledge that one of our actions has been determined by the pure law.]

§ 2232.—Reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the imperatives, which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers. (page 338, line 28.) See § 37.

§ 2233.—OUGHT indicates a possible action, the ground of which is a pure conception; while the ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. (page 339, line 3.)

§ 2234.—Empirical character of reason. (Conception of a cause, as a faculty or power.) (page 339, line 29.)

* See § 2552 and cf. §§ 2260 and 2360 and 1470.

§ 2235.—Volition of every man has an empirical character, which is nothing more than the causality of his reason, insofar as its effects in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule. (page 339, line 41.)

§ 2236.—*Actions*, in relation to practical reason, as the producing cause of these actions, *determined*, not by empirical causes, but *by the act of the will*, upon grounds of reason. (page 340, line 22.)

§ 2237.—Empirical character is itself determined by the intelligible character. (page 340, line 35.) Cf. Fischer (page 245): “by regarding the empirical character itself to be a consequence of the intelligible, *a sequence which excludes all succession in time.*” Cf. § 2221: “by virtue of the empirical character, which is the phenomenon of the intelligible character.” Cf. § 2243: “a different intelligible character would have exhibited a different empirical character.” See Mahaffy Int. Fischer, page lxxvii. Cf. § 2165.

§ 2238.—Causality of reason in its intelligible character *does not begin to be*. Not the conditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the internal sense, precede the act. (page 341, line 1.) [The causality of a cause in nature makes its appearance in a determined time. But the causality of reason makes its appearance in a perfectly indeterminate time, which time it alone determines for itself by and in its spontaneous action. So appearing, it is empirical. (See § 2226.)]

§ 2239.—Condition of a successive series of events, itself empirically unconditioned. If reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena, it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects. (page 341, line 14.)

§ 2240.—No given action can have an absolute and spontaneous origin, all actions being phenomena, and belonging to the world of experience. (page 341, line 26.)

§ 2241.—Reason, as the unconditioned condition of all action of the will, admits of no time-conditions, although its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena—a beginning which is not, however, absolutely primal. (page 342, line 1.)

§ 2242.—Illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example from its employment in the world of experience—(offense is estimated according to its intelligible character). (p. 342, l. 29.)

§ 2243.—Different intelligible character would have exhibited a different empirical character; and when we say that in spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority—permissive or prohibitive—of reason. (page 343, line 29.) Cf. § 2237. [*Not sub-*

ject in its causality: although, so far as we know, it can not manifest its causality otherwise than upon phenomena conditioned in time, and is therefore not *absolutely* free. (Cf. § 1544.)]

§ 2244.—Beyond the power of our reason to decide. (page 344, line 17.)

§ 2245.—Intention in the above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom. (page 345, line 1.)

Article IV.—Solution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the dependence of phenomenal existences. (§§ 2246–2255 inclusive.)

§ 2246.—Guide to an existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable phenomena, that is, to a necessary being. (page 345, line 26.)

§ 2247.—Existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the existence of sensible phenomena, would be perfectly impossible, if phenomena were things in themselves. (page 345, line 37.)

§ 2248.—Important distinction between the dynamical and the mathematical regress. (page 346, line 9.) See § 270.

§ 2249.—Way of escape from the difficulty; for it is not impossible that both of the contradictory statements (§§ 2105 and 2108) may be true in different relations. (page 346, line 24.)

§ 2250.—Ground of distinction between the modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. (p. 346, l. 35.)

§ 2251.—Regulative principle of reason in relation to the fourth antimony. (page 347, line 5.)

§ 2252.—Set bounds to the law of the purely empirical understanding (against any attempts on its part at deciding on the possibility of things). It has been shown that the contingency of all the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary although purely intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists between them, and that consequently both may be true. (page 347, line 18.)

§ 2253.—Cogitate an intelligible ground of phenomena; as free, moreover, from the contingency of the latter. (page 348, line 4.)

§ 2254.—Empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption of a purely intelligible being. (page 348, line 33.)

§ 2255.—Intelligible cause signifies merely the transcendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous phenomena. (page 348, line 37.)

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. (§§ 2256, 2257.)

§ 2256.—Transcendent ideas detach themselves completely from experience, and construct for themselves objects the material of which has not been presented by experience, and the objective

reality of which is not based upon the completion of the empirical series, but upon pure apriori conceptions. (page 349, line 7.)

§ 2257.—First step which we take out of the world of sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with the investigation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions of it all our conceptions of intelligible things. (page 349, line 27.)

Chapter III.—The Ideal of Pure Reason. (§§ 2258–2371 inclusive.)

TITLE I.—OF THE IDEAL IN GENERAL. (§§ 2258–2263 inclusive.)

§ 2258.—Ideas are still further removed from objective reality than categories; for no phenomenon can ever present them to the human mind *in concreto*. (page 350, line 17.) [*Cresco*—grow.]

§ 2259.—Ideal (the idea, not *in concreto*, but *in individuo*) still further removed than the idea from objective reality. (page 350, line 32.)

§ 2260.—Human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess (not, like those of Plato, creative, but) certainly *practical* power (as regulative principles), and form the basis of the perfectibility of certain actions. (page 351, line 10.)

§ 2261.—Ideals are not to be considered as chimeras; * on the contrary, they provide reason with a standard which enables it to estimate by comparison the degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to it. (page 351, line 30.) [*Monstrous creations of the brain.]

§ 2262.—Ideals of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an intelligible conception. They are a kind of monogram, drawn according to no determinate rule. (page 352, line 3.)

§ 2263.—Reason, in its ideals, aims at complete and perfect determination according to apriori rules. (page 352, line 18.)

TITLE II.—OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL (Prototypon transcendentalis).
(§§ 2264–2287 inclusive.)

§ 2264.—Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in it, undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. (page 352, line 28.)

§ 2265.—Everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject to the principle of complete determination. (page 352, line 36.)

§ 2266.—Principle of complete determination relates to the content, and not to the logical form. (page 353, line 8.)

§ 2267.—Conception of complete determination can not be presented in its totality *in concreto*, and is therefore based upon an idea. (page 353, line 18.)

§ 2268.—Idea of the sum-total of all possibility becomes the conception of an individual object, which is completely determined

by and through the mere idea, and must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason. (page 353, line 33.)

§ 2269.—Negation indicates a mere want, or privation, or absence. (The logical negation expressed in the word *not*, does not properly belong to a conception, but only to the relation of one conception to another in a judgment.) (page 354, line 12.)

§ 2270.—All conceptions of negatives are accordingly derived or deduced conceptions, and realities contain the data and (so to speak) the material or transcendental content of the possibility and complete determination of all things. (page 354, line 32.)

§ 2271.—Idea of a sum-total of reality. (In this view, negations are nothing but limitations.) (page 355, line 6.)

§ 2272.—Transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the complete determination of every thing that exists, and is the highest material condition of its possibility. (page 344, line 15.)

§ 2273.—Reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the foundation of its determination of all possible things, takes a course in exact analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms. (page 355, line 29.) See §§ 1968–1970, and 1996. Perhaps the first reference is intended to be or begin with § 1964: [See Mahaffy's note in Fischer, pages 254, 255.]

§ 2274.—Reason, in cogitating the necessary complete determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being corresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal. (page 356, line 17.)

§ 2275.—Possibility of things must be regarded as derived, except that of the thing which contains in itself all reality. (page 356, line 27.)

§ 2276.—Object of the ideal of reason—an object existing only in reason itself. (page 356, line 38.)

§ 2277.—Ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple. (page 357, line 9.) Cf. § 1516.

§ 2278.—Highest reality must be regarded rather as the *ground* than as the *sum total* of the possibility of all things, and the manifold nature of things be based, not upon the limitation of the primal being itself, but upon the complete series of effects which flow from it. (page 357, line 14.)

§ 2279.—Ideal of pure reason is the object-matter of a transcendental theology. (page 357, line 27.)

§ 2280.—Hypostatizing of the content of the idea into an ideal, as an individual being, is a step perfectly unauthorized. (page 357, line 36.)

§ 2281.—Endeavor to discover the sources of this dialectic, that

we may have it in our power to give a rational explanation of this illusion. (page 358, line 8.) See §§ 2282–2285.

§ 2282.—Reality of the phenomenon (that element which corresponds to sensation) MUST BE GIVEN FROM WITHOUT, as otherwise it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind. (page 358, line 20.) Cf. §§ 1522, 1544, 1551.

§ 2283.—Material of the possibility of all sensuous objects must be presupposed as given in a whole; and it is upon the limitation of this whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their distinction from each other and their complete determination, are based. (page 358, line 27.)

§ 2284.—Thing is not an object to us unless it presupposes the whole or sum total of empirical reality as the condition of its possibility. (page 358, line 37.)

§ 2285.—Natural illusion leads us to consider this principle, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as valid with regard to things in general. (page 359, line 1.)

§ 2286.—Proceed afterward to hypostatise this idea of the sum total of all reality, by changing the *distributive* unity of the empirical exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole (a dialectical illusion), and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality. (page 359, line 8.)

§ 2287.—Ideal of the *ens realissimum* (although merely a mental representation) is (1) objectivised, (2) hypostatished, (3) personified. (page 359, note.)

TITLE III.—OF THE ARGUMENTS EMPLOYED BY SPECULATIVE REASON IN PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING. (§§ 2238–2299.)

§ 2288.—Foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and above it empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room for a why or a wherefore. (p. 359, l. 22.) [*Factitious*: artificial. *W.*]

§ 2289.—Argument by which reason justifies its advances toward a primal being. (page 360, line 13.)

§ 2290.—Purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of possible things, that conception which possesses no element inconsistent with the idea of absolute necessity. (page 360, line 21.) [*Remove*: prove?]

§ 2291.—Can not infer that what does contain in itself the conditions of all that is possible, must possess unconditioned existence; for, precisely because by hypothesis it is unconditioned, it possesses no condition which can enable reason to cognize apriori its necessary existence.* (page 360, line 37.) [*i. e. it is impossible to conclude that it might not just as well not exist. (But if the

reader prefers, he may put upon this section another meaning, to-wit, that we can not infer that what does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition, must therefore not possess unconditioned existence. See § 2295.) Cf. § 2326.] See § 2330.

§ 2292.—Conception of an *ens* realissimum is that which best agrees with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary being. (page 361, line 14.)

§ 2293.—Natural course of human reason. Concludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary. (page 361, line 23.)

§ 2294.—Conclusion seems defective in the grounds upon which it is supported. (page 361, line 34)

§ 2295.—Can not infer that the conception of a limited being, in which the supreme reality does not reside, is *therefore* incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity. (page 362, line 8.) *This argument*: § 2289.

§ 2296.—Equilibrium of doubt (as to the validity of the conclusion of § 2293) destroyed by a practical addition. (page 362, line 33.) Cf. § 541. [The reader ought to notice in this section (as also in § 2236 and elsewhere) the extreme care with which Kant avoids the direct and unqualified assertion of positions based on the practical law, which are nevertheless practically sufficient. See §§ 2231, 2232.]

§ 2297.—Highest cause we regard as absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to rise to it, and do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it. It is natural that we should place the *highest* causality just where we place *supreme** causality, in that being which contains the conditions of all possible effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that of an all-embracing reality. (page 363, line 11.) [*Highest in authority. That is, we place the highest possible where we find the highest necessary for the practical purposes of our reason.]

§ 2298.—Only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on the grounds of speculative reason: (1) physico-theological; (2) cosmological; (3) ontological. (page 363, line 29.)

§ 2299.—Begin with an examination of the transcendental argument, It is the transcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage and is the goal of all its struggles. (p. 363, l. 41.)

TITLE IV.—OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. (§§ 2300-2315 inclusive.)

§ 2300.—Conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception of such a being. (page 364, line 19.)

§ 2301.—Trouble of conceiving whether and how a being of this

nature is even cogitable. (page 364, line 31.) [*Demonstrable: in-demonstrable?*]

§ 2302.—Logical necessity has been the source of the greatest delusions. All the examples adduced have been drawn from judgments and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. (page 365, line 9.)

§ 2303.—No contradiction arises if I suppress both subject and predicate in thought. (page 365, line 35.)

§ 2304.—Contradiction is the only criterion of impossibility, in the sphere of pure apriori conceptions. (page 366, line 17.) [*and in further maintaining your position you find yourselves compelled to declare, etc.*].

§ 2305.—Affirmed that there is one and only one conception in which the non-being or annihilation of the object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an *ens realissimum*. (page 366, line 30.)

§ 2306.—Warning against concluding from the possibility of a conception (which is logical) the possibility of a thing (which is real). (page 367, note.) *Nihil negativum* § 1924.

§ 2307.—Absurd to introduce (under whatever term disguised) into the conception of a thing (which is to be cogitated solely in reference to its possibility) the conception of its existence. (page 367, line 6.)

§ 2308.—Illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavors of explanation and illustration. (page 367, line 30.)

§ 2309.—Being is evidently not a real predicate—that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. (page 368, line 9.)

§ 2310.—Real contains no more than the possible. (page 368, line 25.) See § 1856.

§ 2311.—Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. (page 368, line 40.)

§ 2312.—Cause of the present difficulty (§ 2301) becomes apparent. (page 369, line 12.)

§ 2313.—All our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a percep-

tion) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience. (p. 369, l. 32.)

§ 2314.—Synthesis of the possibility of which an apriori judgment can not be formed, because these realities are not presented to us specifically; and even if this were to happen, a judgment would still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea can not belong. (page 370, line 5.)

§ 2315.—Ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient. (page 370, line 22.)

TITLE V.—OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. (§§ 2316–2338 inclusive.)

§ 2316.—Ontological argument an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools. (page 370, line 31.)

§ 2317.—Cosmological proof concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of some being, its unlimited reality. (Termed by Leibnitz the *argumentum a contingentia mundi*.) (p. 371, l. 18.)

§ 2318.—Cosmological argument really begins at experience, and is not completely apriori. (page 371, line 36.) Cf. § 1860 (referred to by Meiklejohn) and § 2162.

§ 2319.—Proof of the cosmological argument. (page 272, line 10.) Cf. § 2324.

§ 2320.—Imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress. (page 372, line 20.) Cf. §§ 2324, 2327.

§ 2321.—Pursues its inquiries in the field of pure conceptions. (page 372, line 31.)

§ 2322.—Presupposed that the conception of an *ens realissimum* is perfectly adequate to the conception of a being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the existence of the latter from that of the former—a proposition which formed the basis of the ontological argument. (page 373, line 12.)

§ 2323.—Experience has been of no further use than to conduct us TO THE CONCEPTION of absolute necessity (being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute in any determinate existence or thing). (page 373, line 25.)

§ 2324.—*Nervus probandi* of the cosmological argument. (page 373, line 41.) § 2319.

§ 2325.—Possesses the additional blemish of an *ignoratio elenchi*.* (page 374, line 19.) [*Irrelevant conclusion. (Elenchos—argument, proof, question.)]

§ 2326.—Cosmological argument contains a perfect nest of dialectical assumptions. (page 374, line 25.) Above: § 2320.

§ 2327.—Aim of the cosmological argument defeated. (Its aim is to avoid the necessity of proving the existence of a necessary being apriori from mere conceptions.) (page 375, line 16.)

§ 2328.—No longer the modest enunciation of an admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodictic* certainty. (page 376, line 14.) [**Apodict*—the logical correlate of the mathematical axiom. A logical proposition which does not require demonstration. The apodict, like the axiom, must be POINTED OUT (*apo-deiknumi*). Cf. logic 33, 34, 35, §§ 1243–1245.]

§ 2329.—Aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either to discover a conception which shall harmonize with the idea of absolute necessity, or a conception which shall contain that idea. (page 376, line 22.)

§ 2330.—Unconditioned necessity,* which, as the ultimate support and stay of all existing things, is an indispensable requirement of the mind, is an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles with dismay. (page 376, line 31.) [*That which is absolutely unconditioned can not possibly be necessary. I can not cogitate internal necessity; for if I say (for instance) that I am under an internal necessity to exist no otherwise than in space, I immediately ascribe that necessity to some external cause. But then, it is external (foreign) necessity. If I say that God is, I do not condition Him; for I may say that He might just as well not be. But the moment I say that He *must be*, I have conditioned Him. In other words, although being is not a predicate, necessity is. It follows that the only necessity is external, or relative; and that only is unconditionally necessary without which nature could not exist or I possess any experience. But when I transcend the bounds of nature and experience, the conception of unconditioned necessity becomes self-contradictory; and instead of an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles with dismay, I find nothing at all. That which is an indispensable requirement of my mind, is an existence unconditionally necessary. But this is asserting nothing more than existence. If I say that God is unconditionally necessary, I am merely using the strongest language to posit His existence; but if I say that He possesses unconditioned necessity, I have so far vitiated my conception that it is no longer absolute or unconditioned, and I must now proceed to inquire (as Kant suggests) whence God is—that is, I must carry the regress further back. See § 2309, and § 2333 sqq.]

§ 2331.—Ideal of pure reason can not be termed mysterious or inscrutable. It must, as a mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and solution. (page 377, line 7). See § 2136.

Detection and explanation of the dialectical illusion in all transcendental arguments for the existence of a necessary being. (§§ 2332–2338 inclusive.)

§ 2332.—What is the cause, in these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical but natural illusion which connects the conceptions of necessity and supreme reality, and hypostatizes that which can not be anything but an idea? (page 377, line 29.)

§ 2333.—Can not cogitate any single or individual thing as necessary, even though I may be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis. (page 378, line 9.)

§ 2334.—Inevitable inference is that necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves, but merely subjective principles of reason. (page 378, line 24.)

§ 2335.—Both principles, in their purely heuristic* and regulative character, and as concerning merely the formal interest of reason, are quite consistent with each other. (page 378, line 36.)

* Promotive of discovery. See § 2401.

§ 2336.—Must accept the absolutely necessary as out of and beyond the world. (page 379, line 11.)

§ 2337.—Matter, and in general all that forms part of the world of sense, can not be a necessary primal being, nor even a principle of empirical unity. (page 379, line 17.) Cf. §§ 2175, 2176. Cf. Fischer, page 269, and § 2380.

§ 2338.—Absolute necessity exists merely in my own mind, as the formal condition of thought, but not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence. (page 380, line 15.)

TITLE VI.—OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROOF.
(§§ 2339-2354 inclusive.)

§ 2339.—Grounding our argument upon a determinate experience of the phenomena of the present world, their constitution and disposition. (page 381, line 7.)

§ 2340.—Essence of an idea consists in the fact that no experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate with it. (page 381, line 19.)

§ 2341.—All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible experience and the objects of the sensible world. (p. 381, l. 32.)

§ 2342.—Universe must sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain of contingencies, there exists something that is primal and self-subsistent. (page 382, line 4.)

§ 2343.—Supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, what is to prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection as to place it above the sphere of all that is possible? (page 382, line 26.)

§ 2344.—Belief in a Divine Author of the universe rises to the power of an irresistible conviction. (page 383, line 4.)

§ 2345.—Hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. (page 383, line 15.)

§ 2346.—Physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the existence of a Supreme Being. It must intrust this to the ontological argument, to which it serves merely as an introduction. (page 383, line 26.)

§ 2347.—Momenta in the physico-theological argument. (page 384, line 1.)

§ 2348.—Inferred from the analogy of certain products of nature with those of human art. (page 384, line 21.)

§ 2349.—Demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a CREATOR of the world, to whom all things are subject. (page 384, line 41.)

§ 2350.—Conception of this cause must contain certain *determinate* qualities. (page 385, line 18.)

§ 2351.—Physico-theology incapable of presenting a determinate conception of a Supreme Cause of the world. (page 385, line 39.)

§ 2352.—Rekurs, in its embarrassment, to the cosmological argument. (page 386, line 8.)

§ 2353.—Physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with contempt the transcendental mode of argument. (p. 386, l. 29.)

§ 2354.—Ontological proof the only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all to pure reason. (page 387, line 12.)

TITLE VII.—CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY BASED UPON SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES OF REASON. (§§ 2355-2371 inclusive.)

§ 2355.—Theology is based either upon reason, or upon revelation. The former is either transcendental or natural theology. (page 387, line 23.)

§ 2356.—Deist believes in a transcendental theology alone; the theist acknowledges the possibility of a natural theology also. (page 387, line 31.)

§ 2357.—Transcendental theology divided into cosmotheology and ontotheology. (page 388, line 8.)

§ 2358.—Natural theology is either physico-theology or moral-theology. (page 388, line 15.)

§ 2359.—Deist believes in a God; the theist in a LIVING God (*summa intelligentia*). (page 388, line 23.)

§ 2360.—Practical employment of reason is that by which I cognize apriori what ought to happen. (p. 389, l. 3.) Cf. § 2231.

§ 2361.—Moral laws postulate the existence of a Supreme Being. (page 389, line 9.) See § 2567. [*Postulate*: see § 1857.]

§ 2362.—Theoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a thing can not be attained otherwise than apriori by means of conceptions. (page 389, line 27.)

§ 2363.—Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or certain conceptions of an object which is not given and can not be discovered by means of experience. (page 389, line 39.) Cf. logic § 1167.

§ 2364.—Principle that everything which happens (the *empirically* contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of nature, but not of speculative cognition. (page 390, line 4.)

§ 2365.—Assertion of a reason employing its principles in a speculative manner. Assertion that the existence of substance itself is contingent, is not justified by experience. (p. 390, l. 17.)

§ 2366.—Rational theology can have no existence unless it is founded upon the laws of morality. (page 390, line 35.)

§ 2367.—All transcendental procedure in reference to speculative theology is without result. (page 391, line 23.)

§ 2368.—Cognition of the EXISTENCE of the object depends upon the object's being posited and given in itself *apart from the conception*. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our conception without the aid of experience. (page 391, line 38.) Cf. § 2282.

§ 2369.—Pure speculative reason is of the highest utility in correcting our conception of the Supreme Being. (page 392, line 30.)

§ 2370.—Transcendental theology of importance in a negative respect. To overthrow all contradictory assertions, be they atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. (page 392, line 39.)

§ 2371.—Conception which perfects and crowns the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. (page 393, line 22.)

APPENDIX TO TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. (§§ 2372-2444 inclusive.) See § 2836.

Scholion I.—Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason. (§§ 2372-2407 inclusive.)

§ 2372.—Transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the understanding. (p. 394, l. 4.)

§ 2373.—Errors of *subreptio* (of misapplication) are to be ascribed to defects of judgment, and not to understanding or reason. (page 394, line 18.) Cf. §§ 1926-1928.

§ 2374.—Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates immediately to the understanding alone. (p. 394, l. 35.)

§ 2375.—Transcendental ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas; but they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects—as *regulative* ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim. (page 395, line 15.)

§ 2376.—Demands complete unity in the cognition of the understanding (not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of a system connected according to necessary laws). (p. 395, l. 39.)

§ 2377.—Conceptions of reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary we employ them for the interrogation and investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long as it is not adequate to them. (page 396, line 12.) § 2387.

§ 2378.—Hypothetical employment of reason, and the demonstrative or apodictic* employment of reason. (page 396, line 31.)
[* See § 2328.]

§ 2379.—Hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive, but merely regulative. (page 397, line 8.)

§ 2380.—Object of the hypothetical employment of reason is the systematic unity of cognitions. (page 397, line 19.)

§ 2381.—Systematic unity of cognitions is a logical principle, whose aim is to assist the understanding. This regulative principle, transformed by a natural and unavoidable dialectic (§ 1933) into an illusory transcendental principle of reason, would render this systematic unity objectively necessary. (p. 397, l. 29.) § 2337.

§ 2382.—Illustrate this by an example. (The idea of a fundamental power.) (page 398, line 5.)

§ 2383.—Try to discover and introduce it, so far as is practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions. (page 398, line 30.) [In this and the preceding section appears, developed as a heuristic principle for the investigation of nature, insofar as it could be properly stated as an appendage to a system of pure reason, the doctrine of the correlation of forces, anticipating the natural philosophers by two generations. This would be a good place for the positivists and cosmic philosophers to remark that the pursuit of metaphysics is an idle and profitless employment.*]

* Kant's authority as a natural philosopher is not altogether derived from the Critique of Pure Reason, although it might securely rest thereon. Ernst Haeckel, Professor in the University of Jena, in his *History of Creation* (Appleton, New York, 1876, vol. i., p. 101), says: "Even in the year 1755, in his 'General History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens,' he made the bold attempt to discuss the constitution and the mechanical origin of the whole universe, according to Newton's principles, and to explain them mechanically by the natural course of development, to the exclusion of all miracles. This cosmogeny of Kant's, or cosmological gas theory, which we shall briefly discuss in a future chapter," [page 321, sqq.], "was at a later day fully established by the French mathematician Laplace, and the English astronomer Herschel, and enjoys at the present day almost universal recognition. On account of this important work alone, in which exact knowledge is coupled with most profound speculation, Kant deserves the honorable name of a natural philosopher, in the best and purest sense of the word."—See Appendix XI. below.

§ 2384.—Transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us to believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical, but that it possesses objective validity. (page 398, line 39.)

§ 2385.—Can not understand how a logical principle of unity can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle by which such a systematic unity (as a property of objects themselves) is regarded as necessary a priori. (page 399, line 16.) § 2875.

§ 2386.—Find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different forms in the principles of philosophers. (page 399, line 39.)

§ 2387.—Presupposed by philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim which forbids us unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles. (page 400, line 12.) §§ 2377, 2343.

§ 2388.—Logical principle of genera, if it is to be applied to nature, presupposes a transcendental principle (of homogeneity). (page 401, line 3.)

§ 2389.—Balanced by another principle, that of species, which requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their accordance in the same genus, and directs the understanding to attend to the one no less than to the other. (page 401, line 20.)

§ 2390.—No species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest possible. (page 402, line 3.) See § 1198.

§ 2391.—Based upon a transcendental law of specification. The cognition of phenomena in their complete determination (which is possible only by means of the understanding) requires an unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and a progression to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction had been made in the conception of the species, and still more in that of the genus. (page 402, line 25.)

§ 2392.—Law of specification can not be deduced from experience. (page 403, line 4.)

§ 2393.—Understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of differences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that these objects are homogeneous. (page 403, line 16.)

§ 2394.—Reason prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations of this faculty by the principles of (1) the homogeneity, (2) the specification, and (3) the continuity of forms. (page 403, line 23.) See §§ 2396 and 2397.

§ 2395.—Illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical principles. Till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and true horizon, which is determined by the highest conception, and which contains under itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and sub-species. (page 403, line 39.) See § 1065.

§ 2396.—Principle *datur continuum formarum* indicates that all differences of species limit each other and do not admit of transition from one to another by a *saltus*, but only through smaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. (page 404, line 17.) Cf. § 2394.

§ 2397.—Enouncing the fact of homogeneity as existing even in the most varied diversity, by means of the gradual transition from one species to another. (page 404, line 39.)

§ 2398.—Presupposes a transcendental principle, without which the understanding might be led into error. Principles of parcimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both with reason and with nature. (page 405, line 9.) § 2892.

§ 2399.—Continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. (page 405, line 29.) Meiklejohn refers to § 1735 *et. seqq.*

§ 2400.—Arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order conformable to their employment in experience: (1) variety; (2) affinity; (3) unity. (page 406, line 3.)

§ 2401.—Available as rules for possible experience. They may also be employed with great advantage as heuristic principles [i. e. promotive of discovery or invention]. (page 406, line 38.) [Cf. §§ 1990, 1579, 1592, in reference to deduction.] *Asymptotic*: like a tangent to an infinitely distant curve. See Webster, sub nom. Asymptote. [See § 2411.]

§ 2402.—Principles of pure reason can not be constitutive* even in regard to empirical conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be discovered, and they can not *therefore* have an object *in concreto*. (page 407, line 11.) [*§§ 1714, 1715, 1752, 1753.] *Schema*: see § 1668.

§ 2403.—Analogon of a schema for the complete systematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding. (p. 407, l. 25.)

§ 2404.—Objective validity of the principles of pure reason as regulative principles. (page 408, line 10.)

§ 2405.—Maxims of reason are subjective principles derived from the interest which reason has in producing a certain completeness in her cognition. (page 408, line 23.)

§ 2406.—Regarded as objective principles, they must not only occasion contradictions and polemic, but place hindrances in the way of the advancement of truth. (page 404, line 30.)

§ 2407.—Method of investigating the order of nature which guides us to the goal of systematic unity. (page 409, line 31.)

Scholion II.—Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason. (§§ 2408-2443 inclusive.) See §§ 2837, 748, 2316.

§ 2408.—Ideas of pure reason can not be of themselves and in their own nature dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that fallacies and illusions arise. (page 410, line 17.) See § 2833 and Fischer (page lxiv.) where Mahaffy quotes from this section, in correcting Hamilton. [§ 2435.]

§ 2409.—Deduction of the ideas of pure reason must be possible, if they are to possess the least objective validity. (p. 410, l. 31.)

§ 2410.—Object (1) in an absolute sense, or (2) merely an ideal object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the object; in the latter case, nothing is present to the mind but a mere schema. (page 410, line 40.)

§ 2411.—Idea is properly a heuristic and not an ostensive* conception. It does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an object. (page 411, line 8.) [**Showing*. That is, promotive of discovery by urging toward the goal, but not itself discovering.] §§ 2335, 2401.

§ 2412.—Transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas (not as constitutive principles, but as regulative principles.) (page 411, line 24.) See §§ 1753, 2402.

§ 2413.—Guided by the principles involved in these ideas. (page 411, line 40.) §§ 2808, 2818.

§ 2414.—Regarded not as actual things, but as in some measure analogous to them. (page 412, line 29.) See § 2828.

§ 2415.—Admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience. We extend merely the empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity. (page 413, line 14.)

§ 2416.—Transcendental and only determinate conception of God which is presented to us *by speculative reason* is in the strictest sense *deistic*. (page 413, line 28.) §§ 2827, 2296, 2573.

§ 2417.—Admitting a divine being, I can have no conception of the internal possibility of its perfection or of the necessity of its existence. (page 414, line 3.)

§ 2418.—Distinction in regard to the way in which we may cogitate a presupposition. I may have sufficient grounds to admit something, or the existence of something, in a relative point of view (*suppositio relativa*), without being justified in admitting it in an absolute sense (*suppositio absoluta*). (page 414, line 16.)

§ 2419.—Admit the existence of an incomprehensible being of this nature (the object of a mere idea) *relatively to the world of sense*, although I have no ground to admit its existence absolutely

and in itself. (page 414, line 28.) [See § 2258 and cf. § 1673 in reference to concrete representation.] See § 2818.

§ 2420.—Regarding all connections and relations in the world of sense AS IF they were the dispositions of a Supreme Reason. (page 415, line 18.) Cf. § 529. See, § 2825.

§ 2421.—Cogitate merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest possible systematic unity of experience. (page 415, line 31.)

§ 2422.—Supposition of a Supreme Being or Cause is purely relative. (page 416, line 10.)

§ 2423.—Unity of reason is the unity of system; and this systematic unity is not an objective principle, extending its dominion over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending its authority over the empirical cognition of objects. (p. 416, l. 22.) See §§ 328, 2569.

§ 2424.—Object of the idea forms merely the problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces among the phenomena of the sensuous world. (p. 417, l. 5.) [§ 2441 *sub finem*.]

§ 2425.—Left completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this so-called ground may be. (page 417, line 20.)

§ 2426.—Psychological idea is meaningless and inapplicable, except as the schema of a regulative conception. (page 417, line 33.) [*Palingenesis*: regeneration. See Webster, under Palingenesia.]

§ 2427.—Cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles, and not constitutive. (p. 419, l. 9.) *In indefinitum*: see. § 1483.

§ 2428.—Theological idea does not contain any constitutive principle. (page 420, line 1.)

§ 2429.—Hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as a principle which is purely regulative. (Reason aims at the highest degree of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a causality according to design in a supreme cause—a cause which it regards as the highest intelligence.) (page 420, line 25.) [*Teleological*: pertaining to the science of the final causes of things. See Webster.]

§ 2430.—Neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely regulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. (page 421, line 31.)

§ 2431.—Inactive reason (*ignava ratio*) the first error which arises from our employing the idea of a Supreme Being as a constitutive principle, and not as a regulative principle. Prejudicial consequences. (Directing us to refer such and such phenomena immediately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to investigate their causes in the general laws of the mechanism of matter.) (page 422, line 5.) [*For* which no particular arrangement, etc.: *from*.]

§ 2432.—Perverted reason (*perversa ratio*) the second error which arises from the misconception of the principle of systematic unity. (Hinders reason from attaining its proper aim, that is, the proof, upon natural grounds, of the existence of a Supreme Intelligent Cause.) (page 423, line 32.) [This argument on perverse reason is very clear and conclusive.]

§ 2433.—Reason ever follows the light of the idea of an Author of the Universe. (page 424, line 27.) [Thus, then,] to take, etc.; [but, if not misdirected], the investigation, etc.

§ 2434.—Idea of unity is essentially and indissolubly connected with the nature of our reason. (page 425, line 3.)

§ 2435.—Always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may raise. (page 425, line 19.) Cf. §§ 2137, 2142, 2408.

§ 2436.—Whether there is anything distinct from the world, which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according to general laws? (page 425, line 31.)

§ 2437.—Whether this being is substance? whether it is of the greatest reality? whether it is necessary? etc. (page 426, line 3.)

2438.—Whether we may not cogitate this being, which is distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience? (page 426, line 14.)

§ 2439.—MUST assume the existence of a wise and omnipotent Author of the world. (page 426, line 33.)

§ 2440.—Use of this conception and hypothesis in the investigation of nature. (page 427, line 13.)

§ 2441.—Justified in introducing into the idea of the Supreme Cause other anthropomorphic elements. (p. 428, l. 12.) Cf. § 2438.

§ 2442.—Directs reason to its proper field of action, nature and her phenomena. (page 428, line 36.)

§ 2443.—Pure reason is found to contain nothing but regulative principles. (page 429, line 5.)

§ 2444.—Speculative reason can never pass the bounds of possible experience. (page 429, line 19.)

TOME II.—TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. (§§ 2445–2628 inclusive.)

§ 2445.—Relates not to the materials, but to the plan of an edifice (if we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason as an edifice). (page 431, line 3.) [See § 977.]

§ 2446.—Transcendental doctrine of method, the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. (page 431, line 26.) Cf. Fischer, page 277.

Chapter I.—The Discipline of Pure Reason. (§§ 2447-2541 inclusive.)

§ 2447.—Negative judgments. In relation to the content of our cognition, their peculiar province is solely to prevent error. (page 432, line 12.)

§ 2448.—Discipline takes a negative, culture and doctrine a positive part. (The restraint which is employed to repress and finally to extirpate the constant inclination to depart from certain rules, is termed discipline.) (page 432, line 28.)

§ 2449.—Reason stands in great need of discipline, to restrain its propensity to overstep the limits of possible experience, and to keep it from wandering into error. (page 433, line 8.)

§ 2450.—Discipline of pure reason in the methodology is not directed to the content, but to the method of the cognition of pure reason. (page 434, line 9.)

TITLE I.—THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN THE SPHERE OF DOGMATISM. (§§ 2451-2480 inclusive.)

§ 2451.—Mathematics presents the most brilliant example of the extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experience. (page 434, line 25.) Dogmatical: see § 2478.

§ 2452.—Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of conceptions; mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conceptions. (p. 435, l. 1.) § 1021.

§ 2453.—Philosophical cognition regards the particular only in the general; mathematical, the general in the particular. (page 435, line 23.)

§ 2454.—Essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists, therefore, in this formal quality (§ 2453); it does not regard the difference of the matter or objects. (page 435, line 31.)

§ 2455.—Mathematics arrives at results which discursive cognition can not hope to reach by the aid of mere conceptions. (page 436, line 24.) [Mahaffy (Fischer, page 279, note) says that the passage relating to the symbolical representation of the construction of conceptions in algebra by means of signs is "confused in the translation."]

§ 2456.—Cause of this difference in the fortune of the philosopher and the mathematician. (page 437, line 25.)

§ 2457.—What is the cause which necessitates this two-fold exercise of reason? [§ 2452.] (page 438, line 25.)

§ 2458.—All our knowledge relates finally to possible intuitions, for it is these alone that present objects to the mind. (page 438, line 33.) Cf. § 2282.

§ 2459.—Matter of phenomena, by which things are given in space and time, can be represented only in perception, *aposteriori*. (page 439, line 1.)

§ 2460.—Transcendental propositions can not be framed by means of the construction of conceptions. They contain merely the rule by which we are to seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical unity of that which can not be intuited *apriori*. (page 439, line 16.)

§ 2461.—Synthetical judgment regarding a conception must go beyond it, to the intuition in which it is given. (page 439, line 28.) Cf. §§ 1110, 1701, 1448.

§ 2462.—Transcendental proposition is a synthetical cognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the discursive method. (page 440, line 10.)

§ 2463.—Discursive and intuitive modes of cognition have the properties of universality and an *apriori* origin in common, but are, in their procedure, of widely different character. (page 440, line 26.)

§ 2464.—Masters in the science of mathematics are confident of the success of this method in other regions of mental endeavor besides that of quantities. (page 441, line 34.)

§ 2465.—Mathematical method is unattended in the sphere of philosophy by the least advantage. (page 442, line 27.)

§ 2466.—Evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms and demonstrations. None of these forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy, in the sense in which they are understood by mathematicians. (page 443, line 1.)

§ 2467.—Definition is the representation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception of a thing within its own limits. (page 443, line 14.)

§ 2468.—Empirical conception can not be defined; it can only be explained. (page 443, line 16.)

§ 2469.—*Apriori* conceptions, such as those of substance, cause, right, fitness, can not be defined. (page 444, line 3.)

§ 2470.—Arbitrary conceptions can always be defined. Consequently, the science of mathematics alone possesses definitions. (page 444, line 19.)

§ 2471.—Philosophical definitions are therefore merely expositions of given conceptions, while mathematical definitions are constructions of conceptions originally formed by the mind itself. (page 445, line 1.)

§ 2472.—Must not imitate in philosophy, the mathematical usage of commencing with definitions—except by way of hypothesis or experiment. (page 445, line 9.)

§ 2473.—Mathematical definitions can not be erroneous. (page 445, line 25.)

§ 2474.—Axioms, insofar as they are immediately certain, are apriori synthetical principles. (page 446, line 16.)

§ 2475.—Philosophy possesses no axioms, and has no right to impose its apriori principles upon thought until it has established their authority and validity by a thorough-going deduction. (page 446, line 28.) *List of principles*: §§ 1713, 1714.

§ 2476.—Demonstration: an apodictic proof, based upon intuition. Discursive proofs ought to be termed acroamatic * proofs, rather than demonstrations. (page 447, line 14.) [* Cf. Logic, § 1245. Designed for hearing only, while a demonstration is something pointed out, to be seen.]

§ 2477.—Not consonant with the nature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure reason, to employ the dogmatical method, and to adorn itself with the titles and insignia of mathematical science. (page 448, line 1.)

§ 2478.—DOGMA is a direct synthetical proposition, based on conceptions; a proposition of the same kind, based on the construction of conceptions, is a *mathema*. (page 448, line 21.) [Dogma (from DOKEO) means that which appears to be, or seems to be. It does not mean that which *is seen* to be, for DOKEO is strictly opposed to EINAI. (See Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon, Article DOKEO.) It follows that a dogma is a rule constructed to simulate an axiom or demonstration. A dogma is not necessarily false; but it can not be *shown* to be true. Hence dogmata constitute the rational dialectic, and are not able to contend successfully with discursive principles based upon experience, although these latter may be equally dogmatic.]

§ 2479.—Pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain a single direct synthetical judgment based upon conceptions. When experience is presupposed, the principles of the pure understanding [§ 1713] are apodictically certain; but in themselves and directly, they can not even be cognized apriori. (page 448, line 39.) See § 1706. [*Theorem*: a demonstrable mathema; a rule based upon contemplation (§ 1963).]

§ 2480.—Dogmatical methods only serve to conceal errors and fallacies, and to deceive philosophy. (page 449, line 20.)

TITLE II.—THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN POLEMICS. (§§ 2481-2516.)

§ 2481.—Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism. (page 449, line 39.)

§ 2482.—Justification of reason, when it has to defend itself, not before a judge, but against an equal. (page 450, line 12.)

§ 2483.—Polemic of pure reason is the defense of its propositions made by reason in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions advanced by other parties! (page 450, line 26.)

§ 2484.—Reason in its highest exercise falls into an antithetic—but we found that it was based upon a misconception [§ 2164]. (page 450, line 36.)

§ 2485.—Cases in which a similar misunderstanding can not be provided against. (page 451, line 13.)

§ 2486.—Sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason (the existence of a Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul) can not be hoped for. (But we can always meet our opponent with a *non liquet* ["My firm foundation does not MELT away" (§ 1962)]. See § 2534.) (page 451, line 33.)

§ 2487.—Appear no combatant whom we need to fear. (page 452, line 22.) Cf. § 2498.

§ 2488.—Everything in nature is good for some purpose. (page 452, line 32.) Cf. § 2833.

§ 2489.—Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him only with the weapons of reason. (p. 453, l. 13.)

§ 2490.—Unfair to decry Priestley and Hume, blameless in moral character. (page 453, line 26.)

§ 2491.—Absurd to expect to be enlightened by reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt. (page 454, line 20.)

§ 2492.—Strife of dialectic requires perfect freedom. (p. 455, l. 9.)

§ 2493.—Unworthy propensity to conceal our real sentiments, and to give expression only to certain received opinions, corrupts the heart. (page 455, line 16.)

§ 2494.—Tendency to misrepresentation and hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion. (page 455, line 40.)

§ 2495.—Consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, there can be really no polemic of pure reason. (page 456, line 36.)

§ 2496.—Critique of pure reason. Why it may be regarded as the highest tribunal for all speculative disputes. (p. 457, l. 16.)

§ 2497.—Freedom of critical investigation will, among other things, permit of our openly stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve. (page 457, line 39.)

§ 2498.—Dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to criticism, and enables us to test and correct its principles, while there is no occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results of his reasoning. (page 458, line 5.)

§ 2499.—Critical system ought to be pursued in academical instruction. (page 458, line 40.)

§ 2500.—Skepticism is merely a means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams, and exciting it to a more careful investigation into its own powers and pretensions. (page 460, line 11.)

Skepticism not a permanent state for human reason. (§§ 2501–2516 inclusive.)

§ 2501.—Consciousness of ignorance (unless this ignorance is recognized to be absolutely necessary) ought, instead of forming the conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. (page 461, line 8.)

§ 2502.—Cognition of absolutely necessary ignorance is an apriori science. (page 461, line 22.) [Note the use of word *apriori* in this section, *sub finem*.] § 1071.

§ 2503.—Sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a level surface, with an apparent horizon. All the questions raised by pure reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon, or at least in its boundary line. (p. 462, l. 5.) § 2832.

§ 2504.—Hume was unable to determine the horizon of our knowledge. He inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical. (page 462, line 14.) § 1065.

§ 2505.—Skepticism must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent employment of principles. (page 462, line 31.)

§ 2506.—Criticism demonstrates from indubitable principles, not merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in regard to all possible questions of a certain class. (page 462, line 40.)

§ 2507.—Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of the bounds of which we have only a general knowledge; it ought rather to be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found from the curvature of its surface (that is, the nature of apriori synthetical propositions), and consequently its circumference and extent. (page 463, line 17.) Cf. § 2642.

§ 2508.—Reason is the sole creator of all her ideas, and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature. (page 463, line 28.) See § 2435.

§ 2509.—Skepticism does not in itself give us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. (p. 464, l. 13.)

§ 2510.—Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all skeptical philosophers, and his writings have undoubtedly exerted the most powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation into its own powers. (page 464, line 26.) Cf. § 2639.

§ 2511.—Hume did not distinguish the synthetical judgments of the pure understanding from those of the pure reason. The so-called apriori principles of these faculties he regarded as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in experience. (page 464, line 34.)

§ 2512.—Hume was wrong in inferring, from the contingency of the determination according to law, the contingency of the law

[of causality] itself; and the passing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience (which is an *apriori* proceeding, constituting the objective reality of the conception) he confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience, which is always empirical. (page 465, line 18.)

§ 2513.—Hume denies, with truth, certain powers to the understanding; but he goes further, and declares it to be utterly inadequate to the *apriori* extension of knowledge, although he has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty. (page 466, line 13.)

§ 2514.—Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason; against which [latter], however, his attacks are mainly directed. (page 466, line 39.)

§ 2515.—Attacks of skepticism are not only dangerous but destructive to the uncritical dogmatist. (page 467, line 12.)

§ 2516.—Skeptical procedure in philosophy does not present any *solution* of the problems of reason; but it forms an excellent *exercise* for its powers, awakening its circumspection, and indicating the means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to its legitimate possessions. (page 467, line 22.)

TITLE III.—THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN HYPOTHESIS. (§§ 2517-2530 inclusive.)

§ 2517.—Where we can not know with certainty, we are at liberty to form suppositions. (page 467, line 36.) §§ 1163, 1117.

§ 2518.—Suppositions must be based on something that is perfectly certain, and that is the possibility of the object. Furthermore, a supposition must be connected, as its ground of explanation, with that which is really given and absolutely certain. (page 468, line 4.) Cf. §§ 1162, 2584, 1856.

§ 2519.—Can not, in accordance with the categories, imagine or invent any object or any property of an object not given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ it in a hypothesis; otherwise we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon mere chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of things. (page 468, line 13.) See § 2261.

§ 2520.—Ideas do not relate to any object in any kind of experience. Consequently they can not be employed as hypotheses in the explanation of real phenomena. (page 468, line 37.)

§ 2521.—Transcendental hypotheses would not assist the understanding in its application to objects. (page 469, line 24.)

§ 2522.—Transcendental hypotheses do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress. (page 470, line 9.)

§ 2523.—Sufficiency is requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis. It must be sufficient alone to determine the given consequences, and must not be supported by auxiliary hypotheses. (page 470, line 24.) [Cf. Hadrian. Imper.—

Animula, vagula, blandula,
Hospes comesque corporis,
Quæ nunc abibis in loca?

See the text in Byron's *Hours of Idleness*; or in Dr. Thomas' *Biographical Dict.*, Art. HADRIAN, page 1108. Cf. § 2967.]

§ 2524.—Opinion must be restricted to the world of experience and nature. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can either cognize a proposition entirely apriori, and as necessary, or it can cognize nothing at all; and hence the judgments it enounces are never mere opinions (they are either apodictic certainties, or declarations that nothing can be known on the subject). (page 471, line 5.)

§ 2525.—Hypotheses are admissible in polemic, but not in the sphere of dogmatism. In relation to its practical exercise, reason has the right of admitting what in the field of pure speculation she would not be justified in supposing except upon perfectly sufficient grounds. (page 471, line 26.)

§ 2526.—Opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves. The difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. (page 472, line 24.)

§ 2527.—Thinker, to be fully equipped, requires the hypotheses of pure reason—(e. g. in relation to the immateriality of the soul [which, however, is a wholly unwarrantable assumption]). (page 473, line 3.) Cf. §§ 2523, 2529, 2023.

§ 2528.—Adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life is properly intelligible, and not subject to changes of time, and that it neither began in birth nor will end in death. (page 473, line 27.)

§ 2529.—Such hypothetical defenses (§§ 2525–2528) against the pretensions of an opponent, must not be regarded as declarations of opinion. (page 474, line 9.)

§ 2530.—Guard against any assumption of absolute validity, (page 474, line 31.)

TITLE IV.—THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON IN RELATION TO PROOFS.
(§§ 2531–2541 inclusive.)

§ 2531.—Peculiarity which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental synthetical propositions. First obliged to prove apriori the objective validity of the conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses. (page 475, line 11.)

§ 2532.—Require, before attempting any proof of a proposition of pure reason, to consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of

cognition by the operations of pure reason. (page 476, line 15.) [*Consequently simple*: I do not see the "consequently." To my mind, the simple is a representation which *does* take account of the content in space, and declares that content to be *not quantum continuum*. (See § 2011.)]

§ 2533.—First rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt a transcendental proof, before we have considered from what source we are to derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based, and what right we have to expect that our conclusions from these principles will be veracious. (page 477, line 23.)

§ 2534.—Unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof is based, we have a right to demand a deduction of the principles employed in it. (page 477, line 35.) Cf. § 2486.

§ 2535.—Transcendental proposition can not rest upon more than a single proof. (Second peculiarity.) (Because it is the conception alone which determines the object). The proof can not contain anything more than the determination of the object according to the conception. (page 478, line 6.)

§ 2536.—Serves to simplify very much the criticism of all propositions of reason. (page 479, line 5.)

§ 2537.—Transcendental proofs must never be apagogic,* or indirect, but always ostensive, or direct. (page 479, line 19.) [*Drawn aside.—See Webster. Like the proofs in the antimonies (§ 2067 *et seqq*) except the fourth thesis (§ 2105).]

§ 2538.—Reason why indirect proofs are employed in different sciences. (page 479, line 34.)

§ 2539.—Apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an objective cognition. (page 480, line 22.)

§ 2540.—Apagogic method of arriving at the truth, in the transcendental sphere of pure reason and in the case of synthetical propositions, is impossible. (page 481, line 2.)

§ 2541.—Apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy. (page 481, line 30.)

Chapter II.—The Canon of Pure Reason. (§§ 2542-2596 inclusive.)

§ 2542.—Use of all philosophy of pure reason is of a purely negative character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a discipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise. (page 482, line 24.)

§ 2543.—Must be some source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which become the causes of error only from our mistaking their true character, while

they form the goal toward which reason continually strives. (page 483, line 5.)

§ 2544.—Canon : a list of the apriori principles of the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. (page 483, line 17.) Cf. § 1656.

§ 2545.—Canon of pure reason will relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use of reason. (page 483, line 25.)

TITLE I.—OF THE ULTIMATE END OF THE PURE USE OF REASON. (§§ 2546-2555 inclusive.)

§ 2546.—Natural desire to venture beyond the field of experience. (page 483, line 38.)

§ 2547.—Highest aims must, from the nature of reason, possess complete unity. (page 484, line 6.)

§ 2548.—Transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things: (1) the freedom of the will; (2) the immortality of the soul; (3) the existence of God. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small. (page 484, line 14.)

§ 2549.—Real value and importance of these three cardinal propositions relate to our practical and not to our speculative interest. (page 485, line 10.)

§ 2550.—Moral laws alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of a canon. (page 485, line 15.) [*Pragmatical*: exhibiting the connection of cause and consequence. A practical law ordains the end—or, more strictly, commands action irrespective of the end; while a pragmatic law directs upon a given end, irrespective of the character of the end. An end contravening the practical command is disallowed; but it is impossible for the end to contravene the pragmatical law, because the latter must be constructed expressly in view of the former. See § 49.] Cf. § 46 *et seqq.*

§ 2551.—Reason's ultimate end—the practical answer to the question *What we ought to do*, if the will is free, if there is a God, and a future world. (page 485, line 35.) See § 1027.

§ 2552.—Excluding all psychological (that is, empirical) elements. (page 486, line 3.)

§ 2553.—Practical laws. Freedom in the practical sense. Reason enounces laws which are imperative or objective laws of freedom, and which tell us what ought to take place. (p. 486, l. 10.)

§ 2554.—All we have to do, in the practical sphere, is to inquire into the *rule* of conduct which reason has to present. (p. 487, l. 1.)

§ 2555.—Canon of pure reason has to do with two questions of practical interest: (1) Is there a God? (2) Is there a future life? (page 487, line 17.)

TITLE II.—OF THE IDEAL OF THE SUMMUM BONUM AS A DETERMINING GROUND OF THE ULTIMATE END OF PURE REASON. (§§ 2556–2578 inclusive.)

§ 2556.—Now remains for us to consider whether reason can be employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason (page 487, line 30.)

§ 2557.—Knowledge in regard to those two problems lies beyond our reach. (page 488, line 5.) Cf. § 1027.

§ 2558.—HOPING stands in precisely the same relation to the practical and the law of morality, as KNOWING to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature. (page 488, line 25.)

§ 2559.—Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires. The moral law dictates how we ought to act in order to deserve happiness. (page 448, line 36.)

§ 2560.—Assume that there are pure moral laws, absolutely imperative. (page 489, line 14.)

§ 2561.—Principles of pure reason in its practical, but especially in its moral use, possess objective validity. (page 489, line 24.)

§ 2562.—Idea of a moral world has objective reality—not as referring to an object of intellectual intuition (for of such an object we can form no conception whatever), but to the world of sense (conceived, however, as an object* of pure reason in its practical use). (page 489, line 40.) [*That is to say, the power of practical reason is here presupposed. See §§ 178, 2560.] [*Pravity*: crookedness—deviation from right.—See Webster.]

§ 2563.—Answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason which relate to its practical interest: *Do that which will render thee worthy of happiness.* (page 490, line 18.)

§ 2564.—System of morality is inseparably (though only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that of happiness. (page 490, line 20.)

§ 2565.—Necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavor to become worthy of happiness, can not be cognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. (page 490, line 34.)

§ 2566.—GOD and A FUTURE LIFE are two hypotheses which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which this reason imposes upon us. (page 491, line 18.) [Kant's doctrine of a future life—how connected with the principles of pure reason.] Cf. §§ 3037, 3046. Cf. Athenagoras (Ueberweg, Hist. Phil. § 79, tr. Morris, vol. i., page 297, line 44.)

§ 2567.—Moral laws could not be universally regarded as commands, did they not connect a priori adequate consequences with

their dictates, and thus carry with them promises and threats. (page 491, line 35.) [Koran.]

§ 2568.—Leibnitz distinguished THE KINGDOM OF GRACE from THE KINGDOM OF NATURE. (page 492, line 9.)

§ 2569.—Observance of moral laws proceeds according to maxims. (page 492, line 21.) Cf. §§ 328, 147.

§ 2570.—Without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, the ideas of morality can not be the springs of purpose and action. (page 492, line 26.)

§ 2571.—Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the complete good. (page 492, line 38.) § 3029.

§ 2572.—Happiness in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness) constitutes alone the supreme good. (page 493, line 17.) § 3061.

§ 2573.—Moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of A SOLE, PERFECT, AND RATIONAL First Cause. (page 493, line 30.)

§ 2574.—Teleological unity of all things according to universal natural laws. (Transcendental theology.) (page 494, line 12.)

§ 2575.—Effect of the practical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us. (Transcendental enlargement of our rational cognition.) (page 494, line 37.) [*This will*: see § 2573.]

§ 2576.—Christianity's effect (of its pure moral conceptions) in correcting our conception of the Divine Being. (page 495, line 13.)

§ 2577.—Moral actions must not be looked upon as binding on us because they are the commands of God, but we must regard them as divine commands because we are internally bound by them. (page 495, line 39.)

§ 2578.—Moral theology is therefore only of immanent use. (page 496, line 21.)

TITLE III.—OF OPINION, KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. (§§ 2579-2596 inclusive.)
Cf. § 1114 et seqq.

§ 2579.—Conviction is a judgment which rests on objective grounds and is valid for every rational being. (page 496, line 35.) [*i. e.* conviction is the subjective phase of knowledge. See § 2583].

§ 2580.—Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. (page 497, line 3.) See especially § 1134.

§ 2581.—Persuasion can not be subjectively distinguished from conviction. Means of detecting the merely private validity of a judgment. How to expose the illusion. (page 497, line 20.)

§ 2582.—Conviction alone can be maintained. Persuasion I may keep for myself. (page 497, line 38.)

§ 2583.—Holding for true has the three following degrees: (1) opinion; (2) belief; (3) knowledge. (page 498, line 1.) Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed *CONVICTION* (for myself); objective sufficiency is termed *CERTAINTY* (for all). Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. [See §§ 1133, 1124, 2594, 2579.] Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment subjectively as well as objectively.

§ 2584.—Must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something. (page 498, line 12.) §§ 2564, 2524.

§ 2585.—Opinion has no place in the judgments of pure reason. (page 498, line 19.)

§ 2586.—Belief can not be admitted in speculative inquiries. (page 498, line 31.)

§ 2587.—Theoretically insufficient judgment can be termed belief only from the practical point of view. (page 498, line 39.)

§ 2588.—Pragmatical belief is a contingent judgment resting upon arbitrary practical grounds. (page 499, line 13.) See §§ 49, 2550. [I suppose that pragmatical belief belongs to the field of opinion, and can not properly be termed belief. In practical or moral belief, the subjective sufficiency is impregnable and secure; in pragmatical belief the subjective sufficiency is not impregnable, although it is practically sufficient. Furthermore, in the case of practical belief, objective sufficiency is known to be unattainable; but I do not know this to be the case with pragmatical belief. See Kant's note ad § 1133, and cf. § 1119.]

§ 2589.—Pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake. (page 499, line 22.)

§ 2590.—Doctrinal belief—an analogon of practical judgments, which is found in theoretical judgments. (page 499, line 39.)

§ 2591.—Doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. (page 500, line 14.) [But see § 2593.]

§ 2592.—*BELIEF* refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason. (page 501, line 4.) §§ 1118, 1121.

§ 2593.—Moral belief in the existence of God and in a future life is (unlike mere doctrinal belief) not wanting in stability. (page 501, line 19.) See §§ 1118, 2486, 1133.

§ 2594.—Belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature that I am under as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter. This conviction is not logical, but moral certainty. (page 501, line 39.) [Religious *conviction*, moral *certainly*, like doctrinal *belief* (§ 2590) are mere analogues.] See §§ 1133, 1124.

§ 2595.—Only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion, is that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral sentiments. (But in these questions, no man is free from all interest.) (page 502, line 15.) [Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. X., ix., 6, and II., i., 4, 9, (pages 509, 423, above), with Kant's note here.] See §§ 441, 248, 125.

§ 2596.—Can not advance further with the help of the highest philosophy than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding. (page 502, line 36.) § 942.

Chapter III.—The Architectonic of Pure Reason. (§§ 2597–2621 inclusive.)

§ 2597.—Architectonic: The art of constructing a system; the doctrine of the scientific in cognition. (page 503, line 24.)

§ 2598.—System—the unity of various cognitions under one idea (the idea of the form of a whole, insofar, as the conception determines apriori not only the limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is to occupy. The whole is thus an organism, and not an aggregate). (p. 503, l. 29.) [*Acervus*: a heap.]

§ 2599.—Schema which is originated from an idea (in which case reason presents us with aims apriori, and does not look for them to experience) forms the basis of architectonical unity. (Empiricism can give us nothing more than technical unity.) (page 504, line 14.)

§ 2600.—Sciences ought to be explained and defined (not according to the description which the originator gives of them, but) according to the idea which we find based in reason itself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of the science already accumulated. (page 504, line 39.)

§ 2601.—Possible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition. Our purpose is at present merely to sketch the plan of the architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason. (p. 505, l. 14.)

§ 2602.—All cognition is, from a subjective point of view, either historical or rational. (page 505, line 39.) §§ 1018, 1072.

§ 2603.—All rational cognition is either philosophical or mathematical. A cognition may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical. (page 506, line 27.) §§ 2452, 1020, 1127.

§ 2604.—Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. (Scholastic conception.) (page 507, line 7.) § 1025.

§ 2605.—Philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanæ*). (page 507, line 24.) Cf. §§ 1023–1027. and § 469.

§ 2606.—Philosopher the ideal teacher who employs conceptions as instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. (page 508, line 1.) §§ 1030, 3104.

§ 2607.—Moral philosophy relates to the one and only ultimate

end of all the operations of the mind. Why the ancients always included the idea (and in an especial manner) of MORALIST in that of PHILOSOPHER. (page 508, line 13.) See §§ 1027, 3005.

§ 2608.—Philosophy is either natural or ethical. (p. 508, l. 26.)

§ 2609.—Philosophy is either pure or empirical. (p. 508, l. 32.)

§ 2610.—Philosophy of pure reason is either propædæutic (the critical philosophy) or metaphysic (the system of pure reason). (page 508, line 36.) §§ 1469, 1424.

§ 2611.—Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical use of pure reason, and is accordingly either the metaphysic of nature or the metaphysic of ethics. (page 509, line 12.) §§ 1409, 3135.

§ 2612.—Duty of the philosopher, that the value of each different kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations of the mind, may be clearly defined. (page 509, line 29.)

§ 2613.—Metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts to represent ALL PURE APRIORI COGNITION in the peculiar and distinct systematic unity which that cognition forms. (page 511, line 10.) Cf. §§ 1469, and 2610.

§ 2614.—Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term [i. e. metaphysic of nature; see § 1409, and Meiklejohn's note there], consists of two parts: (1) transcendental philosophy, and (2) the physiology of pure reason. (page 511, line 19.)

§ 2615.—Physiology of pure reason is either (I) immanent [(1) *physica rationalis*; (2) *psychologia rationalis*] or (II) transcendent [(3) rational cosmology; (4) rational theology]. (page 511, line 28.) *Ontology*: see § 2614.

§ 2616.—Fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity dictates this division [§§ 2614, 2615]; it is therefore architectonical. (page 512, line 20.) Cf. § 2599.

§ 2617.—How is it possible to cognize the nature of things according to apriori principles, and to attain to a *rational* physiology? (page 512, line 29.)

§ 2618.—Empirical psychology must be banished from the sphere of metaphysics and placed by the side of empirical physics, as a part of applied philosophy (the apriori principles of which are contained in pure philosophy). (page 513, line 13.) § 3137.

§ 2619.—Metaphysics can never be completely abandoned. Although it can not form the foundation of religion, it must always be one of its most important bulwarks. (page 513, line 36.)

§ 2620.—Metaphysic therefore forms properly that department of knowledge which may be termed, in the truest sense of the word, philosophy. (page 514, line 17.) [*Propædæutic*: preliminary instruction.—See Webster.]

§ 2621.—Metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the culture of human reason. (page 514, line 31.)

Chapter IV.—The History of Pure Reason. (§§ 2622-2628 inclusive.)

§ 2622.—Cursory glance, from a purely transcendental point of view. (page 515, line 7.)

§ 2623.—Remarkable that, in the infancy of philosophy, the study of the nature of God and the constitution of a future world, formed the commencement, rather than the conclusion (as we should have it); of the speculative efforts of the human mind. Theology and morals formed the two chief motives, or rather the points of attraction in all abstract inquiries. (page 515, line 15.)

§ 2624.—Three different ends, in relation to which the most important revolutions in this sphere of thought have taken place. (page 515, line 33.)

§ 2625.—Philosophers may be divided, in relation to the object of the cognition of reason, into sensualists and intellectualists. Epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former; Plato, of the latter. (page 516, line 1.)

§ 2626.—Origin of the pure cognitions of reason. Aristotle may be regarded as the head of the empiricists; Plato, of the noologists. (page 516, line 19.)

§ 2627.—Methods at present employed may be divided into the naturalistic and the scientific. (page 516, line 37.) [*Misology*: hatred of logic.] Cf. § 1006.

§ 2628.—Scientific method is either dogmatical (*e. g.* Wolf), or skeptical (*e. g.* Hume), or critical (§§ 1403. 1432). (p. 517, l. 20.)

VOLUME V.—PROLEGOMENA

To every Future Metaphysic which can Appear as a Science.

Translated from the German of IMMANUEL KANT, by JOHN RICHARDSON. (§§ 2629-2865 inclusive.) Paging (in parentheses) of the edition of Simpkin and Marshall (London, 1819). [I subjoin (in [brackets,] and explicitly marked M.) the paging of MAHAFFY (Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1872), and (also in [brackets] and also in every case marked M) so many of Mahaffy's alterations as I think may perhaps be of use to the reader. The words selected from Professor Mahaffy are also in every case on the following pages preceded by one or more words (printed in *italics*) from Richardson's translation, not with the purpose of placing before the student the whole of that part of Richardson's text which corresponds with the words from Professor Mahaffy, but merely for the purpose of reference. Else I prefer Richardson; not without regret, however, because I do not know German, and because my own frequent failure to comprehend Kant's meaning does not add weight to my judgment, and because I am greatly indebted to Prof. Mahaffy for his notes, and still more for his translation of FISCHER and for his accompanying expositions, and most of all for his translation of important passages of the first (1781) edition of the Critique, which he appended to Fischer and also to the Prolegomena. (See below, § 2866.)]

Preface. (§§ 2629-2645 inclusive.)

§ 2629.—Prolegomena intended for future teachers. (page iii., line 2.) [page 1, line 5. M.]

§ 2630.—First to put the question whether such a science as metaphysic is but possible. (page iii., line 7.) [page 1, line 10. M.]

§ 2631.—Amuses the human understanding with never ceasing but never fulfilled hopes. (page iv., line 7.) [page 2, line 10. M.]

§ 2632.—Human reason builds so willingly that it has often reared up an edifice and as often pulled it down again in order to examine the state of its foundation. (page v., line 3.) [page 3, line 3. M.]

§ 2633.—Metaphysics do not yet exist as a science. (page v., line 14.) [page 3, line 13. M.]

§ 2634.—Since the origin of the metaphysics, as far as their history reaches, no event more decisive of their fate than the attack which DAVID HUME made on them has happened. (page vi., line 19.) [page 4, line 13. M.] § 2670.

§ 2635.—Hume proves incontrovertibly that it is totally impossible for reason to conceive of such a conjunction (as that of cause and effect) apriori and from conceptions. (page vii., line 3.) [page 4, line 22. M.]

§ 2636.—Hume's conclusion, though precipitate and wrong, is at least founded in investigation. (page viii., line 4.) [page 5, line 24. M.] See § 1460.

§ 2637.—Painful to see how his opponents—REID, OSWALD, BEATTIE, and at last even PRIESTLY—so entirely miss the point of his problem. (page viii., line 13.) [page 6, line 8. M.]

§ 2638.—Hume could lay just as good a claim to COMMON SENSE as Beattie, and over and above to that which Beattie certainly did not possess, A CRITICAL REASON, which sets limits to common sense, that it may not lose itself in speculations. (page ix., line 24.) Cf. § 1145. [page 7, line 12. M.]

§ 2639.—Hume's hint first roused KANT from a dogmatic slumber of many years, and gave quite a new direction to his researches in the field of speculative philosophy. (page xi., line 8.) See Richardson's note, and cf. § 2363. Cf. § 2510. [page 8, line 25. M.]

§ 2640.—Tried first whether Hume's scruple could not be universally represented. Deduction of the apriori conceptions of the understanding from a single principle. (page xi., line 22.) [*Intellect*: understanding. M.] [(page 9, line 9. M.) § 1570.]

§ 2641.—Execution of Hume's problem in its greatest possible extension (the CRITICISM OF PURE REASON*). It will not be understood, because the public in general will be inclined to turn

over the leaves of the book, but not to study it thoroughly. (page xiii., line 1.) [*Prolix*: opposed to all ordinary notions, and moreover voluminous. M.] [*Richardson says, in a note here, of the Critique of Pure Reason: "It were well worth a philosopher's while to learn German for the sole purpose of studying this incomparable work in its native language. It would be of more use to him than all his Greek and Latin."] [page 10, line 9. M.]

§ 2642.—Nothing of any former data but the hint Hume's doubt gave could be used, which doubt however afforded no presension [anticipation] of a possible formal science of this nature. (page xiv., line 12.) Cf. Fischer* (page 33). Cf. § 2507. Cf. § 279. [*Pilot*: whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot. M.] [page 11, line 9. M.] [*The references to Fischer are to the edition of 1866, Mahaffy's translation, Longmans, Green & Co., London.]

§ 2643.—Much perseverance and not a little self denial were requisite to postpone the temptation of an earlier favorable reception to the prospect of a late but lasting approbation. (page xv., line 4.) [*Opiniative*: "very stiff in adherence to preconceived notions."—*Webster*.] [*Prolivity*: voluminous character. M.] [page 11, line 27. M.]

§ 2644.—Criticism of Pure Reason must be completed entirely. Either everything or nothing of the sphere of this faculty must be determined. The end of each member can not be derived but from the complete conception of the whole. (page xvi., line 7.) [*Proposing*: by proposing what it knows not where to find. M.] [*Presumed* (i. e. than mere presumption): than mere conjectures. M.] [page 13, line 3. M.]

§ 2645.—PROLEGOMENA a mere plan after the analytic method, and for review, to be considered subsequently to the CRITICISM OF PURE REASON. (page xvii., line 6.) Cf. § 2664. [*Very particular*: peculiar. M.] [*Genuine*: yet it does contrast with sound critical principles. M.] [page 13, line 27. M.] See §§ 2668, 2664.

Chapter I.—On what is Peculiar to all Metaphysical Cognition. (§§ 2346–2376.)

Article I.—Of the sources of the metaphysics. (§§ 2646–2648.)

§ 2646.—Must previously be able exactly to ascertain that which is distinctive in it. (page 17, line 9.) [*As to their nature*: according to its nature. M.] [page 16, line 5. M.]

§ 2647.—Principles of metaphysical cognition must never be taken from experience. (page 17, line 22.) [page 16, line 16. M.]

§ 2648.—Metaphysical cognition is cognition apriori, and (to distinguish it from the pure mathematics) is named pure philosophical cognition. (page 18, line 9.) See §§ 2452–2454. [*Intellect*: understanding. M.] [*Represented*: is sufficiently explained. M.] [page 17, line 4. M.]

Article II.—On the only sort of cognition which can be named metaphysical. (§§ 2649–2654 inclusive.)

A.—On the distinction of synthetic and of analytic judgments in general (§§ 2649, 2650.)

§ 2649.—Distinction between judgments as to the matter: (1) merely explanatory, add nothing to the cognition; (2) enlarging, increase the given cognition. (page 18, line 25.) [*Peculiar*: the peculiarity of its sources. M.] [page 17, line 17. M.]

§ 2650.—Analytic judgments express nothing in the predicate but what is really cogitated in the conception of the subject. (page 19, line 10.) *Resolved*: analyzed. M.] [page 17, line 27. M.]

B.—The common principle of all analytic judgments is the proposition of contradiction. (§ 2651.)

§ 2651.—Analytical judgments rest entirely upon the proposition of contradiction, and are as to their nature cognitions apriori, whether the conceptions which serve for matter to them are empirical or not. (page 19, line 29.) Cf. § 1695. [*Though*: even when. M.] [page 18, line 14. M.] §§ 1081, 1083.

C.—Synthetic judgments require another principle than the proposition of contradiction. (§ 2652–2654 inclusive.)

§ 2652.—Synthetic judgments never can arise from the proposition of contradiction only (though they must always be derived conformably to that principle). (page 20, line 26.) [*Conformably*: they must be subject to the law of contradiction. M.] [page 19, line 12. M.] Cf. §§ 1697, 1692.

§ 2653.—Judgments of experience are always synthetical. (page 21, line 11.) [Mahaffy refers to Fischer (page 12) where he (M.) translates from the first edition of the Critique.] [This section 2653 is wholly included in §1449, q. v.] [page 19, line 25. M.]

§ 2654.—Mathematical judgments are synthetical. (page 21, line 25.) See § 1722. [§ 2654 is almost the same as §§ 1452–1456, which see.] [*Add the units contained in the five given in the intuition to the conception of seven* (§ 1454): Whereupon Mahaffy here remarks: "The reader will observe that to the *concept* of 7 the *intuition* of 5 is gradually added; it is not an addition of two intuitions. In the case of $2+2=4$ this latter may be the case, but most probably more than five can not be grasped in a single visible intuition. Accordingly 7 is first made up of $5+2$, and then the resulting concept used for further processes. The system adopted in Roman figures (which is indeed almost universal) illustrates the point exactly. Instead of writing six points or strokes, we write VI, substituting the symbol V, perhaps a rude representation of an open hand, for the intuition IIII."'] [page 20, line 13. M.]

Article III.—Scholion to the general division of judgments into analytical and synthetical. (§§ 2655, 2656.)

§ 2655.—Division of judgments into analytical and synthetical is with regard to the criticism of the human understanding indispensable. (p. 24, l. 24.) [*Ground*: reason. M.] [p. 24, l. 5. M.]

§ 2656.—Locke's *ESSAY ON THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING*—a hint of this division. (page 25, line 9.) [*Fourth Book*: ch. iii., § 9, seq. M.] [*Allows*: § 10. M.] [*When*: then. M.] [Prof. Mahaffy refers to Locke's *Essay*, book IV., chapter i., § 7, as the "really decisive passage in Locke on the point."] [page 24, line 17. M.]

Article IV.—Is metaphysic possible? (§§ 2657–2665 inclusive.)

§ 2657.—Can not open a single book, as we can a *Euclid*, and say, "Here is metaphysic, here you will find the chief end of this science, the knowledge of a Supreme Being and of a future world, evinced on principles of pure reason." (page 26, line 8.) [*Were metaphysic—actual*: a metaphysic—really in existence. M.] [*Make the beginning*: comes to attain it. M.] [*Our real design*: Mahaffy here refers to *Article II.*, above.] [page 26, line 3. M.]

§ 2658.—Endeavors to bring this science to pass were no doubt the first cause of so early a skepticism. (page 27, line 10.) [*To pass*: to set up such a science. M.] [*His own*: they questioned isolated reason. M.] [*That when*: that when what had been gathered was dissolved. M.] [*Of those*: of their neighbors. M.] [page 27, line 4. M.]

§ 2659.—Hume inadvertently cut off from the field of pure cognition *apriori* its chief province, the pure mathematics. (page 28, line 1.) [*Construction of conceptions*: § 2452.] [*To his whole conception*: [system] adds Mahaffy.] [*Too great penetration*: Mahaffy thinks "Kant's confidence on this point is hardly justified," and refers to Hume's essays (vol. ii., note P, etc.) for hints that mathematics might be based on experience.] [*His opinion*: Hume's intention. M.] [page 27, line 23. M.]

§ 2660.—All metaphysical judgments are synthetical. (Metaphysical judgments, however, must be distinguished from those belonging to the metaphysics.) (p. 29, l. 21.) [p. 29, l. 11. M.]

§ 2661.—*Philosophia definitiva*, which contains merely analytic propositions belonging to metaphysic. (page 30, line 21.) [page 30, line 14. M.]

§ 2662.—Metaphysic has in strict propriety to do with synthetic propositions *apriori*, and these only constitute its end. (page 31, line 5.) [page 30, line 26. M.] [*Only*: alone. M.]

§ 2663.—Question "Is metaphysic possible?" must be answered not by skeptical objections to certain assertions of an actual meta-

physic (for we do not admit of it yet), but from the (as yet only problematical) conception of a science of this sort. (page 31, line 18.) [page 31, line 9. M.]

§ 2664.—CRITICISM OF PURE REASON treats this question synthetically. (page 32, line 3.) Cf. § 2645. [page 31, line 25. M.]

§ 2665.—Need not ask whether cognitions apriori be possible (for they are real), but how they are possible. (In order to be able, from the principle of the possibility of the given ones, to deduce the possibility of all the others.) (p. 32, l. 25.) [p. 32, l. 18. M.]

Article V.—How is cognition from pure reason possible? (§§ 2666–2676 inclusive.)

§ 2666.—Possibility of synthetic propositions aposteriori does not require a particular explanation. (p. 33, l. 12.) [p. 33, l. 5. M.]

§ 2667.—Problem, expressed with scholastic precision, consequently is, HOW ARE SYNTHETIC PROPOSITIONS APRIORI POSSIBLE? (page 33, line 25.) [page 33, line 18. M.]

§ 2668.—Analytic method, provided that it is opposed to the synthetic (§ 2664), is very distinct from a complex of analytic propositions: it signifies only that we set out from what is sought as if it were given, and mount to the only conditions on which it is possible. (page 34, line 22.) [*Inadequate*: and there can not but be some danger of confusing a newer and more appropriate use with the older. M. (matter not in Richardson).] [p. 34, note. M.]

§ 2669.—Solution of that problem the standing or the falling of metaphysic. (page 35, line 1.) [*With regard to it*: let him pile conclusions upon conclusions till they almost smother us. M. (Not in Richardson).] [page 35, line 1. M.]

§ 2670.—Reflects on what this problem requires, must at first be struck with its difficulty. (page 35, line 20.) [*As difficult*: equally difficult. M.] [*Their*: its. M.] Cf. § 2635. [page, 35, line 21. M.]

§ 2671.—Cost a labor of many years in order to be able to solve this problem in its whole universality. (page 36, line 28.) Cf. § 2641. [page 36, line 27. M.]

§ 2672.—Assertion must be science, or it never is anything at all. Let metaphysicians speak the discreet language of a rational BELIEF. (page 37, line 13.) [page 37, line 11. M.]

§ 2673.—Transcendental philosophy is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded. (page 38, line 17.) Cf. §§ 2664, 2641, 2613, 1469. [*That a whole science*: that when a whole science. M. (A transposition of *when* from below.)] [page 38, line 15. M.]

§ 2674.—Now proceed to this solution according to the analytic method (§ 2645), in which we presuppose that cognition from pure

reason is possible; we can only appeal [in support of this presupposition] to two sciences of theoretical cognition, the pure mathematics and the pure physics. (page 39, line 5.) [page 39, line 1. M.]

§ 2675.—Necessary for us to comprehend the predisposition of nature to such a science as metaphysic. Consequently we divide the transcendental main question (§ 2667) into four other questions: (1) How are pure mathematics possible? (§§ 2677–2700); (2) How are pure physics possible? (§§ 2701–2766); (3) How is metaphysic in general possible? (§§ 2767–2838); (4) How is metaphysic as a science possible? (§§ 2839–2865). [*To comprehend that* (i. e. the dialectic) *which occasions it* (i. e. metaphysic) *and as a merely naturally given* (i. e. as the natural predisposition of human reason to dialectic, it lies at the foundation of the so-called science of metaphysic; but being uncritically taken, it proves illusory) *though on account of its truth not an unsuspected*: i. e. the practical power of the regulative ideas of pure reason (which constitutes its legislative truth) is the energetic reason (i. e. cause) why it has been suspected that metaphysical cognition possesses an apriori character, or (which is the same thing) that there is such a thing as metaphysical cognition.] (page 39, line 22.) [*In our chief question*: under our chief inquiry. M.] [page 39, line 18. M.]

§ 2676.—Solution of those problems, though it is chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the CRITICISM, has something particular, which deserves attention by itself, and which is TO SEEK THE SOURCES OF GIVEN SCIENCES IN REASON ITSELF, in order thereby to know something apriori of this their faculty, to investigate and to measure it by means of the fact itself; by which these sciences themselves gain, if not with regard to their matter, as to their right use, and while they procure light to a higher question relative to their common origin, at the same time give occasion to illustrate their own nature better. (page 40, line 9.) [page 40, line 7. M.]

Chapter II.—How are Pure Mathematics Possible? (§§ 2677–2700 inclusive.)

Article VI.—*Mathematic cognition carries with it thoroughly apodictical certainty.* (§ 2677.)

§ 2677.—Ground of cognition apriori, which lies deeply hidden, but which might manifest itself by these its effects, if their first beginnings were but diligently investigated. (page 40, line 24.) [page 41, line 4. M.]

Article VII.—*Mathematical cognition must previously exhibit its conception by intuition apriori.* (§ 2678.)

§ 2678.—Clue to the first and chief condition of the possibility of mathematics. (page 41, line 15.) [*Philosophy can*: must. M.] [page 41, line 19. M.]

Article VIII.—Difficulty of the question increasing. (§ 2679.)

§ 2679.—How can the intuition of the object precede the object itself? How is it possible to represent anything IMMEDIATELY apriori? (p. 42, l. 21.) [*As: qualibet, non quia.*] [p. 42, l. 28. M.]

Article IX.—It is only possible in one way for my intuition to precede the reality of the object, and to have place as cognition apriori. (§ 2680.) Cf. § 1487.

§ 2680.—Intuition contains nothing but the FORM of the sensibility* (*sensualitas*), which precedes in me all the real impressions by which I am affected by objects. (page 43, line 14.) [**Sensitiv-ity (sensualitas)*: sensibility. M. (Richardson explains, in a note to § 936, that he substitutes the word *sensitivity*, because the word *sensuality* has degenerated from its original meaning in our language. Meiklejohn uses the word *sensibility* (§ 1473), and with it Mahaffy replaces *sensitivity* throughout the Prolegomena—an emendation, to which I need not again refer.)] [page 43, line 18. M.]

Article X.—Intuitions which the pure mathematics lay as the foundation to all their cognitions and judgments. (§§ 2681, 2682.)

§ 2681.—Presupposition absolutely necessary, if synthetic propositions apriori shall be granted as possible, or (in case they are really met with) their possibility comprehended and previously determined. (page 44, line 16.) [page 44, line 17. M.]

§ 2682.—Space and time, being pure intuitions apriori, are mere forms of our sensibility, which must precede all empirical intuition (that is, perception of real objects). (page 44, line 25.) [*Just: at the same time.* M.] [page 44, line 26. M.]

Article XI.—The first problem (§ 2675) solved. (§ 2683.)

§ 2683.—Mathematics, as synthetical cognition apriori, are only possible by their referring to no other objects than those of the senses, to whose empirical intuition a pure one (of space and time) lies as a foundation apriori. (page 45, line 29.) [page 46, line 6. M.]

Article XII.—Something by way of illustration. (§ 2684.)

§ 2684.—Transcendental deduction of the conceptions of space and time (§§ 1484–1488) explains at the same time the possibility of the pure mathematics. (page 46, line 29.) [*Not more than two: three.* M.] [*To indefinite: Mahaffy renders it "to infinity (in indefinitum)," and notes it as "this identification of unendlich with indefinitum."* See § 1483.] [page 47, line 4. M.]

Article XIII.—Exercise your acumen on the following. (§§ 2685–2687 inclusive.)

§ 2685.—Two spherical triangles, whereof the one can not be put in the place of the other. (p. 48, l. 11.) [*Of both hemispheres: on opposite hemispheres.* M.] [*Of both triangles: between the two triangles.* M.] [page 48, line 18. M.] Cf. Fischer (page 42).

§ 2686.—Left hand can not be inclosed in the same bounds as the right. (page 49, line 18.) [page 49, line 22. M.]

§ 2687.—Solution of that paradox. Objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves and as the pure understanding would cognize them, but sensual intuitions (that is, phenomena) *whose possibility rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else* (to our sensitive faculty). (page 50, line 3.) [*Snails: spirals winding opposite ways.* M.] [page 50, line 8. M.]

Scholion I.—*The pure mathematics, and particularly pure geometry, can not have objective reality but on condition of their referring to objects of sense only.* (§§ 2688–2690 inclusive.)

§ 2688.—Propositions of geometry are not the determinations of a mere creature of our feigning fancy, nor for that reason invalid in reference to real objects. (p. 50, l. 24.) [p. 51, l. 2. M.]

§ 2689.—All the external objects of our sensible world must necessarily accord with the propositions of geometry with the greatest punctuality; because the sensibility, by means of its form of external intuition (or of its original mode of representation, space), about which the geometrician is occupied, first of all makes those objects possible as mere phenomena. (page 51, line 16.) [*Only: alone.* M.] [page 51, line 19. M.]

§ 2690.—Geometrician can be secured in no other way from all the cavil or chicane of superficial metaphysicians, on account of the undoubted objective reality of his propositions. (page 52, line 10.) [page 52, line 15. M.]

Scholion II.—*The understanding represents nothing immediately* (§§ 2691, 2692.)

§ 2691.—Idealism of Kant grants that there are bodies without us, that is, *things*, which, though it is quite unknown to us what they are in themselves, we know by the REPRESENTATIONS which their influence on our sensibility procures us, and to which we affix the denomination of a BODY, which word therefore signifies merely the PHENOMENON of *that object which is unknown to us, but not the less real.* Can this be termed idealism? *It is the very contrary.* (page 53, line 19.) [*Without these: external to them.* M.] [page 53, line 20. M.]

§ 2692.—Idealism of Kant can not be named IDEALISTICAL merely; for the existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed (as in the real idealism), but it is shown that we can not cognize at all by the senses how it is in itself. [Kant's system must therefore be named THE CRITICAL IDEALISM, as in the next scholion.] (page 54, line 22.) [page 55, line 1. M.] See § 1846.

Scholion III.—The critical idealism. (§§ 2693–2700 inclusive.)

§ 2693.—Objection to Kant's critical idealism is started, as if it turned all the things of the sensible world to mere apparition. (page 55, line 28.) [*Appearance*: illusion. M.] An objection which the philosophers of the Leibnitzian school can easily make, *after having first spoiled*, etc. See Mr. Richardson's note on this point. Cf. § 1905. [page 56, line 12. M.]

§ 2694.—PHENOMENON depends upon the *senses*, but the judgment (which we make from it) in reference to the THING depends upon the *understanding*, whose province alone it is to give an objective judgment of the phenomenon. (page 56, line 23.) [page 57, line 6. M.] § 1927.

§ 2695.—Deceitful appearance or truth can arise accordingly as we are negligent or careful to reflect on the origin of our representations and to connect our intuitions (of the senses, whatever they may contain, in space and in time) according to the rules of the coherence of all cognition in an experience. (page 57, line 25.) [*Rules of truth*: of reality. M.] [page 58, line 7. M.] § 1928.

§ 2696.—Error, which rests upon an illusion,* may arise, if I venture to go beyond all possible experience with my conceptions of space and time (which I can not avoid doing when I give them out for qualities which adhere to things in themselves). (page 58, line 24.) [**Appearance*: illusion. M.] [page 59, line 7. M.] § 1862.

§ 2697.—Critical idealism is the only means of securing the application of one of the most important cognitions (that which the mathematics propound apriori) to real objects, and of preventing its being held mere illusion.* (page 59, line 8.) [**Appearance*: illusion. M.] [page 59, line 21. M.]

§ 2698.—Critical idealism is the only means of preventing the transcendental illusion by which the metaphysics have hitherto been deceived, which error gave occasion to the remarkable antinomy of reason. (p. 59, l. 26.) [p. 60, l. 9, M.] § 2036, sqq.

§ 2699.—Critical idealism need not be confounded with the empirical idealism of Descartes or with the mystical and extravagant idealism of Berkley. (page 60, line 12.) [*Denominations*: nomenclature. M.] [*Appearance*: illusion. M.] [p. 60, l. 25. M.] § 1843.

§ 2700.—Critical idealism concerns NOT THE EXISTENCE OF THINGS (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the received* sense), *for it never entered into my mind to doubt of them.* (page 61, line 10.) Cf. § 2785. [**Received*: ordinary. M.] [*Repudiable*: objectionable. M.] See what Kant says of transcendental in § 2700. [page 61, line 22. M.] Cf. §§ 1751, 1787, 2692.

Chapter III.—How are Pure Physics Possible? (§§ 2701-2766 inclusive.)

Article XIV.—Of the legality of the determinations of the existence of things in general. [See § 2703.] (§ 2701.)

§ 2701.—Nature is the existence of things, provided that it is determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we could never cognize them* either apriori or aposteriori. (page 62, line 7.) [* *Them*; nature. M.] [*By which*: by what. M.] [*Without our conception*: outside the. M.] [page 63, line 4. M.]

Article XV.—Of the pure science of nature. (§ 2702.)

§ 2702.—Actually universal laws of nature, which subsist totally apriori. By consequence, there is IN FACT a pure natural philosophy; and the question now is, How is it possible? (page 63, line 12.) See § 2675. [*Ranges*: to which nature is subject. M.] [*Inertness*: inertia. M.] [page 64, line 11. M.]

Article XVI.—Of things as objects of possible experience. (§ 2703.)

§ 2703.—Nature, considered *materialiter*, is the complex of all the objects of experience. (p. 64, l. 20.) [p. 65, l. 14. M.] § 2056.

Article XVII.—Of the necessary legality of all the objects of possible experience. (§§ 2704-2706 inclusive.)

§ 2704.—Nature (*formaliter*), in this narrower sense, is therefore the legality of all the objects of experience, and, provided that it is cognized apriori, their necessary legality. (page 65, line 14.) [*Legality*: subjection to law. M.] [page 66, line 7. M.] § 1647.

§ 2705.—Better to arrange the problem thus: How is it possible to cognize apriori the necessary legality* of experience itself, relatively to all its objects in general? (page 66, line 2.) [* *Legality*: legitimacy. M.] [*Only such*: alone such. M.] *For things*: laws for things. M.] [page 66, line 18. M.] § 1706.

§ 2706.—Only objects of our research here are experience and the universal conditions given apriori of its possibility, and thence we have to determine nature as the whole object of all possible experience. (page 67, line 16.) [page 68, line 3. M.]

Article XVIII.—Judgments of experience distinguished from judgments of perception. (§§ 2707-2709 inclusive.)

§ 2707.—All judgments of experience are empirical; but all empirical judgments are not judgments of experience. (page 68, line 2.) [page 68, line 17. M.]

§ 2708.—Empirical judgments, *provided that they have objective validity*, are JUDGMENTS OF EXPERIENCE; but those which are *only subjectively valid*, are mere JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION. (page 68, line 14.) [I take the emphasis from Mahaffy, and may have done so elsewhere; at least I know that I often approved his use of italics.] [*Give occasion to*: produce. M.] [page 69, line 1. M.]

§ 2709.—Objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else than its NECESSARY UNIVERSAL VALIDITY. (page 69, line 1.) [*Give*: we do not till afterward give them a new. M.] [*Willing*: that is, nobody is unwilling to agree.] [*May express*: expresses. M.] [page 69, line 12. M.]

Article XLX.—Universal validity of the empirical judgment rests never on empirical conditions, nor even on sensual conditions in general. (§§ 2710, 2711.)

§ 2710.—Judgments of experience take their objective validity not from the immediate cognition of the object (for this is impossible § 2701), but from the (condition of the) universal validity of the empirical judgment, which rests upon a pure conception of the understanding. (page 69, line 24.) [*Commonly valid*: universal. M.] [*Already said*: in § 2709.] [p. 70, l. 5. M.]

§ 2711.—Judgment of perception is one in which I do nothing but refer two of my sensations to one another. But if I would have it named a judgment of experience, I require this connection to stand under a condition which makes it universally valid. (page 70, line 18.) [*My will*: not arbitrary. (See § 2709) Mahaffy has "I desire."] [page 70, line 27. M.]

Article XX.—How the judgment of experience is possible. (§§ 2712—2716 inclusive.)

§ 2712.—Foundation of experience is the intuition (of which we are conscious to ourselves, that is perception), which pertains merely to the senses. And in the next place, judging also (which belongs merely to the understanding) pertains thereto. (page 71, line 23.) [page 72, line 4. M.]

§ 2713.—Judgment of perception is merely a connection of the perceptions in the state of my mind, without reference to the object. (page 72, line 7.) [page 72, line 12. M.]

§ 2714.—Before perception can become experience, the given intuition must be subsumed under a conception which determines the form of judgment in general relatively to intuition, connects its empirical consciousness in a consciousness in general, and thereby procures universal validity to empirical judgments. (page 72, line 22.) [*Such*: suppose the concept of cause to be such. M.] [*Hypothetical*: the causality of the air, from which causality the elasticity results, is not intuited. If the intuition is not subsumed under the category of cause, no universal judgment can be pronounced, no matter how often the intuition is repeated; but the moment the intuition is brought under the category, the air (which possesses the causality) stands to the elasticity (which results from the causality) in the logical relation of the principle

to the consequence, which relation constitutes the hypothetical judgment. (See §§ 1558, 1228). The conception of expansion could be here taken "in a statical sense" only by a dolt.] [page 72, line 26. M.]

§ 2715.—Subsumption under the apriori conception of the pure understanding determines the perceptions not merely respectively to one another in me, but *relatively to the form of judging* in general, and in this way renders the empirical judgment universally valid. (page 73, line 15.) [page 73, line 20. M.]

§ 2716.—Dissection of objectively valid synthetic judgments will show that they never consist of bare intuitions merely connected by comparison in a judgment, and that they would be impossible were not a pure conception of the understanding super-added to the conception drawn from the intuition. (page 74, line 15.) [*Logical points*: logical distinctions (Momente).* M.] [*Two points*: two points. M. (Cf. in §§ 2717, 2721, 2731.)] *Much*: a plurality of homogeneous parts. M.] [page 74, line 15. M.] [*I have substituted parentheses () for the brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word Momente.]

Article XXI.—*Systematic division of the function of judgment in general.* (§ 2717.)

§ 2717.—Principles apriori of the possibility of all experience, as of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely determined. (page 75, line 12.) [The momenta of this determination are as follows: (1) We represent what belongs to JUDGING IN GENERAL, and the various states* of the understanding in it, in a complete table (the logical table of judgments: cf. § 1555). (2) We find, *exactly parallel to these logical positions*, pure conceptions of the understanding, which may be regarded as conceptions of *intuition-in-general determined by the logical functions of judgment*. (These pure conceptions constitute a table of categories: cf. § 1570). (3) We are now in a position to formulate the propositions by which all perceptions are subsumed under the pure conceptions of the understanding (and so to frame a pure physiological table of the universal principles of the physics: cf. § 1713). The following is Richardson's version of this important section, which might almost be called "The transcendental analytic compressed into three sentences:"] In order therefore to show the possibility of experience provided that it rests upon pure conceptions of the understanding apriori, we must first represent what belongs to judging in general, and the various points* of the understanding in it, in a complete table; for the pure conceptions of the understanding, which are nothing more than conceptions of intuition in

general if these are in † regard to the one or the other of these points determined for judgments in themselves, † by consequence necessarily and in a universally valid manner, will ‡ fall out exactly parallel to them. ‡ And by that means the principles apriori of the possibility †† of all experience, as of an objectively valid empirical cognition, will be precisely determined. For they are nothing but propositions by which all perceptions are (on certain universal conditions of intuition) subsumed under those pure conceptions of the understanding. [Here follow the three tables.] [*Particular*: see Kant's note to § 2716.] [*Indefinite*: infinite. M. (But see §§ 1219–1221, 2178, 2684.)] [** Points*: states. M.] [† *In regard to*: determined by one or other of these ways of judging, in themselves. M.] Cf. §§ 2912, 2914. [‡ *Will fall out*: must run parallel to these states. M.] [*Commerce*: community. M. (But see § 1822.)] [page 75, line 19. M.] [†† § 1652.]

Article XXII.—What the judgment of experience adds to the judgment of perception: something that determines the synthetic judgment as necessary. (§§ 2718, 2719.)

§ 2718.—Question here is not the ORIGIN of experience, but that which lies in experience. (The former pertains to the empirical psychology.) (page 78, line 2.) [page 77, line 21. M.]

§ 2719.—Category represents the intuition *with regard to one form of judgment rather than another* as determined in itself; *i. e.* it is the conception of that synthetic unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgments. (page 78, line 11.) [page 78, line 4. M.]

Article XXIII.—The sum of the foregoing subject. (§§ 2720–2723.)

§ 2720.—Judgments are OBJECTIVE, when representations are united in a consciousness in general, that is, NECESSARILY. (page 79, line 6.) [*Represent immediately*: intuitive. M.] [*Casual*: contingent. M.] [*Is a consciousness in the judgment*: in one consciousness is judgment. M.] [page 78, line 26. M.]

§ 2721.—CATEGORIES are conceptions of the necessary union of representations in a consciousness, and consequently principles of objectively valid judgments. (page 79, line 20.) [*Points*: phases (Momente). * M.] [page 79, line 14. M.] [** I have substituted parentheses () for brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word Momente.*]

§ 2722.—Perceptions, ere they can serve for judgments of experience, must previously be subsumed under the categories. (page 80, line 1.) [page 79, line 19. M.]

§ 2723.—Experience is first of all generated by this addition of the conception of the understanding to perception. (page 80,

note). [*Casual*: contingent. M.] Cf. §§ 1699 and 1703. [page 80, note. M.]

Article XXIV.—The second problem (§ 2675) solved. A system of nature which precedes all empirical cognition of nature. (§§ 2724, 2725.) [Compare § 2725 with § 2717.]

§ 2724.—No conditions of the judgments of experience are above those [determined in § 2717] which bring the phenomena, according to the various form of their intuition, under pure conceptions of the understanding which render the empirical judgment objectively valid. (page 80, line 15.) [page 80, line 3. M.]

§ 2725.—Principles of possible experience are at the same time universal laws of nature, which can be cognized apriori. (page 81, line 15.) [*Perfectly*: in perfection. M.] [p. 81, l. 3. M.] § 1652.

Article XXV.—The mathematical principles. (§ 2726.)

§ 2726.—Principles of the application of the mathematics to experience. (The first and second physiological principles, concerning the quantity and quality of the empirical representations. See §§ 1714, 1716, 1724.) (page 82, line 8.) [*Showing*: in giving a general view. M.] [*Counterbalanced*: outbalanced. M.] [*Thus*: this occurs. M.] [page 81, line 23. M.]

Article XXVI.—The dynamical principles. (§§ 2727, 2728.)

§ 2727.—Principles apriori of the possibility of experience if it shall connect objects, as to existence, in nature. (The third physiological principle, with regard to the relation of phenomena.) Dynamical laws of nature. (page 83, line 20.) Cf. §§ 1751, 1744, 1825–1827. [*The laws*: the proper laws. M.] [p. 83, l. 3. M.]

§ 2728.—Principles of the relation of phenomena to the conditions of experience in general. (The fourth physiological principle, concerning the modality of the empirical representations, which constitutes the physiological doctrine of method.) (page 84, line 14.) Cf. §§ 1830, 1857. See §§ 1831, 1832. [*Unites*: i. e. comprehends. (Mahaffy has *concerns* in brackets here and *combines both* below)] [page 83, line 24. M.]

Article XXVII.—Of the essential limitation of the employment of the categories in the physiological principles. (§§ 2729–2732.)

§ 2729.—Executing all synthetical principles apriori completely and on a principle (the faculty of judging in general) which constitutes the essence of experience in regard to the understanding. (page 84, line 28.) [page 84, line 9. M.]

§ 2730.—Limits all similar* principles to a condition: that they contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience-in-general provided that it is subjected to laws apriori. (page 85, line 14.) [**Similar*: such. M.] That all things stand of necessity apriori

AS OBJECTS OF EXPERIENCE ONLY under the afore-mentioned conditions. [I take the emphasis from Mahaffy.] [page 84, line 24. M.]

§ 2731.—Hence follows a specifically peculiar mode of proof of these principles. That they are not referred directly to phenomena and their relation, but to the possibility of experience. (page 86, line 7.) [That they are proved neither inductively (empirically) nor dogmatically (from conceptions), but by showing that experience is possibly only by virtue of these principles.] [*By this, that*: because. M.] [*Points*: gradations. M.] [p. 85, l. 16. M.]

§ 2732.—Analogies of experience comprise the necessity of the determination of the existence in time in general, consequently according to a rule of the understanding a priori. (page 87, line 12.) Cf. §§ 1828, 1755, 1756. [*It (this existence)*: this determination. (Mahaffy has it *the connection*, and also inserts *connection* in brackets after *this* in the second line preceding.)] [*Prolegomenous*: in Prolegomena. M. [page 86, line 15. M.]

Article XXVIII.—*The proper place to remove Hume's doubt.* (§ 2733.)

§ 2733.—Laws of nature, however incomprehensible absolutely in themselves, are nevertheless firmly established a priori relatively to experience, and in experience (but not elsewhere) possess undoubted objective validity. (page 88, line 24.) Cf. § 784. [*Perspect*: Mahaffy has *see* in the third line and *comprehend* in the seventh line.] [*Commerce*: community. M.] [page 88, line 1. M.]

Article XXIX.—*Connection of the representations in our understanding.* (§ 2734.)

§ 2734.—Question is not how the thing in itself, but how the cognition of experience of things in respect to the various modes of judgment in general, is determined. (page 89, line 26.) [*Reference*: relation. M.] [*Perspect*: comprehend. M.] [p. 88, l. 28. M.]

Article XXX.—*Hume's crux metaphysicorum* (causality). (§ 2735.)

§ 2735.—PERSPECT* [§ 1113] the conception of cause as a conception necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience and of its possibility as a synthetic union of PERCEPTIONS in a consciousness; but I do not at all perspect* the possibility of a THING as a cause. (p. 91, l. 6.) [*In order to bring—to the test*: let us make an experiment with Hume's. M.] [*To use*: qu.—to-wit? (Mahaffy has *that is*.)] [*Which experience can not be but*: it is nothing in fact but. M.] [page 90, line 4. M.] [*I do not know the meaning of the word *perspect*, and I do not know whether the illustration which I made at § 1113 (page 592 above) is correct. Mahaffy in § 2735 has *comprehend*, possibly qualified in one instance.]

Article XXXI.—*Categories serve, so to say, only to spell phenomena, that we may be able to read them as experience.* (§§ 2736–2738.)

§ 2736.—Pure conceptions of the understanding, if we quit objects of experience and would refer these conceptions to things in themselves (noumena), have no signification whatever. (page 92, line 15.) [*Further*: beyond this. M. (i. e. beyond experience).] [*Arbitrable*: arbitrary. M.] [page 91, line 11. M.]

§ 2737.—Preserves to the pure conceptions of the understanding their origin apriori, and to the universal laws of nature their validity as laws of the understanding, yet in such a manner that their use is limited to experience, because their possibility has its ground only in the reference of the understanding to experience; but not in such a manner that they are derived from experience (but that it is derived from them). (page 93, line 4.) [*This complete*: (though to its originator unexpected.) M. (words not in Richardson.)] [page 91, line 27. M.]

§ 2738.—All synthetic principles apriori are nothing more than principles of possible experience, and can never be referred to things in themselves (but to phenomena, as objects of experience). (page 93, line 15.) [*Always*: be capable of being represented. M.] [page 92, line 9. M.] § 1862.

Article XXXII.—Who make use of these conceptions and principles beyond all possible experience. (§§ 2739, 2740.)

§ 2739.—Always blindly gone beyond everything without distinction. (page 93, line 27.) [*Sane*: supposed sound common sense. M.] [*And even on*: or even on. M.] [page 92, line 21. M.]

§ 2740.—Adept of sound reason is not so sure, for all the easily acquired wisdom which he arrogates to himself, not to fall insensibly beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras. (page 94, line 14.) [*Vaticinating*: prophetic spirit of his sound sense, not only suspected, but knew and comprehended, what is here propounded with so much ado. M.] [*Dogmatist*: both himself and the dogmatist, who makes use. M.] [page 93, line 8. M.]

Article XXXIII.—Of particular beings of the understanding, or noumena. (§§ 2741–2743 inclusive.)

§ 2741.—Granted creatures of the understanding alone reality. (page 95, line 12.) [*Phenomenon and mere appearance*: appearance and illusion. M.] [*Scrutators of*: inquirers into. M.] [page 94, line 5. M.]

§ 2742.—Representation of such beings as form the substrata of phenomena, consequently of mere beings of the understanding, is not only admissible, but unavoidable. (page 95, line 21.) [page 94, line 14. M.]

§ 2743.—Rule which admits of no exception, and which is that we know nothing at all determinate of these pure creatures

of intellect, nor is it possible for us to know anything of them. (p. 96, l. 7.) [*Quit these* : leave this sphere. M.] [p. 94, l. 27. M.]

Article XXXIV.—Temptation to a transcendental use of the pure conceptions of the understanding. (§ 2744.)

§ 2744.—Conceptions of the understanding SEEM to have too* much sense and matter for the mere use of experience to exhaust all their determinations. (page 96, line 25.) Cf. § 1687. [*Something* : something seductive in our pure concepts of the understanding, which tempts us to a transcendent† use. M.] [*Our conceptions of substance* : Not only are our. M.] [*Still corroborates* : strengthens. M.] [*Comprise* : they contain. M.] [**Too* : deeper meaning and import than can be exhausted by their empirical use. M.] [†*Transcendental* : cf. §§ 1537, 1887, 2373 and especially §§ 1930, 1931, 2853.] [page 95, line 16. M.]

Article XXXV.—Two indispensable investigations have therefore been necessary [i. e. §§ 1665 sqq., 1863 sqq.*]. (§ 2745.) [*I presume that I am indebted to Professor Mahaffy for these references, and possibly elsewhere, because he refers to the pages of Meiklejohn, whereas Richardson I suppose refers to the paging of a German edition.]

§ 2745.—Notwithstanding the independence of our pure conceptions of the understanding and of our principles upon experience (and †indeed upon the seemingly greater sphere of their use), NOTHING WHATEVER can be thought of by them without the field of experience. (page 97, line 26.) [*Intellectual world* : see § 1885.] [*Yes* : and †despite of. M.] [*The objects of its reference* : to which it should be applied. M.] [*Without it* : beyond it. M.] [page 96, line 11. M.]

Article XXXVI.—Understanding never can be forgiven for roaming instead of thinking. (§ 2746.)

§ 2746.—Fruitless endeavors of pure reason will never be fully set* aside, if the self-cognition of reason does not become true science, in which the field of its right use is (so to say) distinguished with geometrical certainty from that of its wrong and vain use. (page 99, line 11.) [*For upon it* : for we depend upon it alone for assistance. M.] [*With that* : its vagaries. M.] [*Purifies* : separates. M.] [*Of degradation* : by degrading our assertions. M.] [**Set aside* : abandoned. M.] [page 97, line 12. M.]

TITLE II.—HOW IS NATURE ITSELF POSSIBLE. (§§ 2747–2753 inclusive.)

Article XXXVII.—Nature is derived from the laws of the possibility of experience in general § 2752. (§§ 2747–2753 inclusive.)

§ 2747.—Nature in the material sense is possible by means of the quality* of our sensibility, according to which our sensibility

is affected (in the way peculiar to it) *by objects which are in themselves unknown to it.* (page 100, line 26.) [* *Quality*: constitution. M.] [page 99, line 2. M.] [I have substituted Professor Mahaffy's *sensibility* for Richardson's *sensitivity* throughout the Prolegomena section heads. See § 2680, page 772 above.]

§ 2748.—Nature in the formal sense is possible by means of the quality* of our understanding, *according to which* all those representations of the sensibility are necessarily referred to a consciousness, *and by which* the peculiar way of our thinking, that is by rules, †and by their means experience (which is to be quite distinguished from the insight into the objects in themselves), is possible. (page 101, line 15.) [* *Quality*: constitution. M.] [page 99, line 18. M.] [† See §§ 986, 1658.]

§ 2749.—Can not be further resolved or answered. (page 102, line 1.) Cf. § 2914. [*Basis*: and of the apperception which is necessarily its basis and that of all thinking. M.] [p. 100, l. 5. M.]

§ 2750.—NATURE IN GENERAL we can not learn to know by any experience, because experience itself requires laws upon which its possibility bottoms apriori. (p. 102, l. 8.) [p. 100, l. 12. M.]

§ 2751.—Possibility of EXPERIENCE IN GENERAL is therefore at the same time the universal law of nature. (page 102, line 14.) [page 100, line 18. M.]

§ 2752.—Must not seek the universal laws of nature in nature by means of experience, but (conversely) nature, as to its universal legality, in the conditions of the possibility of experience, which lie in our sensibility and in our understanding. (page 102, line 25.) [page 100, line 28. M.] §§ 1826, 1706, 2479, 1862. [*Crusius*: cf. Tennemann, Hist. Phil., ed. Morell, §§ 368, 369, pages 360–362.]

§ 2753.—Understanding does not draw its laws (apriori) from nature, but prescribes them to it. (p. 104, l. 1.) [p. 102, l. 1. M.]

Article XXXVIII.—*Illustrate this apparently* hazardous proposition.* (§§ 2754–2756 inclusive.)

§ 2754.—Unity of various properties of geometrical figures under common laws. (page 104, line 18.) [* *In appearance*: apparently. M.] [*When they*: when these laws. M.] [*Arbitrable*: arbitrary determinations of space in itself, and therefore in a universal rule. M.] [*Lines which cut*: which intersect one another and the circle, however they may be drawn, are always divided so that the rectangle. M.] [*Diameters*: radii. M.] [*Radii's*: chords. M.] [*Radii which cut*: chords which intersect. M.] [*Right angles*: rectangles. M.] [*Equal relations*: a constant ratio. M.] [page 102, line 17. M.]

§ 2755.—Law of the reciprocal attraction diffused over all ma-

terial nature. (page 105, line 30.) [*Conversely*: that it decreases inversely as the square of the distance from each. M.] [*As the spheres*: that is, as the spherical surfaces over which this. M.] [*In sections of cones*: (are described)* in conic sections. M.] [*Inverse*: inverse square of the distance. M.] [page 104, line 2. M.] [*I have substituted parenthesis () for the brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the words *are described*.]

§ 2756.—Understanding (as it comprehends all phenomena under its own laws, and thereby brings first of all to pass apriori experience ((as to its form)) by means of which all that which can only be cognized by experience is subjected to its laws of necessity) is the origin of the universal order of nature. (page 106, line 20.) [*To which*: in which its concepts are all centred. M.] [page 104, line 23. M.]

APPENDIX TO THE PURE PHYSICS. (§§ 2757-2766 inclusive.)

Article XXXIX.—Of the system of the categories. (§§ 2757-2766.)

§ 2757.—Nothing can be more wished for by a philosopher than to be able to derive the multifarious of conceptions (and principles) from a principle apriori, and to unite everything in this way in one cognition. (page 108, line 4.) [*Multifarious*: the scattered multiplicity of the concepts or the principles, which had occurred to him in concrete use. M.] [page 106, line 8. M.]

§ 2758.—Aristotle collected ten pure elementary conceptions under the name of categories. (page 108, line 21.) Cf. § 1570. [*Quality*: constitution. M.] [*Lie in those*: are contained in the former. M.] [page 106, line 23. M.]

§ 2759.—Because there was not a principle on which the understanding could be fully investigated, and all its functions, whence its pure conceptions arise, determined fully as to number and with precision. (page 109, line 20.) [page 107, line 23. M.]

§ 2760.—Looked round me for an act of the understanding which comprises all the other acts. (JUDGING: cf. § 2717.) (page 110, line 6.) Cf. § 1570. [*Wants*: defects. M.] [*To determine*: of determining judgments as objectively valid, and so there arose the pure concepts of the understanding, concerning which I could make certain that these, and this exact number only, constitute our whole cognition of things from pure understanding. I was justified in calling them by their old name, CATEGORIES; while I reserved for myself the liberty of adding, under the title of PRE-DICABLES, a complete list of all the concepts deducible from them, by combinations whether among themselves, or. M.] [page 108, line 11. M.] *Predicabilia*: cf. § 1571.

§ 2761.—True signification of the pure conceptions of the un

derstanding and the meaning of their use can be precisely determined. (page 111, line 6.) [*Why it only*: for which alone it. M.] [*Obvious*: for here it became obvious that they are themselves nothing but. M.] [*As limits*: which limits. M.] [p. 109, l. 13. M.]

§ 2762.—System of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure reason itself systematical, and affords a clue how and by what points of inquiry every metaphysical contemplation must (if it shall be complete) be made. (page 112, line 16.) Cf. §§ 1923 and 2043. [page 110, line 17. M.]

§ 2763.—Many curious observations may be made on the table of the categories. (page 113, note.) Cf. §§ 1575, 1560. [*For this purpose the categories*: of quality. M. inserts.] [page 111, note. M.]

§ 2764.—Making use of this guidance with regard to one of the most abstract ontological divisions, the various distinction of the conceptions of something and of nothing. (page 113, line 6.) See § 1924, pages 698, 703 above. [page 111, line 9. M.]

§ 2765.—System of the categories excludes all foreign conceptions which might otherwise slip in between those pure conceptions of the understanding, and determines the place of every cognition. (page 114, line 15.) Cf. §§ 1888–1897. [page 112, line 1. M.]

§ 2766.—Use of that separated table of the categories, if we separate the table of the transcendental conceptions of reason. (page 115, line 3.) Cf. §§ 1966–1968. [*Metaphysic*: (†where on the contrary)* these rational Ideas live with the categories without separation, like the children of one family†—a confusion not to be avoided for want of a definite system of categories. M.] [page 112, line 17. M.] [*I have substituted parenthesis () for the brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the words *where on the contrary*.] [† . . . † not in Richardson.]

Chapter IV.—How is Metaphysic in General Possible? (§§ 2767–2838 inclusive.)

Article XL.—*Why metaphysic requires the solution of this question.* (§§ 2767–2771 inclusive.)

§ 2767.—Neither the pure mathematics nor the pure physics had any occasion for such a deduction as we have made [in the two preceding chapters]. (page 115, line 15.) [page 114, line 4. M.]

§ 2768.—Metaphysic has to do with pure conceptions of reason and the acquaintance with objects which is supposed to arise immediately from these conceptions without standing in need of the mediation of experience; and therefore this science requires a deduction. (page 115, line 28.) [*And whilst*: and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately from this incubation of its own concepts, without requiring or indeed being able to reach that knowledge through experience. M.] [page 114, line 16. M.]

§ 2769.—Absolute whole of all possible experience is itself not experience, and yet a necessary problem for reason. (page 116, line 22.) [page 115, line 13. M.]

§ 2770.—Reason contains in itself the ground of IDEAS, by which I mean *necessary* conceptions whose object can not be given in any experience. (page 117, line 15.) [*Appearance*: illusion. M.] [page 116, line 6. M.]

§ 2771.—Self-cognition of pure reason is the sole preservative from the aberrations into which reason falls when it misapprehends its destination, and refers that, which only regards itself and its guidance in all immanent use, transcendently to the object in itself. (page 117, line 25.) [(*False*) *appearance*: illusion. M.] [page 116, line 15. M.]

Article XLII.—Value of the Criticism of Pure Reason. (§ 2772.)

§ 2772.—Distinguishing of ideas from categories, as cognitions of a quite distinct species, origin, and use, is so important a part for the groundwork of a science which contains the system of all these cognitions apriori, that, without this separation, metaphysic is absolutely impossible, or at most an irregular bungling attempt to erect an edifice without a knowledge of the materials or of their fitness for any purpose. (page 118, line 4.) [*To the illustration of*: to clear up. M.] [page 116, line 23. M.]

Article XLII.—Reason naturally becomes dialectical by means of its ideas. (§ 2773.)

§ 2773.—Transcendent cognitions of reason neither can (as to their ideas) be referred to experience, nor can their propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it; hence can the error, which slips in perhaps by that means, be discovered by nothing but pure reason itself. (page 118, line 27.) [*But which discovery*: a discovery of much difficulty. M.] [*Appearance*: illusion. M.] [*Researches*: into things, but by a subjective investigation of. M.] [page 117, line 14. M.]

Article XLIII.—Division of the dialectic. (§§ 2774–2776.)

§ 2774.—Derive conceptions belonging to each sort of cognition alone from their common source, in order that I not only could, by my being informed whence they descend, determine their use with safety, but have the incalculable advantage of cognizing the completeness in the enumeration, the classing, and the specification of the conceptions apriori, consequently according to principles. (page 119, line 15.) [page 117, line 28. M.]

§ 2775.—Seek the origin of the IDEAS in the three functions of the syllogisms of reason. (page 120, line 8.) [page 118, line 15. M.]

§ 2776.—Division of the whole dialectic of pure reason into its

paralogism, its antinomy, and its ideal, is founded therein. (page 120, line 22.) [page 118, line 29. M.] See §§ 1292, 1970, 1944.

Article XLIV.—Purpose of the ideas of pure reason. (*To bring the cognition of the understanding as near the completeness which an idea denotes, as possible.*) (§§ 2777–2779 inclusive.)

§ 2777.—Idea of reason is not, as the categories are, of service to us for the use of the understanding in regard to experience; but with respect to that use it is quite dispensable, nay even contrary, and an impediment to the maxims of the rational* cognition of nature. (page 121, line 15.) [**Cognition of reason*: rational cognition. M.] [page 119, line 18. M.] See Richardson's note.

§ 2778.—Must be harmony between that which belongs to the nature of reason and what belongs to that of the understanding, and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter, and can not possibly confuse it. (page 123, line 1.) [*Use of experience*: empirical use. M.] [page 120, line 28. M.]

§ 2779.—Pure reason has not in its ideas particular objects which lie beyond the field of experience in view, but requires only completeness of the use of the understanding in the coherence of experience. But this completeness can be a completeness of principles only (not of intuitions and of objects). (page 123, line 18.) [*Conceives of such a one*: i. e. regards its own procedure.] [page 121, line 16. M.]

Article XLV.—Observation previous to the dialectic of pure reason. (§ 2780.)

§ 2780.—Transcendental ideas (which rightly aim only at illimited extension of the use of experience*) entice the understanding by an unavoidable illusion† to a transcendent use. (page 124, line 6.) Cf. §§ 2741–2744. [*On which only*: on which alone. M.] [**Use of experience*: empirical use. M.] [*Determination of nature*: natural determination. M.] [†*Appearance*: illusion. M.] [page 122, line 3. M.]

TITLE I.—PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS. (§§ 2781–2785.) Cf. §§ 1997–2335, 2921–3000.

Article XLVI.—The denotation of the object of the internal sense, and the illusory inference of the nature of our thinking being. (§§ 2781, 2782.)

§ 2781.—Pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its subject that belongs to it, and for this subject, which is of necessity nothing but a predicate again, its subject, and so on. (page 125, line 26.) [page 123, line 22. M.]

§ 2782.—I can not be conceived of as the predicate of any other subject. But it is nothing more than the feeling of an existence, without the least conception, and is only the representation of

that to which all thinking stands in relation (*relatione accidentis*) [*Das Denken ist nicht das Ich.*] Cf. §§ 2026, 952, 1729, 1599. (page 126, line 30.) [*I can not be conceived of*: I can not conceive myself. M.] [*We do not cognize more* of it*: we cognize it by no further predicate. M.] [*i. e. than the bare fact of existence.] [*Should be thought*: could be thought. M.] [page 124, line 26. M.]

Article XLVII.—*From the conception of a subject which does not exist itself as the predicate of another thing, to prove that its existence is thoroughly permanent.* (§ 2783.)

§ 2783.—Conception of the thinking self as substance, if its durability can not be proved, remains quite empty and of no consequence. (page 128, line 5.) Cf. § 1764. [*Whether*: whether he can succeed in proving. M.] [*Beginning*: originate or be annihilated. M.] [page 126, line 1. M.]

Article XLVIII.—*Permanence of the soul can be evinced during the life of man only.* (§ 2784.)

§ 2784.—Conception of substance, if it shall be considered as necessarily conjoined with the conception of permanency, can be so according to a principle of possible experience only, and consequently for the behoof of experience only. (page 128, line 28.) [*End of all experience*: of all experience which concerns the soul as an object of experience, except the contrary be proved, which is the very question in hand. M.] But I am not sure that Richardson is not right. [page 126, line 23. M.]

Article XLIX.—*Kant's formal (or transcendental) idealism actually annuls the material (or Cartesian) idealism.* (Cf. §§ 2854, 2855.) (§ 2785.)

§ 2785.—BODIES EXIST WITHOUT US (IN SPACE) is just as sure an experience as that I myself exist according to the representation of the internal sense (in time). (page 130, line 2.) Cf. §§ 1846, 2700 and 2953. (Cf. Mahaffy's notes on this § 2785.) [*If the objects*: whether the objects. M.] [*If experience*: whether experience. M.] [*As of external phenomena*: Mahaffy omits of.] [*May likewise*: may accordingly. M.] [*Out of my thoughts*: apart from my thoughts. M.] [*Out of my power*: apart from my faculty. M.] [*In both*: in both (space and time). M. (I have substituted parenthesis () for brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the words *space and time*.)] [page 128, line 1. M.]

TITLE II.—COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. (§§ 2786-2804 inclusive.) Cf. § 2042 et seqq.

Article L.—*In what respect the cosmological idea becomes transcendent.* (§ 2786.)

§ 2786.—Cosmological idea takes its object from the sensible world, but enlarges the connection of that which is conditionate

with its condition so much that experience never can equal it. (page 133, line 8.) [page 131, line 9. M.]

Article *LI*.—*Transcendental ideas refer to nothing but the absolute completeness of the series of conditions of a given conditionate.* (§ 2787.)

§ 2787.—Antinomy, which is not arbitrarily* excogitated, but founded in the nature of human reason, by consequence unavoidable and never ceasing. (page 134, line 4.) (Here follow the four theses, together with their antitheses. See §§ 2067, 2081, 2094, 2105.) Cf. §§ 2051, 2062. [**Arbitrarily*: arbitrarily. M.] [*Casual*: contingent. M.] [*Is simple*: consists of simple (parts).† M.] [page 132, line 9. M.] [† I have substituted parentheses () for the brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word parts.]

Article *LII* (a).—*The thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be evinced by equally clear, evident, and irresistible proofs.* (§ 2788.)

§ 2788.—Must bring the philosopher to reflection and give him uneasiness. (page 135, line 23.) [page 134, line 1. M.]

Article *LII* (b).—*The only possible case in which reason reveals its secret dialectic.* (§ 2789, 2790.)

§ 2789.—Never can be refuted by experience. (page 136, line 14.) [*If the world*: whether the world. M.] [*If matter*: whether matter. M.] [page 134, line 20. M.]

§ 2790.—Must necessarily discover an error for us which lies hidden in the presuppositions of reason.* Two propositions contradicting one another can not both be false, except when the conception upon which both bottom is itself contradictory. (page 137, line 1.) Cf. § 2149. [*Against its will*: unintentionally. M.] (*I therefore wish [says Kant in a note here] that the critical reader may make this ANTINOMY his chief study, because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions, and to force it to self trial. Every proof which I have given, as well of the thesis as of the antithesis, I oblige myself to be answerable for, and thereby to show the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason. If the reader is once brought by this rare phenomenon to recur to the proof of the presupposition upon which it bottoms, he will feel himself constrained to investigate the first foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me.) Cf. § 2860. [*Appearance*: illusion. M.] [page 135, line 5. M.]

Article *LII* (c).—*The mathematical antinomies.* (§§ 2791–2794.)

§ 2791.—Thesis as well as the antithesis of both is false. (page 138, line 14.) [page 136, line 14. M.]

§ 2792.—Objects of the senses exist in experience only. To give them an existence subsisting by itself* without experience or

before it, is as much as to represent to ourselves that experience is actual without experience or before it. (p. 138, l. 20.) [*But I: accordingly I. M.*] [p. 136, l. 21. M.] [*Absolutely. R's n.]

§ 2793.—Solution of the problem concerning the quantum of the world (as to space and time) is (whether attempted positively or negatively) always false, because the conception of AN ABSOLUTELY EXISTING SENSIBLE WORLD is contradictory in itself. (page 139, line 10.) [*Impossible to all: impossible, as regards all. M.*] [*According to: or, again, of the limitation of the world by a void space or an antecedent void time, is impossible. M.*] Cf. §§ 2170, 2189, 2193. [page 137, line 16. M.]

§ 2794.—Every solution of the misunderstood problem relating to the division of phenomena, whether it is maintained in it that bodies consist in themselves either of infinitely many parts, or of a finite number of simple parts, is contradictory or absurd. To assume that a phenomenon (*exempli gratia*, that of a body) contains in itself before any experience all the parts which nothing † but possible experience can ever reach, is as much as to give a mere phenomenon, which can exist only in experience, at the same time an existence previous to experience, or to say that mere representations exist before they are met with in the power* of representation. (page 140, line 5.) Cf. §§ 2171, 2196. [*Power: faculty. M.] [† Nothing but: any. M.] [page 138, line 8. M.]

Article LIII.—In the dynamical antinomies, both the thesis and the antithesis (which are opposed to one another by mere misunderstanding) can be true. (§§ 2795–2803 inclusive.)

§ 2795.—Falseness of the representation in the dynamical antinomies consists in representing what can be united as contradictory. (page 140, line 26.) [page, 138, line 26. M.]

§ 2796.—Presupposition of homogeneity is by no means requisite to the dynamical connection. (page 141, line 9.) Cf. § 2205. [Mahaffy begins this § 2796 with the word *For*.] [*Laid down by: posited through. M.*] [page 139, line 9. M.]

§ 2797.—Necessity of nature is referred merely to phenomena, and liberty merely to things in themselves, and—though both species of causality (how difficult soever or impossible it may be to render that of the latter sort comprehensible) are assumed or granted—no contradiction arises. [This position is the master-key to all the speculative difficulties inherent in moral philosophy. The solution is not essential to ethics (whose supreme position is the Law's imperative), but is required for the satisfaction of reason. (Cf. § 2862.)] (page 141, line 22.) [*Same: same predicate is at once affirmed and denied of the same kind of object in the same sense. M.*] [page 139, line 21. M.]

§ 2798.—Nature therefore and liberty can without a contradiction be attributed at the very same time to the very same thing, but in a distinct reference: (1) as a phenomenon; (2) as a thing in itself (*in se*). (page 142, line 6.) See § 2212. Cf. § 2214 *et seqq.* [*Every effect (as a phenomenon):* In the phenomenon, every effect. M.] [*To effectuate:* to act must also have originated among phenomena. M.] [*Of its own accord:* from itself. M.] [*But the effects:* and its effects only, as. M.] [*Though grounded:* though the basis of one. M.] [*At one time:* on one side as a phenomenon, on the other as. M.] [page 140, line 6. M.]

§ 2799.—Idea of liberty has place only in the RELATION of the INTELLECTUAL, as cause, to the PHENOMENON, as the effect. (page 143, note.) Cf. § 718. [*Pure beings of the understanding:* pure rational beings. M.] [*Begin itself:* itself begin. M.] [*Beginning itself:* itself beginning. M.] [*Produce:* originate. M.] [page 141, note. M.]

§ 2800.—Causality of reason is liberty with regard to the effects in the sensible world, provided that objective grounds, which are themselves idea, are considered as determining relatively to liberty.* (This connection is expressed by the word OUGHT. Cf. § 2233.) [*That is, provided that liberty means (not lawlessness, but) conformity to the LAW. (Cf. James, i., 25.) Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 109, § 30.] (page 144, line 1.) Cf. § 2231. [*Causes of nature:* natural causes. M.] [**Relatively to liberty:* in regard to it. M.] [*To determine it:* Mahaffy says “to determine them,” (*i. e.* I suppose, conditions).] [page 142, line 3rd M.]

§ 2801.—LAW OF NATURE REMAINS,† whether the rational being is the cause of the effects of* the sensible world from reason, consequently through liberty, or whether he does not determine these on grounds of reason. [That is to say, he who tramples on the Law is not more A NATURAL MAN than he who “abides ‡ thereby, being not a forgetful hearer, but a DOER OF WORK,” but has merely cast away his liberty—lost his soul birthright (§ 369) without gaining therefor the whole world, in which his Law-abiding brother has quite as large ground as he.] (page 145, line 8.) Cf. § 2212. [**Of the effects of:* of the effects in. M.] [*Contradiction:* Now I may say without contradiction. M.] [*Mere laws of nature of the sensitivity:* mere natural laws of sensibility. M.] [*Hindrance:* no hindrance to natural law in phenomena. M.] [page 143, line 6. M.] [† I take the emphasis from Mahaffy.] [‡ Am. Bib. Un., I think.]

§ 2802.—Relation of the action to objective grounds of reason is not a relation of time; in this case that which determines the causality does not as to time precede the action, because such de-

termining grounds represent not a reference of objects to sense, by consequence not to causes as phenomena, but determining causes as things in themselves, which do not rank under conditions of time. (page 146, line 15.) [*Necessity of nature's*: natural necessity. M.] [*Respective to the*: regarded as. M.] [*Of its own accord*: from itself. M.] [*Of objects to sense*: to objects of sense. M.] Cf. § 2238. [page 144, line 12. M.] [Simple Int. K. Eth., page c.]

§ 2803.—Solution of the fourth antinomy. Both propositions can perfectly subsist together. (page 147, line 23.) Cf. § 2249. [*As a phenomenon*: in the phenomenon. M.] [*In another way*: of another kind. M.] [page 145, line 19. M.]

Article LIV.—Result of the whole antinomy. (§ 2804.)

§ 2804.—Reader is thereby forced once more to undertake the deduction of all our cognition a priori, and to prove that deduction which Kant has already given (in the transcendental analytic). (page 148, line 10.) [*Erection*: arrangement. M.] [*Represented*: exposed. M.] [*Necessitated*: compelled. M.] [*Circumstance*: preparation. M.] [page 146, line 6. M.]

TITLE III.—THE THEOLOGICAL IDEA. (§ 2805.)

Article LV.—Dialectical illusion ‡ *of the third transcendental idea (which is occasioned by our holding the subjective conditions of thinking objective ones* † *of the things themselves and a necessary hypothesis for the satisfaction of our reason a dogma) can be easily exhibited.* (§ 2805.)

§ 2805.—IDEAL OF PURE REASON affords matter for the most important (but, if it is made* only speculatively, transcendent and just thereby dialectic) use of reason. (page 149, line 10.) Cf. §§ 2258–2371. [**If it is made*: if pursued. M.] [*Misled*: and err by exaggerating its grounds, in striving to attain if possible the absolute completeness of their series. It rather breaks totally with experience. M.] [† *Ones*: conditions. M.] [‡ *Appearance*: illusion. M.] [page 147, line 4. M.]

GENERAL SCHOLION. (§§ 2806–2808 inclusive.)

Article LVI.—On the transcendental ideas. (§§ 2806–2808.)

§ 2806.—Reason by all means can give and must give a full account of its own procedure. All the problems that must needs arise from the conceptions of reason can be solved. (page 150, line 17.) Cf. § 2408. [*Platner*: A. D., 1744–1818. See Tennemann (Morell) § 381, page 387.] [*Aphorisms*: (§ 728–9). M. inserts.] [*To a certain height*: beyond a certain point. M.] [p. 148, l. 8. M.]

§ 2807.—Questions which reason asks us relatively to the transcendental ideas are put to us not by the objects but by mere maxims of our reason for the sake of its own satisfaction, and

must collectively be capable of being* sufficiently answered. (page 151, line 8.) [**Answered*: of complete answers. M.] [*Of it on the whole*: of experience as a whole. M.] [*The only idea*: yet the Idea of a whole of cognition according to principles must above all things afford. M.] [*Mean*: mean only the practical, but also the highest end of the speculative use. M.] [page 148, line 26. M.]

§ 2308.—Transcendental ideas therefore express the peculiar destination of reason as a principle of the systematic unity of the use of the understanding. But if this unity of the mode of cognition is considered as if it adhered to the object of cognition, if it (a unity merely regulative) is held constitutive, and if we should persuade ourselves that we can by means of these ideas enlarge our cognition far beyond all possible experience, then the DIALECTIC arises, confusing the empirical use of reason, and urging reason into conflict with itself. (page 152, line 13.) [*Partly—partly*: both—also. M.] Cf. § 2375. [page 150, line 3. M.]

CONCLUSION.—ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE BOUNDARY OF PURE REASON. (§§ 2809–2837 inclusive.)

Article LVII.—On the outer verge of all lawful † use of reason. (See § 134.) (§§ 2809–2825 inclusive.) [† See in § 2823.]

§ 2809.—Absurd for us to hope to cognize more of any one object than belongs to the possible experience of it, or to lay the least* claim to the cognition of any one thing which we do not assume to be an object of possible experience. (page 153, line 7.) [**Least*: lay claim to the least atom of knowledge. M.] [*Clear-est*: very cogent. M.] [*Quality*: the constitution it has in itself. M.] [page 150, line 22. M.]

§ 2810.—Absurdity yet greater if* we should not allow of any things in themselves, or had a mind to give out our experience for the only possible mode of cognition of things, by consequence our intuition in space and in time for the only possible intuition, and our discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible understanding. (page 153, line 24.) [**If we*: if we conceded no things *per se*. M.] [page 151, line 11. M.]

§ 2811.—Confusion of the science of metaphysics can be cleared up only* by a formal determination, drawn from principles, of the boundary of our use of reason. (page 154, line 7.) [*Could in consequence of that*: might in this way. M.] [*Serve*: may illustrate. M.] [*Same understanding*: sane † understanding?] [*Give out—for*: announce—as. M.] [*And thus*: then men began to doubt even the. M.] [**But this confusion*: and this confusion can only be cleared up and all future relapses obviated by a formal determination, on principles, of the boundary of the use of our reason. M.] [page 151, line 20. M.] [† Sound sense. M.] 51

§ 2812.—Insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to the satisfaction of reason. (page 155, line 4.) [*Clear*: “as regards the nature of our soul, a clear consciousness of the subject”—(so many words I select from Mahaffy, almost consecutively).] [*From losing himself in mere ideas*: against losing himself in transcendent Ideas. M.] [page 152, line 16. M.]

§ 2813.—Reason sees, as it were, a space round it for the cognition of things in themselves (though it can never have determinate conceptions of them). (page 156, line 15.) [*Always*: always presuppose. M.] [page 153, line 27. M.]

§ 2814.—Reason, in the mathematics and in natural philosophy, admits (of limits, but) not of bounds; that is, (that something at which it can never arrive lies without it, but) not that it will be anywhere completed itself in its internal progress. (page 156, line 24.) [*By constant*: by continued experience and its rational combination. M.] [page 154, line 7. M.]

§ 2815 —LIMITS must* not be mistaken here; for the mathematics refer to phenomena|| only; and what (such as the conceptions of the metaphysics and of moral philosophy) can not be an object of sensual intuition, lies entirely without their|| sphere, and they can never lead to it. (Natural philosophy will never discover to us the INTERNAL of things.) (page 157, line 6.) [**Must not*: can not. M.] [*So to say*: and there is not, as it were, any point. M.] [*They should*: must. M.] [*Chief*: ultimate. M.] [page 154, line 18. M.]

§ 2816.—Metaphysic leads us (in the dialectic essays of pure reason) to BOUNDS; and the transcendental ideas serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of the use of pure reason, but the way to determine them. (page 157, line 28.) [*Of being rendered current*: “of evasion.” (I have interlined it, and I presume that it is Professor Mahaffy’s word.)] [page 155, line 11. M.]

§ 2817.—Sensible world is nothing but a chain of phenomena connected according to universal laws; it therefore has not any subsistence by itself, it is not the thing in itself, and by consequence refers of necessity to that, which contains the ground of this phenomenon,* to beings which can not be cognized merely as phenomena. (page 158, line 18.) [**Phenomenon*: experience. M.] [*Of them—only*: of them alone. M.] [page 156, line 1. M.]

§ 2818.—Question now is, What is the office of our reason in this connection of that which we know with that which we do not know and never shall know? This is A REAL CONNECTION of a known thing with one quite unknown (and which will always remain unknown), and, though* what is not known should not be-

come known in the least (which knowledge we in fact can not hope for), the conception of this connection must be capable of being determined and rendered distinct. (page 159, line 12.) [**If*: though. M.] [*At present*: Now only—since the transcendental Ideas compel us to approach them, and so have led us, as it were, only to the contact. M.] Cf. §§ 2741–2745 (Mahaffy refers to xxxiv. and xxxv., i. e. §§ 2744, 2745). [page 156, line 23. M.]

§ 2819.—Conceive of an immaterial being, of an intelligible world, and of a Supreme of all beings (merely noumena), because in them only, as things in themselves, reason meets with that completeness and satisfaction which it never can hope for in the derivation of phenomena from their homogeneous grounds. (page 160, line 9.) [*Always*: always presuppose a thing *per se*, and therefore indicate it, whether we can know more of it or not. M.] [page 157, line 20. M.] Cf. § 2566.

§ 2820.—Assume them *relatively to the sensible world*, and connect them with it by reason; we are able to think at least of THIS CONNECTION by means of such conceptions as express their RELATION TO THIS world. (page 160, line 21.) [*For*: yet. M.] [page 158, line 3. M.] Cf. § 2418.

§ 2821.—Deistical conception, a pure conception of reason, which represents only a thing that contains all reality, is nevertheless not able to determine any one reality; because for that purpose the example would need to be taken from the sensible world, in which case we should have to do always with an object of sense only, not with something quite heterogeneous, which CAN NOT be an object of sense. (p. 161, l. 8) [*In reducing*: in bringing them under rules of the unity of consciousness. M.] [*Universal*: general. M.] [*Happens*: very same difficulties arise if. M.] [*But in this*: and therefore from our dependence for satisfaction upon objects whose existence we require, and so the notion rests upon sensibility. M.] [page 158, line 20. M.]

§ 2822.—Hume's objections to DEISM are weak, and reach nothing but the proofs; but with regard to the THEISM which will be brought about by a stricter determination of the deist's* merely transcendent conception of the Supreme Being, they are very strong. All his dangerous arguments refer to ANTHROPOMORPHISM, which he holds inseparable from theism, and to make† it absurd in itself, and that if the former were omitted‡ the latter would fall with it, and nothing remain but a DEISM, of which nothing can be made, which is of no use to us, and which can not serve for any foundation of religion or of morals. (page 162, line 16.) [**Our there*: the deist's. M.] [†*Makes*: to make. M.] [‡*Omit*—

ted: abandoned. M.] [*Ubiquity*: omnipresence. M.] [*Always*: Hume always insists that. M.] [*But properties*: and that properties. M.] [*Unavoidableness*: If this anthropomorphism were really unavoidable. M.] [*Not enough*: that it is not enough to say, it is Cause, but we must explain the nature of its causality. M.] [page 159, line 29. M.]

§ 2823.—Both can subsist together, BUT EXACTLY AT THE BOUNDARY or verge of all allowed † use of reason ONLY. (page 163, line 22.) Cf. § 134. [† *Allowed*: lawful. M.] [*For this*: For this boundary. M.] [*So that*: as if nothing but mere world remained for us to cognize. M. (Cf. § 2810).] [page 161, line 3.]

§ 2824.—Limit our judgment to the RELATION merely, which the world may have to the Supreme Being, and thereby avoid the dogmatic anthropomorphism (and allow ourselves a SYMBOLICAL anthropomorphism). (page 164, line 10.) Cf. § 748. [*Appropriate*: attribute. M.] [page 161, line 20. M.]

§ 2825.—Necessitated so TO CONSIDER the world AS IF IT WERE the work of a Supreme Understanding and Will. (page 164, line 22) [*To me*: for me. M.] [page 162, line 3. M.] Cf. § 2420.

Article LVIII.—*Anthropomorphism is entirely avoided in rational theology.* (§§ 2826–2829 inclusive.)

§ 2826.—Analogy (§§ 2824, 2825) yields a conception of the Supreme Being sufficiently determined FOR US,* though we have left out everything that could determine him ABSOLUTELY* or IN HIMSELF; for we determine him respectively to the world, and by consequence to us, and *more is not necessary to us.* (page 165, line 4.) See § 1330. [* I take this emphasis from Mahaffy.] [*That according to analogy*: analogical. M.] [*Act as much*: react equally. M.] [*Right and motive power*: Here right and motive power. M.] [*Give*: obtain. M.] [*If we should*: if we give up the. M.] [page 162, line 13. M.]

§ 2827.—*DEISTICAL CONCEPTION* of the First Being, as a necessary hypothesis, in which conception this Being is thought of by the merely ontological predicates of substance, of cause, etc., as those predicates are mere categories, which, as* they do NOT give a *DETERMINATE* conception of him,† consequently give a conception which is NOT LIMITED to any sensuous conditions, *PERMITS OUR* predicating of this Being a causality by ‡ reason with regard to the world, and thus *PASSING TO THEISM.* (page 166, line 10.) Cf. §§ 2356 and 2359. [* *As they*: though they. M.] [† *Thereby give*: yet give. M.] [‡ *By reason*: through reason. M.] [*As to the former*: in the first place.] [*If we are but granted at first*: let us assume at the outset. M.] [*And which*:

and it therefore. M.] [*To him himself*: to him in himself. M.] [*If we even assume again*: to assume. M.] [*To it*: to our reason. M.] [*Use of nature*: natural use. M.] [page 163, line 14. M.]

§ 2828.—Reason is attributed to the Supreme Being, provided that he contains the ground of the rational form of the world, but ACCORDING TO ANALOGY ONLY, that is provided that this expression shows THE RELATION ONLY which the Supreme Cause that is unknown to us has to the world. We are thereby using the property of reason for the purpose of conceiving by means of it *not of God, but of the world* in such a manner as is necessary in order to have the greatest possible use of reason with regard to it according to a principle. (page 167, line 10.) [*Form of reason*: rational form. M.] [*Of this form*: of this rational form. M.] [*Of conceiving*: kept from using this (human)* attribute, Reason, for the purpose of conceiving *God* by means of it, instead of conceiving *the world*. M.] [*Quality*: constitution. M.] [*That reason*: the former reason. M.] [page 164, line 19. M.] [* I have substituted parenthesis () for the brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word *human*.]

§ 2829.—Difficulties which seem to oppose theism disappear. The CRITICISM OF PURE REASON shows here the true middle way between the dogmatism which Hume combats and the skepticism which he would introduce. (page 169, line 1.) [*As that which*: as one which. M.] [*To determine*: to determine for. M.] [*Something*: by adopting something from one side and something. M.] [page 166, line 7. M.]

Article LIX.—The general conclusion of the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. (§§ 2830–2832 inclusive.)

§ 2830.—Bounding of the field of the understanding by *something which is otherwise unknown to it*, is however a COGNITION, by which reason is neither shut up within the sensible world nor roams without it, but limits itself to THE RELATION OF THAT which lies without it to THAT which is within it. (page 169, line 18.) [*Type*: metaphor. M.] [*At this station*: even at this standpoint. M.] [*As belongs to*: as befits. M.] [page 167, line 3. M.]

§ 2831.—NATURAL THEOLOGY is a conception of that sort *at the boundary* of human reason, because reason is obliged to look beyond this boundary for the idea of a SUPREME BEING, *not in order to determine anything* relatively to this mere being of the understanding, consequently *out of the sensible world*, but in order TO GUIDE ITS OWN USE WITHIN IT according to principles of the greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical) unity. (page 170, line 28.) [*Feign*: invent. M.] [page 168, line 9. M.]

§ 2832.—Result of the whole CRITICISM OF PURE REASON: that reason by all its principles apriori never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience, and even of these nothing more than what can be cognized in experience; *but this limitation does not prevent reason leading us to the objective BOUNDARY of experience, to the REFERENCE to something not an object of experience, but the chief ground of all experience, without however teaching us anything of it in itself.* (page 171, line 15.) [I am partly indebted to Professor Mahaffy for emphasis.] [page 168, line 28. M.]

Article LX.—*WHATEVER is grounded in the nature of our powers, will be found to be in harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim* [§ 2373]. (§§ 2833–2837 inclusive.)

§ 2833.—Problem worthy of inquiry: to find out the ends* of nature at which this predisposition to transcendent conceptions in our reason may be aimed,* because everything that lies in nature must be originally placed in it for some useful purpose. (page 172, line 4) [* *The ends of nature—aimed:* the natural ends intended by this. M.] [*Predisposition of nature:* natural predisposition. M.] [*Partly—partly:* either apparently or really conflicting dialectical. M.] [page 169, line 15. M.]

§ 2834.—Aim of this natural predisposition* is to free our conception from the fetters of experience and the limits of the mere contemplation of nature, so far as at least to open to its view a field which contains merely objects for the pure understanding, *not for the purpose of speculation, but for† the behoof of practical principles.* (page 173, line 5.) [† *In order that:* for the behoof of.] [* *Predisposition of nature:* natural tendency. M.] [*Whether:* be it knowledge or nonsense. M.] [*Spread:* expand. M.] [page 170, line 12. M.]

§ 2835.—Transcendental ideas serve to annul* the rash assertions of materialism, of naturalism, and of fatalism, and thereby to afford scope for the moral ideas without the field of speculation. (page 173, line 26.) [*Over and above:* besides. M.] [*Sufficiently:* which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself. M.] [* *To annul:* at least to destroy. M.] [page 171, line 5. M.]

§ 2836.—Practical utility of the transcendental ideas. (First scholion to the transcendental dialectic, §§ 2372–2407). Not belonging as a part to the science of metaphysic itself, this practical reference, however, lies at least within the bounds of PHILOSOPHY. (page 174, line 29.) [*Appearance:* illusion. M.] [*Solved:* to be removed, but also, if possible, as a natural provision. M.] [page 172, line 9. M.]

§ 2837.—Principles which determine a priori the order of nature or rather * the understanding, which seeks nature's laws by experience. (Second scholion to the transcendental dialectic, §§ 2408-2443.) Provided that the thorough unity of the use of the understanding for the behoof of a collective possible experience (in a system) can not belong to the understanding but with reference to reason (§§ 1942, 2374, 2423, 2403), experience is mediately subordinate to the legislation of reason (cf. § 2401). (page 175, line 17.) [* *Or rather the* : or rather of the. M.] [*As they* : though they. M.] [*The nature of reason* : i. e. the natural tendency of reason.] Cf. §§ 2440-2442. Cf. §§ 2429, 1409. [p. 172, l. 25. M.]

§ 2838.—Accomplished the analytic solution of the main question. (page 176, line 14.) See §§ 2674, 2675. [*From that* : see Kant's note to § 2768.] [page 174, line 1. M.]

Chapter V.—Solution of the General Question of the Prolegomena. How is Metaphysic Possible as a Science? (§§ 2839-2835 inclusive.) [See § 2375.]

§ 2839.—Metaphysic, as a natural predisposition * of reason, is real, but by itself only (as the analytic solution of the third principal question [chapter iv.] evinces) dialectical and illusory. (page 177, line 5.) Cf. § 2811. [* *Predisposition of nature* : natural tendency. M.] [*Vies with* : may overcome another. M.] [p. 175, l. 4. M.]

§ 2840.—CRITICISM alone contains in itself the whole well proved and approved plan,* and even all the means of execution, whereby metaphysic can be brought about as a science. (page 177, line 15.) [*Inferred* : see § 2760.] [*Sources of—of—of* : Mahaffy omits *of* in these two lines.] [*Persuasion* : plausibility. M.] [* *Yes* : and. M.] [*Elaboration* : cultivation. M.] [*Be made the most conducive* : best be directed. M.] [page 175, line 14. M.]

§ 2841.—CRITICISM stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the schools, as chemistry to alchemy or as astronomy to judiciary * astrology. (page 178, line 11.) [* *Judiciary* : prognosticating. M.] [*Seeming* : mock. M.] [*Preference* : here is an advantage. M.] [*Remains* : unexplored.] [*Closed* : self-contained. M. (but he says it "does not adequately render the untranslatable" German "original *Geschlossenes*").] [*Particular* : peculiar. M.] [page 176, line 14. M.]

§ 2842.—Period of the downfall of all dogmatic metaphysic is undoubtedly arrived. (page 179, line 15.) [*Lasts its time; for* : lasts its time, but. M.] [*Moment of its fall* : epoch of its decay. M.] [*Inclination* : tendency. M.] [page 177, line 22. M.]

§ 2843.—Hope these PROLEGOMENA will excite investigation in the field of criticism. (page 180, line 14.) [*Bespeaks much* : promising. M.] [*Represent to myself* : imagine. M.] [page 178, line 25. M.]

§ 2844.—Metaphysic can not give satisfaction to any reflecting mind, but it is quite impossible to forego it entirely: a CRITICISM OF PURE REASON must therefore be attempted, or (if one exists) investigated. (page 180, line 25.) [*Desire of: thirst for. M.*] [page 179, line 5. M.]

§ 2845.—Metaphysic, after all its bustle and noise, still remains as it was in the time of Aristotle; though the preparations for it are (since the clew to synthetic cognitions has been found) undoubtedly much better made than they formerly were. (page 181, line 12.) [*Determination: preciseness. M.*] [*Materials: from which the science still remains to be built. M.*] Cf. § 2661. [*More composed: i. e. complicated.*] [page 179, line 21. M.]

§ 2846.—Easily annul this accusation, by producing a single synthetic proposition (belonging to metaphysic) which he can * prove dogmatically apriori. (page 182, line 26.) [* *Can prove: proposes to prove dogmatically apriori, for until he has performed this feat, I shall not grant. M.*] [*Forbid: deprecate. M.*] [*The toys of: trifling about. M.*] [*Understanding: common sense. M.*] [*Properties: peculiarities. M.*] [page 181, line 4. M.]

§ 2847.—Nothing can be more absurd than, in metaphysic (a philosophy from pure reason), to think of grounding our* judgments upon probability and upon conjecture. (page 183, line 16.) [* *Their: our. M.*] [*Is cognized: is to be cognized. M.*] [*Quite certain cases: but perfectly certain judgments concerning the degree of the probability of certain cases, under given uniform conditions, which. M.*] [*Accident: chance. M.*] [page 181, line 24. M.]

§ 2848.—Certainly a bad sign of a sound understanding to appeal to the testimony of COMMON SENSE. (page 184, line 4.) Cf. § 2633. [*To the sound understanding: to sound sense. M.*] [*Common understanding: common sense. M.*] [*The common intellect: common sense. M.*] [*Known: but what it has always thought when a pane was broken or a kitchen utensil missing, it then understands the principle. M.*] [*Down only: down with contempt. M.*] [page 182, line 14. M.]

§ 2849.—Evasion which those false friends of COMMON SENSE who occasionally praise it highly but usually despise it, are wont to make use of, when they say that there must* surely be at all events some* propositions which are immediately certain, and of which there is occasion to give not only no proof, but no account at all, because we otherwise could never have done† with the grounds of our judgments. (page 185, line 9.) [* *Must at last: must surely be at all events some propositions. M.*] [† *Never have done: never stop inquiring into. M.*] [*Of this right (or moral fac-*

ulty): of this privilege. M. (The word *moral* ought to be omitted, in any event).] [*By my own power*: by all my power. M.] [*Or out of it*: or beyond it also. M.] [page 183, line 16. M.]

§ 2850.—Never make an appeal to COMMON SENSE in metaphysic (* which must always be science), but only out of it (in practical philosophy, and then only when a belief of reason only is found possible for us, and sufficient to our want, and perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself). (page 186, line 19.) Cf. § 1145. [(*On certain occasions*) and *when*: on certain occasions, when. M. (omitting () and *and*).] [* Mahaffy's use of ().] [*Shape of the thing*: attitude of the question. M.] [*In gross*: as a whole. M.] [*Understanding*: sense. M.] [page 184, line 28. M.]

Appendix.—On what can be done to realize metaphysic as a science. (§ 2851.)

§ 2851.—Investigation of the principles of the CRITICISM OF PURE REASON must precede all judgment on its value. (page 187, line 14.) [*Here*: now. M. (*i. e.* the Critique).] [*No sure*: if no sure. M.] [*Even that there*: even if there.] [page 186, line 3. M.]

Review of a judgment on the CRITICISM, which (judgment) is antecedent to investigation. (§§ 2852–2860 inclusive.)

§ 2852.—Occasion to make a few illustrations which may guard the reader of these PROLEGOMENA in a few cases against misconception. (page 189, line 4.)

§ 2853.—Let us see what sort of an idealism it is, which, though it is far† from constituting the soul of the system, pervades my whole work. (page 190, line 26.) [† Very far indeed.]

§ 2854.—IDEALISM OF KANT contrasted with that of all genuine idealists. (page 192, line 1.) [The following is the full text of this section:] The proposition of all genuine idealists, from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition by sense and experience is nothing but mere appearance [*i. e.* illusion*], and truth is in the ideas of the pure understanding only, and of pure reason." Whereas the principle which thoroughly governs and determines my idealism is: "all cognition of things from mere pure understanding or mere reason, is nothing but appearance [*i. e.* illusion*], and truth is in experience only." [* See Professor Mahaffy above, e. g. pages 786, 774.]

§ 2855.—Idealism of Kant (more properly named CRITICAL IDEALISM) subverts the common idealism. How Kant came to use this word in quite an opposite view.—Kant and Berkeley. (page 192, line 12.) See §§ 1844, 2699.

§ 2856.—Nothing further remarkable in the judgment (§ 2852) on my book. The reviewer generally fights with his own shadow.

When I oppose the truth of experience to dreaming, he is not aware that I am alluding to the known *somnio objective sumto* of the Wolfian philosophy, which is merely formal, and by which the difference of sleeping and waking is not considered. (p. 194, l. 9.)

§ 2857.—Idealism is only adopted in Kant's system as the sole means of solving the problem of synthetic cognition apriori, upon whose solution the fate of metaphysic entirely rests, and which is the sole aim of the CRITICISM OF PURE REASON, as well as of these PROLEGOMENA. (page 195, line 10.)

§ 2858.—Standard for judging of that which is termed metaphysic, must be first found. (page 197, line 16.)

§ 2859.—Challenging my reviewer to show in his way any one principle, which is maintained by him, to be really metaphysical, that is, synthetical and cognized apriori from conceptions. (page 198, line 12.)

§ 2860.—Reviewer is free to choose any one of these eight propositions [in § 2787], and to assume it without proof, and then to attack my proof of the antithesis.* If I can save it, and show in this way that, on principles which every dogmatic metaphysician must acknowledge, the contrary † of the proposition adopted by him can be proved just as clearly, it is thereby established that there is in metaphysic a hereditary fault which can not be explained (and not removed) but by mounting to its place of nativity, PURE REASON itself; and thus either my CRITICISM must be adopted, or a better one put in its place. (page 199, line 4.) [*If the reviewer selects one of the antitheses, it is thereby made his thesis, and Kant's thesis is its antithesis.] [† See § 2790.]

Proposal for an investigation of the CRITICISM, which the judgment can follow. (§§ 2861–2865 inclusive.)

§ 2861.—Propose to prove it piece by piece from its foundation, and for this purpose to use these PROLEGOMENA as a general sketch with which the work itself may be occasionally compared. (page 200, line 22.) Cf. § 2645. [*Presumption that in*: presumption of interest in.] [*By consequence*: and betrays by consequence.]

§ 2862.—Embrace every good occasion to contribute to the common interest of reason which enlightens itself more and more, if there is but some hope of thereby attaining the end. The mathematics, natural philosophy, law, the arts, and even moral philosophy, do not fill the mind entirely; there still remains a place in it, which is marked out for the mere pure and speculative reason, and whose void compels us to seek (in appearance) employment and entertainment, but at bottom dissipation only, in gewgaws and playthings, or even in extravagance, in order to deafen the trouble-

some call of reason which (conformably to its destination) requires something that may absolutely satisfy it, and not merely put it in activity for the behoof of other designs or for the interest of the inclinations. (page 201, line 26.) Cf. §§ 2807, 2812.

§ 2863.—GERMANS are praised for possessing the faculty of carrying that to which constancy and persevering diligence are requisite, further in these respects than other nations. (page 202, line 26.)

§ 2864.—Let attacks, repetitions, limitations, or confirmation, enlargement and complement, as it happens, contribute their part; if the matter is only searched to the bottom, a system, if not mine, that can be a legacy to posterity for which they will have reason to be thankful, can not fail any longer of being brought to pass. (page 204, line 10.)

§ 2865 CRITICISM, by being brought to its full exercise in metaphysic grounds a way of thinking, which afterward extends its salutary influence to every other use of reason, and first infuses the true philosophic spirit. And the service which it does theology, by making it independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation and thereby putting it fully in safety from all the attacks of such an opponent, certainly is not to be undervalued. Fanaticism, which in an enlightened age can not spring up but when it conceals itself behind a school metaphysic, by whose auspice it can venture (so to say) to speak at once like a madman and rationally, is driven from its last lurking hole by the CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY. (page 204, line 21.)

PROFESSOR MAHAFFY'S APPENDICES.

The principal passages in the Critique of Pure Reason altered in the second (and following) editions. Translated from the first edition by JOHN P. MAHAFFY, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Dublin. (§§ 2866–3000 inclusive.) Paging (in parentheses) of Mahaffy's Prolegomena. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1872.) Paging [in brackets] of Mahaffy's Fischer. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1866) I follow the revised text appended by Professor Mahaffy to the Prolegomena.

Appendix I.—Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. (§§ 2866–2912 inclusive.)

TITLE II.—OF THE APRIORI GROUNDS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCE. (§§ 2866–2893 inclusive.) Cf. § 1596 et seqq.

§ 2866.—Self-contradictory and impossible that a conception* should be generated completely apriori *and have relation to an object* without itself belonging to the conception † of possible experience or being made up of the elements of possible experience. (page 191, line 5.) [page 309, line 6.] [* In order to maintain uniformity

in terminology, I have substituted the words *conception* and *conceptions* for Professor Mahaffy's words *concept* and *concepts*, whenever they occur in the section heads taken from Mahaffy.] [† I have substituted the word *conception* for Professor Mahaffy's two words (the first of which he prints within brackets) "[general] notion."]

§ 2867.—ELEMENTS of all apriori cognitions, even those of capricious and absurd chimeras, can not indeed be borrowed from experience (or they would not be apriori cognitions), but must in every case contain the pure apriori conditions of possible experience, and of an object thereof: otherwise we should not only be thinking nothing by means of such chimeras, but they themselves, having no starting-point, could not even originate in thought. (page 192, line 3.) [page 309, line 21.]

§ 2868.—CATEGORIES are the conceptions which contain apriori the pure thinking in each individual experience; and it will be a sufficient deduction of them and a justification of their objective validity, if we prove that THROUGH THEM ALONE can an object be thought. (page 192, line 28.) [page 310, line 17.]

§ 2869.—SUBJECTIVE * sources which constitute the apriori foundation of the possibility of experience must be first discussed (not according to their empirical, but according to their transcendental, nature). (page 192, line 32.) [* Mahaffy says: "This is the aspect omitted in the second edition, and alluded to in the first preface." (Cf. §§ 1407, 1434.)] [page 310, line 21.]

§ 2870.—FOUNDATION of a three-fold synthesis which necessarily occurs in all knowledge: (1) the APPREHENSION of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition; (2) the REPRODUCTION of them in the imagination; (3) their RECOGNITION in the conception. (page 193, line 9.) [page 310, line 29.] [§ 2901.]

Prefatory Remark. (§ 2871.)

§ 2871.—Better, in the four following articles, rather to prepare than instruct the reader, and not to lay before him the systematic discussion of these elements of the understanding (§ 2870) till the succeeding third title (§ 2894 *et seqq.*) (p. 194, l. 2.) [p. 311, l. 7.]

Article I.—Of the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. (§§ 2872–2874 inclusive.)

§ 2872.—All our cognitions must ultimately be subject to the formal condition of our internal sense—TIME—as being that in which they are all ordered, connected and brought into relation. (page 194, line 17.) [page 311, line 19.]

§ 2873.—Synthesis of apprehension—an action directed immediately toward intuition, to make out of the manifold a unity of

intuition. Intuition presents to us multiplicity, but (without a simultaneous synthesis) can not produce it as such and also as contained in one representation. (page 194, line 28.) Cf. §§ 1729, 2901, 1600, 1642. [Mahaffy says: "The reader should here notice the element omitted (for the sake of simplicity) in Kant's *Æsthetic*, and to which he afterward refers" in a note named and referred to by Mahaffy (§ 1639).] [page 311, line 29.]

§ 2874.—Synthesis of apprehension must also be carried out apriori (in the case of representations which are not empirical). For without it we could not have representations either of space or time apriori, as these can only be generated by means of the synthesis of the manifold, which ((manifold))* the sensibility offers in its original receptivity. (page 195, line 13.) [page 312, line 8.] [*I substitute ((double parenthesis)) for the brackets [] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word *manifold*.]

Article II.—Of the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination. (§§ 2875–2877 inclusive)

§ 2875.—Empirical law according to which representations which have often accompanied or followed one another at length become associated, and so form a connection, according to which, even in the absence of the object, one of these representations produces a transition of the mind to another, by a fixed rule. But this law of reproduction presupposes that phenomena themselves are really subject to such a rule, and that in the multiplicity of their representations there is a concomitance or sequence according to a fixed rule. (page 195, line 22.) Cf. §§ 2385, 2391, 2398. [page 312, line 15.]

§ 2876.—Synthesis of the imagination must be founded apriori on a principle prior to all experience, and we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which lies at the very foundation of even the possibility of any experience, and which makes the reproduction of phenomena possible, by being the apriori foundation of a necessary synthetical unity among them. (page 196, line 20.) [page 313, line 1.]

§ 2877.—Reproductive synthesis of the imaginative faculty is one of the transcendental operations of the mind; and in reference to these, we shall name this faculty the transcendental imagination. (page 197, line 16.) [page 313, line 25.]

Article III.—Of the synthesis of recognition in the conception. (§§ 2878–2887 inclusive.)

§ 2878.—Without the consciousness that what we now think is identical with what we thought a moment ago, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. It is this *one*

(single) consciousness which unites the manifold, gradually intuited, and then also reproduced, into *one* representation.. (page 197, line 25.) [page 313, line 32.] §§ 1599, 1604. [Con-capio.]

§ 2879.—Object corresponding to cognition and yet distinct from it. Must be thought as something in general = *x*. because outside our cognition we surely possess nothing which we could place over against it, as corresponding to it. (p. 198, l. 22.) [p. 314, l. 21.]

§ 2880.—Unity which the object necessarily produces can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the multiplicity of representations. (page 199, line 1.) [page 314, line 31.]

§ 2881.—All cognition requires a conception, however incomplete or obscure; and this, in its very form, is something universal, and which serves as a rule. (page 199, line 32.) [page 315, line 20.]

§ 2882.—Always a transcendental condition at the foundation of any necessity. Hence, we must be able to find a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold in all our intuitions, and in all our conceptions of objects generally—consequently, in all objects of experience. (page 200, line 11.) [page 315, line 30.]

§ 2883.—Transcendental apperception.—Neither can cognitions take place in us, nor any conjunction or unity among them, without this unity of consciousness, which is prior to all the data of intuition, and by reference to which alone all representation of objects is rendered possible. (page 200, line 21.) [page 315, line 38.]

§ 2884.—Original and necessary consciousness of the identity of self is at the same time a consciousness of just as necessary a unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to conceptions. For the mind could not possibly think its own identity in the multiplicity of representations, and this too *a priori*, if it had not before its eyes (so to speak) the identity of its own action, which subjects all the empirical synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity, and is the necessary condition of the connection of this apprehension according to rules. (page 201, line 15.) [page 316, line 23.]

§ 2835.—Transcendental object (= *x*). All representations have (as such) their object, and may themselves also become the objects of other representations. Phenomena are the only objects which can be given us immediately, and that which in the phenomenon refers immediately to the object is called intuition. These phenomena are not things *per se*, but themselves only representations, which, again, have *their* object, and this we can no longer intuit; it may therefore be called the non-empirical, or transcendental, object = *x*. (page 202, line 3.) [page 317, line 3.]

§ 2886.—Pure conception of the transcendental object can contain no determinate intuition, and can therefore refer to nothing but that unity which must be found in the multiplicity of a cognition, as far as it stands in relation to an object. (page 202, line 14.) [page 317, line 12.]

§ 2887.—Relation to a transcendental object (that is, the objective reality of our empirical knowledge) depends on the transcendental law that all phenomena (so far as objects are to be given us through them) must submit to the apriori rules of their synthetical unity, according to which alone is their relation in empirical intuition possible. (page 202, line 25.) [page 317, line 21.]

Article IV.—Preliminary explanation of the possibility of the categories as apriori cognitions. (§§ 2888–2893 inclusive.)

§ 2888.—Experience is nothing but the synthetical unity of phenomena according to conceptions. Unity of synthesis according to empirical conceptions would be quite contingent; and were these not based on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a confused crowd of phenomena to fill our minds without our ever forming experience from them. (page 203, line 7.) [page 317, line 34.]

§ 2889.—Categories are nothing but the conditions of thinking in possible experience (just as space and time are the conditions of the intuition which is requisite for the same). The apriori conditions of experience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.* (page 203, line 29.) [* Mahaffy says: “It is idle to add *for us*, since no *noumenon* can properly be called an *object*.”] [page 318, line 16.] § 1706.

§ 2890.—Possibility, nay even the necessity, of these categories depends upon the relation in which the whole sensibility, and with it all possible phenomena, must stand to primitive apperception; in which apperception everything must necessarily accord with the conditions of the thorough-going unity of self-consciousness, which means that *everything must be subject to universal functions of synthesis*—synthesis according to conceptions. (page 204, line 8.) [page 318, line 24.] §§ 1608, 1615.

§ 2891.—Affinity of the manifold. What makes this thorough-going affinity of phenomena conceivable to you (by which they stand under and *must* be subject to permanent laws)? (page 204, line 27.) [page 319, line 7.] § 2398.

§ 2892.—Transcendental affinity. All possible phenomena belong, as representations, to the whole of possible self-consciousness. But this being a transcendental representation, its numerical identity is indivisible and certain apriori, because we can not possibly

know anything except through this primitive apperception. Now, as this identity must necessarily be introduced into the synthesis of all the manifold of phenomena which are ever to become empirical cognition, the phenomena must be subject to apriori conditions, to which their synthesis (in apprehension) must thoroughly conform. The representation of a general condition according to which a certain multiplicity *can* be brought before us (that is to say, a definite way of doing it) is called RULE; if it *must* be so brought before us, LAW. Consequently, all phenomena stand in thorough connection with one another according to NECESSARY LAWS, and hence in a *transcendental affinity*, of which the *empirical* is merely the consequence. (page 205, line 23.) [page 319, line 26.]

§ 2893.—Nature must conform to our subjective apperception. (page 206, line 9.) [page 320, line 4.] §§ 1826, 2752.

TITLE III.—OF THE RELATION OF THE UNDERSTANDING TO OBJECTS IN GENERAL, AND OF THE POSSIBILITY OF COGNIZING THEM APRIORI. (§§ 2894-2912 inclusive.)

§ 2894.—Three subjective sources of cognition, upon which rest the possibility of experience in general and the cognition of objects: (1) sense; (2) imagination; (3) apperception. (page 207, line 3) Cf. § 1472. [page 320, line 25.]

§ 2895.—Transcendental principle of the unity of all multiplicity in our representations. (Pure apperception.) (page 207, line 23.) [page 321, line 6.]

§ 2896.—Synthetical unity of the manifold (of consciousness) which is cognized apriori, and which gives just the same basis for synthetical apriori propositions which relate to pure thinking, as space and time give to such propositions as relate to the form of mere intuition. The synthetical proposition that the various empirical consciousnesses must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is absolutely the first and synthetical principle of our thinking in general. (page 208, note.) [page 321, note.]

§ 2897.—Transcendental unity of apperception points to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an apriori condition of the possibility of any combination of the manifold into a single cognition. But it is only the productive synthesis of the imagination which can take place apriori; for the reproductive depends on empirical conditions. (page 209, line 1.) Cf. §§ 2904, 1628. [page 322, line 1.]

§ 2898.—Transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of all possible cognition, by means of which all objects of possible experience must be represented apriori. (page 209, line 14.) [page 322, line 12.] § 1627.

§ 2899.—UNDERSTANDING is the unity of apperception in relation

to the synthesis of the imagination. The pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetical principle of all experiences, and phenomena have a necessary relation to the understanding. (p. 209, l. 25.) Cf. §§ 1626, 1569. [p. 322, l. 21.]

§ 2900.—PERCEPTION OF PHENOMENA. The first thing given us is the phenomenon, which, if combined with consciousness, is called perception. (Without relation to at least a possible consciousness, the phenomenon could never be for us an object of cognition.) (page 210, line 19.) Cf. § 2949. [page 323, line 8.]

§ 2901.—APPREHENSION OF PERCEPTIONS. As every phenomenon contains a certain multiplicity—that is to say, as various perceptions are found within us, in themselves scattered and single—a connection of them is necessary, and this they can not have in mere sense. There is, then, within us an active faculty of the synthesis of this multiplicity, which we call the faculty of imagination, and the action of which, when directed immediately upon the perceptions, I call apprehension. The province of the imagination is to unite the manifold of intuition into an *image*; it must first, then, grasp the impressions ACTIVELY, viz., APPREHEND them. (page 210, line 28.) Cf. §§ 1729, 2873. [page 323, line 16.]

§ 2902.—ASSOCIATION OF REPRESENTATIONS.—But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold by itself could produce no image, nor connection of impressions, if there were not present a subjective condition for summoning a perception from which the mind had made a transition to the next, to join this next, and so produce whole series of these perceptions—in fact, if we did not possess a reproductive faculty of the imagination (which even then is only empirical). But representations, if they suggested one another just as they chanced to meet together originally, would have no determinate connection, but be a mere confused crowd, from which could spring no cognition; their reproduction must therefore have a rule by which a representation enters into combination rather with this than with another representation in the imagination. This subjective and empirical cause of reproduction according to rules, we call the *association* of representations. (page 211, line 7.) Cf. §§ 1628, 2877, 2904. [page 323, line 26.]

§ 2903.—Objective ground prior to any of the empirical laws of imagination, and apriori, on which depends the possibility—nay, even the necessity—of a law extending over all phenomena; which regards them universally to be such data of the senses as are in themselves associable, and subject to the general rules of a thorough-going connection when reproduced. (*Affinity*: §§ 2891, 2892.) (page 212, line 1.) [page 324, line 9.]

§ 2904.—Imagination is consequently also a faculty of apriori synthesis, for which reason we call it the **PRODUCTIVE** imagination; and since, as far as it relates to the multiplicity of phenomena, it has no further object than to produce the necessary unity in their synthesis, we may call it the transcendental function of the imagination. (page 213, line 3.) Cf. § 2897. [page 324, line 37.]

§ 2905.—Fixed and permanent **EGO** (of pure apperception) constitutes the correlatum of all our representations, so far as the mere possibility of becoming conscious of them; and all consciousness belongs just as much to an all-comprehensive pure apperception as all sensuous intuition (*qua* representation) belongs to a pure internal intuition (namely, that of time). (page 213, line 24.) [page 325, line 16.]

§ 2906.—Pure imagination, as an original faculty of the human soul, lying at the basis of all cognition apriori. By means of it we bring on the one side the multiplicity of intuition, and on the other the condition of the necessary unity of apperception, into mutual relation.* (page 214, line 7.) [* Mahaffy says: "From this point I have developed my explanation of the schematism of the categories."] [page 325, line 29.]

§ 2907.—Real experience, consisting of apprehension, association (of reproduction), and finally, of the recognition of phenomena, contains in this last and highest (merely empirical element of experience) conceptions, which render possible the formal unity of experience, and with it all objective validity (truth) of empirical cognition. These fundamental causes of the recognition of multiplicity, so far as they concern merely the *form of experience in general*, are the very categories of which we are speaking. (page 214, line 16.) [page 326, line 3.]

§ 2908.—Order and regularity in phenomena, which we call nature, we ourselves introduce, and should never find it there if we (or the nature of our mind) had not placed it there. (page 215, line 3.) Cf. §§ 2893, 2756. [page 326, line 17.]

§ 2909.—Understanding as the faculty of rules. Unity of apperception is the transcendental basis of the necessary regularity of all phenomena in experience. The same unity in relation to the multiplicity of representations (that is to say, determining it from a single representation) is the rule, and the faculty of these rules is the understanding. (page 215, line 15.) [*Derselben*, their nature, Professor Mahaffy emends, by changing it to *desselben*. But why not understand *their* of the categories, the general subject under consideration?] [page 326, line 27.]

§ 2910.—Understanding itself is the source of the laws of nature and of the formal unity thereof. All empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, under which, and according to the type of which, they first become possible. (page 216, line 23.) Cf. § 2752. [page 327, line 24.]

§ 2911.—Pure understanding constitutes, in the categories, the law of the synthetical unity of all phenomena; and hence it first renders experience possible as to form.* (page 217, line 6.) [*Whereupon Mahaffy remarks that Kant “never asserts that the matter of experience is created by the *Ego*.” Kant’s repeated and emphatic protests against idealism appear again and again in the pages of this clavis, and are absolutely conclusive. (See, *ex. gr.*, § 2855, page 801 above.)] [page 327, line 37.]

Summary statement of the legitimacy and possibility of this and no other deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. (§ 2912.)

§ 2912.—Categories must precede all experience, and make it even possible as to form. The way in which the manifold of sensuous representations (intuition) belongs to one consciousness, precedes all cognition of the object, as being its intellectual form, and even produces a formal cognition of all objects apriori, so far as they are thought (categories). (page 217, line 18.) Cf. § 2717. [page 328, line 10.]

Appendix II.—Distinction Between Noumena and Phenomena. (§§ 2913–2920 inclusive.)

Professor Mahaffy says: “After the words ‘under such conceptions’ [§ 1869], the following paragraph [§ 2913] occurs in the first edition.”*

§ 2913.—Categories, if taken for conceptions of things in general (that is, of transcendental application), would represent the logical function in judgments as the condition of the possibility of things themselves; without there being the least evidence how they could then have their application and object, or how they could then have any meaning and objective validity in the pure understanding, without intuition. (page 220, line 7.) Cf. §§ 1869 and 1687. [page 330, line 4.] [*The words “the following paragraph” refer to the entire text of § 2913, not to my section head which immediately follows them in this clavis. The caution seems scarcely necessary; but I suppose that misapprehension is possible, not only here, but elsewhere in the clavis.]

Professor Mahaffy says: “Instead of the note [§ 1871], the first edition has the following note.” [§ 2914.]

§ 2914.—Categories require, beyond the mere conception of the understanding, determinations of their application to sensibility in

general (*schemata*), and without this are not conceptions by which any object can be cognized and distinguished from another: they are rather so many ways of thinking an object for possible intuitions, and giving it its signification (under conditions yet to be supplied), according to some function of the understanding; that is, of *defining* it: but these categories can not themselves be defined. The logical functions of judgment in general—unity and plurality, affirmation and negation, subject and predicate—can not be defined without arguing in a circle, because such definition can not but be a judgment, and must therefore contain these functions. But the pure categories are representations of things in general, so far as the diversity of their intuition must be thought through one or other of these logical functions. (page 221, line 13.) See §§ 1869, 1870, 1871, 1755. (See § 2717 and cf. § 2749.) [p. 331, l. 3.]

Professor Mahaffy says: “The passage commencing ‘but there lurks’ [§ 1876] and ending ‘negative sense’ [§ 1880] was rewritten in the second edition. Its original form was as follows.” [§§ 2915–2920 inclusive.]

§ 2915.—Division of all objects into PHENOMENA and NOUMENA, and so of the world into one of sense and reason (*mundus sensibilis et intelligibilis*). And indeed the difference would not seem to be the logical form of the distinct or indistinct knowledge of one and the same object, but would start from the difference of the way in which they are given to our cognition. (page 223, line 3.) Cf. §§ 1876–1880. [page 332, line 4.]

§ 2916.—All our representations are in fact referred to some object by the understanding, as phenomena are nothing but representations. But this transcendental object ($= x$, of which we know nothing) can not be at all separated from the sensuous data, because then nothing remains by which it would be thought.* It is therefore no object of cognition in itself. (page 224, line 10.) [*Professor Mahaffy, in a note here, calling attention to Professor Kuno Fischer's misunderstanding of the matter, adds: “Because nothing is left *for us*, when we subtract all the subjective conditions of the object, it does not follow that nothing *at all* remains.” This is well said, and strictly Kantian doctrine (cf. § 2810).] [page 332, line 36.]

§ 2917.—Categories consequently do not represent any definite object given to the understanding alone, but only serve to determine the transcendental object (the conception of something in general), by what is given in sensibility, so as by it to cognize empirically phenomena under conceptions of objects. (page 223 [mis-numbered], line 5.) [page 333, line 13.]

§ 2918.—Follows naturally from the very conception of a phenomenon in general, that something must correspond to it which in itself is not phenomenon; because phenomenon can be nothing in itself beyond our faculty of representation. (page 223 [misnumbered], line 11.) [page 333, line 18.]

§ 2919.—Although our thought can abstract from all sensibility, the question still remains to be settled, whether it is then anything but the mere form of a conception, and whether, when such abstraction is made, any object at all is left.* (page 224 [misnumbered], line 3) [*“Here,” says Professor Mahaffy, “is the question of absolute idealism explicitly raised; and the following paragraph [§ 2920] proceeds, not to solve it dogmatically, but merely to show that no possible data can be found for settling the question.”] [page 334, line 5.]

§ 2920.—Object to which I refer the phenomenon in general is the transcendental object; that is, the totally undetermined thought of *something* in general. This can not be called the *noumenon*;* for I do not know what it is in itself, and have no conception of it at all, except as the object of sensuous intuition in general, which is, accordingly, of the same description for all phenomena. I can not think it by means of any category; for such is valid only of empirical intuition, in order to subject it to the conception of an object in general. A pure use of the categories is indeed possible, or not contradictory, but has no objective validity, because it concerns no intuition on which it confers the unity of an object; for the category is only a pure function of thought, by which no object can be given me, but by which I only think what is given in intuition. (p. 224 [misnumbered], l. 24.) Cf. §§ 2934, 2885, 2155, 2955, 2965, 2830, 2809, 2691, 2700, 1884, 1918. [p. 334, l. 22.] [*The student will not fail to notice the caution with which the transcendental object is distinguished from the noumenon. (Compare transcendental in § 2937.) The transcendental object is no object for us. The noumenon is no possible object, being merely the intellectual schema denoting the place (vacant to all human sense) over against which stands that transcendental object of which we are and must remain ignorant so long as we are intellectually so constituted as now. For even if we should by some unexpected transposition come into possession of some new and different sensibility of whose very possibility we can form to ourselves no representation whatever, yet whatever we should through such strange faculty of representation be enabled to represent to ourselves would still be by virtue of such representation mere representation, that is to say phenomenon of no one knows what sort, leaving us quite as far as ever from any real knowledge of

the essential constituting of the thing in itself so appearing. But this whole matter of representation depends on the possession of a discursive understanding, a form which we have not only no warrant for transgressing, but also (the point here to be considered) no warrant for imposing upon things in themselves. It follows that we must not confound the noumenon which is in very conception no more than the intellectual representation of our own incapacity, with the transcendental object which the noumenon serves us to indicate. Such confusion would but make room for the most subtle of all idealism, most difficult to uproot because it can never be shown to be false. For my own part, I am inclined to the belief that the general conclusions of Spinoza (of whose writings I am entirely ignorant †) are true (Kant's criticism destroys only Spinoza's method and proof), and that God is all in all (*Deo parere summa libertas est*; ‡ see J. R. Morell's Tennemann's Manual of the History of Philosophy, § 338, page 316, London; Bell & Daldy, 1870); but there is no foothold on Kantian ground for any system of idealism whatever. Kant's own system might have been better denominated CRITICAL REALISM, inasmuch as he, first of all philosophers, thoroughly establishes reality in complete conformity with the nature of the human intellect.] § 870.

Appendix III.—The Paralogisms of Rational Psychology.

(§§ 2921–3000 inclusive.)

Professor Mahaffy says: "The following discussion [§§ 2921–3000] stood in the first edition after the words 'predicaments of pure psychology'" [in § 2007].

Article I.—The first paralogism of pure psychology. (§§ 2921–2925 inclusive.)

Text of the first paralogism. (§ 2921.)

§ 2921.—Paralogism of substantiality. That of which the representation is the absolute subject of our judgments, and which consequently can not be used to determine anything else ((as predicate)),* is SUBSTANCE. *I*, as a thinking being, am the *absolute* subject

[† I am indebted to Seelye's Schwegler and Morell's Tennemann. I hastily glanced at a few paragraphs of the Ethics, eight or nine years ago, but the statement above requires no serious qualification.] §§ 251, 266.

[‡ "*And whoso willeth, taketh the way unto his LORD: but ye shall not will, unless GOD willeth.*" See in the seventy-sixth chapter of the Koran (appendix xvi. below, ¶ 369, clause 19, sqq.). "*Deus est qui operatur aeterna sua potentia.*" George Sale, in his preliminary discourse prefixed to his incomparable and most excellent translation of the Koran (I do not know Arabic), quotes (in not. ad sect. iv.; page 77 of Lippincott's edition; page 85 of the Chandos Classics edition) from a Latin epistle written by a Moor named Ahmed Ebn Abdalla to Maurice prince of Orange, and Emanuel prince of Portugal, and also tran-

of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself can not be used as the predicate of anything else. Therefore I, as a thinking being (soul), am *substance*. (page 226, line 3.) [page 335, line 3.] [* I have substituted ((double parenthesis)) for the [brackets] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the words as *predicate*.]

Criticism of the first paralogism. (§§ 2922–2925 inclusive.)

§ 2922.—Every one must necessarily consider himself as the substance and his thoughts as the accidents of his existence and determinations of his condition. (p. 226, l. 13.) [p. 335, l. 12.]

§ 2923.—What use can I make of this notion of a substance? That I, as a thinking being, exist permanently—that I can not naturally either originate or pass away—this I can not at all infer from it; and yet it is the only use of the conception of the substantiality of my thinking subject (with which I could otherwise well dispense). (page 227, line 11.) [page 336, line 1.]

§ 2924.—Obliged to start from the permanence of an object derived from experience, if we wish to bring such an object under the empirically applicable conception of substance. (page 227, line 18.) [Professor Mahaffy says that Kant “here approaches as closely as possible to the refutation of idealism in his second edition.” (See § 1845.)] [page 336, line 7.]

§ 2925.—Palms off upon us a pretended discovery, by setting up the continual logical subject of thinking as the cognition of the real subject of inherence. Of this latter we neither have nor can have the least knowledge. (p. 228, l. 3.) [p. 336, l. 22.]

Article II.—The second paralogism of transcendental psychology. (§§ 2926–2940 inclusive.)

Text of the second paralogism. (§ 2926.)

§ 2926.—Paralogism of simplicity. A thing whose action can not be regarded as the concurrence of the action of several things, is *SIMPLE*. Now the soul, or thinking *Ego*, is such a thing. Therefore, it is simple. (page 228, line 22.) [page 337, line 6.]

scribes (in not. ad sect. viii.; pages 119, 120, and 122 of Lippincott's edition; and pages 130, 131, and 134 of the Chandos Classics edition) from a postscript subjoined to the epistle, in which (Sale says) “the point of free will is treated *ex professo*. Therein the Moorish author, having mentioned the two opposite opinions of the Kadarians, who allow free-will, and the Jabarians, who make man a necessary agent, (the former of which opinions, he says, seems to approach nearest to that of the greater part of Christians and of the Jews), declares the true opinion to be that of the Sonnites, who assert that man hath power and will to choose good and evil, and can moreover know he shall be rewarded if he do well and shall be punished if he do ill; but that he depends, notwithstanding, on God's power, and willeth, if God willeth, but not otherwise. Then he proceeds briefly

Criticism of the second paralogism. (§§ 2927–2940 inclusive.)

§ 2927.—ACHILLES of all the dialectical syllogisms of pure psychology. Thought is [supposed to be] only possible in a substance which is not an aggregate of many substances, but absolutely simple. (page 229, line 5.) [page 337, line 12.]

§ 2928.—*Nervus probandi* of this argument lies in the proposition: that many representations must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject to make up one thought. But this proposition no one can prove *from conceptions*. (page 230, line 3.) [page 338, line 3.] [I am often indebted to Professor Mahaffy for emphasis.]

§ 2929.—Equally impossible to deduce from experience this necessary unity of the subject, as the condition of the possibility of each single thought. (page 230, line 24.) [page 338, line 20.]

§ 2930.—Plain that if we wish to represent a thinking being, we must put ourselves in its place, and so supply our own subject to the object which we wish to obtain (which is not the case in any other sort of investigation), and that we only demand the absolute unity of the subject, because otherwise we could not say “*I think* (the manifold of the representation).” (page 231, line 3.) [page 338, line 26.] See § 2810.

§ 2931.—“*I think*” is not experience, but merely the form of apperception, belonging to and preceding every experience. But with reference to possible cognition, this must be regarded merely as a *subjective condition*, which we have no right to exalt to a condition of the possibility of objects, that is, to a conception of a thinking being in general. (page 231, line 14.) [page 339, line 1.]

§ 2932.—Simplicity of myself (as a soul) is not really inferred from the proposition “*I think*,” for it already exists in every thought. The proposition “*I am simple*” must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as the supposed Cartesian conclusion, *cogito, ergo sum*, is really tautological, as *cogito* (= *sum cogitans*) expressly asserts existence. (page 231, line 27.) Cf. § 2026. [page 339, line 12.]

to refute the two extreme opinions, and first to prove that of the Kadarians, though it be agreeable to God's justice, inconsistent with his attributes of wisdom and power: ‘*Sapientia enim Dei,*’ says he, ‘comprehendit quicquid fuit et futurum est ab æternitate in finem usque mundi et postea. Et ita novit ab æterno omnia opera creaturarum, sive bona, sive mala, quæ fuerint creata cum potentia Dei, et ejus libera et determinata voluntate, sicut ipsi visum fuit. Denique novit eum qui futurus erat malus, et tamen creavit eum, et similiter bonum, quem etiam creavit: neque negari potest quin, si ipsi libuisset, potuisset omnes creare bonos: placuit tamen Deo creare bonos et malos, cum Deo soli sit absoluta et libera voluntas, et perfecta electio, et non homini. Ita enim Salomon in suis proverbiiis dixit,

§ 2933.—Subject of inherence is only indicated as transcendental by the *Ego* attached to the thought, without noting in the least any of its properties, and without knowing or cognizing anything at all about it. It means something in general (a transcendental subject), the representation of which must indeed be simple, for the obvious reason that nothing at all is determined in it, since we can not represent a thing more simply than by the notion of a mere something. But the fact of the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not, for that reason, a cognition of the simplicity of the subject itself. (page 232, line 4.) [page 339, line 21.]

§ 2934.—Represent to myself by *Ego* always an absolute, though only a logical, unity of the subject (simplicity), but do not cognize through it the real simplicity of my subject. (page 232, line 22.) Cf. §§ 2032, 2009, 2920, 2998. [There is no real conflict between the first and second editions, the question being one of exposition merely. It makes no real difference whether we say with the first edition that the categories abstract from sense have no application (cf. § 2914), or with the second edition that as mere modes of thought or logical representations they are not related to the categories (§ 2032).] [page 339, line 36.]

§ 2935.—Assertion of the simple nature of the soul is merely of value so far as I am able by it to separate this subject from all matter, and consequently exempt it from decay, to which matter is always liable. (page 233, line 6.) [page 340, line 13.]

§ 2936.—Thinking beings, as such, can never be represented to us as among external intuitions; or, we can not intuit their thoughts, consciousness, desires, etc., externally; for all these must come before the internal sense. (p. 233, l. 23.) [p. 340, l. 27.]

§ 2937.—Admitting the simplicity of its nature, the human soul is not at all proved to be distinct from matter, as regards their respective substrata, when considered (as it should be) merely as a phenomenon. (page 234, line 6.) [In a note at this point in Fischer (page 183), Professor Mahaffy says: "Kant here asserts as problematical or possible, what Spinoza taught as consequences

Vitam et mortem, bonum et malum, divitias et paupertatem, esse et venire a Deo. Christiani etiam dicunt S. Paulum dixisse in suis epistolis: Dicet etiam Iulianus figulo, quare facis unum vas ad honorem, et aliud vas ad contumeliam? Cum igitur miser homo fuerit creatus a voluntate Dei et potentia, nihil aliud potest tribui ipsi quam ipse sensus cognoscendi et sentiendi an bene vel male faciat. Que unica causa (id est, sensus cognoscendi) erit ejus gloriæ vel pœnæ causa: per talem enim sensum novit quid boni vel mali adversus Dei præcepta fecerit.' The opinion of the Jabarians, on the other hand, he rejects as contrary to man's consciousness of his own power and choice, and inconsistent with God's justice, and his having given mankind laws, to the observing or transgressing of

of his system, as the English reader will see in Schwegler's History of Philosophy (trans. Seelye) page 188," § 26.] [As to the transcendental object, see § 2920.] [page 341, line 4.]

§ 2938.—Get rid of the expression that souls only (as being a peculiar sort of substances) think; we should rather use the ordinary phrase, that men think; that is to say, that the very same thing which is extended as an external phenomenon, is internally (in itself) a subject not composite, but simple and thinking. (page 234, line 33.) Cf. § 2030. [page 341, line 27.] § 482.

§ 2939.—Simple consciousness is not a cognition of the simple nature of our subject, so far as it is to be distinguished as such from matter as a composite existence. If I mean by *soul* a thinking being *per se*, the very question is improper, if we mean to ask whether it is of the same kind or not as matter (which is not a thing *per se*). But if we compare the thinking *Ego*, not with matter, but with the intelligible something at the basis of the external phenomena which we call matter, as we know nothing of this latter, we can not assert that the soul differs from it in any way internally. (page 235, line 22.) [page 342, line 10.]

§ 2940.—Whole of rational psychology falls to the ground with its principal support; and we can as little here as elsewhere hope to extend our information by pure conceptions (still less by consciousness, the mere subjective form of all our conceptions). (page 236, line 8.) [page 342, line 24.]

Article III.—The third paralogism of transcendental psychology. (§§ 2941–2947 inclusive.)

Text of the third paralogism. (§ 2941.)

§ 2941.—Paralogism of personality. That which is conscious of its own numerical identity at different times is, so far, a person. Now, the soul has this consciousness. Therefore it is a person. (page 237, line 2.) [page 343, line 11.]

Criticism of the third paralogism. (§§ 2942–2947 inclusive.)

§ 2942.—Personality of the soul should be regarded, not as an inference, but as a perfectly identical assertion of self-conscious-

which he has annexed rewards and punishments. After this he proceeds to explain the third opinion in the following words: 'Tertia opinio Zunis (*i. e.* Sonnitaram), quæ vera est, affirmat homini potestatem esse, sed limitatam a sua causa, id est, dependentem a Dei potentia et voluntate, et propter illam cognitionem qua deliberat bene vel male facere, esse dignum pena vel præmio. Manifestum est in æternitate non fuisse aliam potentiam præter Dei nostri omnipotentis, e cujus potentia pendebant omnia possibilia, id est, quæ poterant esse, cum ab ipso fuerint creata.' [I omit part of Sale's transcription at this point.] "A potentia igitur Dei pendet solum quod potest esse, et possibile est esse; quæ semper parata est dare esse possibilibus. Et si hoc penitus cognoscamus, cognoscemus pariter omne quod est, seu futurum est, sive sint opera nostra,

ness in time ; and this, too, is the reason why it is valid apriori. For it says nothing but this : In all the time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time, as belonging to the unity of myself ; and it is indifferent whether I say, the whole of time is in me, who am an individual unity ; or, I am, with my numerical identity, present in all this time. (page 237, line 8.) [page 343, line 17.]

§ 2943.—Personal identity must always be found IN MY OWN consciousness. But if I consider myself from the point of view of another person (as an object of his external intuition), the identity which is necessarily bound up with my consciousness is not bound up with his (that is, with an external intuition of my subject). (page 237, line 28.) [page 344, line 1.]

§ 2944.—Identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connection, and does not demonstrate the numerical identity of my subject. (page 239, line 1.) [Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., p. 111, § 36.] [page 344, line 13.]

§ 2945.—Proposition of some ancient schools, *that everything is in a flux, and nothing permanent*, is not refuted by the unity of self-consciousness. (page 239, line 13.) [page 345, line 1.]

§ 2946.—Personality, and the permanence which it presupposes—that is, the substantiality of the soul—must now be proved first. (page 240, line 11.) Cf. § 2998. [page 345, line 15.]

§ 2847.—Conception of the identical self does not assist in solving a single question which aims at synthetical cognition. What sort of thing *per se* (transcendental object) matter may be, is wholly unknown to us ; nevertheless, its permanence as phenomenon may be observed when it is represented as something external. But when I wish to observe the mere *Ego* in the alteration of all representations—as I have no other *correlatum* for my comparisons except the same identical self with the universal conditions of my consciousness—I can only give tautological answers to all questions by supplying my conception and its unity to those

sive quidvis aliud, pendere a sola potentia Dei. Et hoc non privatim intelligitur, sed in genere de omni eo quod est et movetur, sive in cœlis, sive in terra ; et nec aliqua potentia potest impediri Dei potentia, cum nulla alia potentia absoluta sit, præter Dei ; potentia vero nostra non est a se, nisi a Dei potentia.’” [I omit part of Sale’s transcription at this point.] “Igitur Deus est qui operatur æterna sua potentia.’” [I omit part of Sale’s transcription at this point.] “Homini tribuitur solum opus externe, et ejus electio, quæ est a voluntate ejus et potentia ; non vero interne.—Hoc est punctum illud indivisibile et secretum, quod a paucissimis capitur, ut sapientissimus Sidi Abo Hamet Elgaceli (*i. e.* Dominus Abu Hamed al Ghazali) affirmat (cujus spiritui Deus concedat gloriam, Amen !) sequentibus verbis : Ita abditum et profundum et abstrusum est intelligere punc-

properties which I possess as an object, and so by assuming what was under investigation. (page 240, line 29.) (page 346, line 1.)

Article IV.—The fourth paralogism of transcendental psychology. (§§ 2948–2965 inclusive.) [See § 2020.]

Text of the fourth paralogism. (§ 2948.)

§ 2948.—Paralogism of ideality (of external relations). Whatsoever can only be inferred to exist, as the cause of given perceptions, has only a *doubtful* ((problematical))* *existence*. Now, all external phenomena are of such a kind that their present existence can not be perceived immediately, but we infer them to exist as the cause of given perceptions. Consequently, the existence of all the objects of the external senses is doubtful. This uncertainty I call the ideality of external phenomena; and the doctrine which holds this ideality is IDEALISM, in contrast with which the assertion of a possible certainty of objects of the external senses is called dualism. (page 241, line 22.) [page 346, line 21.] [*I have substituted ((double parenthesis)) for the [brackets] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word *problematical*.]

Criticism of the fourth paralogism. (§§ 2949–2965 inclusive.)

§ 2949.—DESCARTES justly restricted all perception in the strictest sense to the proposition *I* (as a thinking being) *exist*; for it is clear that, as the external [intellectually cogitated] is not in me, it can not possibly be found in my apperception, or in any perception (which is properly only a determination of apperception). (page 242, line 9.) Cf. §§ 2900, 2957, 1963, 1754. [page 346, line 33.]

§ 2950.—Doubtful whether all so-called external perceptions are not a mere play of our internal sense, or whether they indeed refer to real external objects as their causes. (page 242, line 24.) [Professor Mahaffy says: “This is the very question discussed in the much-abused refutation of idealism in the second edition. The definition of idealism which immediately follows” (in § 2951) “shows how strictly Kant confined both this and the corresponding refutation in the later editions” (§§ 1843–1849) “to Descar-

tum illud Liberi Arbitrii, ut neque characteres ad scribendum, neque ullæ rationes ad exprimendum sufficiant, et omnes, quotquot de hac re locuti sunt, hæserunt confusi in ripa tanti et tam spaciosi maris.” [A little below, in a separate note, Sale transcribes from the Moorish author quoted above] “the following passage, with which he concludes his discourse on Free-will: ‘Intellectus fere lumine naturali novit Deum esse rectum judicem et justum, qui non aliter afficit creaturam quam juste: etiam Deum esse absolutum Dominum, et hanc orbis machinam esse ejus, et ab eo creatam; Deum nullis debere rationem reddere, cum quicquid agat, agat jure proprio sibi: et ita absolute poterit afficere

tes, and did not consider Berkeley, as Fischer and other Germans allege.”] [page 347, line 11.]

§ 2951.—IDEALIST is one who will not concede that the existence of external objects is known by immediate perception, and who concludes, accordingly, that we can never be absolutely certain of their reality by any possible experience. (page 243, line 14.) [page 347, line 26.]

§ 2952.—Transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist (or, as he is called, a dualist); that is, he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness, or assuming anything beyond the certainty of the representations in me. (page 243, line 20.) Cf. § 2150. [*Internal possibility*: Professor Mahaffy says, in a note in Fischer (page 189): “I suppose he means the occult forces or elements which we can possibly discover by experiment or observation. All these, if cognoscible at all, must become objects of possible experience.” But why not mean, by *internal possibility*, the schematism of the understanding? without which that “complex of mere relations” (§ 1895) which Kant calls “matter,” could not (so far as we know) exist. As the principles of the understanding make experience possible, there can be no difficulty in assuming that they make matter possible. The unknown substratum is not thereby denied.] [page 347, line 31.]

§ 2953.—Accepting our doctrine, all difficulty of admitting the existence of matter on the testimony of our mere consciousness vanishes, as well as of declaring it so proved, just as the existence of myself as a thinking being is so proved. (page 245, line 4.) [Professor Mahaffy remarks that this section maintains precisely the “doctrine of the refutation of idealism in the second edition” (§ 1846).† “The concluding limitation” (i. e., that external bodies are mere phenomena) “is also there distinctly implied in the statement” (§ 1844)† “that the æsthetic has removed all possibility of making space a property of things *per se*.”] [page 348, line 26.] [† Professor Mahaffy refers to Meiklejohn’s pages of the Critique: consequently I owe to him these and many other references.]

præmio vel pœna quem vult, cum omnis creatura sit ejus, nec facit cuiquam injuriam, etsi eam tormentis et pœnis æternis afficiat: plus enim boni et commodi accepit creatura quando accepit esse a suo creatore, quam incommodi et damni quando ab eo damnata est et affecta tormentis et pœnis. Hoc autem intelligitur si Deus absolute id faceret. Quando enim Deus, pietate et misericordia motus, eligit aliquos ut ipsi serviant, Dominus Deus gratia sua id facit ex infinita bonitate; et quando aliquos derelinquit, et pœnis et tormentis afficit, ex justitia et rectitudine. Et tandem dicimus omnes pœnas esse justas quæ a Deo veniunt et nostra tantum culpa, et omnia bona esse a pietate et misericordia ejus infinita.’”

§ 2954.—Transcendental realism [§ 2952], on the other hand, necessarily becomes perplexed, and is forced to make way for empirical idealism [§ 2951], because it regards the objects of external senses as something distinct from the senses themselves, and mere phenomena as independent beings existing without us. (page 246, line 1.) [page 349, line 16.]

§ 2955.—Transcendental object, as well of internal as of external intuition, is to us equally unknown. Not this, however, but the empirical object, is in question. (page 247, line 3.) [In a note to this section, and also in a note to § 2952, Professor Mahaffy recalls attention to Professor Kuno Fischer's mistake. The distinctions are sufficiently subtle to escape the notice of a careless reader, as may be readily seen by referring to Fischer's commentary (pp. 186–195). But there is no doubt that Dr. Fischer is wrong, and deserves Professor Mahaffy's censure. Professor Mahaffy has here disregarded the distinction between *noumenon* and *transcendental object* (cf. § 2920), although doubtless for the most part such neglect would occasion no misapprehension. I can not agree with Professor Mahaffy that Kant's argument "is somewhat obscurely expressed." (Cf. above, at § 1985.)] [page 350, line 6.]

§ 2956.—"Without us" is unavoidably ambiguous (meaning either THAT WHICH EXISTS AS THINGS PER SE, distinct from us, or merely that which belongs to *external phenomena*); and therefore (in order to secure to this conception the latter meaning—being that in which the psychological question about the reality of our external intuition arises) we shall distinguish *empirically external* objects (from those possibly so called in a transcendental sense), by denominating them simply things *which can be perceived in space*. (page 247, line 17.) Cf. § 1846. [page 350, line 19.]

§ 2957.—Perception is that through which the material must be given, in order to supply objects to sensuous intuition. This material or real something which is to be intuited in space, NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSES* perception, and can not be in any way imagined or produced independently of this perception, which announces the reality of something in space. (page 248, line 5.) Cf. § 2900. [*"It presupposes," says Professor Mahaffy, "as a necessary condition of being perceived, our faculty of perception." See Mahaffy's note.] [page 350, line 27.]

§ 2958.—Perception then (to keep to external intuitions at present) represents something REAL IN SPACE. Nothing can be considered as *real in space* except that which is represented in it; and, *vice versa*, what is given in space (or represented through perception) is also real in it; for, were it not so—that is, were it not

given immediately by empirical intuition—it could not be invented, because the *real* element in intuitions can not at all be obtained by apriori thinking. (page 248, line 25.) [page 351, line 14.]

§ 2959.—REALITY IN SPACE, as being the reality of a mere representation, is nothing but the perception itself. It is impossible that IN THIS SPACE anything *without* us (in the transcendental sense [§§ 2955, 2956]) should be given. (page 249, line 12.) [page 351, line 26.]

§ 2960.—Illusive representations may arise, not corresponding with objects; and we must ascribe this illusion either to images of the fancy (dreams [§ 2856]), or to a mistake of the faculty of judgment (in the case of the so-called deceptions of the senses [§ 1927]). To avoid these illusions, we proceed according to the following rule: *that which is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real.** (page 250, line 9.) Cf. §§ 1839, 1841, 1830. [*Mahaffy notes that “the substance of this remark is repeated in the end of the note on the refutation of idealism, in the second preface” (§§ 1434, 1846).] [page 352, line 17.]

§ 2961.—Dogmatical idealist, the man who *denies* the existence of matter. He who *doubts* it, because it can not be proved, would be the skeptical idealist. (page 251, line 3.) [*The following section*: see § 2971 *et seqq.* Cf. § 2036 *et seqq.* Cf. § 2031 *et seqq.* Cf. § 2150 *et seqq.*] [page 353, line 1.]

§ 2962.—Skeptical idealist is a benefactor to human reason; since he compels us, even in the most trifling steps of ordinary experience, to keep wide awake [§ 2856]. (page 251, line 13.) [page 353, line 10.]

§ 2963.—Skeptical idealism compels us to take refuge in the ideality of all phenomena; and this we expounded in the transcendental æsthetic, independent of the consequences, which we could not have then foreseen. (page 252, line 1.) [page 353, line 27.]

§ 2964.—Dualism must consequently follow in psychology, *but only in the empirical sense.* But neither dualism in the transcendental sense, nor pneumatism, nor materialism, which oppose it from different sides, has the least basis. (page 252, line 12.) Cf. §§ 2037, 2019, 865, 2937, 2920. [page 353, line 37.]

§ 2965.—Never even come into our heads to make investigations about the objects of our senses as to what they may be in themselves, out of relation to our senses. (p. 253, l. 6.) [p. 354, l. 22.]

Reflection concerning the whole of pure psychology, as an appendix to these paralogisms. (§§ 2966–2986 inclusive.)

§ 2966.—Remarkable difference between psychology and physiology. If we contrast the *doctrine of the soul* ((psychology)),† as the

physiology of the internal senses, with the *science of bodies*, as the physiology of the objects of the external senses, we shall find (in addition to the fact that in both we know a great deal empirically) this remarkable difference: that in the latter science much can be cognized apriori from the mere conception of an extended incompressible being; whereas in the former, from the conception of a thinking being, nothing can be cognized synthetically apriori. Because, although both are phenomena, yet the phenomenon presented to the external sense has something permanent* or fixed, which gives a *substratum* lying at the basis of changeable determinations, and so gives us a synthetical conception, namely, that of space and a phenomenon in it. Time, on the contrary, which is the only form of our internal intuition, has nothing permanent in it; so that it only lets us know the change of determinations, not the determinable object. (page 253, line 25.) [* Mahaffy says "this important passage again anticipates (almost verbally) the refutation of idealism of the second edition. It shows the superior dignity of external *experience*, as contrasted with internal, in affording us data for science." (Cf. §§ 1434, 1846.)] [page 355, line 4.] [† I have substituted ((double parenthesis)) for the [brackets] within which Professor Mahaffy prints the word psychology.]

§ 2967.—All rational psychology falls to the ground, being a science surpassing all the powers of the human reason. In that which we call the soul, everything is in a continuous flux, and nothing is permanent except (IF YOU WILL have it so) the *Ego*, which is perfectly simple, merely because this representation has no content or multiplicity; for which reason it seems to represent or (I should rather say) indicate a simple object. (page 254, line 12.) Cf. §§ 2006, 2001. [page 355, line 19.]

§ 2968.—Important negative use of psychology, if we consider it as nothing but a critical treatment of our dialectical syllogisms, and indeed of the ordinary natural reason. (page 255, line 7.) [page 356, line 6.]

§ 2969.—Securing our thinking self from the danger of materialism. (page 255, line 13.) [page 356, line 10.]

§ 2970.—Find a reason in other than merely speculative grounds for hoping that my thinking nature will remain permanent in the midst of all possible changes of state. (page 255, line 25.) Cf. §§ 2023, 2028. [page 356, line 21.]

§ 2971.—Three additional dialectical questions, which form the proper object of rational psychology, and which can only be decided by the foregoing investigations: (1) the possibility of the community of the soul and an organic body, i. e. the animality

of the condition of the soul in this life ; (2) the commencement of this community, i. e. the state of the soul at and before birth ; (3) the end of this community, i. e. the state of the soul at and after death (the question of immortality). (p. 256, l. 7.) [p. 356, l. 34.]

§ 2972.—Difficulties with which these questions are supposed to be beset, are all based on a mere delusion, by which what only exists in our thoughts is hypostatized, and, without its quality* being changed, assumed to be a real object without the thinking subject (for example, extension, which is nothing but a phenomenon, is taken for a property of external things existing apart from our sensibility ; and motion is taken for their action, taking place really in itself, even apart from our senses. (page 256, line 18.) Cf. § 1895. [* I would like to know whether the word rendered here (and below) *quality*, is the same word which Richardson rendered *quality* in the Prolegomena, and which Mahaffy printed *constitution* (cf. §§ 2747, 2758, 2828).] [In a note to the close of this section, Professor Mahaffy says “a plain assertion of what I before explained, that Kant is refuting, not a thing *per se*, about which we can assert nothing, but such an absurdity as a noumenon in space.” (Cf. § 2955.)] [page 357, line 5.]

§ 2973.—Question is no longer about the community of the soul with other known and heterogeneous substances without us, but merely concerning the connection of the representations of the internal sense with the modifications of our external sensibility ; and how it is that these are connected together according to constant laws, so as to form one systematic experience. (page 257, line 8.) [page 357, line 23.]

§ 2974.—Motion itself (and matter also, which makes itself cognoscible by this means) is mere representation. REMEMBER that bodies are not objects *per se*, present to us, but a mere appearance of nobody-knows-what-sort-of unknown object ; that motion is not the effect of this unknown cause, but merely the appearance of its influence on our senses ; consequently, that both are not anything without us, but mere representations within us. It follows, that it is not the motion of matter which produces representations in us, but that this motion itself (and matter also, which makes itself cognoscible by this means) is mere representation. (page 257, line 29.) [page 358, line 7.] See §§ 2952, 2979.

§ 2975.—Whole difficulty we have conjured up amounts to this : how and through what cause the representations of our sensibility are so related that those which we call external intuitions can be represented as objects without us, according to empirical laws. This question by no means contains the supposed difficulty

of explaining the origin of the representations of causes which exist without us and act in a foreign way (—in that we take the appearances of an unknown cause to be a cause without us: a proceeding which can breed nothing but confusion). (page 258, line 30.) [page 358, line 32.]

§ 2976.—Objections may be all divided into dogmatical, critical and skeptical. The critical objection, as it never touches the truth or falsity of the proposition, and only attacks the proof, does not require or pretend to a better knowledge of the object than the opposed assertion; it only proves the assertion groundless—not that it is false. (page 259, line 17.) [page 359, line 10.]

§ 2977.—Foundation of all theories as to the community between body and soul. (*Subreptio*.) (p. 260, l. 11.) [p. 359, l. 33.]

§ 2978.—Three ordinary explanations of the community of the soul with matter: (1) physical influence; (2) pre-established harmony; (3) supernatural assistance. The two latter are based upon objections to the first (which is the representation of common sense), namely, || that what appears as matter can not by immediate influence be the cause of representations, which are a perfectly heterogeneous sort of effect. According to our principles, their theory must rather attempt to show that the true (transcendental) object of our external senses can not be the cause of those representations (phenomena) which we understand by the word matter. Now, as no one can pretend with any reason to know aught of the transcendental cause of the representations of our external senses, their || assertion is quite groundless. (page 260, line 25.) [When men argue in this way, etc., i. e. it is clear that they do not use the word *object* in the Kantian sense.] [page 360, line 7.]

§ 2979.—All difficulties which beset the connection of thinking nature with matter arise, without exception, merely from the insinuation of the dualistic representation, that matter as such is not PHENOMENON, OR A MERE REPRESENTATION OF THE MIND, TO WHICH AN UNKNOWN OBJECT CORRESPONDS, but is that object itself in itself, as it exists without us, and apart from all sensibility. (page 261, line 19.) [page 360, line 29.]

§ 2980.—No dogmatical objection can be made to the usually accepted physical influence. Assuming that matter and its motion are mere phenomena, and therefore themselves mere representations, our opponent can only raise this difficulty, *that the unknown object of our sensibility can not be the cause of representations in us*—a thing which he has not the least right to assert, because NOBODY CAN TELL OF AN UNKNOWN OBJECT WHAT IT CAN OR CAN NOT DO. (page 262, line 8.) [page 361, line 9.]

§ 2081.—Critical objection can still be made to the common doctrine of physical influence. Such a pretended community between two kinds of substances (the thinking and the extended) presupposes a gross dualism, and makes the latter, which are nothing but mere representations of the thinking subject, into things existing *per se*. Physical influence *thus misconceived* may then be completely overthrown by showing its grounds of proof to be idle, and surreptitiously obtained. (p. 262, l. 21.) [p. 361, l. 20.]

§ 2982.—Question concerning the community of that which thinks and that which is extended—if we discard all fictions—would simply come to this: *How external intuition, viz., that of space (the occupation of it, figure and motion), can be at all possible in a thinking subject?* But to this question no man can ever find an answer; and we can never supply this gap in our knowledge, but only indicate it BY ASCRIBING EXTERNAL PHENOMENA TO A TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT (as the cause of this sort of phenomena), which, however, we do not know, and of which we can never obtain any notion. (page 262, line 30.) [page 361, line 28.]

§ 2983.—Settlement of all disputes or objections which concern the condition of this thinking nature before the community (this life), or after its cessation (in death). (page 263, line 14.) [In a note Professor Mahaffy very correctly says: "To assert of the writer of the preceding argument that he is an absolute idealist, is surely very strange criticism. It is impossible to conceive a more distinct and official refusal to accept that extreme doctrine." (Cf. §§ 2911, 2920.)] [page 362, line 3.]

§ 2984.—Whoever he may be, he knows no more of the absolute and internal cause of external or corporeal phenomena than I or anybody else. He can not, then, reasonably pretend to know on what the reality of external phenomena depends in the present state (in life), nor consequently, that the condition of all external intuition, or even that the thinking subject itself, must cease to exist after this state (in death). (p. 264, l. 3.) [p. 362, l. 21.]

§ 2985.—Whole dispute about the nature of our thinking being and its connection with the world of matter, merely arises from our supplying the gaps in our knowledge by paralogisms of the reason, in that we make our thoughts to be things, and hypostatise them, whence arises an imaginary science, both as regards its affirmations and its negations. We either pretend to know something of objects of which nobody has the least notion, or we consider our own representations to be objects, and so become involved in a perpetual circle of ambiguities and contradictions. (page 264, line 16.) [page 362, line 32.]

§ 2986.—Nothing but the sobriety of a severe but fair criticism† can free us from this dogmatical illusion. (page 264, line 26.) [page 363, line 7.] [† I have substituted the word criticism for Prof. Mahaffy's word *Critick*. (See Richardson, *Proleg.* passim.)]

Concluding remark on the dialectical fallacy in the syllogisms of pure psychology. (§§ 2987–3000.)

§ 2987.—Owe to our reader a distinct and general explanation of the transcendental and yet natural illusion in the paralogisms of the pure reason, as well as a justification of their systematic arrangement and their running parallel to the categories. (page 265, line 16.) [page 363, line 20.]

§ 2988.—Consider all illusion to consist in this: that the subjective condition of thinking is taken for the cognition of the object. (page 265, line 25.) [page 363, line 27.]

§ 2989.—Dialectical illusion of the pure reason can not be an empirical illusion, occurring with determinate empirical cognition; consequently it must concern the conditions of thinking generally, and there can be only three cases of dialectical use of the pure reason: (1) the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general; (2) the synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking; (3) the synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking. (page 265, line 27.) Cf. §§ 1966–1969 and 1986–1988. [page 363, line 28.]

§ 2990.—Synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general is not at all objective, but merely a synthesis of the thought with the subject, which synthesis is falsely held to be a synthetical representation of an object. (page 266, line 20.) [page 364, line 14.]

§ 2991.—Dialectical inference to the condition of all thinking in general, which is itself unconditioned, does not make a mistake as to content (for it abstracts from all content or object); but it is merely false as to form, and must be called a paralogism. (page 266, line 27.) Cf. §§ 1997, 2016. [page 364, line 20.]

§ 2992.—Ego is only the formal condition or logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract from all objects—and yet it is represented as an object which I think, that is, the *Ego* and its unconditioned unity. (page 266, line 33.) [page 364, line 25.]

§ 2993.—Suppose any one were to put to me the general question, “*of what sort of nature is a thinking being?*” I do not in the least know how to answer the question apriori, because the answer must be synthetical (for an analytical answer might perhaps explain thinking, but could not extend our knowledge of that upon which thinking depends as to its possibility). But for every synthetical solution INTUITION is necessary, a point which is wholly passed over in the vague problem proposed. (page 267, line 8.) [page 364, line 32.]

§ 2994.—Although I know no answer in general to that sort of question, it [illusively] appears to me that I might give one in the special case of the proposition “*I think*,” which expresses consciousness. (page 267, line 20.) [page 365, line 4.]

§ 2995.—Further investigation into the origin of these properties, which I attribute to myself, as a thinking being in general, exposes the error. They are nothing more than pure categories, by which I can never think a determined object, but only the unity of representations, in order to determine them as an object. Without being founded on an intuition, the category alone can never provide me with a conception of an object; for only by intuition is the object given, which is afterward thought in accordance with the category. (page 268, line 5.) [page 365, line 15.]

§ 2996.—Mere apperception (*Ego*) is in conception substance, is in conception simple, etc.; and so far all these psychological dogmas have indisputable truth. Yet what we really want to know about the soul is not at all discoverable in this way; for, since all these predicates are not at all valid of intuition, and therefore can have no consequence applicable to objects of experience, they are quite void. (page 268, line 30.) [page 366, line 1.]

§ 2997.—Subreption of hypostatised consciousness (*apperceptionis substantiatæ*). The illusion of considering the unity in the synthesis of thoughts to be a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. (page 269, line 27. [page 366, line 26.] See § 2782.

§ 2998.—Paralogism in the dialectical syllogisms of rational psychology, so far as their premises are in themselves true, may be called a *sophisma figure dictionis*, in which the major premiss makes merely a transcendental use of the category with reference to its condition, but the minor premiss and conclusion make of the same category an empirical use with reference to the soul, which has been subsumed under this condition. (page 270, line 21.) Cf. §§ 2016, 2164, 2946. [page 367, line 10.]

§ 2999.—Systematic connection of all these dialectical assertions in a fallacious psychology. (page 271, line 9.) Cf. §§ 1968, 2043, 1972, 1986, 2025. [page 367, line 24.]

§ 3000.—Assertions of pure psychology do not contain empirical predicates of the soul, but those which (if they occur) should determine the object *per se* independent of experience—that is, through the pure reason. They must therefore [but Dr. Kant has conclusively proved that they can not] be fairly based upon principles and universal notions of thinking natures in general. (page 272, line 4.) [page 368, line 12.] [Cf. § 1935.] Consequently there does not exist any rational psychology as a *doctrine* furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. § 2024.

APPENDICES FROM PROFESSOR ABBOTT.

"Kant's Theory of Ethics, or Practical Philosophy. Comprising: (1) Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals; (2) Dialectic and Methodology of Practical Reason; (3) On the Radical Evil in Human Nature. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin; sometime Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer, 1873." The first division is Professor Abbott's translation of the Groundwork, of which Mr. Semple's translation is referred to in §§ 1-146 inclusive (page 11-18) above. I make of Mr. Abbott's translation of the preface to the Groundwork, a sixth appendix to the Prolegomena (§§ 3129-3145 inclusive, below). The second division I place here as the fourth and fifth appendices to the Prolegomena (§§ 3001-3128 inclusive, below). The third division is Professor Abbott's translation of the first book of the Religion, of which Mr. Semple's translation is referred to in §§ 651-724 inclusive (pages 52-57) above. [See immediately the note to the preface, at § 3129 below.]

Appendix IV.—Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.* (§§ 3001-3103 inclusive.)

Chapter I.—Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally. (§§ 3001-3008.)

§ 3001.—PURE REASON always has its DIALECTIC, whether it is considered in its speculative or its practical employment. [page 123 (of Longmans' edition of 1873 above mentioned).]

§ 3002.—Antinomy of the pure reason which is manifest in its dialectic is in fact the most beneficial error into which human reason could ever have fallen. [page 294 (probably an error for 124), line 1.] See §§ 2790, 2787, 2124, 2135, 2142, 2835.

§ 3003.—Pure practical reason likewise seeks to find the unconditioned for the practically conditioned. [page 294 (124), line 20.]

§ 3004.—PHILOSOPHY in its ancient signification as a DOCTRINE OF THE SUMMUM BONUM, so far as reason endeavors to make this into a science. [page 295 (125), line 3.] § 2562.

§ 3005.—Philosophy as well as wisdom would always remain an ideal, which objectively is presented complete in reason alone, while subjectively for the person it is only the goal of his unceasing endeavors. [page 295 (125), line 23.]

§ 3006.—Self-contradictions of pure practical reason honestly

[*The solution of the dialectic of pure speculative reason is an attempt on the part of man to justify his own reason, lest she quibble herself into a disbelief in her own freedom. The solution of the dialectic of pure practical reason is an attempt on the part of man (by showing that the supreme Law does not direct upon an impossible end) to justify GOD, the Author of the unconditioned Law. The former is a science of immediate rational interest, and belongs to the logical division of the science of ethics. (See §§ 1925-2444 inclusive, above, and consult § 2120.) The latter is natural and perhaps inevitable, but, if admitted into the science, must be restrained to the form of an appendix, or scholion.]

stated and not concealed, force us to undertake a complete critique of this faculty. [page 296 (126), line 16.]

§ 3007.—*SUMMUM BONUM* may be the whole *object* of a pure practical reason, i. e. a pure will, yet it is not on that account to be regarded as its *determining principle*. (The *MORAL LAW* is the sole determining principle of a pure will.) [page 296 (126), line 25.]

§ 3008.—Will is in fact determined by the moral law which is or may be included in the conception of the *summum bonum*. [page 297 (127), line 16.]

Chapter II.—Of the Dialectic of Pure Reason in Defining the Conception of the *Summum Bonum*. (§§ 3009-3103 inclusive.)

§ 3009.—*Summum* may mean either the supreme (*supremum*) or the perfect (*consummatum*). The former is that condition which is itself unconditioned, i. e. is not subordinate to any other (*originarium*): the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the same kind (*perfectissimum*). [page 128, line 4.]

§ 3010.—Virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the *summum bonum*. This *summum bonum* expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good. [page 128, line 12.]

§ 3011.—When two elements are *necessarily* united in one conception they must be connected as reason and consequence; and this either so that their unity is considered as *analytical* (logical connection), or as *synthetical* (real connection); the former following the law of identity, the latter that of causality. The connection of virtue and happiness may therefore be understood in two ways. [page 129, line 18.]

§ 3012.—Ancient Greek schools did not allow virtue and happiness to be regarded as two distinct elements of the *summum bonum*, and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the rule of identity; but they differed as to which of the two was to be taken as the fundamental notion. [page 130, line 4.]

§ 3013.—Acuteness was unfortunately misapplied in trying to trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous notions. [page 130, line 18.]

§ 3014.—Stoic maintained that virtue was the whole *summum bonum*, and happiness only the consciousness of possessing it, as making part of the state of the subject. The *EPICUREAN* maintained that happiness was the whole *summum bonum*, and virtue only the form of the maxim for its pursuit; viz., the rational use of the means for attaining it. [page 131, line 8.]

§ 3015.—Analytic of pure practical reason [see §§ 147-274 above] has shown what it is that makes the problem difficult to solve; namely, that happiness and morality are two specifically *distinct*

elements of the summum bonum, and therefore their combination *can not be analytically cognized*. [page 132, line 5.]

§ 3016.—Deduction must be TRANSCENDENTAL. It is apriori (morally) necessary to *produce the summum bonum by freedom of will*: therefore the condition of its possibility must rest solely on apriori principles of cognition. [page 132, line 17.]

Article I.—The antinomy of practical reason. (§§ 3017, 3018.)

§ 3017.—Virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined in the summum bonum. This combination can not be analytical; it must, then, be synthetical, and, more particularly, must be conceived as the connection of cause and effect, since it concerns a practical good, i. e. one that is possible by means of action; consequently either the desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is *absolutely impossible*. [page 133, line 9.]

§ 3018.—Second is *also impossible*, because the practical connection of causes and effects in the world as the result of the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the will, but on the knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical power to use them for one's purposes; consequently we can not expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the moral laws any necessary connection of happiness with virtue, adequate to the summum bonum. Now as the promotion of this summum bonum, the conception of which contains this connection, is apriori a necessary object of our will, and inseparably attached to the moral law, the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the latter. If, then, the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to vain imaginary ends, and must consequently be false.† [page 133, line 26.]

[† But the MOST HOLY LAW is for us men MOST ABSOLUTELY the MOST APODICTIC and INEVASIBLE LAW of GOD, from which there is for us NO ESCAPE POSSIBLE, not even through the most complete demonstration that the END COMMANDED is impossible and imaginary and vain, for the inexorable law commands regardless of any end whatsoever (a statement which I need scarcely repeat to any student of Kant. See §§ 151, 152, 164, 178, 186, 242, and cf. *Jour. Sp. Phil.*, vol. viii., pages 344, 345). PRACTICALLY, therefore, there is no dialectic of pure practical reason; although *logically* (because of our blindness) there is a *dialectic of* (originated by and belonging to) *speculative* reason CONCERNING pure practical reason. It may therefore be called "the antinomy of pure practical reason" merely in order to distinguish it from the antinomy of PURE speculative reason; but it would be better to term it "the dialectic of speculative reason in respect to practical reason," a designation which would prevent misapprehension.]

Article II.—Critical solution of the antinomy of practical reason. (§§ 3019–3030 inclusive.)

§ 3019.—Antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar conflict between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of events in the world. It was solved by showing that there is no real contradiction when the events and even the world in which they occur are regarded (as they ought to be) merely as appearances. [page 134, line 20.] Cf. §§ 2207 et seqq.

§ 3020.—Solution of the antinomy of pure practical reason. The first of the two propositions: That the endeavor after happiness produces a virtuous mind, is ABSOLUTELY FALSE; but the second: That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness, is not *absolutely* false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the sensible world. It is not impossible that morality of mind should have a connection as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz.: through an intelligent author of nature), and moreover necessary. [page 135, line 10.] § 2565.

§ 3021.—Seeming conflict of practical reason with itself. The relation between appearances was taken for a relation of the things in themselves to these appearances [page 136, line 3.]

§ 3022.—Philosophers of both ancient and modern times have been able to find happiness in accurate proportion to virtue even in *this life* (in the sensible world), or have persuaded themselves that they were conscious thereof. Epicurus as well as the Stoics extolled above everything the happiness that springs from the consciousness of living virtuously. [page 136, line 15.]

§ 3023.—Epicurus, like many well-intentioned men of this day, who do not reflect deeply enough on their principles, fell into the error of presupposing the virtuous *disposition* in the persons for whom he wished to provide the springs to virtue. [p. 137, l. 11.]

§ 3024.—Beware lest by falsely extolling this moral determining principle as a spring, making its source lie in particular feelings of pleasure (which are in fact only results) [cf. §§ 215, 287] we degrade and disfigure the true genuine spring, the Law itself. [page 138, line 8.] §§ 220, 233, 232.

§ 3025.—Consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the Law is by no means analogous to the feeling of pleasure. [page 139, line 16.] [*Respect*: reverence, a word used by Semple (vid. exemp grat, et conf., § 214), is a better word.]

§ 3026.—Freedom and the consciousness of it as a faculty of following the moral law with unyielding resolution is *independence on inclinations*, at least as motives determining (though not as

affecting) our desire; and so far as I am conscious of this freedom in following my moral maxims, it is the only source of an unaltered contentment which is necessarily connected with it and rests on no special feeling. [page 140, line 4.]

§ 3027.—All must be directed to the conception of the Law as a determining principle, if the action is to contain *morality* and not merely *legality*. Inclination is blind and slavish whether it be of a good sort or not. [page 140, line 24.] §§ 291, 226, 302.

§ 3028.—Consciousness of this faculty of a pure practical reason produces by action (virtue) a consciousness of mastery over one's inclinations, and therefore of independence on them, and consequently also on the discontent that always accompanies them, and thus a negative satisfaction with one's state, i. e. CONTENTMENT. [page 141, line 18.] [Cf. Zoroaster, Avesta, Yasna, xlvii., 12 (page 176 above in § 881).]

§ 3029.—Morality is the *supreme* good, as the first condition of the summum bonum, while happiness constitutes its second element, but only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned (but necessary) consequence of the former. [page 142, line 8.]

§ 3030.—Possibility of such connection of the conditioned with its condition belongs wholly to the supersensual relation of things. [page 142, line 25.] § 2565.

Article III.—Of the primacy of pure practical reason in its union with the speculative reason. (§§ 3031–3036 inclusive.)

§ 3031.—Primacy between two or more things connected by reason: the prerogative belonging to one, of being the first determining principle in the connection with all the rest. [page 143, line 13.]

§ 3032.—Interest of reason's speculative employment consists in the COGNITION of the object pushed to the highest apriori principles: that of its practical employment, in the determination of the WILL in respect of the final and complete end. [page 143, line 19.] [See §§ 287, 125, 285, 2124, 2125, 2605, 1168, 1023, 469, 2607.]

§ 3033.—Question is, which interest is the superior (not which must give way, for they are not necessarily conflicting), whether speculative reason, which knows nothing of all that the practical offers for its acceptance, should take up these propositions, and (although they transcend it) try to unite them with its own conceptions† as a foreign possession handed over to it, or whether it is justified in obstinately following its own separate interest, and according to the canonic of Epicurus rejecting as vain subtlety everything that can not accredit its objective reality by manifest examples to be shown in experience. [page 144, line 10.] [†I have

substituted the word *conceptions* for Professor Abbott's word *concepts*. (See at the top of page 804 above.)]

§ 3034.—Only one and the same reason which, whether in a theoretical or a practical point of view, judges according to *apriori* principles. Although it is in the first point of view incompetent to establish certain propositions positively, which, however, do not contradict it, then as soon as these propositions are *inseparably* attached to the *practical interest* of pure reason, then it must accept them. [page 145, line 8.] §§ 246, 278, 2607.

§ 3035.—When pure speculative and pure practical reason are combined in one cognition, the latter has the *primacy*, provided, namely, that this combination is not *contingent* and arbitrary, but founded *apriori* on reason itself and therefore *necessary*. [p. 146, l. 9.]

§ 3036.—ALL INTEREST IS ULTIMATELY PRACTICAL, and even that of speculative reason is conditional,* and it is only in the practical employment of reason that it is complete. [page 146, line 20.]

Article IV.—*The immortality of the soul as a postulate of pure practical reason.* (§§ 3037–3040 inclusive.)

§ 3037.—Perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is HOLINESS, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a *progress in infinitum* toward that perfect accordance. [page 147, line 4.] Cf. § 713.

§ 3038.—Endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an *endless* duration of the *existence* and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum then practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a POSTULATE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON. [page 147, line 20.] Cf. §§ 2566, 1857.

§ 3039.—Principle of the moral destination of our nature, namely, that it is only in an endless progress that we can attain perfect accordance with the moral law, is of the greatest use, not merely for the present purpose of supplementing the impotence of speculative reason, but also with respect to religion. [p. 148, l. 5.]

§ 3040.—HOPE, not indeed here, nor at any imaginable point of his future existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God alone can survey), to be perfectly adequate to His will. [page 149, line 3.] Cf. § 2558. See § 713. [See § 3056.]

Article V.—*The existence of GOD as a postulate of pure practical reason.* (§§ 3041–3065 inclusive.)

* Cognition being required only for the behoof of action. Cf. §§ 952, 1168, 2607.

§ 3041.—Law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element of the *summum bonum*, viz.: Happiness proportioned to that morality. Must postulate the EXISTENCE OF GOD, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum*. [page 150, line 10.]

§ 3042.—OUGHT to endeavor to promote the *summum bonum*, which therefore must be possible. [page 151, line 7.]

§ 3043.—*Summum bonum* is possible in the world only on the supposition of a SUPREME NATURE having a causality corresponding to moral character. [page 151, line 29.]

§ 3044.—Supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as a condition of the *summum bonum*, is a being which is the cause of nature by † INTELLIGENCE and WILL, consequently its author, that is God. [p. 152, l. 15.] [† I think this transcendent.]

§ 3045.—Postulate of the possibility of the *highest derived good* (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a *highest original good*, that is to say, of the existence of God. [page 152, line 22.]

§ 3046.—Necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should presuppose the possibility of this *summum bonum*, and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty, that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God. [page 152, line 25.] Cf. § 2566.

§ 3047.—Moral necessity is in this case *subjective*, that is, it is a want, and not *objective*, that is itself a duty, for there can not be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since this concerns only the theoretical employment of reason). [page 153, line 5.]

§ 3048.—Duty here is only the ENDEAVOR TO REALIZE AND PROMOTE THE SUMMUM BONUM in the world, the possibility of which can therefore be postulated; and as our reason finds it not conceivable except on the supposition of a supreme intelligence, the admission of this existence is therefore connected with the consciousness of our duty, although the admission itself belongs to the domain of speculative reason. [page 153, line 13.] § 2831.

§ 3049.—HYPOTHESIS in respect of *speculative* reason; but in reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the moral law (the *summum bonum*) and consequently of a requirement for *practical* purposes, it may be called FAITH, that is to say A PURE RATIONAL FAITH. [page 153, line 21.] [See the opening words of full text of § 913 and cf. § 817.] [See § 826 (page 64 above) and observe that the word FAITH is used correctly in this § 3049.]

§ 3050.—Greek schools could never attain the solution of their

problem of the practical possibility of the *summum bonum*, because they made the rule of the use which the will of man makes of his freedom the sole and sufficient ground of this possibility. [page 154, line 1.]

§ 3051.—Epicureans assumed as the supreme principle of morality a wholly false one, namely that of happiness. [p. 154, l. 14.]

§ 3052.—Stoics on the contrary chose their supreme practical principle quite rightly, making *VIRTUE* the condition of the *summum bonum*; but they left out the second element of the *summum bonum*, namely, personal happiness. [page 154, line 28.]

§ 3053.—Christianity, even if we do not yet consider it as a religious doctrine, gives touching this point a conception of the *summum bonum* (*THE KINGDOM OF GOD*) which alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is *HOLY* (unyielding) and demands holiness of morals [see § 909]; although all the moral perfection to which man can attain is only *VIRTUE* [cf. §§ 232, 231, 229, 713, 750], implying consciousness of a constant propensity to transgression, or at least a want of purity [§ 677], that is, a mixture of many spurious (not moral) motives of obedience to the Law, consequently a self-esteem [§ 239] combined with humility [§§ 208, 220]. In respect, then, of the holiness which the Christian law requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a progress *in infinitum*, but *FOR THAT VERY REASON* it justifies him in hoping for an endless duration of his existence. [page 155, line 23.]

§ 3054.—Christian morals, on their philosophical side, compared with the ideas of the Greek schools, would appear as follows: The ideas of the *Cynics*, the *Epicureans*, the *Stoics*, and the *Christians*, are: *simplicity of nature*, *prudence*, *wisdom*,* and *holiness*.† Christian morality, because its precept is framed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding, takes from man all confidence that he can be fully adequate to it (at least in this life), but again sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we *ACT AS WELL AS IT IS IN OUR POWER TO DO*, then what is not in our power will come in to our aid from another source. [page 155, line 24 (note).] Cf. §§ 724, 766. [† I desire to protest, once for all, against Professor Kant's exaltation of Christianity above every other religious creed (unless indeed I may correctly say with the exception of the pure rational creed). Or rather, since I ought not and do not de-

[* Professor Abbott from Kant's preface makes an extract, from which I take the following: "Perhaps the expression *VIRTUE*, with which also the Stoic made great show, would better indicate the characteristic of his school." Cf. § 730. Cf. Dr. Willich's *Elements*, p. 183 (see below at head of appendix viii.).]

sire even to seem to protest against the exaltation of any godly teaching, even though it may be combined with error, I shall with more propriety express myself as follows: I desire to protest, once for all, against Kant's degradation of every other religious creed (except possibly the pure rational creed) below Christianity.†† I do not here assert that Kant's position is false; ‡‡ but what I have read and hereinbefore set forth of the words of the mighty Roman stoic (that is all I know of stoicism), does not induce me to suppose that the stoic ideal (see especially pages 566, 587, 580, and 574 above) is any less pure, exalted, and unattainable than the Christian ideal, and even if it is, I do not know that the interests of morality and religion need that it be decried.†††]

§ 3055.—Christian morality supplies this defect (of the second indispensable element of the summum bonum [cf. § 3052]) by representing the world in which rational beings devote themselves with all their soul to the moral law [cf. page 210 above], as a KINGDOM OF GOD, in which nature and morality are brought into

††[I do not complain, for example, that in § 723 (see page 57 above) the Christian religion is classed as a moral religion, but I complain of the use of the word *alone*. I do not complain that in § 236 Kant says that the moral precepts of the gospel introduced purity of moral principle, but I complain of the use of the word *first*; for I can not conscientiously ignore Zoroaster (see the Gatha Ustavaiti) and Aristotle (see Nic. Eth. II., iv.) and I do not know that greater learning would not require of me further recollection. I do not complain that in § 906 Kant speaks of a true catholic church, but I complain of the use of the definitive article, *the* true catholic church; for I do not know any obstacle to the universality of Judaism, Zoroastrianism, or Mohammedism (nor even of Buddhism or Confucianism, since lack of religious fervor is certainly not such an obstacle, but merely an impediment, and I should be guilty of injustice here if I did not define religious fervor to be devotion displayed immediately toward the person of the Deity, and so distinguish it from ethical fervor, which latter I do not by any means hold to be the less worthy in the sight of God).]

‡‡[Because (1) in consequence of my want of learning, such my judgment would be presumptuous; because (2) my *clavis* is not a fit place for polemic, nor have I any time to spare for any polemic whatever, even if my information were sufficient; and because (3) the registration of a mere protest is all the defense which I require against the charge of infidelity.]

†††[In the above remarks, I have not entertained any distinction between Christianity, as a system of credenda, and the teachings of Jesus Christ, which latter include godliness; but in reference to the former I desire to say that if the doctrine of vicarious atonement be fundamental and essentially constitutive in Christianity (as I suppose it to be, although I am ignorant of certainty, never having studied theology, and knowing no more of Christianity than any man may who has been born and bred in a Christian people), then I do not see how I can escape (and I do not attempt to escape) from the peremptory and absolute duty of rejecting Christianity.]

harmony by a HOLY AUTHOR who makes the derived summum bonum possible. *Holiness* of life is prescribed to them as a rule even in this life; while the welfare proportioned to it, namely, *bliss*, is represented as attainable only in an eternity: because the *former* must always be the pattern of their conduct in every state [cf. § 717], and progress toward it is already possible and necessary in this life; while the latter, under the name of happiness, can not be attained at all in this world (so far as our own power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of hope. [page 157, line 14]

§ 3056.—Christian principle of morality itself is not theological (so as to be heteronomy [cf. §§ 187, 183 (§ 183 may be found entire in Jour. of Sp. Phil., vol. v., pages 298, 299)]), but is AUTONOMY OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON; since it does not make God's knowledge [§ 3044] and His will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the summum bonum, on condition of following† these laws, and it does not even place the proper *spring* of this obedience in the desired results, but in the conception of DUTY only, as that of which the faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences. [page 158, line 9.] [Cf. pages 152 (xviii.) and 184 (verse 5) above.] Cf. § 910. §§ 215, 204.

§ 3057.—Moral laws lead through the conception of the summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to RELIGION [cf. § 896], that is, to the *recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions (that is to say, arbitrary ordinances*

[† In a note ad § 3040 (pages 149, 150 of Abbott's translation), Professor Kant says:] It seems, nevertheless, impossible for a creature to have the *conviction* [§§ 2579, 2594, 2583] of his unwavering firmness of mind in the progress toward goodness. On this account the Christian religion makes it come only from the same Spirit that works sanctification, that is, this firm purpose, and with it the consciousness of steadfastness in the moral progress. But naturally one who is conscious that he has persevered through a long portion of his life up to the end in the progress to the better, and this from genuine moral motives, may well have the comforting hope, though not the certainty, that even in an existence prolonged beyond this life he will continue steadfast in these principles, and although he is never justified here in his own eyes, nor can ever hope to be so in the increased perfection of his nature (to which he looks forward, *together with an increase of duties*),* nevertheless in this progress which, though it is directed to a goal infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as equivalent to possession [§ 713], he may have a prospect of a *blessed future* [§§ 761, 754]; for this is the word that reason employs to designate perfect *well-being* independent on all contingent causes of the world, and which, like *holiness*, is an idea that can be contained only in an endless progress and its totality, and consequently is never fully attained by a creature. [* I have inserted marks of parenthesis to improve the punctuation, and have italicized six of the words inclosed.]

of a foreign will and contingent in themselves), but as essential LAWS of every free will in itself, which nevertheless must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being. [page 158, line 21.]

§ 3058.—All remains disinterested and founded merely on DUTY; neither fear nor hope being made the fundamental spring (they if taken as principles would destroy the whole moral worth of actions). [page 159, line 5.] Cf. § 242. See §§ 220, 16.

§ 3059.—Morality is not properly the doctrine how we should make ourselves happy, but how we should become WORTHY of happiness. [page 159, line 24.] §§ 102, 93, 706, 821.

§ 3060.—Man is *worthy* to possess a thing or a state, when his possession of it is in harmony with the summum bonum. All worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the summum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest [Matthew, vii., 21 (page 219 above)]. [page 160, line 1.] §§ 13, 93, 100.

§ 3061.—Morality should never be treated as a *doctrine of happiness*, that is, an instruction how to become happy; for it has to do simply with the rational condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of happiness, not with the means of attaining it. [page 160, line 7.]

§ 3062.—Hope of happiness first begins with religion only. [page 160, line 12.] Cf. § 2558. See § 706.

§ 3063.—God's †ultimate end in creating the world, we must not name the *happiness* of the rational beings in it, but THE SUMMUM BONUM (which adds a condition to that wish of such beings, namely, the condition of being worthy of happiness). Those who placed the end of creation in THE GLORY OF GOD (provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a desire to be praised), have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing glorifies God more than the observance of the holy duty that His Law imposes on us. [page 160, line 23.] See § 821. [† Professor Kant sometimes uses expressions which I regard as transcendent.]

§ 3064.—GOD is the ONLY HOLY, the ONLY BLESSED, the ONLY WISE, because these conceptions already imply the absence of limitation. In the order of these attributes He is also the HOLY LAW-GIVER (and creator), the GOOD GOVERNOR (and preserver), and the JUST JUDGE, three attributes which include everything by which God is the object of religion, and in conformity with which the metaphysical perfections are added of themselves in the reason. [page 161, line 19 (the note).] Cf. § 879. [Cf. Socrates, in the Apology of Plato, quoted by Ueberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. i., page 2) who refers to pages 20 and 23, ed. Stephanus.]

§ 3065.—HUMANITY in our person must be HOLY to ourselves. [page 162, line 10.] Cf. §§ 97, 239.

Article VI.—Of the postulates of pure practical reason. (§§ 3066–3069 inclusive.)

§ 3066.—Postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but suppositions practically necessary. By means of their reference to what is practical, they give objective [see § 3072] reality to the ideas of speculative reason IN GENERAL. [page 163, line 3.] [*Conditions of obedience*: obedience has no conditions. Let this be distinctly remembered. (Cf. Koran, passim, ex. gr. cap. vi., vid. inf. appendix xvi., ¶ 95, clause 15, sqq., et sup., p. 301, line 6; et c. lxxvi., ¶ 369, clauses 21, 22, vid. sup., p. 314, l. 5, sq.; et c. xxviii., ¶ 236, clause 24, sqq. vid. sup. p. 313, l. 27.) Cf. § 3091.]

§ 3067.—Postulates are those of IMMORTALITY, FREEDOM positively considered (as the causality of a being so far as he belongs to the intelligible world [cf. §§ 105, 124, 125, 174]), and the EXISTENCE OF GOD. The *first* results from the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the complete fulfillment of the moral law; the *second* from the necessary supposition of independence on the sensible world and of the faculty of determining one's will according to the law of an intelligible world, that is, of freedom; the *third* from the necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in such an intelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent good, that is, the existence of God. [page 163, line 15.]

§ 3068.—FACT that reverence† for the moral law necessarily makes the summum bonum an object of our endeavors, AND THE SUPPOSITION THENCE RESULTING of its objective reality LEAD through the postulates of practical reason TO CONCEPTIONS WHICH SPECULATIVE REASON might indeed present as problems, but COULD NEVER SOLVE. [page 164, line 6.] [† I have substituted the word reverence for Professor Abbott's word *respect*. (See page 833 above, at § 3025.)]

§ 3069.—IMMANENT in practical reason (*but only in a practical point of view*), which for the speculative was only transcendent. We do not thereby take knowledge of the nature of our souls, nor of the intelligible world, nor of the Supreme Being, with respect to what they are in themselves; but we have merely combined the conceptions of them in the PRACTICAL conception* of the SUMMUM BONUM as the object of our will, and this altogether apriori, but only by means of the moral law, and merely in reference to it, in respect of the object which it commands. *Ideas the possibility of which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of which on the other hand no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction even of the commonest man.* [page 165, line 14.] [*§ 3033.†]

Article VII.—How is it possible to conceive an extension of pure reason in a practical point of view, without its knowledge as speculative being enlarged at the same time? (§§ 3070–3089 inclusive.)

§ 3070.—SUMMUM BONUM is not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions (for which, because they are mere conceptions of pure reason, no corresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by the path of theory any objective reality): namely, freedom, immortality, and God. [p. 166, l. 12.]

§ 3071.—Actually have objects, because practical reason indispensably requires their existence for the possibility of its object, the summum bonum, which practically is absolutely necessary, and this justifies theoretical reason in assuming them. The above three ideas of speculative reason are still in themselves not COGNITIONS; they are however (transcendent) *thoughts* in which there is nothing impossible. [page 167, line 2.]

§ 3072.—Theoretical knowledge, *not indeed of these objects*, but of reason generally, is so far enlarged by this, that by the practical postulates *objects were given* to those ideas, a merely problematical thought having by this means first acquired objective reality. [page 167, line 29.] See §§ 2820, 2832.

§ 3073.—Accession for which pure theoretical reason, for which all those ideas are transcendent and without object, has simply to thank its practical faculty. [page 168, line 24.]

§ 3074.—Clearing up its knowledge, so as on one side to keep off ANTHROPOMORPHISM, as the source of SUPERSTITION, and on the other side FANATICISM. [page 169, line 5.] [See page 10 above.] (All these are hindrances to the practical use of pure reason, so that the removal of them may certainly be considered an extension of our knowledge in a practical point of view.)

§ 3075.—Reality is supplied by pure practical reason, and theoretical reason has nothing further to do in this but to *think* those objects by * means of categories. [page 169, line 22.] [*§ 3063.†]

§ 3076.—Category as a mere form of thought is here not empty but has significance. [page 170, line 17.] §§ 1687, 1917, 1861.

§ 3077.—When these ideas of God, of an intelligible world (the kingdom of God), and of immortality are further determined. [page 171, line 1.] §§ 2826, 2438. [§ 3063.†]

§ 3078.—Incapable of being the foundation of a speculative knowledge, and their use is limited simply to the practice of the moral law. [page 171, line 23.] See § 3074. [§ 2443.]

§ 3079.—Reality is given to the conception of the object of a will morally determined (the conception of the summum bonum), and with it to the conditions of its possibility, the ideas of God,

freedom, and immortality, but always only relatively to the practice of the moral law (and not for any speculative purpose.) [page 172, line 12.]

§ 3080.—Whether the notion of God is one belonging to physics (and therefore also to metaphysics, which contains the pure apriori principles of the former in their universal import) or to morals? [page 173, line 16.] § 627.

§ 3081.—Metaphysics, however, can not enable us to attain *by certain inference* from the knowledge of *this* world to the conception of God and to the proof of His existence. [page 173, line 29.]

§ 3082.—Absolutely impossible to know the existence of this Being from mere conceptions. [page 174, line 10.] § 2361.

§ 3083.—Only one single process possible for reason to attain this knowledge, namely, to start from the supreme principle of its pure practical use (which in every case is directed simply to the EXISTENCE of something as a consequence of reason). The necessary direction of the will to the summum bonum discovers to us not only the necessity of assuming such a First Being in reference to the possibility of this good in the world, but what is most remarkable, something which reason in its progress on the path of physical nature altogether failed to find, namely, an accurately defined conception of this First Being. [page 174, line 20.] § 2573.

§ 3084.—Empirical inquiry (physics) leads to a conception of the First Being not accurately enough determined to be held adequate to the conception of Deity. (With metaphysic in its transcendental part nothing whatever can be accomplished.) [page 175, line 5.] §§ 2371, 2349, 2343.

§ 3085.—Moral principle admits as possible only the conception of an Author of the world possessed of *the highest perfection*. [page 175, line 29.] §§ 2573, 2566.

§ 3086.—Conception of God consequently belongs originally not to physics, i. e. to speculative reason, but to morals. The same may be said of the other postulates [§ 3067]. [page 176, line 15.]

§ 3087.—Grecian philosophy exhibits no distinct traces of a pure rational theology earlier than Anaxagoras. But when this acute people had advanced so far in their investigations of nature as to treat even moral questions philosophically, on which other nations had never done anything but talk; then first they found a new and practical want, which did not fail to give definiteness to their conception of the first being. [page 176, line 21.]

§ 3088.—Reader of the Critique of Pure speculative Reason will be thoroughly convinced how highly necessary that laborious

DEDUCTION of the categories [§§ 1578–1652] was, and how fruitful for theology and morals. [page 177, line 26.] [§§ 2866–2912.]

§ 3089.—Path to wisdom, if it is to be made sure and not to be impassable or misleading, must with us men inevitably pass through science. [page 178, line 24.]

Article VIII.—Of belief from a requirement of pure reason. (§§ 3090–3100 inclusive.)

§ 3090.—Want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use, leads only to a *hypothesis*; that of pure practical reason leads to a postulate [§ 3067]. [page 179, line 7.] § 3049.

§ 3091.—Requirement of pure *practical* reason is based on a *DUTY*, that of making something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to promote it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its possibility, and consequently also the conditions necessary thereto, namely, God, freedom, and immortality. [page 179, line 24.] § 3045.

§ 3092.—Subjective effect of the Law presupposes that the summum bonum is *possible*, for it would be practically impossible to strive after the object of a conception which at bottom was empty and had no object. [page 180, line 16.]

§ 3093.—Postulates concern only the physical or metaphysical conditions of the *possibility* of the summum bonum. [p. 181, l. 1.]

§ 3094.—Admitting that the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a command (not as a rule of prudence), the righteous man may say: I * WILL that there be a God, that my existence in this world be also an existence outside the chain of physical causes, and in a pure world of the understanding, and lastly that my duration be endless; I firmly abide by this, and will not let this faith be taken from me. [page 181, line 18.] [* § 3063.†]

§ 3095.—Duty to realize the summum bonum to the utmost of our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for its objective possibility. [p. 182, l. 14 (the note).]

§ 3096.—No one can affirm that it is *impossible* in itself that rational beings in the world should be worthy of happiness in conformity with the moral law, and also at the same time possess this happiness proportionately. [page 182, line 4.]

§ 3097.—MORAL INTEREST which turns the scale. [page 183, line 9.] [See § 2595: "But in these questions no man is free from all interest. For though the want of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral interests, still even in this case enough may be left to make him FEAR the existence of God and a future life."]

§ 3098.—Reason finds it (SUBJECTIVELY) impossible to render conceivable in a mere course of nature in the world an accurate correspondence between happiness and moral worth. [p. 183, l. 25.]

§ 3099.—Reason can not decide* OBJECTIVELY in what way we are to conceive this possibility; whether by universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over nature, or only on supposition of such an Author. [page 184, line 16.] [*i. e. PURE reason can not attain certain knowledge of this way. See §§ 2371, 2583, 2593, 2366, 2832.]

§ 3100.—FAITH of pure practical reason. A free interest of pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a wise Author of the world. [REFLECT.] [p. 185, l. 5.] Cf. § 3049. See § 3045.

Article IX.—*Of the wise adaptation of man's cognitive faculties to his practical destination.* (§§ 3101–3103 inclusive.)

§ 3101.—Critique of Pure *speculative* Reason proves that this is incapable of solving satisfactorily the most weighty problems. [page 186, line 4.] § 3099.

§ 3102.—Instead of the conflict that the moral disposition has now to carry on with the inclinations, in which, though after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually acquired, GOD and ETERNITY with their AWFUL MAJESTY would stand unceasingly *before our eyes*. Most of the actions that conformed to the Law would be done from fear, a few only from hope, and none at all from duty; and the moral worth of actions, on which alone in the eyes of supreme wisdom the worth of the person and even that of the world depends, would cease to exist. [page 186, line 19.] Cf. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. viii., page 342.

§ 3103.—Room for true moral disposition; immediately devoted to the law. The unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it has granted. [page 187, line 28.]

Appendix V.—Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. (§§ 3104–3128 inclusive.) [See page 830 above.]

§ 3104.—Methodology of pure practical reason—the mode in which we can give the laws of pure practical reason ACCESS to the human mind, and INFLUENCE on its maxims; that is, by which we can make the objectively practical reason SUBJECTIVELY practical also. [page 189, line 5.]

§ 3105.—Subjectively that exhibition of pure virtue can have *more power* over the human mind, and supply a far stronger spring even for effecting that legality of actions, and can produce more powerful resolutions to prefer the Law, from pure reverence for it, to every other consideration, than all the deceptive allurements

of pleasure, than all threatenings of pain and misfortune. [page 190, line 1.] [See pages 555, 567, 568 above.]

§ 3106.—MUST BRING BEFORE THE MIND THE PURE MORAL MOTIVE, which, not only because it is the only one that can be the foundation of a character (a practically consistent habit of mind with unchangeable maxims) [see § 714], but also because it teaches a man to feel his own dignity, gives POWER †† to tear himself from all sensible attachments, and to find a rich compensation for the sacrifice in the independence of his rational nature. [p. 191, l. 8.]

§ 3107.—Proofs of the receptivity for such springs. The only method that exists of making the objectively practical laws of pure reason subjectively practical, through the mere force of the conception of DUTY. [page 191, line 25.] [†† § 740.]

§ 3108.—Exercise the critical judgment of their scholars by comparison of similar actions under different circumstances. By the mere habit of looking on such actions as deserving approval or blame, a good foundation would be laid for uprightness in the future course of life. [page 194, line 10.]

§ 3109.—Refer all to DUTY merely, and to the worth that a man can and must give himself in his own eyes by the consciousness of not having transgressed it. [page 195, line 8.] Cf. § 715.

§ 3110.—None but philosophers can make the decision of this question doubtful. [page 196, line 1.]

§ 3111.—Point out the criterion of pure virtue in an example first. [page 196, line 8.]

§ 3112.—Virtue is here worth so much only because it costs so much, not because it brings any profit. [page 197, line 12.]

§ 3113.—Every admixture of motives taken from our own happiness is a hindrance to the influence of the moral law on the heart. [page 197, line 27.] Cf. §§ 242, 221.

§ 3114.—More necessary than ever to direct attention to this method in our times, when men hope to produce more effect on the mind with soft, tender feelings, or high-flown, puffing-up pretensions, which rather wither the heart than strengthen it, than by a plain and earnest representation of DUTY. [p. 198, l. 13.]

§ 3115.—PRINCIPLES must be built on conceptions: on any other basis there can only be paroxysms. [page 199, line 3.] Cf. §§ 461, 466, 1939, 147.

§ 3116.—Moral law demands obedience from DUTY (not from predilection, which can not and ought not to be presupposed at all). [page 199, line 15.]

§ 3117.—Juvenal describes such an example in a climax, which makes the reader feel vividly the force of the spring that is con-

tained in the pure law of duty, as duty. [page 200, line 3.] Cf. § 717.

§ 3118.—Consciousness of the Law, as a spring of a faculty *that controls the sensibility*. [page 201, line 13.] Cf. § 221.

§ 3119.—Make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural employment *accompanying all our own* free actions, as well as the observation of those of others, asking first *whether the action* CONFORMS OBJECTIVELY TO THE MORAL LAW. [page 201, line 29.]

§ 3120.—Question *whether the action was also* (subjectively) *done* FOR THE SAKE OF THE MORAL LAW, so that it not only is correct as a deed, but also (by the maxim from which it is done) has moral worth as a disposition? [p. 202, l. 15.] Cf. §§ 680, 711, 206.

§ 3121.—JUDGING merely OF THE PRACTICAL must gradually produce a certain interest in the law of reason, and consequently in morally good actions. [page 202, line 21.]

§ 3122.—Employment of the faculty of JUDGMENT, which makes us feel our own cognitive powers, is NOT yet the INTEREST in actions and in their morality ITSELF. [page 203, line 13.]

§ 3123.—Exhibition of morality of character by examples, in which attention is directed to purity [§ 677] of will, first only as a negative perfection, insofar as in an action done from duty no motives of inclination [§ 227] have any influence in determining it. By this the pupil's attention is fixed upon the consciousness of his FREEDOM. [page 203, line 29.]

§ 3124.—Law of duty, in consequence of the positive worth which obedience to it makes us feel, finds easier access through the REVERENCE [§ 225] FOR OURSELVES in the consciousness of our freedom. When this is well established, when a man dreads nothing more than to find himself (on self-examination) worthless and contemptible in his own eyes [§ 211], then every good moral disposition can be grafted on it, because this is the best, nay the only, guard that can keep off from the mind the pressure of ignoble and corrupting motives. [page 204, line 23.]

§ 3125.—Intention of these outlines is only to point out the most general maxims of the methodology of moral cultivation and exercise. [page 205, line 16.]

CONCLUSION. (§§ 3126-3123 inclusive)

§ 3126.—Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: THE STARRY HEAVENS ABOVE AND THE MORAL LAW WITHIN. [page 206, line 2.]

§ 3127.—Though admiration and reverence may excite to inquiry, they can not supply the want of it. The contemplation of the

world began from the noblest spectacle that the human senses present to us, and that our understanding can bear to follow in their vast reach; and it ended—in astrology. Morality began with the noblest attribute of human nature, the development and cultivation of which give a promise of infinite utility; and ended—in fanaticism or superstition. [page 207, line 11.]

§ 3128.—SCIENCE (critically undertaken and methodically directed) is the narrow gate that leads to the true *doctrine of practical wisdom* [*Weisheitslehre*, Abbott notes, and refers to § 3004], if we understand by this not merely what one ought to do, but what ought to serve *teachers* as a guide to construct well and clearly the road to wisdom which every one should travel, and to secure others from going astray. [page 208, line 14.]

Appendix VI.—Preface to the Groundwork.* (§§ 3129–3145.)

§ 3129.—Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: physics, ethics, and logic. This division is perfectly suitable. [page 1, line 4.]

§ 3130.—All rational knowledge is either MATERIAL or FORMAL. Formal philosophy is called logic. [p. 1, l. 11.] Cf. §§ 1529, 989.

§ 3131.—Material philosophy, which has to do with determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject, is again two-fold; for these laws are either laws of NATURE or of FREEDOM. The science of the former is physics; that of the latter, ethics: they are also called NATURAL PHILOSOPHY and MORAL PHILOSOPHY respectively. [page 1; line 16.] Cf. § 2608.

§ 3132.—Logic can not have any empirical part; otherwise it would not be logic, i. e. a canon for the understanding or the rea-

*“Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,” Professor Abbott translates; but because I have (page 11 above) Mr. Semple’s rendering (“Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics”) of the title “*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*” (see Ueberweg’s Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., page 152), which I moreover prefer (see the note * to § 470. page 38 above), although I am ignorant of German, and consequently not entitled to an opinion respecting the relative merits of the translations, I have retained at the head of this appendix the designation “Groundwork.” I find it necessary to say here, in so much as the reader will probably infer that I have deliberately preferred also Mr. Semple’s version of the whole matter of the Groundwork (§§ 1–146 above), that I have examined but few paragraphs of Professor Abbott’s translation, which I did not see till after that portion of the *clavis* had been printed. I am well satisfied with Mr. Semple, whose occasional inelogenicities are abundantly compensated by vigorous intensity of expression at important points, and I do not desire to substitute for his translation any other; but if GOD permits me to live to revise the first part of the *clavis* (a permission for which increasing infirmities do not allow me to hope), I desire to supplement Mr. Semple’s translation by subjoining to the section heads of the Groundwork some valuable

son, valid for all thought, and capable of demonstration. [page 2, line 4.] Cf. §§ 1009, 993, 1533.

§ 3133.—Natural and moral philosophy can each have an empirical part. [page 2, line 9.] Cf. §§ 2618, 297.

§ 3134.—Pure philosophy deduces its doctrines from apriori principles alone. When it is merely formal, it is LOGIC: if it is restricted to definite objects of the understanding, it is metaphysic. [page 2, line 19.] Cf. §§ 1000, 1538.

§ 3135.—Metaphysic of NATURE and a metaphysic of MORALS. Physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part [cf. § 2615]. It is the same with ethics; but here the empirical part might have the special name of PRACTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY [§§ 3133, 2618, 296], the name MORALITY being appropriated to the rational part. [page 2, line 25] Cf. § 2611.

§ 3136.—Whether pure philosophy in all its parts does not require a man specially devoted to it [a separate chair in each university]. [page 3, line 5.]

§ 3137.—Always carefully separate the empirical from the rational part, and prefix to physics proper (or empirical physics) a metaphysic of nature [§§ 1409, 2611, 2702, 2614], and to practical anthropology a metaphysic of morals [§§ 34, 296], which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical, so that we may know how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both cases. [page 3, line 28.]

§ 3138.—Whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only empirical, and which belongs to anthropology? [page 4, line 11.] Cf. § 33.

variations which I may obtain from Professor Abbott's translation, in the same way in which I have supplemented John Richardson's translation of the *Prolegomena* by selections from Professor Mahaffy. Because I have no desire to revise more than about 300 pages of the *clavis*, except it be for two reasons (one of which is concerned with the reconsideration upon practical ground of the scope of the extracts from the *Memorabilia*, in order to determine whether there ought not to be a reduction of that scope; and the other is my dissatisfaction with my general system of giving only a single general credit to each of the authors or translators to whom I am indebted for all the excellencies of my work, although I alone am responsible for all its defects), and because any person who chooses to reprint the *clavis* may do so without consulting me and without charge from me (the copyright has not been secured by me for any pecuniary purpose, but solely to prevent it from being secured by any other person), I find it convenient to say here that it is my wish that any person who desires to reprint the *clavis*, or any portion thereof, shall first compare it with the designated sources from which I have taken it, and append to every foot note a specific credit to its proper author, editor or translator.

§ 3139.—All moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part. When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws apriori to him as a rational being. [page 5, line 5.] Cf. § 27.

§ 3140.—Metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not merely for speculative reasons, in order to investigate the sources of the practical principles which are to be found apriori in our reason, but also because morals themselves are liable to all sorts of corruption as long as we are without that clue and supreme canon. [page 5, line 21.]

§ 3141.—Wolf's general practical philosophy distinguished from a metaphysic of morals, just as general logic (which treats of the acts and canons of thought *in general*) is distinguished from transcendental philosophy (which treats of the particular acts and canons of *pure* thought, i. e. that whose cognitions are altogether apriori). [page 6, line 20.] Cf. § 1536.

§ 3142.—Metaphysic of morals has properly no other foundation than the CRITIQUE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON; just as that of metaphysics is the critique of pure speculative reason. [p. 8, l. 1.]

§ 3143.—Metaphysic of morals, in spite of the discouraging title, is yet capable of being presented in a popular form, and one adapted to the common understanding. [page 8, line 25.] § 1074.

§ 3144.—Present treatise is nothing more than the investigation and establishment of THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY; and this alone constitutes a study complete in itself, which moreover ought to be kept apart from every other moral investigation. [page 9, line 5.]

§ 3145.—Method of this work: proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the determination of its ultimate principle, and again descending synthetically from the examination of this principle and its sources to the common knowledge in which we find it employed. [page 9, line 22.]

APPENDIX FROM JOHN RICHARDSON.

Appendix VII.—Two Extracts from John Richardson's Life of Kant.*

While Kant stood upon the verge of this world, Death, that king of terrors to the guilty, was not armed with anything terrific,

*“A sketch of the Author's Life and Writings, by the Translator,” appended to John Richardson's translation of Dr. Kant's *Logic* (see page 320 above). In one of the notes to the appendix (page 232, ed. 1819), Mr. Richardson says: “It were well worth a British philosopher's while to learn German for the sole purpose of studying the critical philosophy; for that language, as it is a key to more science than either Greek or Latin, would certainly repay him fully for his time and labor. Meanwhile, if I am fortunate enough to be instrumental

but the prince of peace, to him. He made the awful transition from time to eternity, from this corporeal earthly scene to the intelligible† world, with philosophical serenity or composure of mind, with the dignity peculiar to a wise man, with the calmness, fortitude, and resignation of a virtuous mind deeply penetrated with a firm belief of reason in the Supreme Intelligence, and in a future state, the life spiritual, or the prolongation of our moral existence to infinite. "Virtue alone has majesty in death." [page 239.]

* * * * *

The true criticism on his moral character, as well as the most sublime panegyric that can be made on him, is, That he earnestly and steadfastly endeavored to practise what he professed, to make the moral law, the great comprehensive rule of duty, the spring of his actions. For, his life was, so to say, a comment or illustration to his pure doctrine, and almost exemplified it, or was led as nearly up to it; consequently he, by precept and by example, came as near the idea of a sage, or of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the frailty inherent in the human nature allows. So that he gives us a conspicuous proof of the feasibility of acting (as far perhaps as a mortal is capable of acting) on pure moral principle; by his active, useful, and immaculate life he teaches us how to live, by his invaluable instruction and moral lessons how to grow wiser and better, and by his memorable death how to die. *Quid virtus et quid sapientia possit, utile proposuit nobis exemplar Kantien.*

The way to excel unquestionably is, *optima quaeque exempla et imitandum proponere*; yet it, in strict propriety, is not the conduct of any man, how good soever it may be, but the moral law itself by which we should strive to direct our actions or to regulate our lives. Not the conduct of man as it is, therefore, but the idea of what it ought to be, can be a pattern for imitation, or set up as the standard of moral judgment or comparison.

But, as we in general are neither so good nor so bad as our friends or our enemies usually represent us, as the virtue or moral goodness of the best of us is but relative, for absolute perfection does not fall to the lot of man in this transitory life, as no human portrait can be painted without some shade, we have made every possible inquiry among those envious of Kant's well-earned fame

toward transplanting the genuine seeds of that philosophy to this country, I shall enjoy the consciousness of contributing essentially to the dissemination of real science, and therefore of not having traveled in vain or of not being altogether a passive or useless member of society."

[† The word *intelligible* (which ought not to have been used here at all) must here be taken tropically: locupletatio animarum, non mundus intelligibilis philosophiae. Vid. Jour. Sp. Phil., vol. v., page 108 ad §26, and p. 112 ad §38.]

and "hating that excellence they can not reach" (for he had no other enemies, but was esteemed and beloved by everybody who was acquainted with him), to find out a spot in his reputation, or character in the opinion of the world; and all that they can lay to his charge is, that his economy bordered on avarice, or sordid parsimony. But even this imputation his friends deny, say it is an aspersion, and maintain, that his rigid frugality or strict economy in early life was the effect of urgent necessity, but that, at a later period, he, when possessed of the means, did not suffer his increase of fortune to contract or to harden his heart (for an ample fortune is sometimes apt to contract and to harden the heart), but, so far from wanting brotherly love, was generous on proper occasions, beneficent to the honest industrious poor, not however "before men, to be seen," out of vanity or ostentation, but from a sense or motive of duty, bestowed his charity in private, "denied them nothing but his name," and that his principles were not only laid down in his head, but written and settled in his heart. For, as he was a man of a good heart, his benevolence was active, and his sympathy or fellow-feeling warm, but always regulated or governed by his understanding, always ruled by his reason, which superior faculty it was the study of his whole life to cultivate, and to exercise freely on all subjects and on all occasions, to the utmost of his power. *O virum sapientia sua simplicem, et simplicitate sua sapientem! O virum utilem sibi, suis, reipublicae, et humano generi!* [pages 240-242.]

APPENDICES FROM DR. WILLICH.

"Elements of the Critical Philosophy: containing a concise account of its origin and tendencies; a view of all the works published by its founder, Professor IMMANUEL KANT; and a glossary for the explanation of terms and phrases. To which are added Three Philological Essays, chiefly translated from the German of JOHN CHRISTOPHER ADELUNG, Aulic Counsellor and First Librarian to the Elector of Saxony. By A. F. M. WILLICH, M. D. London: printed for T. N. Longman, No. 39 Paternoster-Row. 1798." To the paging of this work are references [in brackets] below in Appendices VIII.-XIV., which appendices are (except whatever in them is inclosed [thus], in brackets) literally transcribed out of Dr. Willich's Elements.*

Appendix VIII.—The Critique of Practical Reason.

[It will be seen by reference to §§ 210, 244, that Kant refers to a chapter which Semple (see his notes) has not translated. In the table of contents of the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, in Dr. Willich's Elements [pages 100-103], I find the following, which I suppose refers to the chapter in question:]

* Dr. Willich says in his preface [page iii]: "Although I had the good fortune to attend Prof. Kant's lectures between the years 1778 and 1781, during my residence at the University of Königsberg, and again heard several of his

Section II. [of the Analytic].—Of the idea concerning the object of pure practical Reason.

Table of the Categories of Liberty relative to the cognitions we possess of the Good and Bad.

I.—Of QUANTITY: [1] Subjective, in consequence of maxims: (*opinions depending upon the will* of the individual); [2] Objective, in consequence of principles: (*precepts*); [3] Apriori objective as well as subjective principles of liberty: (*laws*).

II.—Of QUALITY: [1] practical rules of *appetition*, (*præceptiva*), [2] practical rules of *omission*, (*prohibitiva*), [3] practical rules of *exceptions* (*exceptiva*).

III.—Of RELATION: [1] To *personality*, [2] To the *condition* of the person, [3] *Reciprocally* of one person to the condition of another.

IV.—Of MODALITY: [1] *Permitted* and *non-permitted* actions, [2] *Duty* and contrary to duty, [3] *perfect* and *imperfect* duty. [I have contracted the space of the above table, using figures inclosed in [brackets] to distinguish the heads.]

Appendix IX.—Metaphysical Elements of Jurisprudence.

[It will be seen by reference to § 378, that Semple has omitted what he calls “a course of THEORETIC LAW.” The *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre* is number xxix. in Dr. Willich’s analysis, [pages 127–134]; and he concludes with the following:]

FURTHER CONTENTS OF THE WORK.

PART I.—OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN GENERAL.
[§§ 1–42.]

Chapter I.—Of the Mode of Possessing Something External as Property.
[§§ 1–9.]

§ 1.—My property is that, with which I am so connected that the use, which another might make of it against my will, would injure me. The subjective condition of the possibility of use, in general, is *possession*.

§§ 2, 3.—Juridical postulate of practical reason. It is possible to have every external object of my will as my property; i. e. the maxim is contrary to justice, according to which, if it were a law, an external object of the will behooved to be in itself without an owner (*res nullius*).

§ 4.—Exposition of the idea of external property. Of the external objects of my will, there can be only three: (1) a corporeal thing without me; (2) the will of another to a determined act

lectures in summer 1792, when I revisited my native country; yet I must confess, that my other professional labors have not permitted me to devote, to the study of the Critical System of Philosophy, that portion of time and close ap-

(*praestatio*); (3) the situation of another in relation to me, according to the Categories of Substance, Causality, and Community between me and external objects, agreeable to the laws of freedom.

§ 5.—Definition of the idea of external property. External property is that without me, to hinder me from using which, as I choose, would be unjust, or an injury.

§ 6.—Deduction of the idea of the mere legal or civil possession of an external object.

§ 7.—Application of the principle of the possibility of external property to the objects of experience.

§ 8.—To have something external as property, is only possible in a juridical state, under a public legislative power, i. e. in civil society.

§ 9.—In the state of nature, nothing but a merely *provisional*, though real external, property can take place.

plication, which, in more favorable circumstances, I should have been happy to bestow upon this important branch of human knowledge." And he says [page vi.]: "Whatever the execution may be, for the anxiety of my wishes I can confidently appeal to the testimony of those literary friends, who have occasionally lent me their aid in correcting the grammatical part of both the *Elements* and the *Essays*. They well know my eager and sincere desire of improvement in English composition; and if any material errors should occur in the course of such a diversity of subjects as the present, I beseech the judicious reader and the candid critic to consider, that I have ventured into a field of inquiry, of which but a small part has hitherto been explored." Dr. Willich quotes [pages iv., v.] the advice of Professor WILL, of Altdorf, to his pupils; the second paragraph is as follows: "Not to complain of the want of that plainness which is necessary to render a book palatable to *popular* readers; since difficulty of apprehension appears to be peculiar to the inquiries that form the object of the *CRITIQUE*." In addition to the compact exhibition of a table of contents of the *Critique of pure Reason*, [pages 64-67], and an exposition of that work [pages 67-80], Dr. Willich presents [pages 38-53] a Synopsis, "giving Kant's peculiar definition and division of Philosophy, accompanied with five connected problems," "originally digested," he says in a note, "by Mr. JOHN SCHULZE, an eminent Divine and Court Chaplain at Königsberg; a particular friend of KANT's, who, on that occasion, congratulated him upon having *fully* entered into the spirit of the *Critique*, and bestowed upon him every mark of approbation." (Cf. pages 6, 7, of the following work, though I do not know whether it be by the same author; I find it among French translations of Kant's works by Tissot and Barni, which were procured from Paris and given to me by WILLIAM H. CHILTON, commercial editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*: "Eclaircissements sur la Critique de la Raison pure de M. le professeur Kant, par J. SCHULTZE, predicateur aulique du roi du Prusse (Königsberg, 1791); traduit de l'Allemand par J. Tissot, doyen de la Faculte des Lettres de Dijon. Paris: Libraire Philosophique de Ladrangé." 1865. Cf. also pages 189-238 of Tissot's *Schultze* with pages 43-53 of Dr. Willich's *Elementary View*.) In another note, Dr. Willich, relying "upon the information of that learned and

Chapter II.—Of the Mode of Acquiring External Property. [§§ 10-36.]

§ 10.—General principles of external acquisition. I acquire something originally, when I cause that to become mine, which formerly was the property of no other person. Division of the acquisition of external property: (1) according to the *matter* (the object) I acquire either a corporeal thing (substance), or the performance of another person (causality), or this other person, i. e. his or her state, so far as I obtain a right to rule over that person; (2) according to the *form* or mode of acquisition, I have either a *real* right, or a *personal* right, or *both* real and personal right to the possession, not the use, of another person or thing.

Section I.—Of real rights. [§§ 11-17.]

§ 11.—A real right is the right to the private use of a thing, in the common possession of which (whether original or acquired) I am with all others.

sagacious pupil who condescended to translate the synoptical problems here stated, with their solutions, as a specimen of his progress in the German," compliments Dr. REID, of Glasgow, as "the first among the British philosophers, who distinguished clearly between the *objective* and *subjective* use of the words, which are employed to express the immediate objects of *sensation* and *perception*," [page 38.] Tennemann (Hist. Phil., 2d ed. Morell, page 476) mentions "Johann Schulze" as one of the editors of the works of Hegel, and (page 411) notes the titles of two works by "Joh. Schulz" in reference to the Critique. Dr. Ueberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., page 196) says that "Johannes Schultz, Court Preacher and Professor of Mathematics at Königsberg, published an Exposition of Kant's *Critique* (*Erläuterungen ueber des Herrn Prof. Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Königsberg, 1784) which had Kant's full approval," etc. The Chronological Analysis [pages 53-138] (from which I extract the matter of the following appendices) and the Glossary [pages 139-183] are worthy monuments of the patient industry and zeal with which Dr. Willich endeavored to set before the British people the principles of the Kantic philosophy. The reader will find a notice of the medical works of Dr. Willich in Allibone's Dictionary of Authors (Lippincott, 1872, vol. iii., page 2755, where injustice is done to Dr. Willich so far as it seems to appear that the Elements of the Critical Philosophy are translated from the German of J. C. Adelung, a remark which ought to have been restricted to the philological appendices). One of Dr. Willich's works (Domestic Encyclopædia, 4 vols., 8vo., 1802) attained considerable reputation, I judge from the fact that it was reprinted twice in America (5 vols., 8vo., 1803-4, and 3 vols. 8vo., 1821, Allibone says). Dr. Willich's Glossary is arranged alphabetically, beginning with AESTHETIC and ending with WISDOM. The concluding article is as follows, except that I have slightly changed the punctuation: "WISDOM (*Weisheit*) is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible purposes. It is therefore (1) *theoretically* considered, the cognition of the highest good; (2) *practically*, an attribute of that will which realizes the highest good, or at least exerts itself for that purpose." Pains-taking and conscientious, Dr. Willich knew Kant.

§ 12.—The first acquisition of a thing can be no other than that of the soil.

§ 13.—Every part of the soil may be originally acquired, and the ground of the possibility of this acquisition is, that the soil in general was originally common.

§ 14.—The legal act of this acquisition is *occupancy*.

§ 15.—It is in civil society alone that any *peremptory* acquisition can be made: in a state of nature, it can only be *provisional*.

§ 16.—Explanation of the idea of an original acquisition of the soil.

§ 17.—Deduction of this idea.

Section II.—Of personal rights. [§§ 18–21.]

§ 18.—A personal right is the possession of the will of another, as the power of determining that will through mine to a certain action, according to the laws of freedom. Of the transference of will by contract.

§ 19.—Of the constituents of a contract.

§ 20.—Of the causality of the will of another, which is acquired.

§ 21.—In a contract, a thing is not acquired by the acceptance of the promise, but by the delivery of what has been promised.

Section III.—Of real personal right. [§§ 22–32.]

§ 22.—This right is that of the possession of an external object as a *thing*, and of the use of it as a person.

§ 23.—Of the right of the Family-Society.

§§ 24–27.—Title *first*: of the right of marriage.

§§ 28, 29.—Title *second*: of the rights of parentage.

§ 30.—Title *third*: of the rights of a Master of a Family.

§§ 31, 32.—Dogmatical division of all the rights acquirable by contracts. I. Of Money. II. Of literary property.

Section IV.—Of the ideal acquisition of an external object of the will. [§§ 33–36.]

I.—§ 33.—Of prescription, or the mode of acquiring property by length of possession.

II.—§ 34.—Of acquisition by Inheritance.

III.—§§ 35, 36.—Of posthumous reputation.

Chapter III.—Of the Subjectively Conditioned Acquisition, by the Sentence of a Public Court of Justice. [§§ 37–42.]

A.—§ 37.—Of the contract of Donation.

B.—§ 38.—Of the contract of Loan (*commodatum*).

C.—§ 39.—Of the re-acquisition or reclaiming of property lost (*vindicatio*).

D.—§ 40.—Of the acquisition of security by oath (*cautio juratoria*).

§§ 41, 42.—Transition from property in a state of nature, to that in a juridical state, or civil society in general.

PART II.—OF PUBLIC LAW. [§§ 43–62.]

Section I.—§§ 43, 44.—*Of the constitutional law of a state.*

§§ 45–47.—Of a State as a collection of men.—Of the powers in a state, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. “The only rational plan of government is that, in which the combined will of the people determines the law.”

§§ 48, 49.—Of co-ordinate and subordinate powers.

GENERAL REMARKS.

A.—Of the supreme power; of the social compact, and the duty of obedience. Of redress of grievances. Of sedition and rebellion.—According to the principles established by KANT, “A change in the Constitution of a State, which its faults may sometimes render necessary, can only in justice be accomplished by the sovereign, by means of *reform*; not by the people, by means of a *revolution*; and if it take place, it can only affect the executive, not the legislative power. At the same time, if a revolution has once been brought about, and a new constitution established, the injustice of this revolution in its beginning and accomplishment, does not free the subjects from the obligation to accommodate themselves, as good citizens, to the new order of things.”

B.—Of the rights of the sovereign power to the territory of the state. Of the rights of taxation. Of finance and police.

C.—Of the maintenance of the poor; of foundling hospitals; of a religious establishment.

D.—Of the distribution of offices; of rank in the state; of nobility.

E.—Of criminal law, and a penal code; of the right of punishing and pardoning.

§ 50.—Of the relation of a citizen to his native and other countries, in point of right and obligation.

§ 51.—Of the different forms of government.

§ 52.—Of the attainment of that rational form, which the spirit of an original compact requires, which makes *freedom* alone the principle, i. e., the basis, and condition of all *force*. Of the representative system.

Section II.—*Of the law of nations, or international law.* [§§ 53–61.]

§§ 53, 54.—Nations, in their external relation to each other, are in a state of nature, not unlike lawless savages, among whom the right of the strongest is established [cf. § 686.]; consequently, a confederacy of states becomes necessary, in order to protect one another against external attacks, conformably to the idea of an original social compact.

§§ 55-58.—Of the right of making war, both with regard to the subjects of a state, and foreign nations.

§§ 59, 60.—Of the right of peace.

§ 61.—Of the injustice of a state of warfare. "*There shall be no war*, is the irresistible *veto* of morally-practical Reason."—Of the mode of bringing nations, like individuals, from a state of nature to a *juridical* state. Of the establishment and maintenance of a perpetual peace, by means of a permanent congress of states.

Section III.—Of cosmopolitical law, or the rights of the citizen of the world. [§ 62.]

§ 62.—Of the right of mutual intercourse and commerce, as belonging to all mankind.

CONCLUSION.

This union of the whole human race, under certain universal laws, it may be said, is not the partial, but the total and complete attainment of the grand aim, the final purpose of Jurisprudence within the boundaries of mere Reason. For, that the prototype of a juridical federation of men, according to public laws in general, must be derived from Reason *apriori*, is now obvious; since all the examples, taken from experience, can indeed serve the purpose of illustrating, but not of establishing, the necessity of a metaphysical decision of this important question. Those very men, who smile at the novelty of this inquiry, incautiously betray themselves, when they admit, and even make use of the commonplace assertion, "that that is the best constitution, in which the laws govern, not men." And what, says the author, can be more sublime than this idea, which is evidently applicable to practice, and capable of being realized in experience, and which alone—provided it is not attempted to be brought about by means of revolutions, or the forcible overthrow of all erroneous establishments (for that would be the annihilation of all law and justice), but by gradual reform, according to fixed principles—leads by continual approximation to the supreme political good, A PERPETUAL PEACE.

Appendix X.—Everlasting Peace.

[“Everything tends at last to the practical,” says Dr Kant in § 1168; and again, in § 3036, “all interest is ultimately practical.” We have just seen (appendix ix.) that “the final purpose of Jurisprudence within the boundaries of mere reason,” is precisely that “perpetual peace” which is to be given to the world under the “victorious sway” of morality, when “the opposing evil” has been subdued (page 206, verse 27 above) by the establishment of the dominion of the Good Principle “according to moral laws”

(see § 855). But the two ideas, "like all other representations of the absolute and unconditioned" notwithstanding their objective reality as practically obligatory regulative principles, are not in real fact adequately exemplified by anything phenomenal (see § 854); and consequently "the PHILOSOPHICAL MILLENNIUM, which expects a period of perpetual peace, grounded on a universal league of nations, constituting themselves into a grand cosmical republic, is—just like the THEOLOGICAL, which tarries for the complete moral amendment of the whole human race—universally derided as a fanatical delusion" (§ 686). Dr. Kant's "Project for a Perpetual Peace" (*Zum ewigen Frieden, ein philosophischer Entwurf*, Königsberg, 1795; see Ueberweg's Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., page 153) is number xxviii. in the analysis of Dr. Willich, who speaks of it [pages 121–127] as follows:]

Of this original work, which is so much and justly admired on the continent, we already possess an English translation.* And if the appearance of this production in foreign versions could establish any proof of its merits, I might add that "Kant's Project for a Perpetual Peace" has been likewise translated into French, and indeed with the sanction of the author, who has furnished the French translator with a new supplement, which contains "*a secret article for a perpetual peace.*"

Many of our political readers must remember, that the idea of a perpetual peace has formerly employed the pen of the GOOD ABBOT DE ST. PIERRE; and that, at a still earlier period, the most patriotic king of whom France can boast, HENRY IV. [A. D. 1553–1610; as to his "senate of the Christian commonwealth," see New Am. Cyclop., vol. ix., page 97, ed. 1860, article *Henry IV.*], was seriously engaged in modeling this beneficent plan, which he proposed to submit to the consideration of his cotemporary potentates, if an untimely death had not frustrated that philanthropic design. Though our sage politicians have always considered plans of this kind as the fanciful productions of good-natured fanatics, it may on the other hand be observed, that by disputing on the possibility of a perpetual peace, the necessity of a perpetual warfare must be admitted as a maxim; because, without being continually prepared for war, the different states of Europe could not long exist together. This

*["Kant's Essays and Treatises," 2 vols., London, 1798; see the contents inserted by Professor Morris in the literature of Dr. Ueberweg's § 121, vol. ii., pages 138, 139, where the title of the sixth number of the first volume is "Eternal Peace." Semple (Ethics, page vii., of both editions of 1836 and 1869) says "the *Essays* are apparently rendered by a foreigner and printed abroad, although graced with a London title page."]

maxim, however, is as abominable in theory, as it is practically destructive of every principle of morality. For, if *all* independent states adopt or continue to practice such a maxim, and if their views be constantly directed to the execution of it, their political existence itself must be extremely precarious. From this source, I am inclined to derive the frequent revolutions in the political world, the frequent returns from a state of intellectual and moral improvement to their former barbarism, and the perpetual animosities (emphatically called, *natural* enmities) between man and man, which are so industriously transmitted from one generation to another; especially in the frontier provinces of different nations. Man is a fighting animal! is the general outcry of all those who are interested, whether directly or indirectly, in propagating this absurd and pernicious doctrine. Even admitting, that man is naturally prone to exercise his physical powers; that he has this propensity in common with the lower animals; that he occasionally manifests the desire of revenge and conquest, not unlike the rapacious tiger or the victorious lion; and that he can not easily overcome these natural inclinations, as long as his inhuman feats are more admired and encouraged than the dignified, though less alluring, exertions of his intellect;—does it follow from these *primitive* dispositions of savage man, that perpetual warfare is a necessary evil in the *present* state of society? I hope for the honor of humanity, that none but the callous financiers of deluded nations, or the avaricious contractors of armies and navies, with their numerous train of connections, will be hardy enough to draw so false a conclusion.

When we consider those, who direct the affairs of nations, in a moral as well as legislative capacity, it is rather surprising, that the important plan of a perpetual peace has never been duly weighed: while many subjects of less consequence, and comparatively trifling matters, daily occupy their attention. Nobody will deny, that the ideas of right and wrong, of just and unjust, are equally applicable to a plurality of states, as to different individuals of one or several countries. The only obstacle to the *just* application of these ideas must, therefore, lie in the diversity of opinions, arising among those *corrupted* servants of the state, to whom the management of external affairs is intrusted. Why, therefore, do the rulers of nations not agree upon a general federation of states? Why do they not, like every other *reasonable* being, submit to arbitration, by choosing the arbiters from the bosom of disinterested states; in order to settle such differences as their own ministers can not determine? This would be the

only rational and proper method; a method which is daily practiced in private life, by those very men, who seem to oppose its introduction in diplomatic transactions. Nay, if the arm of violence and rapacity were permitted to decide the quarrels of individuals, all civil institutions and social compacts would soon be dissolved. And does not the same reasoning apply to every government, whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic?—have we not sufficient testimonies upon historical record, that dissolution and annihilation have hitherto been their ultimate fate?

Induced by such considerations, the venerable Kant, after having observed the political changes of Europe for upward of half a century, steps forward with a plan drawn up in a diplomatic form. His noble design of stopping the prodigal effusion of human blood, and his aim at convincing the governors of nations, that the practicability of this plan merely depends upon the exertions of their moral will, are equally conspicuous. The great modern improvements in Ethics throughout society, particularly in the higher ranks; the view of the innumerable sufferings and exterminations accompanying the present state of warfare in Europe; and finally the conviction, that his “Project” is truly practicable and morally unexceptionable; these were sufficient motives to rouse the “hoary philosopher of the North,” and to animate him with new vigor for this grand and benevolent attempt.

The author exhibits the *Preliminary* and *Definitive Articles* for a perpetual peace, in two sections, which he accompanies with proper illustrations. The preliminary articles are as follows:

1.—“No treaty of peace shall be considered as valid, that has been concluded with a secret reserve of matters for a future war.

2.—“No independent state shall ever be permitted to be transferred to the dominion of another state, whether by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation.

3.—“Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall in time be entirely discharged.

4.—“No national or state debts shall be contracted, that relate to the external or foreign affairs of the state.

5.—“No state shall, by force of arms, interfere with either the constitution or government of other states.

6.—“No state, at war with another, shall make use of such hostilities, as must destroy their reciprocal confidence in a future peace; for instance, the employing of assassins, poisoners, the violation of cartels, the instigation of treasonable practices, rebellion in the inimical state, etc.”

The conclusion of a *definitive peace* presupposes it as a postu-

late: "that all men, who are able to produce reciprocal effects upon each other, must necessarily be subject to some civil institutions." All civil institutions, however, as far as regards the *persons* submitting to them, may be reduced to three classes:

- (1) Those concerning the right of the citizen in the state;
- (2) Those relative to the right of nations; and
- (3) Those ascertaining the rights of the citizen of the world (cosmopolite).

Conformably to this introduction, the author proposes *three Definitive Articles*.

I.—The civil constitution of every state ought to be republican.

By a republican constitution is here understood such a one, as is founded upon the principles of *liberty*, *dependence*, and *equality*. By means of that *liberty*, acquired by the constitutional law, all the members of a state must be entitled to the privilege of obeying no other external or by-laws than those, to which they have given their consent. By virtue of their legal *dependence*, all members of a society are subject to only one common legislation. And by their legal *equality*, among men as citizens of the state, there must subsist such a relation, that none of them can lawfully oblige the other, without subjecting himself to the law, by which the other party *may* reciprocally compel him in a similar instance. This, therefore, is the only constitution, which forms the basis of every other in civil society; and it is also the only one, that can lead to a perpetual peace. For, in a government where the consent of the citizens of the state is required for declaring war, they will be very cautious in giving their approbation to those horrid measures, in consequence of which they themselves must bear all the calamities of a bloody contest.

In order to prevent any misconstruction of terms, KANT distinguishes a *republican* from a *democratic* constitution, by discriminating between the *forms of government* (*imperii*), and those of *administration* (*regiminis*); the former of which are determined by the distinction of *persons*, who hold the supreme power of the state, but the latter, by the *mode of governing* the people by a supreme head, whoever this may be. The forms of government, or those of the former kind, are *autocracy* or the power of the prince, *aristocracy* or the power of the nobles, and *democracy* or the power of the people: those of the latter kind, namely the forms of administration, are *republicanism* and *despotism*. The former of these again consists, according to the essential characters above described, in the separation of the executive power from the legislative; the latter, namely despotism, is the arbitrary execution of

the laws, which the sovereign himself has enacted ; so that his private will becomes the public law of the nation. Concerning *democracy*, then, Kant affirms that it *necessarily* leads to *despotism*; because it establishes a legislative and executive power by which all have a share in forming resolutions relative to *one*, and even against this one, who consequently would not agree with them, so that *all* are said to partake of the legislation, when in fact they do not so; which is in contradiction to the general will itself and to liberty.

II.—*The rights of nations ought to be founded upon a federation of independent states.*

The author's ideas in this article are expressed with equal boldness, energy, and truth. The result of them is this: In the relative condition of states to one another, there can be rationally no other method of extricating themselves from the lawless condition that engenders continual wars, than to imitate individual man in the resignation of his wild (unconstrained) liberty; to accommodate themselves to public compulsory laws; and thus to form a STATE OF NATIONS, gradually increasing, and at length comprehending all the nations of the earth. Since, however, according to their notions of the right of nations, they are averse to submit like individuals to the laws of compulsion; and since they reject *in hypothesi* what is just *in thesi*; let them at least adopt the *negative* substitute of a federation (congress) for the prevention of war, instead of the *positive* establishment of an UNIVERSAL REPUBLIC. Such a congress may at least save us from total ruin, by checking that hostile disposition of man which shuns the operation of the law; it may gradually spread its beneficent influence to distant nations; though it will nevertheless be in constant danger of being interrupted, by the capricious opposition of a lawless monarch.

III.—*The cosmopolitical right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.*

The cosmopolitical right is that of a stranger, by which he is intitled to a friendly reception at his arrival upon foreign ground. It is not strictly the right of hospitality, but that of visiting one another, which belongs to all men, in offering their company, by virtue of their common inhabitation of the surface of the earth [cf. the third subdivision of § 370. Both statements should be struck out, both cases being covered by the general principles of ethics and requiring no special statement]. The *inhospitality* of sea-coasts, for instance that of Barbary, and the *inhospitable* conduct of cultivated and chiefly of commercial nations of our quarter

of the globe, who change their *visits* into *conquests*, is consequently against the law of nature. As, however, the means of communication among the nations of the earth are so much improved, that the violation of a right on *one* spot of the globe is now felt in *all* countries; it hence follows that the idea of a cosmopolitical law is not a whimsical or extravagant representation of a right, but a necessary supplement to a code, that remains to be written, and that relates to the rights of states and nations, as well as to the rights of man in general. Under this condition only, we may flatter ourselves with the hopes of a continual, though gradual, approximation to a perpetual peace.

In the further illustrations annexed to these articles, the author maintains that both morals and politics, so far from being in opposition to this plan, rather tend to confirm and to render it universal; "for," says he, "the guarantee of this compact is the grand and ingenious artist, nature herself, who by her mechanical course evidently manifests her purposed aim of restoring harmony among men, even against their will, and in the very bosom of their contentions. The provisional dispositions made by nature for this purpose, are the following:

"(1) That she has provided for the subsistence of man in all climates;

"(2) That she has dispersed them, through wars, in every direction, even to the most inhospitable countries, in order to people them; and

"(3) That she has thus compelled them to enter into reciprocal engagements, which are more or less established by law."

The many valuable hints and philosophical reflections, contained in this little work, it is impossible to abridge. And as we possess an English translation of it, I must refer the curious reader to the book itself; at the same time assuring him, that he will find the arts of courts and the juggles of statesmen exposed, in a manner altogether original.

Appendix XI.—Critique of the Faculty of Judgment.

[In § 298, Dr. Kant says: "With regard to the division, just mentioned, of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and that this last could be no other than moral science, I have elsewhere explained myself at length (*Disquisition on the apriori Functions of the Judgment*)."] (Cf. §§ 1027, 1168, 2611, 2607, 3131.) Kant's *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, in Dr. Willich's analysis, is spoken of [pages 103–113] as follows:]

The author's principal aim in this work is to inquire "whether the *Judging Faculty*, which, in the order of our cognoscible powers,

forms an intermediate capacity between the Understanding and Reason, has likewise its own principles apriori; whether these are constitutive or merely regulative; and whether that faculty of judging affords apriori the rule for the sensations of pleasure and displeasure, which again are the intermediate degrees between the cognoscible and appetitive faculties."

"A Critique of pure Reason, i. e. of our capacity of judging conformably to principles apriori, would be incomplete, if the Judging Faculty, which likewise claims these principles, were not treated as a separate part of that Critique; although, in a system of pure philosophy, the principles of judgment must not be considered as a separate part, belonging either to the theoretical or practical department of the system; but, in cases of emergency, they may be occasionally connected with either. For, if such a system shall once be established under the general name of Metaphysics (a work, the complete attainment of which is by no means impossible, and which would be of the first importance to the general use of Reason); the Critique must have previously investigated the ground, on which this structure is to be erected, as well as the solidity of the basis of this faculty, that deduces its principles independent on experience: and if any one part of this fabric should be found to stand upon a slight foundation, the downfall of the whole would be the inevitable consequence.

"But we may easily perceive from the nature of the Judging Faculty, that the discovery of the peculiar principle of it, must be attended with great difficulties; for this faculty must necessarily contain some such principle apriori; because, in the contrary case, it could not be subject to the most common critique as a particular faculty of acquiring knowledge; and because the proper use of it is so necessary, and so universally admitted, that everybody is acquainted with its influence. That principle, however, must not be derived from notions apriori, since these are the property of the Understanding, and the application of them only belongs to the Judging Faculty. Hence the latter must furnish an idea, through which indeed we obtain no intuition of any object, but which serves as a rule to that faculty itself. This rule, however, is not of an *objective* nature, so that we could compare the judgment with it *in concreto*; for to do this, there would be required a second Judging Faculty, in order to enable us to distinguish whether the case applies to the rule or not [cf. § 444].

"This perplexity on account of a principle (whether a subjective or objective one) chiefly manifests itself in those judgments which are called *aesthetical*, which relate to the Beautiful and the Sublime,

whether that of nature or art. And yet is the critical investigation of a principle of the Judging Faculty, respecting those objects, the most important part of the Critique of this power. For, though the æsthetical judgments, of themselves, contribute nothing to the knowledge we obtain of things, they nevertheless belong exclusively to the cognoscible faculty, and evince the immediate relation of this faculty to the sensations of pleasure and displeasure, in consequence of some one principle *apriori*, without confounding it with that, which may be the cause of determining the appetitive faculty; because this has its principles *apriori* in notions, which are the produce of Reason."

Having premised this extract from the author's preface to the work under consideration, I shall only add the result of KANT's inquiry respecting the final purposes of nature, as exhibited in the Second Book of this publication; though, in my opinion, this investigation forms the most interesting and essential part of the whole. It is as follows:

In conformity to our Reason, we are obliged to assume a certain connection subsisting between the final purposes of nature, in the same manner as our Understanding, in consequence of its constitution, is impelled to combine things according to their efficient causes. As soon as we observe a certain positive relation among things to one another; as soon as we can represent to ourselves one thing as possible only through the idea we possess of another; we can reduce such a combination to no other idea than that of final causes, or of means and purposes. Although we are not able to perceive and to determine the ground, on which that connection rests, as a thing independent on our senses; we may still conceive it, in a general manner, as the ground of such a combination as can be represented by us under the idea of connecting final causes; we may thus think of it under the only SYMBOL, which can properly denote the basis of this association, namely, that of Reason. In this way, however, we have no title to refer the modes and actions we observe in our Reason, to that being (*substratum*) itself; but we must make use of them only as a symbol, which at least expresses similar relations.

We must, therefore, justly consider the world as if everything were arranged in it by the highest Understanding [see §§ 748, 2420, 897]; and we must, with the greatest attention, endeavor to discover in experience those traces that are everywhere scattered for the support of this conclusion; in order to prepare our minds for the conviction arising from a very considerable number of individual cases. In this, we shall the better succeed, if, as the

groundwork of this inquiry, we exhibit that systematic order which is already determined by our Reason *a priori*, and in consequence of which determination the moral beings compose the last and absolute purpose, to which all other things ultimately and necessarily refer as the means of the former [cf. sup. §§ 72, 88]. But since we can recognize no other moral being than MAN, we must accordingly regulate our investigations relative to final purposes, and particularly attend to what is connected with *his* nature. Here, however, we must abandon the notion hitherto erroneously maintained by many theologians, that *everything* has a necessary relation to man. For, as the world of moral beings certainly consists of more classes than we are acquainted with [II. Peter, ii., 11; Revelations, xix., 14], we may indeed presuppose that men are absolute purposes, yet far from being exclusively so; and that nature has not been constituted for the sake of men alone, but that, at the same time, other moral beings have not been disregarded. We may therefore safely admit that nature has been so formed that the essential purposes concerning man can be certainly attained, notwithstanding that the accidental purposes must occasionally remain unaccomplished, on account of others that are more important and necessary. For this assertion, which is supported merely upon the principles of our moral nature, and not by any intuitive knowledge of the world itself, experience only furnishes us with arguments, which this order of the world displays in individual cases. But the greatest number of phenomena must necessarily remain inexplicable to us, who are acquainted only with the smallest part of the world, and from whom the extensive territory of moral beings is almost wholly concealed [see page 112 above]: whereas a complete knowledge of their relations to purposes would presuppose not only a thorough knowledge of the world of sense, but likewise that of moral beings. We derive from the contemplation of the world no proofs showing a regular order of moral purposes, but we investigate the cases corresponding with that order, so as to ascertain it in the individual, and to strengthen our knowledge upon what we had already presupposed, in consequence of our moral nature. For, that which affords some knowledge in a general way, gives but a slight degree of conviction; while that which animates this conviction and renders it applicable to particular cases, i. e. our sensation of it, is produced only by individual instances.

According to these principles, we shall be able to discover traces of divine wisdom in a great number of phenomena, without neglecting on that account our inquiries into nature [§ 2429], which

alone can extend our knowledge of things, which previously unfolds the matter of knowledge, and which points out the relations wherein divine wisdom is evident. The field of physics is immense; and by an appeal to the Deity, who has produced nature itself conformably to final causes, we can set no limits to that field. For, to obtain a complete view of final causes, and to apply them to the explanation of phenomena, is entirely out of our power; we can only mark them as the results arising from our intuitive knowledge of nature, with this limitation; that, when we obtain a more accurate knowledge of the nature of these things, we shall likewise discover a greater variety of final causes, and so on in infinitum.

The contemplation of nature, agreeably to final purposes, is therefore fully established in the constitution of our Reason; although we have no intuition of the being that is the basis of this order. We can conceive this being merely by the idea of Reason in general [§ 3044], as the only possible way of apprehending it: thus, however, our knowledge of the nature of that being is not increased [§ 3072]; and we only satisfy a subjective [§ 3047], but necessary claim of our Reason. For such an order of things as depends upon a regular succession of final causes, can be thought of by no other relation but that of a causality conformably to ideas; a result which exactly corresponds with the general idea of an efficient Reason.

[Here follows the table of] CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

I.—Of the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical. [§ 298.]

II.—Of the extent of philosophy in general.

III.—Of the Critique of the Judging Faculty, being the medium of combining the two parts of philosophy into one system.

IV.—Of the Judging Faculty being a legislative power *a priori*.

V.—The principal of formal † conformation (*Zweckmaessigkeit*) of nature is a transcendental principle of the Judging Faculty.

VI.—Of the connection between the sensation of pleasure and the idea of the conformation of nature.

VII.—On the æsthetical method of representing this conformation.

† [Perhaps this is a misprint for "final conformation." In the glossary [page 150] Dr. Willich says that "conformation—*Zweckmaessigkeit*—i. e. *forma, sive nexus finalis*, is that constitution of an object (or even of a state of mind, or of an action), which can be conceived, or thought of by us, as possible only through a causality according to conceptions—that is, through a Will" (cf. §§ 2825, 2828, 2420).]

VIII.—On the logical method of exhibiting the same.

IX.—On the connections formed between the legislative acts of the Understanding and Reason, by means of the Judging Faculty.

The following table exhibits the whole of what relates to the province of

TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

<i>Collective faculties of the mind.</i>	<i>Faculties of cognition.</i>	<i>Principles apriori.</i>	<i>Application to</i>
The faculty of cognition.	The Understanding.	Legality.	Nature.
The sense of pleasure and displeasure.	The Judging Faculty.	Conformation.	Art.
The faculty of desiring [cf. § 163].	Reason.	Final purpose.	Liberty.

DIVISION I.—CRITIQUE OF THE ÆSTHETICAL FACULTY OF JUDGING. [§§ 1-60.]

Section I.—Analysis of the Æsthetical Judging Faculty. [§§ 1-53.]

BOOK I.—ANALYSIS OF THE BEAUTIFUL. [§§ 1-22.]

FIRST MODIFICATION of the Judgment of Taste according to its QUALITY. [§§ 1-5.]

§ 1.—The judgment of taste is *æsthetical*.

§ 2.—The approbation determined by this judgment is not influenced by any self-interest relative to the object.

§ 3.—The approbation, or the satisfaction we express upon what is *agreeable*, is connected with self-interest.

§ 4.—The same is the case with regard to what is *good*.

§ 5.—Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction.

SECOND MODIFICATION of the Judgment of Taste, namely according to its QUANTITY. [§§ 6-9.]

§ 6.—That which is represented as an object of *universal* approbation, independent on collateral notions, is called Beautiful.

§ 7.—Composition of the Beautiful, the Agreeable, and the Good, by the above stated character.

§ 8.—The universality of approbation, in a judgment of taste, is represented only in a subjective sense.

§ 9.—Investigation of the question: whether in a judgment of taste the sense of pleasure precede the act of judging upon the object, or follow it.

THIRD MODIFICATION of the Judgments of Taste, according to their RELATION to purposes. [§§ 10-17.]

§ 10.—Of Conformation in general.

§ 11.—The judgment of taste is wholly founded upon the *form* or the *nexus finalis* of an object (or on the manner of representing that object to the mind).

§ 12.—The judgment of taste depends upon principles a priori.

§§ 13, 14.—This judgment is not related to any emotion of the mind.

§ 15.—It is equally unconnected with the idea of perfection.

§ 16.—That judgment of taste, by which an object is declared to be beautiful only under a certain condition, can not be called a pure judgment.

§ 17.—On the prototype of Beauty.

FOURTH MODIFICATION of the Judgment of Taste, according to the MODALITY of the satisfaction in the object. [§§ 18-22.]

§ 18.—This modality of an æsthetical judgment is not a necessary, but an *exemplary* determination of all individuals, respecting a judgment, that is considered as an example of a general rule, the particulars of which can not be defined.

§ 19.—The subjective necessity, which we attribute to an æsthetical judgment, is conditional.

§ 20.—The condition of the necessity, which a judgment of taste supposes, is the idea of a common sense.

§ 21.—Whether we have grounds, on which we may conclude the reality of a common sense.

§ 22.—The necessity of the general approbation, which is conceived in an æsthetical judgment, is a subjective necessity, which, under the supposition of a common sense, is represented as objective.

COROLLARIES from these four modifications.

I.—*Taste* is the faculty of judging of an object, or of representing it by means of approbation or disapprobation, unconnected with any *self-interest*. The object of such approbation is called *Beautiful*.

II.—*Beautiful* is that which affords universal satisfaction, without reducing it to a certain idea.

III.—*Beauty* is the conformation or *nexus finalis* of an object, so far as it is observed in it, *without the representation of a purpose*.

IV.—*Beautiful* is that which is recognized as an object of *necessary* satisfaction, without combining with it a particular idea.

BOOK II.—ANALYSIS OF THE SUBLIME.

§ 23.—Transition from the judging power of the Beautiful to that of the Sublime.

§ 24.—Of the division of an inquiry into the sensation of the Sublime.

A.—On the mathematical Sublime. [§§ 25-27.]

§ 25.—Definition of the Sublime: "*Sublime*, in general, is that which is absolutely great, which admits of no comparison, to think

of which only proves a faculty of the mind, which is not subject to any scale of the senses, etc."

§ 26.—Of the mathematical computation of natural objects, which is requisite to produce the idea of the Sublime.

§ 27.—Of the quality of the satisfaction we receive in judging of the Sublime.

B.—On the dynamical Sublime of nature.

§ 28.—Nature considered as might (*potentia*).

§ 29.—On the modality of the judgment respecting the Sublime of nature.

Deduction of the pure æsthetical judgments.

§ 30.—The deduction of æsthetical judgments upon the objects of nature must not be directed to what we call Sublime in the latter, but to the Beautiful only.

§ 31.—On the proper method of this deduction.

§ 32.—*First* peculiarity of an æsthetical judgment: "that it determines its object with respect to the satisfaction found in it, at the same time claiming the approbation of *everybody*, as if it were *objective*."

§ 33.—*Second* peculiarity: "that it can not at all be determined by argumental proofs, as if it were merely *subjective*."

§ 34.—No objective principle of taste can be discovered.

§ 35.—The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the judging faculty in general.

§ 36.—How the deduction of æsthetical judgments must be carried on.

§ 37.—What is properly asserted *a priori*, in this judgment, concerning the object.

§ 38.—Deduction of æsthetical judgments.

§ 39.—How a sensation can be communicated.

§ 40.—Of Taste, as a species of *sensus communis*.

§ 41.—Of the empirical interest in the Beautiful.

§ 42.—Of the intellectual interest.

§ 43.—Of art in general. "*Art* is distinguished from *Nature*, like doing (*facere*) from acting or operating in general (*agere*); and the production of the former, i. e. work (*opus*) is distinguished from the latter as operation (*effectus*). *Art*, as human ingenuity, is further distinguished from Science, like the practical from the theoretical part of geometry; for to be acquainted with the principles of navigation, for instance, does not yet form a practical navigator: hence the Sciences imply the knowledge of things, and the Arts teach us the practical application of that knowledge. Lastly, *Art* is distinguished from *handicraft*; the former may be called *free*, the latter *mercenary art*."

§ 44.—Of the fine arts.

§ 45.—By fine arts is understood any art, so far as it, at the same time, is imitative of nature.

§ 46, 47.—The fine arts are the efforts of genius.

§ 48.—Of the distinction subsisting between genius and taste. "To judge of beautiful objects, as such, requires *taste*; but the art of producing such objects, supposes *genius*."

§ 49.—Of the faculties of the mind, which compose what is called genius. [Cf. §§ 543, 544.]

§ 50.—Taste and genius must be combined in the productions of the fine arts.

§ 51.—Of the division of the fine arts:

"(1).—The arts of language, viz.: *Oratory* and *Poetry*;

"(2).—The arts of sensible imitation, which are either those of *true* or of *illusory* exhibitions, the former are called *Plastic*, the latter *Painting*: plastic includes *Statuary* and *Architecture*; painting consists either in copying beauteous nature, or in beautifully arranging her productions; i. e. in the respective arts of *Painting* or *Pleasure-gardening*;

"(3).—The beautiful combination of external sensations, viz.: the arts of *Music* and *Dying*" [?tragedy perhaps].

§ 52.—Of the combination of the fine arts in one and the same production.

§ 53.—Comparison of the fine arts with one another, with regard to their æsthetical value.

Section II.—Dialectic of the Æsthetical Judging Faculty.

§§ 55–57.—Representation and Solution of the Antinomy of Taste.

§ 58.—On the Idealism of conformation in nature as well as art, being the only principle of the æsthetical faculty of judging.

§ 59.—Of Beauty as the symbol of Morality.

Appendix.

§ 60.—Of the methodical doctrine of taste.

DIVISION II.—CRITIQUE OF THE TELEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF JUDGING. [§§ 61–91.]

§ 61.—Of the objective conformation of nature.

Section I.—Analysis of the Teleological Faculty of Judging. [§§ 62–68.]

§ 62.—Of the objective conformation, which is merely formal, in distinction from what is material.

§ 63.—Of the relative conformation of nature, in distinction from the internal.

§ 64.—Of the peculiar character of things, as purposes of nature.

§ 65.—Things, as natural purposes, are organized beings.

§ 66.—Of the principle of judging of the internal conformation of organized beings.

§ 67.—Of the teleological principle of judging of Nature in general, as a system of purposes.

§ 68.—Of the principle of Teleology, as an internal principle of Natural Philosophy.

Section II.—Dialectic of the Teleological Faculty of Judging. [§§ 69-78.]

§ 69.—The antinomy of the Judging Faculty.

§§ 70, 71.—Representation and solution of this antinomy.

§ 72.—Of the various systems respecting the conformation of nature.

§ 73.—None of these systems is satisfactory.

§ 74.—The cause of the impossibility of treating this idea, "that nature is *technically* arranged," in a dogmatical manner, lies in our incapacity of explaining the design or aim of nature.

§ 75.—The idea of an objective conformation of nature is a critical principle of Reason, belonging to the reflex Faculty of Judging.

§ 76.—Illustrating remarks. [It is stated in the New American Cyclopædia (article *Kant*, vol. x., page 113, ed. 1860) that Schelling (*Phil. Schriften*, i. s. 114), says that "there were perhaps never so many deep thoughts compressed in so few leaves as in § 76 of the 'Criticism of the Judgment.'" Dr. Ueberweg (*Hist. Phil.*, vol. ii., page 193, ed. Morris) says (I do not know what section he had in view): "In the analogy of the forms of the different classes of organisms Kant finds (in agreement with the subsequent speculations of Lamarck and Darwin) ground for the supposition that they are really related to each other through generation from a common original germ." (Cf. Averroes, in Ueberweg, *Hist. Phil.*, Dr. Morris' translation, vol. i., page 415, line 41.) Cf. § 2382 (page 745) above.]

§ 77.—Of the peculiarity of the human understanding, from which the idea of the purposes of nature arises.

§ 78.—On the principle of the universal mechanism of matter, united with the teleological principle in the technical (architectonic) arrangement of nature.

Appendix.—Methodical Doctrine of the Teleological Faculty of Judging. [§§ 79-91.]

§ 79.—Whether Teleology ought to be treated as a branch of Physics. [See the *History of Creation* (vol. i., pages 101, 106, Appleton, New York, 1876), by Ernst Haeckel (professor in the University of Jena), who says, in quoting a passage from § 79,

methodical system of the teleological faculty of Judgment: "On account of this one passage taken by itself," (but that, in justice to Kant, it can not be taken by itself, is immediately afterward evident, as Haeckel in equivalent language admits), "we might place Kant beside Goethe and Lamarck, as one of the first founders of the doctrine of descent," etc. (page 105).]

§ 80.—Of the necessity of classing the principle of mechanism under that of teleology, when we attempt to explain a thing as a design of nature.

§ 81.—On the association of mechanism with the teleological principle, accounting for natural purposes, as being the productions of nature.

§ 82.—Of the teleological system in the external relations of organized beings.

§ 83.—Of the last purpose (design) of nature as a teleological system.

§ 84.—Of the final purposes of the existence of a world, i. e. of the creation itself.

§ 85.—Of physico-theology.

§ 86.—Of ethico-theology.

§ 87.—Of the moral proof of the existence of God.

§ 88.—The validity of this moral proof is limited.

§ 89.—Of the use of the moral argument.

§ 90.—Of the manner of admitting things as true, in a moral proof of the existence of God.

§ 91.—Of the manner of considering things as true, by means of a practical belief.

Appendix XII.—Metaphysical Principles of Natural Philosophy.

[In § 276, Dr. Kant says: "I shall therefore here, as formerly in the metaphysical elements of natural philosophy, print in the text that part of law which is strictly systematic and apriori; and that part which regards given cases in experience. I shall discuss in notes, since otherwise it would not be clear what ought to be considered as metaphysics, and what as practical laws." The *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*" is number xxii. in the analysis of Dr. Willich, who speaks of it [pages 93–99] as follows:]

This is, without exception, the most profound of Kant's works; and in order to afford the reader a concise view of the author's aim, I shall first give an abstract from the elaborate preface to this publication, and then exhibit the principles of this *new* science, in a close translation.

"It is of the greatest importance to the progress of the sciences," says Kant, "to separate dissimilar principles from one another, to reduce each set of them to a particular system, that they may form a science of a peculiar kind. Thus we shall prevent that uncertainty in sciences, which arises from confounding them, and in consequence of which we can not easily distinguish the limits, which, in a doubtful case, are to be assigned to each of them; nor can we discover the source of the errors, that may attend the practical application of them. On this account, I have deemed it necessary, to exhibit systematically the *pure* part of Natural Philosophy (*Physica Generalis*), in which metaphysical and mathematical constructions of ideas occur promiscuously; and, in treating of the former, to show at the same time the principles of that construction, and consequently to prove the possibility of a System of Natural Philosophy, deduced from mathematical demonstrations. This division of sciences, beside the advantage already stated, is attended with the particular satisfaction, which the unity and harmony of knowledge afford, when we can prevent the limits of the sciences from interfering with one another."

"As a second reason of recommending this process, it may be urged, that in every department of Metaphysics we may hope to attain to *absolute completeness* [cf. §§ 2729, 2841, 1409, 1424], such as we can not expect in any other species of knowledge; consequently, the completeness of the Metaphysics of material nature may be expected, here, with the same confidence as in the Metaphysics of nature in general [§§ 2611, 2613, 2614, 1409. Ueberweg (Hist. Phil. vol. ii., page 154) says: "A manuscript on the *Metaphysics of Nature*, on which Kant labored in the last years of his life, has never been published; see (Ginscher?) in the *Preuss. Jahrbuecher*, ed. by Haym, I. 1858, pp. 80-84, Schubert, in the *N. preuss. Provinzialblatt*, Koenigsb., 1858, pp. 58-61, and particularly Rudolf Reicke, in the *Altpreuss. Monatschr*, vol. i., Koenigsberg, 1864, pp. 742-749;"] and again (p. 180) Dr. Ueberweg says: "The transition from the *Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science* to physics is provided for in the '*Metaphysics of Nature*' (a work co-ordinated with the *Metaphysics of Ethics* [§ 275, page 26 above], which includes the doctrines of legal right and of morality), which treats of the motive forces of matter, and is divided by Kant into an 'Elementary System' and a 'System of the World.' The manuscript was left unfinished. (Some fragments of it will perhaps soon be edited by Reicke.)"] For, in Metaphysics, the object is merely considered, agreeably to the general laws of thought, while in other sciences it must be represented according to the different

data of perception, whether this be pure or empirical. In Metaphysics, too, we acquire a determined number of cognitions, which can be completely exhausted; because here the object must be continually compared with all the necessary laws of thought: while in the other sciences, on account of the infinite variety of perceptions, or objects of thought, which they present to the mind, we never can attain to absolute completeness, but may extend them in infinitum, as is the case with pure Mathematics and experimental Physics. I likewise believe, that I have completely stated these metaphysical principles of Natural Philosophy, to their utmost extent; but though I have succeeded in this attempt, I do not flatter myself with having performed any extraordinary task."

"To complete, however, a metaphysical system, whether that of nature in general, or that of the material world, the Table of the Categories must serve as its Schema [see § 2717 above]. For there are in reality no more nor fewer pure intellectual notions concerning the nature of things, than I have stated in that table. All the determinations relative to the general notion of matter, consequently all that can be conceived of it a priori, that can be exhibited in mathematical construction, or that can be proposed as a determined object of experience, must admit of being reduced to the four classes of the Categories, viz.: that of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. There remains nothing to be discovered or added here; but if imperfections should occur, with respect to perspicuity and order, the system in this respect may be occasionally improved."

"The idea of matter must, therefore, be examined through all the four mentioned functions of the intellect (in four sections), in each of which a new determination of that idea occurs. The primary attribute of something, that represents an object of the external senses, must be motion; for by that only can these senses be affected. To this, the Understanding reduces all other predicates of matter that relate to its nature [cf. §§ 1500, 1632]; and thus Natural Philosophy is, throughout, either a pure or applied *theory of motion*. The metaphysical principles of this science must, consequently, be divided into four sections: in the *first* of which, motion is considered as a pure quantum, according to its composition, without any quality of that which is movable, and hence may be called PHORONOMY; in the *second*, motion is investigated in its relation to the quantity of matter, under the name of an originally moving power, and is therefore called DYNAMICS; in the *third*, matter is examined in reciprocal relation to this quantity,

by its peculiar motion, and appears under the title of MECHANICS; and in the *fourth* section, the motion or rest of matter is determined merely in relation to the mode of representing it, or *Modality*, consequently as phenomenon of external senses, on which account it is called PHENOMENOLOGY." [Cf. Ueberweg, ii., 179.]

[Here follows the table of] CONTENTS.

Section I.—Metaphysical Principles of Phoronomy.

Position I.—MATTER is that which is *movable* in space. That space, which itself is movable, is called the *material*, or likewise, *relative space*; that, in which all *motion* must be ultimately conceived (and which consequently in its own nature is absolutely immovable), is called the *pure*, or likewise, *absolute space*.

Position II.—The motion of a thing is the change of its *external relations* to given space.

Position III.—REST is the permanent presence (*praesentia perdurabilis*) in the same place; *permanent*, however, is that which exists. i. e. continues for a certain time.

Position IV.—To *construct* the idea of compound motion, means to represent motion apriori in the perceptive faculty, as far as the former arises from two or several joint motions in one movable space.

Theorem.—Every motion, as object of experience, may be considered either as the motion of a body in a resting space, or as the rest of a body and, on the other hand, motion of space in opposite direction with equal velocity.

Position V.—The *combination of motion* is the representation of the motion of a point, as being homologous with two or several motions of it united together.

Section II.—Metaphysical Principles of Dynamics.

Position I.—MATTER is that which is *movable*, so far as it *fills* a space. To *fill* a space, is to resist all that is movable and that makes an effort, by its motion, to penetrate into a certain space. A space that is not filled, is a *vacuum*.

Theorem I.—Matter fills a space, not by its mere *existence*, but by a particular *moving power*.

Position II.—The *power of attraction* is that moving power, by which one matter may be the cause of the approach of others toward it; or, in other words, by which it resists the removal of others from it. The *power of repulsion* is that, by which one matter may be the cause of removing others from it; or, in other words, by which it resists the approach of others toward it.

Theorem II.—Matter fills its spaces by the repulsive power of

all its parts, i. e. by a peculiar power of extension, that has a determined degree, beyond which smaller or greater degrees may be conceived in infinitum.

Position III.—One matter, in its motion, *penetrates* another, when, by means of compression, it completely removes the space of its extension.

Theorem III.—Matter may be *compressed* in infinitum; but it never can be *penetrated* by matter, however great its pressing power may be.

Position IV.—That *impenetrability* of matter, which depends upon the resistance proportionally increasing with the degrees of compression, is called *relative*; as on the contrary that, which rests upon the *supposition*, that matter, as such, is not liable to any compression whatever, is here called *absolute* impenetrability. The *filling of space* with absolute impenetrability may be called *mathematical*, while that of relative impenetrability receives the name of *dynamical*.

Position V.—*Material substance* is that in space, which is movable of itself, i. e. separate from every other thing that exists without it in space. The motion of a part of matter, by which it ceases to be a part, is *separation*. The separation of the parts of matter is the *physical division*.

Theorem IV.—Matter is *divisible in infinitum*, and indeed into parts, each of which is again matter. [See §§ 1735, 2092.]

Theorem V.—The possibility of matter renders a power of attraction necessary; this being the second essential and fundamental power of it.

Theorem VI.—By the mere power of attraction, without that of repulsion, we can not conceive the possibility of any matter.

Position VI.—Contact, in a physical sense, is immediate action and re-action of *impenetrability*. The action of one matter upon another, without contact, is the *action at distance* (*actio in distans*). This action at distance, which is possible without the aid of intervening matter, is called the immediate *action* of matter upon matter, *through empty space*.

Theorem VII.—The *attraction essential to all matter*, is the immediate action of it upon another matter, through empty space.

Position VII.—A moving power, by which matters can immediately act upon one another only in a common surface of contact, is called a *superficial power*; but that, by which one matter can immediately act upon the parts of another, even beyond the surface of contact, may be called a *penetrating power*.

Theorem VIII.—The original power of attraction, upon which the possibility of matter itself, as such, must depend, extends in the universe immediately from every part of it to another ad infinitum.

Section III.—Metaphysical Principles of Mechanics.

Position I.—*Matter* is that which is *movable*, so far as it (as such) possesses moving power.

Position II.—The *quantity of matter* is the amount of that which is movable in a determined space. This, so far as all its parts are considered in their motions as operating (moving) at the same time, is called *congeries*: and we say, that a matter acts in a *congeries*, when all its parts, moved in the same direction, exercise their moving power externally, and *at the same time*. A *congeries* consisting of a determined shape is called a *body* (in a mechanical sense). The *magnitude of motion* (mechanically computed) is that which is estimated both by the quantity of matter moved, and its velocity: when *phoronomically* considered, it consists merely in the degree of velocity.

Theorem I.—The quantity of a piece of matter, in comparison with *any* other, can be estimated only by the quantity of motion in a given velocity.

Theorem II.—FIRST LAW OF MECHANICS. In all the changes of corporeal nature, the quantity of matter remains, upon the whole, without increasing or diminishing. [See § 1757.]

Theorem III.—SECOND LAW OF MECHANICS. Every change of matter has an external cause. (Every material body remains in its state of rest or motion, in the same direction, and with the same velocity, unless it be compelled by some external cause, to change this state.) [See § 1771.]

Theorem IV.—THIRD MECHANICAL LAW. In every communicated motion, the action and re-action always correspond with one another. [See § 1813.]

Section IV.—Metaphysical Principles of Phenomenology.

Position.—Matter is that which is movable, as far as in that respect it can be an object of experience.

Theorem I.—The motion of matter, in a straight line, is, with respect to an empirical space, merely a *possible* predicate, in contradistinction to the opposite motion of space. The very same predicate is *impossible*, if we conceive it in no external relation to matter, i. e. as *absolute motion*.

Theorem II.—The circular motion of matter, in contradistinction to the opposite motion of space, is a *real* predicate of it;

whereas the opposite motion of a relative space, if substituted for the motion of the body, is no real motion of the latter, and if considered as such, is a mere illusion.

Theorem III.—In every motion of a body, by which it is moving, with respect to another body, an opposite equal motion of the latter is *necessary*.

Appendix XIII.—Kant's Inaugural Dissertation.

[In § 2682 Dr. Kant says that space and time are "pure intuitions that lie *apriori* at the basis of the empirical" (Mahaffy's edition). In § 1482 Kant says that space is "a pure intuition." In § 1498 Kant says that time is "a pure form of the sensuous intuition." In § 1472 Kant says that "there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably [Professor Mahaffy (Fischer, page 4) translates "perhaps"] spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding" (Meiklejohn's translation, page 18). Professor Kuno Fischer (commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason, Mahaffy's translation, ed. 1866, page 4) says that "this determination of the distinction between sensibility and understanding is the first position taken by the critical philosophy [cf. §§ 1524, 1473]. Kant himself in his inaugural treatise, notes the difference in kind between the two cognitive faculties as the propædæutic of the new school of metaphysic." Dr. Ueberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., p. 149) says (in reference to this inaugural treatise): "The fundamental conception underlying the Critique of the Pure Reason, becomes here already manifest in regard to space and time, but not yet in regard to substantiality, causality, and the other categories." Dr. Fischer says (page 6) that "the doctrine of the form-giving principles of the sensuous world develops quite clearly and accurately what the Critique of the Pure Reason repeats in the transcendental æsthetic." In the next sentence, Professor Fischer refers particularly to Section III. of the inaugural treatise. Dr. Willich [page 64] says "that the preceding extract from the author's Inaugural Dissertation has been given in his [Kant's] own words, in the original Latin;" and the reader will readily see, merely from the brief heads of the third section, that, as Dr. Fischer (page 7) says, "in his inaugural treatise Kant stands (as it were) with one foot firmly on critical ground." Kant himself says (in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn, dated August 18, 1783; the statement appears in Ueberweg at page 151) that the Critique embodied the result of at least twelve years of reflection: it is of interest to note what progress he had made in 1770. Dr. Willich's abstract [pages 62-64] is as follows]:

DE MUNDI SENSIBILIS ATQUE INTELLIGIBILIS FORMA ET PRINCIPIIIS.

Dissertatio pro loco professionis Log. et Metaph. ordinariae rite sibi vindicando; quam exigentibus statutis academicis publice tuebitur IMMANUEL KANT. *Regiomonti*; in auditori maximo. horis matutinis et pomeridianis confuetis; Die XX. Aug., MDCCLXX.

Sectio I.—De Notione Mundi Generatim.

Momenta, in mundi definitione attendenda, haec sunt:

I.—*Materia* (in sensu transcendentali) h. e. *partes*, quae hic sumuntur esse *substantiae*.

II.—*Forma* quae consistit in substantiarum *co-ordinatione*, non *subordinatione*.

III.—*Universitas* quae est omnitudo compartium *absoluta*.

Sectio II.—De Sensibilium atque Intelligibilium Discrimine Generatim.

Sensualitas est *receptivitas* subjecti, per quam possibile est, ut status ipsius repraesentativus objecti alicujus praesentia certo modo afficiatur.

Intelligentia (rationalitas) est *facultas* subjecti, per quam, quae in sensus ipsius per qualitatem suam, incurrere non possunt, sibi repraesentari valet.

Sectio III.—De Principiis Formae Mundi Sensibilis.

DE TEMPORE.

I.—*Idea Temporis* non oritur sed *supponitur* a sensibus.

II.—*Idea Temporis* est *singularis*, non *generalis*: Tempus enim quodlibet non cogitatur, nisi tanquam pars unius ejusdem temporis immensi.

III.—*Idea* itaque temporis est *intuitus*, et quoniam ante omnem sensationem concipitur, tanquam conditio respectuum in sensibilibus obviorem, est *intuitus*, non *sensualis*, sed *purus*.

IV.—Tempus est *quantum continuum* et legum continui in mutationibus universi principium.

V.—Tempus non est *objectivum aliquid et reale*, nec *substantia*, nec *accidens*, nec *relatio*, sed *subjectiva conditio* per naturam mentis humanae necessaria, quaelibet sensibilia, certa lege sibi co-ordinandi, et *intuitus purus*.

VI.—Tempus est *conceptus verissimus*, et, per omnia *possibilia sensuum objecta*, in infinitum patens, *intuitivae repraesentationis conditio*.

VII.—Tempus itaque est *principium formale Mundi sensibilis absolute primum*.

DE SPATIO.

A.—*Conceptus spatii* non abstrahitur a *sensationibus externis*.

B.—*Conceptus spatii* est *singularis representatio omnia in se comprehendens*, non *sub se continens notio abstracta et communis*.

C.—*Conceptus spatii itaque est intuitus purus* ; cum sit conceptus singularis, sensationibus non conflatus, sed omnis sensationis externae forma fundamentalis.

D.—*Spatium non est aliquid objectivi* et realis, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio ; sed subjectivum et ideale et a natura mentis stabili lege proficiscens, veluti schema, omnia omnino externe sensa sibi co-ordinandi.

E.—*Quanquam conceptus spatii*, ut objectivi alicujus et realis entis vel affectionis, sit imaginarius, nihilo tamen secius, *respective ad sensibilia quaecunque*, non solum est *verissimus*, sed et omnis veritatis in sensualitate externa fundamentum.

Sectio IV.—De Principio Formae Mundi Intelligibilis.

Sectio V.—De Methodo Circa Sensitiva et Intellectualia in Metaphysicis.

[Dr. Willich thinks that an abstract of the last two sections "could not be rendered intelligible to the reader, without stating likewise the illustrations of the different positions, at full length." Dr. Fischer (page 6, speaking of section iii.) says: "Comparing it with the Critique of the Pure Reason, there is a perfect harmony between this part of the Inaugural Treatise and the transcendental Æsthetic. The opposite is the case when we compare the doctrine of the form-giving principles of the intelligible world with the transcendental Logic." And again (pages 6, 7), "The order of the world, existing independent of the human reason, which can therefore never be an object of sensuous intuition, but of thought—the forms and principles of this intelligible world can not have their foundation either in human nature, or in the nature of things, but only in the Deity. From God, as Creator, comes the harmony of the world." See further in Fischer (pages 7 and 89), and also Ueberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., pages 149, 150). Cf. §§ 3046, and 3053.] [See § 279.]

Appendix XIV.—Kant's First Essay.

[Dr. Ueberweg (Hist. Phil., ed. Morris, vol. ii., p. 142) says that the date is "1747 (not 1746, the date given on the title page; the dedication is dated April 22d, 1747)." Ueberweg also says (page 137) that Kant "was born on the 22d day of April, 1724." See in Ueberweg (page 143) the judgment of B. W. H. Lexis, from the present standpoint of science. Dr. Willich prefaces his analysis [pages 55–60] with what he calls "the singular Motto prefixed" by Kant to this essay, as follows:]

Nihil magis praestandum est, quam ne pecorum ritu sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes. non *qua* eundum est, sed *qua* *itur*.
SENECA *de vita beata* ; Cap. I.

[*Gedanken von der wahren Schætzung der lebendigen Kraefte und Beurtheilung der Beweise, deren sich Leibnitz und andere Mechaniker in dieser Streitsache bedient haben*, is the title as I find it in Ueberweg (page 142).]

REFLECTIONS UPON THE TRUE COMPUTATION OF LIVING (MOVING) POWERS. Koenigsberg, 220 pp., large 8vo., with two plates, 1746.

After having paid handsome and due compliments to his meritorious countrymen LEIBNITZ, WOLF, HERRMANN, BERNOULLI, BUELFINGER, and many other eminent philosophers, the young author examines the different theories and proofs advanced “on the living (inherent) powers of bodies,” and endeavors to show that their notions on this intricate subject were far from being correct, and that the dissensions prevailing among them arose chiefly from having, each of them, considered the subject in a different point of view. Thus their understandings were misled by paying an undue regard, partly to the *obstacles overcome by weight*; partly to *matter as acted upon, or moved, by weight*; partly to the *pressure suffered by elastic bodies*; and finally to the *velocities arising from compound motion*. He attacks LEIBNITZ most severely, while he enters upon a fundamental inquiry into the origin of his theory concerning the moving powers. It appears obvious to KANT, that LEIBNITZ had been led to this theory, by implicitly proceeding on the known rule from which DESCARTES explains the nature of the lever. Prior to LEIBNITZ, the world had admitted the simple proposition of DESCARTES, “that the mere velocity of bodies, even such as are in actual motion, serves as a rule for ascertaining their power.” But LEIBNITZ suddenly roused the reasoning powers of man, by proposing a new law which, since that period, has offered rich materials for discussion to the most learned and acute. DESCARTES had computed the powers of bodies in motion by *mere velocity*. But LEIBNITZ adapted the *square of velocities* in this computation. [See further, on this subject, Ueberweg (page 142) referred to above.]

CONTENTS.

Chapter I.—Of the Power of Bodies, in General.

§ 1.—Every mechanical body possesses an *essential* power.

§ 2.—This power of bodies Leibnitz expressed by the common name, *effective power*.

§ 3.—It ought to be called *vis motrix* (moving power).

§ 4.—On the method of explaining motion from the effective powers in general.

§ 5.—Of the difficulties arising from the theory of reciprocal operation of body and mind, if we attribute to the former no other power than the *vis motrix*.

§ 6.—Of the obstacles thence arising in the explanation of the manner in which the mind affects the body; of the method of removing them, if we adopt a common *vis activa*.

§ 7.—There may exist things, the presence of which can not be at all demonstrated.

§ 8.—It is not improbable, in a strict metaphysical sense, that there may be more than *one* world.

§ 9.—If bodies, or substances, had no power to operate *externally*, there would be neither *extension* nor *space*.

§ 10.—The *triple* dimension of space is probably derived from the law, according to which the powers of substances affect each other.

§ 11.—Of the condition which renders the existence of a plurality of worlds probable.

§ 12.—Some metaphysicians maintain, that bodies, by means of their (peculiar) powers, incline toward motion in all directions.

§§ 13, 14.—Two objections against this opinion: (a) That the moving body does not advance in an equal ratio with the body moved; (b) That the effort toward motion, which substances manifest in all directions, must have a certain degree of intensity; for it can not be infinite, and a finite (limited) exertion, without a certain degree of effort, involves a contradiction.

§ 15.—Motion must be considered to be of *two* different kinds.

§ 16.—Motion of the *first* kind is analogous to dead (inert) pressure.

§§ 17, 18, 19.—Motion of the second kind presupposes a power, which corresponds with the square of velocity. [Dr. Ueberweg (p. 143) says that "a characteristic affirmation is made by Kant in § 19, that metaphysics, like many other sciences, had only reached the threshold of well-grounded knowledge."]

Chapter II.—Inquiry into the Principles upon which the Adherents of Leibnitz Explain the Living Powers.

§§ 20, 21.—Buelfinger's advice in settling differences between parties.

§ 22.—Leibnitz's and Descartes's method of computing powers.

§ 23.—*First* error of Leibnitz, in asserting "if a body is in actual motion, its power is equal to the square of its velocity."

§ 24.—Actual motion is that, which is not merely at the point of beginning, but during which a certain time has elapsed. This intermediate time, between the beginning of motion and the mo-

ment in which the body moves, properly constitutes what is called *actual motion*.

§ 25.—*Second* error of Leibnitz, “that the time consumed during motion is the true and only character of living power, and that from this alone the difference of computing dead and living powers must result.”

§ 26.—Further proof against Leibnitz, from the law of continuity.

§ 27.—The time elapsed during motion, consequently the reality of motion, is not the true criterion of computing the living power of bodies.

§§ 28, 29.—Mathematics can not prove the reality of living powers.

§ 30.—Leibnitz was first misled in the computation of living powers, by Descartes’s explanation of the lever.

§ 31.—Herrmann’s assertion, that the powers are in proportion to the heights, to which they may rise.

§ 32.—Refutation of this assertion.

§ 33.—The followers of Descartes commit the same error.

§§ 34, 35.—Lichtscheid’s doubts upon this head removed.

§§ 36, 37 38.—An instance which proves, that in the computation of power arising from weight, time must be necessarily taken into account.

§ 39.—Summary of all the proofs derived from the motion of elastic bodies.

§ 40.—The Leibnitzians refute their own conjectures, through the Systems of Mechanics which they establish.

§ 41.—Herrmann’s statement, respecting the repulsion of three elastic bodies, examined.

§§ 42, 43.—The origin of the fallacy in the reasoning, by which he established his conclusion.

§ 44.—This conclusion was unknown to Mad. de Chastelet.

§§ 45, 46, 47.—Jurin’s objection concerning the reciprocal pulsion of two elastic and unequal bodies;—Bernouilli’s answer to this objection, in comparing it with the pressure suffered by elastic bodies;—his ideas on the subject are refuted by his own premises, which confirm Kant’s opinion.

§ 48.—Defense of the living powers, supported by the constant balance of power in the world.

§§ 49, 50.—Two different ways of explaining this assertion.

§ 51.—The source of Leibnitz’s hypothesis relative to the preservation of a uniform power, with proposals for settling this controversy, and a conclusive answer to his assertion.

§ 52.—According to the law established by Leibnitz, the power exercised in the touch, between a small and a larger elastic body, is the same before as after this contact.

§ 53.—The fallacy of this observation itself refutes the theory of the living powers, as maintained by the Leibnitzians.

§ 54.—This appears still more obvious, by inverting the case; if, namely, a larger elastic body is brought into contact with a smaller one.

§ 55.—Calculation affords proofs of the Cartesian law, that “if a larger body touches a smaller one, there remains an equal proportion of power.”

§ 56.—The power, with which a smaller body recoils from a larger one, is called *minus*.

§ 57.—Mad. de Chastelet has very improperly ridiculed this determination, which M. de Mairan first proposed.

§ 58.—The Leibnitzians shrink from the inquiry into the living powers, by means of the pulsion observed in *inelastic* bodies.

§ 59.—The latter is more decisive in determining the living powers, than the resistance of elastic bodies.

§§ 60, 61.—The Leibnitzians give a frivolous answer to these objections, by saying, that “in the repulsion of unelastic bodies, one half of the power is consumed in the impression made upon the parts of these bodies.”

§ 62.—Reply *first*: because this is a mechanical, not a mathematical effect of bodies.

§ 63.—Reply *second*: because we have *right to call a body unelastic, though it be perfectly hard.

§ 64.—Reply *third*: the impression made upon the parts, offers no argument for asserting, that a part of the power of unelastic bodies is lost by the resistance exerted on their side.

§ 65.—Reply *fourth*: the degree of hardness in unelastic bodies, and the degree of power exerted in the contact, must yet be determined by the Leibnitzians.

§ 66.—The resistance of unelastic bodies entirely destroys the living powers.

§§ 67-70.—General proof, that the concussion of elastic bodies must, in every instance, evince the falsity of supposing living powers;—that in the percussion of elastic bodies, we ought to consider only the *incipient* velocity of the body *percussed*.

§§ 71-77.—Examination of the proofs of the living powers de-

* [There is a small blank space here in my copy of Dr. Willich's Elements; it is at the end of a line, and perhaps the word *a* or the word *no* has been broken off or dropped out in putting the form to press.]

rived from compound motion: particularly Buelfinger's, which is refuted in several ways.

§ 78.—The straight power in the diagonal line does not correspond with the amount of power exerted toward the lateral parts.

§ 79.—In the computation of power by Leibnitz, the amount of it, in an oblique direction, is equal to the diagonal power; but in that by Descartes, the former frequently is infinitely greater than the latter.

§§ 80–83.—A new case toward the refutation of living powers; viz.: “that a body moving in a circle produces the same effect, with respect to gravity, as if it reclined upon an oblique surface; and that a circular moving body, in every finite measure of *time*, produces the effect of a finite *power*, even against the obstacles of *gravity*.”

§ 84.—Descartes removes this difficulty by his method of computing power.

§ 85.—Another contradiction in this computation by the square; for every one agrees “that the computed power of velocity resulting from the multiplication with itself, according to the right angle, must have infinitely more force, than that which is simply expressed by the measure of velocity; and that it has the same relation to this, as the surface has to the line.”

§ 86.—The case stated by Bernouilli, concerning the *elastic* power of *four similar* springs, is here refuted.

§§ 87–90.—Mairan's objection against the statement of Herrmann; the utility of the method adopted by the former; its tendency to prevent certain palpable mistakes, which have long remained concealed.

§ 91.—Buelfinger's distinctions, by which he endeavors to elude the objection of Mairan, are settled by this method.

§§ 92, 93.—A singular compound case by Leibnitz, which rests upon fallacious reasoning. “As Bernouilli, Herrmann, and Wolf, the admirers of Leibnitz, have not in the usual manner informed us that *nothing* equals this proof in point of invention and (apparent) strength. I am inclined to think,” says Kant, “that so great a man as Leibnitz could not err without gaining reputation by the very idea that misled him into this error.” I can not, upon this occasion, forget the words of Hector in Virgil:

Si Pergama dextra

Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent.—*Virg. Aeneid.*

§§ 94, 95.—The power, which the body A has acquired by the arrangement of a machine, is *not* the effect of power produced by the body B.

§ 96.—The same is confirmed from the law of *continuity*.

§ 97.—The whole extent of the *sufficient reason* in the preceding position.

§ 98.—The only difficulty, that still prevails in the Leibnitzian argument, is answered.

§ 99.—Papin's evasive objection is weak and untenable, viz: "Quomodo autem per translationem totius potentiae corporis A in corpus B. juxta Cartesium, obtineri possit motus perpetuus evidentissime demonstrat, atque ita Cartesianos ad absurdum reductos arbitratur. Ego autem et motum perpetuum absurdum esse fateor, et Cl. Vir. demonstrationem ex supposita translatione esse legitimam." And after having, in this *positive* manner, declared himself against that important position of Descartes, he seeks for shelter, in disputing the premises of his adversary; and in challenging him, to solve this gordian knot. The following words discover his opinion: Sed Hypothesis ipsius possibilitatem translationis nimirum totius potentiae ex corpore A in corpus B pernega, etc. (Act. Erudit. 1691, page 9.)

§§ 100, 101.—Leibnitz's reply to Papin is equally inconsistent, and Kant believes that the former has written these words in good earnest: "Cum Florentiae essem, dedi amico aliam adhuc demonstrationem. pro possibilitate translationis virium dotalium, etc. corpore majore in minus quiescens, prorsus assinem iis ipsis, quo Cl. Papinus ingenuosissime pro me juvando excogitavit, pro quibus gratias debeo, imo et ago, sinceritate ejus dignas." Proof, that a quadruple body may communicate to a single body four degrees of velocity by means of percussion upon a lever; how Papin ought to have reasoned against Leibnitz; all the arguments for proving the entity of living powers against the computation of Descartes have failed; no hopes are left to reconcile them.

§ 102.—The principal arguments of the Leibnitzians refuted.

§§ 103, 104.—Wolf's argument, and his principal axiom: "if a body has passed through the same space, it has also produced the same *innocuous effect*."

§ 105.—Another axiom of the *Wolfian Schediasma*: "As spaces (objects of space), in the act of uniform motion, bear a compound relation to the velocities and times; so the *innocuous effects* correspond with the masses, times, and velocities of bodies." Upon this axiom, Wolf establishes the following erroneous theorem: Actiones quibus idem effectus producitur, sunt et celeritates.

§ 106.—We are not yet in the possession of a *System of Dynamics*.

§§ 107, 108.—The argument of Muschenbroek examined.

§ 109.—A new case for the confirmation of the Cartesian method of computing powers.

§ 110.—The doubts of Leibnitz solved by Jurin.

§§ 111, 112.—Mad. de Chastelet's frivolous objection against Jurin's argument exposed.

§ 113.—Richter's objections share the same fate.—The author concludes this chapter with some supplementary notes and illustrations, in which he unfolds the following particulars: (a) Why the undetermined idea of finite time, also includes the portion of time infinitely small? (b) Leibnitz's method of computing powers can not even be admitted under the condition of finite (limited) velocity. (c) Why time must necessarily enter into the computation of the obstacles occasioned by gravity.

Chapter III.—A View of a New Method of Computing the Living Powers; Being the Only True Measure of Natural Powers.

§ 114.—That law, which has been found inapplicable in *Mathematics*, may nevertheless apply to Natural Philosophy.

§ 115.—Distinction between *mathematical* and *natural* bodies, and between the laws relative to both.

§ 116.—Velocity affords no just idea of power.

§ 117.—There would be no power, if there were no effort to preserve the *status in se*; illustration of the idea of *intension*.

§ 118.—If intension be comparable with a *point*, power resembles a line, namely that of velocity.

§ 119.—If intension be finite, i. e. like a line, *power* is comparable with a *square*.

§ 120.—A body, that manifests an internal effort to preserve its motion free and constant, has a power analogous to the square of velocity.

§ 121.—A body can not acquire its living power from without.

§ 122.—There is an infinite number of intermediate degrees between dead and living power;—the latter can arise only in a finite time, after the beginning of motion.

§ 123.—That state, in which the power of bodies is not yet *living* (evolved), but is in a progressive crisis, Kant terms the *vivification*.

§§ 124, 125.—According to a new estimation of powers, a body that preserves its velocity, in free motion, *in infinitum* undiminished, possesses living power, i. e. such a power as can be estimated by the square of velocity.

§ 126.—As there are free motions, there are likewise living powers.—Mathematics admit no free motions.

§ 127.—An easier method of applying these reflections to advantage.

§ 128.—Bernouilli was not unacquainted with these ideas. "Vis viva," says he, "est aliquid reale et substantiale, quod per se subsistit, et quantum in se est, non dependit ab alio:—Vis mortua non est aliquid absolutum et per se durans," etc.

§ 129.—The living powers are of an accidental nature.

§§ 130, 131.—Experience confirms the successive *vivification*.

§§ 132, 133.—Vivification is not applicable to all velocities in general;—application of this rule to motion, in a resisting medium.

§§ 134, 135.—Whether vivification and free motion, in all the higher degrees of velocity, are possible *in infinitum*.

§§ 136–138.—The living power may in part vanish, without having produced any effect.

§§ 139, 140.—The phenomena of those bodies which overcome gravity, neither manifest any living power, nor do they militate against it.

§ 141.—Soft bodies do not operate with their collective power.

§§ 142, 143.—Query: whether the effect of bodies, without distinction, is proportional to the mass of their living power.

§§ 144, 145.—The mass, in which a body can produce effects proportional to its living power, must be determined; smaller masses, under a certain size, can not produce that effect.

§§ 146, 147.—Fluid bodies operate in proportion to the square of velocity.

§§ 148–151.—The motions of elastic bodies are inconsistent with the computation of Leibnitz, but they agree with that of Kant.

§§ 152, 153.—Mechanical proof of the living powers, by Muschenbroek.

§§ 154, 155.—A spring of equal elasticity communicates a greater degree of power to a larger body than to a smaller one.

§§ 156–158.—Whence the squares of velocities of cylinders are in an inverse ratio to the masses.

§§ 159–161.—In the effect of gravity, time ought to be computed;—soft substances are of a very different nature.

§ 162.—The force of resistance of soft matter takes place with finite velocity.

Appendix XV.—How to Study Kant.

I.—Every day, before beginning to study, read Job, xxxiv., 31, 32, on your knees, on every occasion. (See page 319 above.)

II.—Read Semple's translation of Kant's Ethics. If you read forty pages a day, it will take you a week; if you read ten pages a day, it will take from you a month. Pay no attention to any introduction or preface by any person. If you come to a paragraph

which you do not understand, waste no time in seeking for explanation; but note your difficulty upon the margin with your pencil, and go on.

III.—Read Meiklejohn's translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. If you read forty pages a day, it will occupy you about two weeks; if you read ten pages a day, it will require two months. Waste no time in seeking for explanation of any passage which you do not understand; but make a pencil note on the margin, and go on.

IV.—Read Semple's translation of Kant's Ethics. Be sure that you understand every word. In regard to every doubtful point, search diligently through the Ethics and the Critique for explanation. Search nowhere else. Whenever you are perplexed, you will probably remember that there is a paragraph somewhere, either in the Ethics or in the Critique, which you have seen, which will perhaps throw light on the difficulty. Find that paragraph, even if it takes a month, and make a full note of it on the margin. Then go on.

V.—Read Meiklejohn's translation of Kant's Critique. Be sure that you understand every word. In regard to every doubtful point, search diligently through the Critique and the Ethics, for passages which you remember seeing somewhere there, which you think will help you. Never give up. Never look elsewhere. Note every reference and every explanation on the margin.

If you follow this programme earnestly [Dharmapada 30, page 271 above], you will complete the second reading of the two books specified (which together will cost you about \$6) in about eighteen months.

VI.—Read Semple's translation of Kant's Ethics. (See § 983, page 320 above.)

Revelation.

XIX. 11.—And I saw heaven opened, and behold a white horse, and he who sat upon him, called Faithful and True; and in righteousness he judges, and makes war. 12. His eyes were as a flame of fire, and on his head were many crowns; and he had a name written, which no one knows but he himself. 13. And he was clothed with a garment dipped in blood; and his name is called, THE WORD OF GOD. 14. And the armies which are in heaven followed him upon white horses, clothed in fine linen, white, pure. 15. And out of his mouth goes a sharp sword, that with it he may smite the nations; and he will rule them with a rod of iron; and he treads the wine-press of the fierceness of the wrath of GOD THE ALMIGHTY.

APPENDIX XVI.

EXTRACTS FROM THE KORAN.†

CHAPTER I.—REVEALED AT MECCA.

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD.

[¶ 1.] 1 PRAISE be to GOD, 2 the LORD of all creatures ; 3 the most merciful, 4 the king of the day of judgment. 5 Thee do we worship, 6 and of thee do we beg assistance. 7 Direct us in the

† The text of the following extracts from the Koran is taken out of the English version of GEORGE SALE ("sixth edition, with a memoir of the translator, and with various readings and illustrative notes from Savary's version of the Koran. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1876"), which (it is stated on the title page) is "translated into English immediately from the original Arabic, with explanatory notes, taken from the most approved commentators," and "to which is prefixed a Preliminary Discourse," by the translator, of very great value. For convenience of reference, I have subdivided the extracts into paragraphs (marked ¶ and numbered consecutively) and clauses (designated by numerals which I have inserted uninclosed and unexplained in the text). I have retained Sale's numbering of the chapters. I have omitted the particular title of each chapter, except so much thereof as states the place where the chapter was revealed, whether at Medina or at Mecca (see the fifth paragraph of the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse). I have retained Sale's numbering of the thirty sections named *Ajza* (from the singular *Joz*) of which explanation is to be found in the ninth paragraph of the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse: in the seventh paragraph of the third section Sale gives a sufficient reason for not making a division of the chapters into those smaller portions which (Sale says in the sixth paragraph) "we customarily call verses; but the Arabic word is *Ayat*, the same with the Hebrew *Ototh*, and signifies signs, or wonders; such as are the secrets of GOD, his attributes, works, judgments, and ordinances, delivered in those verses;" etc. I have omitted certain letters of the alphabet with which certain chapters begin (see the twelfth paragraph of the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse). For detailed reference to my omissions from the text, see the notes. Omissions of entire notes are made by me in silence: omissions of parts of notes are indicated. References appended to the notes (which I find printed in the form of subsidiary notes, usually at the foot of the page) I have inclosed within marks of parenthesis (thus) and transposed them into the notes to which they pertain: I have not attempted to verify any of these references, except such of them as refer either to the Bible, or to the Koran, or to the Preliminary Discourse; of the rest the verification requires works which I do not possess, and also in many instances scholarship, which I do not possess. I have retained many of the various readings and some of the notes from Savary: for these I am wholly indebted to the edition published by Lippincott & Co.; I am too ignorant of French to be willing to undertake the task of verification, a task which would exact from me a sacrifice of time altogether disproportionate to the comparatively worthless result which I would attain. I have added some various read-

right way, 8 in the way of those to whom thou hast been gracious; 9 not of those against whom thou art incensed, 10 nor of those who go astray.

ings and notes selected by me from the English version of the Rev. J. M. Rodwell, M. A., (Williams and Norgate, London and Edinburgh, 1861, to the paging of which edition are references below).

[CHAPTER I.—*The title of the chapter.* I have omitted the title, except so much thereof as states the place where the chapter was revealed: see the fifth paragraph of the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse. In a note upon that portion of the title which I have omitted, after stating what it is in Arabic (giving what I suppose to be an English transliteration; I do not know Arabic, but I do not know how a transliteration can be of any service, and I have omitted it), Sale proceeds as follows:] This chapter is a prayer, and held in great veneration by the Mohammedans, who give it several other honorable titles; as the chapter of *prayer*, of *praise*, of *thanksgiving*, of *treasure*, etc. They esteem it as the quintessence of the whole Koran, and often repeat it in their devotions both public and private, as the Christians do the Lord's Prayer. (Vide Bobovium de Precib. Mohammed., page 3, et seq.)—Sale.

[*IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD.*—See the tenth paragraph of the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse. I find inserted (I do not know by whom: the Advertisement printed at page xvi. of the edition published by J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, from which I am taking these extracts, begins as follows: "The present Edition of Sale's Translation of the Koran will, it is hoped, be found to possess some advantages over every other. Many useful notes, and several hundred various readings, are added from the French version by Savary") among Sale's notes a note by Savary, of which the following is the first part:] "This formula is prefixed to all the chapters (with the exception of one [the ninth]). It is expressly recommended in the Koran. The Mohammedans pronounce it whenever they slaughter an animal, and at the commencement of their reading, and of all important actions."—Savary. [I find printed in Rodwell's preface (page xxvi.) Lieutenant Burton's version of this chapter. Rodwell subjoins to Burton's version a quotation from which I take the following words: "I have endeavored," he adds, "in this translation to imitate the imperfect rhyme of the original Arabic. Such an attempt, however, is full of difficulties." (See a few lines below.) Burton's version begins as follows:] "In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate!"—Burton. [Rodwell's own version is as follows:] "*In the Name of GOD, the Compassionate, the Merciful.*"—Rodwell (page 11).

[¶ 1.] [Clause 2.] The original words are *Rabbi 'alamina*, which literally signify, *LORD of the worlds*; but *alamina*, in this and other places of the Koran, properly means the three species of rational creatures, men, genii, and angels. Father Maracci has endeavored to prove from this passage that Mohammed believed a plurality of worlds, which he calls the error of the Manichees, etc. (In Prodomo ad Refut. Alcorani, part iv., p. 76, et in notis ad Alc. cap. 1): but this imputation the learned Reland has shown to be entirely groundless (De Religione Mohammed., p. 262).—Sale. Savary translates it "Sovereign of the worlds."

[Clauses 1–10 inclusive.] "Praise be to GOD, LORD ‡ of the worlds! The compassionate, the merciful! King on the day of reckoning! Thee *only* do we

CHAPTER II.—REVEALED PARTLY AT MECCA, AND PARTLY AT MEDINA.

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD.

[¶ 2.] 1 There is no doubt in this book; 2 *it is* a direction to the pious, 3 who believe in the mysteries of faith, 4 who observe the appointed times of prayer, 5 and distribute *alms* out of what worship, and to Thee do we cry for help. Guide Thou us on the straight path,† the path of those to whom Thou hast been gracious;—with whom Thou art not angry, and who go not astray.”—*Rodwell*. [† At the foot of the page, with reference to the word path, Rodwell prints the single word Islam.] [‡ Here and throughout the following pages of the *clavis*, I print the words GOD and LORD in capital letters, an improvement which I believe was suggested to me by the example of the common English version of the Bible at Deuteronomy, xxviii., 58 (see page 99 above). If I have done wrong, the fault must not be ascribed to Rodwell nor to Sale.]

[Clauses 5–10 inclusive.] “Thee *alone* do we worship, and of thee *alone* do we ask aid. Guide us to the path that is straight—The path of those to whom thy love is great, Not those on whom is hate, Nor they that deviate. Amen.”—*From Lieut. Burton's version of this chapter, which is printed in Rodwell's preface, page xxvi.* [See page 893 line 32, above.]

[Clauses 7–10 inclusive.] This last sentence contains a petition, that GOD would lead the supplicants into the true religion, by which is meant the Mohammedan, in the Koran often called *the right way*; in this place more particularly defined to be, *the way of those to whom GOD hath been gracious*, that is, of the prophets and faithful who preceded Mohammed; under which appellations are also comprehended the Jews and Christians, such as they were in the times of their primitive purity, before they had deviated from their respective institutions; *not the way of the modern Jews*, whose signal calamities are marks of the just anger of GOD against them for their obstinacy and disobedience; *nor of the Christians of this age*, who have departed from the true doctrine of Jesus, and are bewildered in a labyrinth of error. (Jallalo'ddin, al Beidawi, etc.)

This is the common exposition of the passage; though al Zamakhshari, and some others, by a different application of the negatives, refer the whole to the true believers; and then the sense will run thus: *The way of those to whom thou hast been gracious, against whom thou art not incensed, and who have not erred.* Which translation the original will very well bear.—*Sale*.

[CHAPTER II.—*The title of the chapter.* I have omitted the title of the chapter, except so much thereof as states the place where the chapter was revealed: see note † page 892 above.]

[¶ 2.] [Clause 1. I have omitted certain letters of the alphabet with which the second chapter begins: see the twelfth paragraph of the third section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse.]

[Clause 3—*Mysteries.*] The Arabic word is *ghaib*, which properly signifies a thing that is *absent*, at a great distance, or *invisible*, such as the resurrection, paradise, and hell. And this is agreeable to the language of scripture, which defines faith to be *the evidence of things not seen*. (Heb. xi, 1. See also Romans viii, 24, 25. II Cor. iv, 18 and v. 7.)—*Sale*.

we have bestowed on them, 6 and who believe in that *revelation*, 7 which hath been sent down unto thee 8 and that which hath been sent down *unto the prophets* before thee, 9 and have firm assurance of the life to come: 10 these are directed by their LORD, 11 and they shall prosper.

[¶ 3.] 1 As for the unbelievers, 2 it will be equal to them whether thou admonish them, 3 or do not admonish them; 4 they will not believe. 5 GOD hath sealed up their hearts and their hearing; 6 a dimness covereth their sight, 7 and they shall suffer a grievous punishment. 8 There are some who say, 9 We believe in GOD, 10 and the last day; 11 but are not *really* believers: 12 they seek to deceive GOD, 13 and those who do believe, 14 but they deceive themselves only, 15 and are not sensible thereof. 16 There is an infirmity in their hearts, 17 and GOD hath increased that infirmity; 18 and they shall suffer a most painful punishment, 19 because they have disbelieved. 20 GOD shall mock at them, 21 and continue them in their impiety; 22 they shall wander in con-

[¶ 2.] [Clauses 2–11, inclusive.] “It is a guidance to the God-fearing, who believe in the unseen, who observe prayer, and out of what we have bestowed on them, expend *for God*; and who believe in what hath been sent down to thee, and in what hath been sent down before thee, and full faith have they in the life to come: these are guided by their LORD; and with these it shall be well.”—*Rodwell* (page 429).

[Clause 8.] The Mohammedans believe that GOD gave written revelations not only to Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, but to several other prophets; (vide Reland. de Relig. Moham. p. 34, et Dissert. de Samaritanis, p. 34, etc.); though they acknowledge none of those which preceded the Koran to be now extant, except the Pentateuch of Moses, the Psalms of David, and the Gospel of Jesus; which yet they say were even before Mohammed’s time altered and corrupted by the Jews and Christians; and therefore will not allow our present copies to be genuine.—*Sale*.

[Clause 9.—*The life to come*.] The original word *al-akherat* properly signifies *the latter part* of any thing, and by way of excellence, *the next life*, *the latter* or *future state* after death; and is opposed to *al-dunya*, *this world*; and *al-oula*, *the former* or *present life*. The Hebrew word *ahharith*, from the same root, is used by Moses in this sense, and is translated *latter end*. (Numbers xxiv. 20. Deuteronomy viii, 16.)—*Sale*.

[¶ 3.] [Clause 5, 6.] “Their hearts and their ears hath GOD sealed up; and over their eyes is a covering.”—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 12–15 inclusive.] “Fain would they deceive GOD and those who have believed; but they deceive themselves only, and know it not.”—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 16, 17.] “Diseased are their hearts! And that disease hath GOD increased to them.”—*Rodwell* (page 430).

[Clauses 19, 20.] I have omitted ninety-two words of Sale’s text between clause 19 and clause 20.

[Clauses 20–22 inclusive.] “GOD shall mock at them, and keep them long in their rebellion, wandering in perplexity.”—*Rodwell* (page 430.)

fusion. 23 These are *the men* who have purchased error at the price of *true* direction : 24 but their traffic hath not been gainful, 25 neither have they been *rightly* directed. 26 They are like unto one who kindleth a fire, 27 and when it hath enlightened all around him, 28 GOD taketh away their light 29 and leaveth them in darkness, 30 they shall not see ; 31 *they are* deaf, 32 dumb, 33 and blind, 34 therefore will they not repent. 35 Or like a stormy cloud from heaven, 36 fraught with darkness, 37 thunder, 38 and lightning, 39 they put their fingers in their ears 40 because of the noise of the thunder, 41 for fear of death ; 42 GOD encompasseth the infidels : 43 the lightning wanteth but little of taking away their sight ; 44 so often as it enlighteneth them, 45 they walk therein, 46 but when darkness cometh on them, 47 they stand still ; 48 and if GOD so pleased, 49 he would certainly deprive them of their hearing and their sight, 50 for GOD is almighty.

[¶ 4.] 1 O men of Mecca, 2 serve your LORD who hath created you, 3 and those who have been before you : 4 peradventure ye will fear *him* ; 5 who hath spread the earth as a bed for you, 6 and the heaven as a covering, 7 and hath caused water to descend from heaven, 8 and thereby produced fruits for your sustenance. 9 Set not

[Clause 26.] In this passage, Mohammed compares those who believed not on him, to a man who wants to kindle a fire, but as soon as it burns up, and the flames give a light, shuts his eyes lest he should see. As if he had said : You, O Arabians, have long desired a prophet of your own nation, and now I am sent unto you, and have plainly proved my mission by the excellence of my doctrine and revelation, you resist conviction, and refuse to believe in me ; therefore shall GOD leave you in your ignorance.—*Sale*.

[Clause 27.] The sense seems to be here imperfect, and may be completed by adding the words *he turns from it, shuts his eyes*, or the like.—*Sale*

[Clauses 35–38.] Here he compares the unbelieving Arabs to people caught in a violent storm. To perceive the beauty of this comparison, it must be observed, that the Mohammedan doctors say, this tempest is a type or image of the Koran itself: the thunder signifying the threats therein contained ; the lightning, the promises ; and the darkness, the mysteries. The terror of the threats makes them stop their ears, unwilling to hear truths so disagreeable ; when the promises are read to them, they attend with pleasure ; but when any thing mysterious or difficult of belief occurs, they stand stock still, and will not submit to be directed.—*Sale*.

[Clauses 35–42 inclusive.] “Or like *those who, when there cometh a storm-cloud out of the Heaven, big with darkness thunder and lightning, thrust their fingers into their ears because of the thunder-clap, for fear of death !* GOD is round about the infidels.”—*Rodwell*.

[¶ 4.] [Clause 1. In the Chandos classics edition (Frederick Warne and Co., London), the word *Mecca* is printed in italics, and also in Rodwell's edition.]

[Clauses 1, 2.] “O men of Mecca adore your LORD, who hath created you.” *Rodwell* (page 431).

up therefore any equals unto GOD, 10 against your own knowledge.

[¶ 5.] 1 But bear good tidings 2 unto those who believe 3 **and do good works.**

[¶ 6.] 1 How *is it that* ye believe not in GOD? 2 Since ye were dead, 3 and he gave you life; 4 he will hereafter cause you to die, 5 and will again restore you to life; 6 then shall ye return unto him. 7 It is he who hath created for you whatsoever is on earth; 8 he knoweth all things.

[¶ 7.] 1 O children of Israel, 2 remember my favor wherewith I have favored you; 3 and perform *your* covenant with me, 4 and I will perform *my* covenant with you; 5 and revere me: 6 and believe in the *revelation* which I have sent down, 7 confirming that which is with you, 8 and be not the first who believe not therein, 9 neither exchange my signs for a small price; 10 and fear me. 11 Clothe not the truth with vanity, 12 neither conceal the truth against your own knowledge; 13 observe the stated times of prayer, 14 and pay your legal alms, 15 and bow down yourselves with those who bow down. 16 Will ye command men to **do justice**, 17 and forget your own souls? 18 yet ye read the book of the law: 19 do ye not therefore understand? 20 Ask help with perseverance and prayer; 21 this indeed is grievous, unless to the humble, 22 who *seriously* think they shall meet their LORD, 23 and that to

[¶ 4.] [Clause 10. I have omitted sixty-one words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 10.]

[¶ 5.] [Clauses 2, 3.] "To those who believe and do the things that are right."—*Rodwell* (page 431.) [Clause 3. I have omitted one hundred and fifty-nine words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 3.]

[¶ 6.] [Clause 3.] *i. e.* Ye were dead while in the loins of your fathers, and he gave you life in your mothers' wombs; and after death ye shall be again raised at the resurrection. (Jallalo'ddin.)—*Sale*. [See ¶ 39.]

[Clauses 7, 8. I have omitted sixteen words of Sale's text between clause 7 and clause 8.] [Clause 8. I have omitted three hundred and forty-six words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 8.]

[¶ 7.] [Clause 9.] "Corrupt not my doctrine for vile gain. Fear me."—*Savary*.

[Clauses 1-19.] "O children of Israel! remember my favor wherewith I shewed favor upon you, and be true to your covenant with me; I will be true to my covenant with you; me therefore, revere me! and believe in what I have sent down confirming your Scriptures, and be not the first to disbelieve it, neither for a mean price barter my signs: me therefore, fear ye me! And clothe not the truth with falsehood, and hide not the truth when ye know it: and observe prayer, and pay the legal impost, and bow down with those who bow. Will ye enjoin what is right upon others, and forget yourselves? Yet ye read the Book: will ye not understand?"—*Rodwell* (page 434).

[Clauses 20-22.] "And seek help with patience and prayer: a hard duty indeed is this, but not to the humble, who bear in mind that they shall meet their LORD,"—*Rodwell*.

him they shall return. 24 O children of Israel, 25 remember my favor wherewith I have favored you, 26 and that I have preferred you above all nations: 27 dread the day *wherein one* soul shall not make satisfaction for *another* soul, 28 neither shall any intercession be accepted from them, 29 nor shall any compensation be received, 30 neither shall they be helped.

[¶ 8.] 1 Surely those who believe, 2 and those who Judaize, 3 and Christians, 4 and Sabians, 5 whoever believeth in GOD, 6 and the last day, 7 **and doth that which is right**, 8 they shall have their reward with their LORD; 9 *there shall come* no fear on them, 10 neither shall they be grieved.

[Clauses 28–30.] “Nor shall any intercession be accepted from them, nor shall any ransom be taken, neither shall they be helped.”—*Rodwell* (page 435.)

[Clause 30. I have omitted four hundred and ninety words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 30.]

[¶ 8.] [Clause 4. Sale's note is appended to clause 4, but I suppose that it refers to the entire paragraph, except perhaps the eighth clause, which does not appear near the end of ¶ 83.] From these words, which are repeated in the fifth chapter, [at the end of ¶ 83], several writers (Selden. de Jure. Nat. et Gentium sec. Hebr. 1. 6, c. 12. Angel. a. S. Joseph. Gazophylac. Persic. p. 365. Nic. Cusanus in Cribratione Alcorani, 1. 3, c. 2, etc.,) have wrongly concluded that the Mohammedans hold it to be the doctrine of their prophet that every man may be saved in his own religion, provided he be sincere and lead a good life. It is true, some of their doctors do agree this to be the purport of the words; (see Chardin's Voyages, vol. ii, p. 326, 331); but then they say the latitude hereby granted was soon revoked, for that this passage is abrogated by several others in the Koran, which expressly declare that none can be saved who is not of the Mohammedan faith; and particularly by those words of the third chapter, *Whoever followeth any other religion than Islam* (i. e. the Mohammedan), *it shall not be accepted of him, and at the last day he shall be of those who perish.* (Abu'lkasem Hebatallah de Abrogante et Abrogato.) However, others are of opinion that this passage is not abrogated, but interpret it differently; taking the meaning of it to be, that no man, whether he be a Jew, a Christian, or a Sabian, shall be excluded from salvation, provided he quit his erroneous religion and become a Moslem, which they say is intended by the following words, *Whoever believeth in GOD and the last day, and doth that which is right.* [I omit the remainder of Sale's note.] (Vide Reland. de Rel. Moham. p. 128, etc.)—*Sale*.

“Verily, they who believe (Muslims), and they who follow the Jewish religion, and the Christians, and the Sabeites †—whoever of these believeth in GOD and the last day, and doeth that which is right, shall have their reward with their LORD: fear shall not come upon them, neither shall they be grieved.”—*Rodwell* (pages 436, 437). († The Sabeites are identical with the Mendaïtes, or so-called Christians of S. John, residing in the marshy district at the mouth of the Euphrates, but are not the same with the star-worshipping Sabians of Harran in Mesopotamia. See D'Herbelot, Bibl. Or., under the word *Sabi*; Assemani, Bibl. Or. iii. 2, 609. For curious details as to the elements of the Sabeite religion, see Chwolson's SSabier und SSabaismus I.—*Rodwell's note*.) [See Sale's Preliminary Discourse, section i., at about the eleventh page.]

[¶ 9.] 1 They say, 2 The fire of *hell* shall not touch us but for a *certain* number of days. 3 Answer, 4 Have ye received any promise from GOD to that purpose? 5 for GOD will not act contrary to his promise: 6 or do ye speak concerning GOD that which ye know not? 7 Verily whoso doth evil, 8 and is encompassed by his iniquity, 9 they *shall be* the companions of *hell* fire, 10 they shall remain therein forever: 11 but they who believe 12 **and do good works**, 13 they shall be the companions of paradise, 14 they shall continue therein for ever.

[¶ 10.] 1 *Remember* also, 2 when we accepted the covenant of the children of Israel, 3 *saying*, 4 Ye shall not worship *any other* except GOD, 5 and *ye shall show* kindness to *your* parents 6 and kindred, 7 and to orphans, 8 and to the poor, 9 and speak that which is good unto men, 10 and be constant at prayer, 11 and give alms. 12 Afterward ye turned back, 13 except a few of you, 14 and retired afar off. 15 And when we accepted your covenant, 16 *saying*, 17 Ye shall not shed your *brother's* blood, 18 nor dispossess one another of your habitations; 19 then ye confirmed *it*, 20 and were

[¶ 8.] [Clause 10. I have omitted six hundred and seven words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 10.]

[¶ 9.] [Clause 2.] That is, says Jallalo'ddin, forty; being the number of days that their forefathers worshiped the golden calf; after which they gave out that their punishment should cease. It is a received opinion among the Jews at present, that no person, be he ever so wicked, or of whatever sect, shall remain in hell above eleven months, or at most a year; except Dathan and Abiram, and atheists, who will be tormented there to all eternity. (Vide Bartolocci Biblioth. Rabbinic. tom. 2, p. 128, et tom. 3, p. 421.)—Sale.

[Clause 6.] "or, Speak ye of GOD that which ye know not?"—Rodwell. [Rodwell seems to indicate by his capital S a division (of the words directed to be spoken) into two alternative parts or answers.] (Rodwell's page 439.)

[Clause 7.] By *evil* in this case † the commentators generally understand polytheism or idolatry; which sin, the Mohammedans believe, unless repented of in this life, is unpardonable, and will be punished by eternal damnation; but all other sins they hold will at length be forgiven. This therefore is that irremissible impiety, in their opinion, which in the New Testament is called *the sin against the Holy Ghost*.—Sale. [† The Chandos classics edition reads 'place.']

[Clauses 7–14.] "But they whose only gains are evil works, and who are environed by their sins,—they shall be inmates of the fire, therein to abide for ever: But they who have believed and done the things that be right, they shall be the inmates of Paradise,—therein to abide for ever."—Rodwell (page 439.)

[¶ 10.] [Clauses 4–11.] "Worship none but GOD, and be good to your parents and kindred, and to orphans, and to the poor, and speak with men what is right, and observe prayer, and pay the stated alms."—Rodwell.

[Clauses 15–18. In the Chandos classics edition, clause 19 is the beginning of a new sentence: the effect of such punctuation (and I presume that it is correct) appears to me to be to refer clauses 15–18 back to clause 1.]

witnesses *thereto*. 21 Afterward ye were they who slew one another, 22 and turned several of your *brethren* out of their houses, 23 mutually assisting each other against them with injustice and enmity; 24 but if they come captives unto you, 25 ye redeem them: 26 yet it is *equally* unlawful for you to dispossess them. 27 Do ye therefore believe in part of the book of the law, 28 and reject other part thereof? 29 But whoso among you doth this, 30 shall have no other reward than shame in this life, 31 and on the day of resurrection they shall be sent to a most grievous punishment; 32 for GOD is not regardless of **that which ye do**. 33 These are they who have purchased this present life, 34 at the price of that which is to come; 35 wherefore their punishment shall not be mitigated, 36 neither shall they be helped.

[¶ 11.] 1 Dost thou not know that GOD is almighty? 2 Dost thou not know that unto GOD belongeth the kingdom of heaven and earth? 3 neither have ye any protector or helper except GOD. 4 Many of those unto whom the scriptures have been given, 5 desire to render you again unbelievers, 6 after ye have believed; 7 out of envy from their souls, 8 even after the truth is become manifest unto them; 9 but forgive *them*, 10 and avoid *them*, 11 till GOD shall send his command; 12 for GOD is omnipotent. 13 Be constant in prayer, 14 and give alms; 15 and what good ye have sent before for your souls, 16 ye shall find it with GOD; 17 surely 18 GOD seeth **that which ye do**.

[Clause 21.] This passage was revealed on occasion of some quarrels which arose between the Jews of the tribes of Koreidha, and those of al Aws, al Nadhir, and al Khazraj, and came to that height that they took arms and destroyed one another's habitations, and turned one another out of their houses; but when any were taken captive, they redeemed them. When they were asked the reason of their acting in this manner, they answered, That they were commanded by their law to redeem the captives, but that they fought out of shame, lest their chiefs should be despised. (Jallalo'ddin).—Sale.

[Clauses 27, 28.] "Believe ye then part of the Book, and deny part?"—Rodwell (page 440).

[Clause 36. I have omitted eight hundred and thirty-seven words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 36.]

[¶ 11.] [Clauses 3, 4. I have omitted thirty words of Sale's text between clause 3 and clause 4.]

[Clauses 7, 8.] "out of selfish envy, even after the truth hath been clearly shown them."—Rodwell (page 444).

[Clauses 9–12 inclusive.] "But forgive them, and shun them till GOD shall come in with his working. Truly GOD hath power over all things."—Rodwell.

[Clauses 13–18 inclusive.] "And observe prayer, and pay the legal impost:† and whatever good thing ye have sent on before for your soul's sake, ye shall find it with GOD. Verily GOD seeth what ye do."—Rodwell. († In all Muhammadan countries the first time of prayer is the *moghreb* or sunset, or rather,

[¶ 12.] 1 They say, 2 Verily none shall enter paradise, 3 except they who are Jews or Christians: 4 this is their wish. 5 Say, 6 Produce your proof of this, 7 if ye speak truth. 8 Nay, 9 but he who resigneth himself to GOD, 10 **and doth that which is right,** 11 he shall have his reward with his LORD: 12 there shall *come* no fear on them, 13 neither shall they be grieved. 14 The Jews say, 15 The Christians are *grounded* on nothing; 16 and the Christians say, 17 The Jews are *grounded* on nothing: 18 yet they *both* read the scriptures. 19 So likewise say they who know not *the scripture*, 20 according to their saying. † 21 But GOD shall judge between them 22 on the day of the resurrection, 23 concerning that about which they *now* disagree.

[¶ 13.] 1 Who is more unjust than he who prohibiteth the temples of GOD, 2 that his name should be remembered therein, 3 and who hasteth to destroy them? 4 Those men can not enter therein, 5 but with fear: 6 they shall have shame in this world, 7 and in the next a grievous punishment. 8 To GOD *belongeth* the

four minutes later; the second the *eshe*, when it has become quite dark; the third the *soobh* or *fegr*, the daybreak; the fourth, *doohr*, or a little after noon, when the sun has begun to decline; the fifth, the *asr*, midway between noon and nightfall. The obligatory legal alms or impost are called, as here, *zekah* (lit. purity), the voluntary, *sudackah*. It is, however, left to the conscience of individuals to give and to apply them as they think fit.—*Rodwell's note*.) [See a more particular explanation in Sale's Preliminary Discourse, section iv.]

[¶ 12.] [Clause 3.] This passage was revealed on occasion of a dispute which Mohammed had with the Jews of Medina, and the Christians of Najran, each of them asserting that those of their religion only should be saved. (Jallal'n)—*Sale*.

[Clause 9.] Literally, *resigneth his face*, etc.—*Sale*.

[Clauses 8–11.] “But they who set their face with resignation Godward, and do what is right,—their reward is with their LORD.”—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 15.] The Jews and Christians are here accused of denying the truth of each other's religion, notwithstanding they read the scriptures. Whereas the Pentateuch bears testimony to Jesus, and the gospel bears testimony to Moses. (Jallalo'ddin.)—*Sale*.

‡ [Clauses 19, 20.] “So with like words say they who have no knowledge.”†—*Rodwell*. († The idolatrous Arabs.—*Rodwell's note*.)

[¶ 13.] [Clause 1.] Or hindereth men from paying their adorations to GOD in those sacred places. This passage, says Jallalo'ddin, was revealed on news being brought that the Romans had spoiled the temple of Jerusalem; or else when the idolatrous Arabs obstructed Mohammed's visiting the temple of Mecca, in the expedition of al Hodeibiya, which happened in the sixth year of the Hejra. (Vide Abu'lfedæ Vit. Moham. p. 84, etc.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 1–3.] “And who committeth a greater wrong than he who hindereth GOD's name from being remembered in his temples, and who hasteth to ruin them?”—*Rodwell* (page 445.)

[Clauses 8–11.] “The east and the west is GOD'S: therefore, whichever way ye turn, there is the face of GOD.”—*Rodwell*.

east and the west ; 9 therefore, 10 whithersoever ye turn yourselves to pray, 11 there is the face of GOD ; 12 for GOD is omnipresent and omniscient.

[¶ 14.] 1 They say, GOD hath begotten children : 2 GOD forbid ! 3 To him *belongeth* whatever is in heaven, 4 and on earth ; 5 all is possessed by him, 6 the Creator of heaven and earth ; 7 and when he decreeth a thing, 8 he only saith unto it, 9 Be, 10 and it is. 11 And they who know not *the scriptures* say, 12 Unless GOD speak unto us, 13 or thou show us a sign, 14 *we will not believe*. 15 So said those before them, 16 according to their saying : 17 their hearts resemble each other. 18 We have already shown manifest signs unto people who firmly believe : 19 we have sent thee in truth, 20 a bearer of good tidings, 21 and a preacher ; 22 and thou shalt not be questioned concerning the companions of hell. 23 But the Jews will not be pleased with thee, 24 neither the Christians, 25 until thou follow their religion : 26 say, 27 The direction of GOD is the *true* direction. 28 And verily if thou follow their desires, 29 after the knowledge which hath been given thee, 30 thou shalt find no patron or protector against GOD. 31 They to whom we have given the book of *the Koran*, 32 and who read it with its true reading, 33 they believe therein ; 34 and whoever believeth not therein, 35 they shall perish. 36 O children of Israel, 37 remember my favor wherewith I have favored you, 38 and that I have preferred you before all nations ; 39 and dread the day wherein *one* soul shall not make satisfaction for *another* soul, 40 neither shall any compensation be accepted from them, 41 nor shall any intercession avail, 42 neither shall they be helped.

[¶ 14.] [Clause 1.] This is spoken not only of the Christians, and of the Jews (for they are accused of holding Ozair, or Ezra, to be the son of GOD), but also the pagan Arabs, who imagined the angels to be the daughters of GOD.—*Sale*.

[Clause 2.] "No! Praise be to Him!"—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 5, 6.] "All obeyeth Him, sole maker of the heavens and of the earth!"—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 15–22 inclusive.] "So, with like words, said those who were before them : their hearts are alike : clear signs have we already shown for those who have firm faith : verily, with the Truth have we sent thee, a bearer of good tidings and a warner : and of the people of hell thou shalt not be questioned."—*Rodwell*. [Clause 30.] "thou shalt find neither helper nor protector against GOD."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 31–35] "They to whom we have given the Book, and who read it as it ought to be read,—these believe therein : but whoso believeth not therein, shall meet with perdition."—*Rodwell* (page 446).

[Clause 40.] "nor shall any ransom be taken from it,"—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 42. I have omitted four hundred and thirty-seven words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 42.]

[¶15.] 1 They say, Become Jews or Christians that ye may be directed. 2 Say, 3 Nay, 4 *we follow* the religion of Abraham the orthodox, 5 who was no idolator. 6 Say, 7 We believe in GOD, 8 and that which hath been sent down unto us, 9 and that which hath been sent down unto Abraham, 10 and Ismael, 11 and Isaac, 12 and Jacob, 13 and the tribes, 14 and that which was delivered unto Moses, 15 and Jesus, 16 and that which was delivered unto the prophets from their LORD: 17 we make no distinction between any of them, 18 and to GOD are we resigned. 19 Now if they believe according to what ye believe, 20 they are surely directed, 21 but if they turn back, 22 they are in schism. 23 GOD shall support thee against them, 24 for he is in the hearer, the wise. 25 The baptism of GOD *have we received*, 26 and who is better than GOD to baptize? 27 him do we worship. 28 Say,

[¶ 15.] [Clause 4.] “the religion of Abraham, the sound in faith,” †—*Rodwell*. [† In a note at this point (page 448) Rodwell refers to his note at page 252 (see ch. xvi., ¶ 174 below), where the same expression, “sound in faith,” occurs.] († *Ar. a Hanyf*. According to a tradition in Waquidi, fol. 255, Zaid (who died only five years before Muhammad received his first inspiration, and undoubtedly prepared the way for many of his subsequent announcements) adopted this term at the instance of a Christian and a Jew. who exhorted him to become a *Hanyf*. Zaid having at that time renounced idolatry, and being unable to receive either Judaism or Christianity, “What,” said he, “is a Hanyf?” They both told him, it was the religion of Abraham, who worshiped nothing but GOD. On this Zaid exclaimed, “O GOD, I bear witness that I follow the religion of Abraham.” The root, whence *Hanyf* is derived, means generally to turn from good to bad, or vice versa, and is equivalent to the verbs *convert* and *pervert*.—*Rodwell's note* (page 252). [In a note on a passage which I have omitted (after the end of ¶ 64), in ch. iv, Sale expounds his text as follows: “That is, if GOD had not sent his apostle with the Koran to instruct you in your duty, ye had continued in idolatry and been doomed to destruction; except only those who, by GOD's favor and their superior understanding, should have true notions of the divinity; such, for example, as Zeid Ebn Amru Ebn Nofail, and Waraka Ebn Nawfal, who left idols, and acknowledged but one GOD, before the mission of Mohammed.” On Zeid, Sale says, “vide Millium, de Mohammedismo ante Moh. p. 311;” and on Waraka, “see the Prelim. Disc., sect. ii;” and at the end of the note Sale refers to al Beidawi.]

[¶ 15.] [Clause 18.] “and to GOD are we resigned (Muslims).”—*Rodwell*. [In a note on a passage (“LORD, make us also resigned unto thee,”) which I have omitted (after the end of ¶ 14), Sale says, “The Arabic word is Moslemuna, in the singular Moslem, which the Mohammedans take as a title peculiar to themselves. The Europeans generally write and pronounce it Musulman.”]

[Clauses 21, 22.] “but if they turn back, then do they cut themselves off from you.”—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 24. “for he is the hearer, the wise.”—*Chandos classics edition, London*.] “for He is the Hearer, the Knower.”—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 25.] By baptism, is to be understood the religion which GOD insti-

29 Will ye dispute with us concerning GOD, 30 who is our LORD, 31 and your LORD? 32 we have our works, 33 and ye have your works, 34 and unto him are we sincerely devoted. 35 Will ye say, 36 Truly Abraham, 37 and Ismael, 38 and Isaac, 39 and Jacob, 40 and the tribes 41 were Jews or Christians? 42 Say, 43 Are ye wiser, 44 or God? 45 And who is more unjust than he who hideth the testimony which he hath *received* from GOD? 46 But GOD is not regardless of **that which ye do**. 47 That people are passed away, 48 they have what they have gained, 49 and ye shall have what ye gain, 50 nor shall ye be questioned concerning that which they have done.

[JOZ II.] [¶ 16.] 1 The foolish men will say, 2 What hath turned them from their Keblah, 3 toward which they formerly *prayed*? 4 Say 5 Unto GOD *belongeth* the east and the west: 6 he directeth whom he pleaseth into the right way. 7 Thus have we placed you, 8 *O Arabians*, 9 an intermediate † nation, 10 that ye may be witnesses against *the rest of* mankind, 11 and that the apostle

tuted in the beginning; because the signs of it appear in the person who professes it, as the signs of water appear in the clothes of him that is baptized. (Jallalo'ddin.)—Sale.

"Islam is the Baptism of GOD."—Rodwell. (The original simply has *Baptism of GOD*.—*Beginning of Rodwell's note*.)

[Clause 29.] These words were revealed because the Jews insisted that they first received the scriptures, that their Keblah was more ancient, and that no prophets could arise among the Arabs; and therefore if Mohammed was a prophet, he must have been of their nation. (Jallalo'ddin.)—Sale.

[Clauses 29–31. "Will ye dispute with us about GOD? when He is our LORD and your LORD!"—Rodwell.

[Clauses 42–44.] "Say: Who knoweth best, ye, or God?"—Rodwell.

[Clause 48.] Or deserved. The Mohammedan notion, as to the imputation of moral actions to man, which they call *gain*, or *acquisition*, is sufficiently explained in the Preliminary Discourse.—Sale's note on a similar passage [which passage I have omitted before the beginning of ¶ 15].

[Clause 48.] "They have the reward of their deeds."—Rodwell (page 449).

[¶ 16.] [Clause 3.] At first, Mohammed and his followers observed no particular rite in turning their faces toward any certain place, or quarter of the world, when they prayed; it being declared to be perfectly indifferent. (See before, page [902 above, ¶ 13].) Afterward, when the prophet fled to Medina, he directed them to turn toward the temple of Jerusalem (probably to ingratiate himself with the Jews), which continued to be their Keblah for six or seven months; but either finding the Jews too intractable, or despairing otherwise to gain the pagan Arabs, who could not forget their respect to the temple of Mecca, he ordered that prayers for the future should be toward the east. This change was made in the second year of the Hejra (vide Abulf. Vit. Moham. p. 54), and occasioned many to fall from him, taking offense at his inconstancy. (Jallalo'ddin.)—Sale.

[Clause 9.] This seems to be the sense of the words; though the commenta-

may be a witness against you. 12 We appointed the Keblah toward which thou didst formerly *pray*, 13 only that we might know him who followeth the apostle, 14 from him who turneth back on the heels; 15 though this *change* seem a great matter, 16 unless unto those whom GOD hath directed. 17 But GOD will not render your faith of none effect; 18 for GOD is gracious and merciful unto man. 19 We have seen thee turn about thy face toward heaven *with uncertainty*, 20 but we will cause thee to turn thyself toward a Keblah that will please thee. 21 Turn, 22 therefore, 23 thy face toward the holy temple of *Mecca*; 24 and wherever ye be, 25 turn your faces toward that *place*. 26 Neither is GOD regardless of that which ye do. 27 From what place soever thou comest forth, 28 turn thy face toward the holy temple; 29 and wherever ye be, 30 thitherward turn your faces, 31 lest men have matter of dispute against you; 32 but as for those among them who are unjust doers, 33 fear them not, 34 but fear me, 35 that I may accomplish my grace upon you, 36 and that ye may be directed. 37 As we have sent unto you an apostle from among you, 38 to rehearse our signs unto you, 39 and to purify you, 40 and to teach you the book of the *Koran* 41 and wisdom, 42 and to teach you that which ye knew not: 43 therefore remember me, 44 and I will remember you, 45 and give thanks unto me, 46 and be not unbelievers.

[¶17.] 1 O *true* believers, 2 beg assistance with patience and prayer, 3 for GOD is with the patient. 4 And say not of those who tors (Jallalo'ddin, Yahya, etc.) will have the meaning to be, that the Arabians are here declared to be a most *just* and *good* nation.—*Sale*.

[¶i. e. in the right way, in the path of the mean. See the Confucian Doctrine of the Mean, ch. xiii. (page 110 above); and Arist. Nic. Eth. II. vi, 6 (page 429 above).] [Clauses 7-9 inclusive.] "Thus have we made you a central people,"† —*Rodwell*. (†Or, *intermediate*, i. e., according to the commentators, not addicted to excess, just.—*First part of Rodwell's note*, page 449.)

[Clause 10.] We have established you, O chosen people, to bear witness against the rest of the nation, as your apostle will bear it against you.—*Sacary*.

[Clause 14. *On the heels*: on his heels.—*Chandos classics edition*.]

[Clauses 15, 16.] "The change is a difficulty, but not to those whom GOD hath guided."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 17.] Or will not suffer it to go without its reward, while ye prayed toward Jerusalem.—*Sale*.

[Clauses 25, 26. I have omitted one hundred and ninety-one words of *Sale's* text between clause 25 and clause 26.]

[Clause 37.] That is, of your own nation.—*Sale*.

"And wesent to you an apostle from among yourselves."—*Rodwell* (page 450).

[Clause 46.] "and be not ungrateful."—*Rodwell*.

[¶17.] Clauses 1-3 inclusive.] "O ye who believe! seek help with patience and with prayer, for GOD is with the patient."—*Rodwell*.

are slain in fight for the religion of GOD, 5 that *they are* dead; 6 yea, 7 *they are* living: 8 but ye do not understand. 9 We will surely prove you 10 *by afflicting you* in some measure with fear, 11 and hunger, 12 and decrease of wealth, 13 and *loss* of lives, 14 and *scarcity* of fruits: 15 but bear good tidings unto the patient, 16 who, 17 when a misfortune befalleth them, 18 say, 19 We are GOD's, 20 and unto him shall we surely return. 21 Upon them shall be blessings from their LORD 22 and mercy, 23 and they are the rightly directed.

[¶18.] 1 For I am easy to be reconciled 2 and merciful. 3 Surely 4 they who believe not, 5 and die in their unbelief, 6 upon them shall be the curse of GOD, 7 and of the angels, 8 and of all men; 9 they shall remain under it for ever, 10 their punishment shall not be alleviated, 11 neither shall they be regarded. 12 Your GOD is one GOD; 13 there is no GOD but He, 14 the most merciful. 15 Now 16 in the creation of heaven and earth, 17 and the vicissitude of night and day, 18 and in the ship which saileth in the sea, 19 *loaden* with what is profitable for mankind, 20 and in the *rain* water which GOD sendeth from heaven, 21 quickening thereby the dead earth, 22 and replenishing the same with all sorts of cattle, 23 and in the change of winds, 24 and the clouds that are compelled to do service 25 between heaven and earth, 26 are signs to people of understanding: 27 yet some men take idols beside GOD, 28 and love them as with the love *due to* GOD; 29 but

[Clause 4.] The original words are literally, *who are slain in the way of* GOD. [I omit the remainder of Sale's note. See, immediately, ¶ 23, clauses 12-16 inclusive (page 911 below).]—Sale.

[Clause 20. I have no doubt that Sale's reference is to clause 19 also.] An expression frequently in the mouths of the Mohammedans, when under any great affliction, or in any imminent danger.—Sale.

[Clause 23, I have omitted one hundred and nine words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 23.]

[¶ 18.] [Clauses 1, 2.] "for I am He who Turneth, the Merciful."—Rodwell (page 451).

[Clauses 3-5 inclusive.] Verily, they who are infidels and die infidels."—Rodwell.

[Clauses 10, 11.] "their torment shall not be lightened, and GOD will not even look upon them."—Rodwell.

[Clause 11.] Or, as Jallalo'ddin expounds it, GOD will not wait for their repentance.—Sale.

[Clauses 13, 14.] "there is no GOD but He, the Compassionate, the Merciful."—Rodwell.

[Clauses 15-17 inclusive.] "Assuredly in the creation of the heavens and of the earth; and in the alternation of night and day."—Rodwell (page 452).

[Clause 24.] The original word signifies properly *that are pressed or com-*

the true believers 30 are more fervent in love toward GOD. 31 Oh that they who act unjustly did perceive, 32 when they behold their punishment, 33 that all power belongeth unto GOD, 34 and that he is severe in punishing! 35 When those who have been followed 36 shall separate themselves from their followers, 37 and shall see the punishment, 38 and the cords of relation between them shall be cut in sunder; 39 the followers shall say, 40 If we could return to life, 41 we would separate ourselves from them, 42 as they have now separated themselves from us. 43 So GOD will show them **their works**; 44 they shall sigh grievously, 45 and shall not come forth from the fire of hell.

[¶ 19.] 1 O men, 2 eat of that which is lawful and good on the earth; 3 and tread not in the steps of the devil, 4 for he is your open enemy. 5 Verily 6 he commandeth you evil and wickedness, 7 and that ye should say that of GOD which ye know not. 8 And when it is said unto them *who believe not*, 9 Follow that which GOD hath sent down; 10 they answer, 11 Nay, 12 but we will follow that which we found our fathers practise. 13 What? 14 though their fathers knew nothing, 15 and were not *rightly* directed? 16 The unbelievers are like unto one who crieth aloud to that which heareth not so much as *his* calling, 17 or the sound of his voice. 18 *They are* deaf, 19 dumb, 20 and blind, 21 therefore they do not understand. 22 O true believers, 23 eat of the good things which we have bestowed on you for food, 24 and return thanks unto GOD, 25 if ye serve him. 26 Verily 27 he hath forbidden you to eat that

pelled to do personal service without hire; which kind of service is often exacted by the eastern princes of their subjects, and is called by the Greek and Latin writers *Angaria*. The scripture often mentions this sort of compulsion or force. [Matt. v., 41; xxvii., 32, etc.].—*Salé*.

[Clause 31.] Or it may be translated, *Although the ungodly will perceive*, etc. But some copies instead of *yara*, in the third person, read *tara*, in the second; and then it must be rendered, *Oh if thou didst see when the ungodly behold their punishment*, etc.—*Salé*.

[Clauses 35–38 inclusive.] [See ¶ 308 and ¶ 153.] “When those who have had followers shall declare themselves clear from their followers after that they have seen the chastisement, and when the ties between them shall be cut asunder.”—*Rodwell*.

[¶ 19.] [Clause 16. I suppose the reference should be to clauses 16–21.] “The unbelievers are like unto him who heareth the sound of the voice without comprehending anything. Deaf, dumb, and blind, they have no understanding.”—*Savary*.

[Clauses 16, 17.] “The infidels resemble him who shouteth aloud to one who heareth no more than a call and cry.”—*Rodwell* (page 453).

[Clauses 24, 25.] “and give GOD thanks if ye are his worshippers.”—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 26–35, inclusive.] “But that which dieth of itself, and blood, and swine’s flesh, and that over which any other name than that of GOD hath been

which dieth of itself, 28 and blood, 29 and swine's flesh, 30 and that on which any other name but GOD's hath been invocated. 31 But he who is forced by necessity, 32 not lusting, 33 nor returning to *transgress*, 34 it shall be no crime in him *if he eat of those things*, 35 for GOD is gracious and merciful.

[¶ 20.] 1 It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces *in prayer* toward the east and the west, 2 but righteousness is of him who believeth in GOD 3 and the last day, 4 and the angels, 5 and the scriptures, 6 and the prophets; 7 who giveth money for GOD's sake 8 unto his kindred, 9 and unto orphans, 10 and the needy, 11 and the stranger, 12 and those who ask, 13 and for redemption of captives; 14 who is constant at prayer, 15 and giveth alms; 16 and of those who perform their covenant, 17 when they have covenanted, 18 and who behave themselves patiently 19 in adversity, 20 and hardships, 21 and in time of violence: 22 these are they who are true, 23 and these are they who fear GOD.

[¶ 21.] 1 It is ordained you, 2 when any of you is at the point of death, 3 if he leave any goods, 4 *that he bequeath* a legacy to his parents, 5 and kindred, 6 according to what shall be reasonable. 7 This is a duty *incumbent* on those who fear GOD. 8 But he who shall change *the legacy*, 9 after he hath heard it *bequeathed by the dying person*, 10 surely the sin thereof shall be on those who change it, 11 for GOD is he who heareth and knoweth. 12 Howbeit 13 he who apprehendeth from the testator any mistake or injustice,

invoked, is forbidden you. But he who shall partake of them by constraint, without lust or willfulness, no sin shall be upon him. Verily GOD is Indulgent, Merciful."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 30.] For this reason, whenever the Mohammedans kill any animal for food they always say *Bismillah*, or *In the name of GOD*; which if it be neglected, they think it not lawful to eat of it.—*Sale*.

[Clause 35. I have omitted one hundred and six words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 35.]

[¶ 20.] [Clauses 1–6, inclusive.] "There is no piety in turning your faces toward the east or the west; but he is pious who believeth in GOD, and the last day, and the angels, and the Scriptures, and the prophets."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 7. *for GOD's sake*.] "for the love of GOD."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 14–23 inclusive.] "who observeth prayer, and payeth the legal alms, and who is of those who are faithful to their engagements when they have engaged in them, and patient under ills and hardships, and in time of trouble: these are they who are just, and these are they who fear the LORD."—*Rodwell* (page 454).

[Clause 23. I have omitted one hundred and four words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 23.]

[¶ 21.] [Clause 6.] That is, the legacy was not to exceed a third part of the testator's substance, nor to be given where there was no necessity. But this injunction is abrogated by the law concerning inheritances.—*Sale*.

14 and shall compose *the matter* between them, 15 that shall be no crime in him, 16 for GOD is gracious and merciful.

[¶ 22.] 1 O true believers, 2 a fast is ordained you, 3 as it was ordained unto those before you, 4 that ye may fear GOD. 5 A certain number of days *shall ye fast*: 6 but he among you who shall be sick, 7 or on a journey, 8 *shall fast an equal* number of other days. 9 And those who can *keep it*, 10 *and do not*, 11 must redeem *their neglect* 12 by maintaining of a poor man. 13 And he who voluntarily dealeth better *with the poor man than he is obliged*, 14 this shall be better for him. 15 But if ye fast 16 it will be better for you, 17 if ye knew it. 18 The month of Ramadan *shall ye fast*,

[Clause 14.] "and shall make a settlement between the parties."—*Rodwell*.

[¶ 22.] [Clause 9.] The expositors differ much about the meaning of this passage, thinking it very improbable that people should be left entirely at liberty either to fast or not, on compounding for it in this manner. Jallalo'ddin therefore supposes the negative particle *not* to be understood, and that this is allowed only to those who are *not able* to fast, by reason of age or dangerous sickness: but afterward he says, that in the beginning of Mohammedism it was free for them to choose whether they would fast or maintain a poor man; which liberty was soon after taken away, and this passage abrogated by the following: *Therefore let him who shall be present in this month, fast the same month*. Yet this abrogation, he says, does not extend to women with child, or that give suck, lest the infant suffer. Al Zamakhshari, having first given an explanation of Ebn Abbas, who, by a different interpretation of the Arabic word Yotikunaho, which signifies *can or are able* to fast, renders it, *Those who find great difficulty therein*, etc., adds an exposition of his own, by supposing something to be understood; according to which the sense will be, *Those who can fast*, and yet have a legal excuse to break it, *must redeem it*, etc.—*Sale*.

[Clause 12.] According to the usual quantity which a man eats in a day, and the custom of the country. (Jallalo'ddin.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 13-17 inclusive.] "And he who of his own accord performeth a good work, shall derive good from it: and good shall it be for you to fast—if ye knew it."—*Rodwell* (page 455).

[Clauses 18-23 inclusive.] "As to the month Ramadhan, in which the Koran was sent down to be man's guidance, and an explanation of that guidance, and of that illumination."†—*Rodwell*. [†*Rodwell*, in a note at this point, refers, on the word *Furquan*, to a passage (in ch. xxi.), which I have omitted at the end of ¶ 198, which *Sale* translates, "We formerly gave unto Moses and Aaron the *Law*, being a distinction between good and evil, and a light and admonition unto the pious;" and in a note on the word *distinction*, *Sale* says, "Arab. al Forkan. See the Prelim. Disc. sect. iii.," near the beginning of which it is explained that al Forkan, one of the appellations of the Koran, common to other books of scripture, is "from the verb *faraka*, to divide or distinguish; not, as the Mohammedan doctors say, because those books are divided into chapters or sections, or distinguish between good and evil; but in the same notion that the Jews use the word *Perek*, or *Pirka*, from the same root, to denote a section or portion of scripture." *Sale* refers to Gol. in append. ad Gram. Arab. Erpen. 175, and adds, "A chapter or subdivision of the Massicthoth of the Mishna is

19 in which the Koran was sent down *from heaven*, 20 a direction unto men, 21 and declarations of direction, 22 and the distinction 23 *between good and evil*. 24 Therefore, 25 let him among you who shall be present in this month, 26 fast the same *month*; 27 but he who shall be sick, 28 or on a journey, 29 *shall fast the like number of other days*. 30 GOD would *make this* an ease unto you, 31 and would not *make it* a difficulty unto you; 32 that ye may fulfil the number of *days*, 33 and glorify GOD, 34 for that he hath directed you, 35 and that ye may give thanks. 36 When my servants ask thee concerning me, 37 Verily 38 I am near; 39 I will hear the prayer of him that prayeth, 40 when he prayeth unto me: 41 but let them hearken unto me, 42 and believe in me, 43 that they may be rightly directed.

[¶ 23.] 1 Thus GOD declareth his signs unto men, 2 that ye may fear *him*. 3 Consume not your wealth among yourselves in vain; 4 nor present it unto judges, 5 that ye may devour part of men's substance unjustly, 6 against your own consciences. 7 It is

also called *Perek*. Maimon. præf. in *Seder Zeraim*, p. 57." The same passage Rodwell (page 176) translates, "We gave of old to Moses and Aaron the illumination, and a light and a warning for the God-fearing," and in a note on the word *illumination* Rodwell says that *Ar. furqan* is "a word derived by Muhammad from the Jews, constantly used in the Talmud." Rodwell states its equivalents in that use, and proceeds, "and meaning as in Syr. and *Æth. deliverance, liberation*." Rodwell refers to two passages in ch. viii., one of which will be found four or five lines before the end of ¶ 117 below, and proceeds, "and hence *illumination, revelation*, generally. The usual interpretation here and in other passages is," he adds, "*the distinction*, i. e. between good and evil, lawful and unlawful. The title is applied to the Koran and Pentateuch alike." —Rodwell (page 176).]

[Clause 19.] See the Preliminary Discourse, sect. iv.—*Sale*.

[Clause 25—*present*.] i. e. At home, and not in a strange country, where the fast can not be performed, or on a journey.—*Sale*.

[Clauses 30–35 inclusive.] "GOD wisheth you ease, but wisheth not your discomfort, and that you fulfill the number of *days*, and that you glorify GOD for his guidance, and that you be thankful."—Rodwell (page 455).

[Clause 43. I have omitted one hundred and fifteen words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 43.]

[¶ 23.] [Clauses 1, 2.] "Thus GOD maketh his signs clear to men that they may fear Him."—Rodwell (page 456).

[Clauses 4–6 inclusive.] "nor present it to judges that ye may consume a part of other men's wealth unjustly, while ye know *the sin which ye commit*."—Rodwell.

[Clauses 6, 7. I have omitted twenty-seven words of Sale's text between clause 6 and clause 7.]

[Clause 7.] Some of the Arabs had a superstitious custom after they had been at Mecca (in pilgrimage, as it seems), on their return home, not to enter their house by the old door, but to make a hole through the back part for a passage, which practice is here reprehended,—*Sale*,

not righteousness that ye enter *your* houses by the back parts thereof, 8 but righteousness is of him who feareth GOD. 9 Therefore enter *your* houses by their doors; 10 and fear GOD, 11 that ye may be happy. 12 And fight for the religion of GOD 13 against those who fight against you; 14 but transgress not 15 *by attacking them first*, 16 for GOD loveth not the transgressors. 17 And fear GOD, 18 and know that GOD is with those who fear *him*. 19 Contribute *out of your substance* toward the defense of the religion of GOD, 20 and throw not *yourselves* with your own hands into perdition; 21 and **do good**, 22 for GOD loveth those who do good.

[¶ 24.] 1 Perform the pilgrimage of *Mecca*, 2 and the visitation of GOD; 3 and, if ye be besieged, 4 *send* that offering which shall be the easiest; 5 and shave not your heads, 6 until your offering reacheth the place of sacrifice. 7 The good which ye do, 8 GOD knoweth it. 9 Make provision *for your journey*; 10 but the best provision is piety: 11 and fear me, 12 O ye of understanding. 13 It shall be no crime in you, 14 if ye seek an increase from your LORD, 15 *by trading during the pilgrimage*. 16 And when ye go in procession 17 from Arafat, 18 remember GOD 19 near the holy monument;

[Clauses 12–16 inclusive.] “And fight for the cause of GOD against those who fight against you: but commit not the injustice of attacking them first: GOD loveth not such injustice.”—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 16, 17.] I have omitted one hundred and forty-three words of Sale’s text between clause 16 and clause 17.]

[Clauses 19, 20.] “Give freely for the cause of GOD, and throw not yourselves with your own hands into ruin.”—*Rodwell* (page 457).

[Clause 20.] —*i. e.*, Be not accessory to your own destruction, by neglecting your contributions toward the wars against infidels, and thereby suffering them to gather strength.—*Sale*.

[¶ 24.] [Clause 2.] “and the visitation of the holy places *in honor of* GOD.”—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 5.] For this was a sign they had completed their vow, and performed all the ceremonies of the pilgrimage. (Jallalo’ddin.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 6, 7. I have omitted one hundred and forty-one words of Sale’s text between clause 6 and clause 7.]

[Clauses 9, 10.] “And provide *for your journey*; but the best provision is the fear of GOD.”—*Rodwell* (page 458).

[Clause 16.] The original word signifies *to rush forward impetuously*; as the pilgrims do when they proceed from Arafat to Mozdalifa.—*Sale*.

[Clause 17.] A mountain near Mecca.—*First part of Sale’s note*.

[Clause 19.] In Arabic, *al Masher al haram*. It is a mountain in the farther part of Mozdalifa, where it is said Mohammed stood praying and praising GOD. till his face became extremely shining. (Jallalo’ddin.) Bobovius calls it Forkh ‡ (Bobov. de Peregr. Meccana. p. 15), but the true name seems to be Kazah; the variation being occasioned only by the different pointing of the Arabic letters.—*Sale*. [‡ Farkh.—*Chandos classics edition*.]

20 and remember him 21 for that he hath directed you, 22 although ye were before this of *the number* of those who go astray. 23 Therefore 24 go in procession from whence the people go in procession, 25 and ask pardon of GOD, 26 for GOD is gracious and merciful. 27 And when ye have finished your holy ceremonies, 28 remember GOD, 29 according as ye remember your fathers, 30 or with a more reverent commemoration.

[¶ 25.] 1 There are some men who say, 2 O LORD, 3 give us *our portion* in this world ; 4 but such shall have no portion in the next life : 5 and there are others who say, 6 O LORD, 7 give us good in this world 8 and also good in the next world, 9 and deliver us from the torment of *hell* fire. 10 They shall have a portion of that which they have gained : † 11 GOD is swift in taking an account. 12 Therefore fear GOD, 13 and know that unto him ye shall be gathered.

[¶ 26.] 1 GOD is gracious unto *his* servants. 2 O *true* believers, 3 enter into the true religion wholly, 4 and follow not the steps of Satan, 5 for he is your open enemy. 6 GOD is mighty and wise. 7 Whoever shall change the grace of GOD 8 after it shall have come unto him, 9 verily 10 GOD will be severe in punishing *him*. 11 The present life was ordained for those who believe not, 12 and they laugh the faithful to scorn ; 13 but they who fear GOD 14 shall be above them, 15 on the day of the resurrection : 16 for GOD is bountiful unto whom he pleaseth 17 without measure. 18

[¶ 25.] [Clauses 5–11 inclusive.] “And some say, ‘O our LORD! give us good in this world and good in the next, and keep us from the torment of the fire.’ They shall have the lot which they have merited : and GOD is swift to reckon.” —*Rodwell* (page 458).

† [Clause 10. See ¶ 15, clause 48, page 904 above.]

[¶ 25.] [Clauses 11, 12. I have omitted forty-five words of Sale’s text between clause 11 and clause 12.]

[Clause 13.] I have omitted one hundred and fourteen words of Sale’s text immediately after the end of clause 13.]

[¶ 26.] [Clauses 5, 6. I have omitted sixteen words of Sale’s text between clause 5 and clause 6.]

[Clauses 6, 7. I have omitted forty-six words of Sale’s text between clause 6 and clause 7.]

[¶ 26.] [Clause 11. I suppose the reference is concerned with clauses 11–17 inclusive.] “The life of this world is strewed with flowers for the unbelievers. They make a scoff of the faithful. Those who have the fear of the LORD shall be raised above them at the day of resurrection. GOD dispenseth as he pleaseth his innumerable gifts.” —*Savary*.

[Clauses 11, 12.] “This present life is prepared for those who believe not, and who mock at the faithful.” —*Rodwell* (page 459).

[Clauses 17, 18. I have omitted eighty-two words of Sale’s text between clause 17 and clause 18.]

GOD directeth whom he pleaseth into the right way. 19 Did ye think ye should enter paradise, 20 when as yet no such thing had happened unto you, 21 as *hath happened* unto those who have been before you? 22 They suffered calamity, 23 and tribulation, 24 and were afflicted; 25 so that the apostle, 26 and they who believed with him, 27 said, 28 When *will* the help of GOD *come*? 29 Is not the help of GOD nigh?

[¶ 27.] 1 They will ask thee what they shall bestow *in alms*: 2 Answer, 3 The good which ye bestow, 4 *let it be given* to parents, 5 and kindred, 6 and orphans, 7 and the poor, 8 and the stranger. 9 Whatsoever good ye do, 10 GOD knoweth it.

[¶ 28.] 1 They will ask thee also what they shall bestow *in alms*: 2 Answer, 3 What ye have to spare. 4 Thus GOD showeth *his* signs unto you, 5 that peradventure ye might seriously think 6 of this present world, 7 and of the next.

[¶ 29.] 1 They will also ask thee concerning orphans: 2 Answer, 3 To deal righteously with them is best; 4 and if ye intermeddle with *the management of what belongs* to them, 5 *do them no wrong*; 6 they are your brethren: 7 GOD knoweth the corrupt dealer 8 from the righteous; 9 and if GOD please, 10 he will surely distress you, 11 for GOD is mighty and wise.

[¶ 30.] 1 And fear GOD, 2 and know that ye must meet him; and bear good tidings 4 unto the faithful. 5 MAKE NOT GOD THE OBJECT OF YOUR OATHS, 6 that ye will deal justly, 7 and be devout, 8 and make peace among men; 9 for GOD is he who heareth 10 and knoweth. 11 GOD will not punish you for an inconsiderate

[Clauses 19, 20.] "Think ye to enter Paradise, when no such things have come upon you,"—*Rodwell* (page 460).

[¶ 27.] [Clauses 7, 8.] "and the poor, and the wayfarer."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 10. I have omitted two hundred and thirty-one words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 10.]

[¶ 29.] [Clause 10.] *viz.*: By his curse, which will certainly bring to nothing what ye shall wrong the orphans of.—*Sale*.

[Clause 11. I have omitted one hundred and seventy words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 11.]

[¶ 30.] [Clause 5.] So as to swear frequently by him. The word translated *object*, properly signifies a butt to shoot at with arrows. (Jallalo'ddin.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 6-8 inclusive.] Some commentators (Jallalo'ddin, Yahya) expound this negatively, *That ye will not deal justly, nor be devout*, etc. For such wicked oaths, they say, were customary among the idolatrous inhabitants of Mecca; which gave occasion to the following saying of Mohammed: *When you swear to do a thing, and afterward find it better to do otherwise, do that which is better, and make void your oath*.—*Sale*.

[Clause 11.] When a man swears inadvertently and without design.—*Sale*.

[Clauses 5-14 inclusive.] "Swear not by GOD, when ye make oath, that ye

word 12 in your oaths ; 13 but he will punish you for that which your hearts have assented unto : 14 GOD is merciful and gracious. 15 And fear GOD, 16 and know that GOD seeth whatsoever ye do.

[JOZ. III.] [¶ 31.] 1 O true believers, 2 give *alms* 3 of that which we have bestowed unto you, 4 before the day cometh 5 wherein there shall be no merchandising, 6 nor friendship, 7 nor intercession. 8 The infidels are unjust doers. 9 GOD ! 10 there is no GOD but he ; 11 the living, 12 the self-subsisting : 13 neither slumber nor sleep seizeth him ; 14 to him *belongeth* whatsoever is in heaven, 15 and on earth. 16 Who is he that can intercede with him, 17 but through his good pleasure ? 18 He knoweth that which is past, 19 and that which is to come unto them, 20 and they shall not comprehend any thing of his knowledge, 21 but so far as he pleaseth. 22 His throne

will be virtuous and fear GOD, and promote peace among men ; for GOD is He who Heareth, Knoweth. GOD will not punish you for a mistake in your oaths : but He will punish you for that which your hearts have done. GOD is Gracious, Merciful."—*Rodwell* (page 462).

[Clauses 14, 15. I have omitted six hundred and twelve words of Sale's text between clause 14 and clause 15.]

[Clause 16. I have omitted one thousand and ninety-one words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 16. I have omitted nine hundred and eighty five words between the end of clause 16 and the end of JOZ II., and one hundred and six between the beginning of JOZ III. and the beginning of ¶ 31.]

[¶ 31.] [Clause 5.] "when there shall be no trafficking."—*Rodwell* (page 468).

[Clause 8. *are unjust doers.*] "are the wrong-doers."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 9–12 inclusive.] "GOD ! There is no GOD but He ; the Living, the Eternal."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 9.] The following seven † lines contain a magnificent description of the divine majesty and providence ; but it must not be supposed the translation comes up to the dignity of the original. This passage is justly admired by the Mohammedans, who recite it in their prayers ; and some of them wear it about them engraved on an agate or other precious stone. (Vide Bobov. de Prec. Moham. p. 5, et Reland. Dissert. de Gemmis Arab. pp. 235. 239.)—*Salé*. [† In the text before me, published by J. B. Lippincott & Co., clauses 9–25 inclusive occupy precisely seven lines.]

[Clauses 16, 17.] "Who is he that can intercede with Him but by His own permission ?"—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 18, 19.] "He knoweth what *hath been* before them and what *shall be* after them."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 20—*comprehend.*] "grasp."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 21.] "save what He willeth."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 22.] This throne, in Arabic called *Corsi*, is by the Mohammedans supposed to be GOD's tribunal or seat of justice ; being placed under that other called *al Arsh*, which they say is his imperial throne. The *Corsi* allegorically signifies the divine providence, which sustains and governs the heaven and the earth, and is infinitely above human comprehension. (Vide D'Herbelot. Bibl. Orient. Art. *Corsi*.)—*Salé*.

is extended over heaven and earth, 23 and the preservation of both is no burden unto him. 24 He is the high, 25 the mighty.

[¶ 32.] 1 LET THERE BE NO VIOLENCE IN RELIGION. 2 Now is right direction manifestly distinguished from deceit: 3 whoever therefore shall deny Tagut, 4 and believe in GOD, 5 he shall surely take hold on a strong handle, 6 which shall not be broken; 7 GOD is he who heareth 8 and seeth. 9 GOD is the patron of those who believe; 10 he shall lead them out of darkness 11 into light: 12 but as to those who believe not, 13 their patrons are Tagut; 14 they shall lead them from the light 15 into darkness; 16 they shall be the companions of hell fire, 17 they shall remain therein for ever.

[¶ 33.] 1 GOD is mighty, 2 and wise. 3 The similitude of those who lay out their substance 4 for advancing the religion of GOD, 5 is as a grain of corn which produceth seven ears, 6 and in every ear an hundred grains; 7 for GOD giveth twofold unto whom he pleaseth: 8 GOD is bounteous and wise. 9 They who lay out their substance for the religion of GOD, 10 and afterward follow not what they have so laid out by reproaches or mischief, 11 they shall have their reward with their LORD; 12 upon them shall no fear come, 13 neither shall they be grieved. 14 A fair speech and to

[Clauses 24, 25.] "and He is the High, the Great!"—*Rodwell*.

[¶ 32.] [Clause 1.] This passage was particularly directed to some of Mohammed's first proselytes, who, having sons that had been brought up in idolatry or Judaism, would oblige them to embrace Mohammedism by force. (Jallal'n.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 1, 2.] "Let there be no compulsion in Religion. Now is the right way made distinct from error."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 3. *Tagut*.] This word properly signifies an idol, or whatever is worshiped besides GOD; particularly the two idols of the Meccans, Allat and Uzza; and also the devil, or any seducer.—*Sale*.

[Clauses 7, 8.] "and GOD is He who Heareth, Knoweth."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 16, 17.] "They shall be given over to the fire: they shall abide therein forever."—*Rodwell* (page 469).

[Clause 17. I have omitted two hundred and eighty-two words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 17.]

[¶ 33.] [Clauses 3-8 inclusive.] "The likeness of those who expend their wealth for the cause of GOD, is that of a grain of corn which produceth seven ears, and in each ear a hundred grains; and GOD will multiply to whom he pleaseth: GOD is Liberal, Knowing."—*Rodwell* (page 470).

[Clause 10.] *i. e.* Either by reproaching the person whom they have relieved, with what they have done for him; or by exposing his poverty to his prejudice. (Jallalo'ddin.)—*Sale*.

[Clause 10.] "and never follow what they have laid out with reproaches or harm."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 14, 15.] "Humanity in words and actions is better than alms after injustice."—*Savary*.

[Clauses 14, 15.] "A kind speech and forgiveness is better than alms followed by injury."—*Rodwell*.

forgive, 15 is better than alms followed by mischief. 16 GOD is rich and merciful. 17 O true believers, 18 make not your alms of none effect 19 by reproaching, 20 or mischief, 21 as he who layeth out what he hath 22 to appear unto men *to give alms*, 23 and believeth not in GOD 24 and the last day. 25 The likeness of such a one 26 is as a flint covered with earth, 27 on which a violent rain falleth, 28 and leaveth it hard. 29 They can not prosper in any thing 30 which they have gained, 31 for GOD directeth not the unbelieving people. 32 And the likeness of those who lay out their substance 33 from a desire to please GOD, 34 and for an establishment for their souls, 35 is as a garden on a hill, 36 on which a violent rain falleth, 37 and it bringeth forth its fruits twofold : 38 and GOD seeth **that which ye do.**

[¶ 34.] 1 Thus GOD declareth his signs unto you, 2 that ye may consider. 3 O true believers, 4 bestow *alms* of the good things which ye have gained, 5 and of that which we have produced for you out of the earth, 6 and choose not the bad thereof, 7 to give it *in alms*, 8 such as ye would not accept yourselves, 9 otherwise than by connivance : 10 and know that GOD is rich and worthy to be praised. 11 The devil threateneth you with poverty, 12 and commandeth you filthy covetousness ; 13 but GOD promiseth you pardon from himself 14 and abundance : 15 GOD is bounteous and wise. 16 He giveth wisdom unto whom he pleaseth ; 17 and he

[Clauses 18-22 inclusive.] "Make not your alms void by reproaches and injury, like him who spendeth his substance to be seen of men."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 25-31 inclusive.] "The likeness of such an one is that of a rock with a thin soil upon it, on which a heavy rain falleth but leaveth it hard: No profit from their works shall they be able to gain; for GOD guideth not the unbelieving people."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 32-37 inclusive.] "And the likeness of those who expend their substance from a desire to please GOD, and for the stablishing of their souls, is as a garden on a hill, on which the heavy rain falleth, and it yieldeth its fruits twofold."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 37, 38. I have omitted fourteen words of Sale's text between clause 37 and clause 38.]

[Clause 38. I have omitted fifty-three words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 38.]

[¶ 34.] [Clauses 1, 2.] "Thus GOD maketh plain his signs to you that ye may reflect."—*Rodwell* (page 471).

[Clause 9.] That is, on having some amends made by the seller of such goods, either by abatement of the price, or giving something else to the buyer to make up the value.—*Sale*.

[Clauses 11, 12.] "Satan menaceth you with poverty,† and enjoineeth base actions."—*Rodwell*. († That is, Satan would dissuade you from liberal contributions by instilling the fear of poverty.—*Rodwell's note*.)

[Clause 16.] "He giveth wisdom to whom He will."—*Rodwell*.

unto whom wisdom is given 18 hath received much good : 19 but none will consider, 20 except the *wise* of heart. 21 And whatever alms ye shall give, 22 or *whatever* vow ye shall vow, 23 verily GOD knoweth it ; 24 but the ungodly shall have none to help *them*. 25 If ye make your alms to appear, 26 it is well ; 27 but if ye conceal them, 28 AND GIVE THEM UNTO THE POOR, 29 this *will be* better for you, 30 and will atone for your sins : 31 and GOD is well informed of **that which ye do**. 32 The direction of them belongeth not unto thee ; 33 but GOD directeth whom he pleaseth. 34 The good that ye shall give *in alms* 35 shall *redound* unto yourselves ; 36 and ye shall not give unless out of desire of *seeing* the face of GOD. 37 And what good thing ye shall give *in alms*, 38 it shall be repaid you, 39 and ye shall not be treated unjustly ; 40 unto the poor who are wholly employed in fighting for the religion of GOD, 41 and can not go to and fro on the earth ; 42 whom the ignorant man thinketh rich, 43 because of their modesty : 44 thou shalt know them by this mark, 45 they ask not men with importunity ; 46 and what good ye shall give *in alms*, 47 verily GOD knoweth it. 48 They who distribute *alms* of their substance night and day, 49 in private and in public, 50 shall have their reward with the LORD ; 51 on them shall no fear come, 52 neither shall they be grieved.

[¶ 35.] 1 They who devour usury 2 shall not arise *from the dead*, 3 but as he ariseth whom Satan hath infected by a touch : 4 this shall happen to them because they say, 5 Truly 6 selling is but as usury : 7 and yet GOD hath permitted selling 8 and forbidden usury. 9 He therefore who 10 when there cometh unto him an admonition from his LORD 11 abstaineth *from usury for the future*, 12 shall have what is past *forgiven him*, 13 and his affair belongeth unto GOD. 14 But whoever returneth *to usury*, 15 they shall be the companions of *hell* fire, 16 they shall continue therein for ever. 17 GOD shall take his blessing from usury, 18 and shall increase alms : 19 for GOD loveth no infidel, 20 or ungodly person. 21 But they who believe 22 **and do that which is right**, 23 and observe the stated times of prayer, 24 and pay their legal alms, 25 they shall have their reward with their LORD : 26 there shall come no fear on them, 27 neither shall they be grieved. 28 O true believers,

[Clause 36.] *i. e.* For the sake of a reward hereafter, and not for any worldly consideration. (Jallalo'ddin.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 42, 43.] "Those who know them not, think them rich because of their modesty."—*Rodwell* (page 472).

[¶ 35.] [Clause 3.] *viz.* Like *demoniacs* or possessed persons, that is, in great horror and distraction of mind and convulsive agitation of body.—*Sale*.

[Clause 30.] Or the interest due before usury was prohibited. For this some

29 fear GOD, 30 and remit that which remaineth of usury, 31 if ye *really* believe; 32 but if ye do it not, 33 hearken unto war, 34 *which is declared against you* from GOD and his apostle: 35 yet if ye repent, 36 ye shall have the capital of your money. 37 Deal not unjustly *with others*, 38 and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly.

[¶ 36.] 1 If there be any *debtor* under a difficulty of *paying his debt*, 2 let *his creditor* wait till it be easy for him to do it; 3 but if ye remit it as alms, 4 it will be better for you, 5 if ye knew it. 6 And fear the day wherein ye shall return unto GOD; 7 then shall every soul be paid 8 what it hath gained, 9 and they shall not be treated unjustly.

[¶ 37.] 1 O true believers, 2 when ye bind yourselves one to the other 3 in a debt 4 for a certain time, 5 write it down; 6 and let a writer write between you 7 according to justice, 8 and let not the writer refuse writing 9 according to what GOD hath taught him; 10 but let him write, 11 and let him who oweth the debt dictate, 12 and let him fear GOD his LORD, 13 and not diminish aught thereof. 14 And disdain not to write it down, 15 be it a large *debt*, 16 or be it a small one, 17 until its time of *payment*: 18 this will be more just 19 in the sight of GOD, 20 and more right for bearing witness, 21 and more easy, 22 that ye may not doubt. 23 But if it be a present bargain 24 which ye transact between yourselves, 25 it shall be no crime in you, 26 if ye write it not down. 27 And take witnesses 28 when ye sell one to the other, 29 and let no harm be done to the writer, 30 nor to the witness; 31 *which* if ye do, 32 it will surely be injustice in you: 33 and fear GOD. 34 and GOD will instruct you, 35 for GOD knoweth all things. 36 And if ye be on a journey, 37 and find no writer, 38 *let pledges be taken*: 39 but if one of you trust the other, 40 let him who is trusted 41 return what he is trusted with, 42 and fear GOD his LORD. 43 And conceal not the testimony, 44 for he who concealeth it hath surely a wicked heart: 45 GOD knoweth **that which ye do.**

of Mohammed's followers exacted of their debtors, supposing they lawfully might. (Jallalo'ddin.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 35–38.] “Yet if ye repent, ye shall have the principal of your money. Wrong not, and ye shall not be wronged.”—*Rodwell* (page 473).

[¶ 36.] [Clauses 7, 8.] “Then shall every soul be rewarded according to its desert.”—*Rodwell*.

[¶ 37.] [Clauses 13, 14. I have omitted eighty-five words of Sale's text between clause 13 and clause 14.]

[¶ 37.] [Clauses 14–22 inclusive.] “And disdain not to put *the debt* in writing, be it large or small, with its time of payment: this will be more just for you in the sight of GOD, better suited for witnessing, and the best for avoiding doubt.”—*Rodwell*.

[¶ 38.] 1 Whatever is in heaven and on earth is GOD's: 2 and whether ye manifest that which is in your minds, 3 or conceal it, 4 GOD will call you to account for it, 5 and will forgive whom he pleaseth, 6 and will punish whom he pleaseth; 7 for GOD is almighty. 8 The apostle believeth in that which hath been sent down unto him from his LORD, 9 and the faithful *also*. 10 Every one of them believeth in GOD, 11 and his angels, 12 and his scriptures, 13 and his apostles: 14 we make no distinction at all between his apostles. 15 And they say, 16 We have heard, 17 and do obey: 18 *we implore thy mercy*, 19 O LORD, 20 for unto thee must we return. 21 GOD will not force any soul beyond its capacity: 22 it shall have the *good* which it gaineth, 23 and it shall suffer the *evil* which it gaineth. 24 O LORD, 25 punish us not, 26 if we forget, 27 or act sinfully: 28 O LORD, 29 lay not on us a burden 30 like that which thou hast laid on those who have been before us; 31 neither make us, 32 O LORD, 33 to bear what we have not strength to *bear*. 34 but be favorable unto us, 35 and spare us, 36 and be merciful unto us. 37 Thou art our patron, 38 help us therefore against the unbelieving nations.

CHAPTER III.—REVEALED AT MEDINA.

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD.

[¶ 39.] 1 There is no GOD but GOD, 2 the living, 3 the self-subsisting: 4 he hath sent down unto thee the book of the *Koran* 5 with

[¶ 38.] [Clause 9.] "as do the faithful also."—*Rodwell* (page 474).

[Clause 14.] But this, say the Mohammedans, the Jews do, who receive Moses, but reject Jesus; and the Christians, who receive both those prophets, but reject Mohammed. (Jallalo'ddin.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 21–23 inclusive.] "GOD will not burden any soul beyond its power. It shall enjoy the good which it hath acquired, and shall bear the evil for the acquirement of which it labored."—*Rodwell*. [See ¶ 15, clause 48, page 904 above.]

[Clause 30.] That is, on the Jews, who, as the commentators tell us, were ordered to kill a man by way of atonement, to give one fourth of their substance in alms, and to cut off an unclean ulcerous part, (Jallalo'ddin), and were forbidden to eat fat, or animals that divide the hoof, and were obliged to observe the sabbath, and other particulars wherein the Mohammedans are at liberty. (Yahya.)—*Sale*.

[Clauses 34–36 inclusive.] "but blot out our sins and forgive us, and have pity on us."—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 37.] "Thou art our protector."—*Rodwell*.

[CHAPTER III.—*The title of the chapter*.—I have omitted the title, except so much thereof as states the place where the chapter was revealed: see note †, page 892 above.]

[IN THE NAME OF THE MOST MERCIFUL GOD: in reference to this auspiciatory introduction, see the notes to chapter i., p. 893 above.]

truth, 6 confirming that which was *revealed* before it; 7 for he had formerly sent down the law 8 and the gospel, 9 a direction unto men; 10 and he had also sent down the distinction 11 *between good and evil*. 12 Verily 13 those who believe not the signs of GOD 14 shall suffer a grievous punishment; 15 for GOD is mighty, 16 able to revenge. 17 Surely 18 nothing is hidden from GOD, 19 *of that which is* on earth, 20 or in heaven: 21 it is he who formeth you in the wombs, 22 as he pleaseth; 23 there is no GOD but he, 24 the mighty, 25 the wise. 26 It is he who hath sent down unto thee the book, 27 wherein are some verses clear to be understood, 28 they are the foundation of the book; 29 and others are parabolical. 30 But they whose hearts are perverse 31 will follow that which is parabolical therein, 32 out of love of schism, 33 and a desire of the interpretation thereof; 34 yet none knoweth the interpretation thereof, 35 except GOD. 36 But they who are well grounded in knowledge 37 say, 38 We believe therein, 39 the whole is from our LORD; 40 and none will consider except the prudent. 41 O LORD, 42 cause not our hearts to swerve 43 *from truth*, 44 after thou hast directed us: 45 and give us from thee mercy, 46 for thou art he who giveth.

[¶ 39.] [Clause 1. I have omitted certain letters of the alphabet, with which the third chapter begins: see note †, page 892 above.]

[Clauses 2, 3.] "The Living, the Merciful!"—*Rodwell* (page 494).

[Clause 10. *the distinction*.] "the 'Illumination,' † (Furkan)."—*Rodwell*.
[† In a note at this point (page 495) Rodwell refers to his note on a passage in chapter xxi.: see extracts from it at ¶ 22, page 910 above.]

[Clauses 15, 16.] "And GOD is Mighty, the Avenger!"—*Rodwell* (page 495).

[Clause 29. I suppose the reference should also include clauses 27, 28.] This passage is translated according to the exposition of al Zamakhshari and al Beidawi, which seems to be the truest. The contents of the Koran are here distinguished into such passages as are to be taken in the literal sense, and such as require a figurative acceptance. The former being plain and obvious to be understood, compose the fundamental part, or, as the original expresses it, *the mother* of the book, and contain the principal doctrines and precepts; agreeably to and consistently with which, those passages which are wrapt up in metaphors, and delivered in an enigmatical, allegorical style, are always to be interpreted. (See the Preliminary Discourse, section iii.)—*Sale*.

[Clause 29.] "and others are figurative."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 32, 33.] "craving discord, craving an interpretation."—*Rodwell*¹.

[Clause 40.] "This language is that of the wise."—*Savary*.

[Clause 40.] "But none will bear this in mind, save men indued with understanding."—*Rodwell*.

[Clauses 41–44 inclusive.] "O our LORD! suffer not our hearts to go astray after that thou hast once guided us,"—*Rodwell*.

[Clause 46. I have omitted twenty-eight words of Sale's text immediately after the end of clause 46.]

